Helping Hands, IAEA Bulletin, May 2009

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYIAEA BULLETIN

Protecting the Oceans • Hanging Questions • Food Security

Helping Hands

May 2009 | 50-2 | www.iaea.org/bulletin

The International Atomic Energy Agency is the world’s centre of nuclear cooperation. Created in 1957 as the intergovernmental “atoms for peace” organization within the UN system, the IAEA contributes to global peace, development, and security in essential ways — helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and fostering safe, secure and peaceful uses of beneficial nuclear tech-nologies for human development.

The IAEA mission covers three main pillars of work, with authority rooted in its Statute:

Safeguards & Verification, including safeguards inspec-tions under legal agreements with States to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear material and activities.

Safety & Security, including the establishment of safety standards, codes, and guides and assistance to help States apply them.

Science & Technology, including technical and research support for nuclear applications in health, agriculture, energy, envi-ronment and other fields.

The work is multi-faceted and engages multiple governmental and other partners at national, regional and international levels in and outside the UN system. IAEA programmes and budgets are set through decisions of its own policymaking bodies — the 35-member Board of Governors and the General Conference of all Member States. Reports on IAEA activities are submitted peri-odically or as cases warrant to the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly.

The Agency is headquartered at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria. Operational field and liaison offices are centred in Toronto, Canada; Geneva, Switzerland; New York, USA; and Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA runs or supports research centres and scientific laboratories in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria; Monaco; and Trieste, Italy.

The IAEA Secretariat is a team of 2300 professional and support staff led by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and six Deputy Directors General who head the major departments:

Mr. David Waller Management

Mr. Olli Heinonen Safeguards

Mr. Yuri Sokolov Nuclear Energy

Mr. Werner Burkart Nuclear Science & Applications

Ms. Ana Maria Cetto Technical Cooperation

Mr. Tomihiro Taniguchi Safety & Security

IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 | 1

Helping HandsThe world has one billion slum dwellers, about one in six of us. For a brief moment this year, a few of them stood on the global stage. They became star actors in a movie — Slumdog Millionaire — that won cinema awards and critical acclaim in many countries. Though the title suggests otherwise, the film was not about chasing money but about a young man in India chasing romance against all odds — a love story with a happy end.

We need more happy ends in the cause of elevating “slumdogs” and sus-taining human development. The timing does not look good, and the out-comes cannot be scripted. Helping hands are sought nearly everywhere.

“The global economy is in a mess,” writes Homi Karas of the Brookings Institution, the renowned US think-tank. “That is not news. But the degree to which the global crisis has spread across all countries, even the poorest, is alarming.”

The situation is crushing investment to cut poverty and could add another 90 million people to those already living in slum neighbourhoods. In wealthier countries, the economic downturn is adding new faces to the ranks of the jobless, homeless, and hungry.

The United Nations has urged governments not to allow the financial crisis to turn into a prolonged human crisis that undermines hard-won progress to raise levels of income, education, nutrition, and health care. Foreign aid for developing countries can help slow but not solve the recessional course. The aid amounts are tiny — “a drop in the ocean,” the World Bank’s presi-dent says — compared to the trillions of dollars spent in stimulus packages to revive economies in wealthier nations.

The IAEA is not a big player in the marketplace of international develop-ment. But it is a leading player in a grand nuclear bargain that seeks to keep weapons proliferation at bay and help countries benefit from science and technology. This edition of the IAEA Bulletin reports on cancer, food, energy, and environmental threats. It also features the efforts of Zambia’s Beatrice Mwape and medical leaders like her in Africa who struggle to provide safe and effective health care for patients and practitioners alike.

This year is one of transition for the IAEA, with changes in leadership, fund-ing, and strategies on the horizon. Proposed budget increases to 2012 tar-get areas of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and technical support for peaceful nuclear applications in fields of medicine, food, water, and electricity production.

The call for more investment stems from “critical needs and priorities that have been ignored for far too long,” said IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei in briefing Member States. Without reinforcement, he sees the IAEA’s capabilities to serve countries eroding to dangerous levels. Later this year, governments will decide the IAEA’s next leaders, and where and how their funds are invested.

The stakes are high, and demand a happy end.

— Lothar Wedekind, Editor-in-Chief

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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYIAEA BULLETIN

Protecting the Oceans • Hanging Questions • Food Security

Helping Hands

May 2009 | 50-2 | www.iaea.org/bulletin

The Evolving Landscape of Nuclear Security p24Anita Nilsson explains how the international nuclear security paradigm is extending its reach.

The Peer View p27Dana Sacchetti provides an insight into how the IAEA is supporting safety advancements in nuclear infrastructures through its Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme.

Sidebars: OSART An Open Business

HealtH above allSmart Protection p31Madan M. Rehani suggests that an electronic “Smart Card” could serve as a digital medical record of radiation exposure for patients.

Sidebars: Africa’s Nightmare by Sasha Henriques

Measure for Measure by Sasha Henriques

Cancer: Where IAEA is Involved p38The IAEA is helping low-resource countries fight the growing cancer crisis.

Stronger Together, Weaker Apart p40For the IAEA collaboration is key in the global fight against cancer, writes Angela Leuker.

Food For tHougHtFighting Malnutrition p43Alan Jackson describes how nuclear technologies are helping scientists to understand, treat and prevent malnutrition wherever this scourge might be afflicting children.

Sidebar: International Malnutrition Task Force

Breeding Crops for Better Nutrition p45Yassir Islam and Christine Hotz explain how IAEA-supported research partnerships zero in on “biofortification”.

Sidebar: About HarvestPlus

Issues at largePath Towards the Future p6Ruud Lubbers outlines the considerations on the future role of the IAEA that emerged from its 11th Scientific Forum.

Sidebar: Finding A New Role, an interview with Ruud Lubbers

Protecting the Oceans p11The world’s scientific community is calling for urgent actions to halt rising levels of acidity in the oceans.

Sidebars: The Intense Effort Needed

The Monaco Environment and Economics Group

Sustaining Food Security p15Werner Burkart explains how science and technology can help meet world’s food production needs.

Nuclear Science for Food Security p19Crops developed through nuclear technologies provide much needed food as well as millions of dollars in economic benefits.

essentIal busInessA Global Challenge p22According to Tomihiro Taniguchi, nuclear activities are increasingly multinational, no longer confined to the borders of one country.

“It is necessary to have response measures in case of a seizure. These include knowing what to do with this material, taking proper radiation protection, but also handling the material in a safe and secure manner and bringing it to a place where it is under appropriate control. This is the essence of the holistic approach. ”— Anita Nilsson, Director of the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security/p24

CONTENTS IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009

Snapshots p4Facts, figures and images from a nuclear world.

nuclear science for Food security, p19

protecting the Oceans, p11

peer View, p27

Fighting Malnutrition, p43

lIFe moves onCommunities Helping Themselves p49Yoshio Matsuki reports on how, more than two decades after the Chernobyl accident, people living in the affected regions are slowly taking control of their lives.

Sidebar: Grass Roots Humanity

nuclear power, tomorrow and yesterdayHanging Questions p53Sharon Squassoni explains why a nuclear renaissance would require significant changes by both governments and multinational agencies as well as aggressive financial support.

Sidebar: Seven Steps

Pages from the Past: Nuclear Power Redux p58In 1986, nuclear’s contribution to electricity supply was growing and a nuclear expansion seemed to be under way. An excerpt from IAEA Bulletin archives.

a closer lookUnfair Trade p61Matti Tarvainen describes how nuclear trade analysis may provide early indications of proliferation.

The Tools of Today and Tomorrow p64Dana Sacchetti takes a look at the evolution of the technology employed by safeguards inspectors for their work — where they’ve been, and what the future holds for verification tools.

our HomeM is for Meetings p66The Vienna International Centre gets a dedicated conference facility.

smIles and InspIratIonIAEA on Canvas p68American artist Lisa Ruyter finds inspiration at the IAEA Board of Governor meetings, by Vannessa Maravilla

Art and Radiation p70A travelling exhibition combines science and art to artistically interpret the concepts of radiation and radiation protection.

Nuclear Humour p72Josef Kobra Kucera has published a collection of cartoons inspired by nuclear power under the title “Nuclear Smiles.”

4 | IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008

An Additional Protocol to the nuclear safeguards agreement (AP) between the IAEA and the US entered into force on 6 January 2009. All five nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) now have fulfilled their undertak-ing, assumed at the time of approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, to conclude such APs.

1 Billion

from our image bank

Europe’s Danube River shows signs of improving water quality and still contains significant natural populations of flora and fauna which are typical for such a large river. A study by the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), with assistance from IAEA hydrologists, concluded that the Danube River has less water pollution than before. But further reduction of nutrients and organic pollution is needed, and cities such as Budapest, Belgrade and Bucharest should establish waste water treatment plants, the study said.

The Joint Danube River Survey 2 was conducted for six weeks between August and September 2007.

(Photo: ICPDR)

US ratifies AP people around the world lack access to clean, safe drinking water.

Isotopes and the Danube

Source: www.worldwaterday.net

* As of May 2009. Source: IAEA

436nuclear power plants in 30 countries produce electricity.*

Radiation All Around Us

Source: World Health Organization

Sources of Human Exposure to Radiation

IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 | 5

Pictures from the decommissioning of the Merlin Research Reactor in Germany in 1985.

For more information and photos visit at www.iaea.org

An Agreement for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities was signed between the Government of India and the IAEA, on 2 February 2009 in Vienna. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and Ambassador Saurabh Kumar of India, signed the agreement.

The safeguards agreement, which is the result of several rounds of consultations conducted between India and the IAEA since November 2007, was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in August 2008. It will enter into force on the date the IAEA receives written notification from India that its statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met.

The IAEA already applies safeguards to six nuclear reactors in India under safeguards agreements concluded between 1971 and 1994. In the future, additional reactors are expected to be under IAEA safe-guards under the newly-signed agreement.

(Photo: D. Calma/IAEA)

India Safeguards Agreement Signed

The world’s cancer crisis took centre stage at a gala event in Monaco’s Hotel de Paris on 16 December 2008. Hosted by HSH Prince Albert II of Monaco and in the presence of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, the event aimed to raise awareness and funding for the work of the IAEA’s Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). Prince Albert underscored Monaco’s determination to add its support to the fight against cancer in low-income countries.

(From Left to Right: Prince Albert of Monaco, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei

and his wife Aida. Photo: “Centre de Presse de la Principauté de Monaco”)

Monaco dedicates Gala to IAEA Cancer Programme

2009marked the entry into force of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) treaty, where Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

path towards6 | IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009

the FutureIn this era of incessant change, “the

future”, it is said, “has a way of arriving unannounced”. Organisations, there-fore, face a constant challenge to try

and discern the trends that are likely to affect their future and to map the way ahead.

It is acknowledged that different expectations exist and will continue to exist on what the future holds in store. However, from our discussions [at the 2008 Scientific Forum] it was evident that the IAEA has over half a century of its existence assumed recog-nisable roles along well defined trajectories.

➟ In certain spheres of activity it is the acknowl-edged lead actor globally. For example, verification of the fulfilment of non-proliferation commitments;

➟ In certain other areas, for example in assessing nuclear energy as part of the global energy sector, the IAEA plays an important role as the place in the world where long-term visions, strategies, innova-tion and nuclear planning can be discussed and, hopefully be condensed into a shared view of all Member States on the nuclear future. The IAEA also assists States in developing infrastructural require-ments, energy assessments that support decision making;

➟ While safety and security are national respon-sibilities, the development of international safety standards and nuclear security norms based on best practices is a key IAEA role; and

➟ In yet other areas, such as the entire spectrum of development assistance, the role the IAEA plays is strategic but modest, making specific targeted

contributions in activities where nuclear techniques have a comparative advantage.

Let me outline the contours of what participants at the Scientific Forum viewed as the IAEA’s future along these trajectories. It is, of course, entirely pos-sible that there may be drivers in the future that could lead to changes in these trajectories.

Safeguarding Our FutureIt was an unfortunate twist of fate that the first pub-lic demonstration of nuclear technology was its destructive power. That association of nuclear tech-nology with destructive capabilities has remained the predominant concern in the public percep-tion of all things nuclear. Irrespective of the forum in which they are pursued, efforts towards nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation will remain crucial to the future of all aspects related to the public acceptance of nuclear technology. The perils of the ‘dark’ side of the nuclear equation are such that the IAEA’s verification role will always remain, in the public’s perception, an overwhelm-ing priority.

Much will depend on what will be the shared safe-guards and verification standard applied in 2020. In case it would be, as it is widely expected, the com-bination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, this would imply contin-uing changes to the verification culture and prac-tices including more information-driven verifica-tion activities, use of state-of-the-art technologies, high caliber staff, outsourcing, etc. Since the IAEA’s resources are unlikely to increase at the same pace

Considerations on the future role of the IAEA emerged from its 11th Scientific Forum.

by Ruud Lubberspath towards

path towards

Issues at Large | Path Towards the Future

IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009 | 7

as its increasing verification activities, efficiency requirements will also be greater. Transparency and cooperation with States and with nuclear vendors embedding safeguards features directly and deeply into their facility designs, systems and components, will play important roles.

Initiatives have been launched to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves over the next 25 years. Meeting successfully new global challenges needs also other innovations related to fourth (IV) genera-tion reactor systems and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

Past initiatives for multilateral nuclear cooperation did not result in any tangible results. Proliferation concerns were perceived as not serious enough. Economic incentives were seldom strong enough. Concerns about assurances of supply were para-mount. National pride also played a role, alongside expectations about the technological and eco-nomic spin-offs to be derived from nuclear activi-ties. Many of these considerations may still be per-tinent.

However, the result of balancing these considera-tions today, in the face of a possible multiplication of nuclear facilities over the next decades and the pos-sible increase in proliferation risks associated with sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, may well produce an environment more conducive to mul-tilateral nuclear approaches in the 21st century that may help the expansion of nuclear power.

Myriad technical issues of an evolutionary nature will form the “bread and butter” tasks in the fore-seeable future. On the other hand, it is imperative not to lose sight of the commitment of all of us to “de-demonize” nuclear technology. The genie can-not be put back into the bottle. We need, however, to be assured that it is up to no further harm. This can only be done if disarmament and arms control return as the focus of the international agenda. It is rightly pointed out that the IAEA is not the lead agency or forum for nuclear disarmament.

However, it must prepare for and be ready to respond to the technical needs of verification which will be required to be met as and when the polit-ical decisions are taken in the appropriate fora. As the Secretary General in his message to the 52nd session of the General Conference indicated, future progress in nuclear disarmament may also bring opportunities for the IAEA in the area of verification, transparency and irreversibility.

Partnerships for Meeting Energy Needs in a Safe and Secure MannerIt is estimated that the world’s energy needs could be 50% higher in 2030 than they are today. There are rising expectations in the area of nuclear power that are gradually leading towards a renaissance of nuclear energy, through expanding programmes in ‘mature’ countries and through new programmes in ‘newcomer’ countries alike. As a result, the nuclear landscape in the next decades might look funda-mentally different from that of today.

A second important fact affecting the nuclear future is that the perceived or real concerns associ-ated with the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste remain. To a large extent, public acceptance of the use of nuclear power depends on the solu-tions to this issue. The expectations from the IAEA are likely to be:

➟ A continuing demand for support stemming from operating nuclear installations;

➟ In the short and medium term, requests for more support for ‘newcomer’ countries, either through providing planning and decision-making guidance or through direct assistance;

➟ To ensure the sustainable development of nuclear energy, continued IAEA support will be needed in finding appropriate solutions for the back-end issue, keeping in mind concerns linked to scarcity of resources, technical sustainability of the complete global nuclear system and public accept-ance;

➟ The IAEA will be asked to contribute to innova-tion that will be key for building the nuclear fleet of tomorrow, be it in nuclear power technology, fuel

Myriad technical issues of an evolutionary nature will form the “bread and butter” tasks in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, it is imperative not to lose sight of the commitment of all of us to “de-demonize” nuclear technology.

the Future


8 | IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009

cycle technology or innovations in institutional arrangements;

➟ The IAEA should continue to be an active player in the global debate on climate change, possibly also in connection with public acceptance cam-paigns, taking advantage of its role as a trusted inter-national organization.

The envisaged renaissance depends very much on the success of international cooperation and approaches, and thus on the IAEA, in particu-lar regarding confidence-building, communicat-ing with the public and with governments, and in consensus-building through a global discussion. A bright future of nuclear energy does not only depend on individual countries’ policies. It depends on all those who want to use its benefits to get it right every time, thus the world needs to do nuclear together.

A stringent approach to safety and security is neces-sary to enable this renaissance. Measures to advance nuclear safety and security are important and should be achieved in a way which harmonises them.

There is recognition that, while safety requirements are well established, not all safety problems have been resolved. In addition, security requirements continue to develop. Care must be taken to ensure that this process of continuous improvement results in harmony between safety and security. It is impor-tant to emphasize that the protection of people and the environment is the ultimate goal and that harmonization of safety and security is a means to achieve the end goal, it is not the end goal itself.

Continuous international cooperation will be required to facilitate improvements to safety and security. Numerous challenges remain in harmoniz-ing safety and security, in particular because security often involves sensitive information. The IAEA has a leading role in this harmonization process through the definition of instruments, standards and norms and the provision of services. It will require strength-ened capabilities including adequate resources to take on this expanded role and to continuously improve its standards, guidance and services.

Opportunities in Partnerships for Development

The development scenario is one of pressing, unful-filled needs. Amidst the vast expanse of unfulfilled needs, the validity, indeed the viability of an organ-

isation adopting solely a normative role, while hav-ing the capacity to contribute its mite to develop-mental goals is a non sequitur. At the Forum, it was a widely shared belief that targeted assistance in human health, food and agriculture, environment and water resources are areas where nuclear tech-nologies can make a difference.

By way of illustration, let me provide a few examples of where Forum participants strongly felt that the IAEA can and should be doing more, much more, in the future:

➟ While combating cancer is a multi-dimensional effort, nuclear techniques have a unique role in can-cer diagnosis and therapy. Radiation therapy — a lifesaving component of treatment for over 50% of cancer patients in high income countries — remains out of reach for millions of cancer patients in the developing world. The current shortage of radio-therapy machines in developing countries exceeds 5000 machines, with no radiotherapy capacity at all in more than 30 countries in Africa and Asia. The IAEA has unrivalled experience in the transfer of radiotherapy and diagnostic imaging technology and nuclear medicine procedures to developing countries as part of its support for the safe, effective and sustained implementation of radiotherapy and nuclear medicine services.

➟ If the target set by the UN of 50% more food annually by 2030 is to be met, food production must grow by 2% per year. Historically, every quan-tum leap in food production in the past was based on a change in agrarian practices along two dimen-sions, namely a change in cultivation practices com-bined with genetic selection of new crops, varieties and breeds. The Joint FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation)/IAEA Division is well placed to partic-ipate in and contribute to both these endeavours. It can assist in transforming cultivation practices by transferring methodologies aimed at making eco-system services visible and valued by policy makers, starting with plant nutrient transformations in soil ecosystems, crops and livestock. Partnerships with environmental scientists, ecologists, agronomists, livestock specialists, nutritionists, social scientists and policy makers need to be pursued. Similarly, nuclear scientists will need to partner with genet-icists, plant and animal breeders, molecular biolo-gists and social scientists to play a meaningful role in surmounting the challenge posed by the need for appropriate genetic varieties and breeds.

➟ The combination of a growing population, increased industrial growth and irrigated agricul-ture has stressed the global freshwater resources

the Future



over the last several decades. Isotope and nuclear techniques have demonstrated their utility in understanding water dynamics, past climates and in assessing available resources. Isotopes help to rapidly and cost-effectively provide scientific infor-mation on, and understanding of water resources – that may otherwise not be possible or may require observations over decades. Additionally, in order to apply isotopes at local or regional scales and in particular to assess the impact of climate change, methodologies and reference data sets are needed on an international scale. The IAEA’s continued role in collecting isotope data and assisting developing countries to use such data will remain important in the future. There is also a continuing need for the IAEA to build sufficiently trained capacity and to help countries use isotopes for their national water resource assessment and management efforts. To maximize the effectiveness of its work, the IAEA needs to enhance partnerships with other UN and international programmes and agencies such as the World Bank, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

Given the overwhelming nature of development needs, the scope for an enhancement of the IAEA’s future role in this area remains vast. However, for this to happen, the provision of operational support through enhanced technical cooperation in part-nership with other organisations will need to be sup-plemented by giving thought to overcoming factors that have impeded the full potential of nuclear tech-nologies being realised. Working towards enhanc-ing acceptability, accessibility and affordability of nuclear technologies for development will be the key to success of the IAEA as an organisation con-tributing to development.

