Heinrichs -The Consulter's Conceit

7/29/2019 Heinrichs -The Consulter's Conceit

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THECONSULTERSCONCEIT

HOW PHONY PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET

BRIANNA HEINRICHS

SEPTEMBER 26, 2013

KEY POINTS

Public consultations aim to discover public

preferences, but seldom consult representative

samples.

Consultations generally consider only those options

that are presently describable, whereas innovations

in the market place are often completely unforeseen.

Special interest groups have the ability and incentive

to dominate the public consultation process.

In the market place people constantly use prices

to weigh up the value of dierent options, but

consultations do not deal well with trade-os.

Cities should rely less on planning by consultation

and allow development to take place through the

market, which allows people to have a direct input

proportionate to their level of investment and risk.


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LACK OF COMPLETE

INFORMATION ON WHICH

TO BASE DECISIONS

IS A CONDITION SO

BASIC TO HUMAN LIFE

THAT IT INFLUENCES

THE STRUCTURE OF

ALMOST EVERY SOCIAL

INSTITUTION.

Anthony Downs, 1957


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Since implementing the engage! Policy in 2003, visioning and public engagement exercises

have been fashionable at Calgarys City Hall. The purpose of a consultation is to engage with

others and receive knowledge and advice. The City of Calgary states that it makes better

decisions when it consults with citizens and stakeholder groups (City of Calgary, 2003).

Following is a table listing some of Calgarys recent public consultations.

SECTION I:

INTRODUCTION

Write on the walls*. Eat a cookie. Marvelat the view. Ponder the funny boardroomnames. Youll have a blast.

*Yes. With dry erase markers. Its incred-ible. Youll feel like youre ve years old!

But you wont get in trouble and we wontsend you to your room (City of Calgary,

n.d.a).Have you ever attended one of The Citysmany public engagement events andthought to yourself, Wow this event couldreally use some LEGO bricks?(Hall,2013)


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Over 18,000 citizens participated in

imagineCALGARY, culminating in the Citys

Plan for Long Range Urban Sustainability. The

project asked Calgarians ve questions:

What do you value about Calgary?

What is it like for you to live here?

What changes would you most like to see?

What are your hopes and dreams for the next100 years?

How can you help make this happen?

The City boasts that imagineCALGARY

represents the largest community visioning and

consultation process of its kind anywhere in the

world (City of Calgary, 2013a).

Subsequent public consultations were to

be aligned with the goals and vision of

imagineCALGARY. Plan It Calgary focused

on setting out a long-term direction for

sustainable growth to accommodate another 1.3

million people over the next 60 years, and the

consultation engaged over 6,000 Calgarians in

public hearings, open houses, round table talks

and workshops to discuss the transit system and

urban development (City of Calgary, 2013b).

Another city-wide consultation was Our City.

Our Budget. Our Future. This resulted in

Calgarys 2012 to 2014 business plans and

budgets. The project reportedly included more

than 23,000 participants in its engagement

TABLE 1 - SAMPLING OF CALGARY CONSULTATIONS

CONSULTATION STATED PURPOSE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS DATES

imagineCALGARY Create a long-range urbansustainability plan for Calgary

18,000 January 2005 to 2006

Plan It Calgary Plan to accommodate another 1.3million people over the next 60 years

6,000 2007 to 2009

RouteAhead Create a strategic plan for transit inCalgary

4,000 Spring and summer2012

New CentralLibrary

Identify key expectations and prioritiesfor libraries

16,500 June to October 2012

Our City. OurBudget. Our Future.

Development of business plans, budgetand priorities for 2012 to 2014

23,000 Winter/spring 2013,(Web site launchedJune 2012)

$52-million/Dragons Den

Decide how council should use$52-million in tax room vacated by theprovincial government

Over 10,000 Spring 2013

Multi-family

Recycling Strategy

Review three potential recycling service

options

Ongoing Launched fall 2011

Continue theConversation

Learn how to make it easier for citizensto provide input into City decisions

Ongoing/370 responses to surveyquestion

Launched early 2012

TransformingPlanning

Design and deliver a high-performanceplanning system for Calgary

Ongoing Launched June 2012

8th Street SWImprovement

Develop a Public Realm Master Plan forthe 8th St. SW Corridor

Ongoing/200 at March 20, 2013Open House

Launched September2012


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process. The City advertised in several places,

including Facebook, local news Web sites and

public transit. The electronic newsletter list

reached 2,012 contacts (Dialogue Partners,

2011).

The Continue the Conversation project takes

a fresh look at how Calgarys consultations

take place so that the City can improve

its engagement process and make it more

accessible. Calgarians are encouraged to ll out

surveys, participate in live or tweet chats and

provide input through a discussion forum or by

calling 3-1-1 (City of Calgary, n.d.b).

The City also recently launched Transforming

Planning, a project that engages industry,

communities and citizens in revising the Citys

planning system, in order to build a vibrant,

prosperous and sustainable city for everyone

(City of Calgary, 2013c).

PLANNINGAND THEKNOWLEDGE

PROBLEMSection 632(1) of Albertas current Municipal

Government Act requires that municipalities

with a population greater than 3,500 adopt a

development plan (Province of Alberta, 2010).

The Act gives city councils the broad authority

to control development, make decisions about

infrastructure and establish fees for licences,

permits and approvals.

City planning is believed to be essential. The

rationale is that if cities are not carefully

planned and their development is constrained

by only market forces, cities will become

inecient and chaotic. Some worry that proper

infrastructure will not be developed in time to

support a growing population and that lower-

income communities will suer if resources are

not distributed fairly. People are concerned that

without planning and regulation, urban sprawl

will do unacceptable environmental damage.

However, small, central groups cannot possibly

plan well or make good decisions on behalf of

a large group of citizens. This is because of the

knowledge problem.

The knowledge problem, as Friedrich Hayek

put it, is a problem of the utilization of

knowledge which is not given to anyone in its

totality (1945). In other words, no single mind

or small group of minds has all the details or

knowledge necessary to organize a society at

least not in a way that will be in everyones best

interests (Hayek, 1945).

Like most cities, Calgarys current planning

regime depends on a small number of people

making decisions for a much larger number

of people. Calgarys population was 1,096,833


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people in 2011 (Statistics Canada, n.d.), and

its Planning Commission consists of two

administrators, two council members, six

citizen members and two sta (City of Calgary,

2012). The Planning Commission makes

recommendations to City council on land-use

planning matters, and it acts as Approving

Authority on all subdivision matters and

Development Authority on some development

matters (City of Calgary, n.d.c).

The Citys Planning, Development and

Assessment (PDA) department seeks to fulll

Calgarys vision for a great city by stewarding

the creation, redevelopment and valuation of

vibrant, sustainable communities by dealing

with land-use planning and policy as well as

development and building approvals (City of

Calgary, 2013d). The Citys PDA department

currently consists of 740 core sta and 83

contingent employees (City of Calgary FOIP[Freedom of Information and Protection of

Privacy] Oce, personal communication, June

11, 2013).

In an attempt to mitigate the knowledge

problem, City planners consult with

stakeholders and citizens to gain knowledge of

their needs and preferences.

When community involvement is emphasized

in the urban planning process, this is

participatory planning and can fall under

the theory of deliberative democracy.

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson see

deliberative democracy as

a form of government in which free and

equal citizens (and their representatives),

justify decisions in a process in which they

give one another reasons that are mutually

acceptable and generally accessible, with

the aim of reaching conclusions that are

binding in the present on all citizens but

open to challenge in the future (2004, p. 7).

