by Major-General Daniel Gosselin, CMM, CD1

HELLYER’SGHOSTS:UNIFICATION OFTHE CANADIANFORCES IS40 YEARS OLD –PART TWO

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Paul Hellyer as Minister of National Defence.

Efforts to create a Canadian unified structure ofcommand have existed since the late 1940s, but theseefforts seldom amounted to important or lasting changesuntil Paul Hellyer arrived at Defence. He reinvigoratedthe concept with a major command reorganizationin 1965, but it was not until General Rick Hillier’srestructuring of February 2006 that, for the first timein Canada, a robust unified chain of command was estab-lished for the conduct of both domestic/continental andinternational operations.

The need to conduct studies and planning estimatesfor the Chiefs of Staff Committee on issues emergingfrom the creation of a North Atlantic alliance had ledMND Brooke Claxton and the three service chiefs tocreate, in 1949, a permanent joint staff so that the Chiefsof Staff could give coherent policy direction to theirrepresentatives in London and Washington.4 In May 1951,the Joint Planning Committee, a joint sub-committeeof the Chiefs of Staff Committee, reviewed the commandorganization for the operations of three services in thedefence of Canada, and tabled a proposal recommending,“...a system of Canadian unified commands for the directionof planning and operations.”5 Continental defence was seenas an emerging mission for Canada and the United Statesin the late 1940s as the Soviet Union and Western nationsrapidly drifted apart. The creation of the North Atlantic

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Introduction2

This article, presented as the second of two consecutive parts,explores five fundamental unification themes that captured

the core ideas that led Minister of National Defence (MND)Paul Hellyer to unify the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1968, andthat underlined the integration and unification efforts of the1960s. It also assesses the legacy of those core concepts in 2008.In Part One, two themes – the need for a single coherentdefence policy for Canada and the creation of the office of theChief of the Defence Staff (CDS) – were reviewed. This partdiscusses the three remaining themes, and then closes with aconcluding segment.

Modern Warfare and Unified Functional Commands

The demands of modern warfare are such thatcommanders and staff down to the lowest level ofoperation and the support echelons must act togetherand in unison as the situation demands. That is why it isa fair conclusion to say that a single organization whichworks and thinks together with direct lines of commu-nications and a single line of responsibility, substantiallyreduces the problems associated with the three servicesystem of coordinating combined operations.

– Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer, February 19673

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Treaty Organization (NATO) to defend against a possibleSoviet invasion provided added impetus for a review ofcommand organizations in Canada and the United States.However, the Korean War, developments that led to thecreation of the North American Air Defence Command(NORAD), and strong negative service reactions suspendedthe adoption in the 1950s of any new operational commandorganization for the defence of Canada.6

Hellyer came to Defence convinced that the existingstructure of command – with three separate service chainsof command – was dated, and that new integrated commandswere required. In the White Paper on Defence, Hellyermade much of the fact that the nature of war was changingrapidly, and it demanded new military organizationalstructures. General Charles Foulkes, who had been Chairmanof the Chiefs of Staff Committee through the 1950s, hadproposed in a 1961 paper, which he shared with Hellyerin 1963, the disbandment of the three services andtheir field forces, and the establishment of task forcescommanded by a commander-in-chief, with the taskforces organized to meet the particular circumstancesdictated by the nature and scope of any internationalcontribution accepted by the Canadian government.7 Despitebeing retired, Foulkes was still highly regarded ingovernment circles, and his ideas greatly influencedHellyer, who gave the new integrated CFHQ defencestaff the responsibility in 1964 for developing a fieldcommand structure suitable for the roles outlined for theCF in the new policy paper.8

The original, main idea of this reorganization wasthat all forces devoted to a primary role would be groupedinto a single command, with sufficient resources assignedto allow the commander of that command to dischargehis assigned responsibilities.9 This new, integratedcommand structure was announced in June 1965, andit consisted of six functional commands in lieu ofthe 11 service subordinate commands. The six commands,in addition to Canadian formations garrisoned in Europe,which were not affected, included: Mobile Command(that encompassed the army and tactical air support);Maritime Command (that included naval air resources);Air Defence Command; Air Transport Command; TrainingCommand; and Material Command (that integratedthe support elements of the three services). The conceptof integration that Hellyer sought was reflected to itsfullest through the formation of Training Command andMaterial Command.10

The command field structure that Hellyer hadpushed through between 1965 and 1966, and that wasstill being implemented, started to come apart soonafter he left Defence in December 1967. Staff cutbacksimposed between 1968 and 1970 eventually forced ashift from a functional to a functional/regional commandorganization, with functional commanders taking controlof all regional forces for the conduct of operationswithin their region.11 Mobile Command (a joint land/aircommand) and Maritime Command (with joint sea/navalair resources) were intended to be true joint operationalcommands, but it did not take long for those commands tobehave like the old army and navy respectively, andto become centres of influence for the land and seaelements of the CF.12 The ‘disintegration’ of the unifiedfield commands got its most significant boost with thecreation in 1975 of Air Command, which grouped allair assets and air element personnel from across theCF into the largest command.13

Without a unified operational chain of command,operations continued to be generated and even commandedby the three service commanders, which created commandand control confusion at times.14 In May 1997, whencriticized by the Somalia Inquiry for the inadequatecommand arrangements of the deployed CF force, theDeputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS), the seniorCF operations officer at the time of the deploymentin 1992, stated that there was no command structureor operational plan because the CF only had “...anadministrative concept of organization and commandand control.”15 The massive re-organization of the 1990s,the Management Command and Control Re-Engineering(MCCR) initiative, mandated to reduce resources consumedby headquarters, infrastructure, and wasteful businesspractices, and to transfer those savings to operationalcapabilities, resulted in a significant CF headquartersreduction and an important transfer of responsibilitiesbetween NDHQ and the field commands and formations,but few substantive changes to the CF chain of commandfor operations.16

General Charles Foulkes.

