Thomas Kuhn and Martin Heidgger: Between Meditation and Action

Brayden Benham

CSP3000

Paper 1

Prof. G. McOuat

The views of Thomas Kuhn and Martin Heidegger overlap in some

fundamental areas, but even more fundamental than their similarities are

their differences. If we take Kuhn’s concept of paradigm shifts in the sense of

Heidegger’s “Enframing” we see a similar vision of world-view, but which is

separated an abyss. The two also point to problems with scientific

representation and the effects it has have on man. Furthermore, both of

them see the study of history as a necessary way of making sense of the

practice of science, but they are looking at the issue from two very different

standpoints, and the conclusions they draw from historiography end up

articulating two incommensurable positions. Ultimately Heidegger is

tackling the problem of science from the perspective of pure philosophy,

whereas Kuhn’s approach is much more practical and only tangentially

linked to the type of philosophy Heidegger embraces. They will never agree,

but through a look at the similarities and differences that unite and set them

apart we come to see that they share an attitude of pointing toward a future

in which science can be better understood and more controlled by man.

There are many definitions of the word “paradigm” in The Structure of

Scientific Revolutions, so many that it makes it easy to squeeze Heidegger ‘s

concept of “Enframing” into its parameters. Let’s take the following as our

definition of “paradigm: “universally recognized scientific achievements that

for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of

practitioners” (Kuhn, x). A prime example of paradigm shift is the transition

from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics. Whereas Newton’s Principia had

been the doctrine by which all scientists referred to in formulating,

hypotheses, doing research, and making conclusions, the development of the

theory of relativity by Einstein in the early twentieth century led to an

upheaval of the old methods of dealing with and representing reality. For

Kuhn this marked a drastic change in the way scientists conduct themselves

and view the world: “though the world does not change with a change of

paradigm the scientist afterward works in a different world” (Kuhn, 120).

That is to say that the old conceptual network of methods, principles,

experiments and definitions has been altered into a distinct system which

now encompasses the world of the scientist and, indirectly, the world of

man. Upon this assertation Kuhn adds, “we must learn to make sense of

statements such as these (Kuhn, 120). There are many statements such as

these, and that Kuhn takes the time to point this out shows us that he leaves

it to others to interpret such statements in their own ways.

Kuhn’s claim that “the scientist afterward works in a different world”

is an interpretation of a similar claim, one he may have gotten from the work

of Alexandre Koyré (whom Kuhn cites as an influence in the preface to his

book). In 1957 Koyré wrote on the various views of perception change in

man:

“In my opinion they are concomitants and expressions of a deeper and more

fundamental process as the result of which man…lost his place in the world,

or, more correctly perhaps, lost the very world in which he was living, and

about which he was thinking, and had to transform and replace not only his

fundamental concepts and attributes, but even the very framework of his

thought” (FCW, 2).

Here Koyré is referring to Heidegger. Before the above statement, Koyré

writes that some thinkers have attributed the perception change of man to

“the discovery, by man’s consciousness, of its essential subjectivity…[and]

others, in the change of relationship between and θεωρία πρᾱ , the old ξις

ideal of the vita contemplativa yielding its place to that of the vita activa”

(FCW, 1). This is precisely where Heidegger finds man’s perception shift, in

his essay “Science and Reflection” he writes: “In theoría transformed into

contemplatio there comes to the fore the impulse, already prepared in Greek

thinking, of a looking-at that sunders and compartmentalizes (SR, 166). This

“compartmentalization” is what eventually led, for Heidegger, to man’s

modern conception of the use of science as a means to define, to control, and

to extract from nature. Heidegger goes through a long etymological

explanation of the word “theoría”, holding that it meant something

completely different to the pre-Socratics then it later would to Plato and

Aristotle, to the Romans, the medievals, and later still, to moderns. This view

is also held, more or less by Werner Heisenberg who, in 1958, wrote that,

distinct from the Greek views, over time “the human attitude toward nature

changed from a contemplative one to a pragmatic one” (PP, 197). All of these

thinkers share the view that man’s perception of nature shifts over the

course of history in accordance with an innumerable amount of factors,

namely science, technology and culture.

