Heroism is No Substitute for Success

7/27/2019 Heroism is No Substitute for Success

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Journal of Occupational Psychology. 1986,59,81-92. Printed in Great Britain1986 The British Psychological Society

H ero ism is no sub stitute for success:Effects of strategy and outcom e onperceptions of performancePATRICK A. KNIGHT* AND FRANK E. SAAL

Kansas State UniversityTwo studies were conducted to determine whether performance ratings are moreheavily influenced by raters' perceptions of the ratee's ' heroism'that is , consistentbehaviour in the face offailureor by raters' perceptions of the ratee's level of suc-cess. Eflects of ratee gender were also investigated. Neither a student sample (n= 179)nor a managem ent sample ( n= 127) provided evidence in suppo rt ofa heroism effect;the effects of strategy (consistent or experimenting) and timing ofsuccess or failure(immediate or delayed) were relatively small. Success and failure had the strongestand most consistent effects on performance ratings. These results supported the pro-position that raters' perceptions of a ratee's performancelevel ofsuccessare theprimary determinants ofratings, and that' heroic' perseverance in the face of failuredoes not result in higher ratings.

Over the years Staw (1981) and his associates have conducted considerable research on the' escalation of com m itm ent' phenom enon. E scalation of comm itment refers to a situationin which a manager or administrator institutes a failing policy, and in response to thefailure commits greater andgreater time and resources to the policy. Most of Staw'sresearch has focused on 'justification' processes, in vk'hich the escalation of resourcescommitted to the failing policy is viewed as an effort to justify the original decision by' making' it work (e.g. Staw, 1980).In an effort to identify other potential contributors to escalation of commitment,Staw &Ross (1980) suggested the notion of a 'heroic leadership' stereotype, whereinthose who suffer throu gh failure, only to succeed in the end, are perceived as being excep-tional managers. Based on this idea, Staw & Ross predicted that managers who eventuallysucceed by pursuing a consistent strategy in the face of failure will be perceived as moreeffective than those wh o experiment or adop t new policies when their original choices fail.Staw & Ros s' (1980) definition of heroism has three com ponents: First, the hero m ustexperience failure. Second, in response to this failure, the hero must be consistent,maintaining the behaviour that is apparently responsible for the failure rather than experi-menting or otherwise changing the behaviour. Third, the hero must ultimately succeed. Ifthis stereotype actually exists, we might expect managers to ' heroically' maintain ineffec-tive policies, and eschew poten tially more effective alternatives, in ord er to conform to thisimage of competence. Of course, such behaviour would be contrary toCampbell's (e.g.1969, 1977) suggestion that managers should adopt an experimenting approach to policyadministration. Inan experimenting approach, policies are periodically evaluated and, if


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82 PATRICK A. KNIGHT AND FRANK E. SAAL

found to be ineffective, replaced with new policies that are subsequently evaluated in thesame manner.Staw & Ross (1980) reported data that they claimed supported the existence of aheroism stereotype. They had subjects read scenarios that described an administratorwhose initial policy was ineffective, and who w as either consisten t, sticking with the policythroughout the scenario, or who experimented, changing policies twice. In each strategycondition, half of the subjects read that the ratee was successful in the end, while the otherhalf were told that the ratee remained unsuccessful. Staw & Ross found : (a ) that the suc-cessful ratee was rated higher than the unsuccessful ratee; (b ) that the consistent ratee wasrated higher than the experimenting ratee; and (c) that a significant o utcom e x strategyinteraction em ergedthe consistent ratee w ho was ultimately successful was rated higherthan all others. This interaction, Staw & Ross argued, su ppo rted their view of heroism as aconsistent, and eventually successful, response to initial failure.