Gutmann and Thompson explain that some

deliberative democrats believe more direct

participation by ordinary citizens in policy-

making is the best or only way to foster values

such as mutual respect. Furthermore,

[g]reater participation not only gives more

citizens the chance to enjoy the benets

of taking part in deliberation, it also canhelp develop the virtues of citizenship,

encouraging citizens to consider political

issues in a more public-spirited mode

(2004, p. 30).

Seen in a positive light, participatory planning

is a mutually benecial endeavour. Planners

gain knowledge and make better policy

decisions, and citizens become educated

and more public-spirited in the process.

Furthermore, it satises the democratic right

of people to be involved in decisions aecting

their lives.


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PURPOSE OFTHIS REPORT

Winston Churchill said:

No one pretends that democracy is

perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been

said that democracy is the worst form of

Government except all those other forms

that have been tried from time to time; but

there is the broad feeling in our country

that the people should rule, continuously

rule, and that public opinion, expressed

by all constitutional means, should shape,

guide, and control the actions of Ministers

who are their servants and not their

masters (1947).

Democracy may be the best system of

governance we have, but public consultations

may do more to amplify the imperfect parts

of democracy than to enhance the good.

Looking deeper into the mechanics of public

consultations reveals aws in the process that

are logically impossible to overcome.

Important questions Calgarians need to askthemselves include the following:

Do public consultations help to keep

governments in check and ensure politicians

are servants and not masters?

How well do the City of Calgarys visioning

exercises and community consultations

reect what Calgarians want from

development?

First, this paper will discuss the mechanics

of facilitating meaningful and equitable

consultations in Calgary and elsewhere. It will

then consider some alternatives if people were

to determine that the Citys current methods for

planning a city are inadequate or inappropriate.

DEMOCRACY MAY BE

THE BEST SYSTEM

OF GOVERNANCE WE

HAVE, BUT PUBLIC

CONSULTATIONS MAYDO MORE TO AMPLIFY

THE IMPERFECT PARTS

OF DEMOCRACY THAN

TO ENHANCE THE GOOD


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To learn whether organizing a city through

consultations is reasonable, one must look at

who is consulted and whether the groups are

representative of the greater population. The

number of participants and their backgrounds

and motivations all aect the ndings of a

consultation.

NUMBER OFPARTICIPANTSMunicipal election voter turnouts in Calgary

ranged from 19.8 per cent to 53.2 per cent

from 2001 to 2010 (Alberta Municipal Aairs,

2012). People are encouraged to vote, because

government decisions aect them regardlessof whether they vote or not. The percentage

of people who can or do participate in public

consultations is much lower.

For example, only 18 people responded to an

online poll seeking feedback from businesses

and property owners on proposed changes to

Calgarys on-street parking rates (Howell &

Zickefoose, 2013).

On the other hand, the imagineCALGARY

project boasts about having more than 18,000

participants. Still, in a city of one million

people, this means not even 2 per cent of

Calgarians participated in creating a shared

vision for our city and a detailed plan for howto get there (City of Calgary, 2013a). The

imagineCALGARY targets drive development

plans and regulations aecting 100 per cent

of Calgarians, not merely the 2 per cent who

participated.

In practice, the vast majority of the population

cannot take a direct part in public deliberations,

due to the impossibility of nding a forum

where millions of participants can have their

say about the countless decisions that aect

their lives (Pennington, 2010, p. 165).

SECTION II:

WHO ISCONSULTED?


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Given that not everybody can participate

directly in every decision a government makes,

most democratic governments work by electing

a smaller number of representatives. Similarly,

people who attend public consultations become

representatives of the wider population,

since not everyone attends or can be involved

(Pennington, 2010, p. 165).

One can neither avoid nor ignore the possibility

of inaccurate representation. For example, a

person who is neither low-income nor female

will have trouble representing the perspective

of a low-income female (Pennington, 2002,

p. 165). Consultations run the risk of certain

groups of people or perspectives dominating

the process, intentionally or unintentionally.

For example, Robert E. Goodin and Julian Le

Grand argue that the middle class is more likely

to try to inuence policy, because its members

have greater faith in their power to change their

environment. They also have more resources

and are more articulate than is the working

class (1987, p. 153). This is a problem, because

however dispassionate [members of

the middle class] may be, or however

much they may perceive their interests

as lying outside those of the middle

class, it is unlikely that they will be able

completely to overcome the eects of

their background or of their current

social status (Goodin & Le Grand, 1987,

p. 153).

MISREPRESENTATION


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SPECIAL

INTEREST

GROUPS

Members of the middle class may be unable

to represent those of dierent backgrounds,

but most of the middle class is likely not

represented properly in consultations, either.

When members of the public act as participants

in central decision making, more-specialized

interest groups have an advantage. Tounderstand the dierence between a small,

organized group and the unorganized public,

consider a disciplined, coordinated army taking

an undisciplined, leaderless mob by surprise

(Olson, 1971, pp. 128-29).

Special interest groups have dierent

motivations to participate in the political

process. One example of how powerless the

political majority can be in the face of an

organized, motivated minority is the infamous

taxi cartel. In city after city, a small number of

taxi licence holders maintain a monopoly on

taxi services at the expense of other voters.

It happens this way: A taxi company can

become rich by getting the government to

establish a cap on the number of taxi licences.

Such a policy restricts new taxi drivers from

joining the industry as the population grows,

resulting in a taxi shortage (Seymour, 2009). In

Calgary in 2011, the people who owned the taxi

plates brought in $300,000 a week by renting

them out for $200 each per week to drivers

(Seymour, 2011). Meanwhile, consumers pay

more to ride because of the taxi shortage, and

potential new taxi drivers who cannot obtain a

plate must seek work elsewhere.

Such a policy signicantly benets those

running the taxi industry. Because the

regulations make them wealthy, they have an

incentive to see that the regulations remain

in place, and they are willing to invest their

time and resources to maintain the policy. On

the other hand, though members of the public

would benet from seeing the regulations go,

they would spend more time, money and eort

organizing against the taxi empire than they

would save if they were successful in their

eorts.

An individual member of a large, latent groupdoes not have an incentive to voluntarily push

for the large groups goal when he will not in

any case be decisive in seeing that the group

goal is achieved, and when he would be as likely

to get the benets from the attainment of the

goal whether he had worked for its attainment

or not (Olson, 1971, p. 129).

Because it is hard to solve this free rider

problem in a large group, where small groups

with common interests are concerned, then,

there is however a surprising tendency for the

exploitation of the great by the small (Olson,

1971, p. 3). Often the public is not even aware of

policies in place that support special interests.


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It should be clear that a consultation on the

issue of taxi regulation would have unbalanced

dynamics, and similar dynamics spill into

consultations on other policy topics.

Lobbyists are eternally on the job, (Olson,

p. 128) and consumers and the public are

disadvantaged because they constantly need to

protect their interests on all fronts. We should

expect that when individuals decide to join a

consultation, some among them would have

motives and preformed groups that would give

them an advantage over the average constituent.

THE SAMPLE

SELECTION

DILEMMA

Organizers of citizen engagement initiatives

have two basic options when inviting public

participation: They can advertise and allow

individuals to self-select, or they can take active

recruitment steps (Ryfe, 2005, p. 51). Choosing

a representative sample may mean having to

reject people who would like to be consulted,

but allowing self-selection may not produce arepresentative sample.

