(Hermeneutic) Phenomenology in tourism studies

Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 1055–1075, 20100160-7383/$ - see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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doi:10.1016/j.annals.2010.04.002www.elsevier.com/locate/atoures

(HERMENEUTIC) PHENOMENOLOGYIN TOURISM STUDIES

Tomas Pernecky 1

The University of Auckland, New ZealandTazim Jamal 1

Texas A&M University, USA

Abstract: Despite the growing popularity of phenomenology in tourism studies, past attemptshave inadequately addressed the theoretical and philosophical assumptions that influence aresearcher’s approach and interpretations. Furthermore, the potential of hermeneutical phe-nomenology to address experiential and existential issues related to being-in-the-world (Heideg-ger, 1996) of tourism remains largely unexplored. This conceptual paper introducestheoretical as well as methodological considerations for tourism research, and situates somekey phenomenological approaches historically as well as within specific research paradigms.We focus here on the differing ontological and epistemological views of Edmund Husserl andMartin Heidegger. Examples are provided to illustrate the importance of situating one’sphilosophical assumptions in research, and the value of applying hermeneutic phenomenol-ogy to study experience, understanding and meaning in tourism. Keywords: Heidegger, Hus-serl, experience, hermeneutics, phenomenology. � 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION

A search for the keywords ‘‘tourist experience’’ in Google Scholar inDecember, 2009, returned 4920 references, indicating that experiencehas occupied a significant space in the study of tourism. In the fieldof business studies, Pine and Gilmore (1999) propose that the ‘‘expe-rience economy’’ is to replace the agrarian economy, industrial econ-omy and service economy; these authors envisage it becoming one ofthe most important economic offerings. In the field of tourism studieswhale watching, amusement parks, luxury resorts, spiritual retreats,and cultural performances are all part of what we understand and con-ceptualise as the tourism phenomenon. Indeed, tourism marketerswere quick to pick up on this, and few would disagree that experienceis an integral component of the ‘‘tourism product’’. In this regard,

Tomas Pernecky is a Programme Manager at the Centre for Continuing Education, TheUniversity of Auckland (Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. Email <[email protected]>). His research focuses mainly on knowledge production of andtheoretical inquiries into tourism. Tazim Jamal is an Associate Professor in Recreation, Parkand Tourism Sciences, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 77843-2261. Email<[email protected]>. Her research addresses theoretical and methodological issues intourism, plus collaborative tourism planning and (eco)cultural sustainability.

1 Both authors have contributed equally to this article.

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the use of phenomenological approaches in tourism is highly pertinentas phenomenology is concerned with the study of lived experience.

The term phenomenology is derived from two Greek words phaino-men (an appearance) and logos (reason or word) which translate intoreasoned appearance where appearance stands for anything one is con-scious of (Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). The word phenomenon similarlyoriginates in the Greek phaenesthai and means to appear or show itself(Moustakas, 1994). Phenomenology is often depicted as the study ofessences (as by Merleau-Ponty, 1942, 1945, 1964), the science of phe-nomena (van Manen, 1990), and the exploration of human experience(Polkinghorne, 1989). It is also commonly described as the study ofconsciousness. To be conscious, as Franz Brentano (1838–1917)pointed out, is to be conscious of ‘‘something’’; this directedness ofexperience towards objects (and the world) in phenomenology is char-acterised as the study of intentionality (first developed by Brentano,1973; see also Cerbone, 2006). Often mistaken for a qualitative meth-od, phenomenology is in fact an area within philosophy that has beenappropriated to provide methodological guidance in applied research(van Manen, 2003).

Phenomenology has become increasingly popular as a research per-spective to study experience in the humanistic and social science disci-plines. It can be seen in professional contexts such as psychology(Giorgi, 1975; Giorgi, 1997), nursing (Annells, 1996; Koch, 1995; Koch,1996), and education (Nell, 1973; van Manen, 1990; van Manen, 2002),but also religious studies (Wolff, 1999) and management studies(Gibson & Hanes, 2003). In tourism studies, it has served as a theoret-ical avenue towards describing or understanding the experiential, andlived existence of tourists/guests, locals/hosts, service providers andany other stakeholders that take part in the tourism phenomenon(as discussed below). It does not merely call for an account of thingswe see in the world (e.g., book, bus, airplane) but shifts the focus toour ‘‘seeing’’ of objects and the world (Cerbone, 2006), and the mean-ings they hold (e.g., the experience of reading a book on travel writing,driving to a holiday destination, travelling to it by bus, or flying there).There are, however, significant variations within the phenomenologi-cal tradition. Hermeneutic phenomenology, for instance, addressesexperience from the perspective of meanings, understandings andinterpretations. Ablett and Dyer (2009, p. 226) see hermeneutic phe-nomenology as ‘‘an inclusive, critical and dialogical endeavour’’.

This conceptual paper explicates the significant differences in phe-nomenological approaches and raises ontological and epistemologicalissues related to the study of experience (lived experience as well as lar-ger existential issues in tourism). We argue that, in addition to theoret-ical considerations, the paradigmatic assumptions underlying variousapproaches to phenomenological research are important to under-stand, if rigorous research is to result. Our primary focus is diverse his-torical contributions of Husserl and Heidegger to phenomenology andexistential phenomenology, but we do draw upon other related philos-ophers (such as Gadamer, 1976, 1989) for specific insights. The trajec-tory commenced by these philosophers leads to contemporary insights

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on hermeneutic phenomenology, which we propose is a valuable andunder-utilised approach for understanding lived experience intourism. A theoretical discussion is provided that helps to delineateontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions for apply-ing phenomenology and, more specifically, hermeneutic phenomenol-ogy to tourism research. Examples are provided and implications formethod, analysis and presentation of results are addressed.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN TOURISM STUDIES

The area of phenomenological research in tourism is gaining agreater momentum, however most of the work has been ambiguousat best. Many publications tend to avoid the discussion of phenomenol-ogy (Ritchie, Burns, & Palmer, 2005; Veal, 1992), or provide brief ac-counts of phenomenological approaches (Jennings, 2001). Somesimply skirt the peripheries of this rich theoretical discipline. Thusthere are at least two major challenges when it comes to employingphenomenology. Firstly, it is largely unknown in tourism research,and clear methodological guidance is lacking in the few studies thatcall on it (e.g., Cohen, Yeshayahu, & Almagor, 1992; Masberg & Silver-man, 1996; Obenour, 2004). Secondly, phenomenological research ishighly complex; it is time-consuming, requiring active researcher’sinvolvement, attentiveness and knowledge of the philosophical under-pinning of the particular approach.