Although Staw & Ross' (1980) findings do correspond to their heroic leadershipstereotype. Knight (1984) suggested a more parsimonious explanation for these results.He noted that the main effect favouring the consistent ratee was due largely to the highrating this ratee received in the successful outcome conditionthere was little differencebetween ratings of consistent and experimenting managers in the failure conditionandthat this was the only cell in the study in which the ratee's initially chosen policy achievedsuccess. Knight therefore proposed that the consistent-successful ratee received highratings not because he was perceived by the subjects as being heroic, but rather becausethat combination of strategy and success led subjects to perceive him as being morecompetent than administrators in other conditions, all of whom either failed or chose aneffective policy only after selecting two ineffective policies.Knight (1984) concluded that the manipulation of managerial strategy (experiment-ing versus consistency) is likely to confound any heroism effects with perceptions of over-all competence and performance. He therefore argued that a more valid test of Staw &Ross' (1980) heroism stereotype would involve the one component ofthe stereotype thatStaw & Ross had not manipulatedthe experience of failure. Knight predicted that if theheroism stereotype existed, then consistent ratees whose success was delayed (i.e. a consis-tent response to initial failure' h ero ism ') would receive higher performance ratings th anequally consistent ratees whose success was immediate, and who therefore could neitherhave experienced failure nor have demonstrated ' heroic' commitment to their policies ordecisions. In the absence of any difference in performance ratings between these two con-sistent-successful cond itions, the imp act of perceived heroism, as defined by Staw & R oss,must be questioned.Knight (1984) replicated Staw & Ro ss' (1980) success cond ition, com paring ratings ofmanagers who demonstrated either a consistent or an experimenting response to initialfailure, but who ultimately succeeded. In addition to these' delayed success' cells. Knightincluded conditions in which the ratee described in the scenarios was immediately suc-cessful and was either consistent, using his initial policy throughout the scenario, orexperimenting, changing policies twice while maintaining his successful performance.Knight argued that by comparing the consistent ratees in the immediate and delayedsuccess conditions, the potential benefits of suffering initial failure (heroism) could betested.Kn igh t's (1984) results revealed no sup port for the heroism stereotype. R atings oft heconsistent-delayed success ratee were not significantly different than those of the consis-tent-immediate success ratee. Both consistent ratees, however, were rated higher than theexperimenting-deiayed success ratee. Knight viewed this as corroborating his ' perceivedperf orm anc e' interpretation of Staw & Ros s' (1980) data , since the first policies chosen by


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HEROISM IS NO SUB STIT UTE FOR SUCC ESS 83

experimenting-immediate success condition received ratings even higher than those in theconsistent conditions. Knight interpreted this latter effect as additional evidence in sup-port of the perceived performance explanation, since this ratee, unlike those in other con-ditions, successfully implemented all three policies.

L IMIT AT ION S OF PRE VIOU S RE SE ARCHWhile Knight's (1984) data suggest that Staw & Ross' (1980) results may have beendue to differences in raters' perceptions of the administrator's performance rather thantheir perceptions of his heroism, this evidence is not conclusive. One problem withKnight's study is that the data are based solely on a sample o(psychology undergraduates;Staw & Ross (1980) did find differences between the responses obtained from psychologystudents and responses obtained from business students (some of whom were managers

attending evening MBA classes). Knight's failure to support the heroism stereotype mayhave been a function of the population from which his sample was drawn; this stereotypemay indeed exist in the business world, and among those students specifically preparingfor business careers. One purpose of the current research, therefore, was to comparestudent and management samples in a design that includes the temporal factor necessaryto test the heroism hypothesis adequately.A second problem with Knight's design is that the manager ultimately succeeded inall of his scenarios. The most o bvious, and crucial, evidence for the perceived performanceexplan ation is a main effect for o utcom e, favouring the successful ratee over the ratee wh oultimately fails. Although other effects may help identify variables that moderate theinfluence of success and failure, without a main effect for outcome it would be difficult toconclude that ratings were based on perceptions of performance.In addition to a main effect due to success or failure, there are other effects that canprovide support for the ' perceived per form anc e' explanation of ratings. For example,ultimately successful ratees should receive higher ratings if their success is immediaterather than delayed, as found by Knight (1984), since immediate success means that theywere successful for a longer period of time than those ratees w ho experienced delayed suc-cess. This ' pro por tion of time successful' criterion also suggests tha t ultima tely unsuc-cessful ratees should receive higher rating s if their failure is delayed rath er th an imm ediate,since delayed failure implies that the stand ard for success was met for at least some pe riodof time, while imm ediate failure demonstra tes th at the ra tee was totally ineffective.It should be noted that the ou tcome x strategy interaction provides a test ofCampbell's (1977) prescription for experimentation in response to policy failure. NeitherStaw & Ross' (1980) nor Knight's (1984) subjects rewarded experimenting managers withhigh ratings. However, if subjects were to view this strategy as effective, ratees whoultimately fail should receive higher ratings if they experiment rather than demonstrateconsistency, since by experimenting they are apparently attempting to identify moreeffective policies, as Campbell advised.Yet another limitation to both Staw & Ross' (1980) and Knight's (1984) studies isthat their scenarios described only male managers. Given the popular stereotype ofmanagement as a masculine occupation (Schein, 1973, 1975), and considering the numberof studies showing that, given equal achievement, men's performance tends to be attri-buted to ability while the performance of women tends to be attributed to luck (e.g. Deaux& Emswiller, 1974), one might expect sex to moderate the effects of policy strategy onsubsequent performance ratings. Since subjective ratings play such an important role in


