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1acHistory hitherto has been the history of Being the evolution of the world is a process bywhich Being disclosing itself each epochal manifestation of Being metamorphoses in theflux of its withdrawal and disclosure which makes their defining essences intelligibleIrwin and Peters, 2k2[Ruth (Senior Lecturer in Ethics at Auckland University of Technology); Michael (ResearchProfessor in Education at the University of Glasgow); Earthsongs: Ecopoetics, Heidegger andDwelling, The Trumpeter Journal of Ecosophy, 2002]Again harking back to the tradition of philosophy which assumes that a teleological processguides history, Heidegger posits that there are underlying laws and a telos or destiny to history.Haar regards Heideggers theory as an inversion of the telos of Hegelianism. Although Haar isnot arguing that the destiny of Being is in any way a dialectical process. Destiny (Geschick) holds

within it all the potential possibilities of history. Resonating, not with Hegel we would argue, butwith Aristotles notion of the essence as a seed that defines the potential pattern of growth. Thisis why the commencement is so important to Heidegger. The sending of destiny (Geschick) isheld in its commencement. We merely note aspects of the essence that has already unfolded.Heideggers teleology does not reach towards a heavenly otherworldliness, or a technologicaland social utopia. He pessimistically characterises the evolution of the world as an ever-increasing fall from grace. The History of Being is the history of the increasing oblivion ofBeing.60 This process is not a logical inevitability, nor does it follow a law of causality that, tosome extent following Nietzsche, Heidegger rej ects. He explains that, Between the epochalmetamorphoses of being & the withdrawal one can perceive a relation, which nevertheless hasnothing to do with a relation of causality. One can say that the further away one is from thedawn of western thinking and from aletheia, the greater is the oblivion into which it falls, theclearer is the manner in which knowledge and consciousness break into the open, and themanner in which being thus withdraws.61 Heidegger believes each epochal manifestation ofBeing has a finitude that excludes it from being able to comprehend dimensions other than itsown disclosure. The destiny of Being has reached its closure with the technologicalapprehension of everything as resource. But Haar says: Final totalization does not mean thatHistory is a total unveiling. What could the term Geschick mean if not that being gives itself,sends itself (schicken), gathers itself at each moment into a domain of unity (Ge -)? This unity isthat of an epoch. But each epoch is completely closed and blind to what does not enter into it.There is a radical finitude to an epoch and to all epochs. Every epoch of History is epoch, whichmeans a holding itself back, self -suspension, or withdrawal, of being which goes hand inhand with its manifestation. The epochal or historical as such is deployed on the basis of a free

emergence closed in itself.62 The (unlooked for) defining principles make an enclosed, finiteepochal period, and the inhabitants of any epoch are not in the position to be able to activatepathways or even see outside it. The enclosure or Enframing; in our case of Technology, limitsthe field of agency.

Susik 14(Abigail Susik 2014 Convergence Zone: The Aesthetics and Politics of the Ocean inContemporary Art and Photography Assistant Professor of Art History at Willamette University.


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Her interdisciplinary work traces metahistorical shifts and transference across material, textualand visual cultures in European and American contexts in between the 19th and 21st centuries.)

One of the primary themes of twentieth-century art concerned the various structures ofcapitalism, and surely it was the first two stages of this cycle of commerce that received themost attention, from dada, to surrealism to pop and beyond: namely, industrial production andmass consumption. It is telling, however, that contemporary art of today instead resoundinglyinvests the most interest in the last stage of the production cycle, that of discard and waste. Asignificant amount of critical literature has emerged regarding this theme, and several criticalterms such as informe, the abject and base, the outmoded, and others touch upon thisconstellation of meanings. Various twentieth-century mediums such as the readymade, theassemblage, the found object, the accumulation, etc., confront our culture of detritus headon.[6] In addition, an intermediary step in that cycle, namely the packaging andtransportation of goods , also appears to be gaining in significance for artists in the lastthree decades. While the planets oceans are certainly also sites of production (oil,power , etc.) and consumption (seafood, tourism , leisure sports, etc.), contemporary artistshave proven to be significantly drawn to contemplate oceans as sites of commercialdissemination and excess. In my mind, this is arguably a partial result of the formersymbolic and formal associations of the ocean in nineteenth- and twentieth-century art.While the deconstruction of ideology that postmodernism has achieved is undoubtedly a causefor celebration, the breakdown of mythologies linked to the ocean carries with it aninvariably tragic ethical message . Whether we like it or not, the ocean is no longer asignifier of boundlessness and self-reflexive emptiness because, like everything elsewithin our reach, we have made full- use of the ocean as just another standing -reservefor the prowess of techne, to put it in Heideggarian terms.[7] Although oceans havearguably been a key site for anthropological exploits of all kinds throughout theevolution of humankind, the current state of total infiltration of the human and the

oceanic, the near-complete acculturation of the ocean so to speak, has taken onunmatched, super- or sur- natural proportions . To bolster this point, I will address asele ction of works that focus on the oceans role as a mega -highway for global capitalism, itsrole in the incessant transport of commodities . The American artist Allan Sekula and theCanadian Photographer Edward Burtynsky offer two prominent examples of a documentaryconcern with the shipping industry, wherein gargantuan cargo vessels become theinternational sentinels of the blue expanse , dramatically transforming global waterwaysand the many ports that shelter them. Between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s Sekulaworked on a remarkable documentary project entitled Fish Story, which took form as large-format color photographs, a continuous slide show of still color photographs, an installation, abook with a long essay by Sekula, and a series of lectures.[8] Sekula continues to work on an

extended version of the project and has made two documentary films in the last decade, Tsukijiand The Lottery of the Sea, and one film essay entitled The Forgotten Space (2010) with NolBurch. One the one hand, for Sekula, Fish Story was a politically-motivated reportage project inwhich he studied firsthand the impact of maritime economics upon working classes and porttowns across the globe. As part of the project, Sekula travelled internationally capturingphotographs and video of ships, goods, sailors, ports and markets, even crossing the Atlantic in acargo ship laden with containers. On the other hand, Fish Story had explicit art historical andsociological implications for Sekula in that he viewed the massive scale of the worldwide


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shipping industry to be indicative of a shift from a human understanding of the oceanas spatially panoramic, unable to be encompassed, to a view of the ocean as full ofatomized details, securely enframed (Fig. 5). On a macrocosmic level, global shippingindustries enframe and contain the vast reaches of the ocean through the constantmapping that occurs via crisscrossing routes between different national ports . These

routes palpably impact the shifting waters around them, to the extent that the interrupt animalmigration patterns and even whale sonar. On a microcosmic level, this containment isepitomized by the standardization of commercial exchange, from the multicoloredhues of shipping container boxes to prefabricated product packaging .Oddly enough, thisblunt formal awareness has a direct correlate in an ethical message, hence the distinctlycomposite nature of documentary-based photography related to the ocean today: aestheticformality is often intermingled with implicit or explicit political critique, as I have alreadytouched upon. Such technical means combined with pointed ideological ends have certainlybeen witnessed before in various developments of twentieth-century art beyond thepropagandistic, as merely a straightforward mode of sound visual rhetoric that convincinglypersuades the viewer. The novel approach of Sekulas work, however, has more to do with the

direct, one-to-one relationship of the formal and the political in the current capitalist culture ofmost of the world. What begins with an impression of the sheer sensorial and formal fascinationof capitalist structures flips over in the next moment of reception to the stark awareness of thesocial and environmental ramifications of this economic system, hence producing a powerfulkind of self-criticism and even paranoia in the viewer. Sekula therefore presents an ominousbreed of beauty in his project, which quite stealthily inculpates the viewer as consumer. Thesharp eye of the documentary camera effortlessly records the decorative nature ofpatterning that results from the systematized nature of commercial shipping. Thisformal play readily computes to the trained eye of the viewer as the language of artand the language of commercial design, creating an atmosphere of visual pleasure .That these means have once again fooled the viewer into reading beauty where disgust instead

might lay upon second and third glance, drives home the psychological effect of the amalgam offormal and political all the more stringently

Technological solutions to global warming only ensure further environmental destruction andare destined to fail

Joronen, 2k10(Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger,Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 224-5)

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of the need for non-violent resistance and power-

free following of the abyssal earth is the contemporary event of global warming . While thisdevastating change is affecting all parts of the earth , even the atmosphere, some of the most vulgarsolutions, especially the geo-engineering proposals, aim at intentional, even global scale,climate modification either by reducing the incoming radiation from the sun for instance, by using therefractive screens or sunshade of autonomous spacecrafts installed in space (Angel 2006), and by spraying cooling sulphate

particle concentrations in the stratosphere (Crutzen 2006) or by removing CO2 from the atmosphere for instance, byincreasing carbon sequestration with iron fertilization pumped at oceans (Buesseler&Boyd 2003).