The following critique is offered constructively to show the necessityfor theoretical and methodological rigour in studying the complex butimportant area of phenomenology. The first and foremost known workthat uses the word phenomenology is Erik Cohen’s (1979) Phenomenol-ogy of Tourist Experiences. Cohen offers a framework and a typology oftourist experiences, but reference to the rich tradition of phenomeno-logical study and theoretical justifications are not provided (brief allu-sions are made to important figures such as Eliade and Turner). Otherstudies similarly use the term phenomenology (Cohen et al., 1992;Mannell & Iso-Ahola, 1987) but neither elaborate on the philosophyof phenomenology, nor show theoretical application to (applied)research.

Uriely and Belhassen (2005) follow Cohen (1979) work and focus ondrug-related tourist experiences. They interview thirty participants andapply interpretive analysis aimed to ‘‘classify each interviewee into oneof Cohen’s modes’’ (Uriely & Belhassen, 2005, p. 242); a philosophicalor theoretical discussion is lacking. Uriely’s earlier study with Yonayand Simchai’s (2002) is similarly based on Cohen’s typology and doesnot describe the philosophical or theoretical considerations guidingthe study. Masberg and Silverman (1996) paper Visitor Experiences atHeritage Sites: A Phenomenological Approach, likewise fails to provide an ex-plicit account of the methodology employed. They distributed sixtyquestionnaires to students and asked questions such as: What was thelatest heritage site you visited? Where is it located? What does the term‘‘heritage site’’ mean to you? Please describe your visit in as much


detail as possible. What did you get out of the visit? Although the authors(Masberg & Silverman, 1996) briefly mention both Husserl and Heideg-ger, it is not clear what phenomenological approach they followed andtheir work reads rather like a method-driven questionnaire analysis.

Szarycz (2009, p. 48) seems to be aware of the discrepancies in phe-nomenological research in tourism studies and notes that most work isbased on a ‘‘potpourri of ideas’’ and that some researchers fail to betrue to the philosophical origins of particular phenomenologies (suchas claims about reality and issues of objectivity). But he, too, attemptsto depict phenomenology as a prescribed method and leaves littleroom for recognising the diversity within the phenomenological tradi-tion. Moreover, papers addressing phenomenology in tourism studiesmisleadingly insist on a subjective-objective ‘‘divide’’; Szarycz errs onthe side of ‘‘subjective’’ and puzzles over the possibility of commonal-ities in understanding a phenomenon (e.g., in a shared travel festival,or dining experience). The next section of this paper shows, by con-trast, that several key phenomenologists doubted the possibility of anessence of experience, or of a ‘‘subjective’’ experience, but addressed in-stead inter-subjectivity, and the relationship between ‘‘subjects’’ and‘‘objects’’ (things in the world): the resulting focus on language, mean-ing and understanding leads to an interpretive turn to hermeneuticphenomenology.

Other recent works in tourism studies show narrowly prescribed,generally positivistic and descriptive phenomenology. Curtin (2006)seeks to gain an insight into the human-dolphin attractions and asksthe pertinent phenomenological question: ‘‘What is it like to swim withdolphins?’’ She draws on Moustakas (1994) and van Manen (1990) toguide her method of data gathering and analysis. Andriotis (2009),Pernecky (2006), Ingram (2002) and Li (2000) offer descriptivephenomenologies to portray the essences of participants’ experiences:largely drawing on the work of Husserl (in combination withMoustakas, 1994 and van Manen, 1990). Similarly, Hayllar and Griffin(2005) also draw method direction from van Manen (1990) to examinethe experience of tourists to The Rocks in Sydney, Australia. Thenthere is Obenour (2004) paper Understanding the Meaning of the ‘‘Jour-ney’’ to Budget Travellers in which the author claims to draw on philo-sophical hermeneutics, but his approach bears no resemblance tothe writing of Gadamer (or Heidegger, for that matter) and there islittle guidance to the reader as to the methodological intentions andthe theory informing Obenour’s method.

By contrast, Pons (2003), draws upon Heidegger’s later developmentof the notion of dwelling in his writing Building, Dwelling, Thinking(Heidegger, 1971) plus a host of other theoretical contributionsincluding Deleuzian post-structuralism to discuss embodiment in tour-ism. Pons (2003) article is theoretically well-informed and seeks to sit-uate tourism phenomenologically within a dwelling metaphor; he alsocalls for overcoming the ‘‘habitual methodological individualism oftourist studies as well as teleological, detached, all-powerful concep-tions of the subject’’ (p. 43). Jamal and Stronza (2008) also draw uponHeidegger (1971) to help inform their study of local-global discourses


and situated experiences of ‘‘dwelling’’ with ecotourism in the Peru-vian Amazon. As presented further below, hermeneutic phenomenol-ogy situates the human body in a network of relationships andpractices, thus facilitating an embodied view of experiences, ratherthan the disembodied, Cartesian dualities that the Husserlian phenom-enology which preceded it tended towards.