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Manipulations. The sex of the manager/ratee was manipulated by varying Ziegler'sfirst name (Joan versus John), and by using the appropriate sex-specific pronouns in thescenarios and the qu estionnaire.The outcomes and the timing of the outcomes were man ipulated throu gh descriptionsof the periodic eva luations . In the success con dition, the defect ra te fell to below the 6 percent goal by the end of the year, while in the failure condition the defect rate was near theoriginal 8 5 per cent at the end of the year. In the immed iate outcom e cond ition, theultimate final outcome was reported in the first feedback report and remained the samethereafter, while in the delayed outcome condition, the final outcome did not occur untilthe third feedback report, an d was preceded by the opposite outco me in the earlier repor ts.Specifically, in the im med iate success cond ition, the defect rate was 6 0 per cent inJanuary, 5 8 per cent in May, and 5-5 per cent in September. In the irhmediate failure con-dition the rates were 8 4 ,8 2, and 8-3 per cent. In the delayed success condition the rates inJanu ary and May were 8 4 and 8 2 per cent, respectively, but the rate fell to 5 5 per cent bySeptem ber. F inally, in the delayed failure condition the rates w ere 6-0, 5-8 and 8-3 per cent.The ratee's strategy was manipulated in the following manner: In the consistentstrategy condition, Ziegler decided to continue the use of the additional inspectors aftereach of the first two evaluations. In the experimenting condition, Ziegler decided aftereach of the first two reports that the current plan had been given a fair chance, andchanged to a new policy to test its effectiveness. Ziegler changed to the new casting designsin January and to the new metals in May. The decision to change or not to change policieswas made by Ziegler alone, and not in consultation with his or her subordinates. Furthe r,each decision was presented as being independent of the previous decisions. Since nopolicy concerning strategy was ever explicitly stated in the scenario, the overall strategycould only be inferred by the subjects from the history of Z iegler's decisions.Dependent measures. The dependent measures used in this study were basically thesame as those used by Kn ight (1984), which were in turn based on those described by Staw6 Ross (1980). After reading the scenario, subjects completed a question naire from whichtwo depend ent v ariables were derived. The first was a performance rating equal to the sumof the following seven-point Likert items:' On the whole, how would you rate Joan [John]Ziegler's perfo rm ance? ' (from 1 = very poo r, to 7 = outstan ding); ' D o you think that Joan[John] Ziegler deserves a large raise in sa lar y? ' (from 1 = definitely should not be given, to

7 = definitely should be given); and ' D o you think Joa n [John] Ziegler should be con -sidered for a higher position at General Casting?' (from 1 = definitely should not be pro-moted, to 7 = definitely should be prom oted ). The m ean of this scale was 12 60 and thestandard deviation was 4 33. The mean intercorrelation of these items was .0 75 and thereliability of the scale was adequate (C ronba ch's a = 0 90). The second dependent variablewas a leadership characteristics rating formed by summing the following seven-pointLikert items (from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree): 'Joan [John] Ziegler is avery intelligent individual'; 'Joan [John] Ziegler is a careful planner'; 'Joan [John]Ziegler would make a strong le ad er '; ' Joan [John] Ziegler had a well developed theory ofthe casting production problem'; and ' Joan [John] Ziegler is exactly the kind of decisionmaker we need in industry'. The mean of this scale was 18-14 and the standard deviationwas 6 50. Th e mean in tercorre lation of these items was 0 56, and the reliability of the scalewas again ad equate (a = 0 86).ResultsManipulation checks. Ziegler was rated as being more consistent in the consistent con-


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86 PATR ICK A. KN IGHT AND FRANK E. SAALTable 1. Outcome x strategy interactions: Study 1

StrategyMean performance ratingsConsistentExperimentingTotalMea n leadership characteristics ratingsConsistentExperimentingTotal