Citizens of Calgary typically self-select for the

Citys engagement programs, as participation is

not compulsory. Citizens can learn how to get

involved through the Citys Web site and other

advertising.

David Ryfe notes that a passive recruitment

method usually produces a snowball sample,

that is to say, interested individuals recruit from

their social networks, and these individuals

recruit from their social networks, and so on,

until the group is composed (2005, p. 51).

Consider the special interest group Bike Calgary.

It states on its Web site, We work with other

cycling and active transportation organisations

as well as with the City of Calgary to shape

policy and implement projects that benet

Calgarians who ride bicycles (Bike Calgary,

n.d.).

Calgarians who are unable to or do not

commute by bicycle may see transportation

needs dierently from members of Bike

Calgary, but Bike Calgary can mobilize and

coordinate its members to show up at relevant

City consultations. The City will not turn peopleaway; this would be seen as undemocratic.

Even if the City could reject people on the basis

that the group would cease to be representative,

how would the City know beforehand what

a person represents? The very reason that

cities consult with citizens is that they do not

know where citizens stand. Therefore, the City

would be unable to avoid the potential over-

representation of special interest groups at its

consultations where citizens self-select.


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CONSULTATIONS

ARE BIASED

TOWARDS

BIGGER

GOVERNMENT

A possible defence against the

misrepresentation charges and the low

participation rate is that consultation must

simply be tried harder. The excuse is that if only

more people were brought into the process, the

sample would become more representative.

However, providing additional opportunities

may only succeed in supplying additional

chances for special interest groups to gain

access (Pennington, 2002, p. 61).

Those in favour of the consultation model may

further argue that people who do not take the

initiative to give feedback cannot complain

about the results that aect them. However,

this seems to imply that people only have rights

to the extent they are able to defend them

through consultative processes.

Gutmann and Thompson argue, for most

people, the freedom not to spend a major part

of ones time deliberating about politics is part

of what it means to live the life of a free citizen

(2004, p. 31).

Public consultations are biased toward

government activity. Government initiates

them, and they generally occur when

government would like to take some kind of

action. People who want to see government

intervention, therefore, have a natural

advantage in consultations, and, ironically,

those who desire government to stay out of

their neighbourhood must get involved in

politics to avoid political intervention.

The City recently launched a consultation with

the intention of developing a multi-family

recycling strategy. However, residents of multi-

family dwellings, such as apartments and

condominiums, can already drop o recyclables

at about 50 community recycling depots, and

a number of companies provide collection

services (City of Calgary, 2013e).

The Blue Cart service, $7.40 a month in 2013,

is not optional for single-family residences

(City of Calgary, 2013f). Just as residents of

single-family dwellings may have disliked the

imposition of the Blue Cart program, residents

of multi-family dwellings may dislike the

government taking control of their recycling

practices.


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PUBLIC

INTEREST

VS. SELFISH

MOTIVES

Some people may carry an assumption

that people involved in representation or

consultation are basing their actions upon

achieving what they believe to be in the public

interest.

People seek government regulations because

of market failures, situations where if

each person acts according to self-interest,

everybody ends up being worse o than if they

had all acted in a more centrally coordinated

way (Friedman, 2004, p. 7).

However, it is important to recognize that the

consultation process and the private market

both rely on human nature. Consultations are

not an antidote to self-interest, but rather a

dierent medium for it. Public consultations

may serve vested interests as much as or even

more than private market interactions would,

because people who will benet personally

from government regulations are more likely to

attend public consultations.

The alternative to an unregulated private

market is not wise and benevolent regulators.

The true alternative is another kind of market:

the political market, a collection of people

interacting under the rules of democratic

politics, each, just as in the private market,

trying to achieve their own objectives

(Friedman, 2004, p. 11).

...IT IS IMPORTANT

TO RECOGNIZE THATTHE CONSULTATION

PROCESS AND THE

PRIVATE MARKET

BOTH RELY ON

HUMAN NATURE.CONSULTATIONS ARE

NOT AN ANTIDOTE TO

SELF-INTEREST, BUT

RATHER A DIFFERENT

MEDIUM FOR IT.


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SECTION III:

CHALLENGESIN GROUPDYNAMICS

Section II highlights problems with

consultations based on the composition of

the groups consulted. But even if a group

were representative of Calgarys entire

population and were seeking the public

good, in comparison with the private market,

the consultation process is an ineective

mechanism to receive and process peoples

knowledge.

Citizens are intelligent and can participate

in Calgarys development in many ways, but

the structure of public consultations provides

incentives for people to remain rationally

ignorant or rationally irrational.

Moreover, people are often guided when giving

their input, partly because they are not experts

in the consultations topic. But the validity

of making laws based on consultation results

depends on the participants independence.

In public consultations, people are not

eectively encouraged to make calculated

decisions, because they are not paying a direct

cost for them. Consultations, therefore, have

more diculty handling trade-os than does

the private market.

Even if people were knowledgeable of the

trade-os and costs involved, communicating

and explaining preferences in a consultationcan also be dicult. People may not even know

their own opinions until confronted with a real

situation, and people do not know what will

occur in the future.


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THE

DILEMMA OF

QUALIFICATIONS

A concern with the public consultation process

stems from the specialist nature of the topics.

Typically, people are not experts in the

consultations topic. This leads to a further

dilemma for municipal consultations: To what

extent should the publics input be guided and

interpreted by experts, and to what extentshould experts yield to the publics desires?

By their very nature, public consultations

value the opinions of the public because they

are members of the public. Yet, transport

engineering, for example, is a large and

complex body of knowledge where experts

have an advantage over lay people. Combining

public and expert opinion presents a dicult

challenge, when one opinion or the other has to

prevail.

Former B.C. Liberal leader Gordon Gibson once

remarked, I would never ride in an airplane

designed by a citizens assembly. They are not

qualied to do that kind of thing (Cayo, 2013).

If conclusions reached by members of the

public were binding on city council, the

outcomes have the potential to be damaging

to the city. This is because most Calgarians are

not, by trade, urban planners or developers.

On the other hand, dogmatically putting expert

opinions rst would defeat the purpose of

public consultation.


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RATIONAL

IGNORANCE

Public consultations carry with them an

incentive to be rationally ignorant. Rationalignorance means that a rational person will

ignore a decision when the eort required to

be informed is greater than the value of getting

the decision right. Anthony Downs writes

that ignorance of politics is not the result of

unpatriotic apathy; rather it is a highly rational

response to the facts of political life in a large

democracy (1957, p. 147).

Learning all there is to know about any given

topic in order to provide valuable input may be

noble, but rational people do not invest more in

a task than they will gain. The rational ignorance

of consultation participants is largely the result

of doubt that their contributions will be taken

seriously.

When Our City. Our Budget. Our Future.

asked respondents why they did not look for

information about the Citys 2013 to 2014

business plans and budget, some verbatim

responses suggested how strong apathy about

the consultation really was. One responder

wrote, what does it matter? They will do

what they are going to do without me. Another

response was, I have no control over it so I have

little to no interest in it (City of Calgary, 2012).

A Continue the Conversation survey question

asked respondents how they wanted the City to

demonstrate that their input in consultations

was heard. The options included a community

newsletter, the Citys Web site or a Community

Association presentation (City of Calgary, n.d.d).

Showing the participants input was valued

through the actual policy decisions made was not

listed as an option.

Mark Pennington asserts that a rationally civic

minded person may be better o spending time

and eort where her own contribution can have

a demonstrable eect by helping an elderly

neighbor, for example, rather than trying to

become politically informed (Pennington, 2000,p. 119).