Reisinger and Steiner (2006b) bring Heidegger into their discussionof authenticity and interpretation in tourism and seem to interpret hiswork through a subjectivist lens. In their paper Reconceptualizing ObjectAuthenticity (2006b, p. 80) they interpret Heidegger’s work to say that itdoes not matter whether representation is ‘‘objective, constructed, ordenied legitimacy; it is the world as pictured through one’s idea or eidosof it’’. Reisinger and Steiner (2006b, p. 80) thus propose: ‘‘if Heideg-ger is right, everything that tourists experience, what they see, touch,hear, smell and taste, is real and authentic in itself’’. The authors con-clude that object authenticity should be abandoned (without explain-ing how or why this follows). Indeed, adherents of hermeneuticapproaches seek to understand the meanings objects hold for the per-ceiver(s), but they also seek to understand the relationships betweenthem (including tradition, culture, heritage, history, and social set-tings). The existence of the external world and objects in it was takenas given (Heidegger was a realist in this sense), but experience of, andrelationships to, the world and objects, were matters for phenomeno-logical investigation. Authenticity, as Heidegger points out in Beingand Time (1996) is an existential condition, and it is surprising to seehow little use has been made of his hermeneutic phenomenology tounderstand the richness and complexity of experience.

In a different paper, Reconceptualising Interpretation: The Role of TourGuides in Authentic Tourism, Reisinger and Steiner (2006a) propose thatthe most Heideggerian types of tour guides can be found in Israel, andthat these guides can be seen as agents of education and culture as theyinterpret scenes and meanings. It appears that the Israeli tour guidesare more reflexive and draw on their individual and cultural back-grounds to produce richer descriptions and interpretations (the turntowards hermeneutic phenomenology here is not clearly explicated).Ablett and Dyer (2009) hermeneutical work on heritage interpretationhighlights well the importance of tradition, history, language, inter-subjective contexts, and social dimensions of experience. They concurthat interpretation is a ‘‘task that belongs equally to visitors as it does tothe interpretive specialist’’ (p. 224). However, epistemological clarity islacking as to what the authors mean by ‘‘revelatory, truth-disclosingcapacities’’ (p. 220), or other ways of ‘‘experiencing truth that aremore basic or ‘primal’ than scientific explanations’’. Furthermore,one may struggle to interpret what appears to sound like a foundation-alist ‘‘larger truth’’ in their citation of Tilden’s statement: ‘‘Interpreta-tion is revelation of a larger truth that lies behind any statement offact’’ (Tilden, 1977, p. 8, cited in Ablett & Dyer 2009, p. 220). In thiscase the reader would benefit from knowing what philosophical andtheoretical assumptions Ablett and Dyer draw upon with respect totheir interpretation of Heidegger’s works. It is to such issues that


inform (or misinform) efforts to apply (hermeneutic) phenomenologymethodologically that we turn to next.

RESEARCH PARADIGMS AND METHODOLOGICALCONSIDERATIONS

Suvantola (2002, p. 14) is well aware of the medley of methodologi-cal possibilities that various phenomenological approaches can informand states that ‘‘while striving to achieve understanding is the commondenominator of all phenomenological methods applied to empiricalinquiries, this striving can embrace a vast range of different ways inwhich to conduct a piece of research’’. To appreciate the richly diverserange of phenomenological approaches and methodological direc-tions they inform, it is crucial to first recognise the philosophicalassumptions that undergird them, and ponder about the confusionand lack of accountability in previous research approaches. In recentyears there has been an emphasis on and proliferation of more quali-tative approaches in tourism studies, a field that has generally favouredthe use of positivistic and quantitative, scientific methods (Jennings,2001; Walle, 1997). These tended to fit well with the industry, businessand functionalist/applied research that dominated the study of tour-ism, as Franklin (2004), and Jamal and Everett (2004) pointed out.Pritchard and Morgan (2007, p. 18) observe that ‘‘tourism continuesto demonstrate a poorly developed disciplinary base prompted by a fail-ure to engage with paradigmatic shift and theoretical challenge’’. Theconcern over appropriate research methods and methodologies andthe contentious debates over legitimacy in social research have givenrise to publications such as Qualitative Research in Tourism: Ontologies,Epistemologies and Methodologies (Phillimore & Goodson, 2004) and TheCritical Turn in Tourism Studies (Ateljevic, Pritchard, & Morgan, 2007).

These issues and paradigmatic debates deserve further scrutiny withrespect to phenomenological research. Phenomenology is a philosoph-ical and theoretical endeavour, and understanding the philosophicaland theoretical assumptions that inform phenomenological researchhelps to situate the various approaches to phenomenology that haveevolved over the 20th century within a diverse range of researchparadigms. A study of philosophy of science (important to thoseconducting empirical studies) and the philosophy of social scienceshows how the positivist or scientific paradigms prevailed for the pastseveral hundred years, and how new ones are finally gaining currency:such as post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism paradigms(Guba & Lincoln, 2004). These research paradigms are useful in thatthey help researchers to recognise where they are situated with respectto the objects and things they study, specifically the philosophical(ontological and epistemological) suppositions that influencemethodological approaches and assumptions of the research. Ontol-ogy is the philosophical study of existence, reality and being, and formsa branch in philosophy known as metaphysics (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).Epistemology is the theory of knowledge and justified belief (Audi,


2003). Methodology is the theory methods, and the methodologicalconsiderations deal with the strategies for finding out what the re-searcher believes can be known (Guba & Lincoln, 2004). Taken to-gether, ontology, epistemology and methodology are complementaryas the first two (ontology and epistemology) inform the latter(methodology).