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Hillier’s immediate focus aftertaking command of the CF in February2005 was to improve CF operationaleffectiveness, leading him to push forthe acquisition of new military capabilitiesand for the establishment of a morerobust and more operationally focusedCF command structure. In February2006, the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) andfour new operational commands were established, reportingto the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS): Canada Command,Canada Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM), CanadaSpecial Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), andCanada Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM).17

An officer with extensive operational experience,Hillier wanted above all to strengthen the unifiedchain of command. A most important principle of theCDS in guiding the CF Transformation was to re-establisha command-centric imperative in the CF – that is, tohave a distinct and unambiguous chain of command,with the key being the allocation of mission-specificcapabilities to operational and tactical commands/formations to increase the ability to deploy rapidly.While a regional distribution of forces existed in Canadafor decades, the new CDS reinforced its primacy withthe concept of regional ‘joint task forces’ (JTF) under thenew Canada Command, an integrated national operationalcommand headquarters identified as thecornerstone of the CF Transformation.18

The creation of Canada Commandmeans that, for the first time in Canada,one unified chain of command existsfor routine and contingency domesticoperations, with each regional JTFcommander being responsible for theemployment of all CF assets assignedwithin his or her region. This commandstructure is far from perfect, ascommanders of JTFs are, in additionto their regional responsibilities,‘double-hatted’ as commanders ofa formation within their environment.For example, Commander MaritimeForces Atlantic (MARLANT) is alsoCommander Joint Task Force (JTF)Atlantic. But the command arrangementsrepresent a necessary compromisebetween a service-oriented chainof command and a regional chain,driven by the realities of Canada’sunique geography and limited CFresources. The key differencebetween this model and the pre-transformation command structureis that the JTF commanders areempowered, during an emergencyor contingency operation, with thecommand authority over all CF assets

within a given region, thereby increasingresponsiveness.

In 2008, the Environment Chiefsof Staff (ECSs) continue to generatethe forces employed by either theCommander Canada Command fordomestic and continental operations,or by the Commander CEFCOM for

international operations.19 This division of force generation/force employment responsibilities is very similar tothat adopted by most of Canada’s allies over the pastdecade. Such a construct acknowledges that the preparationand generation of combat forces is a distinct and uniquelyspecialized function that is best understood and achievedby experts of the army, navy, air force, and specialforces respectively.

Hillier did not approach his command reorganizationin a dogmatic manner. A few months into the CFTransformation, suggestions were made to the CDS toreduce the rank of the ECSs (from three-star statusto two-star status), and to integrate all force generationactivities under Canada Command, mostly to emphasizethe primacy of force employment over force generation andof a unified force over a service-oriented CF. In theend, this bold and controversial proposal was not adopted,and the three ECSs remain at the lieutenant-general and

“...Hillier wantedabove all tostrengthen theunified chain ofcommand.”

CF-5 Freedom Fighters from 434 Squadron in a Nordic setting, a legacy of the Hellyer era.

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vice-admiral rank, and they continue to be ‘dominantactors’ in NDHQ. Further, the CDS recognizedthe fundamental principle of central control anddecentralized execution of air power, giving theCommander of the 1 Canadian Air Division operationalcommand over all Canadian air assets and responsibilityfor air operations in Canada under the Commanderof Canada Command.20 Historically, theCanadian Air Force has always rejectedthe concept of regional organizationsthat would vest in an individualregional commander all the air forces in agiven geographical area of Canada,regardless of function or service of origin,because it reduces flexibility substantially,and it is quite inefficient.21

Even though Hellyer had admittedin the White Paper that Canada didnot expect to exercise any operationalcontrol for international operations,he nevertheless believed that command of the CFcould best be accomplished by a single chain of commandwith new joint commands,22 perhaps envisaging theday when the CDS and NDHQ would take an activerole in nationally commanding the military forcesdeployed around the world. Unfortunately, becauseCanada was not expected to engage independentlyin overseas military commitments, the CF neverfully developed the command organizational structurenecessary to ensure coordination with government policy,to provide strategic guidance and direction from acentral defence authority, and to nationally commandthe deployed forces. Until recently, for the large majority ofoperations, Canada’s overseas forces have operated underNATO or the United Nations command arrangements,with these organizations being responsible for theoperational planning of the forces under such command.Hillier’s vision, particularly the establishment of the SJSand CEFCOM, was to change this ‘colonial’ mindset andto establish a higher command organization that couldthink in strategic terms for Canada, and would be suitedto the particular needs of the CF.

The 2009 CF command structure is, therefore,complex, perhaps confusing to some, but it recognizesthe reality of a number of Canada’s invariants (i.e., a largecountry sharing a long border with the US, touchingon three oceans, and possessing a small military force).23

It is also adapted to today’s environment and it isresponsive to CF operational needs. It consists of fourenvironments (army, air force, navy, and special forces)that generate highly specialized capabilities and combatforces, one functional command that groups commonnational support functions and capabilities (CANOSCOM),two operational commands that employ CF assets for theconduct of operations (Canada Command and CEFCOM),and a unified chain of command with a dedicated unifiedjoint staff at the military strategic-political-diplomaticinterface that helps the CDS to command the CF, to

carry out his national command responsibilities, and toadvise the government. Constructed from a blend oforganizational concepts, this mature command structure isdramatically different from Hellyer’s command constructof 1965. It has transformed significantly since unification40 years ago, and it is expected that it will continueto evolve in the future.

Modern Management Methodsand Increased Efficiency

Hellyer had determined early onin his term that two problems

at Defence – the management and controlstructure of the defence organization,and the reality of rising maintenance andoperational costs – demanded specialattention. The creation of the officeof the CDS helped him to bettercontrol defence policy, and to addressthe management and control of the CF.