These various potential geoengineering implementations seem to do nothing but follow the


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baseline of the gigantic machination, the subjugation of things into orderable reservecommanded to stand by so that they may be manipulated by the operations of calculation .Even though such geo-engineering may eventually mitigate the negative consequences ofclimate change, it offers a calculative moulding of even more complex systems of orderings asa solution to the problem of global warming , which is by itself subordinate to, as well as an outcomeof, this manipulative and calculative subjugation of earth , the logic of circular self-overcomingin the ever greater modalities of exploitative power . As Malpas writes, although it is evident thatmore complex systems of orderings also increase the possibilities of their failure , machinationalways presents itself as a source for continuous improvements by simply viewing thesefailures as an indication of a further need for technological perfection ( 2006:298). In other words,machination does not implicate an achievement of total ordering, but a drive toward total ordering where this driveitself is never under suspicion. Nevertheless, as contemporary climate change indicates, earth never allowsitself to become captured, completely controlled , or emptied into unfolding that frames it in terms oforderable and exploitable standing-reserve . Earth rather resists all attempts to capture it: it resists bypointing out the lack that leads to the failure of all systems of orderings . It is precisely this lack,the line of failure that has always already started to flee the perfect rationalization and totalcapture of things , which presents the earth aspect of Heidegger. Instead of the calculative engineering oftechnical solutions, the non-violent resistance allows the earth to become a source of abyssalbeing, a source of self-emerging things that always retains a hidden element since the earthnever allows itself to become completely secured though particular world-disclosures (see Harrison2007:628; Peters&Irwin 2002:8). In other words, instead of mere calculative manipulation, we can resist the manipulativemachination of earth and thus let the living earth become a source of abyssal being, an earth-site for our dwelling.

The politics of the standing reserve reduce all beings to objects of its own manipulation destroys value to life by sacrificing ethics in the name of protecting instrumental valueMitchell, 2k5(Andrew J., Stanford University, Heidegger and Terrorism, Research in Phenomenology, 35)

The elimination of difference in the standing-reserve along with the elimination of national

differences serve to identify the threat of terrorism with the quest for security . The absence of this threat would be theabsence of being, and its consummation would be the absence of being as well. Security is only needed where there is a threat . If a threatis not perceived, if one believes oneself invulnerable, then there is no need for security. Security is for those who know they can be injured, for those who can be damaged. Does

America know that it can be damaged? If security requires a recognition of ones own vulnerability, then securitycan only be found in the acknowledgment of ones threatened condition, and this means that itcan only be found in a recognition of being as threat. To be secure, there must be the threat. For this reason, all of theplanned securities that attempt to abolish the threat can never achieve the security they seek .Security requires that we preserve the threat, and this means that we must act in the office of preservers.As preservers, what we are charged to preserve is not so much the present being as the concealment that inhabits it. Preserving a thing means to notchallenge it forth into technological availability, to let it maintain an essential concealment . That weparticipate in this essencing of being does not make of it a subjective matter, for there is no isolated subject in preservation, but an opening of being. Heidegger will name thisthe clearing of the truth (Wahrheit) of being, and it is this clearing that Dasein preserves (bewahrt). When a thing truthfully is, when it is what it is in t ruth, then it is preserved. Inpreserving beings, Dasein participates in the truth (preservation) of being. The truth of being is being as threat, and this threat only threatens when Dasein preserves it in terror.

Dasein is not innocent in the terrorization of being. On the contrary, Dasein is complicit in it. Dasein refuses to abolish terrorism.For this reason, a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism must remain skeptical of all the various measures taken tooppose terrorism, to root it out or to circumvent it. These are so many attempts to do away with what threatens, measures that are themselves in thehighest degree willful. This will can only impose itself upon being , can only draw out more and more of its wrath, and this inward wrath ofbeing maintains itself in a never-ending supply. The will can only devastate the earth. Rather than approaching the world in terms of resourcesto be secured, true security can only be found in the preservation of the threat of being. It is preciselywhen we are busy with security measures and the frantic organization of resources that wedirectly assault the things we would preserve. The threat of being goes unheeded when things are restlessly shuttled back and forth,


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harried, monitored, and surveilled. The threat of being is only preserved when things are allowed to rest . In the notesto the Evening Conversation, security is thought in just such te rms: Security (what one understands by this) arises not from securing and the measures taken for this; security

resides in rest [in der Ruhe] and is itself made superfluous by this. (GA 77: 244)23 The rest in question is a rest from the economiccycling and circulating of the standing reserve. The technological unworld, the situation of totalwar, is precisely the era of restlessness (The term totality says nothing more; it names only the spread of the hitherto known into therestless *GA 69: 181+). Security is superfluous here, which is only to say that it is unnecessary or useless. It

is not found in utility, but in the preserved state of the useless. Utility and function are preciselythe dangers of a txnh that has turned antagonistic towards nature . In rest, they no longer determine the being of the thing. Inresting, things are free of security measures, but not for all that rendered insecure. Instead, they are preserved. There is no security; this is whatwe have to preserve . Heideggerian thinkin g is a thinking that thinks away from simple presence and absence. It thinks what Heidegger calls the between (dasZwischen). This between is a world of nonpresence and nonabsence. Annihilation is impossible for this world and so is security.The terror experienced today is a clue to the withdrawal of being. The world is denatured,drained of reality. Everything is threatened and the danger only ever increases . Dasein flees to ametaphysics of presence to escape the threatened world , hoping there to find security . But security cannotdo away with the threat, rather it must guard it . Dasein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. What is perhapsrepugnant to consider in all this is that being calls for terrorism and for terrorists. With the enframing of being and the circulation ofstanding-reserve, what is has already been destroyed . Terrorism is merely the ugly confirmation of this point. As we have seen,being does not linger behind the scenes but is found in the staging itself. If being is to terrorize if, in other words, this is an age of terrorism then being must call for terrorists.They are simply more slaves of the history of beyng (GA 69: 209) and, in Heideggers eyes, no different from the politician s of the day in service to the cause of Americanism.

But someone might object, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians are not. Granting this objection despite its obvious navet, we can nonetheless see that bothpoliticians and terrorists are called for by the standing-reserve, the one to ensure itsnonabsence , that the plan will reach everyone everywhere, and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all beings will nowbe put into circulation by the threat of destruction. In this regard, human resources are no different from livestock, and with this,an evil worse than death has already taken place. Human resources do not die, they perish .

The essence of truth and technology does not permanently endure rather it is thehistorically contingent way in which Being discloses itself and is understood by Dasein metaphysics supplies each epochal period with an ontotheological grounding themetaphysics of presence underlying modern technological thought represents the totalclosure of thought that forgets the question of Being and disincentivizes ontological inquiryThomson, 2k1[Iain, University of New Mexico, Heidegger on Ontological Education, or: How We Become WhatWe Are , Inquiry, 2001]

Heideggers pronouncement that the essence of truth transforms sounds paradoxical; how can an essence change? This willseem impossible to someone like Kripke, who holds that an essence is a property an entity possesses necessarily, thereferent of a rigid designator the extension of which is . xed across all possible worlds.4 The paradox disappears, however,once we realize that Heidegger too uses essence (Wesen) as a technical term, albeit quite differently from Kripke. Tounderstand essence in phrases such as the essence of truth and the essence of technology ,Heidegger explains, we cannot conceive of essence the way we have been doing since Plato , as whatpermanently endures , for that makes it seem as if by essence we mean some mythologi calabstraction . Instead , Heidegger insists, we need to think of essence as a verb , as the way in whichthings essence (west) or remain in play (im Spiel bleib t).5 In Heideggers usage, essence picks out theextension of an entity unfolding itself in historical intelligibility . Otherwise put, Heidegger understandsessence in terms of being, and since being is not a real predicate (as Kant showed), there is little likelihood that an entitysessence can be picked out by a single, . xed predicate or underlying property (as substance metaphysics assumes). Rather,

for Heidegger essence simply denotes the historical way in which an entity comes to reveal itselfontologically and be understood by Dasein .6 Accordingly , essence must be understood in termsof the ek -sistence of Da -sein , that is , in terms of being set -out into the disclosedness ofbeings .7 In On the Essence of Truth (1929), Heidegger applies this historical understanding of essence to truth,contending famously (if no longer terribly controversially) that the original historical essence of truth is not


