Hegemonic Transformation: The State, Laws, and Labour Relations in Post-Socialist China

HEGEMONIC TRANSFORMATION

THE STATE, LAWS, AND LABOUR RELATIONS IN POST-SOCIALIST CHINA

ELAINE SIO-IENG HUI

SERIES IN ASIAN LABOR AND WELFARE POLICIES

Series in Asian Labor and Welfare Policies

Series editorsChris Chan

Department of Applied Social StudiesCity University of Hong KongKowloon Tong, Hong Kong

Dae-oup ChangRussell Square, SOAS, University of London

London, UK

Khalid NadviGlobal Development Institute

Arthur Lewis Building, University of ManchesterManchester, UK

Asia has been the new focus of global social sciences. One of the keyfeatures for the rise of Asia is the creation of the largest industrial workforcein the human history. China, India and many other newly industrializedcountries in Asia have been transformed as ‘world factories’ for the globalcapitalism in the past four decades. This development involves both exten-sive and intensive migration of labour across Asia. Massive populations inthe Asian countries, who formerly involved in traditional self- subsistenceactivities, have become wage labourers. In China itself, more than 260million of rural-urban migrant labours have been created in the past threedecades. The production and the reproduction of labour in Asia havetherefore become the major research themes in a wide range of disciplinessuch as gender studies, development studies, policies studies, employmentrelations, human resource management, legal studies as well as sociology,politics and anthropology.

More information about this series athttp://www.springer.com/series/14486

Elaine Sio-ieng Hui

HegemonicTransformation

The State, Laws, and Labour Relationsin Post-Socialist China

Elaine Sio-ieng HuiSchool of Labor and Employment RelationsPennsylvania State UniversityUniversity Park, PA, USA

Series in Asian Labor and Welfare PoliciesISBN 978-1-349-70019-6 ISBN 978-1-137-50429-6 (eBook)DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-50429-6

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© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018“Zugl.: Dissertation der Oversized Kassel, Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften, ElaineSio-ieng HUI, 17.12.2014”. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely andexclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned,specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting,reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or informationstorage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilarmethodology now known or hereafter developed.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in thispublication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names areexempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informationin this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither thepublisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to thematerial contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Thepublisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps andinstitutional affiliations.

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For my parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is based on my Ph.D. dissertation, submitted in October 2014to the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Kassel under thetitle ‘Hegemonic Transformation: The State, Laws, and Labour Relationsin Post-Socialist China’. Some parts of my dissertation have been revisedand published in China Quarterly and Journal of Contemporary Asia underthe titles “The Labour Law System, Capitalist Hegemony and ClassPolitics in China” and “Putting the Chinese State in Its Place: A Marchfrom Passive Revolution to Hegemony” respectively. The idea of investi-gating the hegemonic capacity of the Chinese state first came to mind in2008 while I studied for a Masters in the Labour Policies and Globalizationprogram at the Global Labour University (GLU). I wanted to make it aresearch topic for my thesis, but, after talking to my supervisorProf. Christoph Scherrer, I found it would be too ambitious. However,I did not put the topic out of my mind. After graduating from GLU,I decided to pursue a Ph.D. and wrote a proposal on this topic that I hadbeen thinking about for some time.

I could not have finished this book without the aid and encouragementof numerous persons and organizations. Most importantly, I have to thankmy mom and dad. They offered me everything that they had withoutasking for anything in return. Words fail to convey my deepest gratitude toand my love for them. I would also like to thank my two brothers andsisters-in-law for their support and tolerance in my never-ending studies.

I am deeply grateful to Prof. Christoph Scherrer, my masters and Ph.D.supervisor. He is one of the key people that have inspired me to embark onthis research on capitalist hegemony in China. He has given me much

vii

room for formulating my own research while offering me invaluable advicewhen needed.

I am indebted to Prof. Simon Clarke, Prof. Andreas Bieler, Dr. LeeChun Wing, Ms. Ellen David Friedman, Dr. Boy Lüthje, Dr. ChristaWicherich and Dr. Bernd Reiter. They patiently read through drafts ofparts of my thesis, offering me highly constructive comments. I would liketo thank Prof. Jude Howell, a respectable expert in China Studies, forbeing my examiner. I would also like to express my gratitude to Prof.Gordon Mathews, the supervisor for my M.Phil. thesis. He patientlyshowed me what writing a dissertation really means. I have to thank Ah Soand my friends from the Grassroots College, who first enlightened me onthe issue of hegemony and its relationship to social and labour movements.

Numerous people have given substantial support to my fieldwork,without which I could hardly have completed this research. They includeDr. Chris Chan, Ellen, Ms. Li, Francine, YY, Pat, Ah Ki, Little Chu, SW,Tong Tong, April, all of the worker-informants and other interviewees.I deeply appreciate their kindness, generosity and trust.

I am thankful to Heinrich Boell Stiftung for awarding me a full schol-arship for three years, without which my Ph.D. life would have been muchmore difficult. I must also thank those who made my Ph.D. life in Germanyenjoyable and inspiring—my Ph.D. colleagues in the Kolleg of GlobalSocial Policies and Governance, the coordinators of the Kolleg, YuanMing, Luciana, Miao Miao, and my friends from Hong Kong, includingAh Keung, Kit Sum, Ah Kin, and Ah Wing, who rendered me all kinds ofsupport during my life in Germany. Last, but not least, I have to thankJason and Bryce for kindly proofreading my Ph.D. dissertation and thisbook manuscript.

viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

1 Putting the Chinese State in Its Place: The Marchfrom Passive Revolution to Hegemony 1

2 The Gramscian Approach to the Chinese State 43

3 The Legal Foundation for ChangingState-Capital-Labor Relations 69

4 Workers’ Active Consent 105

5 Workers’ Passive Consent 151

6 Workers’ Refusal to Consent 197

7 Conclusion: The Chinese State, the Law, Labor Relations,and Hegemony 231

Appendix 1: Details of Informants 253

Index 263

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACFTU All-China Federation of Trade UnionsACWF All-China Women’s FederationCCP Chinese Communist PartyCCYL China Communist Youth LeagueFIEs Foreign-Owned EnterprisesNGOs Non-governmental OrganizationsNPC National People's CongressPLC CCP Politics and Law CommissionPRC People’s Republic of ChinaPRD Pearl River DeltaSOEs State-Owned EnterprisesTVEs Township and Village Enterprises

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LIST OF GRAPHS

1 Putting the Chinese State in Its Place: The Marchfrom Passive Revolutionto Hegemony

Graph 1 China’s GDP growth rate (1992–2013) 14

4 Workers’ Active Consent

Graph 1 Comparison between migrant worker average monthlywages and the national average 135

Graph 2 Worker average wage increase and inflation rates 136Graph 3 Analysis of cases accepted by arbitration committees,

1996–2008 144

7 Conclusion: The Chinese State, the Law, Labor Relations,and Hegemony

Graph 1 Labour share of GDP in China 245Graph 2 Minimum wage as a proportion of the average wage

in China 245

xiii

LIST OF TABLES

4 Workers’ Active Consent

Table 1 A self-constructed typology of worker susceptibility towardslegal hegemony 107

xv

CHAPTER 1

Putting the Chinese State in Its Place:The March from Passive Revolution

to Hegemony

1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK

The Chinese party-state has been studied in a wide range of academicfields. Usually employing a comparative approach, transition studies isinterested in China’s state-socialist history, its path of socio-political andeconomic reform, and the role of the state in the transition to a marketeconomy (Gallagher 2005b; McMillan and Naughton 1992). The Chinesestate’s significant capacity to maintain steady economic growth hasattracted attention from economics and development studies (Oi 1995;Wu et al. 2013). Its authoritarian features and the possibilities of demo-cratic transition are the foci of political science (McCormick 1990;Goldman 1994). The poor working conditions in China’s global factoriesand the rise of the new working class and its relations with the party-stateare regularly debated in the field of sociology and labor studies (Pun andChan 2012; Pun et al. 2010). Beyond the national level, China’s growinginfluence in the international realm has driven international relationsscholars to delve into the characteristics of its party-state (Beeson 2009;Zheng 2005). Like these investigations, the Chinese state is one of the keysubjects of inquiry in this book. I argue that the Chinese economic reformbegun in 1978 is a top-down passive revolution, to borrow the words of ItalianCommunist theoretician Antonio Gramsci (1971, 1988), and that afteralmost four decades of capitalist reform, the post-socialist Chinese state hasbeen transforming from forcefully steering the country’s passive revolutioninto assisting the capitalist class to build up hegemony (i.e., cultural, moral,

© The Author(s) 2018E.S.I Hui, Hegemonic Transformation, Series in Asian Laborand Welfare Policies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-50429-6_1

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and political leadership). Within this framework, I further argue that thelabor law system, which has undergone substantial reform, is a crucial meansthrough which the Chinese party-state has attempted to secure the workingclass’s consent to the ruling class.

The shift from the socialist mode of production to the capitalist mode ofproduction in China should be understood as a ‘passive revolution’ or‘revolution from above’. The term was coined by Gramsci to understandthe differences between the French revolution and the ItalianRisorgimento. Gramsci points out that the former was actively initiated bythe popular masses and led by the bourgeois, and that it resulted in atransition into a capitalist state; but the Italian Risorgimento came aboutthrough a passive revolution that was marked by state-engineered socialand political reform built upon the ruling class’s domination rather thanpopular support, which led to ‘an institutional framework consonant withcapitalist property relations’ (Morton 2007, 610). According to Gramsci, apassive revolution leading to a capitalist social formation is usually backedby the domination of and forces possessed by the ruling class, which occurs,however, without much capacity to acquire the subaltern’s consent tocapitalist development. Gramsci argues that passive revolution is usuallyconcurrent with two other political phenomena: trasformismo and cae-sarism. Trasformismo refers to co-opting the working class’s leaders in suchways that the exploited class is put into a politically passive position(Merrington 1968). Caesarism refers to a situation in which a strongindividual political figure intervenes to resolve conflicts between antago-nistic social forces (Buci-Glucksmann 1980).

Passive revolutions that have taken place in various economic andpolitical settings have been examined in detail, including Mexico (Morton2003), Russia (Van der Pijl 1993), South Korea (Moore 2007), Japan(Kelly 2002), Turkey (Hendrick 2009), and Senegal (Fatton 1986). Cox(1983) highlights that passive revolution is a concept that is ‘particularlyapposite to industrializing Third World countries’, wherein a hegemonicdominant class that is supported by the subordinate class is usually absent.I find this concept useful for analyzing China, which has been in a similarsituation that Cox has described. In fact, Gray suggests that post-socialistChina has been experiencing a passive revolution in which the Chineseparty-state ‘took upon itself the leading role in the reorganization of socialrelations commensurate with a restoration of capitalism’ (Gray 2010, 456).My position aligns with Gray’s, holding that China’s economic reform is apassive bourgeois revolution, which has been guided by strong state

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intervention. However, as will be explained, I go beyond Gray’s argumentto suggest that the Chinese ruling class has been seeking to acquireworkers’ consent to its rule, i.e., constructing capitalist hegemony.Moreover, my approach to the Chinese state also transcends the perspec-tives of the authoritarian state, developmental state, and corporatist state,as will be explicated in Sect. 2, by taking the ideological role of the Chinesestate seriously.

During the state-socialist period, Marxism–Leninism and Maoism werethe ruling ideologies; they served as the sources of political legitimacy forthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and helped mobilize the workingclass and peasants to support the state. Some scholars even suggest that theMaoist state was hegemonic in the sense that many people bought into thesocialist ideas (Chau 2005). However, to cope with economic stagnationand declining political legitimacy of the state in the aftermath of theCultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping, from the second generation ofleadership in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), kicked off thetop-down capitalist revolution in 1978, or what he called the second rev-olution of China.1 At the national level, the party-state forcefully dis-mantled work units (danwei) and rural communes (renmin gongshe),rolling back workers’ and farmers’ welfare provision such that they wereforced into the capitalist market to sell their labor power. Thus, the socialistworking class was decomposed and then remade into the exploited class ofthe capitalist system (see Chap. 3). At the international level, under-standing China’s passive revolution against ‘a world-historical context ofuneven and combined development’ (Morton 2007, 612–613), its opendoor policies and incorporation into global capitalism were concurrentwith the overproduction crisis that occurred during the 1970s in the West.Attempting to boost their profits, many foreign corporations adopted the‘spatial fix’ strategy (Silver 2003) by investing in China. As a result, thecapitalist class, composed of foreign capitalists, cadres-turned-capitalists,private domestic capitalists, and state-capitalists, all of whom were absent inthe state socialist era, were gradually recreated in the reform period andbecome key market players (see Chap. 3).

Despite lingering official slogans and rhetoric, Marxism–Leninism andMaoism are no longer the CCP’s dominant ideologies; they are neither putinto real practice, nor does the general populace still believe in them. Sinceits ideological capacity has been shrinking and no capitalist class has beenready to exercise ethico-political leadership during the early stage of thispassive revolution, the party-state has relied mainly on domination and

PUTTING THE CHINESE STATE IN ITS PLACE … 3

naked power to steer the capitalist reform; the most prominent examplebeing its use of grave violence to clamp down on the Tiananmen demo-cratic movement in 1989 and the autonomous workers’ organizationsformed around that period, such as the Workers’ Autonomous Federation,Free Labour Union of China, the League for the Protection of the Rightsof Working People, the Workers’ Forum, and the Chinese Workers’Autonomous Alliance (Warner 1996; Lau 1997).

However, the implementation of capitalist reform for close to fourdecades has resulted in the exploitation of workers on an unheard-of scale(Chan 2001; Pun 2005), which in turn has triggered tremendous laborunrest (Lee 2007); to continue ruling mainly through coercion will bepolitically hazardous for the party-state. Labor protests against unfairtreatment in the workplace, protests against land expropriation andhousing demolition, and protests over environmental issues are threeprincipal forms of social unrest in contemporary China.2 It was estimatedthat as of May 2014 the total number of mass incidents, the official gov-ernment term for peoples’ protests, was above one hundred thousand peryear, among which labor and environmental protests altogether constitutedapproximately 30%.3 According to a labor advocacy group, there were1171 strikes and protests in the 18 months leading up to December 20134;that amounts to more than 2 strikes taking place every day. In the past,worker grievances were mainly concerned with managerial corruption,layoffs by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), wage defaults, compensation forworkplace injuries, overtime payments, corporal punishment and so forth(Chan 2001; Lee 2007; Chen 2003). Recently, democratic elections inenterprise trade unions, reasonable wages above the minimum wage rate(Chan and Hui 2012), compensation related to factory closures or relo-cations, and social insurance have also become important concerns ofworkers.

In light of the escalating social and labor discontent, the party-state hasstarted to assist the fledgling capitalist class in constructing hegemony inorder to elicit the consent of the popular masses. Going beyond Gray’sargument that the Chinese state has navigated the country’s passive revo-lution (2010), I propose that the Chinese state does not simply seek to retainits role of engineering the passive revolution through coercion, but hasmanifested signs of undergoing a hegemonic transformation—endeavoringto secure the peoples’ consent to its cultural and ethico-political leadership aswell as to the leadership of the new-born capitalist class in order to avoid thesubordinate classes rising up against the state–capital nexus. What I mean by

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hegemony here is in the strict Gramscian sense. Instead of stretching theconcept to include every relation between the oppressor and the oppressed,5

this book focuses on the Chinese party-state’s hegemonic capacity with regardto state–capital–labor relations in the country. In Prison Notebooks, Gramsci(1971) advances the idea that the ruling class’s power is organized by thestate in both political society and civil society through ‘coercion’ plus‘hegemony’. On the one hand, following Marx and Engels’ arguments, hecontends that the coercive machinery of the state—the army, the police, theprisons and so forth—helps sustain the domination of the capitalist class. Onthe other hand, the dominant class has to acquire the active consent of theworking class by establishing ‘its own moral, political and cultural values asconventional norms of practical behavior’ in order to sustain its class rule(Femia 1987, 3). This ideological ascendency of the capitalist class over thesubordinate classes is what Gramsci calls hegemony. This condensedexplanation of hegemony will be further elaborated in Chap. 2.

Rising worker discontent has made it imperative for the Chineseparty-state to cope effectively with labor unrest so as to maintain politicalstability and a stable environment for capital accumulation. Over the pastfew decades, the party-state’s strategy in handling labor protests haveshifted from suppression to tolerance, and now to partial acknowledgment.While trade unions independent from the party-led All-China Federationof Trade Unions (ACFTU) and associations challenging the CCP’s polit-ical monopoly were heavily clamped down upon in the 1990s and are stillbanned, during the 2000s, the party-state became less harsh towardsworker protests (Chen 2006; Tanner 2005). Some local governmentofficials have taken active roles in pacifying angry protestors or mediatingbetween employers and workers. Instead of suppressing protestors in thefirst instance, police forces are now deployed to talk them into droppingtheir collective actions.6 My interviews with trade union officials inGuangdong province reveal that in the past few years, the provincialgovernment’s attitude towards labor demonstrations has changed evenfurther: it has started to regard labor protests with economic demands as anormal part of society.7 One trade union official noted that ‘any intelligentgovernment would not resort to violence to quash strikes. As long asworker strikes do not aim to overthrow the regime and are economic innature, most governments would not suppress them’.8 In addition, somelabor practitioners and labor rights lawyers noted that the party-state is, infact, more tolerant with labor demonstrations than other kinds of socialprotests, such as those related to land and human rights issues.9 It would


be naïve, however, to assume that the party-state in any hegemonic socialformation has forsaken coercive measures to cope with labor protests(Gramsci 1971; Poulantzas 1969, 1978). Indeed, none of the Westerncountries, where capitalist hegemony prevails, have ever abandoned coer-cive tactics. In China, the party-state remains harsh with worker leaders instrikes,10 but it now simultaneously tries to acquire worker allegiance tocapitalist moral and ethico-political leadership. The changing strategiesfrom suppression to tolerance to partial acknowledgement over timeshould thus be assessed seriously. If forceful crackdown is no longer itspredominant tactic, then how does the party-state reduce labor unrest,contain it within the economic arena, and build up capitalist leadershipover workers? I argue that the labor law system serves these purposes byendorsing, inculcating, and reproducing capitalist hegemony, and that it is acrucial point of departure to anatomize the hegemonic power of the Chinesestate due to theoretical reasons, lessons from other countries, and thedevelopment of legal apparatuses in China.

