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Small-Mindedness Writ Large: On theMigrations and Manners of PrejudiceMichael HerzfeldPublished online: 12 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Michael Herzfeld (2007) Small-Mindedness Writ Large: On the Migrationsand Manners of Prejudice, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33:2, 255-274, DOI:10.1080/13691830601154237

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Small-Mindedness Writ Large: On theMigrations and Manners of PrejudiceMichael Herzfeld

Globalisation is not only about commercial goods. It is also about the migration fromcentres of cultural authority of increasingly standardised but locally inflected forms of racism and other varieties of prejudice. It is often marked by disclaimers that, while appearing to mask racist attitudes with reason and etiquette, actually accentuate their destructive implications by rendering them rhetorically palatable, especially within the intimate spaces of local and national society. Using examples from Italy and elsewhere,I suggest that both racism and its associated disclaimers have migrated together,reflecting the powerful expansion of a global hierarchy of value as well as of intimate forms of resistance to that hierarchy. I suggest that such polite racism is ultimately more dangerous than its more brutish variants because it appropriates legitimacy from

collective notions of high civilisational standards. In this sense, immigrants of European origin in countries such as Italy may face its negative consequences with particular force precisely because they phenotypically resemble the host population and therefore represent, for the far right, a threat of racial and cultural miscegenation in an age of declining local birthrates.

Keywords: Racism; Prejudice; Disclaimers; Global Hierarchy of Value; Etiquette

One of the more extraordinary features of the current literature on globalisation andtransnationalism is the extent to which it fastens on the obvious, and especially on theubiquitous use of logos and slogans. A book title like Benjamin Barbers Jihad vs McWorld (1995) is immediately recognisable (and, one presumes, translatable)because the close analogy between a once-esoteric religious principle and a once-distinctively-local form of food provides a sense of globally shared knowledge. We allrecognise these terms. Yet in that very ease lies a conceptual trap. Localised forms of prejudice and outmoded models of social and cultural change can similarly become

Michael Herzfeld is Professor of Anthropology at Harvard University. Correspondence to: Prof. M. Herzfeld,

Dept of Anthropology, William James Hall, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.E-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 1369-183X print/ISSN 1469-9451 online/07/0200255-20 # 2007 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13691830601154237

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2007, pp. 255 274

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generalised to the status of everyday truths, at which point they can easily be investedwith a gloss that has all of the universalist allure of rationality and all of the substanceof the mean local street. Such a work, for example, is Samuel Huntingtons The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996); the confidence that radiates

from those defiant definite articles, the sense that we all already know what is at stake,presages a globalised acceptance of the very localism and factionalism that Barber, inparticular, sees as one of the two evils of globalisation, the other being grosshomogenisation. 1

Some of this literature has pointed up the importance of emphasising interpretivedifferences that underlie the surface of global discourses and symbols. A goodexample is James L. Watsons Golden Arches East (2006). But such studies require acommitment to ethnography, a disciplinary tool of social and cultural anthropology that imposes on its practitioners the need to spend long periods of time in highly

localised and intimate contact with relatively few people. Not only is it easy to mock such work as merely anecdotal, ignoring the depth and intensity of social knowledgein which it is grounded, but the alternative is both easier to do (it requires no foreignlanguage learning, for one thing) and fits prevailing stereotypes.

Disclaimer and Discontent: Globalising Racism

In this essay, however, I wish to focus on a related but different matter. Globalisationhas seemed to be all about the spread of consumerist goods that are presented(usually through advertising) in a positive light, whether or not we as consumersaccept this view of them. The converse phenomenon, on the other hand, has receivedlittle attention. This consists in the extraordinary similarity, from country to country,of the forms of discontent, and especially of the discontent that reveals itself as racialand cultural prejudice. Such disreputable attitudes are hardly the stuff of most studiesof globalisation. Yet they represent the internationalisation of something that already subsists as an officially disapproved but pragmatically tolerated aspect of nationalidentity.

By forms of discontent, I do not so much mean the idiom of protest, although thisis an interesting phenomenon in its own right. 2 Rather, I intend the common

expressions of resentment against, usually, minority populations. These idioms haveacquired some startling commonalities around the world, and not only because someof the grosser racisms are so well-known or because academic works appearing to justify them have been translated into many languages and serve to strengthen thehand of politicians seeking to exploit grass-roots discontent with the shifting sands of economic and cultural security.

It is not only the racism itself that has gone global. Indeed, perhaps the moststriking aspect of this phenomenon is how common the forms of excuse-making forracism turn out to be. They display the features of what Bauman (1977: 21 2),writing of the performed modesty of the musician, calls disclaimers. Suchdisclaimers are declarations about intentions ; racists often claim that theirs are all

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good * a defence of cultural purity, protection of the innocent young frompernicious foreign influences or alien religious values, even sympathy for the plightof the immigrants themselves. They are uses of tact and of etiquette to mask, in many cases, the opposite of what the speaker is actually asserting. A classic example of this

type of rhetoric is the anger expressed by working-class Italians at Romanians whowork in nero * without permits (literally, in [the] black [economy]) * and who aresaid to have been so employed by the left-wing Rome municipality while Romanworkers languished in the doldrums of unemployment. By calling such arrangementsexploitation, right-wing critics can reasonably claim to be supporting the rights of immigrants even as their real constituents understand full well the nature of themessage thus promulgated. They can thus mobilise an intimate complicity of cunningwithout overtly offending their targets and so giving the latter any obviously justifiable cause for complaint.