J. Barry Cullingworth agrees that people may

withdraw from the engagement process because

participation is a sham. L. Christiansen-

Ruman and B. Stuart (as cited in Cullingworth,

1984, p. 6) muse that because expert opinions

dominate the process, this domination may be

the telling blow that sends the once edgling

convert to participatory democracy back to

apathy. Yet, as noted earlier, if expert opinions

do not prevail, a group unqualied to plan a city

could lead it to disaster.


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RATIONAL

IRRATIONALITY

Despite needing to invest time or eort in

gaining knowledge, most people do hold

opinions on political and policy questions.

Because no decision-maker can aord to

know everything that might possibly bear on

his decision before he makes it (Downs, 1957,

p. 145), individuals take information shortcuts

when developing their views. They typically

rely on some subset of information to make a

judgment and discard the rest of the relevant

information.

Researchers have found this process at

work in every level of choice making.

Research on mass opinion shows that

citizens make snap judgments on the basis

of party identication, their liking fora candidate, group aliation, personal

ideology, media frames, elite cues,

perceptions of likely winners and losers,

and a host of other cues (Ryfe, 2005, p. 55).

Bryan Caplan further developed rational

ignorance into the counterintuitive theory of

rational irrationality. He argues that people do

not change their minds once they are convinced

of a political position, even after they are

presented with the facts. He says that people

get a psychological benet out of believing the

world is the way they like to see it. Moreover,

carrying unpopular beliefs often makes a

person unpopular, so people choose to believe

what their friends do (2007, pp. 100, 115).

Downs argues that people are rational in

choosing not to become informed, and Caplan

argues that rational people (those people who

maximize their happiness) will similarly choose

not to discard cherished beliefs. He writes,

If ignorance were the sole cause of error

[y]0u could x any misconception with enough

facts. A few thought experiments show how

implausible this is (2007, p. 101).


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20

GUIDED

CONSULTATIONS

An important moral consideration is that

factors such as ideology or the media may

inuence the reasoning of consultation

participants. In the same way that it would be

wrong for a jury to make its decisions based on

emotional pleas and biased data, conclusions

reached by guided consultations are not

trustworthy. The appropriateness of Calgarys

citizen engagement initiatives is contingent on

the independence of the participants.

The imagineCALGARY consultation

involved the City putting forward ideas to

guide thinking. These were the concepts

of sustainability, the Melbourne Principles

to provide a sustainability lter, systems

thinking theory, the human needs framework,and the community asset-based approach

(2013a, p. 186). Similarly, Plan It Calgary was

grounded in principles of SMART growth

and sustainability principles for land use and

mobility (City of Calgary, 2013b).

Regarding Calgarys chief planner, Rollin

Stanley, City manager Owen Tobert said,

We need someone whos strong-minded,

has leadership capabilities and is persuasive

in arguments, and I think weve found such

a person in Rollin (Markuso, 2012). A city

seeking citizen input should not need to hire

people persuasive in arguments unless there is

an agenda involved. Democratic governments

are meant to serve the public, not manipulate it.

Civil servants and members of the government

have the right to share their views, but they

must also allow people to disagree with them.

Canadian Home Builders Association president

Charron Ungar made critical comments about

the Citys planning and suggested there was a

suburban development freeze in place. In

response, Calgarys Mayor, Naheed Nenshi,

suspended the Association from City Hall

proceedings and sent a reprimanding letter

to Ungar demanding an apology (Zickefoose,

2013).

People questioned whether the actions taken

were appropriate. Richard Truscott, director of

provincial aairs for the Canadian Federation

of Independent Business, said, That

[behaviour] sends a very worrisome signal in

our mind about their approach working with

external groups (Zickefoose, 2013).

If stakeholders get punished for providing

feedback that the City does not want to hear,

the City is denying itself potentially valuable

insight from citizens and stakeholders the

very thing it supposedly desires.

Cullingworth writes, There is a real conict

of view between those who see the inquiry in

narrow terms and those who refuse to accept

predetermined battle lines (1984, p. 8).


21/48

UNLIKE THE ADVICE GIVEN IN

CONSULTATIONS, DECISIONS MADE IN

PRIVATE MARKETS INVOLVE PEOPLE

PAYING A DIRECT COST FOR THEIR

ACTIONS, SO PEOPLE WILL NATURALLY

REASON DIFFERENTLY.


22/48

22

SPREAD-OUT

COSTS AND

TRADE-OFFS

Because the costs associated with public

consultation decisions are spread out among a

large number of people, people in consultations

often fail to consider or address trade-os and

can simply state what they want.

Unlike the advice given in consultations,

decisions made in private markets involve

people paying a direct cost for their actions, so

people will naturally reason dierently.

Consider that a broad range of sizes and types

of televisions are available in the market. It is

easy (or rational) for people to say they desire

a bigger and higher-quality TV, but people still

buy smaller and lower-quality TVs, due to price.

If people buy cheaper TVs, they will have money

left over to spend on something else. They pay

the entire cost of their decision themselves.

RouteAhead is a plan for transit development in

Calgary, and its rst phase included extensive

public engagement. On July 20, 2012, someone

suggested, [m]aking transit cheaper, buses

should run more often (City of Calgary, n.d.e).

While it is easy to understand why both cheaper

transit and more frequent buses are desirable,

addressing both of these desires simultaneously

is not so simple. Running buses more often costs

more money, but how does the transit system

get more money if they make transit cheaper?

This is merely one example of how people may

accidentally leave trade-os out of the equation.

Similarly, Beckerman (as cited in Pennington,

Sustainable Development and British Land-

use Planning, 2006, p. 79) notes that the

insistence of some environmental activists that

irreplaceable assets should be conserved, as

a matter of principle, requires that increases

in living standards be sacriced in order to

maintain the absolute integrity of habitats and

ecological systems.

Limiting suburban development to conserve

land is a signicant trade-o when housing

prices rise because of high land prices. High

housing costs hurt low-income people the

most. Peter Shawn Taylor writes, Density

requirements limiting access to new green eld

suburban developments are meant to articially

push up the price of existing single family

homes under a planning doctrine known as

Smart Growth (2013).

Pennington asserts that this deep greenview is unlikely to nd support from those

still lacking access to the benets of economic

growth. Notably, a City that enforces this view is

making people adhere to a particular worldview

something fundamentally at odds with the


23/48

stated emphasis on public participation, local

control and the acceptability of diverse views

(2006, p. 79).

But, if asked whether one would like land to be

conserved, most people would likely answer yeswithout realizing that their response may be used

to justify higher housing prices, which may or may

not aect them. Even if consultation organizers

are not guiding results, they cannot be sure

participants understand the implications of their

suggestions.

NEEDS VS. DESIRES

In the case of consultations, people are typically

asked about spending decisions where the

cost will be spread across a much wider range

of people than the individual or consultation

attendants. Consultations typically ask people

hypothetical questions such as Would you like

this? or What would be your preferred method of

transportation?

Saying what one wants is helpful to a point, but

making a purchase or private transaction is a more

useful signal to others of what people actually want

and need and is realistically an option. The market

eectively determines needs, while consultations

determine desires.

The risks of policies are not concentrated on the

individuals who are engaged in consultations.

That is to say, they are not held responsible if the

City implements bad policies. If people were held

responsible, they would be less likely to participate

in the policy-making process a telling sign that

perhaps consultations should not be held in such

high regard.