First, as Gramsci has pointed out, laws serve a hegemonic purpose bycreating and sustaining ‘a certain type of civilization and of citizen’,eliminating ‘certain customs and attitudes’, and promoting certain values(Gramsci 1971, 246). The legislative and judicial branches of the state are‘organs of political hegemony’ (Gramsci 1971, 246). Many contemporaryscholars have used Gramsci to highlight the hegemonic characteristics oflaws; for example Litowitz (2000), Culter (2005), Kennedy (1982), andBuckel and Lescano (2009). Second, the experience of Western countriesshows that labor laws are an ideology (Klare 1980) and that they cannegatively affect worker activism. For instance, the Wagner Act in the USAderadicalised the labor movement by instilling a legal consciousness intoworkers premised upon contractualism and private property rights, and byconfining their actions within existing legal institutions and practices (Klare1978, 1982).

Third, within the Chinese context the labor law system is one of the vitalmeans through which the post-socialist party-state has constructed capitalisthegemony in order to avert revolutionary labor insurgency. During theMaoist era, the legal system was completely marginalized (Potter 1999), butit has gained greater weight in the reform period, as will be explained inChap. 3. During the 1980s, the labor contract and economic contractsystems were introduced into the legal system and private property rightswere constitutionally endorsed. The 1992 Trade Union Law, the 1994Labour Law, and the 1995 Arbitration Law were enacted to regulate the

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newly emerging capitalist labor relations (Liebman 2007). Moreover, theconcept of ‘yifa zhiguo’ (rule of laws) was added to the Chinese constitutionin 1999 and the notion of ‘yifa weiquan’ (defending rights according tolaws) has been widely promoted by the party-state. During the 2000s, theintensification of labor–capital conflicts and the proliferation of strikesprompted the party-state to pass three new laws in 2007: the LabourContract Law, the Employment Promotion Law, and the Labour DisputeMediation and Arbitration Law. The 18th CCP National Congress in 2012endorsed the deepening of judicial reform,11 which continues to occupy animportant place on the agenda of the new Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping and LiKeqiang, and their government.12

Scholars widely agree that the labor law system in China is an importantvehicle for the state to channel worker grievances to the regulated, indi-vidualized, and officially-sanctioned procedures so as to forestall radicalactions (Lee 2007; Gallagher 2007; Wang et al. 2009; Friedman and Lee2010; Chen and Tang 2013). However, at the same time, some scholarsreiterate that labor laws are poorly enforced and ill-respected by localgovernments and businesses (Lee 2007; Cooney 2007; Ngok 2008; Wanget al. 2009). If both of these arguments hold true, then an intriguingpuzzle arises: how is it possible that an often-criticized labor law system iscapable of persuading workers to utilize legal vehicles for redressing theirgrievances or to abide by legal principles when taking actions, thus chan-neling their activism into the legal realm? If the labor law system fails toperform its mediating or mitigating functions, workers would likely havebecome more rebellious and subversive. But workers have not becomeinsurrectionary. Given that, how has the labor law system, however flawed,managed to contain labor activism within the legal boundaries? To myknowledge, little is known about this grievance-diversion mechanisminherent in the labor law system: how has the party-state made manyworkers believe that the labor law system can protect their interests so thatthey do not take to the streets? In what ways does the labor law system helpresolve the capital–labor conflict? To what extent do workers trust it andwhy? Under what circumstances would workers be willing to bypass it?Drawing on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, my research seeks to solve theaforementioned puzzle and provide a deeper understanding of the grievance-diversion capacity of the labor law system, which I call legally-mediatedhegemony or legal hegemony. In addition, as previous research on theChinese labor law system seldom explored workers’ views on the laws, I


have spent tremendous effort to make their voices heard in this book (seeChaps. 4–6).

My argument that the Chinese party-state has been undergoing hege-monic transformation (i.e., shifting its role from forcefully carrying out thepassive revolution without popular support to acquiring workers’ consentto the ruling class through the labor law system) should be seen in thecontext of greater socio-political and economic development that havetaken place in China over the past four decades. During the early stage ofChina’s passive revolution, capitalist economic growth was a cardinalagenda forcefully put forward by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, thesecond and third generation of the Chinese leadership, who supported aversion of the trickle down thesis promoted by neoliberal economics (Gray2010). This was well captured by Deng’s famous saying ‘black cat or whitecat, it is a good cat if it catches the mouse’, ‘to get rich is glorious’ (Tokand Zheng 2007, 5) and Jiang’s idea of the Three Representatives (whichled to the admission of capitalists into CCP). However, when the laborshare of GDP plummeted from 51.4% in 1995 to 42.4% in 2007 (Hao2014) and China’s Gini coefficient reached a new height of 0.47 in 2010,13

social protests triggered by serious social inequality and a wide wealth gapbecame as important a concern as economic growth for Hu Jintao andWen Jiaobao, the fourth generation of China’s leadership. They realizedthat the legitimacy of the party-state and the capitalist economy was beingtested increasingly. They thus emphasized the construction of a ‘harmo-nious society’ and granted greater material concessions to the working classin the form of more generous social policies and labor law legislation,including the 2008 Labour Contract Law and the 2011 Social InsuranceLaw. Post-Mao China has initiated numerous economic policies, but itssocial policies were mainly implemented after the mid-1990s, and most ofthem were put into place by the Hu-wen regime (Wang 2008).‘Harmonious society’ is thus regarded as a hegemonic project of theparty-state to curb labor discontent (Hui and Chan 2012). The newlyformed Xi-Li government continues to use the rhetoric of a ‘harmonioussociety’. It has also attempted to mobilize the popular masses to supportcapitalist development through propagating discourses such as building upa ‘moderately prosperous society’ (xiaokang shehui) by 2020 and pursuing‘China’s dream’. The party-state’s increasing effort to elicit the consent ofthe popular masses for capitalist development has resulted in greaterpopular support for the party-state. Research conducted in 2013 showedthat 85% of the citizenry was satisfied with the country’s direction, ranking

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it first out of 39 countries. It had increased by 37% when compared to2002.14

In a nutshell, both national development (i.e., economic stagnation,declining legitimacy of the political regime and etc.) and internationalpolitical-economic dynamics (i.e., the overproduction crisis occurred in theWest during the 1970s) have fuelled a passive revolution in China. This hasconsequently put a strain on capital–labor relations in post-socialist China;labor protests have burgeoned over the past few decades. Instead of pri-marily turning to coercive measures to maintain industrial peace and socialstability as in the early phase of the passive revolution, the Chineseparty-state has increasingly sought to strengthen its hegemonic capacity,especially through the labor law system and the ‘harmonious society’project, to secure the working class’s consent to its rule. Section 2 reviewscurrent studies on the Chinese state in order to expound on how myapproach fills up the intellectual gap. Section 3 clarifies the methodsdeployed to conduct this research. The last section explains the organiza-tion of this book and the theme of each chapter.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Contrary to Stern and O’Brien’s (2012) opinion that current literature onChina has a tendency to sidestep the issue of the state, I notice thatresearch on the Chinese state has actually been proliferating in the past fewdecades; indeed, to the extent that it is imperative to further structure andanalyze them if we are to gain a more thorough understanding of theChinese state. This book aims to conduct a systematic review of the lit-erature on the Chinese state to provide a new point of departure forcomprehending it. I contend that the Chinese state has emerged in thisliterature in three major forms, pertinent to its political, economic, andsocial characteristics. Politically, it largely appears as an authoritarian state.Economically, it is commonly considered a developmental state or anotherrelated form. Socially, state–society relationship in China has beenlargely understood through the concept of a corporatist state or civilsociety. All of these conceptualizations have made significant contributionsto our understanding of the Chinese state, but, as will be revealed, itsideological characteristics are largely overlooked and these three dominantperspectives hardly grasp the Chinese state in its totality. Although I dividethe current literature into three categories—those stressing the political,economic and social facets of the Chinese state respectively, there by no


means exist stiff boundaries between them. I consider these categoriesanalytical rather than rigid and discrete divisions. These studies are classi-fied according to their main attributes, but they may, at the same time,involve elements from the other categories.

2.1 The Political Facet: Various Forms of the Authoritarian State

Since the founding of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), the CCP hasbeen the ruling party, monopolizing the government machinery withLeninist practices. The Chinese government is not popularly elected. Anyattempt to challenge the CCP’s political power will be met with suppres-sion as in the case of the 1989 Tiananmen Democratic Movement. Nofreedom of association is allowed in the country; only social organizationsand trade unions that are subordinate to the CCP or its authorized bodiesare legally permissible. Due to this political reality, many scholars havetaken the authoritarian state thesis as the premise when studying the reformChina.15 During the 1980s, there were many discussions in China on‘neo-authoritarianism’—strongman politics (see Sautman 1992; Petraccaand Xiong 1990). However, Perry (1993) argues that, unlike the FourAsian Tigers (South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong),neo-authoritarianism is hard to take root in China. This is because, firstly,tight centralization, which is an indispensable foundation for strongmanpolitics, is not truly possible in China, given its sheer size and the greatdiversity across the country. Secondly, political acquiescence to the au-thoritarian rule is not so readily secured, Perry holds, because communi-cation technology has substantially advanced in the contemporary world.The other experts, such as Lieberthal and Lampton (1992), Oksenberg(2001), and Goldstein (1994) conceptualize the Chinese political systemduring the 1980s as ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ due to its high degree ofdecentralization in terms of government structures and decision makingprocesses. However, that concept was later criticized for being static andunable to capture the forces propelling changes within the political system.Subsequently, scholars have started to investigate two important types ofquestions: (1) why has the CCP’s rule remained relatively stable or,alternatively, why is it in jeopardy? (2) Is democratic transition of theChinese authoritarian regime possible? If yes, what are the driving forces?

Regarding the first question, some specialists advocate the idea of ‘re-silient authoritarianism’ to underline the Chinese state’s ability to

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acclimatize to changing socio-political and economic development throughimplementing different institutional adaptations, allowing it to maintainpolitical stability and a thriving economy (Nathan 2003; Shambaugh 2008;Miller 2008). However, this conceptualization is not without contestation(Shirk 2007; Gilley 2003). For instance, Li (2012) argues that the resilientauthoritarian thesis cannot capture the paradoxical and transformativedevelopment of the country, which is simultaneously characterized by‘weak leaders, strong factions’, ‘weak government, strong interest groups’,‘weak Party, strong country’ (Li 2012, 595). He holds that the CCP has toimplement democratic changes if it is to maintain political legitimacy andforestall bottom-up insurgency.

Other terms are also used to explicate Chinese politics. Perry (2007)categorizes the Chinese state as a ‘revolutionary authoritarian’ statebecause its durable rule is largely attributed to its continuous recollectionand reinvention of the socialist heritage. ‘Populist authoritarianism’ (Saich2004; Dickson 2005) and ‘authoritarian populism’ (Gallagher 2005a, 26)are employed to grasp the political trend where the Hu-Wen regime placedgrowing emphasis on reducing social inequality but retained tight controlover society. Landry (2008) describes the Chinese party-state as ‘decen-tralized authoritarianism’ for it has been able to maintain an authoritariansystem while at the same time allowing room for economic and adminis-trative decentralization, a strategy that is associated with democracy; it isalso a strategy that other authoritarian regimes in history have not pursued.Mertha (2009) revitalizes the concept of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’,arguing that the policy-making process in China is still shaped by thefragmented authoritarian framework, but the party-state has become moremalleable for interest groups and social actors, who manage to shape policyoutcomes within structural constraints. Similarly, Lee and Zhang (2013)use the notion ‘bargained authoritarianism’ to highlight the room for socialactors to bargain and maneuver within the authoritarian political regime.

Concerning the second question about the possibility of democratictransition, some experts see a glimmer of hope in grassroots elections,which were first introduced in two counties in Guangxi in the early 1980sand in the legislation of the Organic Law of the Villagers Committees. Xuasserts that grassroots elections have empowered different social forces, yetit ‘does not necessarily weaken the capacity of the state to govern society’(1997, 1431). Hence, the party-state would be relatively open to theseelections. She is positive that in the long run this type of election will leadto a peaceful democratic transition in China. However, other scholars have


a bleaker view of grassroots elections. Jakobson (2004) points out bluntlythat the purpose of village elections is not to achieve democracy but topromote better governance and stability in remote rural areas. That said,she does not totally dismiss the long-term impacts of these elections oneducating rural dwellers and instilling a checks and balance system at thegrassroots level. Shi (2000) concludes that people’s attitudes towardspolitical reform have not changed much as a result of grassroots elections.Referencing the case of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, she, instead, placeshope on the political elites to initiate democratic changes. O’Brien and Li(2000) argue that grassroots democracy in China can hardly be realizedunless the Party cadres are subjected to democratic monitoring. They are ofthe view that in China, ‘[e]lections are designed to increase mass supportfor the Party, and grassroots democracy is understood [by the state] to befully compatible with strong state control’ (O’Brien and Li 2000,488–489).

Despite the differences among them, all the literature of Chineseauthoritarianism possess one common feature. Echoing neo-statist theory(Evans et al. 1985; Skocpol and Amenta 1986),16 their approach isstate-centered and explains Chinese politics by paying primary attention tothe political regime and the political system. The Chinese state is, invarying degrees, treated as an actor that is free-standing from society. Theirfocus rests upon the power of the Chinese state to regulate the society, itsability to act independently from social forces, how political institutionshave influenced the party–state’s governing capacities and‚ so forth. Thestate–society relationship has become secondary, if not marginalized, inways that non–state forces, such as social movements, classes, and pressuregroups have receded into the background of their analysis. However, asstressed by Jessop (2008), a sophisticated theory of the state should be atheory of society because the state is socially embedded. If we seek tounderstand the Chinese state in a comprehensive and profound manner,then it should be examined in relation to the society, the economic andsocial relations of the country.

Another deficiency of the literature of Chinese authoritarianism is that itdelivers the incorrect impression that the Chinese state has not undergoneany significant changes because it has remained authoritarian after almost40 years of economic reform. However, Howell is correct in stating that‘China remains authoritarian, but it is an authoritarianism that is increas-ingly, albeit haltingly, opening up, allowing the expansion of spaces forself-regulation and intellectual reflection, and even the competitive

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contestation of power at lower levels’ (Howell 2004a, 17). We thus need amore sophisticated analytical framework, which is able to underscoreconcurrently both the authoritarian characteristics of the Chinese state andthe crucial changes it has been undergoing (especially those pertinent to itsideological and hegemonic capacity) in order to comprehend it accurately.

2.2 The Economic Facet: Developmental State or Not?

The pre-reform economy in China has been characterized asneo-traditionalist (Walder 1986), state paternalist (Chen 2000), or as amoral economy (Wang 2008). However, due to the CCP’s declining le-gitimacy in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and the long-stagnanteconomy marked by serious unemployment and huge population growth(McNally 2008; Gray 2010), Deng Xiaoping initiated the passive revolu-tion in the era of global capitalism. China’s capitalist economic reform hasbeen conducted in a piecemeal manner as captured by Deng’s famousslogan ‘let some people get rich first’ and ‘groping for stones to cross theriver’. The economic reform was considered a ‘segmented deregulariza-tion’ (Gallagher 2004, 17). The years from 1979 to 1984 were a period ofinsulated laboratory, and from 1986 to 1992, the economic reform wasmarkedly controlled liberalization (Gallagher 2004); both periods focusedon reforming SOEs and attracting foreign investment into the country. Inthe wake of the Tiananmen democratic movement, opposition to eco-nomic reform emerged within the CCP, with cadres from the leftist factionarguing that the open door policies had led to serious corruption, socialinequality, and widespread discontent. However, Deng Xiaoping’sSouthern Tour in 1992 was seen as reflecting the party-state’s fullendorsement of the economic reform. Afterwards, more reforms were putinto place, and foreign trade was promoted widely.

From 1993 to 1998, China’s economic reform concentrated mostly onthe fiscal, financial, and corporate realms. Its accession to the World TradeOrganization in 2001 further incorporated the country into global capi-talism. Its banking system was restructured from 1998 to 2006 (Naughton2008). And since 2013 the Xi-Li government has initiated a deepening ofreform. Driven by its export-oriented model, China’s GDP has growntremendously (see Graph 1), and it is now the second largest economy inthe world. After the 2008 economic crisis, the party-state sought to reducereliance on overseas markets, especially the USA and Europe,


hoping to transform the country’s economy into one based on domesticconsumption.

Contrary to the neo-classical viewpoint that the state should not inter-vene in the market, the Chinese state has played a crucial role in restruc-turing and boosting the economy in such ways that China’s economy maybe viewed as a miracle. Regarding the economic role of the Chinese state,there are at least three major debates: (1) Should the Chinese state becategorized as a developmental state or is it pursuing another economicroute? (2) Apart from the central government, what are the roles of localgovernment in China’s developmental process? (3) How is China differentfrom or similar to other developmental countries in Asia?

The developmental state perspective gives weight to the role of the statein organizing and facilitating economic development during industrializa-tion and modernization.17 Many studies uphold the Chinese develop-mental state thesis (Oi 1995, 1999; Blecher 1991; Wade 2005). Forinstance, Baek (2001) explicates that China has followed the same devel-opmental model pursued by Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. It hasexercised strict control over the financial sector, provided tremendoussupport to the SOEs, and strongly promoted export industries. Gallagher(2005b, 6, 7) calls China’s economic model as ‘state-led capitalistdevelopmentalism’, but argues that its developmental path differs from

Graph 1 China’s GDP growth rate (1992–2013). Source http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual (compiled from data ofNational Bureau of Statistics of China)

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http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual

other East Asian countries as they have not depended on FDI as much asChina has. Extending the concept of the developmental state beyond thecapitalist paradigm, White and Wade maintain that China, unlike its Asiancounterparts, in its early reform era was a ‘socialist developmental state’because it retained certain socialist elements in its economic reform (White1984; White and Wade 1988).