Disclaimers can appear in many different contexts, but they all serve to highlightsomething that can never, in fact, be known with any certainty: the innermost desiresof the speaker. Thus, for example, when a Greek conference-goer prefaces a talk orcritical comment with the self-admonishing remark, na mi poliloyiso, Let me not goon at length, we can be reasonably certain that the speaker actually will (and intendsto!) do just that (the Italian equivalent is an admittedly terser but hardly lessdisingenuous saro ` breve , Ill be brief). The intention of the musician is to perform amodesty that is in fact quite immodest (and is understood as such); that of theconference-goer is similarly to perform a restraint that everyone knows to be entirely fictional. As with excuses (see Herzfeld 1991: 92), no one (usually) challenges theseclaims, because all wish to be able to count on the ready availability of suchconventions in other contexts where their own interests are at stake. Those who groanat the speakers subsequent verbiage or mutter savagely that the musician was only speaking the truth are, in effect, reminding us that they, too, understand the rules of the game.

Racists disclaimers are not disclaimers of artistic ability or even of the long-windedness that sometimes passes for ability in academics. They do nonetheless sharethe fundamental sense of self-contradiction that underlies most ordinary and morebenign disclaimers: they are denials of an identity that is also an ideology. In this case,

the ideology is that of racism. It may be uncomfortable to treat aesthetic restraint oracademic pomposity within the same framework as racism, but the very success of racism often depends on precisely this assumption of the trappings of normalcy.Disclaimers are reassuring, not because they are necessarily factually convincing, butbecause they are familiar. In this, they follow the principles that Austin (1971)identified as characteristic of excuses. Disclaimers do not presuppose belief in theirsincerity, although in some cultures the performance of sincerity (see Handler1986) * like that of secrecy (see Herzfeld 1985: 207 9) * includes the articulation of disclaimers. But they do lay claim to acceptance * a social convention, not apsychological inner state, and a convention that requires general complicity inmaintaining an agnostic stance with regard to its truthfulness in particular situations.

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Barber (1995: 281) was being prescient when he identified the paradox of the age aslying in the coexistence of globalising and localising factors. But his argument, whichis weakened from the start by an almost Huntingtonian view of otherness asexpressed through tribalism (a revealingly exoticising term!), is also based on

untested and seemingly ethnocentric assumptions about key Western values, as wellas by the common tendency among writers in this field to distinguish between thelanguage and the rhetoric of political alignment, respectively.

Thus, Barber holds that the processes of globalisation and tribalism weakendemocracy and civil society. Such a view overlooks the fact that these concepts, too,are often refracted through very specific cultural and political ideologies (see, forexample, the essays in Hann and Dunn 1996). They share a common terminology,but their self-proclaimed practitioners may not share common intentions orideological terrain. Here we may take our lead from Stacia Zabuskys (1995: 7 8,

21) excellent analysis of the remarkably divergent uses of cooperation as a statedcommon goal of the various factions and national groups that together operate theEuropean Space Agency. Do George W. Bush and Jacques Chirac mean the same thingby liberty? And would either of them recognise his perspective in the language of thecognate liberation? From here it is an easy step to reminding ourselves that liberatorsfrom one perspective are often terrorists or bandits from another. What Barberidentifies as the key, twin processes of cultural change themselves feed the passions of the racist; the idea that Europe is a continent of distinctive cultural individualismsnow threatened by both ethnic difference and commercially generated homogeneity (and that if ethnic difference comes from a vaguely defined East, then homogeneity comes in parallel fashion from the far West on the other side of the Atlantic) is wellestablished, with a distinguished intellectual lineage as well as deep (and deeply disturbing) political resonance.

In this context, the tact of the racists disclaimer lies precisely in its capacity toblunt the hard edge of hatred for external consumption, much as populist invocationsof democracy and civil society can be cynically deployed in support of truly Gramscian (or Huxleyan!) visions of complicity in ones own engagement indictatorship, racism and intolerance. The morphing of liberalism (as in its neoincarnation) shows how easily this semantic slippage occurs. And these are

phenomena that are amplified by the ubiquity and pervasiveness of todays electronicmedia.Let us return for a moment to matters of definition and analysis. Racist disclaimers

are commonly designed to convince listeners that the speaker is in fact a nice liberalwith a conscience * a compassionate racist, to reappropriate some of the favoredbromides of the political right wing around the world. Such appearances of commonground also invoke the old rationalist image of universal truth and tolerance * itself paradoxically identified with the parochial concerns of a triumphalist West. Becauseso much of this rhetoric appeals to universalist claims of common sense,its reproduction around the world is self-naturalising; it appears to flow from itsobvious status as what everyone knows * a real discouragement to any form of

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dissent. (The Italian anthropologist Silvana Miceli (1982) correctly identifies ovvieta `,obviousness, as a key to any cultural system.) It derives some measure of self-confidence (as well as inspiration) from an extreme political right that can claimrespectability precisely because the fear of persistent threats to European and North

American self-satisfaction is increasingly embodied in parliamentary process. How can a soft-spoken, gentlemanly parliamentarian be taken for a fascist?

Once we see that this can and does happen, we can also begin to explain why therank and file on the street often feel no pressure to follow suit with equal restraint andcourtesy. They can take cover behind the urbane manners of their leaders, whoseelegant words may actually portend something very nasty indeed. If politeness wasonce (and is still) a weapon of the mafia in Italy, where it serves as the proverbialvelvet glove for a whole range of extortionist iron fists, the voice of sweet reason alsoprovides the moral reinforcement * a perverse appeal to a global value once thought

to have been unassailably left-liberal *

to which the thugs can turn as uncouth butwell-meaning followers. Respectability is a mask; it serves many purposes. But aboveall it is about commanding respect * which may accrue to the learned and the urbanein some settings, but that the mafioso demands as the price of a friendship that thevictim is in no position to refuse.