In a phenomenological study, one’s methodology is not a simpleexercise and rather summons the process of coming to understandthe research approach, especially the philosophical assumptions andtheoretical influences that inform the method(s) of data gathering,analysis and writing. Phenomenological research requires a dose ofscholastic vigilance to ensure that all components align with the aimsand philosophical underpinnings of the research study. As argued inour review of phenomenological studies in tourism, lack of philosoph-ical clarity and theoretical consideration has contributed towards theconfusion that prevails in the field (e.g., Czarycz, 2008, 2009). Table 1compares several key paradigms in social research and underlines themajor differences between the ontological, epistemological and meth-odological positions. In this table and paper overall, we reserve theterm methodology for a process which addresses the philosophicaland theoretical assumptions that then influence the choice of meth-ods. It is important to note that approaches to phenomenology differsignificantly despite apparent similarities—a fact that has been largelyneglected in tourism studies. Accordingly, one can situate his/her phe-nomenological study in different research paradigms ranging frompositivist (e.g., Husserl), post-positivist (e.g., Merleau-Ponty), to inter-pretivist (e.g., Heidegger and Gadamer), constructivist (e.g., RichardRorty, Gadamer, Schutz), and deconstructivist (e.g., Jacques Derrida),as illustrated in Table 1. Some key differences are identified below,with the primary focus on events leading to the development of herme-neutic phenomenology.

Husserlian Phenomenology Compared to Heideggerian Phenomenology

Spiegelberg and Schuhmann (1994) identify three core historicalphases and its most influential thinkers: (1) the preparatory phase withFranz Brentano (1838–1917) and Carl Stumpf (1848–1936); (2) theGerman phase with Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Martin Heidegger(1889–1976), and Max Scheler (1874–1928); and (3) the French phasewith Gabriel Marcel (1889–1974), Jean-Paul Satre (1905–80), MauriceMerleau-Ponty (1908–61), Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), Mikel Dufrenne(1919–95), and Emmanuel Levinas (1906–95). We draw largely onHusserl and Heidegger to illustrate important differences that tendto be ignored in previous phenomenological research in tourism.Husserl’s work lends itself well to those inclined towards the searchfor essential structures of consciousness and the intrinsic structuresof experience. But Heidegger’s primary concerns were existentiallyoriented towards understanding ‘‘being’’. His analysis in Being andTime and later works such as What is Called Thinking (Heidegger,

Table 1. Guba’s Comparison of Prevailing Paradigms

PARADIGM ONTOLOGY EPISTEMOLOGY METHODOLOGY

Positivist Realist—reality exists‘‘out there’’ and isdriven by immutablenatural laws andmechanism.Knowledge of theseentities, laws, andmechanisms isconventionallysummarised in theform of time- andcontext-freegeneralisations.

Dualist/objectivist—it isboth possible andessential for theinquirer to adopt adistant, non-interactive posture.Values and otherbiasing andconfounding factorsare therebyautomaticallyexcluded frominfluencing theoutcomes.

Experimental/manipulative—questions and /orhypotheses are statedin advance inpropositional formand subjected toempirical tests(falsification) undercarefully controlledconditions.

Post-positivist Critical realist—realityexists but can neverbe fully apprehended.It is driven by naturallaws that can be onlyincompletelyunderstood.

Modified objectivist—objectivity remains aregulatory ideal, but itcan only beapproximated, withspecial emphasisplaced on externalguardians such as thecritical tradition andthe criticalcommunity.

Modified experimental/manipulative—emphasise criticalmultiplism. Redressimbalances by doinginquiry in morenatural settings, usingmore qualitativemethods, dependingmore on groundedtheory, andreintroducingdiscovery into theinquiry process.

Critical Theory Critical realist—as in thecase of post-positivism.

Subjectivist—in the sensethat values mediateinquiry.

Dialogic, transformative—eliminate falseconsciousness andenergise and facilitatetransformation (viapraxis).

Constructivist Relativist—realities existin the form ofmultiple mentalconstructions, sociallyand experientiallybased, local andspecific, dependentfor their form andcontent on thepersons who holdthem.

Subjectivist—inquirerand inquired into arefused into a single(monistic) entity.Findings are literallythe creation of theprocess of interactionbetween the two.

Inter-subjective,dialectic—individualconstructions areelicited, comparedand contrasteddialectically, with theaim of generating one(or a few)constructions onwhich there issubstantial consensus.

Table Source: Adopted from Guba (1990, p. 23–27).


1968) showed being in hermeneutic (interpretive) relationships withobjects. Gadamer’s treatise Truth and Method (1989) provides further


epistemological contributions to Heidegger’s ontological analysis ofDa-sein (translated as ‘‘being there’’). Taken together, Heidegger’s her-meneutic phenomenology and Gadamer’s subsequent work offerstrong complementarity and guidance for interpretive research aimedtoward ‘‘understanding’’ and ‘‘meaning’’ in the world of tourism.

Edmund Husserl (for major works see Husserl, 1931, 1970;Bernet, Kern, & Marbach, 1995; Levinas, 1998) is known to bethe founder of twentieth-century phenomenological philosophy (Co-hen, 1987). His work can be generally divided into three periods:pre-transcendental or epistemological phenomenology, fully tran-scendental phenomenology, and genetic phenomenology. Phenome-nology for Husserl was a rigorous and scientific study of things asthey appear to be, in order to come to an essential understandingof human consciousness and experience (Valle, King, & Halling,1989). In his early work, Husserl demanded that objectivity of ‘‘eventhe most logical of objectivities be traced back to the structures ofconsciousness in and through which it first became possible’’(Macann, 1993, p. 3). His contemporary exponents such as AmadeoGiorgi (1975, 1997) continued to pursue phenomenology as amethod for the human sciences, searching for the essential struc-tures of experience (Dowling, 2007; Polkinghorne, 1989). The tech-niques of Husserlian phenomenology include phenomenologicalreduction or bracketing, meaning suspending or excluding ‘‘all ques-tions and claims concerning whatever might be casually responsiblefor conscious experience’’ (Cerbone, 2006, p. 22). It is the essencesor inner, true nature of a thing that Husserl strove to identify(Dowling, 2007).