Concluding RemarksIn their capacity as specialists, the Forum partic-ipants did not delve into the financial and admin-istrative minutiae of the Future Role of the IAEA. It was self-evident to all of us, and this is a fact I would like to emphasize, that growing expectations vis-à-vis the IAEA will have to be accompanied by a con-sideration of the need for additional resources. Such resources should not be subject to artificial con-straints. As President Eisenhower once said, “there is no victory at bargain basement prices.”

To sum up, let me reiterate those five items which were the most relevant messages that we heard in

the course of this Scientific Forum and which are vital from the point of view of the IAEA’s dual mis-sion for development and security:

➟ The nuclear landscape is changing. In modern organizations there is no success without a strategic framework, where a shared vision is a critical focal point giving shape and direction to the organiza-tion’s future. The world needs the IAEA to plan to stay ahead of the curve and should provide it with the required mandate, strengthened capabilities and necessary resources;

➟ The IAEA needs to provide more technical assist-ance to individual Member States, working through the transfer of technology, decision making sup-port, planning tools, capacity and knowledge build-ing and R&D coordination;

➟ The IAEA needs to work towards enhanc-ing acceptability, accessibility and affordability of nuclear technologies for development;

➟ The IAEA needs to make sure that all existing and planned nuclear installations respect safety, security and safeguards requirements; and

➟ The IAEA needs to be the place in the world where technical visions are shared and — hopefully — harmonized to build one nuclear future that the world creates jointly.

The path towards the future is a journey and not an end. When looking back at the history of the IAEA in maybe 10, 20, or 50 years, the process of discussions on the “Future Role of the IAEA”, and all actions that we expect to be triggered by these considerations will form a milestone in the course adopted by the IAEA. That the participants of the Scientific Forum were part of this process and hopefully will have contributed to the transition which comes about, is a matter of satisfaction to all of us who participated in this venture. We are honoured to have had the opportunity to be part of this process.

Ruud Lubbers, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, chaired the 11th IAEA Scientific Forum held from 30 September-1 October 2008 in Vienna, Austria.

This article is an excerpt of his report to the 52nd Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference delivered on 3 October 2008.



Question: What are in you view the nuclear issues of the 21st century?Ruud Lubbers: The nuclear issues of the 21st cen-tury are essentially those of the past, as they haven’t really changed.

There are two dimensions to them: the world agreed to promote atoms for peace and prosperity, while at the same time find a way to gradually reduce and ultimately ban nuclear arms.

This was many decades ago, but if you take stock today, at the beginning of a new century, this is still the call: to do these two things together.

Q: What do you think is the current status and role of the IAEA? Is the IAEA equipped to deal with the challenges lying ahead?RL: The IAEA has a good name and reputation. I would not say it is in difficulty, but it is facing chal-lenges nonetheless.

Firstly, it needs reinforced financial means. Secondly, in reducing nuclear arms and preventing prolifera-tion the IAEA is in a difficult position.

Q: In the past you spoke of the need for suprana-tional means to address the nuclear challenge. What role should the IAEA play in a reinforced global nuclear order?

RL: I believe that the role of the IAEA should be strengthened anyhow. But let me give you a couple of examples more to the point.

After World War II, when six European countries decided to get together in a community, they also concluded that it would be wise for them to organ-ise an “atoms for peace” as one community. That tra-dition is still there in Europe: when a country builds a nuclear power plant, still, legally speaking, the fissile material is property of the EU.

In the Middle East, there have been talks of estab-lishing a nuclear weapons free zone. For this to hap-pen, you need a supranational agency in charge of

fissile material in the region. That’s the only way it could be done.

Q: Do you think the IAEA should have a role in disarmament and nuclear weapons monitoring as well?

RL: Yes. An Agency with a monitoring and reporting role would create confidence in the public at large. But it is for the international community to entrust the IAEA with this role.

Q: What should be the role of international part-nerships between the IAEA and other interna-tional organizations?

RL: The are many issues on the table today: Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), climate change, water resources, etc. There is an awareness of the fact that these problems should be addressed together. The IAEA is in the centre of these issues and should play a key, partnership role in address-ing them.

Finding a New RoleGiovanni Verlini spoke with Ruud Lubbers after the conclusion of the 11th IAEA Scientific Forum.

Ruud Lubbers, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, chaired the 11th IAEA Scientific Forum held from 30 September- 1 October 2008 in Vienna, Austria.

(Photo: De Derde Kamer)

The world’s scientific community is calling for urgent actions to halt rising levels of acidity in the oceans.

Protecting the Oceans

Issues at Large | Protecting the Oceans


We scientists who met in Monaco* to review what is known about ocean acidification declare that we are

deeply concerned by recent, rapid changes in ocean chemistry and their potential, within decades, to severely affect marine organisms, food webs, biodi-versity, and fisheries.

To avoid severe and widespread damages, all of which are ultimately driven by increasing concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), we call for policy makers to act quickly to incorporate these concerns into plans to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at a safe level to avoid not only dangerous climate change but also dangerous ocean acidification.

Ocean Acidification The surface ocean currently absorbs about one-fourth of the CO2 emitted to the atmosphere from human activities, namely from fossil-fuel combus-tion, deforestation, and cement production. As this CO2 dissolves in seawater, it forms carbonic acid, increasing ocean acidity.

Since industrialization began in the 18th century, surface-ocean acidity has increased by 30%. This ongoing ocean acidification is decreasing the abil-ity of many marine organisms to build their shells and skeletal structure. Increasing acidity and related changes in seawater chemistry also affect repro-duction, behaviour, and general physiological func-tions of some marine organisms, such as oysters, sea urchins, and squid.

Damage is DetectableObservations collected over the last 25 years show consistent trends of increasing acidity in surface waters that follow increasing atmospheric CO2.

These trends match precisely what is expected based on basic marine chemistry and continuous measurements of atmospheric CO2. A range of field studies suggest that impacts of acidification on some major marine calcifiers may already be detectable.

Also, naturally high-CO2 marine environments exhibit major shifts in marine ecosystems follow-ing trends expected from laboratory experiments. Ocean acidification has altered some coastal waters to the extent that recently during spring they have become corrosive to the shells of some bottom dwelling organisms. Within decades these shell-dis-solving conditions are projected to be reached and to persist throughout most of the year in the polar oceans.

Imminent DangerCurrently the average concentration of atmos-pheric CO2 is 385 parts per million (ppm), which is 38% more than the preindustrial level of 280 ppm. Half of that increase has occurred in the last 30 years. Current CO2 emissions are greater than projected for the worst-case scenario formulated a decade ago. And along with increasing emissions, the increase in atmospheric CO2 is accelerating.

By mid-century, the average atmospheric CO2 con-centration could easily reach double the prein-dustrial concentration. At that 560- ppm level, it is expected that coral calcification rates would decline by about one-third. Yet even before that happens, formation of many coral reefs is expected to slow to the point that reef erosion will dominate. Reefs would no longer be sustainable. By the time that atmospheric CO2 reaches 450 ppm, it is projected that large areas of the polar oceans will have become corrosive to shells of key marine calcifiers.

Socioeconomic ImpactsOcean acidification could affect marine food webs and lead to substantial changes in commercial fish stocks, threatening protein supply and food secu-rity for millions of people as well as the multi-billion dollar fishing industry. Coral reefs provide fish hab-itat, generate billions of dollars annually in tourism, protect shorelines from erosion and flooding, and provide the foundation for tremendous biodiver-sity, equivalent to that found in tropical rain forests. Yet by mid-century, ocean acidification may render most regions chemically inhospitable to coral reefs.

The surface ocean currently absorbs about one-fourth of the CO2 emitted to the atmos-

phere from human activities, namely from fossil-fuel combustion, deforestation, and

cement production.



These and other acidification-related changes could affect a wealth of marine goods and services, such as our ability to use the ocean to manage waste, to pro-vide chemicals to make new medicines, and to ben-efit from its natural capacity to regulate climate. For instance, ocean acidification will reduce the ocean’s capacity to absorb anthropogenic CO2, which will exacerbate climate change.

Rapid Acidification, Slow Recovery

The current increase in ocean acidity is a hundred times faster than any previous natural change that has occurred over the last many millions of years. By the end of this century, if atmospheric CO2 is not sta-bilized, the level of ocean acidity could increase to three times the preindustrial level. Recovery from this large, rapid, human-induced perturbation will require thousands of years for the Earth system to re-establish ocean chemical conditions that even partially resemble those found today; hundreds of thousands to millions of years will be required for coral reefs to return, based on the past record of nat-ural coral-reef extinction events.

Limiting Future CO2 Levels can Help

So-called geo-engineering strategies that would not aim to restrict future atmospheric CO2 con-centrations would not reduce ocean acidification. Mitigation strategies that aim to transfer CO2 to the ocean, for example by direct deep sea disposal of CO2 or by fertilising the ocean to stimulate biologi-cal productivity, would enhance ocean acidification in some areas while reducing it in others. Climate-change negotiations focused on stabilizing green-house gases must consider not only the total radia-tion balance; they must also consider atmospheric CO2 as a pollutant, an acid gas whose release to the atmosphere must be curtailed in order to limit ocean acidification. Hence, limits (stabilization tar-gets) for atmospheric CO2 defined based on ocean acidification may differ from those based on surface temperature increases and climate change.

Despite a seemingly bleak outlook, there remains hope. We have a choice, and there is still time to act if serious and sustained actions are initiated without further delay. First and foremost, policy makers need to realize that ocean acidification is not a peripheral issue. It is the other CO2 problem that must be grap-pled with alongside climate change. Reining in this

double threat, caused by our dependence on fossil fuels, is the challenge of the century.

Solving this problem will require a monumental worldwide effort. All countries must contribute, and developed countries must lead by example and by engineering new technologies to help solve the problem. Promoting these technologies will be rewarded economically, and prevention of severe environmental degradation will be far less costly for all nations than would be trying to live with the consequences of the present approach where CO2

To stay below an atmospheric CO2 level of about 550 ppm, the current increase in total CO2 emissions of 3% per year must be reversed by 2020. Even steeper reductions will be needed to keep most polar waters from becoming corrosive to the shells of key marine species and to maintain favourable conditions for coral growth.

If negotiations at the UN Climate Change Conference — Conference of the Parties in its fifteenth session (COP15) — in Copenhagen in December 2009, fall short of these objec-tives, still higher atmospheric CO2 levels will be inevitable.

The Intense Effort Needed

In the spirit of the Monaco Declaration, the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratories and the Scientific Centre of Monaco have established an expert group to assess the economic impact of ocean acidification. Bridging the gap between environmental science and economics, the Monaco Environment and Economics Group brings together the leading scientific experts of ocean acidification and natural resource economics. They investigate both what is known about ocean acidification, its biological effects and predicted global impacts, as well as ways to evaluate its potential economic costs to fisheries, aquaculture and tourism.

The Monaco Environment and Economics Group



emissions and atmospheric CO2 concentrations continue to increase, year after year.

Fortunately, partial remedies already on the table, if implemented together, could solve most of the problem. We must start to act now because it will take years to change the energy infrastructure and to overcome the atmosphere’s accumulation of excess CO2, which takes time to invade the ocean.

Conclusions

Therefore, we urge policy makers to launch four types of initiatives:

➻ to help improve understanding of impacts of ocean acidification by promoting research in this field, which is still in its infancy;

➻ to help build links between economists and sci-entists that are needed to evaluate the socioeco-nomic extent of impacts and costs for action versus inaction;

➻ to help improve communication between pol-icy makers and scientists so that i) new policies are

based on current findings and ii) scientific studies can be widened to include the most policy-relevant questions; and

➻ to prevent severe damages from ocean acidifi-cation by developing ambitious, urgent plans to cut emissions drastically.

*The statement, known as the Monaco Declaration, was approved by 155 scientists from 26 countries, lead-ers of research into ocean acidification and its impacts, who met in Monaco in October 2008 for the Second International Symposium on the Ocean in a High-CO2 World.

The Symposium was chaired by the IAEA’s James Orr, a research scientist at the IAEA Marine Environmental Laboratories. E-mail: [email protected]

This document is based on the report Research Priorities for Ocean Acidification, available online at: http://ioc3.unesco.org/oanet/HighCO2World.html.

The photo is a reprint of ‘The Great Wave off Kanagawa‘ by the Japanese artist Katsushika Hokusai.


There is no quick fix to the food security crisis that contin-ues to afflict the world’s poorest nations. However, in the medium term, action can be taken to lay the necessary

foundations for a lasting solution to the crisis, enhancing the sustainability of food production and agriculture while simul-taneously improving the quality and safety of the food availa-ble for consumption, particularly in the least developed coun-tries. At the IAEA, our role is to encourage Member States to apply, in an integrated manner, the results of decades of sci-entific research. As importantly, we work to promote dialogue between policy makers and to encourage interdisciplinary and sustainable solutions to the food crisis.

Good seeds and fertilizer, albeit extremely important, will not alone solve the issue of sustainable agriculture and food pro-duction if the most precious resources — our soil and water — are squandered. Through integrated management of these resources, and with the application of a range of technologies, including nuclear technologies, current farming practices can be transformed to obtain higher and sustainable yields. At the same time, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be reduced, thus contributing to climate change mitigation.

Moreover, diseases such as cancers, heart disease and diabetes are on the rise, much of which is attributed to changes in life-style and diet. It is important to address not only the quantity but also the quality of food available to the world population. In particular for children and young people, who are growing and developing quickly, we must ensure that the right foods, rich in essential micronutrients and vitamins, are available at affordable prices.

Integrated Solutions to Complex QuestionsSome would argue that the present food crisis closely follows the theory of Reverend Thomas Malthus, espoused back in the 18th century, that food production, growing arithmetically, could never match exponential population increase. A closer look shows this analysis to be inexact.

SustainingSound science and technology can help the world meet its needs of food production.

by Werner Burkart

A study in Bangladesh is evaluating the impact of replacing white

sweet potatoes with orange flesh potatoes having high pro-vitamin A carotenoid content (biofortified

sweet potatoes) to combat vitamin A deficiency in women.

(Photo: K. Jamil, ICDDR, B. Dhaka, Bangladesh)

Food Security

Issues at Large | Sustaining Food Security


In the next 30 years, by 2040, the world popula-tion will reach nine billion people, compared with today’s nearly seven billion. This fact, combined with a host of problems such as poor water and soil management, climate change and variability, lack of investment in research and development, ineffi-cient or non-existent infrastructure for food distri-bution infrastructure and plummeting world eco-nomic growth prospects in the near future paints a dire and increasingly complex picture.

At the IAEA, we are working closely with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) through our Joint FAO/IAEA Division to change this picture. We believe that on the basis of sound science and technology and through efficient tech-nology transfer mechanisms, food production can keep up not only with the pace of population growth but also with the needs of the growing pop-ulation, provided that considerable educational

efforts are made in the name of nutrition and food security.

The Recent Fall in Food Prices Provide a False Sense of Security

Since the financial crisis began at the end of last year, food prices have fallen steeply; the interna-tional price of corn, wheat and rice has tumbled by 40–60%, but remains above the long-term average. However, as FAO warned, this temporary relief to ordinary people must not provide a false sense of security.

As the credit crunch hits the agricultural market, with prices falling and limited financing available for fertilizers and other inputs, farmers will reduce their planting. This could result in smaller harvests. And with less food on the shelves, prices might surge to all-time highs, unleashing worse riots than those wit-nessed in Latin America and the Middle East in 2007. Even more countries may require food aid, leav-ing us even further from achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of those going hungry by 2015.

This is of particular concern: rather than declines in the number of hungry people on the planet, the world has witnessed increases of 75 million in 2007 and 40 million in 2008, bringing the world total to 963 million hungry people.

To rid the world of extreme poverty and hun-ger, continued investment and the application of research and development in agriculture and food production is essential. For the past 60 years, the international community has called for integrated approaches to food security. One such call was made at the beginning of the year at the Madrid High-Level Meeting on Food Security for All, hosted by the Government of Spain on behalf of the United Nations High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis that was set up in April 2008 by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

Collective ActionThe challenges facing us in food and agriculture are enormous and require both a collective effort and long-term solutions. Scientific and technological innovation will play a crucial role in promoting glo-bal food safety and security, and international coop-

IAEA scientists assess the impact of exposure of commercial seafood,

such as the cuttlefish, to seawater at the

decreased pH levels predicted by climate

change models. (Photo: Courtesy of Todd Stailey,

Tennesee Aquarium)

To rid the world of extreme poverty and hunger, continued investment

and the application of research and development in agriculture and food

production is essential.

Issues at Large | Sustaining Food Security


eration will be vital. As a related organization to the United Nations system with a technical mandate, in continued partnership with the FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO), the IAEA is well posi-tioned to further the use and application of tech-nology in both agriculture and food production sys-tems including water and soil management as well as fisheries. Down the line, nuclear technology can greatly assist in improving the nutritional quality of food.

While more can be done to encourage their use, applications of nuclear science and technology already are essential components of the work to improve crop and livestock production, and the quality and variety of foods. For example, isotopic techniques and neutron moisture probes are part of almost all national research efforts to optimize plant fertilizer uptake, minimize soil erosion and water pollution, improve soil fertility and the effi-cient use of water for food production.

Likewise, research supported through partner-ships encourages plant breeding and genetics pro-grammes to produce better varieties of food and industrial crops. Radiation induced mutations such as drought-resistant cotton plants and saline-resist-ant rice, to mention just two, have provided new hopes and economic opportunities for rural com-munities around the world.

In animal production, the FAO/IAEA implements feed supplementation strategies for animals kept on low-quality diets by smallholder farmers. The nuclear and nuclear related serological platforms that FAO/IAEA experts helped to develop are now widely used by artificial insemination services for dairy farmers and by veterinary authorities to diag-nose diseases and to monitor the success of eradica-tion or control efforts. Advances in molecular tech-nologies will follow suit. Nuclear techniques are also used to identify the causes of ocean acidification, partly responsible for the depletion of fish stocks in our oceans.

Working directly with ministries of science and tech-nology, ministries of health, and ministries of agri-culture through technical cooperation, the IAEA promotes the use of scientific and technological innovation in global food security. Performed under controlled conditions, applications of nuclear sci-ence and technology have much to contribute to improving the quality and variety of foods, to avoid-ing the loss of genetic diversity and its consequent impact on long-term human health, to boosting the nutrient content of crops, and to increasing crop and livestock production.

Using integrated management approaches, nuclear techniques are used extensively in agriculture to make food crops more resistant to disease, boost crop yields and combat pests and animal diseases, manage soils and water management, and identify causes of ocean acidification. The immediate solu-tion to the crisis is to increase and finance mecha-nisms of agricultural self-sufficiency, particularly for food import-reliant countries. In the medium to long term, the world must look beyond the acute needs and invest in comprehensive agricultural and envi-ronmental management that not only mitigates, but actually contributes to enrich the world’s food and water sources for future generations.

Werner Burkart is Deputy Director General and Head of the IAEA’s Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications. E-mail: [email protected]

Using nuclear techniques in conservation agriculture, can increase crop yield, improve soil quality and enhance land carbon sequestration. These techniques are being applied in extensive soybean cultivation in Brazil. (Photo: IAEA)

Nuclear techniques are used extensively in agriculture to make food crops more resistant to disease, boost crop yields and combat pests and animal diseases, manage soils and water management, and identify causes of ocean acidification, largely responsible for the depletion of fish stocks in our oceans.

IAEA


Food SecurityFor decades the IAEA, in partnership with FAO, has assisted its Member States in producing more, better and safer food. In plant breeding and genetics, its expertise is helping achieve enhanced agricultural output using nuclear technology around the world.

The pictures that follow show some of the crops developed through nuclear technologies. They help provide much needed food as well as millions of dollars in economic benefits for farmers and consumers, especially in developing countries.

nuclear science for

Food Security20 | IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009

Canada’s Linola mutant series of linseed contains reduced levels of linolenic and raised levels of linoleic acid making it similar to traditional sunflower oil and therefore suitable for human consumption. Linola accounts for about 10% of all flax/linseed grown in Canada, a major flax producer.

In Egypt, three mutant varieties of high-yielding, disease and insect resistant sesame are bringing higher economic returns than standard varieties.

Pasta, Italy’s favourite food, is made with mutant varieties of durum wheat and contributes tens of millions of dollars each year to farmers’ incomes.

Turkey’s chickpea mutant was successfully released with enhanced yield potential, higher seed protein, early maturity and resistance to blight.

The USA’s grapefruit variety ‘Rio Star’, with its characteristic bright red coloured flesh, now accounts for 75% of the highly lucrative US grapefruit production.

Text: Angela Leuker ♦ Design: Ritu Kenn ♦ For more information visit: www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/FoodSecurity

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Food Security IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009 | 21

In Pakistan, a mutant producing better quality and higher yielding crops quadrupled cotton production within 10 years of release (1983-1992), and now accounts for 70% of all cotton grown in the Punjab. Economic contribution: $20 million a year.

In China, up to 2005, a total of 638 mutant varieties of 42 plant species were released, covering nine million hectares of planting area. Increased cereal production brings economic benefits of roughly $420 million a year.