This kinder, gentler violence has grown commoner with the globalisation of racism. Discontent with the sudden immigrant presence today, as in the riseof fascism in 1920s and 1930s Europe, can all too easily mean that the aggrievedprotests of local subaltern classes are drawn ineluctably, or so it seems, to the sirencall of populist orators. People easily learn conventions that, like the words and musicof folksongs (and also like the language of NGOs), cross linguistic and other culturalboundaries with ease. While some instances of this process may be attributable simply to the necessity of responding locally to an already globalised idiom of power, otherinstances may be the products of that power itself, in all its expansionist fury. This ispart of an exploration of the inculcation of social models that we can see in thereproduction of uncouth masculinity in working-class youths (see Bourdieu 1982;Herzfeld 2004; Willis 1981). To summarise the key issue, such notions may * as heirsto notions like tradition, which indeed they often invoke * be the self-fulfillingprophecies (the poor will always be poor, malcontents will never be satisfied, and so

forth) that discursively and instrumentally serve the interests of those who insteadmaster the subtleties of modern etiquette. And as men, particularly, becomefrustrated with their inability to achieve the status associated with modernity,smilingly kept in thrall as they are by their condescending clients and politicalpatrons, the aggression that they learn in the workplace may become correspondingly channeled toward manifestly different others in their midst.

While some of this dissemination of discontent can certainly be attributed to theactive volition of social movements, a great deal of it reproduces and exploits mediaforms of expression. Included in this range of discontents is the widespread critiqueof political corruption and other formulaic evils, forms of racism directed againstimmigrants of various kinds and in quite varied contexts, and the rejection of


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political parties and campaigned against corruption, only to be charged with itthemselves at terminal risk to their political careers; both notoriously thin-skinned, tothe point of threatening the liberty of the media from which they sprang to highoffice; and both masters of populist campaigning, fiercely anti-intellectual, and

contemptuous of their critics. But why both, almost simultaneously, in countries sofar apart?

These politicians participated in a populist reaction against serious publicintellectual activity, social analysis, and critique. And they, like their Americancontemporary, benefitted from rising fears of foreign subversion even as they inveighed rhetorically against intolerance. Their stance of pious rejection of racistactions and of religious intolerance cannot obviate the fact that their policiessustained both. It thus played out the performative logic of the disclaimer on thegrand scale: we will not put up with any overt expressions of intolerance, they

implied, but of course we cannot help it if its targets act to bring trouble on their ownheads. I am reminded of the old Cretan politician who announced that he would nottake a single vote from animal-rustlers and of his colleague who introducedlegislation to punish that practice. The animal-rustlers with whom I worked knew exactly what to make of such claims and demonstrations of fealty to law and order,especially as one of these politicians was the patrilateral first cousin of a particularly notorious animal-thief (see Herzfeld 1985). If the rustlers were impressed by thepoliticians declarations, then, it was not by any threat to their officially illicit (butlocally admired) activity, but by the sheer brazenness that these politicians sharedwith them * they were, after all, from the same cultural background.

Tactful Tactics: Democratic Rhetoric and Racist Practice

Of such paradoxes is cultural intimacy made (Herzfeld 2005). It is no coincidencethat the Cretan highlanders are known as the fiercest and most loyal citizens in timesof war. The knowledge that precisely those politicians who threaten their mostcherished but technically illegal social practices are the ones who have made thecontinuation of those practices possible is the enabling dirty secret of their devotionto the nation. The equivalent cultural intimacy of the neoliberal state is the shared but

muted recognition that the leaders policies, framed in a language of equalopportunity, actually favour the special interests of the ethnic or cultural majority (and usually only of one segment of the latter).

My argument can be summarised quite simply. It is that there is in the world alargely Western European-inspired hierarchy of moral and social values, which I havecalled the global hierarchy of value (Herzfeld 2004, 2005). In this hierarchy, termslike democracy (see Connors 2003) share a common historical heritage with suchmafia-friendly terms as respect. These notions, which include a vocabulary of regretful disclaimers such as those I have mentioned, all have to do with the rise of acertain kind of individualism, historically well-known in Europe and its colonies andrelated to the ownership of property; morality, in this system, presupposes the


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primacy of an individual person with the freedom to make choices but the obligationto respect the equal rights of others. The content of this system changes through time,and such changes are reflected at local and national levels as well; for example, wherepatriarchal authority may once have appeared to exemplify the acme of orderly

existence, it is now disapproved as socially and morally retrograde and its place hasbeen taken by a rhetoric of equal opportunity (O zyurek 2004 on Turkey; see alsoHerzfeld 2005:58). This leads to some revealing paradoxes, as when the conservativepresident of a country that has never elected a woman to his office * an opportunistwho has shored up his political basis by increasingly opposing abortion rights (alsoframed as a matter of choice) and an exponent of capital punishment who claims tosupport the right to life * castigates Islamic societies for their restrictions of therights of women. In such debates, all sides share a rhetoric of choice, individualismand human rights, and this semantically slithery rhetoric creates the impression of a

largely Western-inspired and timeless set of eternal verities.The predominance of that rhetoric, moreover, permits a complicit engagementwith the persistence of values that contradict it. If the formal values represent anominal espousal of international norms (or at least forms), there is an often gleefuland always surreptitious acceptance of the role of very different ideas in the everyday experience of local identities * ideas that often seem to emanate from the very authorities that deny their existence. This complicity is the aspect of cultural intimacy that permits and even reinforces loyalty to the idea of the nation-state, an idea soabstract in itself as to be virtually unsustainable without such anchoring in thefamiliar world of pragmatic social experience. Prejudice easily enters this space:officers of state may preach the values of tolerance and coexistence, but they will usethe same language to justify immigration quotas and racial profiling. Such practicesprovide a model for less delicately disguised forms of discrimination.