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simply unforgottenness (Unvergessenheit, a literal translation of the original Greek word for truth: Aletheia thealpha- privative un - plus Lethe, the mythological river of forgetting), but phenomenological un -concealedness (Un-verborgenheit) more generally . Historically , truth . first refers to revealedness orphenomenological manifestation rather than to accurate representation ; the locus of truth is notoriginally the correspondence of an assertion to a state of affairs , but the antecedent fact thatthere is something there to which the assertion might correspond . So conceived, the essence oftruth is a revealedness fully co -extensional with Daseins existence , the basic fact of ourstanding -out (ek-sistere) historically into phenomenological intelligibility . The essence of truth thus refers to the way in which this revealedness takes shape historically , namely, as a series ofdifferent ontological constellations of intelligibility . It is not surprising, then, that Heidegger rst began toelaborate his history of being in On the Essence of Truth; for him the essence of truth is the history ofbeing . Of course, such strong claims about the radically historical character of our concepts (even cherished concepts likeessence, truth, history, concept, and being) tend to make philosophers nervous. When Heidegger historicizesontology by re-rooting it in the historical existence of Dasein, how does his account avoid simply dissolving intelligibility intothe ux of time? Heideggers answer is surprising; it is the metaphysical tradition that preventsintelligibility from dissolving into a pure temporal flux . Indeed, careful readers will notice that whenHeidegger writes that ek -sistent, disclosive Da-sein possesses the human being so originarily that only it secures forhumanity that distinctive relatedness to the totality of beings as such which first grounds all history, he is sub tly invokinghis account of the way in which metaphysics grounds intelligibility. Unfortunately, the complexity of Heideggers

idiosyncratic understanding of Western metaphysics as ontotheology, coupled with his seemingly strong antipathy tometaphysics, has tended to obscure the unparalleled pride of place he in fact assigns to metaphysics in the historicalconstruction, contestation, and maintenance of intelligibility. Put simply , Heidegger holds that ourmetaphysicians ontological understandings of what entities are as such ground intelligibilityfrom the inside-out (as it were), while their theological understandings of the way in which thetotality of beings exist simultaneously secure the intelligible order from the outside -in . Westernhistorys s uccessive constellations of intelligibility are thus doubly grounded in a series ofontotheologically structured understandings of the being of beings (das Sein des Seienden),understandings , that is, of both what and how beings are , or of the totality of beings as such (asHeidegger puts it above).8 This account answers our worry; for although none of these ontotheologicalgrounds has served the history of intelligibility as an unshakeable foundation (Grund), nor haveany of the major ontoth eologies instantly given way like a groundless abyss (Abgrund). Rather ,each ontotheology has served its historical constellation of intelligibility as an Ungrund , a perhaps necessary appearance of ground , that is , as that point at which ontological inquirycomes to a rest .9 Because each ontotheology serves for a time as the point where the spadeturns (as Wittgenstein put it), the history of intelligibility has taken the form of a series of relativelydurable , overlapping historical epochs rather t han either a single monolithic understanding ofwhat-is or a formless ontological flux .10 Thus metaphysics , by repeatedly supplying intelligibilitywith dual ontotheological anchors , is able to hold back (epoche) the floodwaters of intelligibilityfor a time the time of an epoch . It is this overlapping historical series of ontotheologicallygrounded epochs that Heidegger calls the history of being .

The loss of Being that defines our historical epoch shapes the dominant social imaginarythrough instrumental reasoning this denies intrinsic value to other beings and the natural

world which legitimates the practices and institutionalization of war, structural violence,and environmental destructionChwastiaka and Lehmanb, 2k8[Michele University of New Mexico, Anderson School of Management, United States, Glen,School of Accounting, University of South Australia, Accounting for war, AccountingForum,Volume 32, Issue 4, December 2008, Pages 313 326]

Many peace researchers argue that the sources for physical violence can be found in passive violence(disrespect for ourselves and others lives), structural violence (daily acts of exploitation andrepression ) and cultural violence (the ideologies , religions , laws , etc. which legitimize violence


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in all its forms) (Galtung & Ikeda, 1995; Galtung, 1996). This paper argues that accounting is a form of cultural violence inthat it legitimizes the exploitation inherent in a capitalist economy by reconstructing itpositively as productive, necessary and normal . The basic hypothesis is that accounting is part of a moralorder based on instrumental rationality that was central to the rise of Western modernity .This mentalist image of the world was at first just an idea in the minds of some influential thinkers, but it latercame to shape the social imaginary of large strata, and then eventually whole societies. Instrumentalreasoning does not allow us to glimpse the wholeness of being and as such stifles ourability to see the intrinsic value of others and the natural realm. If our conceptualrepresentation of the world masks the intrinsic value of others, our ability to feel empathywill be constrained making it possible for us to ignore , for instance, the fact that five of the sixbillion people on earth live in poverty (Ramonet, 2004, p. 84). For as Bauman (1991, p. 155) notes, Themore rational is the organization of action , the easier it is to cause suffering and remainat peace with oneself and as Arias (1999, p. 57) states, While our techn ological capability to destroy has multiplied,our ability to empathize with the problem of the afflicted has faltered. This paper will explore accountings contributiontowards masking the intrinsic value of others and how this assists with rationalizing war and war-like behaviors by firstdiscussing the rise of modernity and its impact on social organization and daily life. The argument is developed using CharlesTaylors Modern Social Imaginaries (2004) and A Secular Age (2007) which traced the historic al trends that have led us to thepresent point in our social narratives. Towards this end, it is interesting to note that one of the primary ideologues of

capitalism, Adam Smith, who provided much of the intellectual foundation for the system, was deeply concerned that moralsentiments toward others could easily be forgotten in the pursuit of profits. In A Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith was clearabout the limitations of capitalism and emphasized that it was always necessary to be sceptical about proposals from theemployer class as their interest is never exactly the same with that of the public (Smith, 1790, p. 250). It is worth

remembering that Smith was also clear that constant care was needed to ensure that ethical values didnot deteriorate. As Keller (2007) argues, in a very interesting paper which contrasts Smith and Friedman, the situationwhere the interests of corporations often take precedence over the interests of society would be Smiths worst nightmare.

(pp. 159 188). Second, the paper examines specific applications of the way in which accountings indifference towardsthe intrinsic value of others assists with rationalizing war and war-like behaviors . First, themaintenance of capitalism requires us to believe that preserving wealth, rather than the sanctity of life, is the supreme end forsociety. Accounting supports this delusion by denying an object any value other than its financial contribution or detriment.

Second, by viewing nature as a good, accounting nullifies its intrinsic value, leading tounbridled exploitation which in turn has brought about resource wars in many forms . Third,war and accounting parallel one another in the fact that they render violence more doable by denying the intrinsic value ofthe other through employ ing a dehumanized rhetoric and creating a distance between the perpetrator and the victim.Fourth, accounting contributes to rationalizing the inequities, exploitation and outright denial of life created by the corporateglobalization agenda through elevating economic development over all other considerations. Fifth, economic sanctions followthe impeccable logic of accounting in that they produce brutal consequences for the enemy, which are rendered invisible, atminimal cost for the perpetrator. Lastly, accounting makes war appear as reasonable a business venture as health care bycondensing the value of an activity to profit or loss. 1. The social imaginary underlying accounting Accounting as a techno logyis, like most modern institutions, ignorant of the structures and values upon which it is based. In the opinion of hermeneutic

thinkers such as Charles Taylor this is because humans have become unaware of the socialimaginary the way of thinking which gives shape to the society which spawnstechnology ( [Taylor, 2003] and [Taylor, 2004]). My basic hypothesis is that central to Western modernity is anew conception of the moral order of society . This was at first just an idea in the minds of some influentialthinkers, but it later came to shape the social imaginary of large strata, and then eventually whole societies. It has now become

so self-evident to us, that we have trouble seeing it as one possible conception among others. The mutation of this

view of moral order into our social imaginary is the coming to be of certain social formswhich are those essentially characterizing Western modernity : the market economy , the publicsphere , the self-governing people , among others. (Taylor, 2002, p. 1). Accordingly, any accounting forviolence and war first involves an understanding of how certain values and ideas, and not others,have come to shape and dominate our culture and institutions and how these in turn have impacted the way we account. The

social imaginary is that shared understanding of the world which makes possiblecommon practices and a collective sense of legitimacy (Taylor, 2002). It is the process by whichordinary people make sense of their social surroundings . As such, it is frequently expressed instories , legends , myths , and other pre-Enlightenment narratives . According to Taylor: This approach is