Success

15-20"15-00"15-1024-78"23-33"24-09

OutcomeFailure

7-96=12-44"10-1815-45 '20-93"18-16

Total

10-1813-6812-6020-2222-1221-14

''Means with common indices are not significantly different. Higherratings are more favourab le.was checked by ratings of how quickly the production problem was solved. The out-come X timing interaction on this rating was significant (F= 209-74, d.f. = 1, 159, 7'


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Table 2. Outcome x timing interaction on performance ratings:Study 1

Timing of outcomeImmediateDelayedTotal

Success15-60 '14-58 '15-10

OutcomeFailure

9-1211-12"10-18

Total12-4312-761 2 6 0

'''Means with common indices are not significantly different. Higherratings are more favoura ble.Post hoc (Newman-Keuls) tests showed subjects in the immediate success and delayedsuccess conditions gave significantly higher ratings than those in other conditions, whilethose in the failure conditions gave higher ratings to the ratee whose failure was delayedthan to the ratee whose failure was immediate (Ps < 005) . This pattern of means is consis-tent with the perceived performance explanation, and contrary to predictions based onheroism. No other significant effects emerged from analyses of performance ratings.The analysis of the leadership characteristics ratings yielded three significant maineffects. Subjects in the success condition gave higher ratings than subjects in the failurecondition (F= 55-78, d.f.= 1, 159, P


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PATR ICK A. KN IGH T AND FR ANK E. SAAL

ST UDY 2Method

Subjects. One hundred and twenty-seven managers served as subjects in the secondstudy. Four of the managers were employees of a large Texas city; the rest were em ployedby a wide variety of organizations in the state of Kansas. This group included employeesof manufacturing firms, insurance companies, banks, a state university, and civilianemployees of the US Army. Participation of the managers was solicited either by contact-ing upper-level personnel managers and asking for their cooperation in distributing thematerials to managers and supervisors in their organizations, or during managementdevelopment seminars conducted by the second author. To be included in the manage-ment sample a person had to supervise at least one other person 's work. One h undred andninety-one managers were asked to participate, and the final sample represents a responserate of 67 per cent. Ninety-two (72 per cent) of the managers reported their sex, and ofthese, 34 (37 per cent) were women. Of the 35 managers not reporting their sex, 20 werefrom a single manufacturing company.

Procedure. The scenarios and the questionnaire were distributed to the managers insealed packages with a cover letter that included an informed consent statement and aguarantee of anonymity. Data from the managers who completed the exercise after themanagement development seminars were collected immediately following the seminarsessions. The other responses were gathered by the personnel administrators in the variousorganizations, and were either mailed to the researchers or picked up by the researchers inperson.

Stimulus m aterials and measures. The scenarios, manipulations, and questionnairewere identical to those used in the first study. In this sample the performance rating scalehad a mean of 9-44 and a standard deviation of 3-92. The mean intercorrelation of thethree items was 0-74 and the reliability was ad equa te (a = 0-89). The leadership cha racter-istics scale had a mean of 16-25 and a standard deviation of 7-11. Thefive tems in this scalehad a mean intercorrelation of 0-62, and the reliability was again ad equ ate (a = 0-89).Results

Manipulation checks. Subjects in the consistent condition perceived greaterconsistency than did those in the experimenting condition (F= 23-67, d.f.= l. 111,P


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HEROISM IS NO SU BST ITU TE FOR SUCC ESS 89

Table 3. Outcome x strategy interactions: Study 2

StrategyMean performance ratingsConsistentExperimentingTotalMean leadership characteristics ratingsConsistentExperimentingTotal

Success

12 -71 "10 -00 '11-0821 -92 '16-69"18-78

OutcomeFailure

7-56 '8-45'"7-9713-89"M - I O '13-99

Total

9-629-289-4417-1015-4916-25

'"iVIeans with common indices are not significantly cJifferent. Higherratings are more favourab le.

(Newman-Keuls) showed that the consistent-successful ratee received higher ratings thanall the other con ditions, while the experimenting-successful ratee received higher ratingsthan the consistent-failing ratee (/'s< 0-0 5; see Table 3).The analysis of variance on the leadership characteristics ratings showed that subjectsin the success condition gave higher ratings than those in the failure condition {F = 18-42,d.f. = 1, 111, /* < 0-01, // = 0-12; see Table 3). The o utcome x strategy interaction was alsosignificant (F=4-88, d.f.= l. 111, Pi^ = 0-03). Post hoc tests (Newman-Keuls)revealed th at the consistent-successful ratee received higher ratings than ratees in anyother condition {P


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90 PATRICK A. KNIGHT AND FRANK E. SAAL

Com pared to Study 1, the results from the manageme nt sample provided n o evidencein support of Campbell's (1977) advice to experiment in the face of failure: In none of theanalyses was an experimenting condition rated higher than the corresponding consistentcondition.