This hierarchy of values is not only about racial and cultural status. It also, moreeffectively than money, determines economic judgments as well. Its effects can becatastrophic. A female Thai citizen who owns no property, for example, cannot easily get a visa to go to the US even if her friends there are willing to act as guarantors,because the stereotype of the poor Thai woman who works for a prostitution ring istoo deeply ensconced in the US immigration bureaucracy and in the larger national

imagination * so much so, in fact, that producing a fiance will simply confirmthe suspicion rather than overturn it; this complicity, moreover, is structural, sincethe womans property rights at home are far more restricted than those of hermale compatriots, thanks to legislation that was introduced as part of the Siamesestates alignment of its bureaucracy to the values and practices of the Western powers.And these structurally replicated injustices are not only about crossing nationalboundaries. An Italian artisan is forced to turn to usurers because the banks will notmake loans to those who do not have real estate as collateral. Usury is illegal, andthose who are known to have recourse to it are shunned as bad bets for investment;the result is that a blanket of silence protects the usurers (as well as their accomplices,lawyers and bank officials who illegally refer desperate customers to them) and thus

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sustains a constant supply of victims for their voracious crimes. Despite very realattempts by some authorities to break the vicious cycle, moreover, the fact that thetrial of at least one high-ranking church prelate for running a loan-shark ring endedwith acquittal sustains the conviction, whether justified or not, that the dominantstructures of society protect evil-doers disguised as its moral guardians.

The effect of these situations is that relatively marginal people discover that they have less than the full qualifications for citizenship even though property ownershipis formally not a criterion of full personhood in either Italy or the United States.Tribal peoples in Thailand cannot get school and other services for related and evenmore consequential reasons: they do not possess even the purely abstract propertyof national identity that underlay the European emergence of nationalism (as RichardHandler 1985 and others have demonstrated). To be a full person has long meant tobe among the haves, and those cultures that expect to play global roles must similarly

be able to boast proud national heritages.In exactly the same way, the illegality of discrimination sustains the persistence of

its unofficial forms. There is even a monumental model for this paradox * therestoration and maintenance of enemy monuments as a way of claiming a highercultural morality, of tolerance and humanism (Rabinow 1989: 299). At the level of everyday discourse and practice, too, pious anti-racism serves to protect the very attitudes that its practitioners claim to oppose. 3 Disclaimers (I am not a racist) musttherefore not be taken either at face value or as evidence of hypocrisy; the trailingconjunction but that follows them shows clearly, to those in the know, that racism

forms one of the bases of fellowship in a nation-state that ostensibly rejects it. Thepoint is precisely that all concerned understand what is at stake. Kapferers (1988)remarkable analysis of the racist undertow of Australian egalitarianism is aparticularly illuminating case study of this embedded paradox, and the disclaimersthat I have discussed here are both the expression and the instrument of itsdiffusion * initially within communities, but also then, with great rapidity, acrossnational, linguistic and religious lines. Some of my best friends are . . . . is such aformula. There are few places in the world where its use does not produce both acringe and a complicit wink of recognition.

The term racism itself has thus become a commonplace, open to appropriation onall sides: just as (for example) the Greek colonels used to describe communism as redfascism, so many majority populations invoke the rhetoric of anti-racism to justify their defence of what they want to claim is a beleaguered majority. (Think, forexample, of the Afrikaner claim to an African tribal identity.) One of the oddestmanifestations of this tendency is the extraordinarily bitter animosity displayed inmany Western European countries today to the arrival of East Europeans. Thesemigrants, many of them destitute, are often the target of particularly disdainfulrejection by local residents. It would be all too easy, as Anton Blok (2001: 115 35)has done for ethnic rivalries in the former Yugoslavia, to attribute such animosity tothe narcissism of minor differences. There is indeed much merit in such a


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description. But it also has different histories in different places, and we can hardly ignore that historical specificity.

Pragmatics of Prejudice: Reflections on the Italian Experience

Some especially rich illustration of such introverted racism can be found in Rome,the capital of a country that takes pride in the fact that even its fascists were notparticularly sympathetic to the Nazis persecution of the Jews. 4 There is a noticeablehierarchy in the expression of prejudice in Rome against, in descending order of intensity, Roma, Albanians, Romanians, Bosnians, Ukrainians, and Russians. But why should these people be the target of an animosity at times noticeably greater than thatmeted out to people of colour? Part of the reason may be a simple fear of economiccompetition, undergirded by a racist assumption that Europeans will represent amore serious threat than others presumed to possess lesser capacities. But I suspectthat something far more insidious is at work as well: a fear of invisible racialcontamination by those who appear to be like us but who, in the rhetoric of anationalist cultural pride fuelled by UNESCOs statistical hierarchies (we own 70 percent of the worlds works of art), are felt to be culturally far behind us. Race andculture merge in an alchemy of fear.

Here David Horns Social Bodies (1994) provides a useful historical backdrop to apervasive fear of miscegenation, recently reinforced by alarmist interpretations of thevery low birth-rate. 5 Clearly the economic factor is also extremely important. Butcompetition from populations that can infiltrate themselves into local society occasions far more fear than that implied by those labelled as vu cumpra ` (literally,Do you want to buy?) * the mostly African hawkers whose relegation to the ranks of the powerless and culturally deprived is signalled by their own stereotypical adoptionof the Southern Italian dialect phrase by which they are collectively known. 6

The hierarchy of immigrant groups is partly determined by economic factors (thepoorer ones tend to suffer more discrimination) as well as religion (here the effectreverses that found in Greece, an Orthodox country as opposed to predominantly Catholic Italy). But the more insidious aspect of this hierarchy is grounded in ideasabout racial purity and the city that are at least pan-European, if we are to believe

such writers as Raymond Williams (1973) and George Mosse (1985), and that are alsobound up with idealisations of local bodies and a fear of invasive presences (see alsoLinke 1999).7 These ideas are rapidly becoming close to universal as largely Western-derived values spread on the wings of international trade and those other processesthat have succeeded to the place of overt colonisation * the global hierarchy of value.