The minister was aware that defence budget increaseswere not projected under the new Liberal government,and only the adoption of modern managementmethods and the elimination of duplicate and triplicatefunctions and organizations would help him controlcosts and increase efficiency at Defence.24 Hellyerwanted to increase the portion of the budget allottedto capital equipment acquisition, from 14 percent in1963 to an aggressive target of 25 percent by 1970. Tomeet his goal, a 30 percent reduction of the manpowerestablishment was also required.25 The basic purposeof the supporting reforms of unification was thereforeto provide funds and create efficiencies that wouldincrease the operational effectiveness of the CF.Unfortunately, even though the Minister had statedthat, “...[the] White Paper of 1964 would not haverecommended integration ... if we had not been certainof the improved capacity of a unified force to meet thedemands of modern warfare,”26 by late 1964, operationaleffectiveness no longer appeared to be the main concernof his defence restructuring.

The integration of common services had alwaysbeen a dominant theme, even before the Hellyerera.27 The 1960 Royal Commission on GovernmentReorganization (known as the Glassco Commission,after its chairman), focusing upon managerial efficiencyin government, had recommended the consolidationof common military functions. Government was changingrapidly in Canada, and departmental autonomy wasbeing challenged by central agencies with professionalpublic administrators that exercised more control anddemanded more rational management.28 Hellyer reliedgreatly upon the observations and recommendations ofthe Glassco Commission to rationalize the integrationof defence activities, and he was influenced by theinitiatives of Robert S. McNamara, the strong-minded USSecretary of Defense, who was concurrently attemptingto reform the American armed forces.29

“Hellyer...believedthat commandof the CF could

best be accomplishedby a single chainof commandwith new jointcommands...”

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The government’s objectiveswith unification were to create asingle recruiting organization,a single basic training organization, asingle basic trades organization,a single support organization, andto achieve full integration of head-quarters and commands.30 Integratingthe three services helped to reduceoverhead costs and achieve savingsin the areas of planning, support,finance and administration. Theminister also achieved considerablereduction in the duplication andtriplication of facilities and servicesthrough the introduction of commonadministrative and base structures(the Canadian Forces Base concept),further reducing the strength of thearmed forces.31 The work with respectto a common trade structure resultedin some 350 classifications in thethree services being reduced to 97 inthe new system, and a number ofCF schools were formed in the late1960s to train the newly merged andcommon CF trades.32 Finally, integration of the navy, army,and air force headquarters allowed the minister to institutean “Integrated Defence Program” to control all approveddefence activities, and to introduce several other “modernmanagement techniques,” consisting mostly of computerizedCF systems.33 Through unification and the creation ofNDHQ in 1972, the national defence command structureassumed several common administrative and logisticalfunctions – such as in the areas of real property andinfrastructure, communications and information systems,personnel management, as well as medical and dentalbranches – that are still in place today.

The focus upon efficiency that underlined severalintegration and unification initiatives was strongly reinforcedby the implementation, in the early 1970s, of manyrecommendations of the influential Management ReviewGroup study, the most notable being the merging of theCF and department headquarters into NDHQ.34 Duringthe 1980s and 1990s, faced with dwindlingbudgets, successive draconian cutbacks,and pressure from government centralagencies, increasingly Defence adoptedbusiness practices, and acceleratedthe centralization of resources and theprivatization of non-core defence functionsto achieve more efficiency. As one experton public administration observed, “[t]hepolitical leadership virtually everywherein the western world...concluded thatmanagement practices in the public sectorshould emulate the private sector or simplyprivatise the function.”35 The ‘managementera’ reached its high-water mark inDefence with the 1997 MCCR initiative,

when private sector managementpractices (often called re-engineeringin the public sector) tended todominate most defence processes, andan obsession to ‘do more with less’distorted defence decision-making.36

As a result, operational effectivenesswas often sacrificed to obtain themost from each defence dollar.Brigadier-General E.M.D. Lesliehad rightly warned as early as winter1972 that “...amidst great andsweeping changes” the CF wasquickly drifting toward “too muchmanagement, too little command,”a trend that continued for over threedecades after unification.37

Periods of defence budgetrestrictions always bring forward ademand for more joint initiatives,since duplication and triplicationof effort are less tolerated, as wasthe case in the 1960s and the 1990s.With the CF and the departmentabout to enter its fifth year of

consecutive budget increases, while being heavily engagedin high-intensity operations in the Middle East and inAfghanistan, it should be expected that the environmentswould have a stronger voice on CF operational matters, and,consequently, would gain and exercise more autonomy.As a result, jointness, the de facto organizational principlefor the CF in the 1990s, which contributed to the DCDSgroup becoming progressively more dominant in joint forcedevelopment and generation over the years, lost its lustrein the CF soon after Hillier’s ascendancy as CDS. Criticshave often argued over the years that jointness in a CFcontext was often pursued as a means to compromise oncontroversial tri-service issues, often resulting in a lossof operational capability for the CF.

There is now recognition – and acceptance – of theunique, very specialized, and essential role that the fourservices perform to prepare CF members for operations.The high-intensity campaign in southern Afghanistan

has highlighted the pressing need toimprove the soldier’s basic individual fieldskills, and the army has, for the most part,been fulfilling this training function forall elements of the CF. Each environmentalso runs a warfare centre, in additionto the CF Experimentation Centre, toassist in developing service and CFdoctrine, to conduct experimentation, andto incorporate rapidly the lessons learnedfrom operations. The operational roleof each service does differ greatly,especially at the tactical level, andHellyer’s unification largely disregardedthis fact for the sake of efficiency andcost savings.

The introductory letter of the Glassco Report.

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“...increasingly,Defence adoptedbusiness practices,and accelerated thecentralization ofresources and theprivatization ofnon-core defencefunctions to achievemore efficiency.”