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not the same as one which might focus on the ideas, as against the institutions of modernity. The social imaginary is not a

set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society. (Taylor, 2002, p. 1). The socialimaginary that enables current day practices of accounting is a product of Enlightenmentthought with its emphasis on technical and scientific achievement . The rise of Western modernitywas most clearly stated in the new theories of Natural Law which emerged in the 17th century, largely as aresponse to the domestic and international disorder wrought by the wars of religion (Kant,1795). The moral background was one of natural rights where people have certainobligations towards one another independent of politics, community, culture, religion,and other associated phenomena . This moral order upset traditional views that a persons role s and obligationswere dependent upon their position within a particular community. As such, it created an individualized andatomized society which gave way to an abstract, instrumental view of others. It gave rise to notonly a secular culture, but a social order that emphasizes continued economic growth and expansionary processes that have

colonized other life-worlds and social structures (see Taylor, 2007).1 In this modern social imaginary,political and social obligations are seen as an extension or application of these naturalrights . Political authority is perceived to be legitimate only if it is based on a social contractconsented to by individuals. Since the time of Locke, the idea that society and politics exist for the benefit of individuals andthe defense of their rights has taken on more and more importance. This notion became the dominant view by marginalizingolder theories and newer rivals, and in so doing generated far-reaching claims on political life. The doctrine of original consent

(e.g., Lockes consent to taxation) underlies the popular sovereignty under which we now live. The theory of naturalrights spawned a dense web of limits to legislative and executive action , via theentrenched charters which have become an important feature of contemporarygovernment . During these last four centuries, the social imaginary of natural rights has undergone a double expansion.This expansion can be traced in a number of ways. First, the discourse of natural law started off in a rather specialized niche. Itprovided philosophers and legal theorists a language with which to talk about the legitimacy of governments and the rules ofwar and peace, the nascent doctrines of modern international law. It then began to infiltrate and transform the discourse inother niches. Second, it has been extended because more people live by it. It was the Scottish philosopher Hume who

emphasized the importance of habit, custom and tradition in transforming a way of thought into a social norm. Acommitment to rights, procedure and precision underlie most social contracts in themodern world . Hence, what started as an idea in the minds of a few influential thinkers, eventually came to shape thesocial imaginary2 of a large strata of people and then whole societies (T aylor, 2007). As stated previously, the theories ofnatural law which helped to spawn the social imaginary of modernity were built on aseries of individualist assumptions . This , together with the Enlightenments emphasis onprecise technical and scientific achievement elevated an instrumental and positiveepistemology as the only rational means for viewing the world . What we account for hasbeen over-determined by this positivist epistemology. Hence, if we are to subject accounting to a criticalinterpretation we must look beyond its instrumental logic . We need to reconsider the societalimages and practices upon which it is based . The positivist epistemology which created thedominant institutions of Western modernity (e.g., the market economy, the public sphere, self-governingpeople, etc.) assumes that history , culture and the social world can be ignored in a system ofvaluation . Hence , from such a perspective terrorism and war , for instance, simply create newbusiness opportunities or distract from others (Chwastiak & Young, 2003). As Weidenbaum states,Although the continuing struggle against international terrorism imposes significant costs on society in general and onbusiness in particular, it is also a source of new or expanded market opportunities for some companies (2003, p. 10). Hence,according to an article in Forbes, terrorism can be a lucky break for some individuals: The failed car bombings in the U.K. lastmonth gave a showcase role to security technology. Security cameras recorded men leaving the scene of the two unexplodedcar bombs in London. License-plate-reading software on highway cams helped lead police to Scotland and the fiery autoattack on Glasgow Airport. Such threats represent opportunity to Andrew Malim, a 64-year-old Brit who sells video analytics

software for the U.K.s ubiquitous closed -circuit TV cameras (Fitch, 2007, p. 80). Thus, the number one problem foraccounting and modern social science has from the beginning been modernity itself . According tothis perspective, modernity and its processes reflect the historically unprecedented amalgam of newpractices and institutional forms (science , technology , industrial production , urbanization );of new ways of living (individualism , secularization , instrumental rationality ) and of new


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forms of malaise (alienation , meaninglessness , a sense of impending social dissolution ). AsBauman (1991) and others have noted the failure to move beyond the rational tends to impose acertain vision of the world on others and nature . This imaginary can turn into a violentattitude towards the other by setting forth a series of dualisms that deny the value ofthe ostensibly negative term (e.g., slave in master/slave, irrational in rational/irrational, etc.). Hence, through

modernity, we created a social imaginary which perpetuates a limited means tounderstand others , as well as the significant relationships which shape the world . This socialimaginary denies the legitimacy of non-Western forms of social organization, calling them barbaric,uncivilized, etc. By understanding these limits to modernity we can better understand theprocesses that legitimize war , violence and terrorism. The remainder of the paper examines howaccounting is wedded to those aspects of modernity which have made cruelty a way of life by denying the intrinsic value ofothers starting with expansionistic logic of capitalism.

Contention Two: Ontological Inquiry

Resolved: Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increaseits non- military exploration of the Earths oceans.

Resolve is not to be found in a willful action, but as a steadfastedness to allow the revelationsof being. This allows for a new mode of political action outside the arbitrary whims of thesovereign ego

Pezze, 2k6(Barbara, PhD Philosophy at Honk Kong U, Heidegger on Gelassenheit, Minerva , vol .10,http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol10/Heidegger.html)

Let us pause for a moment to consider a possible misunderstanding. It could appear, from what we have beensaying, that Gelassenheit floats in the realm of unreality and so in nothingness, and, lacking allpower of action, is a will-less letting in of everything and , basically, the denial of the will to live !(1966a, p. 80). But this is not the case, for in the Gelassenheit we find something that recalls the power ofaction , but which is not a will. It is a resolve *Entschlossenheit+ (ibid., p. 81), but not as an act of willthat makes a decision and finds a solution to a problem or a situation . This resolve , as Heideggerhimself suggests, must be thought as the one that is spoken of in Being and Time, that is, it is a letting oneself becalled forth (1996, p. 283) to ones ownmost possibility of being . Resoluteness as Entschlossenheit istranslated in Being and Time is authentic being a self (1996, p. 274). It is quite difficult to think a resolve that is not a matter of will that moves to an action; we tend, in fact, to consider resoluteness asa strong determination to attain something. As we read in Heideggers Introduction To Metaphysics (2000), the essence of the

resolve, as he intends it, is not an intention to act; it is not a gathering of energy to be released into action.Resolve is the beginning , the inceptual beginning of any action moved. Here acting is not be taken as an action undertakenby Das ein in being resolute. Rather, acting refers to the existential and fundamental mode of being of Dasein, which is to be care,and which is the primordial being of Dasein. Resoluteness, in its essence, is the remaining open of Dasein for be-ing. In the context of the Conversation, this resolve should thusbe understood as the opening of man particularly undertaken by him for openness *als das eigens bernommene Sichffnen des

Daseins fr das Offene+ (Heidegger 1966a, p. 81). It is a resolve to remain open to be-ing , and therefore to what isownmost to mans nature, which is disclosed in relation to be -ing. This resolve is what Heidegger, in the Conversation, indicates as

releasement to that -which- regions, the resolve to release oneself to that -which-regions, to remain open towards theopenness itself .Now, there is another element that pertains to Gelassenheit: there is, in fact, not only a resolve, but also a steadfastness[Ausdauer] (Heidegger 1966a, p.81) proper to Gelassenheit. Thinking, becoming more and more aware of its nature, andexperiencing more clarity about it, remains firm and resolute. Thinking stands within and rests in this composed steadfastness(ibid., p. 81+). The steadfastness proper to Gelassenheit


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would be behavior which did not become a swaggering comportment, but which collected itself into and remained always thecomposure of releasement [Verhaltenheit der Gelassenheit]. (Heidegger 1966a, p. 81)

Our stance of resolve in the face of modern technological enframing allows for a newrelationship with Being and space remaining open to new modes of revealing is a

prerequisite for allowing new forms of political action to reveal themselves outside of thestanding reserve

Joronen, 2k10(Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger,Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 97-99)

