The Cruise Missile Threat and its Proliferation

by John G. Heidenrich

The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of his employer, nor its clients, nor of any U.S. Government official, department, agency, or military command.

Executive Summary Whereas the threat posed by ballistic missiles, such as those in the arsenals of North Korea and

Iran, tends to attract major news headlines, the emerging threat to the United States from cruise

missiles gets much less publicity, though it warrants it also. Even a single cruise missile, with a

design either obsolescent or obsolete and its price relatively inexpensive, can wreak horrific

harm upon a civilian target, especially if armed with a chemical, biological, radiological, or

nuclear (CBRN) payload. If launched from a deceptively innocent-looking platform, a civilian

ship or airplane for instance, a cruise missile with even only a short range capability can hit any

of several U.S. ports and cities at risk. Weapons similar to cruise missiles, such as unmanned

armed drones, likewise pose a homeland threat.

Definition and History Without including any craft flown by suicide pilots, a standard cruise missile can be described as

an unmanned, self-propelled, winged, non-recoverable aerial vehicle designed to destroy a

surface target. It can be launched from aircraft, ships, submarines, or ground-based platforms,

fixed or mobile. The popular image of a cruise missile is that of a smart bomband indeed,

with its sophisticated navigational technology, that unofficial type of cruise missile is among the

most advanced and has not been exported widely, at least not yet. However, several types of

early and mid-generation surface-to-surface and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, such as the

French-made Exocet, have proliferated widely. While not as versatile as, for example, an

armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the average cruise missile can be deadlier, in part

because around the globe are spread many more cruise missiles than armed UAVs.

John G. Heidenrich is a Senior National Security Analyst at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Over his career of more than two decades he has worked either for or as a paid consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and several major commands and offices within the Department of Defense, including the Defense Secretarys Office of Force Transformation (OFT) under the now late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.). He holds a Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree from Harvard University and a Bachelors degree in Political Science from The American University. He can be contacted at (703) 676-6021 or email heidenrichj@saic.com.

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At left, a Super Etendard aircraft drop-launches an Exocet anti-ship cruise missile. At right, top and ottom, the effect of a successful Exocet hit. b

Source: falklandswar.org.uk

Among the reasons for their popularity: the basic technologies associated with cruise missiles

are simple enough, common enough, and inexpensive enough to make them attractive to many

buyers and users. As early as 1907, Ren Lorin, a French artillery officer, suggested that a jet

engine could propel an airframe. A few years later, the First World War saw the creation of the

so-called Aerial Torpedo. Developed by the United States and nicknamed the Bug, it was a

propeller-powered airplane, unmanned, and launched from a special trolley towards a pre-set

target. The Bug carried a payload of 180 pounds (82 kg) of high explosive, out to a range of

about 75 miles (120 km).1

At left, a Kettering Aerial Torpedo is readied for launch. At right, another view of the Bug.

Sources: U.S. Air Force Museum and wikipedia.com

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World War II witnessed the first

modern cruise missile: the V-1 of

Nazi Germany. Its acronym is

short for Vergeltungswaffen-1, or

Vengeance Weapon-1. British

civilians nicknamed the V-1 the

buzz bomb because its engine

made a distinct buzzing sound.

Having a range of 150 miles

(240 km), the V-1 was noisy and

subsonic as it cruised at some

3,000 feet (900 m), flying a fairly

predictable course after being

launched from the German-

occupied French or Dutch coasts

all factors which made it fairly

vulnerable to Britains aerial

defenses.2 Nevertheless, of the

more than 8,000 V-1s which over-flew the English Channel to terrorize London and other

targeted cities, the great majority did get through. Furthermore, those which the British knocked

down still proved deadly to anyone directly below the missiles 1,875 pounds (850 kg) of high

explosive. At least 6,000 people were killed by V-1 attacks, another 24,000 were wounded, and

hundreds of thousands of civilian homes were damaged or destroyed.3 Remarkably, potentially

much higher casualties were averted because double-agents run by British Intelligence fooled

the Germans into programming many of their V-1s to undershootand thus fall short of

heavily populated London, falling instead into the southern suburbs and countryside.4

Above: a V-1 in flight. Below: damage from a single V-1 attack.