Husserl’s undertaking to describe ‘‘pure’’ consciousness (com-bined with the method of the phenomenological reduction) can in-deed appear as a rigid and descriptive exercise: somewhat denotinga positivist tendency. It was his aspiration to develop a method thatwould advance philosophy to the status of a science. Influenced bymathematics, he was driven to develop an ‘‘a priori science of theuniversal structures of the perceptual world’’ (Hughes, 1990,p. 140). Husserl’s structured approach to isolate the empirical worldand describe the essential structures of conscious experience thusseems to fit well within the positivistic paradigm, shown in Table 1.As noted earlier, much phenomenological research in tourism ap-pears to have sought the essence of a phenomenon while disregard-ing the particulars of context and interpretation. In contrast,hermeneutic phenomenology provides researchers with the opportu-nity to explore how tourists’ meaningful experiences come about.For instance, what in a touristic situation may be for X an encounterwith ‘‘strangeness’’, can be meaningfully interpreted by Y due to hersocio-cultural-historical background. Here ‘‘strangeness’’ cannot bethe essence of that experience, but rather something that ‘‘travels’’with the interpreting individual. The task of the hermeneutically in-clined researcher is to engage with and explore the aspects thatshape one’s understanding (as opposed to ‘‘bracketing’’ it), a discus-sion we continue next.


Heidegger’s Ontological Turn to Language and Being

Heidegger studied Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology andworked closely with him, but came to the conclusion that phenomenol-ogy had missed an important understanding of humans as existentialbeings. He laid critical groundwork for hermeneutic phenomenologyin his major treatise Being and Time (1996), Da-sein (‘‘being’’ or, asthe hyphen indicates, ‘‘being there’’) as a situated, historical and tem-poral being-in-the-world, in interpretive relationships with objects andthings (Heidegger, 1996). The question that motivated Heidegger’sthought was: What is the meaning of being? (Gadamer, 1976, p. xlvi).For Heidegger, human existence and experience is based on interpre-tation and understanding; and language is the house of being. Experi-ence is formed through interpretation of the world, and allinterpretation (including scientific understanding/interpretation) isgoverned by the concrete situation of the interpreter.

Husserl and Heidegger thus came very differently to the explorationof lived experience. Husserl focused on understanding consciousness,in acts of attending, perceiving, recalling, and thinking about the world(hence humans as the ‘‘knowers’’). Heidegger (1996) strove to expli-cate Da-sein, humans as beings who are primarily concerned abouttheir existence and seek to understand it. They exist in relations of con-cern to others; for example, we are in everyday relations to our friendsand family, and we also live in relations with equipment and tools (likecars, bicycles that we use for transportation and recreation). Hislife-long work lay in addressing the ontological-existential questions ofexperiencing, understanding and thinking. The two joint aspects thatinform Heidegger’s existential phenomenology are hermeneutics asrelated to beings engaged in language, understanding and interpreta-tion, plus phenomenology as the study of experience (Laverty, 2003).

Heidegger was well-informed on earlier biblical hermeneutics, thetheory and practice of interpretation of scriptural passages/text. Hisown work did not aim to develop a procedure of understanding, butrather attempted to elucidate the conditions in which understandingtakes place (Koch, 1995). Interpretation should not be understoodas a tool for knowledge, he felt, but as the way human beings are (aspart of the hermeneutic circle). As such, Heidegger’s hermeneuticphenomenology did not claim to develop accurate descriptions, asdid Husserl’s phenomenology, but focused instead on the situated, dia-logic and interpretive qualities of being. Understanding occursthrough our culturally and historically mediated interpretations andrelationships with objects and things, and through the social meaningscontained in language. Table 2 summarises some key aspects of Husser-lian and Heideggerian phenomenology and differences between thesetwo important traditions that shaped much of 20th century phenome-nology studies and developments.

Especially pertinent to Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenologyis the notion of historicity, which is a key aspect of the hermeneuticcircle (the most fundamental hermeneutic principle that Heideggerlaid out in Being and Time). As explained by Pattison (2000, p. 109),

Table 2. Differences between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology

Husserlian Phenomenology Heideggerian Phenomenology

Transcendental phenomenology Philosophical hermeneuticsHermeneutic phenomenology

Epistemological (focus on knowledgethrough human consciousness)

Existential-ontological (focus on existentialrelations and experience)

Epistemological questions of knowing Questions of experiencing, understandingand meaning

How do we know what we know? What does it mean to be a person (e.g., ateacher, a backpacker, a shopkeeper, amother)?

Cartesian duality: mind body split Da-sein (being there, being-in-the-world)A mechanistic view of the person Person as self-interpreting beingMind-body person live in a world of objects As person exists as a ‘being’ in and of the

world, ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’categories are dualistic and inappropriate.