India’s mutant groundnut series ‘TAG’ has early maturity, high pod growth and greatly improved harvest rates. Total domestic seed sales amount to 132 000 tons and cover 6.5 million hectares.

In Peru’s high Andes, stronger, healthier varieties of barley grow at altitudes of up to 5000 meters, producing harvests of some 1200 kilograms a hectare. This is an increase of 50% against earlier levels, which translates to roughly $9 million a year.

Ghana’s Cassava variety ‘Tek Bankye’, with improved cooking quality, was released to wide acclaim. Trials are underway to produce higher-yielding, disease resistant cassava, with improved starch content.

Flickr.com/jackFrench

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Flickr.com/Hrishikesh Karanjikar

photogallery.nrcs.usda.gov

IAEA

ChallengeA Global

by Tomihiro Taniguchi


The IAEA, in its role as a leading organization for pro-moting international cooperation among its Member States, is in a unique position to observe global trends, issues and challenges in nuclear safety and security through a wide variety of activities related to the estab-lishment of safety standards and security guidelines and their use. Particularly important opportunities are through the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which oblige the Contracting Parties to submit their country reports for international peer review. On the whole, the IAEA believes that the international nuclear community has achieved a high level of safety per-formance. Nevertheless, vigilance is always required for safety and there is no room for complacency. As often noted by the IAEA Director General, “safety should always be considered a work in progress.”

Today, there is much interest in new nuclear power programmes and the rapid expansion of existing pro-grammes. Nearly 70 countries are considering or have expressed interest in developing nuclear power pro-grammes. Many pundits refer to this renewed interest as a ‘nuclear renaissance.’ I, on the other hand, view this reality as a Vita Nova, or new life, because the nuclear community needs new ideas and innovative thinking to address new challenges, rather than a simple revival of the ‘good old days.’ This perception of a Vita Nova is particularly relevant for new entrant countries and in Asia where significant nuclear power development has continued for the last two decades.

Today’s nuclear business, activities and challenges are increasingly multinational and global in nature, and no longer confined to the borders of one coun-try. To the contrary, a nuclear activity in one country is likely to transcend national borders to involve gov-ernments, non-governmental organizations, indus-try and the public media from many countries. This fact will continue to present challenges for the inter-national nuclear community to address, ranging from the limited supply of major reactor components and trans-border emergency response to managing cul-

tural diversities. As an example, you may have read about the Finnish European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) construction experience and the challenges posed by multicultural and multilingual subcontractors and construction crews. Such multinational complexities in supply, use and impact chains require improved communication, enhanced cooperation and appro-priate oversight by vendors, operators and regulators to ensure that product quality and organisational com-petence are maintained.

The opportunities and challenges of today have strengthened the level of international cooperation towards the prevention of another serious accident or terrorist event and the coordination of international response, should it occur. In this regard, I would like to share with you the IAEA’s key areas of focus for continu-ously improving nuclear safety and security, and the fur-ther promotion of effective international cooperation.

IAEA’s Role in Nuclear Safety and SecurityThe IAEA facilitates and promotes international coop-eration among its Member States to develop and effectively use high quality safety standards and secu-rity guidelines. At the request of its Member States, the IAEA also provides various peer reviews, advisory services and training events based on these standards and guidelines. In addition, the IAEA is the depository of important legally-binding international safety and security conventions and other non-binding interna-tional instruments.

Key Areas of FocusThe IAEA’s first key area of focus is with the safety and security of existing nuclear facilities and activities. As you know, a serious safety or security event in one corner of the world can have lasting implications in another and diminish the confidence and support needed to introduce a new nuclear programme or expand an existing one.

Nuclear activities are increasingly multinational, no longer confined to the borders of one country.

Nuclear Safety & Security

Essential Business | A Global Challenge


Through experience, it is widely shared that self-assess-ment and international peer review activities are valua-ble tools to help ensure high levels of safety and secu-rity performance. In fact, these tools are becoming almost mandatory for European Union Member States, as noted in a newly proposed directive by the European Commission. The IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service (or IRRS) and the Operational Safety Review Team (or OSART) are two of the best-known peer review services that the Agency provides for its Member States. US nuclear power plants have hosted six OSART missions since 1987. These missions have been highly valued by the associated nuclear facility and the participating experts. I am very pleased that the US has requested an IRRS peer review mission that will be carried out in 2010. I am confident that this will provide a precious mutual learning opportunity for the US and the other participating countries.

While nuclear power plants have made peer reviews and self-assessment valuable common practices, many other nuclear applications throughout the world have not. The international nuclear community can certainly improve in this regard.

The IAEA’s second key area of focus is to support the safe and secure introduction of new nuclear power programmes. The collective knowledge from over five decades of worldwide experience is an invalua-ble resource for those considering nuclear power pro-grammes for the first time. In this sense, the IAEA has been adapting and continuously improving its existing standards, guidelines and services to better meet the needs of those countries embarking on new nuclear power programmes.

Global Nuclear Safety and Security RegimeThe IAEA’s third key area of focus is the continuous improvement of the global regime that is in place today as the worldwide international framework for nuclear safety and security. Please allow me to briefly explain this concept. In general terms, the global nuclear safety and security regime reflects the consen-sus that emerged following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which underscored the need for international cooperation to prevent another serious nuclear acci-dent. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 further underscored the similar need but in the areas of security and protec-tion against terrorism.

More specifically, the global nuclear safety and security regime is comprised of the institutional, legal and tech-nical frameworks for ensuring the safety and security of nuclear facilities and activities worldwide in a more

internationally coordinated manner. At the foundation of this global regime are the strong national infrastruc-tures of the countries that actively participate in the international efforts to improve nuclear safety and secu-rity. The major new elements of the global regime that have been in place since the mid-1990s are the interna-tional instruments, both legally binding and non-bind-ing, such as Conventions and Codes of Conduct. These elements work together in synergy with international standards, guidelines, peer reviews and knowledge networks to support and further strengthen existing national and regional infrastructures, thus helping to prevent another serious nuclear accident or terror-ist incident, or to better respond to it should it occur. During the recent IAEA Board of Governors meeting in March, I was particularly inspired by the statements from many Member States, especially those countries who are major suppliers of nuclear technologies like the US, France and Japan, who strongly encouraged new entrant countries to become active participants in the global regime.

A specific issue of interest for the international nuclear community and the IAEA in improving the global regime is in maximizing the synergy between safety and security. The IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles already recognize that safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and vice versa. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s recent power reactor secu-rity rule making for safety and security interface is a good example of improvement in this area.

International CooperationI do believe that worldwide nuclear safety perform-ance has been praiseworthy. At the same time, I also believe that the need for vigilance, continuous improvement and new thinking is highlighted by new entrant and rapidly expanding existing nuclear power programmes, by the levelling off of safety perform-ance indicators and by the increasingly multinational and global nature of today’s nuclear activities. The IAEA is committed to promoting international coop-eration to help maintain a high level of nuclear safety and security and to continuously improve the global regime for this purpose.

IAEA Deputy Director General Tomihiro Taniguchi is Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. E-mail: [email protected]

This article is based on a statement given to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Infor-mation Conference on 10 March 2009.

Nuclear Security24 | IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009

Question: There seem to be significant developments at the horizon for nuclear security, an area that is receiving an increasing level of attention from the international community. What is your view?

Anita Nilsson: Within the past 5-7 years there have been very significant devel-opments in the approach to nuclear security. While this is a matter that was always attended for in the past, recently it has been recognized that much more needs to be done. The materials and facilities that are subject for security considerations are much broader than initially thought of.

One of the signs that the international community is paying much more atten-tion to security is the fact that we have new international conventions, such as the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention. In this convention, which was revised in 2005, the majority of the State parties agreed on strength-ening security measures.

Another convention of similar nature is the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which entered into force recently. This convention emphasises the need to criminalize acts involving the use of radioactive substances for

the purpose of causing threat, destruc-tion or death among people, as well as having negative impacts on the envi-ronment and property. It also contains an article whereby all the State parties commit to make every effort to prevent these acts from happening. In the oper-ative articles the convention also refers to functions of and recommendations for the IAEA.

When you bring these things together it becomes clear that a whole new approach to nuclear security is emerg-ing. We should not forget about the work of the UN Security Council. They issued a resolution (Res. 1540), which also envelopes these measures. It con-tains obligations for all countries of the UN System to protect nuclear material from theft and put in place effective border control, so that that any unde-clared, unauthorised or illegal move-ment of radioactive and nuclear mate-rials could be caught at the borders or other locations. This is a very significant step forward.

Q: Has the approach to nuclear security changed over the years? If so, how?

AN: If we look back 10 years, at that time it was recognized that nuclear mate-rial had to be protected against theft.

States were clearly in agreement on this issue and measures for the protection of nuclear material were adopted. At a later date, nuclear facilities also became the object of an agreement, as referred to in an IAEA document issued as InfCirc 225.

But after 9/11 and other terrorist attacks around the globe, it became evident that security concerns should not be limited to nuclear and fissile material. They should also include lower grade nuclear material as well as radioactive substances which could be used to dis-perse radioactivity in the environment. This new approach changed dramat-ically the perception of security. Now we take a much broader view of secu-rity: all substances, fissile or radioactive, have to be managed to ensure their accountability, safety, security and, for fissile materials, their peaceful uses.

Q: Nuclear security experts such as yourself are now talking about the need for a holistic approach to security. What does this mean in practice?

AN: This is an extension of what I men-tioned earlier. All materials, radioactive and fissile, should be subject for secu-rity considerations. And they should

the evolving landscape ofNuclear Security

by Ritu Kenn & Giovanni Verlini

Terrorism in the modern world has renewed attention to security issues, prompting a profound re-thinking in the international approach to nuclear security.

Anita Nilsson, Director of IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security, explains how the international nuclear security paradigm is extending its reach.

Nuclear Security

Essential Business | The Evolving Landscape of Nuclear Security


also be considered in every applica-tion — at nuclear facilities, for nuclear energy production, in medical or indus-trial uses etc. Wherever these materials are, they should be subject to a man-agement system that ensures security.

Having said that, it is equally necessary to underline that such a security sys-tem is not ‘one size fits all’. One has to consider the type of material, its prop-erties and how a graded approach can be implemented for security and phys-ical protection. Otherwise such as sys-tem would not be respected and imple-mented in a truly holistic manner.

A holistic approach also includes the so called ‘second line of defence’, which means that measures for long-term security at facilities should be comple-mented with other measures to detect stolen materials. For example, at bor-der crossing points in addition to ensur-ing that a cargo does not contain unde-clared radioactive substances, it is essential to cooperate with law enforce-ment authorities in case of a suspected package or seizure.

It is also necessary to have response measures in case of a seizure. These include knowing what to do with this material, taking proper radiation pro-tection, but also handling the material in a safe and secure manner and bring-ing it to a place where it is under appro-priate control. This is the essence of the holistic approach: to combine preven-tion, detection and response.

Q: What are the tools that need to be used to guarantee nuclear security? Are they of a legal nature, political, intelligence, etc.?

AN: In this field there are no tools that can guarantee nuclear security, because the bottom line and the overarching approach is that the responsibility rests with the State. Having said that, it is also clear that security gains from a recog-nized international dimension. This is where the IAEA can make a contribu-tion and a difference.

The IAEA works together with States in prevention, detection, response as requested by them. They can request an advisory service, where we assem-

ble a small group of recognized experts to look at facilities and situations in the country, and evaluate whether these meet international standards and best practices. These experts then make rec-ommendations for improvements or strengthening if this is warranted. If they find good practices, this is also pointed out. This is an important tool for any country to convey the message that they are serious about nuclear security arrangements.

We have a major programme for human resource development which includes training activities as well as an educa-tional programme at a graduate level that can be picked up by universities. We have information networking, such as the illicit trafficking database. This contains information on radioactive and fissile materials circulating in cir-cumstances where they should not be found, and then what to do about it.

We also provide assistance in capacity building. For example, we help build-ing effective border control measures, or improving actual physical protection measures at facilities with accounting and control systems.

Photos: Dean Calma/IAEA

I believe that the expansion of nuclear energy is an opportunity for conveying the values of

nuclear security. It is an opportunity for countries to build security in their system from the very

beginning. — Anita Nilsson is Director of the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security.

Essential Business | The Evolving Landscape of Nuclear Security


Q: Are there any other services that the IAEA offers to its Member States in the nuclear security field?

AN: Yes. Internationally, a common benchmark for the security systems is needed. This is done through the development and publishing of a guid-ance package. The IAEA produces the Nuclear Security Series as internation-ally accepted guidelines in the field. However, as this process takes a while, other publications are produced in the

interim. It is critical that we share values for the security systems, and that we have common benchmarks accepted by Member States and others.

Q: What are Member States and the international community doing in this field?

AN: Again the basic responsibility rests with Member States. In many cases, they take the initiative to reach the goals that we have spoken about. But the interna-tional community in general, and the IAEA in particular can also help with this. We interact with Member States to help them and, if there is an interest, develop an integrated nuclear security support plan — a plan which deals with measures for prevention, detection and response.

Q: What is the contribution from the private sector?

AN: The private sector in this field is nor-mally the operator, and they have the responsibility for exercising the require-ments set by the national regulatory authority. The private sector operator

that has its main target in, for example, energy production, must take this on as one element of how they manage their facility.

Q: How are the international community, the private sector and the IAEA cooperating on this issue?

AN: This happens at several levels. The private sector contributes to our work by sending experts who help develop-ing standards, exercise training, con-

tributing to services, etc. We also have a new institute called the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS), which has expressed its intentions to pick up the industrial dimension of nuclear energy and nuclear security in particular. This is very welcome because the private sec-tor is expanding, with many countries expressing interest in having nuclear energy as part of their energy mix. We must have robust systems for interact-ing with the industry and the govern-ments and WINS may provide a good channel for such interactions.

I believe that the expansion of nuclear energy is an opportunity for conveying the values of nuclear security. It is an opportunity for countries to build security in their system from the very beginning.

Q: A so called three ‘S’ approach, one that encompassed nuclear security, safety and safeguards is emerging. What does this entail?

AN: It goes back to the discussion about recognising the fact that you have to

consider all the conditions of your activ-ities in a comprehensive manner. In sim-ple words this means that there are obli-gations on the operator with relevance to safety – that equipment is managed well, is taken care of, that spare parts are replaced etc in order to avoid acci-dents. The operator also has obligations to account for the material, keep proper registries, know where all the substance and material quantities are at any time, and have the right security systems in place — including a graded approach to physical protection, adequate access control and particular protection for sensitive equipment and information, etc. All this should be conveyed in a comprehensive and synergistic manner to operators.

Rather than putting the three sub-jects in three different boxes, put them in one box and make a more effective system.

Q: What would you say are the challenges for nuclear security in the 21st century?

AN: I think that the main challenge is to keep in mind that this new security par-adigm is here to stay. When we benefit from nuclear energy, the medical appli-cations of radiation therapy or diagnos-tics or the use of radioactive sources in industrial applications, we need to rec-ognise that this must be followed by responsible management including safety, security and safeguards consid-erations.

This is a challenge, but also an oppor-tunity for ensuring further, more wide-spread, benefits of nuclear energy and its many applications.

Anita Nilsson is Director of the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security. E-mail: [email protected]

The expansion of nuclear energy is an opportunity for conveying the values of nuclear security. It is an opportunity for countries to build security in their

system from the very beginning.


As many countries’ nuclear plants begin to creep up in age and utilities seek extensions of the lifespan of facilities,

the global focus upon improving global nuclear safety has never been stronger. The IAEA assumes a unique responsibility in combining knowledge and experience to help countries to advance safety by hosting a variety of programmes and setting of international standards. The lion’s share of the IAEA’s nuclear safety work is accomplished via the applica-tion of peer reviews and advisory services that sup-port the advancement of effective safety infrastruc-tures in IAEA Member States.

One of the more prominent IAEA efforts that helps countries achieve higher levels of safety is the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) pro-gramme, whereby internationally-based teams of experts conduct reviews of operational safety per-formance at nuclear power plants.

OSART’s StartThroughout the 1970s and 1980s, the IAEA con-cerned itself primarily with the safety of the con-struction of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Yet the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 created a renewed sense of urgency about the operational safety of nuclear power amid the growing number of reac-tors worldwide. The US began to create services to peer evaluate the safety of its own fleet of reactors, and the IAEA, recognizing the usefulness of such a programme, decided to internationalize peer safety and in turn created the OSART programme.

The reach of OSART is expansive: to date, OSARTs have visited nearly every major type of nuclear reac-

tor, and over 150 reviews have been conducted since the programme’s inception in 1982.

Three Stage ProcessThe OSART review is a process that begins with a request from a country for a safety review, and can occur in three stages.

Pre-Operation Safety Review Team (Pre-OSART) mis-sions are conducted during the construction and commissioning phase of a plant’s life. These missions help ensure effective preparations for commission-ing and operations.

Safety Review missions consist of a regular OSART mission, offering an in-depth examination of design features most closely related to safe and reliable operation. Human performance issues and recognized design weaknesses are assessed in an integrated way. These regular OSART missions are concluded by follow-up visits, which take place approximately 12-18 months after an OSART mission. The follow-up provides an independent assessment of progress in the resolution of issues identified in the OSART mission.

Once the IAEA receives the review request, it begins to assemble a team of 10-12 experts to undertake the mission. The team is comprised of special-ists from around the globe who have senior-level nuclear operator experience, and each team mem-ber is assigned an area of focus during the mission.

The bulk of the work for a regular OSART is carried out during an intense three weeks of inspections at the plant, whereby OSART mission staff conduct interviews with plant staff, observe plant workers,

Through its Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme, the IAEA is supporting safety advancements in nuclear infrastructures.

The Peer Viewby Dana Sacchetti

Essential Business | The Peer View


and analyze documents related to plant operation. Rather than examining the plant’s physical design, OSART team members are tasked with studying the operation of the plant and the performance of the plant’s management and staff. OSART focuses more on the human aspect of a nuclear plant rather than the technology behind its operation.

The OSART team keeps in constant communication with the plant hosts and records all its findings dur-ing its time at the plant, and the emphasis is always placed on improving safety to the highest interna-tional standard possible. OSART reviews are based wholly upon IAEA Safety Standards, which are estab-lished to give guidance to Member States on the many aspects of the safety of nuclear installations.

“The working methodology of the OSART pro-gramme—from the pre-OSART meeting to the mis-sion to follow-up — encourages the development of safety work in general,” said Olle Andersson, who was a host plant peer during a 2008 OSART mis-sion to Sweden’s Forsmark NPP. “The programme, when well utilized, brings improvements in many areas. It put the focus on deficiencies that one might not have taken notice of because one has become ‘blind to defects in one’s own home.’”

Yet likely the strongest endorsement for the impor-tance of the OSART programme can be found in France, one of nuclear’s strongest proponents. Since 1985, France’s regulatory authority Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) has requested an OSART safety review on an almost annual basis. Within the next few years, each reactor within the French nuclear fleet will have undergone an OSART review at least once.

For a country with a long history of operational expe-rience such as France or the US, the value of OSART is found in the international knowledge transfer that takes place during and after the mission.

“The mission was very beneficial to us and our site as it brought many different perspectives and expe-riences to bear for us to learn from,” explained Tim Mitchell, site Vice President for Arkansas Nuclear One in the US, who was also the primary site contact for another 2008 OSART mission.

“Our key takeaways from the OSART mission were to make sure my country’s paradigms are not looked at as the only approach to solving problems. International experience can provide other experi-ences and approaches,” said Mitchell.

Evolution and FutureSince the programme’s inception nearly 30 years ago, the programme and the environment in which OSART operates have seen many changes. Globally, transparency on the part of the nuclear industry has gradually improved, with most countries realizing that openness and timely communication regard-ing safety is now a guiding principle.

In the early days of the OSART programme, there was a dearth of communication between the OSART team and the plant peer team. Previously, recommendations and feedback were collected solely by the OSART team and were only delivered in a final report at the end of the review. But over time, the teams have changed this practice to sys-tematize daily contact among all members of the team, reducing the number of surprises that may arise towards the conclusion of a mission.

Over the decades, guidelines and operational safety practices have become internationalized, a proc-ess that has been aided by review services such as OSART. The siloed approach to nuclear safety on a country-by-country basis has evolved and given way to a regime of international cooperation and knowledge sharing.

Another change was that a follow-up mission to the OSART review process became standardized in the late 1980s. Inclusion of operating experience was added as an area of focus in 2004, and there are now several additional areas that can be requested as a plant host wishes. Commissioning, long-term oper-ational safety review, and other options are availa-ble for hosts to choose from. The programme’s lead-ers are now also making preparations to put forward a ‘corporate’ OSART service. This offering would

The OSART programme broadly covers nine operational areas:

❶ management, organization and administration;❷ training and qualification;❸ operations;❹ maintenance;❺ technical support;❻ operating experience;❼ radiation protection;❽ chemistry; and❾ emergency planning and preparedness.