CONCLUSIONSBefore discussing the implications of these studies, a potential limitation of thisresearch should be acknowledged. Because the subjects in these studies rated imaginaryratees and based their ratings on necessarily limited information, the generalizability ofthe results to 'real world' problems may be questioned. Although generalization ofresults, whether from laboratory or field research, should always proceed with caution, webelieve that this sort o f paper p eo ple ' task is not without its coun terpart in organizations.For example, as faculty members we make decisions about accepting students into our

graduate programme. Those students, at the time the decisions are made, are literally' paper pe op le'. When our departm ent recruits faculty, the vast majority of the applicantsare rejected on the basis of how they look o n pap er. S imilar personnel decisions are made ,we believe, by most em ploying org aniza tions.Ilgen & Favero (1985) recently argued that paper people research may have somevalue in studying the evaluation of resumes, but tha t in the study of performance appra isalthe technique lacks necessary realism. Applied to the research presented here, Ilgen &Favero's arguments imply that our effects were in part determined by the fact that only asingle aspect of performance (product quality of the unit) was manipulated, relative tospecific goals. The salience of this manipulation in the absence of other performance cuesmay hav e strengthened the observed outcom e effects, althoug h the implications for effects

involving timing an d strategy are less clear.Although Ilgen & Favero (1985) raise legitimate questions about this type ofresearch, we believe that their distinction between evaluating applications and evaluatingjob performance is, to a large extent, artificial. It is true th at th ere is usually more person alinteraction between rater and ratee, and more first-hand knowledge ab out a ratee's actualbehaviour in a performance appraisal task. The evaluation of a ' pa pe r' person, however,whether a job applicant or a worker with whom contact is indirect or limited (e.g. salesrepresentatives, whose evaluations may be influenced primarily by sales volume figures),involves many of the same perceptual and cognitive processes as ' no rm al ' performanceappraisal (cf. Landy & Farr, 1980). Paper people research may therefore have widerrelevance than Ilgen & F avero have argued.Turning to the current hypotheses, the results of these studies offer no support for theheroism stereotype as defined by Staw & Ross (1980). Although there were some effectsthat are consistent with the heroism notion, these results, like those Staw & Rossoriginally offered in support of the stereotype, are more easily explained by alternativeinterpretations of the effects.Greater support was obtained for the position that ratings are determined primarilyby raters' perceptions of ratee performance. In both studies, outcome (success versusfailure) had the largest effects, accounting for between 12 and 33 per cent of the variance inthe ratings. This is encouraging, since performance ratings are typically used in lieu of' ha rd er ' criteria, and should thus correspond closely to objective performance.In most analyses outcome interacted with strategy or timing. With the exception ofthe outcome x strategy interactions in the first study, which supported Campbell's (1977)experimenting approach, the interactions that yielded significant post hoc differences