Ahistorical HistoricalityUnit of analysis is meaning-giving subject Unit of analysis is relationship between

situation and the person, that is,situatedness of the individual in the world

What is shared is the essence of theconscious mind

What is shared in culture, history, practice,language

Starts with reflection of mental states We are already in the world in our pre-reflective states

Meaning is unsullied by the interpreter’sown normative goals or view of the world

Interpreters participate in making data

Participants’ meanings can be reconstitutedin interpretive work by insisting dataspeaks for themselves

Within the fore-structure of understandinginterpretation can only make explicit whatis already understood

Claim that adequate techniques andprocedures guarantee validity ofinterpretation

Establish own criteria for trustworthiness ofresearch

Bracketing defends the validity or objectivityof the interpretation against self-interest

The hermeneutic circle (background, co-constitution, pre-understanding)

Table Source: Adapted from Koch (1995, p. 832); Laverty (2003, p. 26).


interpretation involves the ‘‘unfolding of our tacit, lived self-under-stand (Heidegger’s term, Auslegung, literally means ‘laying out’)’’.Heidegger (1996) argued that interpretation is grounded in some-thing we have in advance, a fore-having, a fore-sight as he puts it. Inthis sense, interpretation is one’s background presenting ways ofinterpreting and understanding the world; pre-understandings shapeexperience. For instance when an eco-conscious hotel guest is askedto turn the lights off to save electricity (she reads the green hotelguidelines posted in her hotel room), she does not have to firstfigure out the concept of electricity nor determine what light is.She has a pre-understanding of these, and of the sustainability con-cerns being expressed—how she acts depends on her ethical andcultural context, background and traditions. Heidegger saw allunderstanding as interlinked with certain fore-structures of which


such historicity was an important part. Therefore rather than focus-ing on the essence of experience (the aim of Husserl), Heideggerwas concerned with illuminating the phenomenon of what he calledthe world—the purposes, activities, and significance of the objectsthat surround us (Cerbone, 2006).

An example may be helpful to further illustrate this important prin-ciple. Take, for instance, the phenomenological question of what itmeans to be a backpacker. To engage with this question in a researchstudy requires consideration of the fore-structures (Heidegger, 1996) ofrelevant concepts such as tourism and backpacking, and various pre-understandings surrounding this activity. Tourism scholars define phe-nomena, create concepts and select research samples based on theirown pre-understandings and historicity. Additionally, the researcher’sinterpretation and understanding is shaped by whether the researcherhas experienced backpacking directly him/herself and is able to relateto the data shared by the participants. For instance, the participant-backpacker may use expressions such as ‘‘Eurotrash’’ and ‘‘hippie’’;or English may be his/her second language while it is the first languageof the researcher. The researcher must ponder whether they have thesame understanding of the above terms and whether one’s ability orinability to communicate in the same language matters. These andmany more questions play a vital role in conducting a study guidedby hermeneutical phenomenology.

Table 3 offers some guidance in regard to ontology, epistemologyand methodology. We have purposefully drawn on Guba and Lincoln(1989) and Denzin and Lincoln’s (2000, 2003), popular portrayal ofparadigms in order not to over-complicate matters. Subsequently,Table 3 summarises some of the key assumptions guiding hermeneuticphenomenology as an interpretive approach to studying experience.We also recommend exploring other literature on the issues of knowl-edge construction (e.g., Crotty, 1998; Slife & Williams, 1995). The workof Alfred Schutz (1967), for example, can be of particular interest tothose wanting to explore phenomenological sociology and social/cul-tural distribution of knowledge.

Methodological Considerations for Tourism Studies

It should be clear by now that phenomenological research is under-pinned by ontological and epistemological assumptions that varydepending on the theorist being followed (see Table 1). Husserl’s phe-nomenology corresponds to a positivistic approach, Merleau-Ponty topost-positivist, Heidegger and Gadamer to interpretivist orientations.The researcher’s responsibility is to ascertain with which paradigm(and ontological and epistemological assumptions) he/she associates,and draw on the corresponding school of thought. We noted earlierthe tendency in tourism research toward a positivistic search for an‘‘essence’’ that characterises, for instance, the notion of difference(self-other) and strangeness in a tourism setting, often also strivingfor research results that provide a generalisable experience. It is notsurprising, perhaps, that Husserl’s positivistic approach is more

Table 3. Hermeneutic phenomenology: preliminary guidelines for research in tourism studies

REASON FOR RESEARCH To study lived experience and understand how experiences areinterpreted and understood (the meanings of theseexperiences to the participants involved).

ONTOLOGY (Being-in-the-World) Realist: The World and Nature can beaccessed by means of our being-in-the-world: we make sense ofour being and lifeworld (the world we live in) throughreflective representation and analysis. All understanding ofour being-in-the-world is perspectival and shaped by pre-understanding, historicity, culture, practice, background,language etc.). There is ‘‘realness’’ to the world and to ourexperiences; Da-sein’s involvement plays a key role inconstructing ‘‘truth’’.

EPISTEMOLOGY Hermeneutic: The main focus is on interpretation, context, andlanguage; what counts as ‘‘truth’’ is based on interpretation,co-construction and reflexive participation. Both theresearcher and the participant are self-interpreting beingswho live in the ‘‘real’’ world and hence both play animportant role in the process of arriving at understandingthrough dialogue and interpretation. Language plays a keyrole.

METHODOLOGY Interpretive and dialogic: The researcher seeks to interpret andunderstand the lived experience; searches for meaning,analyses, critiques, and negotiates between theory and data,and is guided by hermeneutic phenomenology. The focus ison relationship between self and other, rather than‘‘subjective’’ or ‘‘objective’’ stance.

Method: Interviews and participant observation, writing richdescription aimed at understanding and meaning. Co-construction, reflexivity, and historicity are important guidingprinciples to this interpretive task (please note that there areno prescribed methods and these are only suggestions).


comforting to researchers seeing step-by-step methodical process. Con-temporary phenomenologists such as van Kaam (1966), Giorgi (1975,1983, 1997) and Colaizzi (1978) have become the source of inspirationfor guidance to research employing descriptive (positivist) phenome-nologies with established methods/procedures (Ehrich, 2005). Butfor those researchers who admit to a more interpretive paradigm intheir own research orientation, the under-studied hermeneutic phe-nomenology offers rich possibilities for addressing the being-in-the-worldof tourism (Jamal & Hill, 2002), as a tourist, a resident, a governmentalofficial, an enterprise owner, a destination manager or other being inrelationship with the objects and things in the local-global tourismsystem.