A recent enhancement of the OSART review is the addition of a dedicated expert to review the area of operating experience.

The OSART programme started in 1982. To date a total of 152 OSART missions have been carried out in 32 countries.

OSART

Essential Business | The Peer View


It’s a bitterly cold December day in Cruas, a small village situated along the Rhône River in southern France.

Today is a big day for the town, and there’s a notice-able business in the town’s centre. A couple hun-dred people quickly make their way through the rain and enter a large assembly room in Cruas’ town hall. Those assembled, including workers from the nearby Cruas Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), journal-ists, town officials, and staff from the French nuclear industry and regulatory body, sit in hushed silence as a unique meeting begins.

A group of 10 nuclear safety experts, from countries as far flung as Japan, South Africa, and Hungary, take the stage to make remarks on the operational safety performance of the Cruas plant, a large 4-reac-tor facility that accounts for nearly 5% of France’s electricity production. One by one, each expert addresses the audience, giving his or her assess-ment on what the plant does well, what can be improved, and other constructive feedback that can advance plant safety. The comments and feedback by the OSART team for the Cruas plant are balanced in their positive feedback and recommendations for improvement. As each expert provides commen-tary, murmurs and chatter can be heard among the plant workers.

It’s a unique thing; inviting a team of strangers to your workplace to study your every move for three weeks, and then to have them speak about your plant and its performance in such a public forum.

Welcome to a typical OSART exit meeting, where a hand-picked team of nuclear safety experts sum-marize their assessment of the operational safety of

an NPP. The transparency and openness with which the meeting progresses is surprising to many who are new to the process, but it bodes well for main-taining a high level of safety within France’s nuclear industry.

Very few industries open their doors to such scrutiny, analysis, and public discussion of performance, but then again, nuclear power isn’t any ordinary indus-try. The meeting progresses and concludes with a press conference, where journalists ask pointed questions directly to OSART team leaders and Cruas plant management.

Maintaining the highest levels of nuclear safety is a complex task, a collective responsibility. With mis-sions such as OSART providing transparent, con-structive feedback, the effort continues.

An Open Business

In 2009, OSART experts reviewed the operational safety performance of the Cruas plant, a large 4-reactor facility that accounts for nearly 5% of France’s electricity production. (Photo: EDF)

Report from OSART Mission of France’s Cruas Nuclear Power Plant.

by Dana Sacchetti

examine the inner workings of corporate bodies of utilities with multiple nuclear plant sites, which may have a bearing on operational safety.

Finally, OSART team leaders within the IAEA are aiming to broaden the programme’s reach by encouraging countries which have not held an OSART review in the past decade to request new missions. The thinking is that countries with a limited number of nuclear units or those that are geographically remote can benefit from the broad review of an OSART mission, and the IAEA is now in discussions with countries which have not hosted an OSART mission for some time.

With expectations for nuclear power growth continuing to rise, the goal of achieving even greater operational safety is imperative. As the OSART programme enters the end of its third decade of service, review safety services continue to be a quiet yet vital asset to global nuclear safety. The IAEA will continue to support review services such as OSART to keep the nuclear safety regime strong.

Dana Sacchetti is a press officer in the IAEA’s Division of Public Information. E-mail: [email protected]

Design Basis Threat

Security of Radioactive Sources

Technical and Functional Specifications for BorderMonitoring Equipment(79 pp., 3 figs; 2006) • ISBN 92-0-100206-8 • STI/PUB/1240 •€30.00

Nuclear Forensics Support(67 pp., 4 figs; 2006) • ISBN 92-0-100306-4 • STI/PUB/1241 •€26.00

Monitoring for Radioactive Material in International MailTransported by Public Postal Operators(39 pp., 4 figs; 2006) • ISBN 92-0-100406-0 • STI/PUB/1242 •€23.00

Engineering Safety Aspects of the Protection of NuclearPower Plants against Sabotage(58 pp., 1 fig.; 2007) • ISBN 92-0-109906-1 • STI/PUB/1271 •€30.00

Identification of Radioactive Sources and Devices(138 pp., 148 figs; 2007) • ISBN 92-0-111406-0 • STI/PUB/1278 • €45.00 (Also available in Spanish)

Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and OtherRadioactive Material(143 pp., 26 figs; 2007) • ISBN 978-92-0-109807-8 • STI/PUB/1309 • €40.00

Nuclear Security Culture(37 pp., 2 figs; 2008) • ISBN 978-92-0-107808-7 • STI/PUB/1347 • €30.00

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For more information, or to order a book:

Sales and Promotion UnitInternational Atomic Energy AgencyP.O. Box 100, Wagramer Strasse 5A 1400 Vienna, Austriatel: +43 1 2600 22529/30fax: +43 1 2600 29302e-mail: [email protected] www.iaea.org/books

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Mr. Eli McKenzie

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Smart Card

Mr. Eli McKenzie

1234 567890

Radiation Record Card


Up until a decade ago, radiation protec-tion programmes in healthcare were largely dominated by actions that con-

cerned protection of the staff at the medical facility. Patient protection was felt to be not as important, as it was assumed that a patient undergoes examina-tion with ionizing radiation once or only a few times in his or her lifetime.

When I entered the medical radiological profes-sion in 1972, I was informed that my protection, as a member of staff, was more important than pro-tection of the patient. Most countries of the world had adopted a system whereby it was mandatory to monitor radiation dose to the staff and keep lifetime records of it, while annual dose limits for staff as well as for members of the public were set. It was always felt that the concept of “dose limit” should not apply to patients, because of the associated medical ben-efits of exposure to radiation.

Further, if you asked the representative of a manu-facturer of imaging equipment about the radiation dose to the patient, he would hardly have a clue as no buyer would normally ask such a thing. The image quality and the speed of the examination were the main focus of buyers rather than the radiation dose for patients. Take the example of computed tomog-raphy (CT). Every year the manufacturers of CT scan-ners would announce an improvement in scanning time from the previous year while there would be no mention of radiation dose. Faster scanners are what users want. In fact, most professionals would still instinctively associate lower radiation dose with a quicker scan.

The early emphasis on staff protection did pay rich dividends in terms of making staff safer. Currently, most (nearly 98%) of those who work with ionizing radiation in any area of medical practice receive a

radiation dose that is lower than what they get from

natural radiation sources — the so-called background radiation, e.g., cosmic radiation, radon, radiation from building material, earth, food, etc. Background radiation depends on the place you live, but typically is 1 mSv to 3 mSv per year, although in some places can be up to 10 mSv. The dose limit for staff currently recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), and adopted by the IAEA and most countries with few exceptions, is 20 mSv/year, expressed as 100mSv over a period of five years. Such has been the success of occupational radiation protection programmes that not even 0.5% of staff members who work in medical facilities (or in any nuclear facility) reach or exceed the dose limit.

Since there are no dose limits for patients, many may incorrectly assume that there are no controls on patient exposure. The 1996 International Basic Safety Standards (BSS), developed by the IAEA in cooperation with Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and World Health Organization (WHO), clearly

Smart ProtectionAn electronic “Smart Card” could serve as a digital medical record

of radiation exposure for patients who want one.

by Madan M. Rehani

Radiation Record Card: this image is only a representation of what such a card might look like if developed.

Health Above All | Smart Protection


stipulates requirements on patient protection that involve the need to justify and optimize radiation doses. Although no dose limits are propagated, the concept of diagnostic reference levels or guidance levels (DRL or GL) has been proposed. This concept has been included in the European Safety Standards and in most national regulations. Thus there are requirements to keep radiation dose for the patient as low as possible without hampering the diagnostic or intended clinical purpose.

Many countries have estimated DRLs based on large scale surveys and have used these to demonstrate a reduction in patient doses with time, say over 10 years. But such reductions have been observed only for simple radiographic examinations such as chest X-rays or X-rays of other parts of the body. The effective dose to the patient from any of these radiographic examinations is typically in the range of 0.02mSv to 2mSv. During the last 100 years, improvements in technology have resulted in dose reduction for single radiographic examinations by a factor of a few tens.

However, these are low dose examinations, whereas a single CT scan can impart a dose of 5 mSv to 20 mSv to a patient. On average, a CT scan with 10 mSv effective dose is equivalent to 500 chest X-rays, each with 0.02 mSv. Yet, patients nowadays are not get-ting lower doses compared to two decades ago. While technology has improved substantially, mak-ing it possible to obtain a CT scan with a lower radi-ation dose than in the past, the usage pattern has been changing. Much better clinical information is obtained, but generally there is no reduction in dose per examination.

This apparent paradox could be better understood by comparing CT scans to personal computers (PCs) and the evolution they have gone through. The price of PCs has changed relatively little over the years, but their performance has improved many fold. Similarly, the diagnostic benefits of CT scans have been increasing over time, as has patient friendliness thanks to shorter scanning times, mak-ing it very convenient for patients — unlike MRI scans, which still remain relatively unfriendly for the patient. For a CT scan, you just hold your breath for a few seconds and your whole chest is scanned with CT, or your whole body (head to pelvis) is scanned in about a minute. As for MRI, the patient has to lie in an inconvenient tunnel with the unpleasant noise of gradient coils for almost 40 minutes for each scan. The convenience of CT with the added advantage of increased information has resulted in increased usage to the point that there are instances of patients getting tens of CT scans in a year, which

may not be justified, or getting CT scans when it is not indicated. An increasing number of infants and children are also getting CT scans.

A Growing ProblemIt is the alarming increase in use of high radiation dose examinations such as CT that is creating a need for cumulative records of patient dose, somewhat similar to the practice adopted for medical staff all these years. Of course, this would be a voluntary sys-tem for patient dose records rather than a manda-tory system.

It may be argued that in no other practice in the world is a human being exposed to so much radi-ation as in medical examinations. According to the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), there are over 4 billion med-ical radiation imaging procedures done annually. Other than natural background radiation, medical uses constitute the next largest source of ionizing radiation to the world’s population.

There has been an increased use of X-rays to guide interventions so as to replace surgical procedures. A typical example is angioplasty, which has reduced the need for coronary bypass surgery in many sit-uations. But the patient exposure to radiation is quite large (no less than CT) and there have been a number of reports of radiation-induced skin inju-ries to patients.

In the early part of twentieth century, when radia-tion protection measures were not yet established, skin injuries to the hands of those working with X-rays were often observed. Then, for almost 70 years (from the 1920s to 1980s) such injuries largely disappeared. It was in the 1990s that a number of skin injuries in patients undergoing interventional procedures started to be observed. Thus we are now in an era when patient exposure has increased tremendously, is increasing and will continue to increase. Overall, this may not be a bad thing as the medical benefits still outweigh the harm. But there is growing concern about increased cumulative doses to patients. For example, an estimate based on UNSCEAR data indicates that the average lifetime dose to the patient is almost 200 times higher than the average lifetime dose to the staff. This means that the conventional dictum that staff protection is more important than patient protection is no longer valid. This calls for action and thinking about the future.



The IAEA is the first UN organization to take a lead in this area, in a clear sign of its commit-ment to the radiation protection of patients. In fact the IAEA was the first organization to create a separate unit dedicated to the “radi-ological protection of patients” in 2001.

An international action plan on radia-tion protection of patients has been devel-oped involving a number of interna-tional organizations such as WHO, PAHO, UNSCEAR, ICRP, European Commission (EC), International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and professional soci-eties in the field of radiology (ISR), medical physics (IOMP), nuclear medicine (WFNMB), radiographers (ISRRT) and radiation oncol-ogy (ESTRO).

The risk of cancer from radiation doses imparted through a number of CT scans is not insignificant. Most other radiation effects (such as skin injury, just to name one) can be avoided rather effectively, but this is not true for the risk of cancer. There are estimates of few million excess cancers in the USA over the next two to three decades from about 60 million CT scans done annually.

A Smart PlanSo, what needs to be done? The situation demands records of patient doses such that there is a lifetime record of how much radiation an indi-vidual has received. This is a highly ambitious plan full of ifs and buts, but developments in information technology in health care show promise.

One idea is to have a ‘smart card’ that contains a patient’s information including radiation dose data. This is something that is already in sight in several countries, at least for medical records, and if works starts right now it is possible to imagine that it will be possible to add radiation dose information to the smart card. However, more important than that is the electronic health record systems that many countries are aiming at. Imagine a situation where the health records of a patient in a European coun-try (say A) are available on a server in his country. He goes to another doctor in another country (say B) and gives permission for this doctor to access his records. Thus doctor B does not need to repeat many radiological examinations that were already done. Again, this will result in avoidance of addi-tional radiation exposure to millions and millions

of patients. This is something that is not a distant dream but could fast become reality.

The IAEA has launched a smart card project that covers both of the above options. The first meet-ing dedicated to the smart card project was held in Vienna on 27-29 April 2009. Much of the frame-work will be decided and partially implemented within three to five years. The manufacturers of the imaging equipment and those dealing with issues of standards for inter-connectivity and inter-opera-bility will also be involved. After all, it has taken dec-ades to develop occupational dosimetry and still its outreach is far from 100%.

It is hoped that despite increasing use of radiation which is for the benefit of patients, it will be possible to keep radiation risks to a level that are acceptable.

Madan M. Rehani is a Radiation Safety Specialist at the IAEA. E-mail: [email protected]

A lifetime record of how much radiation a patient has received is a highly ambitious plan. But developments in information technology in health care show promise.

(Photo: wikimedia commons)


Africa is sharing the benefits of advances in medical imaging technology that makes it possible for doctors to more quickly diagnose and treat serious illnesses. But

the stunning new machines have brought along some problems of unknown magnitude in the absence of adequate monitoring of staff for radia-tion exposure. Overexposure of medical staff to ion-izing radiation is one concern.

As the complement of lifesaving machines grows in African countries, so has this problem. Practitioners say it stems from a number of causes — lack of over-sight, insufficient staff, poor equipment, inadequate dosimetry, medical personnel who aren’t properly trained, and a lack of guidelines.

The situation affects thousands of workers across the continent, and highlights the need for more training and support.

Over the past six years, the IAEA has trained 107 radiographers and radiologists from 26 African countries in radiation protection. It has also helped 35 of the continent’s governments draft radia-tion protection legislation, and provided detailed guides to States for the application of the IAEA’s International Basic Safety Standards on radiation protection.

The work is ongoing. Zambia and Kenya, two African countries where officials say more support is needed to control radiation exposures, are receiv-ing help from the IAEA.

Beatrice Mwape, a medical imaging specialist in Zambia’s Ministry of Health describes the situa-

tion in her country” “We have a CT (Computed Tomography) scanner, we are planning to buy an MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) machine. We have ultrasound services and we have a radiother-apy centre. Some of these use radiation. There are also some hospitals with obsolete equipment, which need to be checked almost every month to ensure that the right dosage of radiation is going to the patient as well as to the radiographer. And that is a major problem for us.”

There are 150 workers in radiation-related jobs in Zambia’s civil service. But officials have no idea how many are in the private sector. These persons remain off the radar and are never monitored for radiation exposure. For those within the Health Ministry’s sphere of influence, the IAEA provided Zambia with a Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) reader in March 2006, and has offered to procure another for the country’s health service under a cost-sharing scheme in 2011.

Kenya also struggles to monitor its 5,000 workers in radiation-related jobs at 600 medical facilities. Only about a quarter of these nurses, patient assistants, dentists, radiographers, and radiologists are moni-tored for exposure.

The IAEA is working with the Kenya Bureau of Standards to standardise radiation measurements. Specialists helped design the country’s secondary standards laboratory, which last year began offering calibration of machines involved in radiation mon-itoring. The IAEA also provided basic equipment, trained essential staff and provided expert advice to the Kenyan authorities.

africa’s nightmareby Sasha Henriques

The Struggle to Protect Medical Workers in Radiological Services



Problems Grow Alongside Demand

Dosimeter badges measure the radiation dose to which an individual has been exposed. Not all of Zambia’s 150 radiographers in the country’s 94 pub-lic hospitals have these badges. Even those who do aren’t being monitored because of the Radiation Protection Authority’s acute personnel shortage.

The Authority is charged with monitoring work-ers, but its three officers have no proper transport in a country that covers more than 290,000 sq miles. They find the task virtually impossible. “So my radi-ographers are never monitored,” says Ms. Mwape. “And that is a major problem.”

Estimates suggest that there are more than 7,000 new cases of cancer in Zambia a year, and 3,600 new cases in Kenya annually. As cancer cases increase, so has the demand for radiation therapy.

In 2003 the Zambian government and the govern-ment of the Netherlands provided 25 million Euros to equip 71 hospitals with new X-ray equipment and ultrasound machines. There are plans to purchase more medical imaging equipment, all of which use radiation.

Ms. Mwape says, “We would like radiographers in the provinces to be trained to do inspections, so they can assist the Radiation Protection Board. But more importantly, we need more radiation protec-tion officers. So far, our current crop consists of only diploma holders. There’s nobody with advanced training.”

The IAEA does offer training, but the majority of Zambian workers aren’t qualified to take advan-tage of it, since the minimum requirement is an undergraduate science degree. Over the past six years, only two workers have qualified for the IAEA’s advanced training course.

In Kenya, Dr. Jeska Wambani, Chairman of the Radiation Protection Board, says, “There is no aca-demic institution in our country that offers medical physics as an area of study. The five medical physi-cists we have were trained abroad.” She wants to see a centre set up that would cater to the needs of the East and Central Africa region and train profession-als in nuclear and radiation safety.

To date, Kenya has benefited from the IAEA’s bian-nual regional post-graduate educational course on radiation protection and safety of ionizing radiation sources. So far, five officers from the Kenya Bureau

of Standards, the Radiation Protection Board and Kenyatta National Hospital have been trained.

To the Heart of the MatterUsing poorly calibrated radiotherapy and medical imaging machines has resulted in radiographers and patients in both countries being exposed to unknown amounts of unnecessary ionizing radia-tion. Both Ms. Mwape and Dr. Wambani agree that more research is essential to determine the true scale of the problem.

“We don’t have national guidelines and standards in diagnostic radiology in Kenya because we don’t have enough data,” says Dr. Wambani. “And we don’t have the data because we lack adequate funds to collect statistical information from hospitals all over the country.”

Data is necessary because worker and patient radi-ation exposure are inextricably linked. Containing patient dose levels will mean lowering doses deliv-ered to medical workers as well. This is where the IAEA comes in.

The Agency’s Department of Technical Cooperation is undertaking a project at the Kenyatta National Hospital in the capital Nairobi, and at the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital Eldoret, a teaching institution outside the capital. Both are being used as model sites where radiation dose information is gathered, analysed and then used to create diag-nostic reference levels for Kenya. Dr. Wambani says attempts are being made to expand the project to all the hospitals in Kenya’s eight provinces.

Sasha Henriques is a staff writer in the Division of Public Information of the IAEA. E-mail: [email protected]

Beatrice Mwape, a medical imaging specialist in Zambia’s Ministry of Health, spoke about her country’s plight during the IAEA's General Conference in

September 2008. (Photo: D.Calma/IAEA)



There has been a boom in the use of ionizing radi-ation for diagnosis and treatment of illnesses all over the world. This is generally good, contribut-ing to accurate diagnosis of disease and prevent-ing unnecessary exploratory surgery. Research has shown that with these tests there is a ten-dency towards overuse, and up to 50% of the machines involved in these procedures may not be set up correctly. Jim Malone in the IAEA’s Radiation Protection of Patients Unit addresses some of the possible risks.

Question: Patients sometimes get too much radiation. Does the equipment have to be old for this to be a problem?

Jim Malone: No. I know of very new digital equip-ment which was set up in two clinics. For a long period patients were getting eight to 10 times the dose they needed because the equipment was set up that way, and the technologists didn’t notice.

This is a big problem with digital equipment — you get a perfect image every time regardless of the dose. It’s not like film where you’re guided by an image that’s too dark or too light. Digital sys-tems pull the image into an area where it’s nicely visible no matter what the dose.

A big problem with older equipment was that you’d get a dreadful image and have to repeat the procedure. But with modern equipment you get a nice image no matter what and you may be get-ting it at the right dose, at half the dose, or at 10 times the dose.

Question: Where does the problem come from?

JM: If you don’t have well trained technologists you get much more of this type of thing. You need staff, maintenance, and quality assurance, all of which have a very high overhead in train-

ing. Modern equipment is very particular. You need people who are well trained on the specific machine that they’re working with.

That’s a bigger problem today than it was 20 years ago. Then, the equipment was fairly generic and didn’t have a lot of possibilities. It couldn’t do as much, but you couldn’t go as far wrong with it.

You also have problems if you don’t have the equipment regularly maintained. This is a bigger problem in developing countries because they often don’t have the budget to sustain the equipment.

But even in the best funded and best resourced places, to make sure the equipment is doing what it’s supposed to, you need a quality assur-ance programme. So one of the things the IAEA advocates is having a good quality assurance programme for whatever equipment you’ve got.