For Heidegger man’s perception of the world is governed by

“Enframing”. “Enframing” may be taken to be the process by which scientists

represent the world in a way that it may be suppressed, controlled,

understood, and utilized. Taken in a Kuhnian sense it could be said that the

Newtonian paradigm was one method of enframing and that the Einstinian

paradigm was a development of that paradigm into a new enframing. But it

is so much more than that for Heidegger, who defines enframing as “the

challenging claim which gathers man thither, to order the self-revealing as

standing reserve” (QCT, 19). For Heidegger man is challenged by nature. He

is the only being who is set against nature, and this challenge, which comes

from an obscure source, invites man to set-upon nature. Man sets-upon

nature through science because it provides a narrow scope for

understanding, which man comes to see as a “standing-reserve” (QCT, 17).

Standing-reserves are those natural forces and resources, which men have

harnessed for their own use, such as water for hydro, oil for gasoline, trees

for wood, and, possibly, men for work. This enframing is a developing

process in the consciousness of man, which changes along with scientific

and cultural advancement.

Enframing involves “entrapping representation” for Heidegger.

Entrapping-representation “orders it [nature] into place to the end that at

any given time the real will exhibit itself as an interacting network of, i.e., in

a surveyable series of related causes (SR, 168). On the level of science

entrapping-representation involves, above all, theory and observation.

Theory, now far removed from its original Greek meaning, is the method by

which scientists objectify nature in a set of understandable representations

and formulas. Observation is rendered by the modern scientific method to

be a way of looking upon something and then reducing it to a graspable

representation.

Entrapping representation is important because it is seen by average

man as something which helps him in his understanding and mastery of

nature. It is even more so important for scientists because through it they

are seen to have superiority over other fields of knowledge. To this effect

Heidegger writes, “Because modern science is theory in the sense described,

therefore in all its observing the manner of its striving after, i.e., the manner

of its entrapping-securing procedure, i.e., its method, has decisive

superiority” (SR, 169). This thought is reflected in Kuhn, who also sees

science as having a higher, more indisputable, claim to truth. On this he

writes the scientific “group’s members as individuals and by virtue of their

shared training and experience must be seen as the sole possessors of the

rules of the game, or of some equivalent basis for unequivocal judgments”

(Kuhn, 167). They must and, most of the time, are seen as the authoritative

arbiters of truth, but neither Kuhn nor Heidegger sees this as a good thing

and both of them aim at a clearer understanding of why this takes place and

what its implications may be. Kuhn says his aim in the Structure of Scientific

Revolutions is “a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can

emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself” (Kuhn, 1).

Through such a shift in perception man may be able to see that scientists as

the “sole possessors of the rules of the game” are not cumulatively

progressing towards any sort of truth, that their conclusions often derive

from arbitrary sources, and that their representation of reality cannot help

but fall short of what is really going on.

Scientific representation is far too narrow for both Kuhn and

Heidegger to be satisfied, and both think that there is something other in

science. But they also think that such a condensed view of reality is

necessary. Kuhn writes, “observation and experience can and must

drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would

be no science” (Kuhn, 4). Neither Kuhn nor Heidegger abhors science, but

they each protect it for different reasons. Kuhn protects it in order to

improve the scientific method, while Heidegger does it in defense of Being,

and thus his defense of science leads us to a whole other realm than Kuhn’s.

