The early years of the 21st century are wit-nessing a major transformation of worldpolitics, in which the boundaries

between direct and representative democra-cy, and between local, national and globalgovernance, are being tested and rearranged.Central to these changes is the rise of civil soci-ety, but civic participation needs careful man-agement if it is to reach itsfull potential. How can this bedone without harming thediversity and passion that arethe hallmarks of a healthycivic life?

‘Civil society’ comprises allnon-commercial organisa-tions, networks and associa-tions between the family andthe state. It includes Non Gov-ernmental Organisations(NGOs) of many differentkinds, trade unions, faith-based groups, universities, business federa-tions and the independent media. Suchgroups are enjoying an unprecedented levelof coverage in global debates, and, althoughit might lack ideological coherence, the cur-rent wave of global citizen action is compa-rable with, and probably larger than, thatexperienced in the 1960s.

Over 49 million people have joined the‘Hemispheric Social Alliance’ against the FreeTrade Agreement of the Americas, while theUS anti-sweatshop movement has chapters inover 140 colleges and universities. More than30,000 international NGOs are already activeon the world stage, along with approximate-ly 20,000 transnational civil society networks

of various kinds – 90 per centof which have been formedduring the last 30 years. Successive United Nationsconferences have providedvaluable opportunities forsuch groups to mobilise andmake connections in an inter-national context that increas-ingly favours civil societyparticipation: the democrati-sation that has been such afeature of the post Cold-Warworld; the increasing power

of information technology to link geograph-ically disparate groups; and rising disaffectionwith conventional politics.

Why involve civil society? Global market integration, the internet, andthe increasing interconnectedness of citizensare gradually eroding the monopoly of power

71

Herding cats?Civil society and global governance

MICHAEL EDWARDS

Director, Governance and Civil Society, The Ford Foundation

1070-3535/02/02071 + 05 © 2002 IPPR

“Governments canconfer authority on

decisions but rarely acomplete sense of

legitimacy, especiallyin a ‘wired world’where informationflows much morefreely through the

media and across theinternet”

72 NEW ECONOMY

exercised by nation states. Many people havecommented on the implications of this shiftfor global governance, and the move awayfrom ‘club’ models of decision-making toframeworks built around multi-layered, cross-society dialogue, in which non-state involve-ment is a pre-requisite for creating viablepolicy and strategies. The UN cannot preventglobal warming unless citizens decide thattheir own environment has to be protectedfrom their own actions, and industry offersthem products and services that are energy-efficient. Likewise, progressive employmentpolicies will not be viable unless they havesupport from companies like Nike and WallMart, and from consumers who are willing topay higher prices for the goods they procure.In theory, then, civil society can make two con-tributions to effective global governance:

First, improving the quality of debate anddecision-making by injecting more informa-tion, transparency and accountability intothe international system, based on a recogni-tion that government and business have nomonopoly of ideas or expertise. The Jubilee2000 movement created enormous pressurefor debt relief, but it also put new models andpolicy suggestions on the table that gradual-ly worked their way into the internationalestablishment, including proposals for a bank-ruptcy procedure for countries facing eco-nomic meltdown that has since beendiscussed by the IMF. NGO-led certificationsystems such as the Forest Stewardship Coun-cil look set to do the same for trade and theenvironment in the years to come.

Second, strengthening the legitimacy andeffectiveness of decisions and decision-mak-ing processes by involving a broader spec-trum of those whose support is required tomake them work. Governments can conferauthority on decisions but rarely a completesense of legitimacy, especially in a ‘wiredworld’ where information flows much morefreely through the media and across the inter-net. In this scenario, the weight of public

pressure will be felt much more keenly bydecision-makers wherever they are, and sup-port from non-state actors will be crucial inensuring that decisions are actually imple-mented on the ground. This was part of therationale behind the success, for example, ofthe landmines campaign in 1997, interna-tional certification of the diamond trade in2000, and concessions at the Doha worldtrade talks in 2001 around intellectual prop-erty rights on essential medicines.