In Italy, the local hierarchy of prejudice does of course have specific historicalreferents. In rhetorical form but also in specific content, the rejection of EastEuropean immigrants as drunks and perverts and the sexualisation of sta gente ,those people, as prostitutes and pimps * overlooking the role of local Italianoperators and middlemen * are directly related, in rhetorical history as well aspolitical lineage, to Mussolinis project of creating clean (for which read cleansed)

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cities, itself now to be read in the concentric contexts of recent Catholic agitationagainst Muslim and Orthodox corruption of Italian family values, the attempt toexclude Muslims from Europe at the highest levels (e.g. the pronouncements by Giscard dEstaing; see also Holmes 2000), as well as of increasing globalisation of

American xenophobia and Christian supremacism. Respect for culture becomescultural exclusivism, all of it couched in terms that are immediately compatible withlocal categories of kin and community, and thus deeply appealing at a time of greateconomic and political uncertainty.

Within this framework, hostility appears to grow precisely from the ease withwhich the populations in question * unlike, for example, visibly exotic West Africans,or well behaved orientals such as Philippine nationals, but in contrast with theChinese migrants (Italianised as a mafia cinese and resented for their apparently impenetrable language in combination with an all-too-familiar politico-economic

modus operandi ) *

are able to merge with the local population. It is especially whenthese more visibly foreign immigrants gather in large concentrations, where theircollective difference is perhaps impossible to ignore, that one finds systemic prejudiceagainst them. But even difference is not enough to create categorical prejudices.Indeed, I suspect that it would not have been possible to mobilise anger against theChinese had the familiarising term mafia not been applied to them first; in thiscontext, the difference implied by their mysterious language appears instead as a kindof code of impenetrable gesture and silence, a new rule of that masculine-mafiososilence called omerta `. What makes them dangerous is not that they represent a foreignpresence, but the fact that they have assimilated to aspects of Italian culture thatRomans regard as the worst effect of the South on their own, predominantly Southern Italian, culture, including the ability to keep dangerous secrets out of circulation to the detriment of local interests. And in this they more closely resemblethe East European immigrants, who, like them, are associated in the popularimagination with prostitution and drugs.

Sexuality clearly offers one means of mediating this suspect similarity to theconceptual advantage of local people. Indeed, the heavy engagement of East Europeanwomen in the sex trade, particularly in an area of Rome (Suburra) that was the redlight district of ancient Rome, appears as a disruption of the ultimate form of

intimacy.8

The fact that the greatest hostility is sometimes shown to those who seemmost similar is again not simply a matter of the narcissism of minor differences,although it may often be that as well. It seems, rather, to be a direct consequence of ideas about purity. I have been especially struck, in the heart of Rome, by the real fearof miscegnation that appears to underlie resentment of the East European migrants asopposed to those of Asian or African descent; it seems that the dangers of an internalOther swallowing up the locals are genuinely alarming especially to those of strongly localist outlook. Thus, when I pointed out to a man who objected to the presence of East European prostitutes in his old home area that people there liked to boast thishad been the red-light Suburra district even in antiquity, he retorted that thoseancient women were our stuff ( roba nostra ) * a clear sexualisation of the lines of


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demarcation, using language that would have come easily from a long line of Italiansocial fascists and their predecessors, from Cesare Lombroso to Benito Mussolini.

Such sentiments have appeared very much at the same time as Romans have begunto engage more deeply than ever before in forms of local political participation.

Indeed, their localism is notorious, but it is also the source of much re-energising of the body politic at a time when national political institutions appear discredited tocritics on the right and the left alike. It is hard to see bitter racism and politically benign activism in a common framework, but I want to suggest, provocatively, that todo so is not to equate them but to explain how and why they have emerged in moreor less the same historical conjuncture, as two sides of the same global hierarchy.More particularly, I suggest that the resentment often expressed over the presence of aPolish Pope in a Vatican that has been evicting poor Romans from apartments inthe area, only to replace them with larger numbers of East European immigrants,

fuels a vaguely stated but commonly invoked conspiracy theory, and allows working-class Romans to attack the most powerful religious institution in their midst with adegree of moral authority. Indeed, they can even claim a measure of sympathy forthose people, who often end up paying exorbitant rents for living in very crammedconditions, thus drawing both the contempt of the locals for their allegedly unsanitary lifestyle (note again the concern with cleanliness and pollution) and thelocals affectation of sympathy for these unfortunates and high dudgeon against areligious institution that so cynically exploits them! Such affectations partake of thecharacter of the racist disclaimers I mentioned earlier.

These sentiments tend to appear most strongly among those who, disaffected fromthe former Communist Party and its various splinters and outraged by the Leftsfailure to achieve just housing policies, have drifted close to * and in some cases rightinto the hands of * a recently revitalised neo-fascist movement, direct successors tothe old Movimento Sociale Italiano and beyond it Mussolinis social fascism, 9 fullpartners in the recent Berlusconi government and a bulwark within that gerryman-dered but oddly unbudgeable institution against the persistent localism of the thirdparty in the government, the once (and perhaps again-to-be) separatist NorthernLeague (Lega Nord ). For its part, as the price of national power and in exchange forpromises of regional autonomy under a British-inspired model of devolution, the

League had, formally if not whole-heartedly or unanimously, abjured its goal of independence for a new country, Padania, consisting of the Italian lands north of thePo and with its capital at Venice. There is in fact a set of curiously overlappingcollusions here: between the pro-Vatican and the anticlerical elements in theneofascist Alleanza nazionale party; between the passionately anti-Roman Leghisti who scrawl slogans such as Roma ladrona (thieving Rome) on walls and the equally passionately localist romanisti (Roman localists and passionate supporters of theRoma football club) who battle the supposedly pro-fascist Lazio football teamssupporters in graffiti and catcalls at every opportunity; and between anti-Semiticthugs who suddenly discover their sympathy for the oppressed Palestinians and theircomrades who laud the contributions of Romes Jews to the citys culture and history.