Sources: U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Britains National Maritime Museum, London

Though the V-1 was not a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in the contemporary sense, Nazi

contingency plans did exist to arm it with deadly Tabun (GA) nerve gas.5 Records also suggest

a plan to arm the ballistic V-2 rocket with radiological isotopes, thereby creating a giant dirty

bomb, albeit without a thermo-nuclear explosion.6 The end of the war interrupted these plans,

but if the war had dragged on longer, or if the V-2 rocket had not been developed, the V-1 could

have proven vastly more destructive than it was. In other words, more than half a century ago,

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before the Cold War had even begun, the theory and technical feasibility of a cruise missile as

both a terror weapon and a WMD were already established. The Cold War and its after-years saw the creation of

much more sophisticated cruise missiles, some quite

supersonic and having ranges exceeding 1,500 miles

(2,500 km). Todays long-range cruise missiles have

guidance systems which use internally programmed

terrain contour-matching (TERCOM) navigation

maps, some with satellite uplinks for in-flight course

corrections. Among the most advanced are land-

attack cruise missiles (LACMs) like the U.S. Navys

Tomahawk, their avionics and ranges so extensive

that no more than a dozen countries possess the

requisite technology for their general design and

production.7 Of those few countries, the United States is uppermost.

Main picture: a Tomahawk in flight, this one operated by Britains Royal Navy. Inset photo:the submarine-launch of a Tomahawk LACM.

Source: navy-matters.beedall.com

In contrast to this American advantage, however, the American homeland lies widely exposed to

an attack by almost any type of cruise missileand in 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld sent the White House a classified memorandum to that effect. Remarked a senior

official: The issue has gotten peoples attention. 8

Cruise missile technology is not rocket science That attention includes from some quite ordinary, albeit eccentric, individuals. In New Zealand,

a jet-engine enthusiast and self-styled handyman named Bruce Simpson announced in 2003 his

remarkably credible plans to construct, in his garage, his own home-made cruise missile. On

his web-site, InterestingProjects.com, Simpson explained:

Some time ago I wrote an article in which I suggested that it would not be difficult for

terrorists to build their own relatively sophisticated cruise missiles using off-the-shelf

components and materials. [Since then,] Ive received quite a number of emails from

former and currently serving U.S. military personnel who acknowledge that the threat is

one they are very much aware of and for which there is little in the way of an effective

defense available. However, there have also been a number of people who claim Im

overstating the case and that its not possible to build a real cruise missile without

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access to sophisticated gear, specialized tools, and information not readily available

outside the military. So, in order to prove my case, I decided to put my money where

my mouth is and build a cruise missile in my garage, on a budget of just US$5,000. 9

Simpson added this caution:

Obviously, the goal of this web-site is not to provide terrorists or other nefarious types

with the plans for a working cruise missile, but to prove the point that nations need to

be prepared for this type of sophisticated attack from within their own borders....Rest

assured that, while I intend to provide plenty of very interesting detail about what Im

doing, the detail of how some of the critical aspects will not be disclosed here, for

obvious reasons. 10

Bruce Simpson with his garage-built cruise missile. Source: InterestingProjects.com

According to Simpson, he acquired

most of the necessary parts from the

online auction house eBay, including a

Global Positioning System (GPS) he

purchased for only $120delivered

by international airmail in less than a

week and passed through customs

without any problems, he said. He

described his cruise missile as being

crude, like a small aircraft powered by

a jet engine, with a range of 100

kilometers (62 miles) and a payload of

10 kilograms (22 pounds).11

By comparison, even the decades-old

V-1 had twice the range and delivered

a much heavier payloadsome 85

times heavier. To be fair, though, the

V-1 was not built in a garage.

Simpsons personal initiative proved so impressive that the Defence Ministry of New Zealand,

acting reportedly under U.S. pressure, pressed him cease. He refused. If the NZ Government

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thought they were going to kill this project, they were sadly mistaken, he declared on his web-

site, adding:

Id like to thank all those who have emailed me with their opinions, condemnations,

and support. The fact that I get so many emails obviously means that my goal of

raising public awareness is working[U]sing off-the-shelf technology in a suburban

garage, a terrorist can create a weapon against which there is no effective defense. 12

According to a BBC.com news article, Simpson reported that Iran offered to buy the details of

his research, an offer he rebuffed. He plans to write a book about his experience and concerns.