Discussion participants on the Citys Web sitecan remain anonymous, and the Transforming

Planning privacy policy states, Workshop

participant comments and feedback provided

directly to Transforming Planning will remain

unattributed (anonymous) (City of Calgary,

2013g).

If one can anonymously give feedback, citizens will

not know who is advocating for certain policies,

and there is a lack of ownership and accountability.

Gutmann and Thompson see deliberative

democracy as a process requiring citizens to

justify their actions or decisions, but anonymous

opinions, not justications, are usually being

sought.


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24

COMMUNICATION

DIFFICULTIES

Even if people are aware of the trade-os involved,

it is still dicult for them to properly communicate

their values to each other. An individuals

knowledge of the kinds of things he or she wants

may not be conveyed properly in verbal form


Consider the statement I love you. Anyone who

replies, How much do you love me? is usually

teasing. Some values and sentiments are beyond

the English language. In a market place, people can

choose products and places for reasons that they

cannot articulate. A person may prefer chocolate ice

cream to cherry cheesecake, but giving a waitress

justication for the decision is not worth the eort.

Consultations can only deliver or explain the

describable.

Policies based upon verbalized descriptions will

have questionable results when consultations such

as imagineCALGARY ask questions such as What

is it like for you to live here?

In the private market, prices and the amount people

are willing to pay serve as a signal of value. People

value the same things dierently at dierent times.

For example, Kirk may be willing to spend $7 for

a sandwich in the middle of his workday, but if

he leaves work early the next day, he may only be

willing to spend up to $5 on the sandwich, because

he is not yet too hungry and can eat something else

at home.

Prices serve a purpose beyond relieving people of

their money; they are a communication mechanism

within society. When something goes up in price,

people know there is a demand for it. When

something loses its value and becomes cheaper,

people value it less or too much of it is being

supplied. Prices are more easily able to express

trade-os and value than are government-run

consultations.

THE FUTURE

AND INNOVATIVESOLUTIONS

Sometimes people cannot share input simply

because they do not know what they would want or

would do. Economist Thomas Sowell writes:

I might think that, if faced with the stark

prospect of bankruptcy, I would rather

sell my automobile than my furniture, or

sacrice the refrigerator rather than the

stove, but unless and until such a moment

comes, I will never know even my own trade-

os, much less anybody elses. There is no

way for such information to be fed into a

computer, when no one has such information

in the rst place (1980, p. 218).

Planners and those participating in surveys or

consultations are working with existing knowledge,

but they are unsure of what the future looks like

and how they will respond.


25/48

Many consumers love the iPhone, but no one

was demanding iPhones before Apple invented

them. Once confronted with the option of buying

an iPhone, consumers realized their desire for

the product and re-evaluated their original

opinions.

Imagine if 100 years ago, consumers dictated

and regulated what the development of the

telecommunications industry would be and

discouraged experimentation. Now, we are

envisioning Calgary over the next 100 years and

making our development plans accordingly. One

hopes that 100 years from now, cities planned

by consultations are not the equivalent of rotary

phones.

Something may be invented soon, or knowledge

will be obtained that will change development

options and the current understanding of the

land-use problems faced. Moreover, if a person

were to innovate, this would likely take place

within the private market where prot is a

possibility.

CONSULTING ON

CONSULTATIONS

The consultation process is an inadequate

mechanism to receive and process peoples

knowledge. The City apparently wants to learn

how to improve the process and make it easier

for more citizens to give input, so it launched

Continue the Conversation. But the City begs

the question when learning through its public

consultation process how to improve its public

consultation process.

The City of Ottawa also held public consultations

to learn where and how the public wanted to be

consulted. David Reevely noted ironically, [The

City of Ottawa] will be relying on its usual means

with an online survey planned for the citys

ottawa.ca website and four evening sessions

(2013).

PEOPLE ARE EFFECTIVELY DECLARING EVERY

DAY THROUGH THE PRIVATE MARKET WHAT

THEY LIKE AND WHAT IS PRACTICAL FOR THEM

THROUGH THEIR CHOICES AND PURCHASES.


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26

SECTION IV:

IS PLANNING BY

CONSULTATIONAPPROPRIATE?

Whom the government consults and how a consultation process receives feedback aect the valid-

ity of a consultations outcome. Questioning the validity of consultation results is important, because

policies made as a result of the ndings have the potential to do harm.

Participating in public consultations should not be seen as automatically virtuous, despite the City

encouraging everyone to get involved. Consultations cannot achieve consensus, but if they could,

subjective matters achieved by consensus should not be imposed on others. Consultations can restrict

the choices available to consumers as well as their ability to decide what is right for them. Moreover,

participating in consultations may simply give a government the perceived legitimacy it needs to do

what it wants.

CONSENSUS AND

SUBJECTIVITY IN

PUBLIC CONSUL-

TATIONSPublic consultations like to discover majority

opinions or even consensuses, but using consul-

tations to achieve a consensus is futile, because

there is no consensus in a population of one mil-

lion people.

If a community was to pursue a particular course

of action based on a perceived consensus or ma-

jority opinion and it turned out to be a big op,

greater harm would result than if a variety of

actions were attempted. We are not a smart city if

we put all of our eggs in one basket.

Moreover, majority opinions shift. For example,

in the second half of the 1900s, people argued

that the market process did not lead to a proper

geographical division of functions that is to

say, housing, leisure, work and shopping were all

mixed together. A division was seen as desirable,

and people believed planning towns as a whole


27/48

was needed to see their vision come to fruition

(Davies, 2002, p. 20).

This very mix of functions within a city is what

many people are advocating for now, yet they

believe deliberate government action is needed to

provide walkable cities or sustainable growth.

Regardless, some matters do not concern every-

body and should not be regulated by government,

because the types of development that constitute

an improvement in the quality of life are subjec-

tive.

People have dierent preferences and priorities.

Some people may prefer to raise their family in

Cochrane and drive into Calgary for work every

day; others prefer to live in an apartment down-

town and walk to work.

In many cases, consultation participants are

merely trying to impose their tastes on others.

Nevertheless, in democracies, citizens are allowed

some privacy and independence. Consultations

serve no practical purpose, however, if they only

show that everyone has a dierent opinion.

Ironically, an imagineCALGARY target is [b]y

2036, 100 per cent of Calgarians report that they

feel respected and supported in their pursuits of

meaning, purpose and connectedness, and thatthey extend respect and support to others who

meet this need in ways dierent from their own

(City of Calgary, 2006, p. 94).

MORAL RIGHT TO

PARTICIPATE

At least one theorist questions whether public

participation is always right and moral, even

when the topic concerns the greater public. In The

Ethics of Voting, Jason Brennan challenges the

folk theory that any vote in good faith is morally

acceptable and that each citizen has a civic duty to

vote (2011, pp. 1-3).

People argue that voting, regardless of how a

person votes, tends to preserve stable democracy,

yet when the public fails to vote, this destabilizes

democracy (Brennan, 2011, p. 21). It may be that

citizens engaging in elections or public consulta-

tions are doing more harm than good, especially if

the outcomes of the process in which they engage

has greater ramications than they are aware of.

Arguably, it is irresponsible to impose decisionson others, especially when one is not informed

about the decision.

Brennan writes, Even though individual votes

almost never have a signicant impact on election

results in any large-scale election, I argue that this

does not let individuals o the hook. Individual

voters have moral obligations concerning how

they vote (2011, pp. 2-3).


28/48

28

WHAT IF THE

GOVERNMENT

DOES A BAD JOB?