While many of the early studies drawing on the developmental thesisconcentrate on the central Chinese state, later research starts to takeChina’s local diversity into consideration (see Segal and Thun 2001;Blecher and Shue 1996). Oi (1992, 1998) uses the concept of ‘local statecorporatism’ to account for the developmental role of the local state vis-à-vis the central state. She highlights that the fiscal reform started in the1980s allowed local governments to submit only a proportion of theirrevenue to the central government, thereby providing great incentives forlocal governments to pursue local economic development. As a conse-quence of this, many local governments acted as entrepreneurs to ‘coor-dinate economic enterprises in its territory as if they were a diversifiedbusiness corporation’ (Oi 1992, 100–101). Echoing this local stateapproach, various terms have been coined to elucidate the local state’seconomic role, but they usually do not lie within the developmental stateparadigm. With the idea of the ‘entrepreneurial state’, Blecher and Shueanalyze the profit-seeking behaviour of local governments which act aseconomic players rather than trying to provide a conducive environmentfor local economic development (as in the case of the local developmentalstate) (Blecher and Shue 1996; Blecher 1991). The ‘clientelist state’ isdeployed to investigate how local government officials gained economicbenefits from personalized ties to enterprises in their local areas (ratherthan directly engaging in running businesses) (Pearson 1997; Ruf 1999).The ‘predatory state’ is used to describe local governments that extractedheavy rents from peasants, producers, and businesses in the form of taxes,fees, and fines (Bernstein and Lu 2000). Other concepts, such as the‘regulatory state’ (Shue 1995), ‘dual developmental state’ (Xia 2000),‘market facilitating state’ (Howell 1993), ‘diffuse developmental state’(McNally and Chu 2006), and ‘rent-seeking state’ (Wedeman 2003) arealso applied to illuminate the economic behaviour of local governments.

However, Howell contends that the developmental state thesis and theother competing concepts cannot capture the real dynamics in China. Theco-existence of these concepts and corresponding empirical evidence, inher opinion, expose the ‘contradictory features of developmentalism and


predation, rivalry and unity, autonomy and clientelism, efficiency andinefficiency, across time and space’ (Howell 2006, 278). She proposes theconcept of the ‘polymorphous state’ to account for the diversified eco-nomic policies, strategies, and outcomes across the country (Howell 2006,278).

Notwithstanding the differences among these competing theorizationsof the Chinese state, they share a similar ground by principally focusing onthe economic sphere. They fail to provide a profound account of the state’sactivities in the social, political, and ideological domain, and, mostimportantly, for the connection between its social, political, ideological,and economic roles. The economic arena in any society is neither isolatedfrom nor unrelated to the social, political, and ideological terrain (Jessop2008; Poulantzas 2000). The developmental state thesis and the otheraforementioned approaches fall short of addressing one key question: howhas the Chinese party-state mediated conflicting social relations andmaintained its political power so that it could push capitalist economicreform through?

2.3 The Social Facet: Civil Society or Corporatist State?

The Chinese party-state exercises tight control over social organizations.The CCP has established so-called mass organizations in the field of labor,women, and youth, which are the ACFTU, All-China Women’s Federation(ACWF), and China Communist Youth League (CCYL) respectively.While business and commercial associations are encouraged by the gov-ernment for the sake of promoting foreign investment (Kang and Han2008, 47), all the other social organizations and trade unions that are notunder the CCP or its authorized bodies’ leadership are forbidden. Untilrecently, grassroots NGOs wishing to register as social organizations mustfind an administrative supervising agency from the government as requiredby the Regulations on the Registration and Management of SocialOrganizations; this has always been difficult, if not impossible. As a result,many NGOs simply register as business enterprises, which is much easierprocedurally (Kang and Han 2008).

Concerning the state–society relations, the current literature has at leasttwo foci: (1) are Chinese social organizations autonomous from the state,as in the case of western civil society, or are they incorporated into theChinese state? (2) How does the state deal with dissidents and the dis-contented? Let’s begin with the first point. During the 1980s, as noted

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earlier, most studies of Chinese politics focused on the political regime;many of them were grounded in theories of neo-authoritarianism anddemocratism (Kang and Han 2008). However, after the 1989 Tiananmendemocratic movement and the collapse of communist regimes in EasternEurope (in which a sign of civil society emerged), academic attention hasshifted towards the social realm outside of the Chinese state by adopting acivil society framework (Chamberlain 1993; Wakeman 1993). The majorconcern is whether civil organizations independent from the state wereemerging in China, and whether this autonomous social sphere wouldweaken the state’s authoritarian rule. Some scholars advocate that civilsociety is in the process of formation in China (White 1993; White et al.1996). According to Chamberlain (1993), studies of Chinese civil societycan be classified into three types. First, civil society is treated as a ‘productof a revolutionary moment’ (Chamberlain 1993, 200), as in the case of theTiananmen democratic movement, and it is seen in opposition to the state(Gold 1990; Sullivan 1990). The second type of scholarship sees it asgerminating from intellectuals and students (Nathan 1990; Bonnin andChevrier 1991). The third kind considers civil society to have existed inChina since at least a century ago, but it was suppressed during the periodsof Nationalist and Maoist rule, and has reasserted itself in the reform era(see Gold 1990).

Twenty years after Chamberlain’s investigation, I maintain that a fourthtype of scholarship of Chinese civil society has come into existence, whichconcentrates on burgeoning social organizations ranging from labororganizations, business associations, religious groups, to locality-basedorganizations. White (1993) holds that some elements characterizing civilsociety in the weak sense can be identified in intermediate social organi-zations in Xiaoshan; he is optimistic that the corporatist traits of socialorganizations will gradually transform into that of civil society. Howell(2004b, 143) underscores two new developments in Chinese civil society,including the emergence of new types of autonomous organizationsfocusing on marginalized social groups (rather than those initiated by socialelites such as intellectuals, businessmen and professionals as in the earlierperiod), and the increasing social space for independent organizations.Chan (2013) highlights that labor NGOs in South China have contributedto the formation of relatively independent civil society, but they have notyet become democratic labor organizations.


The civil society perspective is not without contention in the field ofChina Studies. Recognizing the Chinese state’s authoritarian control, somescholars contend that social organizations are only partially independentfrom the state, and thus the notion ‘semi-civil society’ is more appropriatein the Chinese context (He 1997). Pushing the argument even further,Frolic (1997) argues that civil society under authoritarian China is state-ledbecause many social organizations are top-down creations that assist thestate in managing a changing society and economy.

Some scholars have totally abandoned the civil society framework toanalyze state–society relations in China; they have, instead, adopted thecorporatist perspective (Saich 2004; Chan 1993; Unger and Chan1995).18 The state corporatist model assumes that diverse and conflictingsocial and political interests exist in the society, and that the state is ‘theguardian of the common good, of a national interest that supersedes theparochial interests of each sector’ (Unger 2008, 49).19 Some scholars notethat the ACFTU is a part of the state corporatist structure (Chan 2008),which is designated as the only legitimate organization representing laborunder state corporatism. It must, on the one hand, help the party-state to(dis)organize workers and keep them under control, while, on the other,protecting the interests of these same workers (its constituents). Dicksonalso notes that this corporatist tactic has been applied to the organizing ofprofessional, industrial, and commercial associations in China (2003 and2004).

The state corporatist approach has made substantial contributions to theexamination of the Chinese state. However, it is problematic for treatingthe state as positioned above sectoral interests in society with the capabilityto mediate those interests, while in fact, the state is both a condensationand reflection of social relations, as Poulantzas (2000) indicates. TheChinese state is neither detached nor independent from these social rela-tions. Besides, by concentrating on the state corporatist structure andcorporatist actors, this approach overlooks social forces that are highlyactive in contemporary China but kept outside of the corporatist structure,such as labor NGOs, international organizations, human and labor rightslawyers and so forth. Given the fact that many social organizations outsidethe corporatist structure have mushroomed in the past few decades, thestate-corporatist approach falls short of accounting for their relations withthe state.

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2.4 The Missing Ideological Link

All of the above-elaborated concepts enhance our knowledge of theChinese party-state, but they do not fill certain lacunae. Poulantzas (1973),an influential post-war state theorist in Europe, contends that the capitaliststate should be examined at three levels: political, economic, and ideo-logical (though he neglects the social dimension of the state, as will beexplained in Chap. 2). Its economic function, he maintains, is to organizeand supervise the labor process, whereas its political function is to maintainthe political order and contain political class conflict. Its ideological func-tion is to educate the popular masses and create social consensus(Poulantzas 1973). These three types of state activities combined are aimedat maintaining the conditions of production, preventing the bursting apartof the capitalist system, and forestalling the outbreak of political classconflict. Seen in this light, current studies on the Chinese state separatelyshed light on the political, social, and economic dimensions of the Chineseparty-state, but they are not sufficient to grasp its full dynamics since itsideological and hegemonic capacities have not been satisfactorily examined.

One of the reasons for the inadequate analysis of the Chinese state’sideological role is the predominance of the authoritarian framework, whichgives overwhelming attention to the Chinese state’s coercive capacity(rather than its soft ideological tactics) to deal with social organizations,and the acts of advocacy and dissent. Gries (2004, 3) correctly remarks that“[i]nfluenced by a Liberal fear of the state, it had long been commonamong Western observers to depict Chinese politics as a simple matter ofcoercion: the ‘butchers of Beijing’…imposing their will upon a submissivepeople”. Here are but a few examples of research centering on the coercivefeatures of the Chinese state. Kang and Han propose an ideal type called‘system of graduated controls’ to theorize the Chinese state (Kang andHan 2008, 36), suggesting that it deploys five grades of control over socialorganizations. Stern and O’Brien (2012) maintain that besides the clearlydefined forbidden zones, the Chinese state sends mixed signals concerningits limit of tolerance on acts of advocacy and dissent. Not knowing whetherthe state’s mixed signals are intentional or unplanned, they nonethelessserve as low-cost policing for the state because political uncertainty drivespeople towards self-censorship and self-control.

In spite of its insights, the authoritarian approach leads to seriousneglect of the Chinese state’s ideological traits. However, it would be anexaggeration to claim that there is no research on these ideological


characteristics at all. In fact, there exist scattered studies of this type. TakingJiang Zemin’s ‘Three Representatives’ and Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious soci-ety’ as examples, Holbig (2006) contests the view that economic reformhas marginalized the role of ideology in China. She holds that the ideologyhas key roles in maintaining the Post-Maoist state’s legitimacy. Breslinargues that nationalism has taken the place of socialism as the ideologylegitimizing the party-state, which often presents itself as defending ‘na-tional interests’ against the ‘hostile west’ (Breslin 2007, 43). Zhao (1998,290) notes that the CCP has endeavored to build up ‘performance legit-imacy’ (with regard to economic development) and ‘nationalist legitimacy’by invoking Chinese culture and warning against hostile foreign forces. Italso tries to construct state-led nationalism as the official ideology throughthe education system.

These studies are useful for comprehending the Chinese state’s ideo-logical potency, especially how it justifies and legitimizes its rule. However,they cannot answer one deeper question: while legitimacy is not identical topopular consent and ideology is not necessarily the same as moral, cultural‚and political leadership,20 how does the Chinese state‚ which pursues cap-italist economic reform‚ obtain the consent of workers that are usually vic-tims of this reform? To put it in Gramscian terms, how does it produce,transmit‚ and reproduce capitalist hegemony in such ways that the workingclass has not staged any political uprising, while ruling class’s leadership hasbeen sustained or even strengthened over the past few decades?

When Burawoy examined how hegemony was manufactured at thepoint of production in US factories, most of the studies in his time focusedon hegemony reproduced in the political arena (1979, XII).The reverse has been taking place in the field of China Studies. There existabundant intellectual discussions on whether the Chinese labor regime ishegemonic, despotic, or despotic hegemonic, most of which are influencedby Burawoy’s insights (Lee 1998, 1999; Zhang 2008; Peng 2011),21 butonly a few scholars have attempted to theorize the hegemonic capacity ofthe Chinese party-state at the national level. Ling (1994, 393) suggeststhat the Chinese state is able to justify its application of violence todissenters with Confucian hegemony which emphasizes parental gover-nance. The dissenters, playing the role of children, have appealed tomorality and shame in their discourse to discredit the state, but ‘filial pietyinherently favours the authority of the parent-state over itschildren-subjects’ (Ling 1994, 393), and thus rationalizes the former’sviolence inflicted on the latter. Ling’s endeavor to connect the coercive and

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hegemonic sides of the Chinese state is insightful as they are hardly isolatedfrom each other. However, her focus lies on the political dissent move-ment, rather than on the state–capital–labor relations in the reform era. Inother words, she does not take capitalist hegemony and capitalist laborrelations into account.

Blecher (2002, 2004) explains that the laid-off urban Chinese workersused to be exposed to socialist ideologies, but they have come to accept themarket ideologies in the post-Maoist era. Many of his interviewees arevictims of economic reform, but they surprisingly think that the marketeconomy is more effective than the planned one. Some workers feel theunfairness of the economic reform, but they believe it is natural andinevitable. Therefore, many of them are unmotivated to struggle for laborrights through collective action. This is, Blecher argues, a testimony toworkers’ acceptance of common sense created by the ruling class. Blechersheds light on the study of the Chinese state by deploying a Gramscianperspective. However, his research is inadequate in accounting for recentdevelopments in China because, firstly, it was conducted almost 20 yearsago during the late 1990s. Substantial socio-political and economicchanges have taken place in both the national and international arena in thepast two decades; therefore, the Chinese state’s hegemonic power needs tobe revisited. Second, Blecher’s study only focuses on laid-off urban work-ers; the substantial migrant workforce from rural areas is left out. Nothingis known regarding their attitude towards capitalist development; forinstance, what do they think about unfair treatment in the workplace?Have capitalist ideologies become common sense for them? Have theygiven any consent to the ruling class’s leadership? Third, Blecher’s studyportrays a gloomy picture for the working class’s future since his inter-viewees were submissive and unmotivated to carry out resistance.However, after the publications of Blecher’s works, there has been anexplosion of workers’ protests. My research aims not only to shed light onruling class’s leadership over migrant workers, but also to investigate theprecariousness of legal hegemony in China; this helps us explore the pos-sibility of staging counter-hegemony in the country.

Another study of the Chinese state’s hegemonic power was conductedby Hui and Chan (2012). They contend that ‘harmonious society’ is notsimply a political slogan propagated by the Hu-Wen regime; it is theparty-state’s hegemonic project to tame restive labor and secure


acquiescence to the ruling class’s leadership. Examining the state–capital–labor relationship during the period from 2004 to 2011, they propose thatthe harmonious society project aims to shape the political and moralworldviews of migrant workers, and to safeguard the ruling class’s domi-nance by incorporating the working class’s short-term concern into socialpolicies. Their findings centering on migrant workers in the 2000s sup-plement Blecher’s study on laid-off SOE workers conducted in the 1990s.Nonetheless, as no worker voices are included in their study, little isrevealed regarding to what extent migrant workers’ worldviews have beenshaped by capitalist hegemony, under what circumstances they will actwithin the hegemonic boundaries‚ and when they are willing to transgressit. I seek to answer these unattended questions in this book.

2.5 Filling the Lacunae

In summary, there are two major problems with the approaches assumingan authoritarian state, a developmental state (and other similar perspec-tives), and a corporatist state. First, they delve separately into the Chineseparty-state’s political, economic, and social traits while its ideological andhegemonic capacities are under-examined. It is true that the state-socialistideology is declining, but this by no means weakens the party-state’s ide-ological and hegemonic potency. While it retains some authoritarianpractices, the Chinese state has increasingly strengthened its hegemoniccapacity to guide capitalist development and to persuade the working classof the political, cultural and moral values of the ruling class. My researchseeks to fill this intellectual gap by studying the hegemonic mechanismsvested in the labor law system, i.e., legal hegemony. I investigate questionssuch as: through what mechanisms has the post-Maoist state reproduced legalhegemony? How do workers perceive capitalist common sense? To what extenthave they surrendered consent to the ruling class? Under what situations willthey confine themselves within hegemonic boundaries, and under what cir-cumstances would they be willing to challenge and transgress legal hegemony?What social forces can help cultivate workers’ class consciousness to offset thehegemonic impact of the labor law system? What makes legal hegemony fragileand unstable?

The second problem with the three predominant approaches to theChinese state is that, in spite of their insights, they merely disjointedly graspone dimension of the state, and thus fail to comprehend it in its totality.I seek to go beyond their limitations with the Gramscian approach that

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puts the political, economic, social, and ideological traits of the Chinesestate under careful scrutiny. First, unlike the authoritarian perspective, myconceptual approach does not focus narrowly on the Chinese politicalregime, the political system, or the legal system; nor do I see them asautonomous from society. Instead, I consider the Chinese state and the lawto be embedded in wider social and economic relations, and thus cannot bestudied in isolation from broader society and economics. Furthermore,arguing that the Chinese state has been transforming from engineering thepassive revolution with coercion to establishing capitalist hegemony, Isimultaneously examine the manoeuvres of coercion and hegemonyimbued within the Chinese labor law system so as to illuminate how forceand persuasion back and supplement each other when the state mediatescapital–labor relations. Second, instead of only stressing the Chinese state’seconomic function, as the developmental approach does, I posit that itseconomic performance is hinged on its political, social and hegemoniccapacities. China’s GDP could not have been maintained at such a highlevel if workers’ consent had not been secured by the state’s political powerand capitalist hegemony. Third, unlike the state corporatist approach, I donot view the Chinese state as neutrally positioned or situated above sectoralinterests in society. Instead, I hold that it is socially-embedded, is a con-densation of social relations, and seeks to sustain capital accumulation inthe society. Also, I do not simply stress the state corporatist structures orturn a blind eye to social forces external to the state. Acknowledging thatthe ACFTU is part of the state corporatist structure, I also dissect the roleof civil society actors, such as labor NGOs, in promulgating or debilitatingcapitalist common sense.