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Warrior Chiefs – Representing the three operational commands at the CF Enrolment Day ceremony that took place at the Canadian WarMuseum, 3 June 2006. L to R, Lieutenant-General Lucas, Chief of the Air Staff, Vice-Admiral Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff, andLieutenant-General Caron, Chief of the Land Staff.

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The recent years have witnessed some ‘disintegration’ ofthe CF structure. For instance, some functions, such as commonmilitary schools that were under the command of oneintegrated CF formation, such as the Canadian ForcesSupport Training Group, have been recently transferred toone specific environment to be responsible for training theentire CF, as was the case in the pre-unification era.Further, with the dissolution of the DCDS Group in 2006, thegeneration of selected CF ‘joint’ capabilities is now aresponsibility of the individual environments.38

In 2009, the default organization for carrying outCF functions and for joint force generation activities is nolonger necessarily going to be a joint/integrated organizationor formation, as was the case in the 1990s and early 2000s,but it is more likely to be one of the four environments.While many of Hellyer’s non-operational CF formationsand entities that were created with integration and unificationhave survived – such as recruiting group, common trainingschools, centralized pay system, the CFB concept, and soon – a greater priority assigned to operational issues in recentyears, combined with important defence budget increases,have helped restore a better equilibrium between the need forefficiency and operational effectiveness.

Despite the increased focus upon operational effec-tiveness in recent years, improving administrative efficiencyof departmental activities remains a most credible goal,even if “...there are no clear lines between achieving greateroperational effectiveness and systematic managerial reforms,”as one author points out.39 With over 135,000 individuals

employed in Defence, and with the department havingthe largest discretionary operating budget of the federalgovernment, the pressure exerted by central agencies uponministers and deputy ministers (DMs) to ‘do more with less’will always exist.40

At first blush, outsiders and bureaucrats from centralagencies, who do not understand DND and the CF well, tendto see huge potential savings at Defence – like a low-hangingfruit ready to be harvested. As the Advisory Committee onAdministrative Efficiency, initiated by MND John McCallumin 2003 to find $200 million to reallocate within the Defenceprogram, found out, however, “...there are few areas of themanagement and administration of Defence that havenot been studied by others,”and obvious opportunities forimproved efficiency have oftenalready been pursued.41 In theend, the advisory committeemade more recommendationswith respect to governanceand management enhancementsthan on administrative savingsand efficiencies. As expected,CDSs will continue to focusprimarily upon operational effec-tiveness, with DMs concentratingmore upon effective managementof the Department’s resources,on streamlining processes, and onreducing inefficiencies.

“One of Hellyer’shopes with respectto reforming themilitary institutionrested uponredirecting theloyalties of the

officers away fromtheir traditionalservice to the

newly unified force.”

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Attaining the Elusive Higher Loyalty to the CF

Canadian Forces identity – Our �rst loyalty is toCanada. Beyond this fundamental imperative, allservice personnel must look past environment,component or unit af�liations to most closelyidentify with the CF. The greater good of Canadaand the CF will, in every instance, take precedenceover considerations of service, component or unitaf�liation.

– CDS Transformation Principle OneGeneral Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff 42

One of Hellyer’s hopes with respect to reforming themilitary institution rested upon redirecting the loyaltiesof the of�cers away from their traditional service to thenewly uni�ed force. Recognizing that CF members wouldcontinue to have “intense loyalties to the �ghting unitsand broader associations within it,” he nevertheless stronglybelieved that loyalty to a CF could be achieved. “Itis nonetheless important that a sense of purpose and asense of belonging to a single Service, covering all aspectsof defence and designed to tackle the complex defenceproblems of the future, be developed,” argued Hellyer.43

Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson had reminded Hellyerof the need to retain important elements of “...[the] servicetraditions and as much of the old distinctions between sea,land and air components.”44 Still, Hellyer dismissed this wisecounsel, believing instead that having all CF personnelwear the same green uniform, within the same rank structureand the same ladder of promotion, and with the opportunityto be employed across all three services, would gradually haveservice members, particularly of�cers, identify themselvesprimarily with the CF, and, over time, it would changetheir values and loyalties.45 It has not happened.

From the �rst days after theReorganization Act was passed,service institutional interests and themotivations of generals and admiralsinevitably acted against Hellyer’splan. Military parochialism, amember’s traditional loyalty to serviceor military specialty over that forthe armed forces as a whole, neverdisappeared in the new uni�ed CF,and it has often been blamed as oneof most serious obstacles preventingmeaningful military reform overthe last 40 years. One former DMcomplained that this unhealthyfriction within the Canadian militaryis constantly a cause of turmoil,preventing military ideas fromsucceeding.46 Douglas Bland remarkedcritically in 1995 that the declineof the intellectual and pragmaticvalues of uni�cation since itsintroduction has been “... exaggeratedby the ascent to high command of

of�cers promoted within their own services for advancingtheir service’s interests and [which] has produced,predictably, an of�cer corps that for the most part stillperceives its responsibilities in service terms.”47

For a variety of reasons, service loyalties remainimportant, and they cannot be suppressed entirely, or ignored,or dismissed. Military leaders have always carried theprimary responsibility for providing a sense of purpose tomembers of their units, doing so by identifying andreinforcing shared values and identities, and by linkingunit goals and tasks to these values and identities. Hellyerwent one step too far in trying to implement his higherloyalty concept above single-service loyalty. As historianJack Granatstein stated a few years ago in Who Killedthe Canadian Military?, “...loyalty to the navy, army, and airforce, to corps and regiments, ships, and squadrons wasvital for sailors, soldiers and air-men and women whose jobwas to �ght and risk their lives to serve their country’sinterests.... [I]t was heritage, tradition, and hard-earneddistinctions to �ghting men.” 48 Unfortunately, Hellyerdid not accept this distinction, and he implementedwholesale uni�cation as the panacea for obtaining a uni�eddefence policy.