If public consultation results do not accurately

convey the needs and interests of the public and

the government makes poor decisions, the costs

are spread among the entire city and mistakes

may not even be realized. There is no institution

competing with a governments attempts at

city planning; there is nobody to provide an

alternative that may be better. Citizens must

take what they get or leave the city. Monopolies

can be harmful, but competition encourages

better performance.

In the private market, consultations are kept

in check by the fact that actors in the private

market face competition, and the public is

not bound to the private decisions of others.

If a consultation is done poorly, the people

who carried it out will be unsuccessful in

their initiatives. Moreover, those conducting

market research may have results that are more

accurate because they do not face the same

obstacles that politicians do.

THERE IS NO

INSTITUTION

COMPETING WITHA GOVERNMENTS

ATTEMPTS AT CITY

PLANNING; THERE IS

NOBODY TO PROVIDE

AN ALTERNATIVE

THAT MAY BE BETTER.

CITIZENS MUST TAKE

WHAT THEY GET OR

LEAVE THE CITY.


29/48

CONSULTATION CAN RESTRICT

CHOICES IN THE MARKETPLACE

Public consultation and participation may bring

with it connotations of inclusiveness and the

ability of all people to have a hand in shaping their

destinies and ensuring sustainability. However,

the downside to public consultations is that

they can be used to justify rules, regulations and

expenditures that remove choices from citizens.

The Citys Municipal Development Plan

(MDP) seeks to guide Calgary toward the

imagineCALGARY vision (City of Calgary, 2009,

p. 1.6). The MDP has led to a wide range of

strategies, goals and policies that restrict the

choices Calgarians have when it comes to land use.

They are summarized in table form in the MDP

(overleaf).

...[T]HE DOWNSIDE TO PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS

IS THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO JUSTIFY RULES,REGULATIONS AND EXPENDITURES THAT REMOVE

CHOICES FROM CITIZENS.


30/48

30

No. Core Indicators Metric Baseline 60-year

target

1 Urban Expansion Per cent of populationgrowth accommodatedwithin developed area(2005 boundary area)

In 2005, the developed areaof the city was losing 5 %of population to greeneldarea.

50%

2 Density People per hectare In 2005, Calgary had apopulation density of 20people per hectare.

27

Jobs per hectare In 2005, Calgary hademployment density of 11

jobs per hectare.

18

3 Population/JobsBalance

Population/Jobs East/West Ratio

In 2005 the population/jobs East/West Ratio was2.7

1.7

Population/Jobs North/South Ratio

In 2005 the population/jobs North/South Ratiowas 1.9

1.7

4 Mix Land Use Land Use Diversity Index In 2008, land use mix diversity index was 0.53

0.7

5 Residential Mix Residential Diversity Index In 2008, residentialdiversity index was 0.19.

0.4

6 Road and Street Infrastructure

Roads to Streets ratio 0.72 (42% Roads and 58%Streets)

0.57 (36%Roads and

64% Streets)

7 Accessibility toPrimary TransitNetwork

Per cent of populationwithin 400m of PrimaryTransit Network

LRT is the only transitservice approaching

Primary Transit levels ofservice in Calgary today

45%

Per cent of jobs within400m of Primary Transit

Network

LRT is the only transitservice approaching

Primary Transit levels ofservice in Calgary today

67%

8 Transit Service Annual transit service

hours per capita

9 Goods Access Per cent of intermodal and warehousing facilitieswithin 1600m (actual) of

Primary Goods MovementNetwork

Currently, 73% ofintermodal andwarehousing facilities arelocated within 1600m of

Primary Goods MovementNetwork


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10 TransportationMode Split

Walking and Cycling ModeSplit (all purpose trips, 24hours, city-wide)

In 2005, walk and biketrips contributed to 14% ofall trips made

20% - 25%

Transit Mode Split (allpurpose trips, 24 hours,city-wide)

In 2005, 9% of all tripswere made by transit 15% - 20%

Auto Mode Split (allpurpose trips, 24 hours,city-wide)

In 2005, 77% of all tripswere made by car 65% - 55%

11 Accessibility toDaily Needs

Per cent of populationwithin Major andCommunity ActivityCentres and 600m ofUrban and NeighbourhoodCorridors

In 2006, 18% of allpopulation was locatedwithin Major andCommunity ActivityCentres and 600m ofUrban and NeighbourhoodCorridors

30%

12 Watershed Health Per cent of impervious

surface

In 1998, 32% of land cover

was impervious (made upof roadways, parking andbuildings)

10% - 20%

13 Urban forest Per cent of tree canopy Canopy cover was 7% in1998

14% - 20%

14 District Energy Per cent of land area withdensities supportive ofdistrict energy systems

In 2005, only 0.3% ofland area had densitiessupportive of districtenergy systems

1.7%

Table 2: Core Indicators for Land Use and Mobility (City of Calgary, 2009, p. 5.10)

People who like to drive, have lots of space and

live in a quiet residential neighbourhood may

nd that its supply is articially restricted. Goal

two of the MDP calls for an increase in density,

while goal 10 calls for a decrease in trips by car

and an increase in trips by transit. However,these are just a couple examples, since the Citys

consultations cover a broad range of topics.

Choices made through consultations are not

without a cost; they reduce the available choices

in the market place. They also seem frustrat-

ingly arbitrary and not really connected with the

consultation process. For example, it is dicult

to see what logical process led to a target of 27residents per hectare, why not 26 or 28?


32/48

32

PRE-MADE

DECISION SEEKS

LEGITIMACY...

Because government decisions bind everybody,

politicians cannot rightly decide an issue

simply by claiming that they know that their

preferred policies are right for their fellow

citizens (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, pp.

22-23). Governments need to demonstrate that

every decision made reects the public interest.

Public consultation is seen as part of the

governments solution to dealing with public

scrutiny. Put another way, public participation

is simply public relations: providing the public

with information and, possibly, reassurance

(Cullingworth, 1984, p. 7). Arguably, people

are less likely to complain about a government

decision they dislike if they believe it was made

through a democratic process.

In Calgary, some citizens are questioning

whether the recent consultation over how to

spend $52-million was appropriate, not simply

because it was done in the style of the Dragons

Den game show, but because of claims that theprovince intended the money to be returned to

taxpayers. Licia Corbella writes:

The provincial government overtaxed

Calgarians by $52 million, and as a

result, it is returning the money. Thats

the right thing to do. Mayor Naheed

Nenshi and city council, however,

are now going through some pretty

imaginative, if not bizarre, exercises to

determine what to do with the found loot

(2013).

A scientic poll showed 39 per cent of

Calgarians supported the option of returning

the money to taxpayers and 25 per cent opted to

cut the Citys debt. The transit option, believed

to be favoured by the mayor, was supported by

17 per cent (Bell, 2013).

The City reports, however, that their own

consultation was a qualitative study and

no numbers were collected (City of Calgary,

2013h). Marc Henry of ThinkHQ says, It seems

like council in their public consultation was

looking for forgiveness, not permission (Bell,

2013). Some argue that consultations do more

to inuence public opinion than policy (Ryfe,

2005, p. 61).

Additionally, a number of people see the results

of some Calgary consultations as quite obvious,

causing them to wonder whether the City is

merely going through the motions of public

participation.

For example, RouteAhead received comments

from 4,000 people, and the top ve priorities

were identied: buses should be scheduled to

arrive at stops more often, routes should go

where people need them to go, fares should stay

aordable, vehicles should be comfortable and


33/48

vehicles should arrive on time (City of Calgary,

n.d.f, p. 25). City council should not need to spend

taxpayer money and seek out citizens in order to

know that most transit riders want comfortable

seats and their buses to arrive on time; this is

intuitive.