Question: What are good Quality Assurance protocols?

JM: Studies have been undertaken to find out what is the best technical and clinical way to do a chest radiograph or a paediatric CT scan of the abdomen for example. The information is avail-able, practitioners just need to use it. Good radi-ology involves a partnership with the industry which supplies the equipment. In diagnostic radiology the relationship between the industry and users in clinics and hospitals is not entirely satisfactory.

There was an audit done in the Nordic countries that found that roughly 20% of the examinations were of no value to diagnosing or solving the problems patients were experiencing. There was also a survey done in an American emergency room which found that 45% of the examinations weren’t of any serious value.

Measure for Measureby Sasha Henriques

The IAEA is drafting guides for proper use of diagnostic imaging technology



If you have lower back pain for example, and you go to your doctor and he recommends that you have what’s called a lumbar spine x-ray, the only thing you can be sure of, is that that x-ray is nor-mally not so useful. Lumbar spine x-rays are high dose examinations, and unless you have other complicating factors, they will tell absolutely nothing that’s of any value in deciding how the back pain will be treated. It’s really like a pla-cebo.

So the first step in any protocol is: “Is this examina-tion of any use? Is it worthwhile?”

The next aspect of the protocol is that for heavier people you need more x-rays than for small peo-ple. So your protocol should include adjustments for the size and shape of the person.

It’s well known for example that for years chil-dren were receiving much higher doses than they needed because with CT scanning, the same pro-tocols were used for children as for adults. This is now improving.

Question: What is the IAEA doing?

JM: This is an issue that we’re putting a lot of effort into. The key is to distribute information and develop good protocols. We are produc-ing publications, training materials, courses and advice on our website to meet these needs. This includes trying to get good protocols suitable for children, and which are size-dependent in adults.

But it’s hard to give a simple answer because the field is developing all the time. And as soon as you’ve got one problem sorted out another one crops up. So, as soon as you’ve addressed the issues plaguing plain radiography with film, film goes out of style and you have digital imag-ing. As soon as you’ve solved issues with digital imaging and film, they become less important than CT scanning. And you sort CT scanning out in an environment where MRI is beginning to find a foothold.

So we’re shooting a moving target. Trying to cre-ate patterns of stable good practice in an evolv-ing field is very difficult.

Also, one of the weaknesses in trying to set up quality assurance programmes is that it demands highly trained technical input that isn’t always easily available to a hospital.

Question: If doctors know that the scans you mentioned earlier are useless, why do they keep ordering them?

JM: The reasons are grounded in all kinds of things that are common to all forms of human behaviour.

♦ People get into the habit of doing them. For example, there’s a really strong habit of doing chest x-rays for people seeking employment and for people going to the operating theatre for surgery. In western countries neither of those practices has any value unless people have other symptoms. They only add to the radiation burden.

♦ Protocols are not up-to-date.

♦ There’s often an economic/business incentive to do the scan even though it’s useless. That’s obviously in systems where medicine isn’t socialised.

♦ Knowledge sharing isn’t good enough. Creation and dissemination of knowledge is an area that needs a lot of work. Because valuable knowledge is local, just as patterns of disease and treatments are local. What’s the best answer might not be the same in every part of the world. You might have very good MRI equipment but an inexperienced team. So it might be better to go for a CT scan, because then at least you have a chance of getting the right answer.

Jim Malone is a Radiation Protection Consultant in the IAEA Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety. E-mail: [email protected]

Even in the best funded and best resourced places...you need a quality assurance programme. So one of the things the IAEA advocates is having a good quality assurance programme for whatever equipment you’ve got.

—Jim MaloneDean Calma/IAEA


Cancer

Note: Deaths from Cancer and New Cancer Cases are 2008 projections. (source: WHO); Population/Radiotherapy Unit ratio refers to the number of people per unit. [source: IAEA Directory of Radiotherapy Centres (DIRAC)];IAEA projects refers to active technical cooperation projects related to cancer or oncology (source: IAEA); PMDS: PACT (Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy) Model Demonstration Site in the region.

PMDS: NicaraguaPopulation: 5.7 million

New Cancer cases: 5,000/year

With the support of IAEA/PACT, WHO and international partners, a National Cancer Control Programme has been finalized and submitted to the Minister of Health for approval.

An MDS Nordion/Best Theratronics radiotherapy unit, recently donated through PACT, will significantly increase Nicaragua’s cancer treatment capacity by providing treatment for up to 180 patients a day.

PMDS: Tanzania

Population: 38 million

Cancer cases: 35000/year

IAEA/PACT is working with WHO and international partners to help build national cancer strategies

and action plans.

The Ocean Road Cancer Institute, Tanzania’s only cancer treatment and radiotherapy centre, inaugurated an MDS Nordion/Best Theratronics

radiotherapy unit (donated through PACT) in May 2008. The unit effectively doubles the

treatment capacity in Tanzania, where services are already severely overstretched.

LaTiN america New Cancer Cases: 991,423/yearDeaths: 576,571/yearPopulation/Radiotherapy Unit: 815,687IAEA Projects: 34

africa New Cancer Cases: 764,259/year

Deaths: 595,758/yearPopulation/Radiotherapy Unit: 4,772,565

IAEA Projects: 41

eUrope & ceNTraL asia

New Cancer Cases: 3,013,665/yearDeaths: 1,821,378/yearPopulation/Radiotherapy Unit: 346,723IAEA Projects: 44

where IAEA is involved

Technical Cooperation Projects Related to Cancer or Oncology Currently Ongoing Worldwide

Radioisotope and Radiation Treatment 87 projects

Nuclear Medicine Imaging 39 projects

Radiation Metrology and Dosimetry 17 projects

Radiation Medicine and Health 5 projects

Diagnostic Radiology 4 projects

Preparation of Labelled Compounds 2 projects


With its vast experience and knowledge of radiation medicine and technology, the IAEA plays a pivotal role helping low-resource countries fight the growing cancer crisis.

Text: Angela Leuker ● Design: Ritu Kenn ● Photos: P.Pavlicek and A.Leuker/IAEA

PMDS: sri LankaPopulation: 21 million

Cancer cases: 18,000/year

With the support of IAEA/PACT, WHO and international partners, Sri Lanka is making steady progress in all areas

of cancer control.

A comprehensive National Cancer Control Programme for Sri Lanka

is now close to completion and implementation.

PMDS: albania

Population: 3.6 million Cancer cases: 6,000/year

IAEA/PACT is working with WHO and international partners to help the Albanian government further develop cancer control activities.

The government has developed a new model for raising awareness and improving early detection of breast cancer.

asia & The pacificNew Cancer Cases: 5,737,035/year

Deaths: 3,934,024/yearPopulation/ Radiotherapy Unit: 979,818

IAEA Projects: 25

PMDS: YemenPopulation: 22 million Cancer cases: 11,000/year

IAEA/PACT, WHO and international partners are supporting government efforts to expand cancer services nationwide, including radiotherapy treatment and nuclear medicine diagnostic services, and to design and implement strategies focused on all areas of cancer care and control.

The government hosted the Fourth Gulf Cooperation Council Conference on Fighting Cancer in February 2009. Over US$1 million was raised for the treatment of Yemeni cancer patients from officials, corporations and others.

PMDS: Vietnam Population: 84 million

Cancer cases: 75,000/year

IAEA/PACT is working with WHO, international partners

and Vietnamese stakeholders to strengthen areas including

cancer registration, prevention, diagnostics and treatment.

The Ministry of Health inaugurated its National

Cancer Control Programme in January 2008. Among other

objectives, the Programme aims to reduce the rate of

advanced stage cancer sufferers seeking consultation

and treatment at specialized health facilities from 80% in

2000 to 50% in 2010.


Cancer is a disease that strikes fear into hearts. Each year it claims the lives of millions of peo-ple around the world while the lives of mil-

lions more—family, friends, colleagues—are indi-rectly touched by the disease. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as early as next year, 2010, cancer will have overtaken heart disease to become the number one cause of death world-wide.

Yet, behind the headlines, advances are being in made in the fight against cancer. In some of the world’s industrialized nations, where cancer aware-ness, prevention, early detection and treatment interventions are advanced, long-term survival rates for cancers such as breast and prostate are reach-ing 85% or higher, and up to 60% of some cancers are cured.

Sadly that’s not the case in many low-resource countries around the world. There, as health systems struggle to cope with the scourge of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, finding the resources to combat cancer remains a formidable challenge. The result: cancer awareness is often low, diagnosis late and treatment choices extremely limited or even unavailable.

“There’s a huge disparity,” says Werner Burkart, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications (NA). “If you take radiotherapy, which is a very effec-tive tool in the treatment of cancer, current figures show that developing countries lack at least 7000 radiotherapy machines to address current needs. And more than 30 countries in Africa and Asia have no radiotherapy facilities at all.”

At the same time, hard won advances in extend-ing life expectancy mean that the number of can-cer cases in low-income countries is likely to rise sig-nificantly, because the incidence of cancer increases with age. And as populations become more urban-

ized, they adopt lifestyles and behaviours associ-ated with increased cancer risk. WHO predicts that by 2020 more than 70% of all cancer cases will be in the developing world.

An Agency-wide ResponseThe IAEA is best known for its activities as the world’s ‘nuclear watchdog’, working to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and ensuring that nuclear power is used safely. But another, equally vital, part of the Agency’s mandate is to foster the peaceful role of nuclear science and technology in tackling urgent needs in developing countries, such as poverty, disease and hunger. For decades, the IAEA has brought its expertise in radiation medicine and technology to the fight against cancer.

Today, as the global cancer threat intensifies, the Agency is responding in a concerted, multi-dis-ciplinary effort. It incorporates the competencies and know-how of dedicated individuals working in fields such as human health and development. Work can range from overseeing the building of a cancer treatment centre, to developing guidelines to ensure the safe and effective application of radia-tion therapy, to assessing a country’s cancer control needs. Very often this work is done in teams drawn from across the Agency. Such cross-departmental collaboration and backstopping ensures that the IAEA’s efforts dovetail to achieve optimal results.

Money is a decisive issue in health care everywhere but especially so in developing countries. Although the initial outlay for radiotherapy equipment and training is high, it is very cost effective in the long term because a single machine can treat thousands of patients a year for as many as 20 years. The most common radiotherapy-treatable cancers are lung, breast, cervix, prostate and head and neck. In incur-able cases, radiotherapy is also used palliatively to help relieve pain. But the Agency recognises that

Stronger TogetherWeaker Apart

For the IAEA collaboration is key in the global fight against cancer.

by Angela Leuker

IAEA


radiation medicine alone cannot beat the cancer pandemic.

Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy

To maximize the benefits of the IAEA’s cancer-related work, radiotherapy needs to be part of a broader, integrated approach addressing the whole spectrum of cancer care and control: cancer regis-tration, prevention, early detection, diagnosis and treatment, and palliative care.

In 2004, the IAEA launched its Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) to spearhead this approach. A specially designated programme within the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications, PACT works together with other inter-national cancer organizations and Member States with the aim of building effective comprehensive cancer control systems based on WHO guidelines. Today it is successfully forming public-private part-nerships, mobilizing funds and raising awareness so that low resource countries might more effectively address their cancer burden.

PACT currently focuses its efforts on six Model Demonstration Site (PMDS) countries (Albania, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Vietnam and Yemen) but its progress is such that more than 50 Member States have requested special ‘imPACT’ Reviews. These are assessment missions conducted by teams of Agency and external experts aimed at

identifying a country’s specific cancer needs, the first step towards finding lasting solutions.

“PACT is the IAEA’s umbrella programme for com-bating cancer. It represents the Agency’s collabo-rative response to the global cancer crisis: working with international partners to help low- and mid-dle-income countries integrate radiotherapy into comprehensive cancer control programmes,” says Massoud Samiei, PACT Programme Head. “No sin-gle organization can combat the cancer epidemic on its own. Only by working together can we help save lives and spare the suffering of millions of men, women and children.”

Technical CooperationNearly 25% of the annual budget of the IAEA’s Department of Technical Cooperation (TC) goes to Human Health projects. Of these, the lion’s share is cancer related, mainly providing Member States with expertise, equipment and training to enhance cancer diagnosis and treatment facil-ities. At the end of 2008, TC had more than 140 such projects in progress around the world, rang-ing from the establishment of radiotherapy serv-ices to the introduction of advanced techniques for cancer diagnosis.

Usually Member States approach the Agency requesting help with a project proposal or concept. What follows is a collaboration tailored to suit the specific situation. A team including a Programme Management Officer from TC, a Technical Officer

More than 30 countries in Africa and Asia have no radiotherapy facilities at all.(Photo: A.Leuker/IAEA)

Health Above All | Stronger Together Weaker Apart


from NA’s Division of Human Health (NAHU), and a counterpart from the Member State normally will work together to design the project, defining spe-cific objectives and producing a work plan of activ-ities including performance indicators to measure the progress made during the life of the project. A TC project can last from two to four years and cost anything from US$ 100,000 to US$ one mil-lion, often on a cost-sharing basis where the coun-terpart institution provides additional funds to the IAEA to support some of the equipment required. This is a good indication of the country’s commit-ment and strengthens the viability and sustainabil-ity of the project’s expected outcomes.

“Establishing or upgrading a nuclear medicine or radiotherapy centre requires much more than infra-structure and equipment,” says Sandra Steyskal, Programme Management Officer in TC’s Europe Division. “In addition, TC projects aim to address the shortage of qualified human resources by pro-viding opportunities for training via fellowships and support for continuous professional develop-ment. The global shortage of qualified health care professionals is highly relevant in radiation medi-cine which relies on complex technology requir-ing highly trained and qualified staff.”

Human HealthWithin the Agency’s Division of Human Health, 60% of the work is cancer related. The activities of three of its four sections are directed specifically or in part towards helping Member States improve their cancer management strategies through the use of nuclear techniques.

Applied Radiation Biology and Radiotherapy (ARBR) aims to ensure that countries have safe, effective cancer treatment capabilities by helping them to introduce or expand radiotherapy capac-ity, establish sound codes of practice and apply advanced techniques.

For example, in 2008, the IAEA and the European Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology (ESTRO) conducted a pilot training course on best practices in radiation oncology. Selected groups from eight European countries received instruc-tion on how to create their own train-the-trainer courses for radiation therapy technologists in their respective countries.

“Requirements differ according to the country,” says Eeva Salminen, ARBR Section Head. “Some needs are basic because the radiotherapy is used

mostly to alleviate pain. But other countries are more advanced, so the Agency could be involved in upgrading radiotherapy facilities and tech-niques.”

Again, in-house collaboration is key, support-ing and exchanging information and know-how often across sections or departments. In 2007, for example, ARBR provided technical expertise on more than 100 TC projects. Currently, 132 projects require its expert support, together with that from other Human Health sections.

Dosimetry and Medical Radiation Physics (DMRP) works closely with ARBR. DMRP, which as been actively helping Member States since the 1960s, is responsible for the quality assurance of radia-tion used in medicine. The accurate measurement of radiation dosage is vital in applications such as radiation oncology, diagnostic radiology and nuclear medicine, for patient and health profes-sional alike. DMRP also provides dosimetry calibra-tion services to countries, using special devices to measure and make sure that the radiation beam is being used safely and accurately, according to IAEA guidelines.

Nuclear Medicine (NM) has the broader objective of ensuring that Member States have the capability and knowledge to effectively apply nuclear med-icine techniques for the diagnosis and treatment of a range of serious health conditions, including cancer.

Carrying the fight forwardToday the IAEA, with its vast experience and knowl-edge of radiation medicine and technology, plays a pivotal role in helping low-resource countries engage with the growing cancer crisis. But only through collaborative work, both IAEA-wide and with relevant external agencies and organizations, can the battle be successfully waged.

In this the IAEA takes its lead from WHO, the foremost United Nations agency in terms of health. Earlier this year a Joint Programme for Cancer Control was formed between WHO and the IAEA aimed at opti-mising efforts, activities and resources. This land-mark agreement offers better chances than ever before in global efforts to tackle the most pressing health issue of our time.

Angela Leuker is a consultant at the IAEA’s Division of Public Information. E-mail: [email protected]


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Nearly 10 million chil-dren under the age of five years die every year...more than half of those children have malnutrition, often severe malnutrition, when they die.

Alan Jackson explains how nuclear technologies are helping scientists to understand, treat and prevent malnutrition wherever this scourge might be afflicting children.

Fighting Malnutritionby Louise Potterton

Question: What is the impact of malnutrition on the world’s young population?

Alan Jackson: According to the latest estimates, some-thing like 10 million children under the age of five years die every year. That is one every three or four seconds. Most of them seem to die of either infectious diseases, such as malaria, HIV or respi-ratory diseases. But what is less clearly understood is that more than half of those children also have malnutrition, often severe malnutrition, when they die.

A great deal of attention is given to how to treat the infections afflicting these chil-dren, much less attention is paid to how to treat their poor nutrition. Obviously, if you don’t treat their poor nutrition in the first place they are more likely to get infections. In the second place, once they get an infection it is much harder for standard medica-tions to work and make them better if malnutrition is also a factor.

If the increased attention to managing HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, is really to have an impact, there has to be more attention given to making sure that the children are better nourished, so that they also have the resist-ance to not get the same problems over again.

Q: What exactly is malnutrition? Is it the case of not getting enough food or getting the wrong type of food or perhaps even getting too much food?

AL: Well, there used to be a lot of confusion around what one called malnutrition and clearly people have mal-nutrition in different ways. A particular area that we are interested in is children who are underweight because they either haven’t had enough food or they haven’t had sufficient food of the right quality — in other words, they have had poor quality food.

The more obvious form of malnutrition in many parts of the developed world is being overweight or obese. But again, there is a sense that much is also due to poor quality food, maybe too much poor quality food. So whether the issue is children being overweight or underweight, the question of food quality is of importance.

Q: Where in the world is malnutrition most prevalent and do you know why?

AL: There is good news regarding malnutrition and undernourished children. The good news is that in many parts of the world over the last 15 years or so, there have been significant improvements and there are fewer chil-dren who are undernourished. In fact there is concern about the children becoming over nourished.

But there are parts of the world where we still have great concern, particularly sub Saharan Africa, where the pro-portion of children under five who are undernourished is not going down — in some areas it is actually going up. In other parts of the world, such as Southeast Asia, the proportion of children who are undernourished may not be as high, but because the population is so large, the numbers of malnourished children are really quite considerable. So the two areas where we have to focus most strongly are in sub Saharan Africa and those parts

Food For Thought | Fighting Malnutrition


of Southeast Asia where the problem is common.

Q: The IAEA is involved in the International Malnutrition Task Force (IMTF). What role does nuclear science play in the aims of your organization?

AL: One can look at this historically. We know what to do in terms of treating malnourished children because 40 or 50 years ago research was done to help us to understand the problems that were taking place and what was hap-pening. Some important parts of that research were carried out using nuclear science.

One of the challenges that we have, is to have a better understanding of how children in the different parts of the world respond to different diets. How their bodies respond, how well they grow and how they might grow better if they were given different diets.

The IAEA is contributing directly to a better understanding of the “qual-ity of growth” during early life by pro-viding technical expertise in the use of nuclear techniques, in particular stable (non radioactive) isotope technique, to assess changes in body composition i.e., body fat versus muscle mass, as a

response to different diets. These tech-niques thus add value to conventional methods by providing more specific information.

Q: A lot of work lies ahead, especially at the moment as we are going through a global food crisis. What will the future role of nuclear science be in your field?

AL: I think the first point to make clear is that when we talk about nuclear sci-ence some might have horrible visions of nasty things happening. The nuclear science that we use in nutrition is per-fectly safe, harmless and doesn’t intro-duce any risk to anybody. So it is a very safe way of managing our business.

The second thing is that it is possible to use nuclear science to follow exactly what happens to the food in the body: how the body uses it, and how the body uses food to grow. In terms of children growing and developing, it is possible to trace this process, and understand it better without doing anything particu-larly invasive, only by being ingenious about how to collect that information.

One of the simple things that we wanted to do for a long time is to know how much water there is in the body.

Most of the body is made out of water and you can measure it by using the appropriate isotopic tools. For a long time those measurements required quite sophisticated technology, but the IAEA has been involved in introducing simpler technology to different parts of Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. They have been able to get us good information relatively simply. What we found from that information was that although all people are funda-mentally the same, there are important differences from place to place, which need to be taken into account when looking for solutions to problems.

Alan Jackson is Professor at the Institute of Human Nutrition of the University of Southampton and convenor of the International Malnutrition Task Force. E-mail: [email protected]

Louise Potterton is a consultant at the IAEA Division of Public Information. E-mail: [email protected]

For more information, visit www-naweb.iaea.org/nahu/nahres/default.shtm

The International Malnutrition Task Force (IMTF) is an inter-agency advisory and advocacy group on malnutrition that has a two fold purpose:

➊ To raise the profile of malnutrition: Malnutrition contributes to 60% of deaths of children under 5, so reducing malnutrition is vital in child survival strategies. Although there are as many deaths from the effects of malnutrition as from AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, malnutrition currently fails to receive the attention

it warrants in health policies and resource allocation.