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HEROISM IS NO SUBST ITUTE FOR SUCCESS 91practical effect, accounting for between 2 and 7 per cent of the variance in the ratings.Similar effect sizes were found by Staw & Ross (1980).* It therefore seems that althoughfactors such as policy consistency and the timing of success or failure can influence percep-tions of performance and subsequent ratings, these effects are likely to be small and oflimited practical impo rtance.It would have been desirable to compare the results of the two studies by combiningthe two data sets into a single analysis. When this is done, however, a 2.4:1 ratio in cellsizes and a 15:1 ratio in cell variances result. (The unequal cell sizes violate the assump-tions of the standard homogeneity of variance tests.) This led us to the conclusion that acombined analysis was not defensible. W here the two studies differ in results, however, thepattern of means clearly indicate the nature of the differences. An im portan t comp arisonbetween the two studies concerns the relative support for Campbell's (1977) prescriptionto experiment. The students showed a preference for the experimenting ratee in the failurecondition, which is consistent with Cam pbell's recom me ndations. They also had an over-all main effect favouring experimenting. Experimentation, however, was not accepted bythe mana gers. The stude nts also gave higher ratings in the female ratee condition s, whereasno main effects for this variable were found in the managers' data. While it is tempting tospeculate about the reasons for these differences, the size of these effects, as mentionedabove, limits their practical importance .Another notable difference between the student and management samples is that themanagers gave uniformly lower ratings on both scales than did the students. Also, theproportion of variance accounted for in both manipulation checks and analyses of thedependent measures was lower for the managers than for the students. We suspect thatthis is due to the effects of the managers' practical experience, and their willingness toanticipate the effects of variables not described in the scenario. For example, both thestudents and managers apparently based their ratings of the successful ratee primarily onthe success of the unit. The managers, however, may have readily recognized that factorsbeyond the control of the ratee could affect perform ance, and therefore assigned less creditto his or her action s. Clearly, future experimental tests of the effects of success and strategyon ratings would benefit from more complex and realistic stimulus materials, such asvideotapes of managers interacting with employees (Ilgen & Favero, 1985).In conclusion, these studies found no support for a heroism stereotype, as defined byStaw & Ross (1980). Third does not necessarily mean that there are no ' he roe s' in organ-izations, but it does suggest that consistency plays a small role in their emergence. As faras we know, any data supporting such a stereotype have confounded consistency withevidence of task success. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to examine systematically theeffects of various task characteristics on the emergence of heroism. For example, Staw &Ross' (1980) scenarios described a public housing ad m inistrato r w ho received feedback onhis efforts to raise consumer satisfaction with housing over a number of years. It may betha t percep tions of the efficacy of consistency or experimenting are mo derated by the typeof problem a manager faces, and the resulting time frame within which he or she mustsolve the problem. Perhaps ' heroism' results only from years of dedicated consistency,while ' wish y-w ashy ' lead ership is inferred only when long-stan ding policies are a ban -doned. If so, this would imply that managerial heroism is a phenomenon more likely toemerge in very long-cycle, non-industrial organizations. In any case, future research onheroism should go beyond simple examinations of managerial consistency, and considersuch situationai factors.Although Staw & Ross (1980) did not report effect sizes, it is possible to compute partial eta-squares(7^-p art) from the da ta they did re po rt. Fo r Staw & Ro ss ' success/failure m ain effect, ;7^-part = O-23, for


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92 PAT RICK A. KN IGH T AND FRANK E. SAALACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.R E F E R E N C E S

CAMPBELL, D . T . (1969). Reforms as experiments. American Psychologist, 24 ,409- 429 .CAMPBELL, D . T . (1977). Keeping the da ta ho nest in the experimen ting society. In H . W. Me lton & D . J.

Watson (eds) . Interdisciplinary D imensions of Accounting for Social Goats and Social Organizations.Columbus , OH: Gr id.

DEAUX, K . & EMSWILLER, T . (1974). Exp lanation s of successful perform ance on sex-linked task s: W hat 'sskill for the male is luck for th e female. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 80-85.

ILGEN, D . R . & FAVERO, J. L. (1985). Limits in generalization from psychological research to performanceappraisal processes. Academy of Management Review, 10 ,311- 321 .

KNIGHT, P. A. (1984). Heroism versus competence: Competing explanations for the effects ofexperimenting and consistent management. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 3 3 ,307-322.

LANDY, F . J. & FARR, J. L. (1980). Performance rating. Psychological Bulletin, 87 ,72- 107 .MAXWELL, S. E., CAMP, C. J. & ARVEY, R . D . (1981). Measures of association: A comparative examination.Journal of Applied Psychology, 66 ,525- 534 .

SCHEIN, V . E. (1973). The relationsh ip between sex role stereotypes and requisite man agem entcharacteristics. Journal of Applied Psychology, 5 7 , 4 4 - 4 8 .

SCHEIN, V . E. (1975). Relation ship between sex role stereotypes and requ isite managem ent characteristicsamong female managers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 60 ,340- 344 .

STAW, B . M . (1980). Rationality a nd justification in organization al life. In B . M . Staw & L. L. Cu mm ings(eds). Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 2, pp. 45-80 . Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

STAW, B . M . (1981). The escalation of comm itment to a chosen cou rse of action. Academy of ManagementReview, 6, 577-587.

STAW, B . M . & R oss, J . (1980). Commitmen t in an experimenting society: A study of the attribution ofleadership from administrative scenarios. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65 ,249- 260 .

Received 12 November 1 985; revised version received 27 February 1986


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Heroism is No Substitute for Success