What Heidegger obviously rejects here is both the logical continuity of the history of being (even the dialectical one ofHegel) as well as the sense of plain discontinuity of history . As Heidegger puts it in Platos Doctrine of Truth, suchdoctrines of thinkers do not merely consist of the intelligibility they create, but of theoblivion (Lethe): in addition to what doctrine says , it also refers to that which, within what is said, remains unsaid (1998b: 155). Thus, theinquiry of the operative history of being never simply returns to past, but steps back to a domain, which in spite of being still affective has been systematically skipped over:

to the concealed destining constituted by the oblivion of the finite Event of be-ing . From aviewpoint of contemporary epoch , such Lethe comes forth as we first become aware of theprevailing mode of veiling-revealing, and hence open up ourselves to think how conceptualpro-gressions and purposeless changes , even seemingly innocent linguistic translations , containa disposure, a non-rational legacy of forgetting and veiling , by which be-in g hands itself from one epoch to another through the veilingdoctrines . Altogether, the incubational maturation of the oblivion has a double outlet: the history of being is not just a history of a loss of sense of be-ing and itsfinitude through metaphysical groundings; it also presents a genealogical incubation of these grounding postulates through the unthought possibilities they release. In orderto further clarify such sense of maturation in the history of being, it is crucial, at least for heuristic reasons, to separate two different planes of maturation: the general inter-epochal plane, where the major modes of withdrawal take place (i.e. the pre-socratic, the ancient, the medieval, the modern, including its planetary outcome), and the morespecific intra-epochal plane, which consists of the incubation within specific epochal modes of sending (Haar 1993:74, See also Gillespie 1984:136; Thomson 2005:9; Davis2007:161 184). Thus, there is not just a cumulative maturation between epochs, where the decisive oblivion of first beginning inaugurates the gradual maturation of the

oblivion of being, but also an incubation within epochs, such maturation taking place, for instance, through the way Kants idea of transcendental conditions of possibility unconscious ly reinforced Leibnizs principle of rationality (i.e., nothing is without ground ), or through the way theunthought of Nietzsches will to power, the will to will, prepared technological self -willing (circular heightening of will) and

hence the technological maxim (

the endless production of things as orderable resource) (See Heidegger

1968:165; Haar 1993:49; Davis 2007:161 162, 179). Thus, when exploring the genealogy of the conditions of planetary unfolding, we should pay attention to all of theseaspects, to what are the conditions of planetary unfolding, how they incubated within the epochal unfolding, as well as to how such incubation epochs are part of a longersuccession of preparing moves and turns. As already mentioned above, due to the matter that the history of the oblivion of be-ing and the sedimented layers of metaphysicalgrounding it constituted become remembered in the other beginning retrieving what was constitutive but yet withheld, what may be seen as awakened by the end of

metaphysics is the possibility of its overcoming through the recovery of the finite power of Event. As Claudia Baracchi sums up, at the end of its history (Geschichte) being constitutes the very possibility of an other inception (2006: 29). However, at the same such turninginto Event of other inception should be itself seen in terms of historical play of oblivion: after the final possibili ty of metaphysics in Nietzsche and t echnological unfolding it

becomes for the first time possible to turn to view the unity of the whole history of oblivion in terms of pointing the finite Event veiled behind such an onto-theologicalmechanism (Davis 2007:268). 24 Yet, even though such other beginning is constit uted in terms ofremembering the forgotten history of the Event, the exact content of the other beginning is apparently left open : Heidegger speaks about essential waiting that takes place through the mindfulthinking releasing the power of open be-ing and self-emerging earth (I will return to these issues later), but this

is above all to emphasize the impermanency of his own thought against the paradoxal essenceof the Event as the impossible that excesses all expectations by becoming possible . In fact, to determine thenew final ground to come in other beginning would speak against the finitude of the Event as well as against the decisi ve and hence unpredictable role of the giving of be-ing

it is waiting that lets the Event to come i nto its own, into its surprising unfolding ofhappening, when human ordering and moulding prevent the Event to take place on its own . Inother words, in order to draw the precedence of being over the comportments of human will into itsfinal conclusion, it is the destining of being that should be seen as letting the Event to comeforth, such an Event signifying what already secretly constituted the whole tradition of destining. Be-ing indeed does not occur as a process in the span of time, but as adisposure: when the succession that grew from the first disposure was based on the oblivion of be-ing and its Event, the other beginning would bring


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a new tradition based on awareness and mindfulness of finite modes of revealing, the Events. Hence,the awakening into finitude of the Event does not merely bring forth what has been send but yetdisposed, but also opens up a chance for completely new and unseen modes of happening ofbe-ing . Nevertheless, at the same time Heidegger quite straightforwa rdly claims that we should handle the other beginning out of the originally proposed direction ofthe first beginning: we must perhaps only direct the historically mindful deliberation toward thethinkers in the history of the first beginning and, by way of questioning dialogue with their questioning posture,unexpectedly plant a questioning that one day finds itself expressly rooted in an otherbeginning (2000:119). The possibility for other beginning , then, undoubtedly expresses thefund amental aim of Heideggers overcoming of metaphysics . Instead of mere suspension ofmetaphysics and its history , its history becomes preserved and hence transformed into truth ofbe-ing (i.e. to the truth about the happening of finite determination of unfolding delimiting the originary abyssal abundance of be-ing), which in turn maylead to the leap into other beginning completely free from the tradition constituted by thefirst beginning . This leap , however, can not be based on our personal inventions, but upon granting of being, which is why Heidegger also claims that theplanetary metaphysics is an order of the earth which will supposedly last for a long time, even though in such an end thinking is equally already in transition to other

beginning, due to the circumstance that thinking is starting to become aware of the ontological limits of technological mani pulation (1973e: 95). Perhaps inproportion to the radical aspect concerning the new modes of unfolding inaugurated by thedaw n of liberation from the tradition of first beginning we should merely talk about

preparatory thinking that anticipates such a leap without predetermining it, but whenthought in proportion to first beginning such preparing thinking is more of a remembering, ofgenealogical retrieval, of the hidden relation of other beginning to first beginning. What is perhaps the most important point to emphasize her e is that inorder to reach the other beginning it is a requirement to turn back towards the hiddensending of being in a manner that investigates the genealogical consummation of this veiling asa preparing history of be-ing (e.g. Krell 1992:109; Thomson 2005:29; Elden 2003b:191 196). Accordingly, Ereignis is not a newlyinvented mode through which be-ing can now take place, but something that has already ruledwithout being revealed Ereignis denotes something that we revitalize, something in which we are awaken to. This brings out twogeneral methodological notions , which will be further discussed in the following sub-section. Firstly, it is precisely thehappening of ontological difference between abyssal be-ing (Seyn) and metaphysical covering of being (Sein) as beingness (Seinendheit) of beings(Seiende), which points out the need to recover the hidden mission, where be-ing sends itself by

covering its finite nature.

The task of thinking is to turn back towards what calls for thinking, andthus to point out the nature of this call of the sending and its mission . Thinking of the specificontological conditions that appropriated their ground from the possibility of rich be-ingthereby cannot be based on a representation of objects, such representation only preparingbeings for calculative knowability, but on a remembering that turns back towards what alreadypositioned us towards the contingent happening of ownness that outstrips all theory and alluniversals (Polt 2006:53). Such representations, in spite of their capability to legitimate their correspondence with objects, are mere by-products of this primordialhappening of owning; in particular, of a modern technological mode of owning that grounds the beingness (Seiendheit) in terms of objectivity by viewing beings as knowable objects standing over againstthe certainty of subject (Heidegger 1973e:88; See also Part II of the present work). Thinking of such world-historical Eventof unfolding, thereby, cannot be based on representative thinking, but on a remembrance thattakes place out of this Event itself thinking the Event denotes a reproductive recovery and return to the primordial allowing of unfolding.Secondly, such being-historical thinking gradually turns to explore and destruct the power of thosesedimented layers of tradition t hat have governed and limited our efforts to think,conceptualize, and understand it is fundamentally consisted of awareness concerning the limiting and enabling power of ontological groundings.Instead of what Heidegger calls an historiographical (Historie) exploration of history, which only represents history, thinking of the history of being (Geschichte) requires us togo into details of those modes of concealing-revealing that constitute the legacy of oblivion, such legacy preparing the conditions of contemporary planetary unfolding.Historie, the historiographical exploration of history, then, is always historical (geschichtlich) it is grounded upon the more fundamental disposure where the Event of beingcovers up itself when the inq uiry of the true history (Geschichte), the succession of disposal of being, is never primarily or necessarily historiogra phical (Heidegger

1977e:175). Exploration of the history of being rather requires that we recover the genealogical preparations made by the onto-theological oblivions. Hence, suchexploration does not try to trace the causal chain of events, but rather inquires what secretly


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determines an entire tradition of unfolding: the source of be-ing lost by the tradition of itsoblivion.