Alongside contributing to a better understanding of the Chineseparty-state undergoing hegemonic transformation, my research, from abroader conceptual perspective, is related to the issue of how a state’sideological project changes within the context of a radical transformationof the economic (and political) system. Many former socialist and com-munist countries have been facing this ideological challenge subsequent tothe demise of soviet communism, the ideological decline of socialism, andtheir incorporation into global capitalism. The ruling class’s hegemoniccapacity in stabilizing social relations of production and facilitatingcapital accumulation in many post-socialist countries have aroused greatconcern and been frequently examined. At the regional level, scholarsadopting the Gramscian approach emphasize that neoliberalism has over-taken communism as a hegemonic ideology in the formerly communist


Eastern Europe. In addition, neoliberal hegemony has been strengthenedby the ‘changing structures of capital, states and international relations’(Stuart 2012, 362; also see Bohle 2006). At the national level, Slovenia’sstate hegemony is built upon a model of managerial capitalism in which thestate and corporatist actors play a strong role in economic and socialdevelopment, while in Estonia it is based on a model of liberal capitalismwith the state playing a minimal role (Adam et al. 2009). In Hungary, thehegemonic growth machine promoted by a class coalition between thestate and big businesses has legitimatized the pro-growth agenda in society(Kulcsar and Domokos 2005). In Poland, neoliberal hegemony hasinduced populist resistance led by nationally conservative social forces; butthis resistance was restricted by the state and has now been co-opted byneoliberal hegemony (Stuart 2012). My research on the Chineseparty-state’s hegemonic capacities will add further knowledge to the con-ceptual issue of the ideological role of the post-socialist state during eco-nomic (and political) transition.

3 METHODS

I conducted the first major phase of my fieldwork research over eightmonths from September 2012 to April 2013. During the period ofOctober 2013 to July 2014, I carried out the second phase of my fieldworkto gain updated knowledge on the socio-political and legal developmentsin China. My fieldwork was conducted in 5 of the 9 cities in the Pearl RiverDelta (PRD) in Guangdong Province. These include Shenzhen,Dongguan, Foshan, Huizhou, and Guangzhou. I chose the PRD inGuangdong as the site of my fieldwork for both socio-economic andpolitical-legal reasons. The cities in the PRD were among the first to beopened up to foreign investment in the 1980s. The PRD has beenundergoing a process of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and iseconomically strong.22 Its growing labor-intensive and export-orientedmanufacturing industries (such as automobiles, electronics, and textiles)have attracted many migrant workers from rural areas (where there are notmany jobs available). This ‘agrarian-industrial mobility’ is not specific topost-Mao China, having also taken place in Europe and elsewhere (Leggett1963, 684).

The Chinese migrant workers are usually not well–educated; many ofthem are in their teenage years and are female.23 Because of the area’sreliance on cheap migrant labor and foreign investment, labor exploitation

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is commonplace, and a culture of labor protest has been cultivated in thePRD. In comparison to the other regions in the country, labor relations inthe PRD are exceptionally tense, and worker strikes are an everydayoccurrence. Endeavoring to pacify the aggrieved workers, the centralgovernment, Guangdong provincial government, and Shenzhen municipalgovernment (which enjoys administrative autonomy and legislative power)have enacted many labor legislations and social policies, such as the 2008Labour Contract Law, the 2008 Regulations of the Shenzhen SpecialEconomic Zone on the Promotion of Harmonious Labor Relationships,and the 2011 Social Insurance Law. The booming economy, high con-centration of global capital, abundance of migrant workers, governmentalconcern about antagonistic labor–capital relations, and a growing emphasisgiven to labor laws in the area makes the PRD an ideal place for investi-gating capitalist hegemony vested in the labor law system, particularlyregarding migrant workers (rather than SOE workers that were alreadystudied by Blecher).

My research focusing on capitalist hegemony and worker class con-sciousness, an issue closely related to hegemony, is qualitative in nature.Some western studies on class consciousness have been conducted with aquantitative approach (Wright 1989; Marshall et al. 1988; Evans 1992;Western 1999). They use workers’ attitudes and opinions on various issues,such as capitalist economic institutions, markets, and labor rights, asindicators of the level of class consciousness of workers. In the field ofChina Studies, some research studies on rights consciousness were con-ducted quantitatively (Wong 2011; Li 2010). However, the quantitativeapproach to consciousness has been criticized for being ahistorical with alack of context (Brooks 1994; Fantasia 1988; Marshall 1983; Carchedi1989), and for treating class consciousness as ‘a static, individuated phe-nomenon, abstracted from social action and the context of class practices’(Fantasia 1995, 269). Aligning with these critiques, I have, therefore,employed qualitative methods to investigate hegemony and class con-sciousness in this book.

My research has relied on a triangulation of sources: participant obser-vation, in-depth interviews, and documentary research, which permits meto verify information collected from one source against other sources,therefore, the issues of invalidity and bias of using only one source can beovercome (Blaikie 1991; Berg and Lune 2004). Participant observationwas done on occasions including workers’ collective actions,24 academic


seminars,25 NGO activities,26 trade union activities,27 worker gatherings,28

legal clinics hosted by universities, and so forth.Besides, I conducted interviews with various kinds of informants (see

Appendix 1). For interviews with workers, I conducted 40 informalinterviews and 75 semi-structured interviews. Informal interviews weredone on occasions such as NGO outreach activities in industrial zones,NGOs’ visits to workers in hospitals, trade unions’ and workers’ activities,etc. Among the 75 semi-structured interviews with workers, one-third ofthem had encountered no labor disputes previously, one-third had indi-vidual experiences of labor disputes, and the last third had run into col-lective labor disputes. Workers’ experiences of labor disputes (especiallythose of a collective nature) are highly relevant to the development ofworkers’ class consciousness and their resistance to legal hegemony(Thompson 1978; Fantasia 1988, 1995; Langford 1994). As the emer-gence of capitalist labor relations during the reform of China is my researchfocus, this interview design permits me to dissect how experiences of labor–capital conflicts have shaped workers’ worldviews, their class consciousness‚and their susceptibility to ruling class’s hegemony. In addition to theirexperience in labor disputes, I tried to select interviewees with diversebackgrounds, for example, different ages, education, gender, positions infactories, and experience working in different cities and industries.

In addition to workers, I also interviewed 16 trade union officials at theprovincial, city, district, and enterprise level.29 Seven legal and laborscholars teaching in Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Shenzhen were alsointerviewed. Three of them were also lawyers, while one was a formerarbitrator. Additionally, I also conversed with five full-time lawyers andlegal practitioners in Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong. Moreover, Iconsulted three judges from Dongguan who had experiences hearing labordispute cases. And I talked to four government and party officials. Twowere from the city-level CCP Politics and Law Commission while the othertwo informants were a current and a retired town-level government official.Furthermore, 19 NGO staff from Shenzhen, Dongguan, Guangzhou,Huizhou‚ and Hong Kong were also interviewed. Lastly, three employersand one Human Resources manager from the furniture, electronics, andwatch industry were interviewed.

Alongside in-depth interviews and participant observation, I also con-ducted documentary research. I have analyzed the websites of variousgovernment and party organs, including the State Council, the Politics and

26 E.S.I HUI

Law Commission, the ACFTU, the Bureau of Public Security, theProcuratorate, the Courts, the Bureau of Justice, the National Bureau ofStatistics and so forth. Various government reports have been examinedtoo, including the annual report of the State Council from 1994 to 2013,the annual report of the Guangdong government from 2003 to 2012.Numerous orders, circulars, and notices issued by the central and localgovernments, the ACFTU, the Courts, the Procuratorate, the Bureau ofJustice, etc. were carefully reviewed. In addition, I studied printed materialsproduced by trade unions and NGOs, workers’ discussions in Weibo andworkers’ online blogs. Review of news reports on labor relations, laborlaws, and worker protests was also conducted.

4 ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

This book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 elucidates my theoreticalapproach to the Chinese party-state, which integrates Gramsci andPoulantzas’s theories. In addition, this chapter summarizes how the notionof hegemony has been used, although ambiguously, by scholars in the fieldof China Studies. Subsequently, it explicates how I understand hegemonyand the party-state in the Chinese context.

Chapter 3 explains how the party-state has utilized the labor law systemto promote the Chinese passive revolution. For example, it has helpedcreate a rising capitalist class that was non–existent in the Maoist era,establish private property rights which are a prerequisite for the develop-ment of capitalism, legitimize the selling and buying of labor power, andendorse the market wage system which prioritizes wage flexibility and laborproductivity. In addition, this chapter examines the party-state’s relativeautonomy from capital, which is newly developed. In the reform era, it hasstepped back from direct production and acted as an impartial mediator ofindustrial relations; but it is by no means classless. Similarly, the legalsystem has developed relative autonomy from the state and capital.

Chapter 4 constructs a typology of worker susceptibility towards legalhegemony. I contend that the labor law system has exercised varyingdegrees of hegemonic effects on workers. The affirmative workers havegranted active consent to legal hegemony whereas the indifferent, am-bivalent, and critical workers have conferred passive consent. The radicalworkers have given no consent to legal hegemony at all. Furthermore, thischapter studies the affirmative workers in great depth. I conclude that thelabor law system exercises double hegemony on the state–labor and


capital–labor relations in such ways that the affirmative workers have notcome to challenge the capitalist economy and party-state fundamentally.

Chapter 5 investigates the indifferent, ambivalent, and critical workers,as well as in what ways they have conferred passive consent to legalhegemony. Due to labor and social policies in China, the indifferentworkers feel detached from the cities and consider their working life theretransitory; therefore, they see labor laws and the socio-economic devel-opment as irrelevant to them. Although both critical and ambivalentworkers criticize the labor law system and do not place full trust in it, it isstill able to impose a minimal degree of hegemonic effect on them becausetheir values and actions are still constrained by legal boundaries and capi-talist common sense.

Chapter 6 analyzes the radical workers who are quite unsusceptible tolegal hegemony. The labor law system fails to shape their worldviews oractions in favor of capital accumulation; they have formulated radicalchallenges to both the capitalist economy and the party-state.

Chapter 7 summarizes the major arguments of this book. It highlightsthe characteristics of legal hegemony in China, as well as factors con-tributing to its fragilities. Finally, it points to different directions for futureresearch about capitalist hegemony in China.

NOTES

1. See http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2012/1026/c350765-19398348.html and http://www.wtoutiao.com/a/426494.html, bothaccessed on 21st August 2014.

2. http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/trad/articles/18068/20121219/group-events.htm, accessed on 24th May 2014.

3. http://news.sina.com.hk/news/20121218/-9-2851316/1.html, acces-sed on 24th May 2014. 50% of these mass incidents were related to landexpropriation and another 20% were related to other issues. It should benoted that official statistics on mass incidents are not always accurate, seehttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a.html#axzz2uhQS1Qnn, accessed on 25th May 2014.

4. http://www.worldfinance.com/markets/ibm-strikes-shine-light-on-chinas-labour-laws, accessed on 24th May 2014.

5. Some scholars apply the idea of hegemony to study gender relations(Connell and Connell 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005); some useit to analyze linguistic relations (Shannon 1995; Woolard 1985); some

28 E.S.I HUI

http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2012/1026/c350765-19398348.html

http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2012/1026/c350765-19398348.html

http://www.wtoutiao.com/a/426494.html

http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/trad/articles/18068/20121219/group-events.htm

http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/trad/articles/18068/20121219/group-events.htm

http://news.sina.com.hk/news/20121218/-9-2851316/1.html

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a.html#axzz2uhQS1Qnn

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a.html#axzz2uhQS1Qnn

http://www.worldfinance.com/markets/ibm-strikes-shine-light-on-chinas-labour-laws

http://www.worldfinance.com/markets/ibm-strikes-shine-light-on-chinas-labour-laws

applies the concept to examine racial inequality (Hall 1986; Crenshaw1987).

6. http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100376, accessed on 24thMay 2014.

7. Interview G1, G2 and G3.8. Interview G1. Chen Weiguang, the former president of the Guangzhou

Federation of Trade Unions revealed a similar point in an interview, notingthat “[t]he Guangdong provincial government basically did not view thesestrikes negatively. We, as a trade union, found the workers’ demands justand reasonable…We therefore believe that the demands of the workerswere justified. But we hope that such economic disputes do not developinto political incidents and will not disrupt social order; this is our bottomline”, see http://column.global-labour-university.org/2011/01/trade-unions-and-worker-struggles-in.html, accessed on 12th December 2011.

9. Interview F1, F4 and D10.10. Solinger writes that “the general pattern, extending back to the first out-

breaks of worker protest right up to the present, is to arrest, detain andimprison the leaders at protests, while distributing token cash hand-outs orpartial back-pay to the masses” (2006, 191).

11. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-01/30/content_17265942.htm, accessed on 11th May 2014

12. http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-11/07/content_30525464.htm,accessed on 11th May 2014

13. China Daily. 12 May 2010. “Country’s Wealth Divide Past WarningLevel.”

14. http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/3/country/45/, acces-sed on 19th June 2014.

15. Political science scholars that consider the Chinese state authoritarianinclude Landry (2008), Pei (2006), Stockmann and Gallagher (2011).Studies within the field of labor studies adopting the authoritarian stateapproach include Friedman and Lee (2010, 514), Perry (2001, 175), Lee(2007, XI). Socio-legal studies that accept the authoritarian state thesisinclude Gallagher (2006), Chen and Xu (2012). Economic scholars thatsee the Chinese state as an authoritarian one include Naughton (2008). Forthe theorization of authoritarianism, see Linz (2000) and Tarrow (1994).

16. Inspired by the Weberian tradition and neo-institutionalism, the neo-statisttheorists have adopted a state-centered approach to explain political out-comes; they claim that the state is an independent actor and is free-standingand autonomous from society (Hay and Lister 2006; Jessop 2008).

17. Howell (2006) has conducted a comprehensive review of the developmentof developmental state theories. Other important works on the


http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100376

http://column.global-labour-university.org/2011/01/trade-unions-and-worker-struggles-in.html


http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-01/30/content_17265942.htm

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-01/30/content_17265942.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-11/07/content_30525464.htm

http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/3/country/45/

developmental state include, Leftwich (1996), Wade (2005), Weiss (2000),White and Wade (1988).

18. Corporatism consists of two types: societal corporatism and state corpo-ratism; the former has given citizens substantial rights, including the rightof association, while the latter only allows citizens limited rights. For moreon the theory of corporatism, see Schmitter (1974).

19. The corporatist state discussed in this sub-section is different from Jean Oi’sconcept of local state corporatism as explained in the previous sub-section.The former refers to a particular pattern of relations between the state andsocial organizations, while corporatism as used by Oi highlights that localstates act like corporations.

20. Legitimacy is a concept usually associated with political regimes, focusingon the political relations between the govern and the governed but withoutconsidering the relationship between the state and the capitalist class andthe relations between the political and the economic. For example, MaxWeber’s understanding of legitimacy is “the belief that someone’s positionand the system incorporating it are right and proper” (Wallace and Wolf2006, 74); for Habermas, it is “a political order’s worthiness to berecognised” (Habermas 1979, 178). However, from the Gramscian per-spective the concept of hegemony concerns both political and economicrelations, as well as the state–capital–labor relations. It focuses on how thestate and the capitalist class try to obtain worker consent and allegiance tothe leadership of the ruling class so as to sustain the long-term dominanceof the capitalist system. Due to their conceptual differences, it is inappro-priate to equate hegemony with legitimacy.

21. Adding to this, studies on China’s hegemonic power in the internationalarena have also mushroomed (Li 1996; Woo 1994; Weede 1999).

22. In 2012, the overall foreign trade of Guangdong Province was US$ 9838.2billion, constituting 25.4% of the country’s total foreign trade. In fact, itstotal exports increased 7.9% to US$ 5741.4 billion, making up 28% of totalexports from China (http://www.gd.gov.cn/gdgk/gdyw/201301/t20130116_173592.htm, accessed on 1st January 2014). The PRD is animportant engine of economic growth in Guangdong Province. In 2009,the PRD’s GDP jumped by 9.4% to $32105.88 billion, which constituted82.2% of the total GDP of the province. And the PRD’s total exports andimports comprised 95.7% of the provincial total in 2009 (http://www.gd.gov.cn/govinc/nj2010/01qsgk/010202.htm, accessed on 1st January2014).

23. For demographic details of Chinese migrant workers, see government infor-mation at http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-05/27/content_2411923.htmand http://www.moh.gov.cn/ldrks/s7847/201309/12e8cf0459de42c9-81c59e827b87a27c.shtml, accessed on 1st January 2014.

30 E.S.I HUI

http://www.gd.gov.cn/gdgk/gdyw/201301/t20130116_173592.htm

http://www.gd.gov.cn/gdgk/gdyw/201301/t20130116_173592.htm

http://www.gd.gov.cn/govinc/nj2010/01qsgk/010202.htm

http://www.gd.gov.cn/govinc/nj2010/01qsgk/010202.htm

http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-05/27/content_2411923.htm

http://www.moh.gov.cn/ldrks/s7847/201309/12e8cf0459de42c981c59e827b87a27c.shtml

http://www.moh.gov.cn/ldrks/s7847/201309/12e8cf0459de42c981c59e827b87a27c.shtml

24. For instance, worker strikes and actions to demand proper compensationfor occupational diseases, terminations, raises, etc.

25. Including seminars where worker activists, trade unionists, governmentofficials were invited to attend.

26. For example, worker meetings, visits to work injury victims in hospitals,outreach activities in industrial zones, staff meetings, legal consultations forworkers, retreat meetings, training for worker activists, and handling ofcollective labor disputes.

27. For instance, Worker Congresses, meetings of enterprise trade union offi-cials, spring festival dinner for union members, dinner meetings betweenenterprise trade union officials and management.

28. Such as having meals in workers’ dormitory and homes, shopping, dancing,singing karaoke and so forth.

29. Eleven of them are also counted as worker-interviewees as they wereworkers elected to be enterprise trade union officials.