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These apparent paradoxes, moreover, are nothing new; they were part of theideological fabric of Mussolinis life and times, and already then had a longprehistory.

What is theoretically and also ethnographically important here is that appeals to

notions of difference (alterity) will not work. A subtler instrument of comparison isrequired, because these apparent paradoxes are all ironic recognitions of the fact thatit is not difference but familiarity that breeds contempt; conversely, it is not samenessor identity that creates the conditions for cooperation, but the recognition of adifference that is judged to be interesting. Indeed, one could argue that in Italy similarity generates a disposition to create unstable coalitions * the history of Italyspostwar governments illustrates this with operatic panache. But such divisions neverseem to lead to the threatened collapse of the country; rather, they become collusivedebates about the risk of a creeping, unseen invasion of the foreign into the body

politic of the Roman citizenry.One consequence of this approach is that it becomes important to see racism as aform of political protest * not an attractive one from our point of view, to be sure,but more comparable with the left-wing and liberal attempts to restrain the excessesof economic neoliberalism than one might initially expect (or want to admit). As theidea of national and local heritage gains worldwide currency, aggressive uses of localism as a form of exclusivism also gain force * whether as government policy oras civil protest. It would be very easy, under these circumstances, to say that thelanguage of political dissent had become global, but this would be to miss theextraordinary range of motives that can hide behind a common language * asKapferer (1988) so cogently demonstrates for Australian and Sri Lankan forms of nationalism (showing that mateship and gentle humanity can easily be transformedinto collective hatred). Kapferers work is seminal for the kind of argument I havebeen sketching here, because he draws attention to the ways in which seemingly benign signifiers may mask ideologies of decidedly malignant import. I suggest thatthe growing sense of globalisation actually fuels and intensifies such negativeresponses to ideals of cultural coexistence, making the idea of a truly global society increasingly improbable.

I have taken the position here that globalisation, whatever else it may be, is not

about a necessary process of unidirectional homogenisation. Indeed, nothing couldbe further from the truth. Let me suggest, indeed, two rather mischievous parallels.Just as moralities with a clearly articulated discourse of rules and prohibitions allow skilled social actors to dissimulate more widely varied and deviant patterns of behaviour than is usually possible in the context of looser systems, and just asbureaucrats usually prefer highly prescriptive sets of instructions precisely becausethese allow a greater latitude of interpretation behind a signifying parade of certainty and clarity, so the apparent globalisation of cultural signifiers affords plenty of play toreworkings of the rhetoric of diversity, tolerance and social justice. Often, in fact, suchreworkings then serve the goals of those we would most probably regard as inimicalto those very values.


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There is already a body of interesting work, for example, on the rhetorics of democracy in Thailand, suggesting that the importation of a discourse originatinglargely in Western Europe has spawned a whole array of terms that look wonderfulbut perform rather suspect tasks: civil society ( prachaasangkhom), participation

(khwaam suan ruam ), democracy ( prachaathipatai ), transparency (khwaamprong-sai ) and so on (Morris 2004). (Although I have mentioned the Thai terms here, thecommon practice of replacing them with English-language equivalents illustrates theproximity and ubiquity of concerns to stay aboard that global hierarchy of value.)Moreover, the public cynicism that comes with the abuse of these notions, fuelled by criticisms of the populist Thaksin government as much as of its predecessors, suggeststhat these reworkings of fundamental meanings are well understood by their intendedconsumers, who are also privy * however indirectly * to international idioms of critique. They, too, generate a form of cultural intimacy (Morris 2004) * a

recognition of familiar evils as somewhat reassuring just because they are familiar * that sustains the willingness of citizens to collude in their own submissionto the prevailing system (what Connors 2003, in Gramscian vein, calls democra-subjection).

Such paradoxes have appeared, tellingly, in numerous polities at more or less thesame time. If one compares the Thaksin and Berlusconi governments, not only is onestruck by the extraordinary convergence they display in their political and judicialhistories, their thin-skinned responses to criticism, and their managerial under-standing of political process, but one can also discern in public reaction a similardegree of cynical deconstruction of these terms. There are, to be sure, differentresonances in these two countries in which threats often take the form of exaggeratedpoliteness (the stereotypical Italian mafioso expression ci penso io , Ill take care of that, comes to mind). The difference in the degree to which people are prepared toexpress criticism directly in public is cultural, but in both countries it often playsright into the hands of those who wield power cynically; people who protest are eitheruncouth or subversive, and they threaten the short-term well-being that populisteconomics have restored to some without alleviating the anxieties * or theaccompanying racism * of others.

Familiar Face: Migrations of an Attitude

What this brief comparative excursus suggests is that not only do the ideal-typicalterms of democratic, egalitarian discourse convey a range of often quite differentmeanings, but they also evoke critiques that are similarly liable to multipleinterpretations. Consider the claims of Roman rightists to feel sorry for the exploitedimmigrants who now live in their erstwhile dwellings * a situation that was madepossible in part, as they themselves somewhat ruefully acknowledge, by their ownreluctance in earlier years to purchase rather than rent their living spaces and by theirwillingness to accept such dependency as a feature of their local culture. Their protestagainst the Vaticans alleged cruelty appears to be quite self-serving, although I would

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not presume to claim any degree of certainty as to their actual motives. But they somehow know that, if they are to expect any sympathy, they must also show it * tothe very people whom they also, from the vantage-point this moral high groundaffords them, despise for an alleged lack of culture. The irony is all the more

remarkable in that working-class Romans carry a defiant awareness that other Italiansdespise them as uncultured southerners; racism is not so much hierarchical as, in thebest Evans-Pritchardian sense (see Evans-Pritchard 1940), segmentary * relative tocontext and nested in a moveable hierarchy of violence and contempt.