To learn how Calgarians would like their money

to be spent, the City dispensed nearly $1-million

on public consultations before creating its budget.

Perhaps Calgarians did not want a million of their

dollars spent on the public consultation. Moreover,

Alderman Andre Chabot pointed out that the

consultation results did not heavily inuence

amendments in the budget that council passed

(Gandia, 2012).


34/48

34

If Calgarians decide the Citys current practice of public consultations is inappropriate and non-benecial,

they may consider promoting more transparency, introducing a more scientic method to the process, re-

stricting the scope of public consultations to truly public matters or call for an end to public consultations

entirely in favour of other decision making methods.

SECTION V:NEW APPROACHES

If the public consultation process is to continue, the

City should be more open and honest with citizens

about the benets of the process. The engage! Policy

states as a principle, The promise, purpose and

limitations on engaging stakeholders will be made

clear and understandable (City of Calgary, 2003, p.

3).

In practice, this should mean the City is required to

educate the public on the diculties in achieving

fair and useful results when the public participates

in consultations. The City should be required to

clearly describe the constraints within which the

consultation takes place and to share the funda-

mental assumptions, if any, that independent bod-

ies discover.

The City needs to be clear about how it will use the

feedback it receives. Are the conclusions reached

in the consultation binding? Is the City seeking to

learn the state of public opinion, or is the City using

the consultation as a means to educate the public of

its plans?

Following the consultation, the City should report

on the composition of the group sample. It can state

the gender balance, areas where the participants

reside, levels of income, levels of education, ethnic-

ity and ages, all factors that determine whether the

group is a true representation of the city as a whole.

The City should state whether the members of the

group were requested to participate or if they had

selected themselves. The City must tell the public

where it advertised the initiative and which external

groups were invited or were not allowed to partici-

pate.

To encourage accountability, participants could also

agree to be named. Rather than simply receiving

composed reports, the public should have access

to all of the Citys materials, feedback, and data for

each of its consultations.

GREATER TRANSPARENCY


35/48

The City of Calgary asked Dialogue Partners to

organize the consultation process for Our City.

Our Budget. Our Future. Dialogue Partners did

share demographic information on the partici-

pants, but declared:

The project was not intended to be market

research where a statistically valid opin-

ion is provided as a snapshot in time. The

engagement process has multiple goals,

which reach far beyond the gathering

of opinions, and is not statistically valid

(2011, p. 32).

A meaningful reform would be to ensure that

consultation research results are statistically

valid. One may wonder what the engagement

process is about if it is meant to go far beyond

gathering opinions.

All consultations could be done, as a rule, with

randomly selected rather than self-selected

participants. This would sacrice the ability of

any citizen to have his or her say, but it would

remove the snowball sample selection and the

presence of interest groups.

Such a reform might also be likely to remove the

diculty of low turnout. By going to the people

rather than waiting for them to come, the City

would be able to ensure the sample size is large

enough to be statistically meaningful.

RANDOM SAMPLE SELECTION


36/48

36

RESTRICT

CONSULTATIONS TO

PUBLIC SPACES

Governments have already established a set of envi-

ronmental standards and regulations within which the

market is allowed to operate. Because these standards

exist, consultations could be used only where public

property is concerned.

Citizens may participate in consultations for the re-

vitalization of a street or matters concerning a publicpark, but the public should refrain from dictating the

development of private property. In these cases, those

who participate in consultations are meddling in other

peoples aairs.

Richard White calls for an end to the consensus mod-

el, referring to the process of seeking consensus among

all stakeholders, ranging from developers to nearby

residents. He asserts that the consensus model is too

time-consuming and inhibits the adoption of innovative

ideas. He writes, Any development is always too much

for some and too little for others very few think it is

just right. There is no perfect plan or policy (2010).

If politicians were to restrict consultation to matters

concerning public properties, this would limit the scope

of potential for special interest groups to take advan-

tage of government power. However, there is still the

potential that these groups will inuence the overarch-

ing policies and regulations for private properties so

that these will be in their favour.


37/48

DO AWAY WITH PUBLIC

CONSULTATIONS IN FAVOUR OF

MARKET AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC

DECISION MAKINGAnother option is for politicians and public o-

cials to relinquish control and allow development

to take place through the market or private cov-

enants.

Sometimes a commoditys value is contingent on

being part of a package deal. Private shopping

malls are an example of this concept. Shopping

centre merchants who fail to supply parking or

who do not collect garbage may be able to charge

less for their goods, but they will also lose clients

or customers who value these services (Penning-

ton, 2002, p. 92).

Similarly, a housing developer that fails to provide

amenities, adequate infrastructure, and aesthetic

touches will lose to its competitors who do so


A person may not want his or her neighbours

to replace their home with a 10-storey building,

because it will ruin ones view and block sunlight.

If that person became part of a private covenant

when moving into the neighborhood, he or she

and the neighbours would face restrictions on

what they can do with their land. Most likely, the

neighbours are unable to replace their house with

a taller building. If a private covenant restricts too

much, however, people who seek more freedom

can buy a house elsewhere, where the stipulations

of the covenant are dierent.

People should be able to voluntarily associate with

organizations that restrict their personal freedom,

and they will do so because it benets them.

In places where people have the right to do with

their property as they like, others may nd some

decisions distasteful. However, those who nd a

decision distasteful have equal rights to do with

their property what they like or can bargain with

the other property owner. The rights people desire

for themselves must also be granted to others.


38/48

38

SECTION VI:

CONCLUSIONKenneth Minogue writes:

Our rulers are theoretically our repre-

sentatives, but they are busy turning us into

the instruments of the projects theykeep

dreaming up. The business of governments,

one might think, is to supply the framework

of law within which we may pursue happi-

ness on our own account (2010, p. 2).

Calgary can move away rom a system where policies

avouring the ew are seemingly legitimized through

public consultations. Insight into how the political

process works shows that the outcomes o consulta-

tions are not so air and praiseworthy, aer all.

As explained earlier, not everyone can or will par-

ticipate in public consultations, and special interest

groups or activists dominate the process. Some peo-

ple enjoy participating, but many people do not have

the time to be constantly deending their interests.

Moreover, the quality o input received in public con-

sultations is questionable. Te majority o people do

not have expertise in city planning. Participants do

not pay a direct cost or their decisions, and consulta-

tions have diculties accommodating trade-ofs.

Consultations necessarily carry underlying assump-

tions or have constraints, so this is a problem or peo-

ple who are unaware o a consultations limitations or

disagree with the methodology used.

Lastly, in cities with tens o thousands o people,

consensus cannot be reached. Preerences are subjec-

tive, and oen the government even i at the word

o others can impose moral decisions on citizens

when it has no right.

Every person should be able to take part in the de-

velopment process directly, rather than a small group

o consultation participants deciding the path or

everyone. Interactions within the private market are

better indicators than consultations o what Calgar-

ians want.

I consultations are merely used as a public relations

tool to push agendas, citizens should demand that

money be better spent elsewhere.