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CHAPTER 2

The Gramscian Approach to the ChineseState

1 INTRODUCTION

As explained in Chap. 1, the approach of the authoritarian state, devel-opmental state, and corporatist state have failed to offer a sufficientlysophisticated conceptualization of the Chinese party-state. Building largelyupon the theoretical insights of Gramsci, complemented by those ofPoulantzas, in this book I propose the Gramscian approach to investigatethe Chinese state. I maintain that the Chinese party-state has been trans-forming from ruling principally with coercion to drive the country’s passiverevolution into governing with both persuasion and domination. Thatbeing said, I do not claim that the Chinese state has become fully hege-monic. Instead, it is undergoing a hegemonic transformation, movingslowly but significantly towards that direction. In other words, myapproach underscores the broader trend of its socio-political and economicdevelopment, rather than merely analyzing a stationary moment within thistrend.

In the next section, I first highlight the critical state theories developedby Gramsci and Poulantzas, which have inspired my conceptualizations ofthe Chinese state. In Sect. 3, I expound on the theoretical benefits ofintegrating Gramsci and Poulantzas’ intellectual insights, Sect. 4 elaborateson how scholars in the field of China Studies have used the concepthegemony, and my hegemony approach to the Chinese state.


43

2 GRAMSCI AND POULANTZAS’ CRITICAL STATE THEORIES

To understand Gramsci and Poulantzas’ theories, we have to first grasp thedevelopment of state theories prior to their time as their aims were toadvance the Marxist state theories prominent at that time that sufferedfrom a few theoretical deficits. Due to his death, Marx did not have achance to complete a systematic theory of the state (Miliband 1969).However, the state is not a missing focus from his work; it is discussed inhis writings, such as The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx1973) and The Civil War in France (Marx 1974). Commenting on thecoup d’état of Bonaparte, Marx argues that the bourgeoisie’s interest is‘most intimately imbricated precisely with the maintenance of that exten-sive and highly ramified state machine’ (Marx 1973, 186). He and Engelscontend in the Communist Manifesto that the modern state is the man-agement committee for the bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels 1978). They seedifferent modes of production as requiring different forms of state inter-vention and argue that ‘the nature of the state power is determined by thechanging needs of the economy and/or by the changing balance of classforces at the economic level’ (Jessop 1982, 10). By underscoring the classcharacter of the state, Marx and Engels lay down a significant foundationfor critical state theories that refuse to regard the state as representing theentire society or serving the national interests.

Since Marx and Engels do not formulate a definitive theory of the stateand politics, there is great room for interpretation of their ideas. As a result,state theories drawing upon their work but with diverse positions havecome into existence, and there are no unitary or coherent Marxian statetheories. Some interpretations of their ideas, especially dogmatic Marxism,are criticized for their instrumentalist tendency because they tend to viewthe state as a ‘thing’ or an ‘entity’ that can be taken over by any class(Jessop 1990). This criticism is one of the major premises for the subse-quent debates about the state. Furthermore, dogmatic and orthodoxMarxism are also disapproved for their economic reductionist orientationas they consider the state (the superstructure) to be a mere epiphe-nomenon of the economic structures. Hobsbawm has pointed out thatthey focus on ‘the derivation of political, juridical and other ideologicalconceptions from the basic economic facts’ (1977, 207).

Lenin regards the state as an instrument of class rule and as a machinefor class oppression, holding that ‘it [the state] is the creation of “order”,which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict

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between classes’ (Lenin 1969). He believes that the state is a thing that anyclass can take over and that the proletarian revolution has the potential tosmash the bourgeois state apparatus to bring about a socialist state (Wright1979). This kind of Marxism-Leninism characterized by instrumentalismand epiphenomenalism was once quite influential, especially in the Secondand Third International. However, it lost its predominance in the 1960swhen many Marxians in Europe became disillusioned with Stalinism andthe authoritarian socialism of the Soviet Union. Marxism-Leninism thencame under attack by invigorated theoretical endeavors in different coun-tries, including Althusserian structuralism in France which later spread toBritain and the USA, the Gramscian schools of thought in Italy andbeyond, and the capital logic school (Staatsableitung debatte) in WestGermany.

Gramsci’s state theory represents a crucial break fromMarxism-Leninism due to his rejection of instrumentalism and crudeeconomic reductionism. He is considered the first Marxian to produce a‘full political theory’ (Hobsbawm 1977, 208) that neither treats thepolitical structures as mere reflections of the economic base, nor views thestate as an instrument for class rule.1 The political and socio–economiccircumstances of the times drove Gramsci to create a state theory thatsurpasses Marxism-Leninism in a number of ways.2 First, vulgar Marxism inGramsci’s time was marked by evolutionary determinism; it viewed thedevelopment of history and society as guided by objective laws and as‘beyond the scope of active human intervention’ (Merrington 1968, 146).Many of its proponents believed that proletarian revolution and the demiseof capitalism would come inevitably and automatically due to its inherentcontradictions. Gramsci contests this mechanistic position, seeking toexamine, with his own theories, why the working class in Western Europe,unlike their Russian counterparts, had not developed a class consciousnessor risen up against capitalism automatically in times of economic andpolitical crisis (Burawoy 2003; Salamini 1974). By introducing thedimension of worker subjectivities and consciousness into his social andpolitical inquiries, as will be elucidated, Gramsci is able to convincinglyexplain why revolution did not take place in Europe.

Second, Gramsci circumvents the trap of reducing the superstructuresinto the economic base by paying legitimate attention to the former. Heenriches Marxian state theories by proposing that civil society is part ofthe state. He regards the state not simply ‘as the apparatus of government

THE GRAMSCIAN APPROACH TO THE CHINESE STATE 45

operating within the “public” sphere (government, political parties, mili-tary) but also as part of the “private” sphere of civil society (for instance,church, media, and education) through which hegemony functions’ (Bielerand Morton 2003, 483). Building upon this broadened concept of thestate, or what he calls the ‘integral state’, Gramsci further sheds light onhow class power is organized by the state in political society and civilsociety with his ideas of ‘coercion’ and ‘hegemony’. Following the argu-ments of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, he holds that the coercive machinery ofthe state (political society) helps maintain the capitalist class’s domination(Gramsci 1971). At the same time, the dominant class seeks to acquire theactive consent of the working class for its leadership by establishing ‘its ownmoral, political and cultural values as conventional norms of practicalbehavior’ in order to sustain its class superiority (Femia 1987, 3). Thiscapitalist class’s ideological ascendency over the subordinate class is whatGramsci calls hegemony. He maintains that a state is ethical if it helpsorganize capitalist hegemony:

[The] state is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is toraise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level,a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces fordevelopment, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. (Gramsci 1971,258)

The ethical state reproduces capitalist hegemony through civil society (andpolitical society). Because of the intricate power mechanism of coercionand hegemony, Gramsci reveals that the working class’s consciousness andits rebellions against capitalism do not appear automatically as vulgarMarxism predicts.

As explained in Chap. 1, hegemony is a concept in contrast to passiverevolution. In a hegemonic social formation, the subordinate class’s con-sent to capitalist development is elicited largely through persuasion. Insome non-hegemonic Western societies, capitalism was introducedthrough state-engineered social and political reforms rather than throughthe initiative of the popular masses and capitalist class. The absence of ahegemonic class in these societies dictated that the state had to resort todomination and force to drive a top–down capitalist revolution.

Third, due to his renunciation of evolutionary and mechanisticMarxism, Gramsci endeavors to explore strategies for working classstruggles in Western Europe. He observes that the state in Russia was

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strong and its civil society was ‘primordial’ and ‘gelatinous’, whereas thestate and civil society in the West has a more balanced relation and its civilsociety is comparatively ‘developed’ and ‘sturdy’ (Gramsci 1971, 238).Because of these substantial differences, Gramsci advocates that workingclass revolution, or what he calls the war of manoeuvre, that had takenplace in Russia could not be copied in Italy or Western Europe. He arguesthat in the West, where hegemony, instead of coercion, is the prevalentform of class control, the exploited classes should deploy the strategy of warof position to accomplish ‘steady penetration and subversion of the com-plex and multiple mechanisms of ideological diffusion’ in order to stagecounter-hegemony (Gramsci 1971, 232).

Because of restrictions in prison, Gramsci’s ideas could only be indirectlyexpressed in his work. This has created room for diverse or sometimescontradictory interpretations of his theories by different political forces inpost-war Italy. For example, Togliatti’s interpretation of Gramsci’s insightsis in line with the Marxist-Leninist political views held by the ItalianCommunist Party (PCI) while opponents of the PCI presented Gramsci asan unorthodox thinker who offers alternative theoretical resources toLeninism and Stalinism. Moreover, Gramsci is simultaneously criticized bysome PCI supporters as a reformist and by some on the right and the left asa Stalinist (Mouffe and Sassoon 1977; Femia 1987). His major works werewritten during the 1920s and 1930s, but they were widely published inItaly only after the 1950s. Since the late 1960s, his intellectual contributionstarted to gain attention in countries beyond Italy, inspiring many subse-quent theorists, such as Poulantzas, Laclau, Jessop, and Foucault.

Poulantzas was one of the most notable post-war critical state theorists.He adopts a structural approach in his counter-reductionist andcounter-epiphenomenalist theorizations.3 In his first book published inEnglish, Political Power and Social Classes (1973b), Poulantzas puts for-ward three propositions on the capitalist state: (1) the economy determinesthe political and the ideological only in the last instance; (2) the state enjoysrelative autonomy from the dominant class; (3) the state performs acohesive function in a capitalist formation. For Poulantzas, the capitalistsocial formation consists of three levels—the economic, the political, andthe ideological. Following Althusser’s contention that the economic level isdeterminant in the last instance, Poulantzas argues that the political andthe ideological cannot be reduced to the economic, though the economiclevel determines them in the last instance. Instead of focusing only on one’sposition in relations of production, his theory concentrates on the


overdetermined effects of the ensemble of these three instances and thedynamics between them in social class formation (Poulantzas 1969,1973a). This is what he first calls ‘overdetermination of class’ in PoliticalPower and Social Classes (1973b, 54) and later calls ‘structural determi-nation of class’ in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (1978, 29).

Within this conceptual framework, Poulantzas contends that the state isrelatively autonomous from the dominant class due to the specificity ofcapitalism. In feudalism, elaborates Poulantzas, the serfs exercised somedegree of control over the means of production and the object of laborbecause they still ‘had possession of his [their] parcel of land, which wasprotected by custom’ (Poulantzas 1978, 19). In other words, while theexploiting class had the economic ownership of the land, the exploited classwas to a certain degree engaged in relations of economic possession.Under these circumstances, the feudal state had to exercise political forceand legitimate violence over the serfs in order to secure the extraction ofsurplus labor from them. As a consequence, the state and the economywere intricately linked in feudal society. However, this kind of ‘overlap-ping’ or ‘mixedness’ (Poulantzas 2000, 18) between the economic and thepolitical has been replaced by the relative separation between the twospheres in capitalism. Workers in capitalist societies, who are completelydeprived of control over the means of production and the labor object,appear to be ‘free labourers’ in a double sense. First, unlike the serfs whowere bounded to the land owned by their landlords, the working class isnot legally or politically tied to the capitalist class. Second, workers arejuridically free to sell their labor power in the market and to enter intolabor contracts with capitalists. Direct political coercion of the state isunnecessary for the conversion of surplus labor into surplus value. Instead,the state’s intervention takes an indirect and legal-political form by creatingthe formal and abstract equality among exchangers of labor power (orother commodities) in the market (Poulantzas 1973a, 2000). Poulantzassees the relative separation between the state and the economy as aninherent characteristic of capitalism. This relative autonomy of the statefrom the capitalist class has enabled the former to reproduce the latter’slong-term dominance by offering short-term benefits to the exploited classso that they will not revolt against the capitalist system.

The relative autonomy of the capitalist state does not mean that it isneutral or classless in nature. In contrast, Poulantzas argues in PoliticalPower and Social Classes that the capitalist state is a cohesive factor in

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maintaining the unity between the economic, political, and ideologicalinstances in capitalist societies. As explained in Chap. 1, Poulantzas pro-poses that the state has three kinds of functions: economic, ideological, andpolitical. Separate as these functions might seem, they together help pre-vent political conflicts from breaking out and the capitalist social formationfrom bursting apart, thereby maintaining the conditions for production.These functions of the capitalist state are interrelated in the sense that theyall serve the purpose of upholding the unity of a capitalist formation.

After the release of his first book, Poulantzas’s state theory changed overtime in at least four respects. First, while his theorizations on the finaldeterminant role of the economic and the relative autonomy of the stateremain in his later writings, the idea that the state serves a cohesive functionin capitalist societies has become less prominent, if not totally displaced. Inhis two other books, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (1978) and State,Power, Socialism (2000), Poulantzas proposes that the capitalist state is thematerialization and condensation of class relations. No longer stressing therole of the state in organizing the capitalist class’s interests and unity, headvances that class contradictions and social relations of production areinscribed, crystallized, and condensed in the state. He writes that

…the state crystallizes the relations of production and class relations. Themodern political state does not translate the ‘interest’ of the dominant classesat the political level, but the relationship between those interests and theinterests of the dominated classes—which means that it precisely constitutesthe ‘political’ expression of the interests of the dominant classes. (2008, 80)

Many political scientists in Poulantzas’s time interrogated the state from aninstitutional perspective (Hay and Lister 2006). Poulantzas’s argumentthat the state is a condensation of class relations is therefore novel andinsightful.

Second, in his later publication Poulantzas better portrays the dynamicsbetween the state and class struggles. Building upon his thesis that the stateis a condensation of class relations, in State, Power, Socialism he holds thateven though class struggles take place beyond the state, they are notexternal to it; class struggles are inscribed in the institutional and materialstructures of the state (2000). Third, in his first book on the capitalist state,structures assumed primacy over class struggles, but in his later writingsPoulantzas gradually shifted from structuralist formalism to asserting pri-macy of class struggles over the structures (Jessop 1982).


The fourth shift of focus in Poulantzas’s writings concerns the weight heattributes to economic materiality. While the role of the economic instanceis not explored so much in his early work Political Power and Social Classes,it is given greater attention in Poulantzas’s two later books. This is prob-ably due to the accusation of overpoliticizing the state in his early works(Poulantzas 2000). Classes in Contemporary Capitalism has a more dis-cernible ‘economic framework’ (Hall 1980); it delves into such questionsregarding whether the role of the capitalist state changes during thetransition from competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism and whetherthe capitalist state still possesses relative autonomy vis-à-vis the dominantclasses. In State, Power, Socialism, Poulantzas further restores the impor-tance of the economic to his state theory with the concept of ‘institutionalmateriality’ (2000, 14). He stresses that the state manifests a materialframework which is irreducible to political or ideological domination.

Despite his theoretical contribution, Poulantzas’s state theory is notwithout criticism. To name a few examples, he has been accused of‘structural super-determinism’ and ‘structuralist abstractionism’ by hisopponent in the famous Poulantzas-Miliband debate (Laclau 1982). EllenMeiksins Wood (1986) asserts that Poulantzas is the ‘forerunner’ inembarking on a retreat from class and leading to the complete autono-mization of ideology and politics from economic materiality. Holloway andPicciotto (1977) disagree with Poulantzas’s postulation that the separationbetween the state and the economy is an inherent characteristic of capi-talism, arguing that such a separation is the product of continuous strug-gles by the ruling class to uphold its domination. Simon Clarke (1991)criticizes Poulantzas’s structural determinism for underemphasizing therole of class struggle and assuming the predominance of structures.

These criticisms contain some truth. However, if we examinePoulantzas’s theory within the historical and intellectual milieu of his time,his contributions to rebutting the instrumentalist and epiphenomenalisttendency of Marxism-Leninism should be rightfully acknowledged.4 Dueto his premature death, Poulantzas’s state theory was mainly developedduring the 1960s and 1970s, and he was not able to respond to manycriticisms against him. However, many contemporary theorists still find histheories relevant and stimulating. Within the British tradition, Jessop(1985) has dedicated a whole book to exploring Poulantzas’s theories; andPoulantzas is a vital reference in much of his work (Jessop 1982, 1990,2008). Within the US tradition, Aronowitz, and Bratsis (2003) have takenthe Poulantzas–Miliband debate and Poulantzas’s theories as points of

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departure in reasserting the relevance of the state in the globalized era.Within the German tradition, Gallas et al. (2011) have offered an acutereading of Poulantzas’s writings and explored how his theories should beapplied and further developed in the contemporary context; Brand et al.(2011) have reformulated Poulantzas’s theories to analyze the interna-tional political economy.

3 INTEGRATING GRAMSCI AND POULANTZAS’ INSIGHTS

My theorization of the Chinese state is largely inspired by Gramsci’s theoryof hegemony (and passive revolution) with additional insights fromPoulantzas. Gramsci and Poulantzas share some vigorous ideas, yet differ inother areas. As will be explicated, this has made their intellectual contri-butions complementary. Against the mainstream perception thatPoulantzas inherits his ideas from Althusserian structuralism, Jessopmaintains that Poulantzas actually adopts a neo-Gramscian approach in hiswork (1982). He writes:

But, if we ignore his earliest studies of law and the juridical system with theirstrongly Sartrean overtones…and his obvious flirtation with Althusserianstructuralism in his first major work on the capitalist state (PPSC) and itsresidues in his subsequent analyses…, it is apparent that his principal sourcesof inspiration among twentieth-century Marxists are Gramsci and Lenin andthat Gramsci is the more influential in many respects. (Jessop 1982, 154)

Gramsci’s influence on Poulantzas is evident in the latter’s emphasis onideologies. As emphasized, Gramsci’s concept of two modalities of classpower (coercion and hegemony) is a breakthrough for Marxian statetheory. With the ideas of hegemony, he convincingly illustrates how thecapitalist class remains dominant by gaining cultural, political and moralleadership. Following in Gramsci’s footsteps, Poulantzas elucidates that tosustain capitalist structures and the capitalist class’s superiority, the statedoes not simply rule with its repressive apparatuses (such as police, army,judiciary and so forth) whose major functions are to maintain politicalorder, it also rules with ideological apparatuses that elaborate and inculcateits ideologies (Poulantzas 1969, 1973a, b, 1978). Furthermore, Poulantzasextends Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to analyze internal factions withinthe capitalist class (Poulantzas 1967, 1973b, 1978). The bourgeoisie is thedominant class in a capitalist formation and, according to Poulantzas,


within the dominant class there exist hegemonic classes that exercisedominance over the other dominant factions and unify them under itsleadership.