The reality is that a service-centred culture is wellingrained into the existing CF culture. At the unit levelof the institution, the three environments continue to play astrong role in fostering a warrior ethos and culture.The younger – and older – members of the CF are proudand dedicated to their military duties and responsibilities,and they clearly identify �rst with their unit, regiment, orservice. Services have therefore an essential role to playin taking the newly recruited soldiers, airmen andairwomen, and sailors, and then turning them intocombat-capable individuals, and into �ghting units. Thisimportant aspect of military ethos is now �nally recognized

General Hillier aboard HMCS Athabaskan.

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in the CF. The cornerstone manual on the professionof arms in Canada, Duty With Honour, acknowledges,after almost 40 years of denial by the unification conformists,the importance of environmental and regimental identitiesto the armed forces.

The [military] ethos permits Environmentaldistinctiveness and allows for cultural adaptation....These unique-to-Environment expressions ofethos derive from and reflect the distinct militaryfunctions associated with sea, land and airoperations.... The unifying power inherent in theconcept of the Canadian Forces must be balancedagainst the differentiation of the three Environments,which is essential for readiness, generating force, andsustaining a multi-purpose combat-capable force.49

As one expert on Canadian military culture wiselyadvises, “[t]o avoid the potential dysfunctional effects ofmisplaced loyalties, the leadership of the CF must ensurethat there is a healthy balance between small grouployalty and loyalty to the organization.”50 In a military force,it is imperative that loyalty evolves gradually with rankand responsibility, with the senior non-commissionedmembers and officers progressively adjusting their loyaltyto the nation, as embodied through the unified CF as theyrise in rank. Joint organizations and a unified professionaldevelopment system in the CF have much to contribute inpromoting this healthy balance.

CF common training and education institutions – suchas the Leadership and Recruit School, the Royal MilitaryColleges in Kingston and in Saint-Jean, the CanadianForces College in Toronto, and the Non-CommissionedMember Professional Development Centre in St-Jean –contribute through the professional development ofCF members to the promotion of a CF culture, as dothe unified NDHQ staff and the newly established opera-tional commands. Like Hellyer, Hillier’s vision has beento foster this CF identity as well, not through thewearing of a common uniform, but primarily through anoperational prism.51 The participation and achievementsof CF members in operations, and highly-deservedrecognition by the Canadian public, have helped greatlyto inculcate a strong sense of pride and higher purpose tothe CF institution, unseen in this country in living memory.It took 40 years for the CF institution to articulateproperly in Duty with Honour what the three service chiefsof staff could not get Hellyer to understand duringthe mid-1960s.

Conclusion – Searching for an OrganizationalConcept for the CF

The present structure of the CF and DND islost among the various concepts of integration,unification, of command, of management, andof the three operationally distinct services. Thisconfusion of concepts leaves open to the demandsof the moment questions about who shall decidedefence policies, how defence functions should

be organized and how policy will be put into action.The result is a structure without conceptualfoundation and a policy process captured bybureaucratic politics.

– Douglas Bland, 199052

Unification and Minister Hellyer have been blamedfrequently since 1968 for subsequent failings of defencepolicy, and for the poor condition of the armed forces overthe years. This is unfair, as there were positive effects ofunification. With the creation of the office of the CDSand the integrated headquarters, Hellyer wanted a unifieddefence policy instead of three uncoordinated servicepolicies. Hillier has proven these past years that, given theright circumstances and with strong government support,the development of a defence policy centred uponCanadian national interests is entirely achievable.

With integration and unification, redundancieswere eliminated through the creation of a common andintegrated administrative, training, and support structurefor the CF, several tri-service committees were abolished,and considerable reduction of facilities, services andpersonnel was achieved as well. One of the key ideas ofunification was also to improve centralized control andadministration of Defence and civil control of the military,and the office of the CDS, now supported by a strongerunified staff, certainly meets this requirement in 2008. Whilethere has been some CF ‘disintegration’ over the years, forthe most part Hellyer’s idea of an integrated CF has survived.

Notwithstanding its benefits, unification has alsogenerated many negative effects, and these have naturallytended to attract more interest over the years. Unificationof the three services, complete with across-the-board andtop-to-bottom integration of all functions, headquartersand activities represented an idealistic – and unproven –organizational concept for the CF. A unified CF is theantithesis of three strong independent and nearly autonomousservices, with little synergies and no integration of theirday-to-day functions and command structures. Hellyerthought that unification of the three services into oneCanadian Armed Forces would solve the problems of defencein Canada. It has not done so, and it will not do so.Unification did not significantly lessen the competitionamong the three services. The reality is that the uniqueoperating environments of the three services make themlook at their capabilities and contributions through adifferent lens, and differing strategic perspectives anddoctrines between the services almost guarantee that therewill be service competition and disputes with respectto operational roles and missions.

The young Liberal minister arrived at Defence in 1963armed with several innovative ideas, but as he facedopposition and resistance to his concepts, he becameinflexible and more determined to impose his idealisticvision of a future CF. Hellyer’s initiative was an audaciouseffort to leapfrog to unification, and fully integrate, inone massive reorganizational change, all functions of the CF,

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including its command structure. In the end, the scheme didnot succeed, mainly because Hellyer failed to realize whenand where to stop with unification as he continued to pushuncompromisingly with complete integration of the threeservices at all levels of the organization. As General Allard,CDS between 1966 and 1969, conceded in his memoirs in1988, those “...who had initiated the [unification] reform... hadnot given sufficient consideration to its overall implications.”53

Hellyer’s most controversial unification experimentincluded the wearing of a single uniform for all CF members,and the establishment of a common rank structure. HadHellyer not tried to impose a green uniform, he might havebeen remembered as one of the greatest Defence ministers inCanadian history, as Jack Granatstein stated some yearsago.54 But the uniform issue eventually became, in 1967, thegalvanizing ‘lightning rod’ for the discontent of the serviceswith unification, as it highlighted Hellyer’s disregard for theunique role and critical functions that the individual serviceswere performing.55 Hellyer’s unification simply had no roomfor a meaningful role for the three services in his new CF.Sadly, at the same time, the service chiefs never managed toget across to Hellyer the justification for the independence ofthe army, air force, and navy, and the long-term operationaland institutional consequences of eliminating the services.