Heidegger writes, “because the essence of technology lies in Enframing,

modern technology must employ exact physical science” (QCT, 23). The

essence of technology can be accessed through enframing because, if looked

at obliquely, it shows itself as both the construct of man and of mysterious

forces. If man is able to look at this vast construct and realize it as such he

will have a closer relationship with the essence of technology and Being, and

will gain a sense of freedom. The manifestation of Enframing is in

representation, Kuhn and, certainly, Heidegger would have to agree with

Koyré that “it is dangerous: the more a mind is accustomed to the rigidity of

geometrical thought, the less it will be able to grasp the mobile changing,

qualitatively determined variety of Being (MM, 38). They would agree, but

Kuhn would most likely take out the Being part, as this is not his concern in

the least, and replace it with “scientific research”. Kuhn admittedly does not

deal with philosophical concepts such as these: “limitations of space have

drastically affected my treatment of the philosophical implications of this

essay’s historically oriented view of science” (Kuhn, xii). Kuhn is dealing in

the realm of historiography, sociology and anthropology; his analysis of

science is only mildly philosophical. But Heidegger couldn’t be more

philosophical and it is in this perspective that his analysis is embedded.

Though representation is necessary for us to bear witness to

“Enframing” and thus come closer to Being “scientific representation…can

never decide whether nature, through its objectness does not rather

withdraw itself then bring to appearance the hidden fullness of its coming to

presence. Science cannot even ask the question; for, as theory, it has already

undertaken to deal with the area circumscribed by otherness” (SR, 174). For

Heidegger, science is not equipped to ask questions about itself. Kuhn,

alternately, is perfectly satisfied with the “potential fruitfulness of a number

of new sets of research both historical and sociological” (Kuhn, xi). He

disagrees with Heidegger in that he does not think a deeply philosophical

approach is necessary to save science. Kuhn is more embedded in the

scientific tradition than Heidegger and thus his means of explanation are not

far removed from that realm. In fact he almost completely extricates

philosophy by, intentionally or unintentionally, down-playing its

importance. To this effect he writes, “scientists have not generally needed or

wanted to be philosophers. Indeed normal science holds creative philosophy

at arms length, and probably for good reasons…the full sets of rules sought

by philosophical analysis need not even exist” (Kuhn, 87-88). But Kuhn does

not completely rule out philosophical speculation, his goal is a change in

perspective toward science, and this leaves room for any alternate analysis

of science. Even though he calls what he is doing part of a “historiographical

revolution in the study of science,” he admits that it “is still in its early

stages” (Kuhn, 3). Kuhn is making no attempt to be the authoritative

forerunner in the field of historiography; he rather supports the

proliferation of analyses of science and thus leaves room for Heidegger.

For Kuhn the salvation of science lies in history. This is true also for

Heidegger. But Kuhn is speaking of the history of science whereas Heidegger

is talking of the history of Being. Thus Heidegger searches for the essence of

technology in the earliest Greek philosophy. This approach is justified by

Heisenberg who wrote that “to get an understanding of the basis of atomic

physics, we shall have to follow, step by step, the ideal which, two and a half

thousand years ago, had led Greek natural philosophy to atomic theory…

only such a background will enable us to understand the sense of the

endeavors of our time” (FPPAP, 96-8). Although here Heisenberg is referring

to atomic theory it is evident in his writing that such a view applies to many

of the same areas of Greek philosophy to which Heidegger refers and to

science in general. Kuhn also invests much importance in history, but it

seems his view of history is more near-sighted and narrow than

Heisenberg’s and Heidegger’s. Kuhn’s involves an encounter with the history

of science through texts and through the monitoring of the research process,

whereas Heidegger’s involves an engagement with Being, Greek philosophy,

and the history of language. He echoes Heisenberg saying, “science…needs

the Greek knowing in order to become, over against it, another kind of

knowing” (SR, 157). Historiography falls short here because it does not

involve the elements of Being and pure language, and thus “we must free

ourselves from historiographical representation” (SR, 158). It seems that

Heidegger counts as scientific representation historiographic representation

as well. This means that since historiography can only explain itself in

preconceived terms, and must fit itself into a network of enframing in order

to articulate itself, it can never move beyond itself and into the realm of

truth: “Whether history reveals itself in its essence only through and for

historiography or whether it is not rather concealed through

historiographical objectification remains for the science of history

something it cannot itself decide. This however is decided: In the theory of

historiography, history holds sway as that which must not be gotten around”

(SR, 175). Because history is something that “must not be gotten around” the

historian will not be able to transcend his own framework in order to get to

a clearer understanding of the history of which he is studying. This is deeply

true for Heidegger who believes that philosophers such as himself must

defend the old philosophical traditions and the integrity of language so as to

preserve, bring forth, and come into touch with Being.