In addition, both Gramsci and Poulantzas hold that capitalist hegemonyand ideologies are rooted in economic materiality while scholars like Laclauand Mouffe have denied their relations to the economic. Gramsci believesthat ‘if hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic’ (Femia1987, 24). For him, in order to sustain the bourgeoisie’s dominance, theruling class has to absorb the antagonism of the dominated class byaddressing their concerns with short-term material measures. Similarly,Poulantzas (2000, 31) maintains that ‘…in working for class hegemony…the state…continually adopts material measures which are of positive sig-nificance for the popular masses…’ The fact that the capitalist state oftenforces concessions from the dominant class for the subordinate class hasinspired Poulantzas to put forward the concept of the relative autonomy ofthe state.

Despite their common analysis on certain issues, Gramsci andPoulantzas’ thoughts have differences; these make their theories comple-mentary to each other. Poulantzas puts flesh on the bones of some ofGramsci’s ideas. For instance, Gramsci does not clearly outline the mech-anisms through which the state builds up and maintains capitalist hege-mony (Poulantzas 2000),5 but Poulantzas fills the gap by highlighting thedual role of the state in organizing the power bloc and disorganizing thedominated class. On the one hand, it attempts to forestall working classstruggles by producing effects of isolation at the ideological level, con-cealing the class nature of social relations of production from workers. Onthe other, the state seeks to unify the dominant class and help themovercome the isolation of their economic struggles by, for example,articulating their interests as the universal interests of society (Poulantzas1973b). Furthermore, borrowing from Althusser, Poulantzas utilizes theconcept of ideological apparatus to explain how the state elaborates uponand inculcates capitalist ideologies to maintain class hegemony. Examplesof such apparatuses are churches, political parties, schools, mass media, andunions (Poulantzas 1969, 1978).

Moreover, influenced by Althusser, Poulantzas considers Gramsci’sunderstanding of hegemony subjectivist as he reduces ideology and con-sciousness to the subjectivity of class agents and does not analyze classsubjects’ consciousness against economic and social structures.6 CriticizingGramsci for conceptualizing the political and the economic as ‘moments’

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(rather than structures) which is an expression of subjectivism (Poulantzas2008, 163), Poulantzas argues that ideologies should be located within ‘anobjective system of relations’ in a social formation (2008, 94). For him, thecapitalist social formation consists of three instances: the economic, thepolitical, and the ideological. Ideologies function within this ensemble ofstructures to shape social class formation, but the economic plays adeterminant role in the last instance.

In addition, Gramsci has been criticized for insufficient attention to theeconomic and the economic role of the state (Hawley 1980; Anderson1976). He surely does not deny the importance of economic materiality inclass reproduction and social formation, but due to his central focus onhegemony, he does not explain the economic role of the state adequately.With his structuralist perspective, Poulantzas brings the economic struc-tures, which Gramsci does not elaborate on much, back to the center ofMarxian state theory.

However, there are two problems with Poulantzas’s structuralistapproach to which Gramsci’s theories offer solutions. First, as mentioned inChap. 1, Poulantzas’s political-ideological-economic structural conceptlacks a social dimension. Influenced by Althusser (1971), Poulantzas tendsto conceive of civil society as not enjoying any autonomy from the state. Inhis opinion, the actions of civil society institutions are determined by therepressive apparatuses of the state. Therefore, ‘the destruction of the ide-ological apparatus has its precondition in the destruction of the Staterepressive apparatus which maintains it’ (Poulantzas 1972, 252–253).Having conflated the state and civil society, Poulantzas does not payadequate attention to the latter in his work.7 Gramsci’s emphasis on civilsociety and its relative autonomy from the state can compensate for the lackof a social dimension in Poulantzas’s state theory.

Second, Poulantzas has been criticized for overemphasizing structures atthe expense of class agency. This perspective has a certain degree of validity,especially concerning his early writings, but it is not applicable to his laterwork which starts to emphasize the primacy of class struggles over struc-tures (Jessop 1982, 156). Nevertheless, when compared to Gramsci’stheory, it is true that the strength of Poulantzas’s theory lies in its structuralconceptualization, and that he has not shed much light on the role of socialforces and class agents in transforming the structures. In contrast, Gramscitakes class actors, class organizations and class struggles more seriously. Inhis conceptualization, class agents play a crucial role in building hegemony


and working class revolution. For instance, the factory council was onceconceived of as a platform through which workers can practise realdemocracy and self-autonomy; political parties are considered a modern‘collective prince’ capable of revolutionizing the working class; organicintellectuals are regarded as vital in assisting the working class to overcomecapitalist common sense. In brief, both theorists’ insights do not only sharecommonalities, but also help overcome each other’s weaknesses in differentrespects.

4 THE GRAMSCIAN APPROACH TO THE CHINESE

PARTY-STATE

Although capitalist hegemony in China has received inadequate intellectualattention, scholars in the field of China Studies frequently refer to the term‘hegemony’. It is, however, often used vaguely and ambiguously; and itsmeaning is always unspecified. According to my own analysis, hegemony isunderstood in at least four different undefined ways in the literaturerelating to the Chinese state, laws, and labor.

First, some scholars have equated hegemony with legitimacy. Forinstance, in his writing entitled Contesting State Legitimacy in the 1990s,Wright (2004) uses the term hegemony and legitimacy interchangeablywhen discussing to what extent the Chinese Democratic Party and ChinaLabour Bulletin (a NGO led by overseas dissidents) can challenge thelegitimacy of the Chinese state. Without defining what these two termsmean, the confusion between them manifests in his conclusion that ‘de-centralized CCP control provides openings that may be probed by groupschallenging CCP legitimacy…the political atmosphere on the mainlandremains extremely constricted, such that only groups that pose a limitedthreat to CCP hegemony (such as the CLB) may be allowed to persist’(Wright 2004, 137–138).8 Legitimacy is a concept usually associated withpolitical regimes, but without considering its relationship with the eco-nomic. For example, Max Weber’s understanding of legitimacy is ‘thebelief that someone’s position and the system incorporating it are right andproper’ (Wallace and Wolf 2006, 74); for Habermas, it is ‘a political order’sworthiness to be recognised’ (Habermas 1979, 178); for Jessop, it is ‘thesocially acknowledged character of its [the state’s] political functions’(Jessop 2008, 10). However, from the Gramscian perspective the conceptof hegemony concerns both political and economic relations. Due to their

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conceptual difference, it is inappropriate to equate hegemony withlegitimacy.

Second, hegemony is used by some scholars to indicate ideologicalinfluence or dominance. Gries argues that the Chinese state’s ‘hegemonyover national discourse’ (2004, 187) has been challenged by the popularnotion of nationalism, which criticizes the state’s nationalist discourse andforeign policies for failing to protect national interest. He suggests that ‘[s]truggling to keep up with popular nationalist demands, the Party appearsto be losing its hegemony over Chinese nationalism’ (Gries 2004, 183).Comparing it to the production regime characterized by localistic despo-tism in Shenzhen, Lee (1995) advances that the production regime inHong Kong is based on ‘familial hegemony’, which refers to the man-agerial control of labor relying on discourses and ideologies related to theChinese family and the domestic responsibilities of women. Although thiskind of usage of hegemony concerns values and ideologies, it is differentfrom the Gramscian notion of hegemony. These authors use hegemony torefer broadly to ideological domination rather than specifically to accep-tance by the subaltern class of capitalist worldviews concerning the stateand the economy.

Third, hegemony is treated as a synonym for domination, power orcontrol. Solinger (1993, 93) emphasizes the Chinese state’s ‘socioeco-nomic domination’ over floating migrant workers, arguing that they havebeen ‘absorbed into the state’s hegemony’. Potter examines how Chineseeconomic reform has strengthened the party-state’s reliance on the legalsystem, which in turn has restrained state power and challenged ‘partyhegemony’ (Potter 2004, 480). He highlights that ‘…once policies arepublicly articulated in law, the regime loses important degrees of controlover the content and interpretation of these new norms. Instead, hegemonyis protected by preserving the party’s authority over personnel…the regimehas attempted to maintain hegemony over legal reform through control overpersonnel’ (Potter 2004, 482).9 Like most of the scholars who have usedthe term hegemony, Potter does not define precisely what it means. Themeaning of the above quotation does not change much if ‘hegemony’ isreplaced by ‘domination’ or ‘power’.

Fourth, some scholars in the field of China Studies have used hegemonyin the Gramscian fashion and understood it as moral and political leader-ship of the capitalist class. As elaborated in Chap. 1, Blecher (2002), andHui and Chan (2012) clearly spell out their Gramscian approachwhen studying the acceptance of market ideologies by urban workers,


and the party-state’s hegemonic project of a harmonious society. Capitalisthegemony is a clear and principal theme of their research.

Some scholars do not make hegemony their subject of inquiry, but usethe concept in a Gramscian sense or in connection to class relations.Friedman and Lee (2010, 528, 530) suggest that the response of theChinese party-state to the 2008 economic crisis shows that it ‘has acceptedthe interests of capital as hegemonic’ and workers were ‘forced to confrontthe hegemonic power of state and capital as individuals’. Pun and Chan(2008, 91) hold that the new working class in China has been undergoinga process of unmaking under ‘the hegemonic project undertaken by a“quest for globality” driven by neoliberal political ideologies’. Pun suggeststhat in China, capitalism has to prevail over ‘noncapitalist reasoning inorder to assert its hegemony’ (1999, 6), and she argues that the hegemonicbloc in China has tried to decry class politics with the neoliberal discourseof modernity (2005). These scholars, however, have employed the termhegemony too readily and casually, which has led to confusion and loss ofprecision. Without providing an unequivocal definition, some authorsassociate hegemony with differing ideas in the same piece of work. Forinstance, Pun, at one point in her book, refers to hegemony as the dom-inance of the capitalist system over non–capitalist reasoning (Pun 2005,119–120, also see 22, 24, 28); but when discussing the politics of dialectsat the workplace, she uses hegemony to indicate the cultural superiority ofCantonese, remarking that Mandarin has lost its ‘hegemonic position’(Pun 2005, 128). Friedman and Lee basically employ hegemony in aGramscian sense (2010, 531); but when they note that Chinese rule by lawhas become a ‘hegemonic discourse’ (2010, 519), they do not explain itsrelationship with capitalist ethico-political leadership. They simply usehegemony to express the general acceptance by workers of handling labordisputes through the legal system.

The lack of clarity and coherence in deploying the term hegemony hashindered constructive debates on the concept and created intellectualconfusion. In order to avoid theoretical ambiguity and incoherence, in thefollowing, I expound on my theoretical approach to the Chinese state bycritically engaging with Gramsci and Poulantzas’s theories, as well as awider range of scholarship in regards to the concept ‘hegemony’.

First, following Gramsci, I see the Chinese state undergoing hegemonictransformation as an integral state that does not merely include the gov-ernment apparatus, but also civil society. Class power is organized by the

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Chinese state in both political and civil society. Anderson (1976) disagreeswith Gramsci’s ideas of the state for entailing certain antinomies. On someoccasions, Gramsci considers the state a combination of civil and politicalsociety, but on others he defines it either as equivalent only to politicalsociety or only to civil society (Hawley 1980). Defending Gramsci, Jessopargues that these antinomies are not significant as long as they are inter-preted with reference to the exercise of state power, instead of to thedefinition of state apparatuses. I agree with Jessop that it is more crucial topay attention to Gramsci’s analysis of ‘the modalities of state power and theperiodisation of forms of state than to consider his various definitions of thestate’ (Jessop 1982, 147). Therefore, despite the ‘antinomies’, in this bookI adhere to Gramsci’s idea of integral state and conceptualize the Chinesestate as a combination of political society and civil society.

Second, I maintain that the Chinese state rules with both coercion andpersuasion (Gramsci 1971; Poulantzas 1969). The long-term ascendencyof the Chinese ruling class is not simply buttressed by the coercive capacityof the party-state, as the authoritarian thesis claims (see Chap. 1). It alsorelies on the state’s hegemonic endeavour to promote and reproducecapitalist commonsensical worldviews among the Chinese working class.

Although I argue that hegemony is a rising modality of power exercisedby the Chinese party-state, in no way do I imply that it now rules withoutcoercion. Some scholars advocate that hegemony and coercion form twodiscrete modes of class power and counterpoise each other; if hegemonyis predominant then coercion will decline proportionately in significance(for example, Gwyn 1960). Some of the writings of Gramsci, in fact, canlead to such an interpretation (Anderson 1976). However, his later elab-oration on the relations between consent and force changes to one thatdoes not view hegemony as ‘“consent” in contrast to another of “coer-cion”, but as itself a synthesis of consent and coercion’ (Anderson 1976,22). Poulantzas (2000) also maintains that the ruling class’s power isrooted in both hegemony and violence and that hegemony is not areplacement of coercion. In this book, hegemony is not simply taken asideological and cultural leadership of the capitalist class; I adopt the viewthat hegemony is always bulwarked by the application of state coercion(Burawoy 2003; Merrington 1968). Even the most hegemonic state can-not rule without the support of military and physical forces. This is whatGramsci calls ‘hegemony protected by the armor of coercion’ (Gramsci1971, 263).


Considering the Chinese party-state’s application of force to ensureworker compliance and its reliance on political control to forestall theformation of independent worker associations, some people may doubt thehegemonic capacity of the Chinese party-state. I contend that this type ofopinion has polarized the modality of hegemony and domination,assuming that they are mutually exclusive. As explained, hegemony is, here,understood as the synthesis of consent and force. Under normal circum-stances, the reign of the state–capital nexus in China is largely built uponthe consent of the working class, with coercion receding into the back-ground, but by no means eliminated. In a moment of crisis, the role ofcontrol and force in securing conformity of the subaltern will become morepalpable and will prevail over consent.

Third, concerning the question about where the site of practice ofhegemony is, the predominant opinion is that in addition to the points ofproduction (Gramsci 1971; Burawoy 1979; Merrington 1968), it is mainlyexercised through private organizations in civil society, such as churches,schools and trade unions (Femia 1987). However, Anderson (1976)reminds us that hegemony is exercised not only in civil society, but also inpolitical society. He and other scholars, such as Hobsbawm (1977) andJessop (2008), argue that the parliamentary democratic system performs ahegemonic function in convincing the subordinate class that they are incontrol of the government; it thus helps dampen their motivation to rebelagainst the socio–economic system. Supporting this argument, Buckel andLescano (2009, 444) assert that ‘[i]n the political and legal apparatuses theleadership personnel act not only repressively but also hegemonically’. Infact, Gramsci (1971, 246) advances that the legislature, judiciary, andexecutive are ‘organs of political hegemony’.

Unlike their Western counterparts, social organizations in China are notcompletely autonomous from the party-state in terms of their structuresand operations. Some scholars hold that only state-led civil society (Frolic1997) or semi-civil society (He 1997) exists in China. The strong gov-ernment control over social organizations in China may weaken the con-ditions for exercising hegemony in the civil arena. Under thesecircumstances, I contend that the labor law system in China acts as a crucialorgan of hegemony by endorsing, inculcating, and transmitting capitalistcommon sense. Moreover, as parliamentary democracy is absent in China,the rule of law through the legal system, which is increasingly emphasizedby the party-state, is an even more critical site for the reproduction ofhegemony.

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Fourth, concerning the relationship between the economic structures,and the political and ideological superstructures, I propose that the socio–economic structures in China and the global economic setting have con-stituted the terrain within which the mode of governance and mode ofregulation by the Chinese party-state develop. Yet the Chinese state is notunilaterally shaped by the economic structures; it still plays a vital role inreproducing the conditions that sustain capitalist social relations of pro-duction (Poulantzas 1973b, 1978).

There is no doubt that Gramsci places an emphasis on the superstruc-tural elements, such as hegemony, values, ideas, and cultures, but differentinterpretations of his views on the relationship between ethico-politicalsuperstructures and economic structures exist. Scholars, such as Bobbioand Jean-Marc Piotte, argue that Gramsci puts primacy on the super-structures over the structures (Mouffe and Sassoon 1977). Contesting thissuper-structural reading of Gramsci, Texier contends that the superstruc-tures and the base have a dialectical relation ‘in which each element can inturn assume the role of conditioner or conditioned’ (Mouffe and Sassoon1977, 45), and that the economic structures are determinant in the lastinstance because they limit the possibilities of the development of super-structures. Portelli has a third opinion, holding that Gramsci attributesequal weight to both the economic base and ideological superstructures(Mouffe and Sassoon 1977, 46). Glucksmann considers Gramsci a theoristof superstructures, for he livens up historical materialism by delving intoquestions of the state and ideology/hegemony. However, she warns thatwe should avoid an ‘excessively super-structural’ reading of Gramsci, whichregards the superstructures/state/ideology both as unrelated to specificrelations of production and as ‘independent variables’ (Mouffe and Sassoon1977, 48).

In this book, I discard the purely super-structural reading of Gramsciand align more with Texier and Glucksmann who adopt a non–economisticand non–reductionist interpretation of Gramsci’s ideas. Instead of seeingthe Chinese state as mechanically determined by the base or manipulatedby the bourgeoisie class, I maintain that the superstructural elements arehighly relevant to the reproduction of social relations of production inChina. Yet, the economic base is determinant in the last instance as itshapes the possible forms of superstructure development (Poulantzas1973b, 1978). Social reproduction should be analyzed


…from the point of view of the articulation of the whole ensemble of thevarious levels of society. The economic aspect remains, in the last instance, asthe final determinant but politics may now play the dominant role since it isthrough politics that a historical bloc is created or destroyed. (Mouffe andSassoon 1977, 51)

Fifth, the capitalist class in China will become hegemonic only when it isable to create a national-popular appearance for its parochial interests(Gramsci 1971; Poulantzas 2008; Culter 2005). The formation of thistrans-class interest is in no way equivalent to the imposition of false con-sciousness on the working class; it has to take account of and incorporatesome of their interests and demands in order to gain universal appeal(Poulantzas 2008). In the country, only when the interests of the domi-nant Chinese class are successfully articulated and taken as national interestwill the subordinate class render its consent to the leadership of thedominant class.