New Zealand officials declare that, for reasons of secrecy, they cannot comment publicly.13

Export is easy, control is not At one point the New Zealand government informed Simpson that, if he wanted to, he could

export his cruise missile technology to Iran quite legallyan admission which stunned him

since, as he explained on his web-site, Iran is widely considered to be a terrorist sponsor, and

similar exports are prohibited in the USA.

Simpsons experience exemplifies the weakness of the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR), a voluntary arrangement between thirty-four (34) countries, including the United States

and New Zealand, which limits the transfer of both the entirety and components of advanced

missile and missile-related systems. Such includes ballistic missiles, space rockets, UAVs, and

cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500-kg payload out to a range of over 300 km. For better

or worse, the MTCR more effectively controls the proliferation of ballistic vice cruise missiles, in

part due to subjective interpretation. Each participating country is supposed to incorporate the

MTCRs guidelines into its own national export control legislation, but uneven compliance still

results. The MTCR is not legally binding and therefore it lacks any enforcement or disciplinary

protocols. Even if it were binding, the technology required to develop long-range cruise missiles

is not very different from that for short-range cruise missiles, the latter technology allowed for

export under the MTCR.14 A report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) warns:

In contrast to ballistic missile proliferation, cruise missiles present a particular

challenge for monitoring and control because they exploit technology that is well

understood and well established in the civil aviation industry. Missile airframes,

navigation systems, jet engines, satellite maps, and mission planning computers and

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software all can be purchased on the commercial market. Cruise missile technology

hides in plain sightmaking it difficult to identify a military program. At the same time,

commercial availability generally means relatively low-cost weapons for many nations

and, potentially, non-state actors. 15

Put another way, an aide to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has explained:

Your car has in it all the sophisticated technology thats necessary to feed a little

actuator inside of a guidance system to make a missile fly more or less where you want

it to go. If you can buy it in your automobile,

you begin to get a sense of how practical it is

for those kinds of weapons systems to be

developed. 16

Components for a caror for a cruise missile? The internal electronics are remarkably similar.

Source: users.tmok.com

Furthermore, the worst proliferators of missiles and

their technologies, such as North Korea for ballistic

missiles, are not MTCR members. The widest

proliferator of cruise missiles, albeit among the

simplest, is the Peoples Republic of China, which

is not an MTCR member.

Out from the sea, into the aironto the land Certainly advanced land-attack cruise missiles can pose a very sophisticated threat to the

United States, but another threat comes from ordinary anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs),

especially those ASCMs whose range and payload can be enhanced to achieve limited land-

attack capabilities. Worldwide, there are an estimated 75,000 ASCMs. At least seventy-five

(75) countries develop ASCMsand even more countries possess the technical capability to

convert their ASCMs into LACMs.17

The most proliferated ASCM may well be the Chinese-made Silkworm, which is based on the

old Soviet SS-N-2 Styx. Among the Silkworms purchasers are Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Its

large internal volume allows for the inclusion of more fuel, a heavier payload, and a larger

internal guidance system. Reportedly only minor changes to its HY-4 variant can extend its

range from about 90 miles (150 km) to more than 310 miles (500 km). 18 Such a missile, if

launched from Iran, could reach almost any U.S. surface forces in the Persian Gulf region.

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Moreover, because 300 miles (nearly 500 km) is a distance farther than the territorial limits of

any country, a cruise missile possessing that much range could, if launched from international

waters, strike almost any large civilian target on the American or European seaboard.19

Dennis Gormley, a leading expert on the cruise missile threat, notes that cruise missiles need

not be stabilized at their launch points, whereas ballistic missiles do. For that reason and

because cruise missiles are compact, Gormley warns that a cruise missile can be launched

from a rather innocent-looking commercial ship, the missile threat concealed inside until just

before its flight. Gormley explains:

Even a bulky large Silkwormcan fit into, with some space, a standard 12-meter

shipping container. And you can build a small erector in it to open the top of the

shipping container, and erect it and launch the system out of the container. 20

Above left: a Chinese-made Silkworm ASCM. Above right: a standard shipping container. Below left: shipping containers at sea. Below right: a Silkworm is launched.