Evaluate ontology first failure to prioritize ontological inquiry is tantamount to a loss ofBeing which impoverishes understanding while locating social -political institutions asisolated from their natural context and eliminates an authentic relationship to Being destroying value to life and causing unchecked environmental destructionMagrini, 2k12[J.M., Professor at the College of DuPage Illinois, Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heideger,Technology, and the Poietic Attunement of Literature , Educational Philosophy and Theory,Volume 44, Issue 5, Pages 500-521, July 2012]Writing in 1927, Heidegger uses the term Dasein to describe the human in his magnum opus, Being and Time. This term is notpsychological , biological , or anthropological in nature . Instead , Dasein denotes specifically the way of life , or Being , of the human . Dasein is unlike any other entity in theworld . For Dasein is neither an object nor subject we hypostatize. When we designate this entity with the term Dasein*there -being+, we areexpressing not its what (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its Being (Heidegger, 1962, p. 67/42). It is possible to envisage Daseinfunctioning uniquely as both noun and infinitive , as it indicates that we are always on-the-way , always moving toward our own potential for being what we will becomethrough the enactment of our unique possibilities for an authentic , flourishing existence that is consistent with Heidegger's notion of authentic worldly dwelling .Ontology , as conceived by Heidegger, raises both the fundamental question concerning Being in general and the concomitant concern with the Being of beings .This latter concern presupposes that there are existential structures sustaining and enabling our Being-in-the-world . Science does not engage in ontological inquiry ,rather it focuses exclusively on learning facts about entities , without concern for their Being . Science conducts ontical investigations , and asks questions that can beanswered with empirical certainty . To conduct an inquiry into Being , or the Being of entities, is to do ontology , and ontological questions are much more difficult , ifnot impossible, to answer with certainty . Ontology unfolds in the form of an inquiry as opposed to an investigation , e.g. ontology is concerned with more primordialquestions than science , such as What is it to be as a human being? or, Why is there something rather than nothing?. Heidegger'sphilosophy of 1927, which attempts to elucidate the meaning of Being through the fundamental ontology of the Dasein , places great importance on revealing theexistential structures underlying our lives , and in particular, the various inauthentic and authentic ways we exist . Our potential for a rich and fulfilling existence isbound up with the understanding of these structures . Living authentically, as Being-in-the-world , relates directly to the ontological ways in which we are free , beholdenand responsible to our ownmost potential for living , which includes the understanding of mortality and our solicitous Being-with-others . When caring for our Being and theBeing of others , which represents an authentic existence , we are living in such a way as to e xercise critical thought and engage in c reative intellectual and artistic problem-solving . Heidegger lived this type of existence as a philosopher, educator, and learner, for Heidegger placed the highest value on education, stating that the teacher's vocation is perhaps the most important and difficult role to assume. Heidegger's entirephilosophy, from Being and Time through his later works on art, poetry and authentic thinking , which includes his thinking on education , is directedtoward awakening humans to their authentic ontological potential for living as true guardians of Being , for dwelling poetically on the earth . In Heidegger's laterphilosophy (writings of the turn), from the 1930s onward, a decidedly new approach to the fundamental topic of addressing t hequestion of Being qua Being is evident. During this time, Heidegger adopts a more poetic style of thinking and writing that isremoved from the academic tone of his earlier work. Rather than philosophizing, Heidegger is concerned with embracing poetic,

meditative thought. Heidegger also atte mpts to overcome metaphysics by moving beyond the linguistic and conceptual constraintsof traditional Western philosophy, which includes graduating beyond thinking the ontological- ontical distinction. The turn (Kehre)in Heidegger's philosophy represent s the movement toward thinking on the human as a true guardian of Being , i.e. one who dwells poetically , which is an authenticexistence characterized by caring for the earth and others in relation to the overwhelming and sublime mystery of Being . It mus t be noted that this turn inHeidegger's thought does not result in a change to the fundamental topic of Being and Time. Rather, it represents a reorientation tothe various ways in which the Being-event occurs, e.g. after Being and Time, Heidegger considers alternative paradigms for pursuingthe question of Being, which includes speculation on the origin of art and the essence of poetry as related to the event of truth asaletheia, or un -concealedness. Educational research focused on Heidegger's philo sophy must take seriously the crucial role thatmoods play in situating the human being in its world, for to gloss over this issue, misses the point that educational reform, from theperspective of Heidegger's thinking, depends on the following understanding: in order to change our theories and views on educationalpractice , we must change our grounding attunement . Heidegger views the history of the Western world in terms of the primary concern for beings andpresent-at- hand entities , a concern for what comes to presence as opposed to a concern for how this is made possible in the first instance . We tend to value scientificinvestigation over ontological inquiry into the nature of Being , into the essence of our unique potentiality-for-Being , i.e. what we can be as ontological sites of potentialand transcendence . This phenomenon , the loss of Being , the forgetting of the original question of ontology , dramatically effects our lives and world , and this includesthe dehumanization of our social-political-educational institutions . According to Heidegger, this relates directly to the way in wh ich our contemporary world is inthe grip of an adverse form of attunement , which is the spawn of modern technology , causing us to understand and discourse about our lives in impoverished ways .

The ontological inquiry of the 1ac is a form of counter-education that provides a startingpoint from which we can engage normalizing education that prioritizes disinterestedinstrumental rationality in politics as well as debate instead of focusing on the successfulimposition of policy we should begin from a position of transcendence that allows reflectionon the meanings, identities, and quests of technological thoughtGur- Zeev, 2k2


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[Ilan, The University of Haifa, Martin Heidegger, transcendence, and the possibility of counter-education , Heidegger, Education and Modernity, 2002]

So even in face of the success of modern science and technology, even in face of the present situateness, evenin face of the absence of thinking - transcendence into learning to think is still an open humanpossibility . The presence of the absence of thinking does not halt genuine learning - and unlearning:it is its starting point . Once we are so related and drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what withdraws,into the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal. Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he isthinking - even though he may still be far away from what withdraws, even though the withdrawal may remain as veiled asever.31 But in what sense is that which calls us to think preferable to concealment, framing, and unauthentic life? ForHeidegger there is no way to justify the one rather than the other. In this sense, on Heideggerian grounds there is no way tofavor this kind of learning over the conventional kind. The two ways represent opposing versions of concern. The receptionof Heideggers ideas in the field of philosophy of education and within different pedagogies varies. Some scholars claim that it has no relevance whatsoever, or at least that he never really had a great deal to say about education.32 Some seeHeidegger's educational implications as nothing but "nonsense".33 Others are basically critical of his abstractness and sti llothers propose various means to implement, instrumenatalize, or domesticate Heideggers philosophy and make itrelevant to actual teaching in schools.34 For all their differences, these responses to Heidegger's thought consider it inrespect of schooling and normalizing education. Even at their best, when following Heidegger they refer to teaching as an

artistic-noninstrumental process.35 Normalizing education , as was shown, guarantees not only security, prosperity,cooperation and reproduction: it offers even concern and transcendence. This kind of concern, however, represents anabandonment of another kind of concern , an authentic one , which does not satisfy itself by

successful imposition on the things in the world ; it does not fulfills itself as technological successor social cooperation and solidarity . This other kind of concern makes another kind of transcendence possible.Here truth as letting-be the otherness of beings realizes human freedom. It is transcendence not as "progress" orself-oblivion but as an outcome of the worthy suffering of facing meaninglessness and living-towards-death . As such, transcendence faces the infinity of nothingness and makes the absent freedom and truthpresent. It becomes what Heidegger never speaks of: worthy suffering. It sheds light on the futility of the merethingness in the beings which have been stripped of their uniqueness by humaninstrumentalism . Worthy suffering makes possible a kind of transcendence , which allowsreflection on the production of meanings , identities , and quests . It even reflects on the representationapparatuses and their manipulations.36 But can it also offer transcendence from pain/pleasure into the worthysuffering/happiness of facing the truth of Being/nothingness as a transcendence into a worthier way of life? Into the terrainof truths which are not fabricated by successful violent manipulations? Is there a way of transcending metaphysical violenceitself in the form of the closure/arbitrariness of enframing (Ge-stell), of human beings as standing-reserve (Bestand), of the

limits of language and the effects of the essence of Being as ontological exile? The kind of counter-education to whichHeidegger's concepts of "unlearning", unconcealment", and "transcendence" are not foreign is still voiceles. It cannotbecome institutionalized or avoid becoming a dogmatic positive Utopia. It should avoid the quest for "authenticauthority" and the acceptance of mundane violence as a tool for overcoming metaphysicalviolence as it is invested in normalizing education . When counter-education is not true to itself, in the nameof authenticity and transcendence it will speak, with Heidegger, the vulgar language of National Socialism and otherpositive Utopias, and create a rhetoric of this kind: The knowledge of true scholarship does not differ in its tradition fromthe knowledge of farmers, lumberjacks, miners and craftsman. For knowledge means being at home in the world in whichwe live as individuals and as part of a community. Knowledge means growth of resolve and action in the performance of ata sk that has been given usKnowledge means being in the place where we are put.37 From here the way easily leads tothe conception of "we are but following the glorious will of our Fuehrer".38 Every historical collectivistic-orientedsituateness or normalization process has its Fuehrer : even the process of McDonaldization ofreality or the infantilization processes in cyberspace as a totalistic pleasure machine . Butcounter-education can find in Heidegger's philosophy a different kind of the concept of transcendence .