Moreover, the hegemonic class in China needs to grant economicconcessions to the working class so as to maintain its support and allegiance(Femia 1987). These concessions are usually short-term in nature, relatedto secondary issues and do not endanger the long-term dominance of thecapitalist class. Burawoy underscores that

To be an effective hegemonic force, a dominant or potentially dominant classmust make economic concessions to elicit the consent of a subordinate orallied class. But these concessions must not touch the essential, and in thecase of capitalists they must leave profit intact. (Burawoy 2003, 225)

These concessions, however, should not be seen as granted readily orwillingly to the working class. In fact, they are often ‘imposed by thestruggle of the subordinated classes’ (Poulantzas 2000, 31). In Westernsocieties, minimum wages, standard working hours, rights to organize andcollective bargaining, social welfare and universal suffrage are all hard-wonconcessions gained by the working class. Similarly, in China, concessions tothe working class in the form of labor and social policies, and labor lawsshould be understood as the products of working class struggle.

Sixth, for the Chinese capitalist class to become hegemonic, it has tonaturalize its moral, ethico-political, and intellectual worldviews; and theymust turn these worldviews into a ‘common sense’ held by the Chinesepopular masses so that they will endorse the capitalist logics and not

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challenge the leadership of the dominant class. This common sense isusually mixed with scientific and philosophical ideas; they are ‘half-waybetween folklore properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and eco-nomics of the specialists’ (Gramsci 1971, 326).

This common sense is transmitted and reinforced by organic intellec-tuals that are allied with the capitalist class (Femia 1987; Adamson 1980),as well as by the state’s ideological apparatuses in civil society and politicalsociety (Poulantzas 1969, 1978). They are not stable, coherent, or com-prehensive thoughts, but are ‘fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequen-tial’ in nature; they usually do not serve the interests of the exploited classwho come to accept ‘common sense’ (Adamson 1980, 150). To overcomethe hegemony of the ruling class, the working class, and its organic intel-lectuals must build up ‘good senses’ that meet their interests and needs(Gramsci 1971, 326).

Seventh, in this book, hegemony is not seen as a thing. Instead, it isconceptualized as a historical process of class struggles through which theruling class continuously reinforces and reproduces their ideologicalascendency, and through which the working class resists capitalist hege-mony (Benney 1983; Mouffe 1979; Culter 2005). Hegemony is ‘historical’because class agents are born into societies that are shaped by classstruggles of the past. As a result of these past struggles, some class agentstake up hegemonic and dominant positions in social relations of produc-tion, and they will need to strive to sustain their control and hegemony(Adamson 1980, 149). Hegemony is a ‘process’ because it does not onlyconcern ‘the fact of consent’, but, more importantly, it is related to theprocess of creating and mobilizing that consent (Hunt 1993, 20).

Hegemony is ‘class struggles’ between the capitalist and the working classbecause the former needs to maintain its ideological, intellectual, and moralleadership continuously so as to pre-empt revolt by the working class, whilethe working class and its class organizations strive to develop stronger classconsciousness among workers in order to transgress capitalist hegemony.In other words, hegemony is not equal to complete submission of theworking class or total domination of the capitalist class; instead, it is only an‘unstable equilibrium of compromises between capital and labor’(Poulantzas 2000, 31). How hegemonic a social class is, how much con-sent is given by labor to the capitalist class, and how much concession iswrung from capital is not definite or stable; rather, they result from classstruggles in the economic, political, and ideological terrain at variousparticular historical moments of a social formation.


Understanding hegemony as a historical process of class struggles, ratherthan merely as a mode of power exercised by the ruling class, offers twotheoretical benefits. First, it does not only focus on how the dominant classreproduces and stabilizes the current socio-economic system, but alsoopens up the possibility of conceptualizing how this system can be trans-formed. By inserting class agency and struggle into the analysis, capitalisthegemony is no longer perceived as stationary or insuperable. Instead, theunstable and fragile nature of hegemonic labor–capital relations can besophisticatedly conceptualized, and the possibility of carrying out subalternprojects of counter-hegemony is not conceptually denied.

Moreover, viewing hegemony as a historical process of class strugglesallows us to do away with a zero-sum understanding of hegemony whenstudying state–capital–labor relations in China. Capitalism has beenintroduced into China through the passive revolution since 1978 and has ashort history in the country. Therefore, in comparison with itsAnglo-Saxon and European counterparts, the process of building hege-mony in China is still in the infant stage. Seen from a widerhistorical-temporal perspective, the Chinese capitalist class is in the initialprocess of building up their moral and intellectual leadership, and theChinese state is in the early process of transforming the basis of its gov-ernance from one that relies principally on coercion to one that combinespersuasion and force. As elucidated in Chap. 1, if we adopt the authori-tarian perspective to analyze the Chinese state, we would overlook thesprouting of an important mode of power exercised by the Chinese rulingclass. Conceptualizing hegemony as a historical process allows us to capturethe critical transformation of the Chinese state ‘within capitalism frompolitical dictatorship to political hegemony’ (Burawoy 2003, 220).

Eighth, hegemony has a praxis dimension. As Buckel and Lescano pointout, ‘…hegemony is not some metaphysical subject, but a permanentpractice, a world-view fought out in struggles for recognition, throughwhich moral, political, and intellectual leadership is established’ (2009,442). Since hegemony is a historical process of class struggles, the con-struction of hegemony in China involves ‘permanent practice’ carried outby the hegemonic class in the socio–economic and political domain tocontinually reacquire the consent of the Chinese working class to capitalistleadership. The commonsensical worldviews of the Chinese dominant classneed to be continuously promulgated and reproduced through their classpractices. In addition, hegemony also has an institutional dimension. Theideological apparatuses of the Chinese state, such as the legal system, trade

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unions, and schools, help transmit, inculcate, and reproduce capitalisthegemony.

Finally, although Gramsci has shed light on how the state helps organizeclass power, he does not discuss much about what the state is. On thisissue, it is useful to apply Poulantzas’s insight about the state as a con-densation and materialization of social relations to analyze the Chineseparty-state. The Chinese state does not translate the interests of the capi-talist class onto the political level, but ‘the relationship between thoseinterests and the interests of the dominated classes’ (Poulantzas 2008, 80).Therefore, class contradictions and social relations of production areinscribed, crystallized, and condensed in the Chinese party-state. Themode of governance, the social and labor policies, and the labor law systemare a condensation and crystallization of class relations, an unstable equi-librium of class forces‚ and products of class struggle.

5 CONCLUSION

My theorization of the Chinese state is substantially different from theauthoritarian, corporatist, and developmental state perspectives outlined inChap. 1. I conceptualize the Chinese party-state as undergoing a hege-monic transformation, changing from engineering the country’s passiverevolution through force to facilitating capital accumulation throughestablishing hegemony. Within this conceptual framework, I argue that theChinese party-state rules not only with coercion as the authoritarian thesisargues, but also through the construction of hegemony to uphold pre-dominance of the capitalist class. The Chinese party-state has utilized dif-ferent state apparatuses of ideological, economic, legal, and political natureto build up, transmit, inculcate, and reproduce capitalist hegemony. Thelabor law system, a key subject of inquiry in this book, is an example of suchapparatuses. Unlike the developmental state perspective that stresses onlythe economic role of the Chinese state, my theorization also considerssocio–economic and juridico-political dimensions of the Chinese state. Thecoercive and hegemonic mechanisms that the Chinese state uses to mediatecapital–labor relations in order to facilitate economic accumulation are ofprimary concern. Different from the corporatist approach that focuseslargely on the corporatist actors, the hegemony approach to the Chinesestate analyzes social forces and class struggles that are beyond the corpo-ratist structures in China. I also examine how state–capital–labor relations


are reinforced, consolidated, and reproduced through the daily hegemonicpractices of class agents, the state, and non-state institutions.

In summary, I advance that, after having steered the passive revolutionfor almost four decades, the Chinese party-state, as a condensation andmaterialization of social relations, simultaneously plays a coercive andhegemonic role in mediating labor–capital relations. The Chinese rulingclass’s long-term ascendency is not simply grounded on the coercivecapacity of the party-state; it is also rooted in the state’s hegemonic attemptto promote capitalist common sense among the subordinate class in thecountry. Moreover, hegemony is not a thing, but a historical process ofclass struggles. It is related to both the economic structures (which lead toeconomic domination of the capitalist class) and the ethico-politicalsuperstructures (which secure the subaltern class’s consent to capitalistideological ascendency), both persuasion (through the formation ofnational-popular interest and granting economic concessions) and domi-nation (through the use of coercive apparatuses), both ideology (such ascapitalist common sense and worldviews) and practice/institutions, andboth civil society and political society.

NOTES

1. There is no doubt that Gramsci is a Marxian; however, his early workswere heavily influenced by Croce, a leading Italian philosopher, and thusshow traits of idealism. From 1919 onward, his writings manifest anorthodox Marxist orientation, and he starts to criticize the Crocean ideasin his prison writings. In the latter stages of his life, he illustrates asophisticated materialist “de-mystification of Hegel” (Femia 1987, 101).

2. This development includes the success of the Russian revolution in 1917,the failure of the factory council movement in Italy in 1920, the eco-nomic crisis from 1929 to 1932, the emergency of fascism in Italy duringthe interwar period and so forth.

3. His early writings were subject to the influence of Sartrean existentialism,but later he was inspired by Gramsci and Althusser in different ways(Poulantzas 2008).

4. His theory also seeks to rebut the pluralist political system approach,which was the focus of inquiries in mainstream sociology and politicalscience during the 1950s and 1960s (Barrow 2003). The political systemapproach assumes a pluralist society, asserting that the state is not the onlyactor making political decisions; politicians, businessmen, trade unions,voters and so forth are also involved (Barrow 2003). Poulantzas has

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revolted against this trend of undervaluing the state, seeking to reviveMarxian critical state theories.

5. Litowitz (2000, 523) writes that “…nor did Gramsci provide an analysisof the various mechanisms by which the existing regime in Italy hadbecome hegemonic” and Stuart Hall states that Poulantzas clearlyattempted to give Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” a more theoreti-cized and systemic “formulation” (Poulantzas 2000, ix).

6. Althusser criticizes Gramsci (and Korsch and Lukacs) for his subjectivistand historicist approach which has reduced knowledge “to its own con-ditions of existence, thus abandoning altogether Marxism’s claim togenuine scientific status” and which has reduced history into “theexpression of a subject” (Martin 2008, 7).

7. Poulantzas’s state theory is insightful, but it neglects the social dimensionof the state. With the exception of Preliminaries to the Study of Hegemonyin the State (Poulantzas 2008, Chap. 3), which was written during hisearly academic career, concepts such as civil society and social organiza-tions were largely missed out from his theory.

8. My own emphasis.9. My own emphasis.

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Althusser, Louis. 1971. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm.

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Barrow, Clyde W. 2003. The Miliband-Poulantzas Debate: An Intellectual History.In Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered, ed. Stanley Aronowitz and PeterBratsis. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

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Habermas, Jürgen. 1979. Legitimation Problems in the Modern State. InCommunication and the Evolution of Society, ed. Jürgen Habermas. London:Heinemann Education Books.

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Hunt, Alan. 1993. Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory ofLaw. New York: Routledge.

Jessop, Bob. 1982. The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods. Oxford:Martin Robertson.

Jessop, Bob. 1985. Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy. NewYork: St. Martin’s Press.

Jessop, Bob. 1990. State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place.Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Marx, Karl. 1973. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In Survey FromExile: Political Writings, vol. 2, ed. David Fernbach. London: New Left Review.

Marx, Karl. 1974. The Civil War in France. In Survey From Exile: Political Writings,vol. 3, ed. David Fernbach. London: New Left Review.

Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1978. The Communist Manifesto. In TheMarx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton.

Merrington, J. 1968. Theory and Practice in Gramsci’s Marxism. Socialist Register5: 145–176.

Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.Mouffe, Chantal. 1979. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci. In Gramsci Marxist

Theory, ed. Chantal Mouffe. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.


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Mouffe, Chantal, and Anne Showstack Sassoon. 1977. Gramsci in France andItaly—A Review of the Literature. Economy and Society 6 (1): 31–68.

Potter, Pitman B. 2004. Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and SelectiveAdaptation. Law & Social Inquiry 29 (2): 465–495.

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Poulantzas, Nicos. 1969. The Problem of the Capitalist State. New Left Review I(58): 67–78.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 1972. The Problem of the Capitalist State. In Ideology in SocialScience, ed. R. Blackburn. London: Fontana.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 1973a. On Social Class. New Left Review I (78): 27–54.Poulantzas, Nicos. 1973b. Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left

Review and Sheed and Ward.Poulantzas, Nicos. 1978. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Verso.Poulantzas, Nicos. 2000. State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso.Poulantzas, Nicos. 2008. The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law and the State.

London: Verso.Pun, Ngai. 1999. Becoming Dagongmei (Working Girls): The Politics of Identity

and Difference in Reform China. China Journal 42: 1–18.Pun, Ngai. 2005.Making in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace.

Durham: Duke University Press.Pun, Ngai, and King Chi Chris Chan. 2008. The Subsumption of Class Discourse

in China. boundary 2 35 (2): 75–91.Salamini, Leonardo. 1974. Gramsci and Marxist Sociology of Knowledge: An

Analysis of Hegemony-Ideology-Knowledge. Sociological Quarterly 15(Summer 1974): 359–380.

Solinger, Dorothy J. 1993. China’s Transients and the State: A Form of CivilSociety? Politics & Society 21: 91–122.

Wallace, Ruth A., and Alison Wolf. 2006. Contemporary Sociological Theory:Expanding the Classical Tradition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Wood, Ellen Meiksins. 1986. The Retreat from Class: The New “True” Socialism.London: Verso.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1979. Class, Crisis and the State. London: Verso.Wright, Teresa. 2004. Contesting State Legitimacy in the 1990s: The China

Democracy Party and the China Labor Bulletin. In State and Society in21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation, ed. Peter Hays Griesand Stanley Rosen. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

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CHAPTER 3

The Legal Foundation for ChangingState–Capital–Labor Relations

1 INTRODUCTION

As introduced in Chap. 1, the cardinal questions under examination in thisbook are: (1) how the Chinese party-state has built up capitalist hegemonythrough the labor law system during its hegemonic transformation;(2) under what circumstances workers conform with, contest or transgresslegal hegemony; and (3) the fragility and precariousness of legal hegemonyin contemporary China. In this chapter, my investigation of the Chinesestate’s hegemonic transformation focuses on the Chinese labor law system.I will elaborate on the ‘legislative intervention’ made by the Chinese stateduring the country’s passive revolution that sought to bring radical changesto its economic structures ‘in order to accentuate the “plan of production”’(Gramsci 1971, 120). The party-state’s legislative intervention, I argue, hascontributed to the following vital developments that facilitate capitalaccumulation: the capitalist class, which was absent in the pre-reformperiod, has been made while socialist workers and peasants have beenturned into the exploited class; labor power is commodified in the newbornlabor market that has been built upon an affirmation of private propertyrights; worker wages is now associated with labor productivity and effi-ciency; trade unions have been co-opted by the state, and workers arediverted to individualized legal channels to handle grievances. All thesestate-driven efforts have established a vital and material bedrock for theproduction of capitalist hegemony in contemporary China.


69

Before proceeding with my main arguments, I will first give an intro-duction to the Chinese legal system as a background to my analysis.Following its founding in 1949, the PRC enacted its first Constitution in1954. Shortly afterward, it attempted to build up legal order in the countrythrough establishing legal institutions, producing legal rules, applying lawsuniformly, and expanding the legal profession. However, subsequentpolitical strife, including the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957–1958), theGreat Leap Forward (1958–1961)‚ and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), rendered this endeavor futile (Potter 1994, 329). In the highlypoliticized environment, laws and lawyers were viewed as bourgeoisie andcounter-revolutionary (Lubman 1999). In the late 1950s, law schools wereclosed down and lawyers were discharged (Potter 2004); the Ministry ofJustice and local Justice Bureaus were abolished in 1959 (Zhu 2004).During the Cultural Revolution, the legal system was further marginalized.Laws were largely the CCP’s administrative instrument for exercisingpolitical power and implementing social policies (Potter 2004). Thestate-socialist rule was guided by the CCP’s policies, which were looselytranslated into ‘imprecise, exhortational, tentative’ legislations (Lubman1999, 384). In other words, the legal system was not ascribed anyautonomy from the party-state.

Post-Mao China has witnessed greater efforts to rebuild the legal system,including professionalization of judges and legal practitioners (Friedmanand Lee 2010), training and regulation of lawyers (Zhu 2004), proliferationof legislation (Ngok 2008), the enactment of the Legislation Law in 2000which specifies how laws should be legislated (Benney 2013), increasinglegal aid to the public‚ and, most importantly, endorsement of the rule oflaw. In 1999, the PRC Constitution was amended to declare that ‘[t]hePeople’s Republic of China governs the country according to law andmakesit a socialist country under rule of law’.1 All these new developments not onlydemonstrate the rising status of the legal system, but they also reveal theparty-state’s intention to loosen, however slightly, its grip on the legal sys-tem due to political and economic consideration, including to legitimatizeits rule with legality (Gallagher 2006), to fulfill the requirements of joiningthe World Trade Organization (Brandt and Rawski 2008), to acquireconsent of the subordinate class and so forth.

Most Chinese laws are based on the legal models of the Soviet Union,Germany, and Europe (Potter 1999). In China, law is a broad concept thatincorporates five levels of law (Ngok 2008). At the apex of the legal

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hierarchy is the PRC Constitution. The first Constitution was enacted in1954. Then three other Constitutions were promulgated in 1975, 1978,and 1982 respectively. The 1982 Constitution is still currently in effect, butit was amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. The second highest legalcategory is the national law (falv), which must be adopted by the NationalPeople’s Congress and its Standing Committee. The next level consists ofadministrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) effected by the State Council.The second lowest level in the legal hierarchy is made of local regulations(difangxing fagui) enacted by the Local People’s Congress, while thelowest level is composed of rules (guizhang) released by administrativeagencies under the State Council or local governments.