Problems and dilemmasThese contributions are potentially very

powerful, but none of them will automaticallybe realised in every context. The actual out-come of civil society involvement depends on● whose voices are represented in debates ● how competing interests are reconciled

and ● whether civic groups are effective in play-

ing the roles assigned to them in the evolv-ing international system.

Unless participation is effectively managed,the result may be gridlock, or chaotic policy-creation processes open to manipulation bythe loudest and strongest groups – a problemalready seen in the special-interest politics ofindustrial democracies like the US, and in thechaos of international gatherings like theGenoa G8 Summit in 2001. The reasons areclear.

First, the sheer number and diversity ofcivil society organisations makes it impossi-ble for each group to participate equally, andthere is no such thing as a ‘common agenda’for all such groups worldwide. Some USNGOs, for example, speak for family farms(like the ‘Institute for Agriculture and TradePolicy’), and others for agribusiness (like‘Truth about Trade’, headed by a former pres-ident of the American Farm Bureau Federa-tion). NGOs are often seen as part of an‘anti-globalisation movement’, but there arepro-globalisation networks too, like ‘Inter-national Consumers for Civil Society’ that

HERDING CATS? 73

actively promotes ‘free trade’ interests in theinternational arena.

According to some calculations, interna-tional development NGOs were outnum-bered by NGOs representing businessinterests at the WTO ministerial meetings inDoha in November 2001, including 26 indus-try committees advising the US Government.The US National Rifle Association has con-sultative status with ECOSOC (the UN’s Eco-nomic and Social Council) and is alreadyusing it to lobby against the NGO-led smallarms campaign. NGOs from the religiousRight (both Catholic and Protestant) usedthe Beijing plus 5 process to campaign againstother NGOs who were lob-bying for the extension ofabortion rights.

And one does not have tocite al Quaeda to make thepoint that elements of ‘unciv-il society’ abound. Even net-works with progressiveagendas are often dominatedby NGOs based in the indus-trialised world. For example,only 251 of the 1,550 NGOsassociated with the UN Department of Pub-lic Information come from the South, and theratio of NGOs in consultative status withECOSOC is even lower.

Second, the legitimacy of many civil actiongroups is often challenged on variousgrounds: ● they do not formally represent those on

whose behalf they claim to speak; ● they are not accountable for their actions,

or the results of the positions they take;● their policy positions are often inaccurate

and misleading; and● they are active only at the global level and

have no roots in local and national politics.There is some truth to all of these assertions,but the debate is clouded by confusion overwhat legitimacy actually means. Legitimacyis generally understood as the right of an

organisation to exist and act in society – asense that it is legal, relevant and justified inits chosen course of action. There are manyways that civil action groups may meet thesecriteria – through representation (as in mem-bership bodies like labour unions), throughcompetence and expertise (as when NGOs arerecognised as bringing valuable knowledgeand skills to the table by other legitimatebodies), through the law (as when NGOscomply with charity legislation, regulation,and effective oversight by their trustees), andthrough the moral claims of civil societygroups to promote the public interest, or atleast represent the views of large segments of

the public.NGOs do not have to be

member-controlled to be legit-imate, but they do have to beaccountable for their actions iftheir claims to legitimacy areto be maintained. If legitima-cy is claimed through repre-sentation, civil society groupsmust be able to show who itis they represent and howthey are held accountable by

their constituents. If it is claimed throughexpertise, they must be able to show how theirpositions have been derived, how rigorous-ly, and so on.

However, conflating different forms oflegitimacy for different groups confuses thedebate and increases the likelihood that crit-icisms will be used to exclude dissentingvoices rather than provide for their involve-ment . Any civil action group is entitled tovoice an opinion, so that even if global net-works lack fully democratic systems of gov-ernance and accountability, the increasingvoice of civil society adds an essential layerof checks and balances into the internationalsystem, and helps to ensure that excludedviews are heard.