39/48

SECTION VII:

RECOMMENDATIONS

POLICY CURRENT STATUS DESCRIPTION BENEFIT

GreaterTransparency

Raw data fromconsultations notalways available

City makes raw datafrom all consulationspublic as soon asavailable

Greater trust inprocess if robust,healthy skpeticism ifnot

Introduce RandomSample Selection

Samples tend tobe self selecting,unlikely to reect

population

Ensure samplingis proportionate to

population as per publicopinion research best

practice

Results ofconsultations morereective of population

Restrict Scope ofPublic Consultationto Truly Public

Spaces

Publicconsultations usedto set global goalsthat aect futuredevelopment and

the use of privateproperty

Public consultation usedonly for matters wherethere is an established

public interest, forexample redeveloping

an established street

Great choice in privatematters, consultationretained for truly

public spaces

Do Away withPublic Consultationin Favour of

Market andOther Democratic

Decision Making

Consultation iswidely used policy

Reject the currentconsultation paradigmin favour of privatechoices in the market

place and conventionaldemocracy throughelected representatives

Greater choince inmarket place, easier toidentify representativeresponsible fordecisions and holdthem to account

MOREAMBITIOU

SREFORM

LESSAMBI

TIOUSREFORM


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40

APPENDIX: SELECTED CITY OF

CALGARY CONSULTATION LINKS

City of Calgary. (2013). What is imagineCALGARY? Retrieved July 2, 2013, from imagine-

CALGARYhttp://www.imaginecalgary.ca/what-imaginecalgary

City of Calgary. (2013). Plan It Calgary. Retrieved May 7, 2013, fromhttp://www.calgary.ca/PDA/LUPP/Pages/Municipal-Development-Plan/Plan-It-Calgary/Plan-It-Calgary.aspx.

City of Calgary. (2013). RouteAhead: What We Heard. Retrieved July 4, 2013, fromhttp://www.routeahead.ca/397-2/what-we-heard/

City of Calgary. (2013, February 7). News Release: 16,500 Calgarians Voice Opinions onNew Central Library. Retrieved July 4, 2013, fromhttp://calgarynewcentrallibrary.ca/news-release-16500-calgarians-voice-opinions-on-new-cen-tral-library/

City of Calgary. (2013). Our City. Our Budget. Our Future. Retrieved July 4, 2013, fromhttp://ocobof.blogspot.ca

City of Calgary. (2013). How Should the City Use $52 Million? Retrieved July 4, 2013, fromhttp://www.calgary.ca/52million

City of Calgary. (2013). Multi-family Recycling Project Status. Retrieved July 2, 2013, fromhttp://www.calgary.ca/UEP/WRS/Pages/Recycling-information/Residential-services/The-3rs-reduce-reuse-recycle/MultiFamily-Recycling-Status.aspx

City of Calgary. (2013). Continue the Conversation. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/getinvolved/Pages/Continue-the-Conversation.aspx

City of Calgary. (2013). Next City: Transforming Planning. Retrieved July 4, 2013, fromhttp://www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/Transforming-Planning/Transforming-Planning.aspx

City of Calgary. (2013). 8 Street S.W. Corridor Public Realm Plan. Retrieved July 4, 2013,from http://www.calgary.ca/Transportation/TP/Pages/Planning/Centre-City/8-Street-S.W.-Cor-ridor-Public-Realm-Plan.aspx


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Bike Calgary. (n.d.). About Bike Calgary. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://bikecalgary.org/about.

Brennan, J. (2011). The Ethics of Voting. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Caplan, B. (2007). The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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City of Calgary. (2003, May 28). engage! Policy. Retrieved July 2, 2013, from http://www.cal-gary.ca/_layouts/cocis/DirectDownload.aspx?target=http%3a%2f%2fwww.calgary.ca%2fCS%2fOLSH%

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http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/LUPP/Documents/Publications/mdp-municipal-development-plan.pdf.

City of Calgary. (2012, June). 2013 & 2014 Business Plan and Budget Adjustments: JuneEngagement Results. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/_layouts/cocis/Direct-Download.aspx?target=http%3a%2f%2fwww.calgary.ca%2fCA%2s%2fDocuments%2fPlans-Budg-ets-and-Financial-Reports%2fBusiness-Plans-and-Budgets-2012-2014%2fAdjustments%25202013-2014%2f2013%2520and%25202014%2520Business%2520Plans%2520and%2520Budget%2520Adjust

ments%2520June%2520Engagement%2520Results.pdf

City of Calgary. (2012, November). Calgary Planning Commission Members for 2012/2013.Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/DBA/Documents/development/calgary_plan-

ning_commission_members_list.pdf.

City of Calgary. (2013a). What is imagineCALGARY? Retrieved July 2, 2013, fromhttp://www.imaginecalgary.ca/what-imaginecalgary.

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City of Calgary. (2013c). What is Transforming Planning? Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/Transforming-Planning/What-Is-Transforming-Planning.aspx.

City of Calgary. (2013d). Planning, Development and Assessment. Retrieved June 4, 2013, fromhttp://www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/home.aspx.

City of Calgary. (2013e). Apartment and Condo Recycling Options. Retrieved July 3, 2013 fromhttp://www.calgary.ca/UEP/WRS/Pages/Recycling-information/Residential-services/The-3rs-reduce-reuse-recycle/Apartment-Condo-Recycling.aspx.

City of Calgary. (2013f). Blue Cart Recycling. Retrieved July 3, 2013 from http://www.calgary.ca/UEP/WRS/Pages/Recycling-information/Residential-services/Blue-cart-recycling/Blue-Cart-Recy-cling-FAQ.aspx.

City of Calgary. (2013g). Transforming Planning: Privacy Policy. Retrieved July 2, 2013, fromhttp://www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/Transforming-Planning/ONLINE-workshop-for-a-New-Planning-System.aspx.

City of Calgary. (2013h). How Should the City Use $52 Million? Retrieved July 4, 2013, from

http://www.calgary.ca/52million.

Corbella, L. (2013, May 31). Citys Tax Grab is not Finders Keepers, Its Stealing. Retrieved June7, 2013, from Calgary Herald at http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/Corbella+City+grab+nders+


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Gandia, R. (2012, January 20). Budget Consultation Cost City Nearly $1 Million. Retrieved May27, 2013, from The Calgary Sun at http://www.calgarysun.com/2012/01/20/budget-consultation-cost-

city-nearly-1-million.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

BRIANNA HEINRICHS is a Masters student at the Universityof Calgary. She holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree in Political Science

from the same institution and currently coordinates the radio and internship

programs at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. Her next project for the

Manning Foundation focuses on transparency at City Hall.


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46

MUNICIPAL REPORT SERIES

The Manning Foundation is building intellectual capital for municipal governance in ve streams of public policy

enquiry. Each stream will include a series of public policy reports designed to stimulate new thought about the role

of municipal government in society. Manning Foundation research reports are placed in the public domain via the

Foundations website and are available for review, debate, criticism and support by Canadians regardless of their

political aliation.

1. ORGANIC CITIES

An enquiry into how cities grow and what role government should play in regulating growth and providing

infrastructure, with the goals of economic eciency and liveability. Much of the debate around municipal development

is based around what urban forms are desirable, with sprawlers and smart growthers alike arguing that land-use

regulation and infrastructure provision should favour their optimal urban form.

The Organic Cities project takes a dierent perspective: that what is important is not the urban form that emerges,

but the processes that are in place, particularly the role of government. On this view, it is more important that the

market is left free to serve consumer demand, with the important constraints being property rights and the real costs of

infrastructure provision rather than land-use regulations.

Upcoming reports include enquiries into the eects of future advances in vehicle technology.

2. APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES

An enquiry into the optimal role of government, with a positive analysis of what municipal government currently does