These are traces of a conceptual migration here, of both racism and politicalparticipation, both of which (although in very different ways!) are recognisably modernist ideals. They are particularly interesting because they are reactions to animage of globalisation, which they also reproduce in the sense that they are foundaround the globe in widely differing places. They do not necessarily reflect the effects

of political activism in spreading certain ideas around the world. But the fact thatthey surface in many different places is prima facie evidence that they representglobally recognisable signifiers. What is much less clear is that they also represent thesame signifieds. On the contrary, it may well be that they are clear evidence of how discourse may create (or be used to create) a sense of common cause, whethersupporting or opposing the principles of social justice. If the common cause is simply the expression of bitter discontent and a sense of grudge against the world, it alsosuggests that the malcontents of todays demonstrations and discriminations are ableto mobilise through form rather than content, appearances rather than substance,rhetoric rather than evidence. In Italy, the public appreciation of rhetoric is sodeveloped that such appreciations flourish like the best of wine grapes in rich,supportive soil.

Racists know that they live in a world where they cannot speak too openly of theirracism if they want to be allowed to move forward, but they also know that they cantap into a large reservoir of sympathy * all the more so if they are able to sound avoice of regret, the modern equivalent of the English public schoolmasters This willhurt me much more than it hurts you, or of certain arguments voiced in the UnitedStates against bilingual education on the grounds that Hispanics will thereby bediscouraged from learning the English that would open up real opportunities for

their advancement.These pieties conceal sources of real embarrassment; to the extent that thesophisticated politician needs the street thug, the latter must be prevented fromappearing too much in the public eye. Yet the thugs presence is also a reassurance, acultural necessity. Like all forms of cultural intimacy, such incongruities are both tobe shielded from outside inspection, and yet at the same time provide the glue thatholds the populace together and in place behind the state (and perhaps also behind itsrecently rightist government). No one in power can afford to admit to racism.Racism, at least in overt form, is unacceptable; even (or perhaps especially) theleaders of Alleanza nazionale must take care to dissociate themselves from it. Thedeep animosity displayed toward East Europeans is re-deflected as concern for their


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welfare or, conversely, as resistance to the foreign power of the Vatican (and here theRight can make an especially effective and subtle play for the affections of thedisaffected foot soldiers of the Left).

At the same time, this systemic animosity already possesses a reassuring feel of

global solidarity despite the fact that it has been filtered through the specificitiesof Italian history and culture. Racism, in this context, is also globalised, and so itappears to share something of the inevitability and solidity of rationality; like otherglobalisms, moreover, it masks perduring cultural differences which are thendeployed in the form of exceptionalist declarations of innocence. In the end, alldisclaimers appear to merge into one. In the land that has given us the organisationSOS Razzismo, one of the commonest expressions of intolerance is a denial: Non sono razzista , Im not a racist. After all, the people this individual attacks are not eventhose of colour; they are fellow-Europeans, who just cannot adapt to the local ways

(it is said).Razzismo has a broader meaning in Italian than is customary with its Englishequivalent. The term is used for virtually any kind of intolerance, whether based onphenotype, gender, sexuality, religion, or virtually any other categorical identification.While this conflation serves the useful purpose of demonstrating the commonground of virtually all collective modes of organising hatred, we may legitimately suspect that it also makes the deployment of a rhetoric of tact much easier. If it isracist to attack Ukrainians, for example, those who do so defend themselves onthe grounds that they are defending their economic interests and cultural values. Theactual racism that underlies such attitudes * especially the fear of miscegenation * isnot obvious when the immigrants skin colour is palpably similar to that of the locals.This occlusion of underlying ideological positions enables racists to deploy aprofoundly courteous and sympathetic rhetoric in defence of their views. Theiropponents call their bluff by insisting on the term razzismo , but, in the absence of aspecifically racial component in the immediate context of confrontation, thediscourse is all about good manners (those people keep getting drunk and ourchildren cannot use the square as they always used to do). It is presented as a defenceof purity (those people are prostitutes and pimps, and our women are inevitably embarrassed even to walk in their own neighbourhood), so it also preserves now-

unfashionable patriarchal idioms in the guise of respect for women. The oldmalavitosi (underworld thugs) who formerly held sway in the central districts of Rome still recall their major role as being the defence of their (that is, theneighbourhoods) women against harassment.

Not all Roman racism is restricted to attacks on European migrants. We must notminimise the racism that is directed against non-Europeans in Italian society; it isneither minimal nor without serious dangers for the future. But the ostensibly subtlerracism that is directed against European immigrants reveals the logic by which racistscan appear to tolerate African and Asian migrants who are, after all, entirely visibleas outsiders, and who may on occasion make useful allies against other forestieri (foreigners) such as Milanese or even Neapolitans. 10 I recall seeing an obviously

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Asian woman, probably Philippine, energetically wielding a Northern League bannerat a particularly well-attended and well-publicised rally in Piazza Repubblica, in theheart of Romes historic centre. And a local Philippine woman, married to a merchantoperating in the central square of the district where I lived, equally warmly endorsed

her husbands contemptuous hatred of the Ukrainians who flocked to their cardinalschurch, located on that same square * even though he also employed numerousEastern Europeans and professed great affection for them as individuals (anotherclassic form of disclaimer, cf. Some of my best friends are Jews).