Heidegger did not craft a methodical guide to studying experience,and in fact emphasised the processual (process-oriented) role of inter-pretation in hermeneutic phenomenology. One has to carefully readand interpret his works, drawing from them methodological guidance(see below). Some attempts have been made to develop systematicmethods that attract those looking for practical guidance to


conducting research using hermeneutic phenomenology. For instance,van Manen’s (1990) Researching Lived Experience is commonly referredto with respect to method guidance in conducting hermeneutic phe-nomenology. For a detailed description of various phenomenologicalapproaches and methods, readers are referred to Hughes (1990), Mou-stakas (1994), Polkinghorne (1983), Polkinghorne (1989), van Kaam(1966), and van Manen’s (1990, 2002).

Methodological Insights from Heidegger

Hermeneutic phenomenology is a challenging research endeavouras noted above, for there are no strict rules of interpretation. But thereare theoretical insights in Heidegger’s writings that one can draw uponfor guidance in developing interpretively rich descriptions, under-standings and meanings. For Heidegger, hermeneutics no longer re-fers to the science of interpretation, but rather to the process ofinterpretation as an essential characteristic of Da-sein. Gadamer(1989) subsequent development of philosophical hermeneutics (build-ing on the work commenced by his teacher, Heidegger) shows thatbracketing of phenomena to get at the structures of consciousness(as Husserl attempted) is not possible because understanding andinterpretation are indissolubly bound up with each other. This is per-haps the most important aspect of hermeneutic phenomenology incontrast to the work of Husserl, for hermeneutic approaches considernot only what is being interpreted but also the process of interpreta-tion and the role of the interpreter. Words such as subjective and objec-tive (as well as attempts to isolate subject and object) have to beproblematised in interpretive social research. Interpretation createsan intricate relationship between the two: showing the inseparabilityof ‘‘being’’ with the ‘‘world’’, with the ‘‘historicity’’ of being, and withthe notion of ‘‘truth’’ in this interpretive paradigm.

Epistemologically, hermeneutic phenomenology is open to manypossible interpretations and understandings, which are historicallygrounded and context dependent. Truth is not constructed regardlessof the external world but rather in intricate relationship with it. Theworld has something to say back to us (the person), to put it somewhatcolloquially. For example, an encounter with a grizzly while hiking inthe back country of the Canadian Rockies is not a one-sided construc-tion of ‘‘essential’’ backpacker experience, as the backpacker wouldfind out very quickly were the grizzly to attack. The backpacker’s expe-rience is intricately related to her interaction with the back countryworld and encounter with the grizzly; it is an interpretive experience,as she attempts to makes sense of the encounter for herself, a processthat continues in dialogic interaction between the backpacker and theinterviewer. ‘‘Truth’’ in hermeneutic phenomenology is neither anobjective endeavour nor something awaiting ‘‘verification’’ or ‘‘confir-mation’’ through a set of methodical tools. Truth is an interpretiveconstruct, and involves assessing the trustworthiness or credibility ofthe researcher’s interpretation of the participant’s experience (as


described by the participant). There is furthermore the interpretiveplay between theory and ‘‘data’’ that the researcher is involved in,for instance, by bringing in other theoretical insights to further inter-pret the experience; it is an iterative process of going back and forth tothe literature to inform concepts that arise from interpretive analysis.

Interpretive studies of experience and meaning thus requirethoughtful discussion of reflexivity (Jamal & Hollinshead, 2001).Laverty (2003) explains that the process of analysing data is differentfrom transcendental phenomenology (Husserl), where the aim is toisolate the perception of phenomena from the researcher and partici-pant. In hermeneutic phenomenology, a participant’s experience of Xis seen to be a process of co-construction by the researcher and partic-ipant(s). The researcher and the participant co-construct the data andwork together to produce meaning; together they elucidate the condi-tions in which understanding takes place. The participant engages ininterpreting and assigning meaning to the experience; in recountingthis to the researcher, another level of interpretation occurs: co-con-struction of the experience as recounted by the participant to the re-searcher (also influenced by particular cultural and social forces).

To further highlight the difference in phenomenological ap-proaches, consider two strategies to study a backpacker’s experience.Say one researcher follows Husserl to describe the ‘‘essential’’ experi-ence of being a backpacker, and the other employs hermeneutic phe-nomenology. Both researchers will engage in interpretation, but theformer would focus on identifying the essential structures of conscious-ness in the backpacking experience, and employ the scientific methodof striving for objectivity and emotional distance. The latter, followingHeidegger’s approach, would look to understand what it means to be abackpacker and how that experience emerges. The latter is a dialogicprocess, and the researcher’s reflexivity is strongly present in interpret-ing the backpacker’s experience as a dialogue between the researcherand the backpacker. Interpretive understanding therefore plays a keyrole in hermeneutic approaches to research.

To ensure that the differences in these two phenomenological ap-proaches are clear, we will solicit the help of a phenomenological studyby Szarycz (2008), which seeks to gain an insight into the passengerfreighter travel experience. While Szarycz cites van Manen (1990)and Moustakas (1994), the research itself appears to try to isolateand identify the essence of a person’s experience, questioning what thatmight be, puzzling over commonalities (or rather lack thereof) be-tween the experiences of various freighter travellers. It could be arguedthat clearly identifying the phenomenological approach (e.g., Hus-serl’s versus Heidegger’s), and the researcher’s own philosophicalassumptions would help reviewers and readers in evaluating the credi-bility (or trustworthiness) of the phenomenological study. Szarycz(2008, p. 261), for example, offers the following types of statements:‘‘participants were selected on the basis of having had experience withthe phenomenon of interest’’...‘‘definitions for each theme were estab-lished as the data were worked and modified accordingly’’. Note theobjective, scientific discourse adopted, including neutral language


and lack of the researcher’s own, situatedness in the study (e.g., using‘‘I’’ instead of the third person). The researcher as an active shaper ofknowledge is absent.