Sources: wikipedia.com, containerarchitecture.co.nz, global-oc.com and iranian.com

Upon that launch, the time and distance for detecting and intercepting that cruise missile could

become very short, indeed. For a surface-based radar, its scanning horizon (i.e., the radars

effective range, limited by the Earths curvature and other factors) is only about 13 miles (20 km)

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for detecting a low-flying, incoming cruise missile. If that radar is land-based, facing terrain

features and other obstacles, the detection distance is even less. 21

The dangers of a radiological payload As for the cruise missiles target, it could be anything from a single building to an area covering

hundreds of square miles. Much will depend on the missiles payload and some environmental

factors. If the payload is a simple dirty bomb, that weapon might consist of only some bulk .

The possible effect of a dirty bomb (3,500 curie of cesium-137 with apx. 50 lbs of explosive) detonated at the lower tip of Manhattan Island.

Source: Scientific American (November 2002), page 76.

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radioactive material and an accompanying conventional explosive to scatter it. A much deadlier

dirty bomb could have radioactive pieces or particles mixed directly into the conventional

explosive; upon detonation, that mixture would create a toxic dust cloud that would spread

downwind almost immediately. The resultant deaths would occur first within a few hours and

then over several years, the latter inflicted by cancer. Meanwhile, the contaminated area would

need to be quarantined and cleaned up, taking a financial and psychological toll. If the area is

ever, indeed, fully decontaminated, it may nevertheless remain economically unviable due to

public fears of lingering radioactivity. If it was a port-city, the financial losses could mount into

the billions of dollars.22

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that almost every country on the globe

possesses enough radioactive material for each to assemble at least one dirty bomband

also that more than one-hundred (100) of those countries do not maintain adequate controls

over their material.23 Perhaps more ominously, in 2003 the British government reported having

captured documents in Afghanistan which state that al-Qaeda terrorists have already fashioned

a small, rudimentary dirty bomb. Apparently, the actual weapon has yet to be found.24

The dangers of an atomic payload An atomic blast, even a relatively minor one, would generate effects that would dwarf any which

a dirty bomb could inflict. A mere half-kiloton blastthat is, an explosion with less than

one/twenty-fifth (1/25) the energy which devastated Hiroshima in 1945is still equivalent to 500

tons of TNT detonated at once. Incidentally, the size of the first reputed North Korean atomic

test, conducted on October 9, 2006, was reportedly equivalent to 550 tons of TNT.

On Kahoolawe Island, 500 tons of TNT were detonated for Operation Sailor Hat in 1965. At right, the initial explosion. At left, the blast quickly forms a mushroom cloud. The ship nearby suggests the scale of that half-kiloton blast.

Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center

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On September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center collapsed only after fires,

ignited by the two airliner crashes, slowly melted the buildings internal structurea decay that

was gradual enough that an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 occupants used that time to evacuate.

By contrast, if a half-kiloton blast had exploded at the base of the Twin Towers, the two

skyscrapers would have toppled more quickly and indeed diagonally, pounding and toppling the

surrounding buildings of lower Manhattan in a giant cascade. Lacking any time for anyone to

evacuate, the resultant deaths would have far exceeded the 9/11 horror. It deserves mention

that most nuclear weapons generate explosive yields far greater than a half-kiloton.

The dangers of a biological or chemical payload A cruise missiles steadiness in flight can enable it, if

so equipped, to spray a deadly biological or chemical

aerosol over a wide area.25 Worth noting, though, is

that in comparison to the specially-designed flying

spray-tanks which U.S. forces once stockpiled to inflict

tactical bio/chemical strikesin particular, the AERO-

14B and the TMU28/Ba cruise missiles bio/chemical

payload would be almost certainly smaller. Still, upon

personal contact, what constitutes a deadly dosage is

merely a few spores of inhaled anthrax, or a tiny drop

of VX nerve agent.

This cruise missile option of a bio/chemical payload

has been considered, reports indicate, by at least

Syria, Iran, and China.26 Iraq under Saddam

Husseins regime did prepare something similar: a few

L-29 Delfin trainer-aircraft were converted into

unmanned drones, each equipped with wing-mounted

tanks to spray anthrax or other agents. In 2002, prior

to the Iraq War, some Iraqi documents confiscated by

United Nations weapons inspectors led a bio-weapons

expert to warn: These aircraft are intended to fly

below radar, so the Israelis cant detect them. The

Iraqis themselves have said so. 27 Meanwhile, in the

Top: an Iraqi F-1 Mirage spraying a bio/chemical agent; this photo comes from the film footage then-Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed to the UN Security Council in 2002. Center: an Iraqi L-29 Delfin converted into a UAV. Below: an ordinary crop-duster in the United States.