Negotiating a treaty, however, is a very dif-ferent matter. In this case detailed rules may

“NGOs do not haveto be member-

controlled to belegitimate, but they

do have to beaccountable for their

actions if theirclaims to legitimacy

are to be maintained”

74 NEW ECONOMY

be essential to preserve genuine democracyin decision making. So while problems oflegitimacy are not a justification for turningback the tide of global citizen action, they area challenge to structure it in ways that com-bat, rather than accentuate, existing social,economic and political inequalities. How canthis be done?

Potential solutionsSolutions to the dilemmas of civil involve-ment in global governance must reconciletwo, potentially contradictory objectives. First,we need to give structure to the process to pre-vent those who shout loudest, or have therichest backers, dominating the debate. Thehuge number and diversity of civil societyactors, and the inequalities of voice andresources that exist between them, makerules, standards and protocols essential toadvance democracy and protect the publicinterest. Second, we need to ensure that thesestructures are as light and non-bureaucraticas possible, to avoid eroding the passion,spontaneity and diversity that are the hall-marks of a healthy civil society, including theright to non-violent street protest.

There are three different approachesamong those who are trying to strike this bal-ance. The first is to ‘aim high’ by pushing fornew, democratically-elected non-state bodiesto stand alongside inter-governmental struc-tures, such as a ‘Global Peoples’ Council’ tocomplement the Security Council and the UNGeneral Assembly. The obvious obstacle tothese models is the question of representa-tion, and how members would be electedacross such a diverse set of constituencies. Anumber of options exist, including repre-sentation from national parliaments, directelections from sub-national constituencies(as in the European Parliament), and electionsfrom non-state bodies that already representa constituency (like trade unions, profes-sional organisations, and national NGOumbrella bodies). However, there is little

political support at present for these ideasfrom governments in any part of the world.

The second approach – what might becalled ‘minimalism’ – opts for mechanismsthat can be accommodated fairly easily intothe present structure of international institu-tions. This would avoid scaring off govern-ment support, especially among those whoare suspicious of civil society participation,especially at the global level (like the gov-ernments of Brazil, India, or countries in theMiddle East). Examples include the NGOadvisory committees to the World Bank andUNDP (which suffer from unclear mandates,limited influence, and narrow non-electedmemberships), and non-representative bod-ies designed to provide a space for debatearound particular international institutions orregimes, with participants selected accordingto the expertise or material interest they havein the subject under discussion. One sugges-tion is for a ‘World Financial Forum’ for theIMF to enable civil society groups to debatepolicy and performance every two years,once the dust has settled on particular macro-economic crises. It is not difficult to envisagesomething similar on trade for the WTO.

Such ideas enjoy more political support,but often lack the resources and will to putthem into practice on a more substantial scaleor get them into the mainstream of the insti-tutions and procedures that make up theinternational system. The WTO, for example,has a total budget equivalent to less than halfthe World Bank’s budget for staff travel.

In the middle of these two extremes lieexperiments that try to balance involvementin debate and decision-making with attentionto questions of legitimacy and representation.These examples represent the most importantsources of energy and innovation in the inter-national system, and priority should go totesting the different models they represent sothat the lessons of experience can be fed backinto policy and practice. Among the mostinteresting current examples are:

HERDING CATS? 75

● Fully integrated decision-making bodiesin which governments, business and civilsociety representatives make collective deci-sions about global rules and standards. TheInternational Labor Organisation showsthat this is a possibility, though it has notworked especially well in practice.

● Multi-stakeholder bodies that encouragehonest debate (but not decision-making)among governments, business and civilsociety organisations around the same table,without fear of being co-opted. Many suchbodies have already been organised aroundthe implementation of Agenda 21 and otherUN processes, including in the lead up tothe Monterrey Conferenceon Financing for Develop-ment in 2002.