➋ To build capacity to prevent and treat malnutrition: In hospitals in developing countries, severely malnourished children comprise a significant proportion of paediatric deaths. Most deaths can be prevented by following treatment guidelines. Community-based treatment can reduce the burden of care on hospitals, shorten in-patient treatment and benefit children with moderate malnutrition.

An integrated system of prevention, timely referral, correct inpatient treatment and effective community-based care will improve child survival and development and build health worker capacity and strengthen health systems.

IMTF was launched at the International Union of Nutritional Sciences (IUNS) 18th International Congress of Nutrition held in Durban in September 2005 by the IUNS President Professor Ricardo Uauy.

For more information, visit www.imtf.org

International Malnutrition Task Force

For a podcast of this interview, visit www. iaea.org/podcasts


Millions of malnourished children in developing countries will never lead healthy, happy lives due to ‘hidden hunger’ caused by an insufficient amount of micronutrients in their

diets. Micronutrients, such as vitamin A, zinc, and iron are more abun-dant in the diverse diets enjoyed by affluent populations—these micro-nutrients quietly do their work to help children grow, develop cogni-tive skills, and build their immune systems. Their presence, beneath the demeanour of a happy well-nourished child, goes unnoticed. However, the same cannot be said of their absence. During the acceler-ated growth phases from infancy through adolescence, micronutrient deficiencies can leave children ill, stunted, or even blind, and diminish their prospects for a healthy and productive adulthood.

Fortifying foods and providing supplements are the main strategies used to reduce hidden hunger. However, the reach of these interven-tions can be quite limited, especially in rural areas of developing coun-tries where most of the poor live. Biofortification is a promising innova-tion that could help fight hidden hunger especially in rural areas.

Researchers know that the rural poor consume large amounts of sta-ple food crops, such as rice, or sweet potato, foods that do not provide them with enough micronutrients. Through a process called biofortifi-cation, scientists are now breeding staple foods with higher micronu-trient content.

HarvestPlus, a global leader in biofortification, is leveraging a world-wide network of scientists to breed and disseminate new biofortified varieties of staple food crops that are rich in vitamin A, zinc, or iron. By targeting staple food crops that are already important in people’s diets, HarvestPlus believes it will be easier—and more cost-effective—to reduce hidden hunger in rural areas by integrating these new foods into the lives of the poor. Along with fortification, supplementation,

for Better NutritionBreeding Crops

IAEA-supported research partnerships zero in on “biofortification”.

by Yassir Islam & Christine Hotz

Gene Hettel

The rural poor consume large amounts of staple food crops, such as rice, or sweet potato, foods that do not provide them

with enough micronutrients. Through a process called biofor-tification, scientists are now breeding staple foods with higher

micronutrient content.

Food for Thought | Breeding Crops for Better Nutrition


and other efforts to diversify diets, biofortification could be an effective tool in helping to prevent, or reduce, hidden hunger.

Plant breeders must taken into account several fac-tors when they set nutrient target levels for staple food crops. Among these are:

✤ post-harvest nutrient loss from crops during storage, processing and cooking;

✤ micronutrient bioavailability (how much of the nutrient is absorbed when the food is eaten), and

✤ bioefficacy—how the increased intake of micro-nutrients increases nutrient stores in the body and

prevents outcomes associated with micronutrient deficiency.

This data is lacking for many crops, but is essential if plant breeders are to breed sufficient amounts of micronutrients into food crops, so that consuming normal amounts of these foods will provide a substantial proportion of daily micronutrient requirements.

It is at this critical juncture, that the IAEA is help-ing HarvestPlus move towards its goal. While ani-mal models may be useful for studying mecha-nisms of absorption and conversion, scientists’ cannot directly extrapolate their results to humans. Ultimately, researchers will need to conduct com-plex human efficacy trials requiring large num-bers of participants, longer consumption periods, and difficult logistics for monitoring consumption of the test foods to provide the burden of proof for the biofortification strategy. However, stable iso-tope tracer studies can provide direct estimates of the bioavailability of micronutrients in humans far more quickly and cheaply than long-term efficacy trials. Furthermore, they can be used to estimate the potential impact of biofortified foods in the dietary contexts typical of rural, developing country pop-ulations, as there are many dietary factors that can limit micronutrient bioavailability.

“Stable isotope tracer techniques constitute a useful intermediate step that can provide us with physio-logical data to help predict the impact of biofortifica-tion in the long-term on micronutrient status,” says Dr. Erick Boy, nutrition coordinator at HarvestPlus, “and IAEA has considerable expertise in this field.”

In 2004, HarvestPlus and IAEA launched their first research partnership, which analyzed the contribu-tion of biofortified staple food crops to micronu-trient status in adult women using stable isotope tracer techniques.

One of the first collaborative projects was on orange sweet potato, which is emerging as a biofortifica-tion success story. It has been demonstrated that orange sweet potato biofortified with provitamin A (hence the orange color) increases vitamin A intake and vitamin A status of deficient individuals, com-pared to traditional white varieties that are pop-ular in Africa. This is encouraging news, given that thousands of children in Africa go blind every year from vitamin A deficiency. Fat is required to facilitate the absorption of vitamin A, but fat intakes tend to be lower in developing country populations than in more affluent populations, which may also con-tribute to inadequate vitamin A status among the

Staple foods, such as rice, may fill a child’s stomach, but provide few

nutrients.

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Food for Thought | Breeding Crops for Better Nutrition


HarvestPlus is an international research program that seeks to reduce micronutrient malnutrition

by breeding biofortified staple food crops that are rich in micronutrients. It is a Challenge Program of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research. It is co-convened by the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

For further information visit: www.harvestplus.org

About HarvestPlusrural poor. Stable isotope dilution techniques are being used to estimate total body stores of vitamin A before and after consumption of provitamin A rich foods, thus determining the efficacy of these foods to prevent vitamin A deficiency.

This research project will also shed light on the extent to which orange sweet potato prepared with added fat improves vitamin A status compared to orange sweet potato prepared without added fat. This will help researchers better understand the broader context in which orange sweet potato can improve the vitamin A status of populations, as many households cannot afford to cook with vege-table oil or other fats.

Wheat is the second most popular cereal in Asia, after rice. In South Asia, where zinc deficiency is widespread, wheat biofortified with zinc could pro-vide more zinc to millions of zinc-deficient peo-ple. The only problem is that phytates, a phospho-rus compound that is abundant in wheat and other cereal grains, can inhibit the absorption of minerals such as zinc and may even contribute to the high rates of zinc deficiency found in populations with high intakes of unrefined cereals. Many consum-ers around the world typically eat products made from refined wheat flour and yeast-leavened bread, both of which have low phytate content due to the processing methods used. However, among popu-lations in rural India and Pakistan, unleavened bread is often prepared from whole-wheat products, and thus, the phytate content is maximal. In this dietary context, the benefits of increased zinc content in biofortified wheat could be rather limited.

A zinc stable isotope tracer study supported by HarvestPlus and IAEA confirmed, however, that a proportionate amount of zinc from biofortified wheat products provided a proportionately greater amount of absorbed zinc, regardless of whether the wheat was refined or unrefined. This result is encour-aging for the prospects of zinc biofortification.

As a follow-up to this first round, a second set of col-laborative projects launched in December 2008, will also examine zinc absorption, but this time, in chil-dren, who are the most vulnerable to the devastat-ing consequences of hidden hunger. Relatively little information is available on zinc absorption in chil-dren, especially from cereal-based diets. These stud-ies will look at zinc absorption from three bioforti-fied crops: rice, pearl millet, and maize. For each of these crops, researchers will measure zinc absorp-tion in children from Bangladesh, India, and Zambia, respectively, who are vulnerable to zinc deficiency. This is important because it is not yet known

whether zinc absorption in children follows the same pattern as it does in adults.

The protocols and findings that emerge from these coordinated research projects should have broad applications in developing biofortified crops and increase our understanding of how humans, espe-cially children, ingest and absorb nutrients from the food they eat. Ideally, the poor will eventually need to have better access to more diverse diets that could provide them with needed micronutrients, but rising food prices means this goal may remain elusive for quite a while longer.

Furthermore, millions of people in remote regions of the developing world also lack diversity in their diets simply due to their isolation, marginal agri-cultural conditions, and the seasonal availability of many foods. Biofortified staple food crops can help bridge the micronutrient gap, providing people with a larger proportion of their daily micronutrient requirements through the foods that they already grow and eat.

Yassir Islam is Communications Specialist and Christine Hotz is Senior Nutritionist at HarvestPlus. E-mails: [email protected]; [email protected].

A zinc stable isotope tracer study supported by HarvestPlus and IAEA confirmed, however, that a proportionate amount of zinc from bioforti-fied wheat products provided a proportionately greater amount of absorbed zinc, regardless of whether the wheat was refined or unrefined.

Atoms for Peace: A Pictorial History of the International Atomic Energy Agency

the IAEA has issued a photographic history of the organization and its work:

The book addresses the fundamental concepts that underline the work of the IAEA — the natural evolution of security and development as the two aspects of the same ideal: “Atoms for Peace”. The successes and challenges that have shaped the organization over the past half century are recorded and key events from the IAEA's past and present are detailed. These include President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' speech, the establishment of safeguards regimes, the international response to the Chernobyl accident and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005, as well as ongoing endeavours in fields ranging from sustainable energy production to human health and agricultural productivity.

To commemorate its first 50 years

To order the book or request more information, please contact:

Sales and Promotion Unit F0855, Publishing Section International Atomic Energy Agency P.O. Box 100 A 1400 Vienna, Austria

Tel.: +43-1-2600-22529/22530 Fax: +43-1-2600-29302 E-mail: [email protected]/books/50thAnnBook

Price: €50

A pictorial history of Atoms for Peace


It is estimated that the number of people in the Ukraine directly affected by the 1986 Chernobyl accident is about 2.6 million from

a total of 2,293 settlements. These communities, which had already been broken down and resettled soon after the accident, were further affected by the restrictions on economic activities imposed on the population living in the contaminated areas. Moreover, governmental aids and subsidies, which soon became insufficient because of the impact of inflation, eventually enhanced apathy and passive behaviours in the population.

The overall impacts on the population standard of living was devastating: lack of effective medical equipments, plummeting standards in child and youth education, and rapidly deteriorating infra-

structures such as water supply and sewage sys-tems, took their toll on the population.

Since the early 1990s, bilateral and multilateral, governmental and non-governmental support has been offered to Ukraine to cope with the Chernobyl aftermath. While at the beginning support tended to focus on humanitarian aid, the recent trend has been to focus on development.

In 2002, a report entitled “Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident — A Strategy for Recovery”, was jointly issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and completed with the support of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA)

In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, people living in the affected regions lost the incentives for social and economic development.

More than two decades on, they are now slowly taking control of their lives once again.

helping themselvesCommunities

by Yoshio Matsuki

(UN

DP/

CRD

P)

Life Moves On | Communities Helping Themselves


and World Health Organization (WHO). The report indicated the need for a paradigmatic shift from humanitarian aid to developmental approach. The new approach was supported by scientific observation indicating that the Chernobyl accident was a ‘low-dose event’ for the majority of people in the areas deemed to be contaminated, and that most people can live safely in their place of residence without any restrictions. This point was further confirmed by participants of the 2005-2006 UN Chernobyl Forum.

At the end of 2002, UNDP and the Government of Ukraine embarked on the Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (UNDP/CRDP), which focused on three major initiatives aimed at local populations:

♦ Building self-reliance and dignity;

♦ Creating livelihoods and economic opportunities; and

♦ Protecting threatened lives in contaminated zones.

The underlying strategy was community develop-ment, which foresaw not only economic develop-ment but also tackling poverty, as well as develop-

ing trust and critical thinking. One of the desired outcomes of the plan was that community mem-bers take control of their lives once again.

Additional funding for the programme was provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Government of Japan through the UN Human Security Trust Fund, the UN Volunteer Programme, and UN-OCHA.

UNDP/CRDP implemented community deve-lopment projects in seventeen administrative districts of the four most contaminated provinces in Ukraine — Chernigivska, Rivnenska, Kyivska, and Zhytomyrska. Through these activities, UNDP/CRDP established 279 Community Organisations in 192 settlements, for a total membership of over 20,000 people.

Each Community Organization designed an action plan, which included rebuilding medical facilities, schools, water supply systems, sewage and heating systems. Subsequently, the Community Organizations applied for and received the nec-essary funds from UNDP/CRDP, local governments, local business entities as well as foreign governments — such as Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Projects. During 2003-2007

Project Number of Projects

Total Budget (US$)

Fund Provided by the CRDP

(US$)

Youth/Community Center 40 681,924 278,335

Improving Local Medical Clinic 41 799,616 301,307

Repairing Water Supply System 34 612,754 213,794

Repairing School 34 802,574 263,896

Others * 41 1,046,822 347,813

Total 190 3,943,691 1,405,147

* Repairing hospital (2), repairing kindergarten (5), repairing sewage system (2), reconstructing the market (4), establishing the Service Center (hair dressing, tailor etc.) (3), repairing gas supply system (3), Web-site project (8), cleaning water reservoir for recreation center (1), repairing cattle bleeding center (2), Sport and health recreation center (1), development of community park (1), repairing pedestrian bridge (1), repairing public bath (1), repairing children’s recreation center (2), repairing street lights (1), repairing heating system for the social center (1), solid waste management (2), establishing Resource Center (1). The number in brackets shows the number of projects.

UNDP — United Nations Development Programme; CRDP — Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme

Source: UNDP/CRDP

Types of Projects Funded by UNDP/CRDP



UNDP/CRDP financially supported 190 community projects. The total budget of community projects was over $3.4 million, 30% of which was provided by UNDP/CRDP.

It might be argued that some of problems facing local communities are not connected to the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Some might even say that in other regions of Ukraine local communities faced similar problems. However, evi-dence shows that people who were offered vol-untary resettlement, did not have the motivation to improve the social infrastructure of the com-munities to which they were relocated. Therefore, the rehabilitation of affected territories should be directed toward primary services such as medicine, water-supply and school systems.

The table shows the types of the projects carried out by the affected communities, and supported by the UNDP/CRDP.

The Lystvin Village ExampleLystvin village is located 120 km west of Chernobyl, 180 km north-west of Kiev, and 40 km west of the centre of Ovruch District in Zhytomyr Province. The village is categorized as being in the third zone of radiological contamination — i.e., zone of voluntary evacuation: all those who chose to relocate were provided with a new apartment in another town.

The village population is about 1600, including 200 children. During the 1990s, the village infrastructure, which includes a school, an agricultural enterprise, a post office, a kindergarten, and a cultural centre, became deteriorated because of lack of funds. The village population also experienced increased illness and mortality rates, as well as increasing migration. Agricultural production, which was the main source of income for villagers, also declined.

In May 2003, village residents started working with UNDP/CRDP initiating the process of becoming self-organised. A Community Organisation was estab-lished, and the first project “Reconstruction of the Bania (sauna)” was also initiated. The project created jobs, and improved the overall sanitary and hygienic conditions of the village. This process continued with the reconstruction of the local medical clinic. The local community renovated the building while the UNDP/CRDP provided the medical equipment. A physical therapy office was also opened, thus improving medical services.

After these two pilot projects were completed, several other Community Organizations were

established in the village to carry out various projects. Under one of those projects, a Youth Centre was established by the Community Organization “Youth”. The project received the support from the local authorities. The Organization found a facility, mobilised their own resources, and applied for the grant from UNDP/CRDP. More than seventy people joined in a team renovating the building. People would be plastering, whitewashing and painting walls, installing equipment, repairing the heating and

In the Lystvin village, more than 70 people joined a project to renovate a building for a Youth Centre.

(Photo: UNDP/CRDP)



the sewage of the building. The local government, together with local sponsors, provided the necessary materials while the UNDP/CRDP provided office and sport equipments. The Youth Centre was finally opened in September 2005. It now provides learning resources, computers, typing and copying services. Lectures and training on site for a variety of jobs are also possible. The centre is equipped with a sports gym and rooms for hobbies.

In June 2005, an Association of Community Organizations was established during a public meeting at the village. The Association’s aim is to coordinate the activities of the various Community Organizations. The Association also applied for a grant from the Embassy of Japan to improve the water supply system.

Upon the request from the Lystvin Village, in June 2006 a Coordinator from the Embassy of Japan investigated the village water supply system. During the inspection, the officer found that the water supply system, built more than 30 years ago, was insufficient and had hygienic problems. Most of the people in the village were using and drinking unfiltered water containing significant traces of iron. During the inspection it became apparent that the village lacked the financial resources to repair the water supply system. Taking stock of the situation, in December 2007 the government of Japan decided to support the community’s plan to improve their living condition by replacing the old water supply system. The Japanese government provided the vil-lage a grant of $32,680 under the framework of the Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Projects of Japan. The project included repairing the water tower, replacing the street hand pumps,

as well as the water pipes, the water cleaning filters and the water pumps. The project was completed in Autumn 2008.

The Association of Community Organizations also carried out several additional projects. These included cleaning the streets and the areas flooded by the local river, renovating a monument, clean-ing and renovating the water wells, cleaning a local dump, renovating the school heating sys-tem, reconstructing the local church, and renovat-ing the cemetery. To implement those projects, the Association cooperated with local governments and donor organisations. Nowadays, Lystvyn vil-lage is regarded as a model for neighbouring vil-lages and the region.

Recovery and DevelopmentMany of the people directly affected by the Chernobyl accident are still dependent on the aid coming from the Ukrainian and foreign govern-ments as well as from international organizations.

However, in recent years they have organized them-selves into Community Organizations and started rebuilding their communities, reconstructing local infrastructures such as water supply systems, schools and hospitals.

There is still much left to do to achieve a full recovery from the Chernobyl accident that took place over two decades ago. However, the people affected by that disaster have finally started building their own future and are no longer passively waiting for gov-ernment aid. This is a crucial step that needs to be saluted as a major achievement for the communi-ties affected by the most devastating accident in the history of nuclear power.

Yoshio Matsuki is an independent consultant who worked as Coordinator of the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects of the Embassy of Japan in Ukraine. E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Pavlo V. Zamostyan, Head of the Chernobyl Recovery & Development Programme of the United Nations Development Programme in Ukraine, also con-tributed to this article.

Grass Roots HumanityThe Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human

Security Projects of Japan is a programme operated by the Embassy of Japan in Ukraine.

It provides small-size financial aid (between $20,000 and $75,000) to non-governmental

organizations and medical facilities in the regions affected by the Chernobyl accident.

In the period 2002-2008, the Programme contributed a total of $717,512 to 16 projects.

? IAEA Bulletin 50-2 | May 2009 | 53

After several decades of disappointing growth, nuclear energy seems poised for a comeback. Talk of a “nuclear renaissance” includes per-

haps a doubling or tripling of nuclear capacity by 2050, spreading nuclear power to new markets in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and developing new kinds of reactors and fuel-reprocessing tech-niques.

But the reality of nuclear energy’s future is more complicated. Projections for growth assume that government support will compensate for nuclear power’s market liabilities and that perennial issues such as waste, safety, and proliferation will not be serious hurdles. However, without major changes in government policies and aggressive financial sup-port, nuclear power is actually likely to account for a declining percentage of global electricity genera-tion. For example, the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2007 projects that without policy changes, nuclear power’s share of worldwide electricity generation will drop from 15% in 2007 to 9% in 2030.

Given the seriousness of these uncertainties, a sound policy on nuclear energy should be based not on hope but on solid answers to six questions.

Can Nuclear Power Enhance Energy Security?

Rising prices of oil and natural gas have had a cas-cading effect on countries’ concerns about energy security. Price disputes have resulted in temporary cutoffs of natural gas supplies in Europe in the past few years. But most countries will not be able to reduce their dependence on foreign oil by build-ing nuclear power plants. Nuclear power—because

it currently only provides electricity—is inherently limited in its ability to reduce this dependence. For example, 40% of the energy consumed in the US comes from oil, yet oil produces only 1.6% of elec-tricity. And even though France and Japan rely heav-ily on nuclear energy, they have been unable to reduce their dependence on foreign oil because of oil’s importance for transportation and industry.

Oil accounts for about 7% of power generation glo-bally, a share that is expected to decline to 3% by

Hanging QuestionsA nuclear renaissance would require significant changes by both governments and multinational agencies as well as aggressive financial support.

by Sharon Squassoni

Without major changes in government policies and aggressive financial support, nuclear power is actually likely to account for a declining percentage of global electricity generation.

Photodisc

?Nuclear Power, Tomorrow and Yesterday | Hanging Questions


2030. Only in the Middle East, where countries rely on oil for about 30% of their electricity generation, could substitution of nuclear power for oil make a significant difference. Until transportation switches to electricity as its fuel, nuclear energy largely will not displace oil.