Sources: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, globalsecurity.org and pest.ifas.ufl.edu

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United States, some of the 9/11 hijackers had first sought to fly ordinary crop-dusters. This fact,

discovered after 9/11, so worried the FBI that all crop-dusters throughout the United States were

kept grounded for a time.28

For a bio/chemical agent to be effectively lethal, it must be released in a specific concentration

or else the atmosphere will dilute it. Even if released in that proper concentration, adverse

environmental conditions can still dilute or even negate that agents effects. (This is why, during

the Cold War, some U.S. chemical munitions were stored in outdoor containers in the deserts of

Arizona and Colorado; for any leakage of agent, the deserts heat and breeze quickly thinned it.)

Such variable conditions are not a reliable defense against the bio/chemical threat that cruise

missiles pose. However, for a perpetrator, these prerequisites do complicate his planning.

The Cruise Missile Threat: How Immediate? Cruise missiles are already widely available: the 75,000 ASCMs estimated to exist worldwide

are only a portion of the global tally of all cruise missile types.* Thus, the cruise missile threat to

the United States is serious and, indeed, is expected to increase as global proliferation

continues of both the missiles themselves and their various technologies. However, against the

American homeland in particular, the cruise missile threat is not yet considered dire. Terrorists

may view suicidal martyrdom operations as easier to mount and more terrifying in their effects

than whatever those terrorists can accomplish with a rudimentary cruise missile. Even an

ordinary truck bomb can carry more conventional explosive than the average cruise missile can.

On 9/11, rather than launch one standard cruise missile against the American homeland,

terrorists transformed four hijacked airliners into immense, human-occupied cruise missiles.

Why then bother with something high-tech?

To this question are three sobering replies. First: most ordinary cruise missiles are not very

high-technot enough to merit any assumption that terrorists, whatever their creed, will never

attempt to acquire a cruise missile of any type. Second: most terrorists would rather not employ

suicide tactics, even if martyrdom is the personal objective of many Islamist terrorists. Third:

terrorists are not the only adversary capable of employing cruise missiles. A regime such as

Irans is quite capable of launching cruise missiles from its national territory and, conceivably,

from even international waters could undertake a covert launch against the U.S. homeland. * Incidentally, because an incoming cruise missile looks the same, whatever its payload, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1988. It bans all ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) of a range between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers (approximately 620 and 3,420 miles, respectively). However, the INF Treaty does not cover ASCMs or LACMs.

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In the best case scenario, a single cruise missile striking the U.S. homeland might cause only

minor physical damage. That missile might be simplistic in its design, and its payload only a

conventional explosive. Yet, this best case scenario could still unleash disproportionately

larger consequences. Whatever the facts of the missile strike, it would represent a propaganda

victory against the United States. The publics knowledge that such an attack was even

attempted could resonate as a profound psychological blow, raising terror. Some Americans,

situated at even the most unlikely of future targets, would feel vulnerable and may over-react.

To guard against approaches by other covert launch platforms, ordinary ships and aircraft might

then be abruptly inconvenienced by reactionary precautions and searches. Commerce and

trade could suffer, at least initially, accompanied by higher prices for increased security and for

more insurance coverage.

On the other hand, whatever the outcome, most Americans might remain remarkably calm and

take the outcomes many consequences in stride, as they have after other crises. But that hope

is not a defense policyespecially since even a single cruise missile carrying a WMD payload

holds a potential which is truly catastrophic. (END)

Top, a table showing various ASCMs with the male figure (left margin) for comparison. At bottom left, the French Apache LACM. At bottom right, the joint India -Russian Brahmos, a supersonic ASCM for export. n

Sources: U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), grime.net and wikipedia.com