In it transcendence is conditioned by overcoming authority , any authority , especially that of theone who "knows "39 or sets the standards , quests or telos . Here it is impossible to differentiatebetween self-overcoming as "let-learn" and unconcealment as let-things-be what they alreadyare in their essence . In both, thinking manifests itself, and the presence of the exile of Being allows authentictranscendence or a kind of religiosity in which redemption as a relevant pole of existence is saved. Transcendence intothinking , which is normally absent , is transformed into a special existential "moment ". Facing thepresence of its absence is already thinking: And what withdraws in such a manner keeps and develops its own incomparablenearness. Once we are so related and drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmaticand therefore mutable nearness of its appeal. Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he is thinking even though hemay still be far away from what withdraws, even though the withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever.40 But even here,


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when it is not the Fuehrer who calls for transcendence into thinking but that to which the Fuehrer's voice responds or thatcall which he betrays, it is always "the call" which chooses us. It is always "the call" which selects us ,challenges us in a way which , while it gives itself to the human , swallows the not-yet-reallyhuman as an act of its creation . The transcendence from contingent human power relationsand the contextualized imposed production of truths , values , identities , consciousness , andrepresentation apparatuses in its turn offers another kind of arbitrariness. It manifests the other face of

metaphysical violence: And what it gives us to think about, the gift it gives to us, is nothing less than itself itself, whichcalls on us to enter into thinking . The question What calls for thinking? asks for what wants to be thought aboutin the preeminent sense: it does not just give us something to think about , nor only itself , but it firstgives thought and thinking to us , it entrusts thought to us as our essential destiny , and thus first

joins and appropriates us to thought .41 Here , as a danger, counter-education unveils its essence andmakes human transcendence possible with no security , no promised "success ", consensus orpleasure . And this is only the first step in the long way of counter-education , which should at thesame time address the most concrete and banal manifestations of reality and the politics of thedistribution of evils .

Our mode of being-in-the-world is determined by the knowledge we value and pursue

when education in the debate community regarding topics like energy production becomesgrounded in the metaphysics of enframing our community becomes fragmented anddevolves into vocationalism rather than emphasizing critical thinking as an activity withintrinsic valueThomson, 2k1[Iain, University of New Mexico, Heidegger on Ontological Education, or: How We Become WhatWe Are , Inquiry, 2001]

Heidegger began developing his critique of higher education in 1911 and continued elaborating it well into the 1960s, butperhaps his most direct answer to this question comes in 1929.20 Having nally been awarded a full professorship (on thebasis of Being and Time), the 39-year-old Heidegger gives his of cial Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg University, the famousWhat isMetaphysics? He begins boldly, directing his critical attention to the university itself by emphasizing philosophys concrete existential foundations (since metaphysical questioning must be posed from the essential position of theexistence *Dasein+ that questions). Within the lifeworld of the university , Heidegger observes, existence

(Dasein) is determined by Wissenschaft , the knowledge embodied in the humanities and naturalsciences . Our Dasein in the community of researchers , teachers , and students is determinedby science or knowledge *durch die Wissenschaft bestimmt+. 21 Our very being-in-theworld is shapedby the knowledge we pursue , uncover , and embody . When Heidegger claims that existence isfundamentally shaped by knowledge, he is not thinking of a professoriate shifting in the winds ofacademic trends , nor simply arguing for a kind of pedagogical or performative consistency ,according to which we should practice what we know. His intent , rather, is to emphasize a troubling sense inwhich it seems that we cannot help practicing what we know , since we are always already implicitly shaped by our guiding metaphysical presuppositions . Heidegg ers question thus becomes: Whatis the ontological impact of our unquestioned reliance on the particular metaphysical presuppositions which tacitlydominate the academy? What happens to us essentially, in the ground of our existence, when the Wissenscha ft pursued inthe contemporary university becomes our guiding passion, fundamentally shaping our view of the world and of ourselves?Heideggers dramatic answer introduces his radical critique of the hyperspecialization and consequent

fragmentation of the modern university : The elds of science are widely separated. Their ways of handling theobjects of their inquiries differ fundamentally. Today only the technical organization of universities and facultiesconsolidates this multiplicity of dispersed disciplines , only through practical and instrumentalgoals do they maintain any meaning. The rootedness of the sciences in their essential ground has dried up and died.2 2Here in 1929 Heidegger accurately describes the predicament of that institution which, almost half a century later, ClarkKerr would satirically label the Multi -versity: an internally fragmented Uni -versity-in-name-only, where the sole communalunity stems from a common grievance about parking spaces.23 Historically , as the modern university losessight of the shared goals which originally justified the endeavors of the academic community asa whole (at rst, the common pursuit of the uni ed system of knowledge, then the communal dedication to theformation of cultivated individuals), its members begin to look outside the university for some purpose


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to give meaning to lives of research . Since only those disciplines (or sub-disciplines) able to produceinstrumentally useful results regularly find such external support , all disciplines increasingly tryto present themselves in terms of their use-value . Without a counter-ideal , students too willadopt this instrumental mentality , coming to see education merely as a means to an increasedsalary down the road . In this way fragmentation leads to the professionalization of the universityand , eventually , its deterioration into vocationalism . At the same time, moreover, the different disciplines,lacking any shared, substantive sense of a unifying purpose or common subjectmatter, tend by the logic of specialization todevelop internal standards appropriate to their particular object-domains. As these domains become increasinglyspecialized, these internal standards become ever more disparate, if not simply incommensurable. In this way, disciplinaryfragmentation leaves the university without common standards other than the now ubiquitous but entirely empty andformal ideal of excellence. Following in Heideggers footsteps, critics such as Bill Readings and Timothy Clark show how ourcontemporary university of excellence, owing to the very emptiness of the idea of excellence, is becoming an excellentbureaucratic corporation, geared to no higher idea than its own maximized self -perpetuation according to optimal

input/output ratios.24 Such diagnoses make clear that the development of our educational institutionscontinues to follow the underlying metaphysical logic of enframing , the progressivetransformation of all entities into mere resources to be optimized . Unfortunately, these critics fail torecognize this underlying ontohistorical logic, and so offer diagnoses without cures. Indeed, Readings materialistexplanation for the historical obsolescence of Bildung as the unifying ideal of the modern university (the result of animplacable bourgeois economic revolution) leads him to succumb to a cynicism in which future denizens of the universitycan hope for nothing more than pragmatic situational responses in an environment increasingly transformed by the logic

of consu merism.25 While such critiques of the university convincingly extend and update aspects of Heideggers analysis,they lack his philosophical vision for a revitalizing reuni cation of the university. To see that Heidegger himself did notrelinquish all hope for the future of higher education, we need only attend carefully to the performative dimension of hisInaugural Lecture. On the surface, it may seem as if Heidegger, welcomed fully into the arms of the university, ratherperversely uses his celebratory lecture to pronounce the death of the institution which has just hired him, proclaiming that:The rootedness of the sciences in their essential ground has dried up and died. Yet, with this deliberateprovocation Heidegger is not beating a dead horse ; his pronouncement that the university isdead at its roots implies that it is fated to wither and decay unless it is revived , reinvigoratedfrom the root . Heidegger uses this organic metaphor of rootedness (Verwurzelung) to put into effect what Derrida(who will restage this scene himself) recognizes as a phoenix motif: One burns or buries what is already dead so that lifewill be reborn and regenerated from these ashes.26 Indeed, Heidegger begins to outline his program for a renaissance ofthe univer sity in the lectures conclusion: Existence is determined by science , but science itself remainsrooted in metaphysics , whether it realizes it or not . Since the roots of the university aremetaphysical , a reinstauration of the scientific lifeworld requires a renewed attention to this

underlying metaphysical dimension . Only if science exists on the basis of metaphysics can itachieve anew its essential task , which is not to amass and classify bits of knowledge , but todisclose in ever-renewed fashion the entire expanse of truth in nature and history .27 What exactly isHeidegger proposing here? To understand his vision for a rebirth of the university, we need to turn to a text he beganwriting the next year: Platos Teaching on Truth.28 Here, tracing the o ntohistorical roots of our educational crisis back toPlatos cave, Heidegger (quite literally) excavates an alternative.