Im not a racist: the phrase, which often prefaces dialect-inflected complaints,announces its own disingenuousness, a necessary adaptation to a globalised rule of tact. It calls on individual friendships as evidence for the absence of a generic hatred,thereby implying that the vast majority of those despised others are worthy only of contempt by comparison. The use of local accent and lexicon shows that racism, likeMcDonalds, is always and forever inflected by local culture. And yet it is also, in thesame way, forever recognisable. Paradoxically, it is its self-denial, the disclaimer, thatguarantees that wide recognition. In this guise, it travels easily across the globe: forexample, the Greek who protests in identical terms * dhen ime ratsistis, alla . . . (Imnot a racist, but . . . ) * will have no difficulty understanding this form of globalism.It is the badge of an expanded, familiar, and * to its members * comfortingly disreputable fraternity.

Parochialism of any variety paradoxically travels better and further thancosmopolitanism, as the experiences of international agencies such as the UnitedNations and the European Space Agency demonstrate. The ubiquity of standardised

disclaimers, moreover, shows that racism has infiltrated the etiquette of exclusionaround the world, creating a durable but obstinately intangible fellowship of globalparochialism: small-mindedness writ large. Racists have concomitantly developedgreat skill at masking their hatred as a means of displaying it. Their favoured device,in one form or another, is the elegant regret of a humanism wounded and betrayed. Ittakes on an air of bafflement at how reasonable people can find the speakers bestintentions so evil, and it invokes a respect for clean individuals, as opposed to thestinking crowd. In claiming to preclude categorical prejudice altogether, it proclaimsthat very stance: Im not a racist, but . . . . The reverberating silence that concludes

such disclaimers, a silence that ostensibly dares the listener to object and so securesand expands complicity, may yet prove longer, louder, more subtly insidious, andthus far more corrosive of human coexistence than the most belligerent scream of fascist rage.

Notes

[1] We can indeed see this in Huntingtons (2004) subsequent diatribe against the weakening of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in American society through the burgeoning of immigration fromthe Hispanic world. It is also apparent in the growing rejection of the learning of foreignlanguages as a matter of policy. Barber is right that cultural isolationism is the other face of global homogeneity; more questionable is the widespread assumption, which he apparently


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shares, that a sharing of cultural forms means a reduction in the range of meanings availableto consumers.

[2] A PhD student at Harvard, Maple Razsa, is currently writing a dissertation on the anti-globalisation movement in Croatia. Although he has focused his ethnography on Croatiaspecically, this research entailed a considerable amount of transnational travel, with directobservation of both the commonalities and cultural differences that such movement broughtto the fore. At a very different level, Zabuskys (1995) account of the multiple readings of such an apparently common term as cooperation in a multinational bureaucracy, in thiscase the European Space Agency, raises some very similar intimations of the limits of supposedly transnational vocabularies.

[3] The preservation of an Islamic mosque in a Christian country can be a particularly solidform of disclaimer in itself. There are parallels elsewhere. I suspect, for example, that theinitial resistance of some local Muslims to the Thai states restoration of the Krue Se mosquein Pattani after the violent military attack in 2004 was not only a defence of religious turf butalso a recognition of the hegemonic implications of the intervention itself. The authoritiesdid consult with local people about the restoration, and this seems to have secured the

compliance of the vast majority.[4] I conducted research in Rome principally in 1999 2000, with fellowship support from the

National Endowment for the Humanities (Washington DC) and the John SimonGuggenheim Memorial Foundation, neither of which is responsible for the views expressedhere but to both of which I am immensely grateful. I have made numerous subsequent visitsand have especially focused on issues of gentrication, eviction, and historic conservationand its social consequences.

[5] Comparable in this respect is the Greek case (on which, see Halkias 2004; Paxson 2004). SeeKrause (2005) for a study explicitly linking fear of declining births with racism against aneconomically powerful minority, in this case the Chinese in northern Italy.

[6] The irony is that many of these immigrants are driven by a work ethic that local Italians

would recognise as admirable because it represents a European mode that Italians ruefully,with full acknowledgment here of a commonplace of cultural intimacy, say they themselveshave not attained. Such an ethic may be rooted in a protestant (in the Weberian sense)reformism such as that of the Mourid Islamic sect of Senegalese immigrants (Carter 1997:71), itself out of Africa and therefore antithetical, in the folk evolutionism of Italian racialprejudice, to the European ideals it in fact partially resembles. For many northern Italians of fascist persuasion, the Mezzogiorno (southern region) represents the intrusion of Africa intothe Italian cultural and racial world.

[7] It is perhaps worth recalling here that Canada rejected many Jewish immigrants during theNazi era on the grounds that Jews were by denition urban people and therefore unt toshoulder the heroic and pure task of taming nature by living in the countryside (Abella and

Troper 1982

83: 54

5).[8] This is where I have conducted eldwork; the area is now heavily gentried. See Herzfeld(2001).

[9] In 2005 Mussolinis granddaughter, Alessandra Mussolini, having been expelled from thenewly respectable Alleanza nazionale , proclaimed her own splinter group the true heir of social fascism, which relieved the Berlusconi government of too direct an association withMussolinis heritage and name or, more disturbingly, with any obligation to represent itself associally compassionate. At the rank-and-le level, however, the rhetoric of Alleanza nazionale activists remained that of social responsibility, here conceived as a defence of the poor againstcapitalisms support for the alleged incursions of innite hordes of immigrants.

[10] Neapolitans do get some solidarity from Romans, who consider them to be makers of superior coffee and comic melodrama, and to have a more sophisticated (but still southern!)dialect.

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Documents

Hertzfeld 2007.pdf