By contrast, in hermeneutic phenomenology, the researcher is anintrinsic part of the interpretation that emerges and he/she cannotbe ‘‘bracketed’’ out of the process. The matter of pre-understandings,prejudices or pre-judgements, which both Heidegger and Gadamershow are intricately part of one’s being, and cannot be isolated scien-tifically. Heidegger’s Da-sein is a historical being, enmeshed in tempo-ral and cultural relationships, and a pre-reflective stance towards theworld. One might guess, therefore, that Szarycz is adopting a positivistlens, and the study most likely fits Husserlian phenomenology, butshould the onus not be on the researcher to declare his/her philo-sophical and theoretical assumptions, and thus justify the choice ofstudy methods? Moreover, what personal ‘‘biases’’ does the researcherbring to the study, and how can these be brought into the study ofexperience? There are different pre-judgements (prejudices) andmeaning which both the researcher and the participant (tourist/host/tour guide) bring to their interpretation of experience. The taskof the hermeneutic phenomenology researcher is to put together thepieces in someone’s understanding of an experience, to interpretand communicate the diverse relationships, meanings and prejudices.Post-positivistic researchers try to declare their biases and ‘‘bracket’’them, while interpretive researchers attempt to situate themselvesand their biases in the study such that the reader and reviewer caninterpret for themselves what these mean in the given context.

CONCLUSION

This paper delineates historical and paradigmatic evolutions in thestudy of phenomenology, specifically, the valuable contributions madein the early half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and MartinHeidegger. Phenomenology as a philosophical area of study has flour-ished to produce diverse theoretical perspectives, and has been usedmore recently to inform the study of lived experience. We haveattempted to clarify above that phenomenological investigations aregrounded in diverse theoretical and philosophical assumptions (e.g.,different ontological and epistemological assumptions). Phenomenol-ogy is not a method in itself, but can guide the choices of methods em-ployed (e.g., it can provide methodological direction). We have arguedthat previous phenomenological research in tourism has generallyfailed to acknowledge these differences, or provide adequate informa-tion to enable effective evaluation of the credibility of the research.From the examples we provided of such previous research, we can‘‘guess’’ (as information on the theoretical influence is often inade-quate) that Husserl’s positivistic approach seems to be favoured overa more interpretive study of experience, such as Heidegger’s existentialphenomenology. We therefore summarise some key characteristics andguidelines to the application of Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology,


and go on to highlight important aspects of Heidegger’s existentialand hermeneutic approaches for the study of experience which wehope may help facilitate future interpretive research into experiencein the tourism domain.

This paper situates hermeneutic phenomenology within an interpre-tive paradigm that is grounded in a realist ontology plus an epistemol-ogy that involves hermeneutic interpretation (see Table 3). The keyrole of language in understanding has been stressed, and the impor-tance of the researcher’s reflexivity, co-construction of interpretation,and historicity (the researcher’s historical context as well as the partic-ipant’s) has been underscored. Combining Heidegger’s developmentof this concept with Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is animportant future task. It offers strong potential for developing robusttheoretical and methodological frameworks for applying hermeneuticphenomenology to tourism studies of experience. Heidegger’s seminaltreatise Being and Time (1996) introduces key principles of hermeneu-tic phenomenology, as noted in this paper; however, his later work ondwelling (Heidegger, 1971) also offers perspectives useful for the studyof dwelling and belonging in spaces of tourism.

There are, of course, other influential contemporary thinkers whoadded significant nuances to the study of experience and whom wecould not possibly discuss in depth in this paper: Hans-Georg Gadamer(philosophical hermeneutics), Ricouer (critical hermeneutics), andJacques Derrida (deconstruction), Aflred Schutz (intersubjective, so-cial phenomenology). We focused largely on the phenomenology ofHusserl and Heidegger whose differing works laid the foundationson which subsequent interpretive, critical and deconstructive variantswere built. What we hoped to achieve is to show that hermeneutic phe-nomenology is a valuable research means and that it has its place intourism. The potential of this approach is vast and comprises a largespectrum of possible research subjects from tourists, hosts, workers,and students, to members of local communities. Information thatemerges as the result of adopting hermeneutic phenomenology canbe valuable to different stakeholders (e.g., marketers, service providers,business owners, and planners) but also to academia. For example, her-meneutic phenomenology can support the emerging works on cosmo-politanism and feminist analysis in forming an understanding of howcosmopolitan individuals negotiate their worlds of place, space andmeaning (Swain, 2009). It can be a critical instrument into furtherexploring how experiences may be gendered, classed, sexed, raced,aged and how these pre-givens dictate how we experience tourism.Hermeneutic modes of investigation also facilitate meaningful inter-pretation of complex issues such as the ontological properties of tour-ism and its relationship to peace (Pernecky, 2010).

Lastly, those inclined towards (post)positivism and scientific study oftourism should note that positivistic approaches to studying experience(e.g., Husserl, Giorgi, van Kamm) may have to face the critique of dis-embodiment and Cartesian dualism (separating mind/consciousnessfrom body). By contrast, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenologyprovides for situated and embodied accounts of tourism, and offers


the opportunity to delve into the understanding of a tourist’s experi-ence. Hermeneutic phenomenology raises questions pertinent toknowledge production and existential being: being-in-the-world as a tour-ist, a researcher, a non-governmental organisation, a small businessper-son, a government agency or any other stakeholder involved intourism. It also challenges dominant epistemologies and breaks newtheoretical grounds in the study of experience in tourism. The overallconceptual effort of this paper commences a preliminary conversationon what are yet to become theoretically and methodologically robust(hermeneutic) phenomenological studies in tourism.

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(Hermeneutic) Phenomenology in tourism studies