● Discussions between inter-governmental bodies andcivil society groups (organ-ised by region, sector, orissue) the day before officialmeetings are due to begin,as in the OECD Committeeprocess, or the use of the‘Arias Formula’ to extend invitations toNGOs to address the UN Security Counciloutside its official sessions. Proposalsalready exist to extend NGO accreditationfrom ECOSOC to the UN General Assem-bly for this purpose.

● Solicitation of ‘alternative reports’ fromcivil society groups to be considered along-side country reports from governments.Some UN Treaty bodies already do this(such as the UN Commission on the Rightsof the Child). The same principles could beused in the WTO to allow non-state actorsto submit briefs to the appellate body.

● Information and communications tech-nologies that facilitate discussion andinformation inputs from large numbers ofcivil society groups simultaneously or overshort periods of time before an official gath-ering (using ‘open space’ technology and

web-casting, for example, to synthesiselarge volumes of information and opinions).

● Internal codes of conduct that spell outminimum standards of behaviour, account-ability, transparency and representationin global civil society networks and coali-tions. The New Economics Foundationhas developed a ‘Code of Protest’ thatspecifies non-violence as a basic principle,alongside ‘remaining curious about per-spectives other than our own’ and ‘focus-ing on creative action’ (ie what NGOs arefor, not just against). Friends of the Earth(Europe) has launched a similar set of‘principles for peaceful protest,’ while the

Institute for Agriculture andTrade Policy (IATP) in theUS worked throughout 2001to exchange a number ofaccredited places at the WTOMinisterial meeting in Qatarwith NGO counterparts fromthe South, in order to ensuregreater balance in civil soci-ety representation.

These examples show thatreal progress is possible despite the con-straints and dilemmas that still stand in theway of granting full decision-making rightsto civil society groups. They deserve muchmore support and publicity to encourage fur-ther innovation and replication where appro-priate. There is also a pressing need for forumsat the global level that would allow govern-ments, inter-governmental institutions, civilsociety groups and business to discuss theseinnovations on a regular basis, and brain-storm new ideas.

The obvious home for such discussions isthe UN Secretariat – the fulcrum of globalgovernance and standard setting – especial-ly since the UN has not been the target of thekind of demonstrations that have affected theG7 and the International Financial Institu-tions. The UN needs to be much more proac-tive in using its greater perceived public

“The issue is not‘whether’ but ‘howbest’ to realise thepotential of civil

society involvementin global governance,

and offset anyassociated costs”

76 NEW ECONOMY

legitimacy to create opportunities for dia-logue around these new ‘rules of the road’.Annual meetings of the G8 group provideother opportunities to foster these conversa-tions, beginning in Canada later this year.

ConclusionThe role of civil society is increasing world-wide, and will continue to increase over thecoming years. The issue is not ‘whether’ but‘how best’ to realise the potential of civilsociety involvement in global governance,and offset any associated costs.

Clearly, civil society groups represent anenormous resource – in innovation and ideas,advocacy, popular mobilisation, financialinvestment and delivery. However, theseresources do not come for free. All civil soci-ety groups have institutional interests, rang-ing from narrow financial concerns to verybroad ideologically-framed agendas forchange. These interests may at times be invid-ious and sometimes illegal, such as the pur-suit of sectarian interests using violent orotherwise unacceptable means. However, the

institutional interests of civil society groupsare in the main perfectly legal, legitimate intheir own terms, and openly declared andpursued.

In realising the potential of civil societyinvolvement, the core challenge is how to bal-ance clear and enforceable rules with theencouragement of diversity, innovation, andthe organic evolution of new patterns of gov-ernance. Heavy-handed intervention or regu-lation by governments and inter-governmentalbodies is unlikely to yield the best results, sincethe temptation will always be for some statesto use the rules to exclude dissenting voicesand legitimise the status quo.

Instead, we should look for measures andmodels that provide positive incentives toresponsible practice, and reward those whorespond with extra access to the negotiatingtable. In the 21st Century, civil society willhave a voice in world affairs, if not a vote,and both governments and NGOs mustshare in the task of structuring those voicesin ways that promote genuine democracy onthe global stage ●