The situation is different for natural gas. Although natural gas also has industrial and heating uses, it produces about one-fifth of electricity worldwide. Natural gas is attractive as a way to produce elec-tricity because gas-fired generating plants are very efficient at converting primary energy into electric-ity and also cheap to build, compared with coal- and nuclear-fired plants. Nuclear energy could displace natural gas for electricity production and improve some countries’ stability of energy supply.

Ultimately, however, countries may be trading one form of energy dependence for another. Given the structure of the nuclear industry and uranium resource distribution, most countries will need to import fuel, technology, and reactor components, as well as fuel services. This means that few coun-tries can expect more than interdependence, even when it comes to nuclear power.

Can Nuclear Power Contribute to Controlling Climate Change?

Nuclear power is not a near-term solution to the challenge of climate change. The need to imme-diately and dramatically reduce carbon emissions calls for approaches that can be implemented more quickly than building nuclear reactors. It also calls for actions that span all energy applications, not just electricity. Improved efficiency in residential and commercial buildings, industry, and transport is the first choice among all options in virtually all analy-ses of the problem. Nuclear energy will remain an option among efforts to control climate change, but given the maximum rate at which new reactors can be built, much new construction will simply off-set the retirement of nuclear reactors built decades ago.

For nuclear energy to make a larger difference in meeting the challenge of climate change, the industry would need to add capacity exceeding replacement levels. According to a 2007 study by the Keystone Center, this would require “the indus-try to return immediately to the most rapid period of growth experienced in the past (1981–1990) and sustain this rate of growth for 50 years.” This would

mean completing twenty-one to twenty-five new, large (1,000MW electric) plants each year through 2050.

Yet the global nuclear construction industry has shrunk. In the past twenty years, there have been fewer than ten new reactor construction starts worldwide in any given year. Today there are already bottlenecks in the global supply chain, including ultra-heavy forgings, large manufactured compo-nents, engineering, craft labour, and skilled con-struction labour. All these constraints have been exacerbated by the lack of recent experience in building nuclear plants and by aging labour forces.

Will New Nuclear Power Plants Be Economically Competitive?

The economic competitiveness of nuclear power is a subject of much debate. Nuclear power plants are expensive to build but relatively inexpensive to operate, because their fuel costs are low compared with alternatives. For example, the price of natural gas accounts for 85% of the variable cost of a kilo-watt-hour, whereas nuclear fuel accounts for 27%. This means that as the cost of fossil fuels rise, either due to short supply or because carbon dioxide emis-sions may in the future be regulated, nuclear power will become relatively more competitive.

A big uncertainty is the cost of constructing new nuclear power plants. As a general rule, about two-thirds of a nuclear reactor’s cost stems from con-struction. Factors affecting this cost of construc-tion include the creditworthiness of the companies involved in building the reactors, the cost of capi-tal (especially debt) over the next decade, the risk of cost escalation due to construction delays and over-runs, less need for additional generating capacity in a slowing economy, and the competitive advantage of both traditional and emerging power generation technologies.

Because data from the past unfortunately provide little help in assessing future costs, the real costs of new nuclear power plants may not be known for years. In fact, Moody’s stated in a special October 2007 report that “the ultimate costs associated with building new nuclear generation do not exist today—and that the current cost estimates repre-sent best estimates, which are subject to change.”

The current economic crisis could make financing nuclear power plants particularly difficult. Financing

?Nuclear Power, Tomorrow and Yesterday | Hanging Questions


costs account for between 25 and 80% of the total cost of construction because nuclear power plants take much longer to build than alternatives (for example, wind plants require eighteen months to build, combined-cycle gas turbines need thirty-six months, and nuclear power plants take at least sixty months). A global tightening of risk management standards in the wake of the current economic cri-sis could imperil the nuclear industry in particular, because a reactor entails such a large investment (between $5 billion and $10 billion per plant) relative to the typical financial resources of electric utilities.

Can Safety Be Assured?Concerns about the safety of nuclear power plants have played a major role in nuclear power’s stagna-tion over the past two decades. Newer designs are much simpler and have built-in passive safety meas-ures. Yet a big expansion of nuclear power could lead to new safety concerns as new suppliers from South Korea, China, and India could enter the field to meet expanded demand.

In addition, countries that are new to nuclear power must not only implement a complex set of regula-tions and laws but also foster the development of resilient safety and security cultures. This could be quite challenging for some developing countries.

Finally, in states with existing power plants, the extension of reactor operations beyond their initial lives of thirty or forty years to sixty or even eighty years could potentially result in new safety concerns if construction materials age in unanticipated ways.

Is an Acceptable Solution to Nuclear Waste at Hand?

Nuclear reactors unavoidably generate radioactive spent fuel as waste. Some states will opt to store spent nuclear fuel indefinitely. Others may seek to recycle it, using a technique known as reprocess-ing, which reduces the volume of waste that needs to be stored but produces separated plutonium, a nuclear weapons fuel. More than fifty years since the first reactor produced electricity, no country has yet opened a permanent site for nuclear waste-known as a geologic repository.

Whether nations are storing spent fuel or recycled waste, adequate physical protection and security against terrorist access are both essential. Even in fuel-leasing schemes, in which spent fuel would be

shipped back to the original supplier, new nuclear states will still require safe and secure interim stor-age for fuel as it cools. A key question for the future of nuclear energy is how many countries will choose to reprocess their fuel. Some states, such as South Korea, are interested in reprocessing to reduce the volume of their spent fuel. Japan has been reproc-essing its spent fuel to both reduce the volume and use the plutonium for fuel as part of an effort to strengthen its energy security. Although there is much evidence that the use of mixed fuel (plu-tonium and uranium) in reactors is uneconomical, some countries may use it anyway. This would vastly increase the quantities of nuclear weapons material available around the world.

Can Proliferation Risks Be Adequately Controlled?The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has cautioned that states just beginning to embark on the path toward nuclear energy can expect at least fifteen years to elapse before their first plant begins operation. They will need this time to develop the necessary physical and intellectual infrastructures to run nuclear power plants safely and securely.

Many of the countries interested in nuclear power anticipate sizable growth in electricity demand. Others may simply be jumping on the nuclear bandwagon, either to make a national statement about capabilities or to take advantage of what they may perceive as incentives from advanced nuclear states, particularly France, Russia, and the US.

In 2008, the International Security Advisory Board of the US Department of State concluded that “the rise in nuclear power worldwide, and particularly within Third World countries, inevitably increases the risks of proliferation.” Only nuclear energy, among all energy sources, requires international inspections to ensure that material, equipment, facilities, and expertise are not misused for weapons purposes. For those countries that do not already have nuclear programs, developing the scientific, engineer-ing, and technical base required for nuclear power would in itself heighten their proliferation potential. Political instability in many cases is a more promi-nent concern than weapons intentions.

Sharon Squassoni is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. E-mail: [email protected] article is based on excerpts from a longer analysis available at www.carnegieendowment.org

➊

➋

➌

Nuclear Power, Tomorrow and Yesterday | Hanging Questions


➊ Compare All Energy Options, Including EfficiencyBecause moving world energy use away from dependence on carbon-based fossil fuels will require enormous investments, it will be essential to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of all possible solutions, including drastically improved efficiency. The only sensible approach to climate change is to prioritize investment in the lowest carbon energy options with the biggest impact that can be deployed immediately. These three criteria should be applied to assessing where nuclear power fits in among states’ possible energy options. The IAEA and the International Energy Agency could collab-orate on such an approach. Alternatively, a new glo-bal energy agency might be organized to perform this task, among others, if needed.

➋ Take the Glamour Out of Nuclear CooperationNuclear energy is often regarded by countries as a symbol of national prowess rather than simply as a way to produce electricity. Because nations have an inalienable right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, part of the challenge in levelling the energy playing field will be addressing the allure of nuclear power.

In part, the glamour of nuclear power is enhanced by the perceived prestige of nuclear cooperation agreements. Some might argue that framework agreements provide the prestige that some states seek, even if little nuclear trade results. However, this approach is not sustainable over time. A more prom-

ising path would be to subsume discussions about nuclear cooperation under the broader rubric of energy cooperation, rather than pursuing them as technology-specific diplomatic initiatives.

➌ Adopt the Model Additional Protocol as a RequirementThe IAEA’s Model Additional Protocol, which contains measures to strengthen the international system of inspections on nuclear material and facilities, was approved in 1997. However, because the protocol’s adoption is not mandatory, around 100 states do not yet have it in force. Its measures—which include increased access for inspectors, a wider array of information about a state’s entire fuel-cycle, provisions for short-notice inspections, and new monitoring techniques—are essential to enhance the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

The Model Additional Protocol needs to become the new benchmark for nuclear supply within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). All countries should incorporate a requirement for an additional proto-col into their nuclear cooperation agreements as well as in vendor contracts.

➍ Supply Nuclear Reactors and Their Components ResponsiblyThe nuclear industry understands its own inter-dependence, particularly in the area of nuclear safety. The common refrain of “a nuclear accident

7 StepsSharon Squassoni of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that some of the risks related to a rapid expansion of nuclear power could be minimized by adopting the following measures:

➍

➏

➐➎

Nuclear Power, Tomorrow and Yesterday | Hanging Questions


anywhere affects everyone everywhere” can be extended to nuclear security and to proliferation. Yet in an expanded nuclear world, there will be tre-mendous commercial pressures to supply nuclear reactors and their components to states that may not yet have all their regulatory, safety, and security infrastructures in place. To mitigate risk in such sit-uations, vendors will need to agree on minimum requirements for the sale of nuclear reactors and components and include these requirements as standard clauses in contracts. It will be important to reach vendors outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group, particularly in India and Pakistan.

➎ Increase Transparency in Cooperation and Tighten Restrictions on Sensitive Technologies

Although US agreements are a matter of pub-lic record because of the requirement for congres-sional approval, this is not the case in other coun-tries. Sharing the texts of cooperation agreements could help promote the standardization of non-proliferation requirements, including restrictions on sensitive technologies.

The NSG needs to make progress on tightening restrictions on sensitive technologies—that is, ura-nium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, and heavy water production.

➏ Give Priority to Small, Proliferation — Resistant Reactor DesignsNew emphasis and funding should be devoted to commercializing small, proliferation-resistant reac-tor designs that incorporate passive safety fea-tures. Although Russian floating reactors have been touted as proliferation resistant because they can be removed from a country once their operational lives have ended, their potential vulnerabilities with respect to security and protection against terrorist attacks need to be assessed more carefully.

And other possible designs—like the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, under development by South Africa—should be internationally vetted against safety and safeguards standards. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership could play a key role here, as the international forum known as Generation IV has in the technical development of the next genera-

tion of reactors. The partnership should focus more directly on helping commercialize the kinds of reac-tors that new nuclear states could deploy most prof-itably.

➐ Phase Out National Enrichment Capabilities Under a Fissile Material Production Cutoff TreatyOne of the most difficult aspects of restricting access to sensitive nuclear technologies like enrich-ment and reprocessing is the element of national prestige that is often attached to these high-pro-file projects. One way of divorcing the element of national pride from sensitive nuclear technologies is to ultimately “denationalize” these technologies. Existing plants would need to be converted to mul-tinational ownership and, perhaps, operation. Such an approach would face heavy resistance, but it could be broached within the context of a fissile material production cutoff treaty (FMCT).

An FMCT treaty could ban not just the production of fissile material for weapons, but could require all — existing and future — enrichment plants to be multinational. In addition to deflecting the element of national prestige, multinational enrichment facil-ities would raise the probability of detecting clan-destine enrichment and hence substantially lower the risk of a national breakout from FMCT restric-tions. Some countries, including the US, might need to alter laws or regulations regarding foreign owner-ship of these sensitive technologies or plants.

Yet in an expanded nuclear world, there will be tremendous commercial pressures to supply nuclear reactors and their components to states that may not yet have all their regulatory, safety, and security infrastructures in place.


During 1985, the total installed nuclear power capacity in the world increased by 14%, with 32 new nuclear power units having a total

capacity of 30 gigawatts-electric (GWe) being con-nected to grids. At the end of 1985 there were 374 nuclear power plants, with a total capacity of just under 250 GWe, in operation in the world. In energy terms, nuclear power plants generated about 1400 terawatt-hours of electricity during 1985, an increase of 19% over 1984, and accounted for about 15% of the world’s electricity generation during 1985.

How large a contribution is this? The electricity pro-duced by nuclear power plants worldwide during 1985 is of the same order as the total electricity gen-erated in the 10 Member States of the European Economic Community in this year. Another way to look at the present situation is to recall that the 1400 terawatthours produced by nuclear power in 1985 was the level of total electricity production in the world in 1954. This corresponds to the use of 570 million tons of coal. For Western Europe, the nuclear generation in 1985 of 551 terawatt-hours equalled the total electricity production in 1960.

Nuclear Shares of ElectricityThe nuclear share in electricity generation var-ies greatly from country to country, and also from region to region in some countries (for example, USA). As shown in the accompanying map, there were 19 countries in which nuclear power plants contributed 10% or more of the total electricity production during 1985. In countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), around 20.4% of the total electricity generated in 1985 was produced by nuclear plants.

It is worth noting that while the contribution of nuclear plants to electricity in Canada was 12.7% in 1985, it was 42% in the province of Ontario. Also, although nuclear contributed 15.5% of the overall electricity produced in the USA, it was over 50% in six of the country’s states.

The present rapid increase in the contribution by nuclear power to the world’s energy supply is a result of orders placed in the 1970s, which would also maintain the nuclear power growth for a few years. If this growth is maintained, the worldwide nuclear power capacity is expected to be around 370 GWe by 1990, with a contribution of 20% to the world’s electrical energy supply, unless there are cancella-tions or slowdowns of planned projects.

National plans and objectives will certainly be subject to re-examination and debates following the reactor accident at the Chernobyl plant in the USSR. Notwithstanding this accident, there remain energy demand and economic factors which should favour the continued expansion of nuclear power through the 1990s and into the next century. Some of these factors and trends are discussed in following sections.

Energy Supply PatternsIn industrialized market-economy countries, there is now a significant decoupling of primary energy consumption from the gross domestic product (GDP). However, there are clear indications of the importance of electricity in energy conservation through its higher efficiency in end use, which in practice has meant a close coupling of elec-tricity demand with GDP. In the OECD countries GDP increased by 27% between 1974-84. This was

In 1986, nuclear’s contribution to electricity supply was growing and a nuclear expansion seemed to be under way.

Pages from the PastNuclear Power Redux

by L.L. Bennett and R. Skjoeldebrand

Nuclear Power, Tomorrow and Yesterday | Pages from the Past


accompanied by a small decrease of total primary energy consumption but an increase of 30% in electric energy consumption. That means that the primary energy saving has been achieved through a shift in end use, in particular from oil to electric energy. This trend is expected to continue through the 1990s.

For individual countries the results have been even more striking. In 1974 France depended on imports for 84% of its energy supply. In 1985 this had decreased to 64%; electricity corresponded to 38% of the primary energy supply with nuclear con-tributing almost 65%. The importance attached to nuclear power in France is well known, also in sta-bilizing the electric energy prices at one of the low-est levels in Europe and thus serving as a motor for national development, besides making possi-ble the decrease in energy imports. (See a related article in edition 28-3-1986.)

Generating Capacity and Reserves

References are often made to the large generating capacity reserves which are said to exist now in the OECD countries. In a study published in 1985 the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris warned that this reserve could disappear quickly in many OECD countries in the 1990s and that there may be capacity shortages even before 1995. The reasons are that many of the plants in the present reserve are oil-fired and many are also old and obsolete. Thus, it can be expected that at least some of these coun-tries will need to further expand their nuclear power capacity during the 1990s.

In the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in Eastern Europe, nuclear power now contributes about 10% of the electric energy,- and the programmes for installing new nuclear plants continue to be increasing in importance. It is notable that in the latest Party Congress of the USSR, plans were announced to add about 40 000 MWe nuclear capacity to the existing 28 000 MWe until 1990.

The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power sta-tion in the USSR will no doubt cause the nuclear industries in all countries to look for ways to further guarantee the safety and reliability of nuclear power stations. However, it is noteworthy that the USSR authorities have stated the accident will not affect the implementation of nuclear power development plans in the Soviet Union. Also, the seven Heads of

State or Government that met in May 1986 in Tokyo similarly stated their conviction that properly man-aged nuclear power is and will continue to be an increasingly widely used source of energy. About 15% of the world’s electricity is today produced by nuclear power plants, and both the USSR authorities and these other world leaders are of the view that it will remain an important energy source.

Nuclear Power in Developing CountriesIn developing countries, the introduction of nuclear power has been slower than expected. In these countries, there are only 21 nuclear units in opera-tion and 18 units under construction, and about half of these are in only two countries, namely India and the Republic of Korea. Electrification is, of course, at a much lower level in the developing world, but a rapid increase in installed electric generating capac-ity must be expected. The importance of electrical energy in these countries is particularly noteworthy as electricity consumption is growing not only faster than primary energy consumption, but also more rapidly than electrical energy consumption in the industrialized countries. Still, it must be recognized that there are great differences among these coun-tries. Ten developing countries now account for 63% of the total electricity production in the develop-ing world and, significantly, 8 of these have nuclear power programmes.

Nuclear Power, Tomorrow and Yesterday | Pages from the Past


Reactor Construction Times

The plant status file in the IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) can be used to obtain information about the construction time for nuclear power plants, in this case defined as the time period between the first major placement of concrete for the plant and its connection to the grid. There are significant differences between countries in the average construction times and their trends over the past decade, as shown in the table on page 45.

Although the averages show very significant differ-ences, it must also be pointed out that individual projects have been completed in very short times. Between 1980-85, not less than 64 plants were com-pleted in less than 7 years construction time. The remarkably short construction times achieved in both Japan and Sweden have been explained by very careful project management and new con-struction techniques, such as shop subassembly on the site and use of very big cranes in Japan. Some of these construction techniques could also enhance quality assurance in a cost-effective manner.

Nuclear Power Plant Performance

Recent trends in nuclear power plant availability have generally tended to follow those shown in the 1985 IAEA report on nuclear power status and trends, thus also confirming the important general reasons for good performance proposed in that report:

• Degree of standardization in plant design and construction;

• Quality assurance standards used;

• Regulatory climate; and

• Competence of the operating organizations.

Average availabilities and trends for the period 1977-85 are shown in the tables (page 43 in original arti-cle) for countries and utilities which have shown either consistently good or steadily improving per-formance. The major feature of the data would appear to confirm that where good performance has been achieved in the past it continues, and where improvements have been achieved they also continue.

The apparently declining performance in Canada is partly explained by an average unavailability caused by external reasons — in this case labour strikes and hurricanes — which in 1985 amounted to 4.2%. The other major factor influencing plant availability was the retubing of the Pickering 1 and 2 units which were down for all of 1985 for this purpose. Some highlights of achievements are worth pointing out:

• In Belgium an average plant availability of 87.4% was achieved with seven commercial-size plants, two of which entered commercial operation in September 1985;

• Finland maintained its high average availability at 90%. Scheduled shutdowns averaged only 22 days per reactor in 1985;

• France continued with a high country average of 78% availability. The 900-MWe series plants per-formed particularly well with an availability of 81% in 1985;

• In the Federal Republic of Germany the average availability in 1985 reached 85.4%. This was mainly achieved by reducing planned outages by 3.5% and unplanned outages by 1.5%;

• In Japan, the remarkable improvement has con-tinued to an average availability of 72.5% in spite of the regulatory annual inspection requirements, which mandate a planned unavailability of 26 to 27%. The unplanned unavailability was an average 1.5%. It is notable that some Japanese utilities now are planning to try to cut down the planned annual outage to about 65 days from 90 to 100 days. The scram frequency continued to be very low at 0.2 per reactor year;

• In Sweden availability continued to improve to 84.7%; and

• In Korea, KN-2 set a record in 1985 of 214 days con-tinuous full power operation.

Excerpts from “Worldwide Nuclear Power Status and Trends,” IAEA Bulletin, Volume 28, Issue 3. To read the full article, visit the IAEA Bulletin archives at: www.iaea.org/bulletin


Nuclear proliferation networks have been considered as one the biggest concerns to international safeguards. Even though

several well-known players in these networks have been revealed and stopped, there are no indications that covert nuclear trade in proliferation sensitive goods, software and technology is decreasing.

The revelation of the Libyan covert nuclear weap-ons programme in December 2003 was a surprise to most of the world — but not to all. For some time indicators of undeclared activities had been followed by some States. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had also detected weak indi-cations in Libya but there was no clear understand-ing whether these indicators were important.

Before the Libyan case, the IAEA had gained relevant experience in monitoring and clarifying in detail Iraq’s undeclared nuclear weapons programme and verifying the extent of Iran’s nuclear programme.