The pedagogical practice of ontological inquiry attuned by an authentic openness to Beingcreates a paradigm shift away from standardized models of unreflective praise forcontemporary norms grounded in vocational, economic, and technological which holds thepotential to awaken authentic ways of being-in-the-worldMagrini, 2k12[J.M., Professor at the College of DuPage Illinois, Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heideger,Technology, and the Poietic Attunement of Literature , Educational Philosophy and Theory,Volume 44, Issue 5, Pages 500-521, July 2012]

The understanding of Being in relation to an authentic existence can prove meaningful for ourpractices in the classrooms , and this is not limited to institutions of higher learning . Whenconsidering the current state of educational , viewing the curriculum in terms of either t he factory -model or thecorporate model , both espousing a philosophy grounded in vocational , economic , and technologicalconcerns , our contemporary schools are exemplars of inauthentic existence , and we can see it inmany of their practices , such as the emphasis on rote memorization and unreflective praise of contemporary


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norms , as contributors to the development of a pervasive inauthenticity (Dwyer et al., 1988, p. 146).Educational reform , as inspired by Heidegger's philosophy, represents the recove ry of our lost potential todevelop ontologically . Dwyer claims that it is possible to envisage a time when students progress to the point wherethey are no longer bound, to a considerable extent, by the possibilities which their own tradition offers ( ibid., p. 146).However, this movement to recover our ontological potential for Being is not an easy or simplematter to conceive , for it must not be mistakenly understood in terms of one educational

philosophy overtaking another , a battle between warring curriculum models, where progressivism usurps essentialismand neo-constructivism overtakes progressivism. Rather , it entails our confronting and overcoming themetaphysics of presence , the traditional metaphysical view that tacitly and insidiously determinesthe way that we are in the world (Thomson, 2002, p. 141). For Heidegger, educational reform is not simply about achange in our mind-set or radical conscious awakening as we find in Sartre's existentialism or Freire's spiritually inspirededucational philosophy. Rather, it is about transcending our inauthentic modes of attunement , andthereby enacting the authentic possibilities of our Being-in-the-world . What is called for is a radicalparadigm shift , from an inauthentic existence to one that is highlighted by resolute openness toour potential for Being , and this change means that along with our mood , our understanding of theworld and the ways in which we interpret and discourse about it has also been reconfigured .Whatever is adve rsely attuned can undergo a change of attunement, where there is attunement there is also the possibility of

an awakening attunement (Heidegger, 1995, p. 181). We hold the potential to change our attunement , and itis possible to be in the right mood . Some moods , which Heidegger classifies as fundamental moods, are forms

of awakening attunement and include : Angst , deep boredom , melancholy , and the mood of theholiday (das Festliche, or The Festival), or the mood of art . In the later works, Heidegger focuses on thefundamental attunement of wonder (Erstaunen), which is associated with authentic dwelling , a way ofBeing-in-theworld in which there exists a serene openness (Gelassenheit) to a possible change in ourunderstanding of Being (Dreyfus, 2001, p. 170). These are all forms of awakening attunements that provideinsight into our Being as a whole , revealing our world in terms of its authentic ontological nature . Achange in attunement would put us back in touch with our lost potentiality-for-Being . Awakeningattunement is a manner and means of grasping Da- sein with respect to the specific way it is, of grasping Da -sein asDa-sein, or better, of letting Dasein be as it is , or can be , as Da- sein (Heidegger, 1995, p. 68). As stated, Heideggerclaims that we are under the spell of das Gestell , the Frame -up , or the inauthentic Enframing moodof modern scientific-technology . Authentic educational reform requires that we undergo a changeof attunement , which is the paradigm shift from inauthentic to authentic existence . Education

conceived in terms of a meditative inquiry into the ontological nature of our Being , has thepotential to attune students anew , to inspire their transcendence beyond the numbing attunementgrounded in the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of today's technology . Heidegger is clear aboutthe path we must tread in order to recover our potentiality-for-Being, our ontological potential for living in an authenticmanner, and interestingly enough, it is real education that first makes this transformation a legitimatepossibility . According to Heidegger, Real education lays hold of the soul itself and transfers it in itsentirety by first of all leading us to the place of ou r essential Being and accustoming us to it (cited inThomson, 2002, p. 134). Heidegger's philosophy does indeed have implications for inspiring us to reexamine andreassess our current educational methods , practices , and curriculum content . The ontologicalconcerns of which Heidegger speaks, the return to the place of our essential Being , should form theessential grounding for any authentic philosophy of educational theory and practice .

Now is the key time to reconceptualize the hyper-separation of humanity from nature attempts at mastery have pushed the atmosphere, forests, and oceans past their capacity toabsorb the externalities of modern technology freedom beyond modernity require arecognition of these conditions, salvaging redeemable parts of the modern system whiledismantling and disposing those that enact physical destruction and ontological violenceIrwin in 8[Ruth; Heidegger, Politics and Climate Change: Risking it All ]

Environmental concerns are forcing us to reconceptualize the age-old assumption thathumanity has mastery over nature. The exponential growth of the global economy creates


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a situation where every year market turnover and consumption increases and the rate ofincrease is greater and greater year upon year. We are now at the stage that the atmosphere,the forests and the oceans cannot carry on absorbing the 'externalities' of pollution, anddramatic climate change is beginning to be upon us . Given these facts, and assuming for amoment that we have the capacity to reconceptualize the traditional 'hyperseparation' ofhumanity from nature - how do we begin the process of education and cultural change? The Kyoto Agreement attempted to bring exponential increase to a standstill and halt consumption and pollution to 1990levels. However, the Agreement rests on market assumptions about the mode of interaction between humanity and the earth(or resources). The Brundtland Report rarely mentions the physical environment, ecology or wilderness. Instead, it refers to'sustainable development' which is another metaphor for ongoing, progressive technological improvement and

universalization of modern cultural practices of consumerism. While the market metaphor structures allinteraction and ways of knowing, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to withdraw fromthe rubric of economic growth . Ideas are not 'constructed' first and then followed bymaterial conditions. Neither do material conditions exist independently of the world-viewby which they are interpreted. An avenue to a freedom beyond technological enframing isthe collapse of the dualism between culture and nature, which simultaneously collapsesthe position of technical mastery held by Man over an innocent, if wild and savage naturalenvironment. One of the recurring problems with dealing with environment issues is the

pessimistic belief that nothing can really change. Many people have a despondent view ofthe world yet see their own efforts to change things as futile or falling on deaf ears.Sometimes this feeling of futility is based on the minimal scale of individual effort - a small drop in avast ocean of ongoing environmentally destructive behaviour and beliefs. No single one ofus can stand outside the system we are thrown into; so that, even while we may abhorusing fossil fuels and cycle each day to work, we still wear clothes with synthetic,petroleumbased material, or we eat food packed in plastic or we fly occasionally to aconference on the other side of the planet. Even those who live in closed communities andgrow their own organic food, refuse to use money, and live wonderfully ecologicallyfriendly lifestyles are still at some points tied into the global economy. Their veryantagonism and self-imposed exile is a reaction that confirms the dominance of

modernity .1 Given the unavoidability of participating in the culture of modernity, thequestion arises about how to institute cultural, technological and economic change thatwill deeply alter the ethical relationship between humanity and the earth. The first step isto recognize the conditions into which we are thrown. This can be a depressing anddisempowering stage where one wonders if there are any possibilities of emerging from apathway that appears determined to carry on along the lines of anthropocentric economicgrowth no matter the anxiety about sustainable living in our ecological niche. The nextstep is to try to discern which aspects of the modern system relies upon industrialproduction, which upon the Enlightenment, which upon monotheistic religion, which upondemocratic Liberalism, which upon positivism and which upon technology itself . Having teasedsome of these aspects apart, it is simpler to dismantle and reassemble a culture that keeps someaspects of modernity: environmentally friendly technology, for example, and egalitarianforms of political power but disposes of consumerism and commensurately, large-scaleindustrial production for its own sake . Optimistic management of environmental issuesfails completely to honestly engage with the full implications of modern behaviour. This ispartly because the technological enframing of our world-view inhibits us from seeing theearth or ourselves in a way that is outside of 'standing-reserve' . Sustainable development hasbecome fully integrated into the enframing of technology and the optimistic mastery over nature.

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