Kuhn also defends the older intellectual traditions, but not in such a

deep way as Heidegger. He says that since there is no equivalent of the

“library of classics” in scientific education “the result is a sometimes drastic

distortion in the scientist’s perception of the discipline’s past” (Kuhn, 166).

Since there is not much emphasis on historical exploration in scientific

education the scientist will come to see their discipline as a cumulative and

progressive process. It is only through history that the scientist may get a

clear view of his discipline. But all that Kuhn can hope for is clarity since he

believes that “…nothing that has been or will be said makes it a process of

evolution toward anything” (Kuhn, 169). It is here that Heidegger most

fundamentally disagrees with Kuhn. Heidegger offers a philosophy of hope

in that to him, "[t]echnology...is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (QCT,

12). Kuhn, as opposed to Heidegger, seems to do away with truth completely

in favour of clarity and correctness. And this is perfectly fine because Kuhn’s

position is related to action rather than contemplation. For Heidegger

reflection, not just on the superficial history of a thing, but on the essence of

a thing is necessary for truth to come to pass, but, there is no room for such

reflection within scientific education. This is because “a scientific

community is an immensely efficient instrument for solving the problems of

puzzles that its paradigms define” (Kuhn, 165). Because it is such an efficient

system there can be no time for reflective questions on the essence, nature

or Being of things. Scientists are engaged in this system and cannot operate

outside of it as scientists, they most contribute to whatever type of puzzle

solving presents itself in their paradigm and “unlike the engineer, and many

doctors, and most theologians, the scientist need not choose problems

because they urgently need solution…” (Kuhn, 163). Heidegger is writing out

of a sense of necessity, out of a perceived need to protect a kind of thought

that he sees as crucial to man’s place in the world, but if we are to take Kuhn

at his word this urgency will never be articulated to the scientific

community because it will always be perceived as futile and immaterial.

Indeed the philosophy of Heidegger is useless to Kuhn’s understanding of

the world. This makes perfect sense because Heidegger himself recognizes

his own philosophy as useless to some extant, saying “the poverty of

reflection is the promise of a wealth whose treasures glow in the

resplendence of that uselessness which can never be included in reckoning”

(SR, 181). That is to say that it is this very uselessness, the nothingness of

reflection, which sets man apart from science and allows him to rise up in a

free relationship with it.

Kuhn as a member of the scientific community does not have time

for this type of reflection and would rather spend his time actively

attempting to communicate his theory of the history of science. Both of

these thinkers ideas aim at getting to a point where science is more

understandable and controllable, but their methods of doing so are

separated by a massive gulf. Heidegger looks at science from the meditative

side, while Kuhn looks at it from the practical side. Talk about

incommensurability. It is hard to see if, under any circumstances, Kuhn

would ever except Heidegger’s view and that Heidegger would accept

Kuhn’s. But through setting the two against each other it can be seen that in

dealing with science there is common ground between meditation and

action.

Bibliography

Heidegger, Martin. “Science and Reflection.” In The Question Concerning Technology. Ed. William Lovitt. New Yor. Harper & Row. 1977. pp. 155-182

Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology.” In The Question Concerning Technology. Ed. William Lovitt. New York. Harper & Row. 1977. pp. 3-35.

Heisenberg, Werner. Fundamental Problems of Present-day Atomic Physics. In Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science. London: Faber and Faber, 1952. Print.

Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 1966.

Koyré, Alexandre. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Baltimore, Maryland. The Johns Hopkins Press. 1987.

Koyré, Alexandre. Metaphysics and Measurment. Cambridge. Harverd University Press. 1968.