The IAEA General Conference (GC) has recognized the proliferation risks related to the trans-national

proliferation networks. Since 2005, the GC has repeatedly passed a resolution which “welcomes efforts to strengthen safeguards, including the Secretariat’s activity in verifying and analyzing infor-mation provided by Member States on nuclear sup-ply and procurement, taking into account the need for efficiency, and invites all States to co-operate with the IAEA in this regard”.

These resolutions mandate the IAEA to investigate covert nuclear related trade to create knowledge of nuclear black markets for safeguards verification purposes. Close cooperation with States provid-ing complementary data is crucial for the success in these efforts.

Trade Controls Need Strengthening

Verifying the correctness and the completeness of State declarations has always been the objective of the IAEA safeguards system. However, it was the

Unfair Tradeby Matti Tarvainen

Nuclear trade analysis may provide early indications of proliferation.

Shown in the photo is the container storage and holding area of the Port of Singapore’s Keppel Terminal.

(Photo: Calvin Teo/Wikipedia)

nuclear proliferation

unfair tradeA Closer Look | Unfair Trade


additional protocol (AP) that improved the IAEA’s capabilities to verify that States’ declarations are complete. In parallel with the AP entering into force in an increasing number of States, the IAEA has also improved information analysis. The on-going State evaluation process, established in the mid-1990s, has become the main process supporting the draw-ing of annual safeguards conclusions.

The AP declarations provide the IAEA with additional information related to manufacturing and construc-tion of sensitive equipment, exports of specialized equipment and material for example, and imports if requested by the IAEA. All this information is useful for verifying that States are fulfilling their safeguards’ obligations.

However, the State may not always be aware of all safeguards relevant activities on its territory, for example in so-called free-trade zones, where trade controls may be minimal at best. As well, the State itself may indeed be involved in undeclared nuclear activities and clearly will not declare these to the IAEA.

Export controls are the responsibility of States. Information available from the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 reveals that nuclear export controls are not always well devel-oped and not capable of effectively controlling global trade in proliferation sensitive goods, soft-ware and technology. Other arrangements to curb nuclear proliferation include voluntary arrange-ments such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines adhered to by 45 States.

The AP provides information on specific nuclear related activities to develop a better understand-ing of States’ nuclear programmes. To curb prolif-eration, the NSG Guidelines require comprehensive

safeguards in the recipient State as a condition of export of nuclear use and related dual use items, in addition to other requirements. The NSG members inform each other of export denials in an attempt to prevent an export denied by one member being licensed by another. Currently, the IAEA does not receive such NSG denial data on a regular basis.

In addition to the national and international con-trol measures, corporate level export control com-pliance programmes are increasingly used by ethi-cally aware companies to make sure company sales are not used to advance proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Additional motivation for improving awareness and avoiding expert con-trol violations include the risk of becoming black-listed, being penalized up to one hundred million dollars and losing export privileges. Identifying sus-picious procurement enquiries and deciding not to supply improves defense-in-depth in fighting pro-liferation.

Denying an export by companies based on an iden-tified proliferation risk rather than mechanistic read-ing of control lists, improves selectivity and the effect of such control measures.

The Need for Nuclear Trade Related Information

The need for additional information in developing a better understanding of covert nuclear related trade has long been recognized by the IAEA. In addition to the GC resolutions mentioned above, detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities is identi-fied as one of the priorities of the IAEA Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2006-2011.

One specific action of the MTS calls for obtain-ing, through appropriate mechanisms and chan-nels, pertinent information on international nuclear activities and trade relevant to safeguards imple-mentation.

Improving access to complementary nuclear related trade data was one of the proposals of the IAEA Secretariat to Committee 25 aiming at further strengthening of safeguards. It was proposed that the Board of Governors would request all Member States to provide to the IAEA, on a voluntary basis, relevant information on exports of specified equip-ment and non-nuclear material, procurement enquiries, export denials, and relevant informa-tion from commercial suppliers in order to improve

Corporate level export control compliance programmes are increasingly used by

ethically aware companies to make sure company sales are not used to advance

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

nuclear proliferation

unfair trade A Closer Look | Unfair Trade


the Agency’s ability to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. The information would have been processed within the existing structure for the evaluation of safeguards related information. The Committee was, however, not able to adopt any specific recommendations.

Nuclear Trade AnalysisThe Libyan case made visible a widespread inter-national nuclear procurement network. It revealed that the traditional, facility oriented safeguards developed in the late 1960s, and strengthened in the 1990s to address the State as a whole, was facing new challenges. The biggest proliferation risks were no longer just State specific but also trans-national in nature with non-state actors increasingly involved. The problem was that the IAEA had no specific ver-ification tools to address such new challenges. This is why innovative approaches in the IAEA, in addi-tion to regulatory control and voluntary compliance on the State level, were and still are needed to curb nuclear proliferation.

To address the safeguards challenges of cov-ert nuclear related trade, a Nuclear Trade and Technology Analysis Unit (TTA) was established in the IAEA in November 2004. The Unit, located in the Department of Safeguards, is mandated to cen-tralize the analysis of all procurement networks related information available to the IAEA. In coop-eration with other organizational units, TTA investi-gates the activities of known networks and endeav-ors to reveal presently unknown networks. It also maintains the IAEA’s institutional memory on covert nuclear related procurement activities. These meas-ures are pivotal to the analysis by enabling access to nuclear trade related data both now and in the future.

TTA provides expert services using technical and trade analysis expertise to support verification activ-ities and the preparation of State evaluations, a core safeguards activity. Close cooperation with other information analysts and inspectors has improved the potential of the IAEA to understand better weak proliferation indicators related to trans-national trade activities.

A specific procurement outreach program was launched in 2006 by the IAEA to facilitate acquiring of nuclear trade related information provided by States and companies. Responding to the requests of the General Conference, some 20 States had been con-tacted by the Secretariat by the end of 2007, inviting

them to provide complementary information on a bilateral, voluntary basis to aid a better understand-ing of safeguards relevant, covert nuclear related trade. The programme is based on the premise that developers of an undeclared nuclear programme need to buy sensitive items from the open mar-ket thereby leaving traces that, once analyzed, may reveal early indicators of proliferation.

States have shown interest and several of them are already providing complementary information on export denials and unfulfilled procurement enquir-ies received by companies. Outreach information is handled with high confidentiality by the IAEA as has been agreed with States participating in the pro-gramme.

ConclusionsTrans-national proliferation networks and the increased involvement of non-state actors in cov-ert nuclear related trade activities pose a challenge not only to national and international safeguards but also to other WMD verification regimes. Nuclear trade analysis aims at developing better under-standing of such networks. Declarations based on safeguards agreements do not provide the type of data networks analysis needs. This is why the needs of nuclear trade analysis call for States to increase information sharing with the IAEA on a bilateral and voluntary basis. It is obvious that synergies in analyt-ical approaches, methods and tools could be found between different WMD verification regimes.

International safeguards would also benefit from increased cooperation with State authorities and companies controlling proliferation sensitive exports. While controls can only address the symp-toms, internal export control and compliance pro-grammes can change the culture of curbing pro-liferation. In these endeavours, the former subject and object of controls become partners in fight-ing proliferation. Increased support of Member States in providing information forms the basis the IAEA needs in addressing the biggest proliferation challenge, the nuclear proliferation networks.

Matti Tarvainen is Head of the IAEA’s Nuclear Trade and Technology Analysis Unit (TTA). E-mail: [email protected] article is based on a paper published in the ESARDA Bulletin, No. 40, December 2008.


If the IAEA is going to live up to its billing as the ‘world’s nuclear watchdog’ in the com-ing years, it certainly has its work cut out for

it. Vast advances in technology, mounting prolifera-tion challenges, and a quickly increasing workload all conspire to put increasing pressure on the IAEA in fulfilling its mission to implement effective nuclear safeguards.

The IAEA relies upon a wide array of devices and technologies to implement safeguards. Accounting for nuclear material calls for safeguards inspectors to quantitatively verify nuclear material during inspec-tions. The inspectors do this by manually count-ing items such as fuel rods, assemblies, and nuclear material, as well as using nuclear-related techniques such as neutron counting or gamma ray spectrom-etry to distinguish if amounts of radioactive sub-stances are in line with declared quantities.

Additionally, the IAEA has also to perform a “nuclear forensics” task, an activity that can trace the origin and history of nuclear material, typically in uranium conversion, enrichment and fabrication. Inspection experts in the field use handheld devices to collect

and profile materials for their physical, chemical and isotopic properties, which can be further analyzed in the lab. Safeguards inspectors also employ envi-ronmental sampling techniques — identifying sub-stances such as highly-enriched uranium particles and where they may have come from.

Remote monitoring has become an increasingly vital component of nuclear verification. By collect-ing images and data remotely, inspectors have pared down time spent in the field, saving money and time as a result. Providing an ability to monitor activities on a near real-time basis, remote monitor-ing also improves safeguards effectiveness. With transfer of data over secure networks becoming more economical each year, monitoring technol-ogies are expected to increase in importance and use.

Another major change in safeguards technology has been the digitization of equipment, which made electronics smaller, lighter, and more capable. Though portable, the legacy devices that inspec-tors had traditionally brought into the field for meas-urements and analysis were bulky and unwieldy. “Some of the older instruments were huge. You had to be big and beefy just to carry them around!” explained Andrew Hamilton, Acting Section Head of the Safeguards Technical Support Coordination Section. “Devices that were once deemed portable wouldn’t even be described that way anymore,” said Hamilton.

the tools of Today&Tomorrow

A look at the evolution of the technology employed by safeguards

inspectors for their work — where they’ve been, and what the future

holds for verification tools.

by Dana Sacchetti

Another major change in safeguards

inspection technology has been

the digitization of equipment, which

made electronics smaller, lighter, and

more functional.

A Closer Look | The Tools of Today and Tomorrow


Yet it’s not simply the size of equipment that has changed over the years; their sophistication and complexities have also been improved. Some of the legacy devices and their resultant functional-ity have been combined into one device; machines that were used for single tasks have been integrated into more comprehensive, ‘all-in-one’ instruments.

While improvements have been made with the new equipment, some innovations have brought new challenges. In addition to an understanding of the technologies and nuclear facilities being inspected, a mastery of the complex set of tools available to complete the task is also required.

With most of today’s inspection systems now driven by computers, it is incumbent upon inspectors to be proficient with technology.

“With every leap in technology, you solve certain problems, but you also introduce new issues that may be unforeseen,” explained Michael Farnitano, Head of the Safeguards Support Programme Coordination Unit. “We typically go through cycles in equipment development. You develop a new technology, go through feasibility studies, deploy it, and then you gain experience and refine it. It takes 7-10 years to develop a major line of equipment.”

The Tools of TomorrowSeeing far into the future to envisage which verifica-tion burdens may be placed on the IAEA is a sizea-ble task. With software and hardware development for safeguards already pushing against the laws of physics and technology, the onus is on the IAEA to ensure that the inspectorate of tomorrow knows what it will be up against. With the average piece of equipment taking nearly a half-decade to develop and deploy, IAEA safeguards has to look into its crys-tal ball to plan for the future.

Since a lot of the digital development was focused on simply upgrading analogue equipment for a digital age, what’s the focus for the future of safe-guards equipment?

Currently, certain measurements present a chal-lenge to inspectors. Even with the latest technol-ogy, carrying out verification work with reprocess-ing and enrichment plant processes puts stress on the IAEA. With spent fuel, locating partial defects in fuel assemblies can be tricky. And with projections estimating that the volume of spent fuel will double during the next twelve years, the IAEA will need to design its safeguards approaches accordingly.

Further, due to the sensitive nature of the technology and access rights, monitoring the proc-ess of enrichment activities remains difficult. Yet the IAEA is currently at work on monitoring entire cas-cades of enrichment facil-ities to check if any devia-tions have occurred.

Additionally, new types of reac-tors and fuel cycle technologies will present new verification demands. Monitoring some of the next-generation nuclear installations in completely new venues — including pebble bed reactors, geo-logical depositories, and pyroprocess-ing facilities, to name a few — will certainly keep IAEA safeguards tool developers on their toes.

To meet these challenges, the IAEA and its Member States are expected to embark on a new approach that would twin verification tool development with new plant and facility designs. When a new plant or reactor is designed, safeguards will be integrated into the build, helping to make ‘safeguards friendly’ installations. The instrumentation in new facilities will not just perform conventional measurements, but also can send detailed data to the IAEA on how the plant is operating and alert the inspectorate to any ‘red flags’ for further monitoring.

“With a new approach to collecting information, we are optimizing our verification activities through information-driven safeguards,” said Hamilton. “Therefore, we expect that the life and skills of inspectors who are joining us in the coming years will be quite different from those of today.”

To turn this concept into reality, the IAEA will work with plant vendors, Member States and other part-ners to bring this vision of shared instrumenta-tion into the next generation of reactors, enrich-ment facilities, and reprocessing plants. The IAEA plans to accomplish this through multilateral meetings, sharing of roadmaps and, co-develop-ment of technology. Keeping ahead of the veri-fication curve will require innovation and coop-eration from both the IAEA and its Member States to meet tomorrow’s challenges.

Dana Sacchetti is a press officer in the IAEA’s Division of Public Information. E-mail: [email protected]

It’s no longer simply an understanding of the nuclear facilities and technologies that are being inspected, but also a mastery of the complex set of tools that are available to complete the task that are required.


A new building serving as a dedicated con-ference facility for the IAEA and the other

Vienna-based organizations, such as United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), was officially handed over to its new own-ers. The ‘M building’, as it is known, was donated to the United Nations by the Austrian Government and the city of Vienna.

The building, which can host up to 2,700 delegates, is an environmentally friendly facility using state-of-the-art technologies to save as much energy as pos-sible. Some of the building’s characteristics include:

◆ The building façade is made of high-security windows that also feature so-called ‘screens’. On cold days the sun light is allowed to go through the glass to heat the building or reduce the amount of heating needed. On warm days the sun light is reflected back to reduce the temperature;

◆ Sensors located in the main conference rooms and foyers allow to control the air ventilation system. They regulate the amount of hot or cold air needed during conference sessions or coffee breaks;

◆ Throughout the building hot and cold air is used to reheat or cool down the internal environment. The hot air that rises up from the floor is pumped through to a heating system lying underneath the floor; and

◆ The building is heated with warm air produced by burning ecological garbage — from Vienna’s ‘Fernwärme’.

A Step Back in Time

When the Vienna International Centre (VIC) was handed over to the IAEA and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1979, it contained generous and, for the time, lux-urious meeting rooms in the cylindrical C building. These could accommodate all but the largest con-ferences, which at first were held in the Hofburg, and later in the Austria Center Vienna (ACV).

Subsequently, the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) were also housed in the VIC, and the number of meetings — both large and small — grew from year to year.

When it was discovered, in 1998, that the VIC con-tained asbestos which would need to be removed, it was realized that the C building would be rendered unavailable for some two to three years, leaving no space for meetings to be held at the VIC. To solve this problem, the Republic of Austria generously offered to build a new conference centre on the VIC premises which would serve as a swing space while building C undergoes asbestos removal, and there-after would be used largely by the IAEA, while the other VIC-based organizations would take over the C building. The result is the splendid, new Conf-erence Building M.

Giovanni Verlini is Periodicals Editor in IAEA’s Division of Public Information. E-mail: [email protected]

by Giovanni Verliniis for meetings

The Vienna International Centre gets a dedicated conference facility.

Our Home | M is for Meetings


Top: The new conference facility at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria.

Middle: The interior of the new conference facility.

Bottom: Children in the Junior Choir of the Vienna International School (VIS) entertained guests at the opening ceremony of “M Building” at the Vienna International Centre on 25 April 2008. (Photos: D.Calma/IAEA)

on canvasby Vannessa Maravilla

While most artists find their muse in their environment such as in nature or the people around them, American artist Lisa Ruyter found her source of inspiration in

an unlikely place: the IAEA Board of Governor meetings.

Invited by the IAEA as a journalist, Ruyter was able to observe and photograph the participants within these meetings, alongside other journalists and reporters. The photographs she took on that occasion in turn became blueprints for her latest series entitled, ‘Atoms for Peace.’

Ruyter has taken what is normally seen as an IAEA common meeting and translating it onto canvas to give “an alternative to the reading” of a normal scene. Using

bright shades and cool tones, Ruyter’s technique is similar to Andy Warhol’s as she “transcribes” the photographs onto a large plane and renders the areas she chooses with paint and pen.

“What at first appear simple but giant paint-by-number works slowly reveal themselves to be complex arrangements of flat colours with poignant, powerful subject matter. The effect freezes the narrative and pushes it toward, abstraction, and highlights potential subtexts,” states a press release issued by Vienna’s Georg Kargl Fine Arts Gallery.

The end result of this endeavour makes normal images of the IAEA Board of Governor meetings into something extraordinary.

Earlier in 2009, Rutyer had 17 paintings from this series on display at the Georg Kargl Fine Arts Gallery in Vienna.


the exhibition entitled “Did you say Radiation Protection? Stories of X-rays, radioactivity, etc.” is an absorbing display of artistic

interpretations of the concepts of radiation and radiation protection. Dealing with a complex subject, the artists entice the audience to formulate new opinions about radiation protection through their works.

The exhibits stimulate visitors to interact with these scientific concepts at a sensorial level rather than rationally trying to explain them. As visitors are drawn through these displays, they are forced to confront these artworks engaging all their senses: touch, sight, hearing, smell and taste.

The artists aim to educate the visitor about the key elements that surround the subject of radiation, such as the difference between X-rays and radioactivity, the context in which radiation was discovered, the hazard it poses and how to protect one self from it.

This combination of science and art is a travelling exhibition co-produced by the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (France), Montbéliard Science Pavilion (France) and the Pays de Montbéliard Metropolitan Region (France); The Curie Museum (Paris), the Röntgen Museum (Remscheid, Germany) and the Deutsches Museum-(Munich, Germany), also contributed to the exhibition.

The exhibition travelled around France, then to Buenos Aires, Argentina. In the future it is schedule to go on display in Lusanne, Switzerland (late 2009-early 2010) and Helsiniki, Finland (2010), before returning to France.

For further information, visit the exhibition website at www.vous-avez-dit-radioprotection.fr

2.X X-LThis work evokes gala soirées where an upscale public rubs shoulders with spiritualists and great minds, eagerly jostling to attend extraordinary shows featuring X-rays.

Artist: Piet.sO

art & radiation


The Fantastic Family BecquerelThis work pays tribute to a dynasty of great minds, the Becquerels: Antoine Cesar, the grandfather; Edmond, the father; Henri, the son; all renowned physicists. It is a special tribute to Henri Becquerel who, following in his father’s foot-steps, became France’s expert on luminescence. Artist: Peter Keene

The Radiant OneA mysterious vessel in the shape of an atom-smasher resembling the one used by the Joliot-Curie team, or maybe rather a giant radish as suggested by the large, metallic mesh leaves, the work oscillates open and shut to reveal a ring of dazzling lights. The Radiant One, rather than banking on our knowledge gleaned from a contemporary laboratory, takes us back to the root, the Rad of radioactivity and radical. At the same time, it already reveals how this invention eventually led to state-of-the-art technology serving mankind today.

Artist: Piet.sO and Peter Keene

art & radiation


Yes, humour has to have a core as a foundation for its message. But the core must be truth-

ful. You could make fun of the fact that Napoleon was obsessed with authority, unscrupulous and egotistical, but not of the fact that he was a cow-ard, because he wasn't. Humour can be white and black, kind and sarcastic, but you should always get a sense of humanity from good humour. There are about thirty theories on humour. As a professional critic and author of cartoons, sometime I stop gaz-ing at a cartoon thinking about what message the author wanted to convey.

There are so many kinds of humour. Somebody may laugh (mainly small children), if you make a funny face at them. But that is not a real laugh; Mr. Karel Polacek, a famous Czech writer, calls it giggling. Humour depends on knowledge of life, and I don't mean education only.

A scientist, who is trying to explain his profession to the public, needs to use shortcuts and comparisons, as well as humour. Naturally, this way a meeting point for science and humour is created. Students of nuclear physics came up with the title of this book. Another suggestions was: "Every redneck knows what uranium can do," but unfortunately, this is a perfect rhyme in Czech only. There are many red-necks in politics, who prefer bombs to power plants. And what shall we call those who protest against nuclear power plants? Because this is a book about humour and every good joke needs you to surmise the punch line, I will leave this question open.

Josef KOBRA Kucera is Vice-chairman of The Czech Union of Caricaturists. The book “Nuclear Smiles,” a collection of cartoons inspired by nuclear power, was published by The Czech Nuclear Society. www.csvts.cz/cns.

HUMOURDOES IT HAVE A CORE?

by Josef Kobra Kucera

Humour can be white and black, kind and

sarcastic, but you should always get a sense of humanity from good

humour.

Documents

Helping Hands, IAEA Bulletin, May 2009