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The afore report was based in part upon the article: John G. Heidenrich and William S. Murray, III, Under the Radar Screen? The Cruise Missile Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Comparative Strategy (January-March 2004). Endnotes 1 Lawrence Hargrave, The Aerial Target and Aerial Torpedo the USA, Remotely Piloted Aerial Vehicles (RPAV), www.ctie.monash.edu/hargrave/rpav_usa.html. Accessed (Acd.) on January 24, 2003. Greg Goebel, The Aerial Torpedo, In The Public Domain, www.vectorsite.net/twcruz1.html. Acd. January 24, 2003. 2 Science Museum of London, V-1 Flying Bomb, History of Flight, www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/on-line/flight/flight/v1.asp. Acd. January 24, 2003. 3 John R. Elting, WWII Commemoration: Costs, Casualties and Other Data, Groliers Encyclopedia online, http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_16.html. Acd. January 24, 2003. 4 Francis Russell, The Secret War (Alexandria: Time-Life Books, 1981), p. 169. 5 Greg Goebel, A history of chemical warfare, In The Public Domain, www.vectorsite.net/twgas2.html and The V-1 Flying Bomb, Third Reich Factbook, www.skalman.nu/third-reich/equipment-bombs-v1.htm. Acd. January 24, 2003. 6 NDIA Systems Assessment Group, Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat, Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat (Washington: National Defense Industrial Association/NDIA, August 1999), pp. 28-29 and 36-39. 7 Dennis M. Gromley and K. Scott McMahon, Proliferation of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: Prospects and Policy Implications, Controlling the Spread of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (Marina del Rey, Calif.: American Institute for Strategic Cooperation, January 1995). Available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch6.htm. 8 Bradley Graham, Cruise Missile Threat Grows, Rumsfeld Says, Washington Post (August 18, 2002), p. A-1. Available online at www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A31153-2002Aug17?language=printer. 9 Bruce Simpson, A DIY Cruise Missile: Watch me build one for under $5,000, www.InterestingProjects.com (updated June 14, 2003). Acd. August 18, 2003. See also Bruce Simpson, The Low Cost Cruise Missile: A looming threat? www.InterestingProjects.com (posted May 20, 2002). Acd. August 18, 2003. 10 Ibid. 11 New Zealand man building cruise missile in garage, posting details on Net, Agence France-Presse (June 3, 2003). 12 Simpson, A DIY Cruise Missile: Watch me build one for under $5,000, loc. cit. 13 DIY Cruise Missile Thwarted, BBC News (December 9, 2003). Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3302763.stm. 14 Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 77-91. 15 Christopher Bolkcom and Sharon Squassoni, CRS Report for Congress: Cruise Missile Proliferation (Washington: Congressional Research Service/CRS, July 3, 2002), p. CRS-2. See pages CRS-3 and CRS-4 for more information about the MTCR. 16 Graham, loc. cit. 17 Gormley, p. 29. 18 Ibid., pp. 30-33. 19 Dennis M. Gormley, Cruise Missile Proliferation: Threat, Policy, and Defenses, Proliferation Brief (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 9, 1998). Available online at www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/ceip100998.html. 20 Ibid. 21 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Cruise Missile Defense: Where Does It Fit in the Overall National Security Spectrum? (Washington: IFPA, June 27, 2001), p. 2. 22 Michael A. Levi and Henry C. Kelly, Weapons of Mass Disruption, Scientific American (November 2002), pp. 77-81. 23 Ibid. 24 Ed Johnson, British Agents Say Al-Qaeda Built Dirty Bomb, BBC Reports, Boston Globe (January 31, 2003). 25 Gormley, Cruise Missile Proliferation: Threat, Policy, and Defenses, loc. cit. 26 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001 (Washington: CIA, January 2003), www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2003.htm. Also, China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States (Washington: National Intelligence Council (NIC),

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November 5, 1999), www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference_reports/weapons_mass_destruction.html. Though sponsored by the NIC, the views in this report are not official positions of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 27 Joby Warrick, Iraq Works On Firing Chemical Weapons: Drone Aircraft, Scud Missiles Could Deliver Germs, Poisons, Washington Post (September 5, 2002), p. A-1. 28 FBI imposes news restrictions on crop-dusters, CNN.com (September 23, 2001). Available online at www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/23/inv.crop.dusters/. Also, Poison Plot? Hijacker May Have Planned Aerial Chemical or Biological Attack, ABCNews.com (September 24, 2001). Available online at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/WTC_Investigation010924.html.

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