Efficiency in defence spending may not have beenHellyer’s fundamental aim of unification, but once he startedto face stiff opposition to his unification idea, his emphasisfor the reorganization of the CF shifted to reducing theduplication and triplication of services, upon increasingefficiency, and upon strengthening civil control.56 Ashistorian David Bercuson has indicated, “[t]he creationof a truly effective fighting force did not figure in thegovernment’s agenda.”57 Unification was both justifiableand necessary from an administrative and managementstandpoint, but it did not correspond to a true operational

need. The focus upon efficiency that dominated the last threedecades contributed to increased civilianization andbureaucratization at Defence, reliance upon managementand business methods, a progressive loss of operationalfocus, and a corresponding erosion of military ethos. A numberof defence analysts and historians have argued over the yearsthat those important second-order consequences played animportant part in the events leading to the Somalia incidentin the mid-1990s, which I believe is a fair assessment.58

Unification has been a “traumatic experience” for theCF, as General Thériault reminded us in 1993, and, asHellyer lamented in 1990, “...perhaps it was inevitable thatthere would be some regression in the twenty years sinceunification became law.”59 The broader perspectives soughtby Hellyer associated with the idealistic and progressiveconcept of unification never fully took root, and the strong-service idea has continued to exercise a powerful influence overall defence issues. Unification proved to be too one-dimensionaland overly constraining as an organizational model for acomplex institution such as the Canadian military.

Accordingly, since 1968, the CF has been drifting fromthe spirit of unification, searching for a better concept toorganize itself and to guide decision-making and command,overshadowed largely by “...an administrative conceptof organization and command,” as one former DCDSdeclared at the peak of the Somalia Inquiry.60 In the 1990sand early 2000s, jointness was adopted as the remedy,but it has faded in recent years. Decisions to reorganizeand to restructure the CF over the years have beenexamined frequently against the unification experience,conditioning ministers, generals, and admirals into a wayof thinking about how the CF should, or should not, beorganized. The ‘ghosts’ of the unification ideals werecertainly part of Hellyer’s legacy.

As Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang,the two authors of the award-winning bookThe Unexpected War, observed, Hillier’sappointment as CDS in 2005 fundamentallychanged the philosophy, the strategy, theorganization, and the culture of the CanadianForces.61 With his CF vision and the subsequenttransformation, he brought several new ideasto the CF, much like Hellyer. While a numberof those ideas were contentious, with stronggovernment support in 2005, they neverthelessserved to articulate a new operational paradigmfor the CF, which, in turn, contributed to theshaping of a new organizational constructfor the institution. In contrast to Hellyer’sunification, however, Hillier’s model placedoperational primacy at the centre of his vision,of his reorganization, and of decision-making inthe CF. The Standing Contingency Task Forceconcept was Hillier’s vision to implant atrue CF joint operational capability, but it hassince been shelved for a few years. Perhaps, inthe end, this bold operational vision was‘a bridge too far’ for Canada’s military.Mobile Command Headquarters St. Hubert, Quebec.

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1. Major-General Daniel Gosselin is the Commanderof the Canadian Defence Academy. He is apart-time PhD candidate in the Departmentof History at Queen’s University, working onhis dissertation analyzing Canada’s nationalcommand. His latest article, “Spirited Imperialism:The Formation and Command of the FirstCanadian Expeditionary Force in South Africa,”was recently published in the Summer 2008edition of Canadian Military History.

2. The author thanks several serving and retiredgeneral officers and Dr. Douglas Bland of Queen’sUniversity for their constructive comments in thepreparation of this article.

3. Paul Hellyer, Minutes of Proceedings andEvidence, Standing Committee on National Defence,7 February 1967, p. 440. Hellyer employed the term‘combined’ for what is commonly referred to as‘joint’ today.

4. R.L. Raymont, “The Organization of HigherControl and Coordination in the Formulation ofDefence Policy, 1945-1964,” (Ottawa: Department

8. Paul Hellyer, House of Commons Debates(thereafter Debates), 7 December 1966, p. 10823.

9. Allan English, Command and Control of CanadianAerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations(Trenton, Canadian Forces Aerospace WarfareCentre, 2008), p. 51.

10. For a discussion on the formation of thecommands, see Vernon J. Kronenberg, All TogetherNow: The Organization of the Department ofNational Defence in Canada 1964-1972 (Toronto:Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973),and R.L. Raymont, “Report on Integration andUnification,” pp. 70-101.

11. Kronenberg, pp. 89-92.12. English, Ibid., p. 60.13. For a discussion on the impact of unification

and the air elements in the CF, between 1968 and1975, see English, Ibid., pp. 55-57.

14. For the problems that this created during theFirst Gulf War in 1990-1991, see Jean Morinand Richard H. Gimblett, Operation Friction:The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf

of National Defence, 1978) pp. 65-66. Members ofthe Chiefs of Staff Committee were, collectively,the government’s professional military advisors. Apermanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff was appointedon 1 February 1951. See discussion pp. 60-76.

5. Report by the Joint Planning Committee to theChiefs of Staff Committee, “A Proposed CanadianSystem of Unified Operational Commands”(CSC 5-11-22 (JPC)), 4 May 1951, DHH 2002/17,Box 77, File 24. My appreciation to RichardGoette for sharing this key document.

6. Later renamed the North American AerospaceDefence Command.

7. General Charles Foulkes, “The Case for OneService,” July 1961, Hellyer Papers, Library andArchives Canada, MG32-B33, Vol. 82. Also,R.L. Raymont, “Report on Integration andUnification 1964-1968,” (Ottawa: Departmentof National Defence, 1982), pp. 7-10, andPaul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight toUnify the Canadian Forces (Toronto: McClelland& Stewart, 1990), pp. 39-40.

NOTES

Despite this setback, Hillier nonetheless reinforcedthe unified operational chain of command through acommand-centric imperative, especially with the creation ofa more robust unified staff at NDHQ and the formationof new operational commands focused exclusively uponthe conduct of operations. At the same time, Hillier’smodel has acknowledged the critical role of theenvironments in generating combat-ready military forces,and in promoting and cultivating a warrior culture inthe CF – and the army, navy, air force and special forceshave taken a more dominant role in force generation.Equally important, a better balance between achievingefficiency in defence activities and operational effectivenesshas been restored, reversing a 40-year frame of mind thathad commenced in the 1960s.

Events and activities since 1968 have always pitted thetwo powerful concepts of unification and the ‘strong-service’idea against each other. This is unlikely to disappear inthe future, and the two concepts will continue to exertpressure upon the institution. Through his leadershipas CDS, General Hillier has helped restore pride inthe CF, has brought new confidence to the Canadianmilitary, has re-connected Canadians to its armed forces,and, in doing so, he has exorcised both the ghosts ofSomalia and of Hellyer’s unification.

Colonel R.L. Raymont, an executive assistant to theCDS between 1955 and 1968, stated in an extensive reporton integration and unification that he authored in 1983that “...whether or not you agree with it, Paul Hellyer

was either a saint or the devil. Whileit is true that the integration of CFHQand ultimately the unification of theservices was finally achieved and becamea reality through the leadership andvigorous efforts of Paul Hellyer, thegeneral concept did not originate withhim, nor the implementation end withhim.”62 After 40 tumultuous years, it istime to finally bury the long shadow ofunification and to stop blaming PaulHellyer for any future ills of defence. TheCF institution is today what it is becauseit was built that way by a succession ofministers, CDSs, DMs, generals andadmirals. When the institution – or partsof it – outlives its usefulness or fails, it willbe our responsibility to take it apart andrebuild it. The CF will continue to transform,adapt, and evolve to meet governmentpriorities, changes in the nature of warfare,and new security challenges. It must.

Maritime Command Headquarters, Halifax, Nova Scotia.

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(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), pp. 97-126. Exceptfor domestic operations, there was no intent forMobile Command and Maritime Commandto conduct international operations, but only togenerate those joint forces for employmentby NATO or the UN.

15. Lieutenant-General Paul Addy, “Affidavit –Written Submissions,” before The Inquiry into theDeployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, May1997, quoted in Douglas Bland, “Canada’s OfficerCorps: New Times, New Ideas,” presentation tothe CDA Institute 15th Annual Seminar (Ottawa,1999), at <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/1999/99bland.htm>, accessed 15 August 2008.

16. See Michael Rostek, “A Framework forFundamental Change? The ManagementCommand and Control Re-Engineering Initiative,”Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter2004-2005), pp. 65-72; and G.E. (Joe) Sharpeand Allan English, Principles for Changein the Post-Cold War Command and Controlof the Canadian Forces (Kingston, ON: CFLeadership Institute, 2002), pp. 22-33.

17. Terry Pedwell, “Hillier orders restructuringof military command: army, navy, air forceto be integrated regionally,” in The Kingston Whig-Standard, 6 June 2005; and Kristina Davis, “CFOperational Commands take charge of domestic,special and international operations,” in The MapleLeaf, Vol. 9, No. 6 (8 February 2006), p. 2.

18. The Maple Leaf, “CF Transformation: FromMission to Vision,” 19 October 2005, Vol. 8,No. 36, p. 7; and DND backgrounder, “CanadaCommand,” BG 05.017, 28 June 2005, availableat <http://www.dnd.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1692>, accessed 15 August 2008.

19. NORAD operations represent a particular case,with the Commander 1 Canadian Air Divisionin Winnipeg reporting to both CommanderNORAD and the CDS for continental airsovereignty missions.

20. Lieutenant-General Steve Lucas, Commentary,NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, Issue 3(Bonn: Mönch Publishing Group, 2005),p. 64. The Combined Forces Air ComponentCommander Forward represents the needs ofCommander 1 Canadian Air Division in Ottawawith the respective Commanders of CanadaCommand, CEFCOM, and, as required,CANSOFCOM.

21. See discussion in Raymont, “Report onIntegration and Unification,” pp. 73-79.

22. See White Paper, in Douglas Bland, Canada’sNational Defence Volume 1 Defence Policy(Kingston, ON: Queen’s University Schoolof Policy Studies, 1997), pp. 91-92.

23. For a discussion on Canada’s defence invariants,see R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long-TermStrategic Situation,” International Journal 17(Winter 1961-1962), pp. 199-233, and JeffTasseron, “Facts and Invariants: The ChangingContext of Canadian Defence Policy,” CanadianMilitary Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2003),pp. 19-30.

24. Paul Hellyer, “Canadian Defence Policy,”in Air University Review, Vol. 19, No. 1,(November/December 1967), p. 3. For a betterunderstanding of the environment in 1964, seeRoss Fetterly, “The Influence of the Environmenton the 1964 Defence White Paper,” CanadianMilitary Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter 2004-2005),pp. 47-54.

25. Hellyer, Debates, 8 May 1964, p. 3067,and Raymont, “Report on Integration andUnification,” pp. 66-76.

26. Hellyer, “Canadian Defence Policy,” p. 6.

42. The Maple Leaf, “CF Transformation: FromMission to Vision,” 19 October 2005, Vol. 8,No. 36, p. 7.

43. Hellyer, as quoted in Bland, Canada’s NationalDefence Volume 2, p. 132-133.

44. Lester B. Pearson, as quoted in Granatstein,“Unification,” p. 236.

45. Granatstein, Ibid., p. 238.46. In Bland, Chiefs of Defence, p. 170.47. Ibid., pp. 288-289.48. Jack Granatstein, Who Killed The Canadian

Military?, p. 82.49. Canada, Duty With Honour (Ottawa: Department

of National Defence, 2003), pp. 25, 74. PeterKasurak, writing in 1982 on the issue ofcivilianization of the CF from the contextof military personnel adopting civilian norms andstandards, recommended the establishment ofa formal military ethos. It took 22 years for amanual on the profession of arms to be published.Kasurak, p. 128. For a discussion on theimportance of the regiment, see David J. Bercuson,The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental Historyfrom New France to Afghanistan (Toronto:HarperCollins, 2008).

50. Allan English, Understanding Military Culture:A Canadian Perspective (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), p. 104.

51. The Maple Leaf, “CF Transformation,”Ibid., p. 7.

52. Douglas Bland, “A Defence White Paperfor Canada,” Canadian Defence Quarterly(December 1990), p. 28.

53. Jean V. Allard, The Memoirs of General Jean V.Allard, with Serge Bernier (Vancouver: UBCPress, 1988), p. 253.

54. Granatstein, “Unification,” pp. 241-242.55. Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian

Military?, p. 82.56. Bland, Chiefs of Defence, p. 88, and Hellyer,

Debates, 8 May 1964, pp. 3065-3069.57. David Bercuson, Significant Incident (Toronto:

McClelland and Stewart, 1996), p. 72.58. The events and contributing factors leading to the

Somalia incident are described in DavidBercuson, Dishonoured Legacy: Canada’s Army,The Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996). Onassigning some degree of responsibility forthe Somalia incident to Hellyer’s unification,see Bercuson, Significant Incident, pp. 72-75;Jack Granatstein, Who Killed the CanadianMilitary?, p. 69; and Bland, “Canada’s OfficerCorps.” See also the discussion in Canada,Commission of Inquiry, “The Military inCanadian Society,” Dishonoured Legacy: TheLessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of theCommission of Inquiry into the Deployment ofCanadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa, ON: PublicWorks and Government Services Canada, 1997).

59. General G.C.E. Thériault, “Reflections onCanadian Defence Policy and its UnderlyingStructural Problems,” Canadian DefenceQuarterly (July 1993),” p. 3; and Hellyer,Damn the Torpedoes, p. x.

60. Addy, “Affidavit,” Ibid.61. Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The

Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto:Penguin, 2007), p. 151.

62. Raymont, “Report on Integration andUnification,” p. 1. Colonel R.L. Raymont wasexecutive assistant to the Chairman, Chiefsof Staff, then to the CDS, for over 13 years,including the critical period 1963-1968. Healso wrote several other key reports between1978 and 1983.

27. Raymond, “Report on Integration and Unification,”pp. 1-10.

28. Douglas Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Governmentand the Unified Command of the CanadianArmed Forces (Toronto: The Canadian Instituteof Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 57-58; andDonald Savoie, Governing from the Centre(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999),pp. 19-46.

29. On the Glassco Commission, Hellyer, Damn theTorpedoes, pp. 36-38. Hellyer had several oppor-tunities to share his frustrations with McNamarawith respect to the implementation of unificationand to learn lessons from the Americanexperience. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

30. Jack Granatstein, “Unification: The Politics of theArmed Forces,” in Canada 1957-1967: The Yearsof Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto:McClellandand Stewart, 1986), p. 227.

31. Kronenberg, All Together Now, Figure 18, p. 111.32. Granatstein, “Unification,” p. 229. Schools included

the School ofAdministration and Logistics (CFSAL)and the School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI),while others were reorganized to better addresspan-CF needs, such as the School of MilitaryEngineering (CFSME), and the School ofCommunications and Electronics (CFSCE). TheCF Recruits School later renamed the CF Leadershipand Recruits School, and the CF ManagementDevelopment School to improve managementmethods, were also formed in 1968.

33. These included computerized program control, paysystem, logistic system, management informationsystem, and personnel records. See Air MarshalSharp presentation to the Standing Committee onNational Defence, 7 February 1967, pp. 452-453, andRaymont, “Report on Integration and Unification,”pp. 105-110.

34. The MRG had been created in 1971 by MinisterDonald Macdonald to advise him on how to bettermanage defence policy. See Douglas Bland, TheAdministration of Defence Policy in Canada inCanada, 1947-1985 (Kingston, ON: R.P. Frye,1987), pp. 62-85.

35. Donald J. Savoie, Globalization and Governance(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,1993), p. 1.

36. The ‘management era’ term was coined byDouglas Bland, in The Administration of DefencePolicy in Canada: 1947 to 1985 (Kingston, ON:Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987), pp. 1-11. AlsoRostek, “A Framework for Fundamental Change?”

37. E.M.D. Leslie, “Too Much Management, Too LittleCommand,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 2,No. 3 (Winter 1972/73), pp. 30-32.

38. For example, the CF School of Military Engineeringand the CF School of Communications andElectronics, which train both air force and armypersonnel, are under command of CLS. The JointNuclear Biological and Chemical (NBCD) DefenceCompany, which was formerly part of the JointOperations Group (disbanded in 2006), now belongsto CANSOFCOM, and was renamed the CanadianJoint Incident Response Unit. See CANSOFCOMwebsite, at <http://www.cansofcom.forces.gc.ca/en/cjiru_e.asp>, accessed 15 August 2008.

39. Rostek, “A Framework for FundamentalChange?” p. 71.

40. As of September 2008, the number is closer to137,000, with nearly 29,000 civil servants,almost 65,000 regular force members, and43,000 reservists (Classes A, B, and C).

41. Canada, Achieving Administrative Efficiency,Report to the Minister of National Defence by theAdvisory Committee on AdministrativeEfficiency (Ottawa, 2003), p. iii.