The Chinese party-state rarely legislates any national laws withoutconducting prior experimentation; it usually pilots new legal and socialpolicies before turning them into nationwide laws (Ngok 2008). Laws andrules are deliberately phrased in broad and indeterminate language so as toallow for flexible implementation and interpretation (Lubman 1999). Thenational Chinese laws need to be supplemented by local legislation, theintent of which is to make the former more concrete and detailed (Zhao2009). Lubman (1999, 390) has characterized the Chinese legislativesystem as a ‘legal fragmentation’ because, first, departments under the StateCouncil have the power to issue and modify binding rules under theirjurisdiction with unclear procedures. Second, the state council, local gov-ernments, and other relevant administrative agencies are vested not onlywith the power to make administrative regulations and rules, but also theauthority to interpret those same regulations and rules. Courts are onlyresponsible for the application of laws to relevant parties. In other words,most Chinese laws are made by the state bureaucracy rather than legislativebodies; local governments and the State Council exercise extensive powerin producing, modifying, and interpreting laws. Cooney (2007, 675, 676)also criticizes the ‘disorderly internal structure’ of the Chinese legal system.

Concerning the labor law system, industrial relations in China are gov-erned by numerous laws and regulations, such as the 1995 Labour Law,2001 Trade Union Law, 2004 Provisions onMinimumWage, 2008 LabourContract Law, 2008 Law on Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration,2011 Social Insurance Law and so forth. The responsibility of enforcementof labor laws lies with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security,labor administration departments, mediation institutions, arbitration com-missions, courts and so forth. Labour laws set the minimum standards forissues such as daily and monthly working hours, overtime payment, work

THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR CHANGING STATE … 71

injury compensation, occupational health and safety, labor contracts, wages,and social insurance. The Chinese labor laws, on paper, offer workers awide-range of protections, but in reality, they are often laxly implemented,and violations of workers’ legal rights are common (Gallagher 2004;Liebman 2007). Furthermore, the rights of workers to strike, engage incollective bargaining‚ and organize independently are not enshrined in thenational laws. While the 1954 Constitution did not protect the right ofworkers to strike, they were included in the 1975 Constitution and kept inthe 1978 Constitution. However, this right was removed from the 1982Constitution currently in use. For collective bargaining, there is no unifiednational law on collective negotiation, and many employers do not conductcollective consultation with worker representatives.2 Moreover, workerscannot form trade unions that are not subordinate to the ACFTU and CCP;any such attempts are met with suppression.

In the following section, I elaborate on the legal reform carried out inPost-Mao China, which has prompted recomposition of the state–capital–labor relationship in the course of the passive revolution. Section 3examines the relative autonomy of the Chinese party-state and the legalsystem resulting from changing political and economic relations. Section 4summarizes my major arguments.

2 THE LABOR LAW SYSTEM AND CHANGING INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS

In state socialism, the party-state possessed direct and full control overproduction. However, following the introduction of capitalism into thecountry, the party-state withdrew from the direct organizing of productionand left economic activities up to the hand of the market economy. Underthese circumstances, the legal system was needed to regulate marketinstitutions, business relations, and capital–labor relations so as to maintainessential conditions for capital accumulation. Jiang Zemin, the third gen-eration of the PRC leaders, once highlighted the importance of establishinga sound legal system:

Whether it is market regulation or macroeconomic regulation and control bythe state, we should constantly sum up our experiences and graduallyincorporate them into the law. We cannot possibly foster good order in thesocialist market economy in the absence of a sound socialist legal system.(Lubman 1999, 127)

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It is widely accepted that the Chinese economic reform has induced thelegal reform (Warner 1996; Gallagher 2004; Cooney 2007). In this sec-tion, I delve into how the incipient legal system and labor law systemexpedited China’s passive revolution. I focus on five important dimensions:(1) the making of the capitalist class and affirmation of private ownership,(2) the creation of a labor market and the commodification of labor power,(3) the introduction of a market wage system, (4) the individualization ofconflict resolution, and (5) the party-state’s control of class organizations.

2.1 The Creation of the Capitalist Class and Affirmationof Private Ownership

China’s passive revolution necessitated the state-driven creation of a privateeconomy and capitalist class, whose existence has become legitimized bythe legal system. In contrast to economic reform in some former socialistcountries (such as Russia) which first focused on privatizing the statesector, the Chinese government placed a great emphasis on developing thenon-state sector throughout the reform (Li 1994). In 1984, the Chineseparty-state characterized its economy as a ‘socialist commodity economy’(Breslin 2007). In 1987, the CCP’s 13th Congress endorsed the privatesector as ‘a necessary supplement’ to the public sector (Clarke et al. 2008,389). Accordingly, the Constitution was amended in 1988 to permit theprivate sector to exist and develop alongside the public economy; it alsoproclaimed that the state safeguards ‘the lawful rights and interests of theprivate sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision andcontrol over the private sector of the economy’ (Article 11). In the sameyear, the State Council issued the Provisional Regulations on PrivateEnterprises, which legalized partnership firms, sole proprietorships, andlimited companies (Clarke et al. 2008). In 1992, the CCP’s 14th Congressdecided to establish a ‘socialist market economy’ in China (Lau 1997). In1993, the CCP Central Committee developed a framework for the socialistmarket economy (Ngok 2008). In the same year, the Constitution wasrevised to affirm the socialist market economy. In this way, the ‘economicplanning on the basis of socialist public owner-ship’ (Clarke et al. 2008,391) or a ‘socialist commodity economy’ was abandoned for a ‘socialistmarket economy’. However, the 1993 amended Constitution still declaredthat China was practising ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. TheCCP’s 15th Congress in 1997 announced that the private sector was notsimply supplementary to the public sector, but had become an important


part of the economy (Clarke et al. 2008). Accordingly, the Constitutionwas amended in 1999 to recognize the non-state sector as constituting ‘animportant component of the socialist market economy’ (Article 16). In2004, the Constitution was revised again to not only sanction, but alsoencourage growth of the non-state sector (Clarke et al. 2008). In 2005,the party-state announced that the supplantation of the state-plannedeconomy by the ‘socialist market economy’ was complete (Breslin 2007).

Due to the party-state’s economic policies and legal affirmation of theonce non-existent private sector, the capitalist class consisting of variousplayers emerged in the reform era. First, as explained in Chap. 1, havingtaken advantage of the expansion of global capitalism, post-socialist Chinaattracted immense amounts of transnational capital following the economiccrisis of the 1970s. In 1979, the Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese andForeign Investment was enacted (Zheng 1987). In 1980, four SpecialEconomic Zones (SEZs) were set up in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, andXiamen as experimental projects to attract FDI and boost exports. In thesame year, the Regulations on Special Economic Zones in GuangdongProvince were issued to govern the first economic experiments with foreigninvestment (Lewis and Ottley 1981). A wide range of privileges, such asconcessionary taxes, preferential fees for land, and flexible wage schemes,were offered to foreign investors in the SEZs (Ge 1999). In 1984, 14 coastalcities andHainan Island were opened up. In 1985, cities in the PRD, YellowRiver Delta, and Yangtze River Delta were also opened up to foreigninvestment (So 2013). In 1986, the Provisions of the State Council on theEncouragement of Foreign Investment were issued (Zheng 1987).3 Since1988, the party-state has opened up all the coastal area, and eventually,almost all border regions of China followed suit (Ge 1999). As a result ofthe party-state’s legal facilitation, Sino-foreign joint ventures and whollyforeign-owned enterprises have mushroomed in China; the transnationalcapitalists have thus become key figures in the rising capitalist class.

Second, while private entrepreneurship was banned in Maoist China, theeconomic reform began to permit individual household firms (getihu) thatcould hire no more than eight employees. In 1981, the State Councilissued provisions that governed individual household firms in towns andcities. In 1983, it was extended to rural areas (Clarke et al. 2008). Thenewly created petty-bourgeoisie also formed a part of the incipient capitalistclass in the country (So 2013).

Third, the economic reform has nurtured many cadre-turned-capitalistsand private domestic capitalists. In state socialism, numerous rural

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communes set up collectively owned industrial enterprises, many of whichwere later turned into township and village enterprises (TVEs) by localcadres that basically acted like economic players in the market (Heston andSicular 2008). TVEs contributed immensely to rural industrialization dur-ing the early reform period. Its development was encouraged by StateCouncil documents issued in 1979 and 1984, and the Law on Townshipand Village Enterprises in 1996 (Clarke et al. 2008). However, many ofthem were privatized during the 1990s and landed in the hands of thecadres or their families; they thus have turned into private domestic capi-talists. In urban cities, driven by then Premier Zhu Rongji who chanted theslogan ‘grasp the big, let go of the small’, a large number of SOEs wereeither corporatized in the form of shareholding companies or sold to privateentrepreneurs in the mid-1990s. Through political manipulations, manycadres and their relatives ended up as the largest shareholders or owners ofthese enterprises (Chen 2003). It is estimated that state assets worth up to30 trillion yuan were transferred to private enterprises through connectionsto the government in the course of SOE privatization (Li 2011).

Fourth, SOEs of strategic importance have become key market players.During the 1980s and early 1990s, SOEs were allowed to alter their internalwage structures and wage rates in order to provide incentives to enhanceproductivity and increase profits (Yueh 2004). In 1997, the CCP’s 15thCongress approved the fundamental restructuring of SOEs (Chen 2003).Thereafter, many small and unprofitable SOEs were privatized, while larger,competitive ones were restructured. In this way, the party-state continues tocontrol large SOEs and shape their role in key, strategic sectors, such astelecom, energy, shipping, and banking (Naughton 2008). Although intheory, SOEs are considered ‘publicly owned’, they keenly pursue capitalaccumulation like all other capitalists and have become de facto state-capitalists.

The infant capitalist class is not only approved of through laws, but alsoby high-level juridico-political mechanisms. Since the mid-1990s, manyowners of private enterprises have become members of local People’sCongresses and People’s Political Consultative Conferences. Some of themare selected as leaders at the village level (Chen 1999). In 2001, JiangZemin, the then President, put forward the principle of ‘ThreeRepresentatives’, which advocates that the CCP should represent, amongother things, ‘the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of thepeople’ (Holbig 2006, 17). This means the party-state should not onlyrepresent the working class, but also the capitalist class, such as


entrepreneurs, the self-employed and so forth. The CCP constitution wasamended in 2002 to include the thought of ‘Three Representatives’.Thereafter, entrepreneurs have been eligible to join the CCP resulting incapitalists constituting the largest proportion of the CCP in comparison toother social classes (Breslin 2007). In 2014, it was reported that close toone-third of the super-rich in the country were CCP members.4

Furthermore, in the same year, 86 billionaires were members of theNational People’s Congress; they on average have accumulated wealth of8.1 billion RMB. In addition, 69 billionaires were members of the People’sPolitical Consultative Conference, who own assets that are valued onaverage at 11.7 billion RMB.5 In 2011, net worth of the 70 richest mem-bers of the National People’s Congress was valued at 565.8 billion RMB($89.8 billion), which massively surpasses the $7.5 billion net worth ownedby all 660 high ranking officials of the USA government.6 All of this reflectsthat the party-state has abandoned the working class and peasants as abroader alliance of social classes and that it has built up a ‘transformedregime alliance’ with the capitalist class in the reform era (Solinger 2006).This is the party-state’s trasformismo strategy to coopt the rising capitalistclass so as to create ‘a new, homogenous, political-economic historical bloc’(Anderson 1976, 19) during the country’s passive revolution.

The making of the capitalist class in China has gone hand in hand withthe endorsement of private property rights. Following the argument that alegal system protecting private ownership is vital for capital accumulation(Hunt 1993; Marx 1990), I maintain that one of the major contributionsof legal reform to China’s passive revolution is affirming private ownershipand private property rights. Public ownership was practised during thestate-socialist era; individual interests were subordinate to collective inter-ests, and the socialist state was seen as the ‘guardian of public welfare’(Potter 2000, 9). The pervasiveness of this public ownership system isreflected by laid-off SOE workers who feel nostalgic for socialism andutilize the discourse of public rights in their protests against SOErestructuring (Chen 2003). To foster capitalism in China, the confirmationof private ownership is prerequisite. Marx states that

Historically and logically, capitalism is tied to the private ownership of themeans of production, which allows private appropriation of produced com-modities, thus private appropriation of surplus value, and thus private accu-mulation of capital. It is surely not accidental that the ‘rights of private

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property’ are thus at the bottom of the whole constitutional and juridicalsuperstructure which centuries of law-making have erected upon the basis ofcommodity production. (Marx 1990, 57)

If private ownership does not exist, then only exchange of objects with usevalue takes place within a community. Only when private property rightsare clearly established can ‘private appropriation of produced commodi-ties’, exchange of commodities of different exchange values‚ and ‘appro-priation of surplus value’ be possible. Put simply, only when privateownership exists can realization of surplus value and capital accumulationbe made attainable.

The Chinese legal system is a crucial means for establishing ‘a newframework of property rights’ in the post-socialist period (Lee 2002, 195).The private property rights of capitalists are recognized by various laws,such as the 1993 Company Law, the 1998 Securities Law (both of whichwere revised in 2005), the 1999 Contract Law, the 2000 Law on SolelyFunded Enterprises, the 2004 amended Constitution, and the 2007Property Law. Intellectual property is protected by the 1984 Patent Law(revised in 1992), the 1982 Trademark Law (revised in 1993), the 1991Copyright Law and so forth. In addition to these laws, the property rightsof capitalists are also promoted by some local governments who run theirown businesses or benefit from investment because their wellbeing is alsoprotected through establishment of private property rights in society(Clarke et al. 2008).

It should be noted that although private ownership is the indispensablefoundation for capital accumulation, and laws regulating private property,indeed, safeguard capitalist interests, these laws always take a universal formand protect the private property rights of all people in society (Martin2008; Hunt 1993). That is why the 1982 Constitution, after amendmentin 2004, proclaims that the lawful rights of private property of all citizens,not simply those of the wealthy class, are inviolable. The ideologicalintention of this universal claim is to depoliticize class relations. As scholarsfrom Critical Legal Studies have pointed out,7 hierarchies and inequalitiesin a society are inherited into and reproduced by the legal system, but theyare often concealed by ‘impersonal’ and ‘neutral’ legal logics, and thusassume an appearance of inevitability and universality (Gordon 1984;Hutchinson and Monahan 1984).


2.2 The Creation of the Labor Market and Commodificationof Labor Power

The nascent capitalism introduced by China’s passive revolution not onlynecessitates the affirmation of private property rights and the creation of acapitalist class, but it also requires the formation of a capital market, labormarket, and commodity market. All transactions and exchanges takingplace in these markets are built upon the implicit, but fundamental,acceptance of private ownership. The capital market is where capitalistsraise credit for investment in physical production.8 The labor market iswhere workers and capitalists sell and buy labor power. The accumulationof capital hinges on the extraction of surplus value from laborers throughcapitalist control of production materials and the production processes(Marx 1990). The commodity market facilitates circulation and con-sumption of commodities so that the surplus value expropriated by capi-talists can be realized. From the angle of capital accumulation, theconstruction of these markets is indispensable for the growth of capitalismin China. In 1993, for the first time, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 14thCentral Committee of the CCP called for the development of a labormarket and capital market in China, commanding the formulation of acorresponding legislative plan and hastening the law-making process(Ngok 2008).

During the state socialist period, no labor market existed, nor was laborpower treated as commodity for sale. The Chinese workers of that perioddid not acquire jobs via the labor market, as in the capitalist economy, butthrough a centralized allocation system that distributed employmentaccording to ones’ skill and technical level. They enjoyed life-longemployment; their wages and welfare were based on seniority rather thandetermined by the supply and demand logics of a market. In order to createa labor market that commodifies labor power, China’s passive revolutionhas demolished socialist protections (including work units and rural peo-ple’s communes) so that workers and peasants are forced to subjectthemselves to capitalist wage-labor relations. Meanwhile, in the 1980s, thelabor contract system that facilitates the selling and buying of labor powerin the market was introduced into SOEs, as well as to the newly emergentnon-state sectors, to replace permanent employment (Zheng 1987). Thishas resulted in the commodification of labor power and a shift from asystem of ‘socialist social contract’ to that of a ‘legal contract’ (Friedmanand Lee 2010, 508).

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In the state sector, the labor contract system was first put forward as anexperiment in Shenzhen in 1982. Since 1983, it has been continuallyextended to other SOEs in most major provinces and cities (Zheng 1987).To nurture the newborn labor market and labor contract system, new lawsand regulations have been put into place. In 1986, the State Councilpromulgated four regulations on contract employment to establish stan-dards for recruitment, dismissal and termination of employees, as well as forsettlement of industrial disputes (Zheng 1987).9 The main purpose ofthese regulations was to legalize the labor contract system. While most ofthe already employed state workers continued to enjoy life-long employ-ment, new workers were hired on contracts offering them fewer benefitsand job security. Moreover, these regulations allowed SOEs to circumventthe centralized allocation employment system in deciding who to hire,even though the new recruitment process was under local labor bureau’ssupervision. By the mid-1990s, mandatory recruitment plans were abol-ished (Yueh 2004), meaning that all recruitment in the state sector is nowmediated by the once non-existent labor market.

In the private sector, several laws were enacted to govern labor relationsin Sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign-owned enterprises, laying a legalfoundation for labor contracts. These include the Regulations on LabourManagement in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment in1980, Procedures for the Implementation of the Regulations on LabourManagement in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment in1984 and the Regulations Governing Employment Autonomy, Workers’Wages and Insurance and Welfare Fees in Foreign Investment Enterprisesin 1986 (Zheng 1987). All of these laws permitted the use of labor con-tracts in Sino-foreign joint ventures.

While the 1980s witnessed the party-state’s experimental efforts tocommodify labor power through smashing the iron rice bowl, ending thejob allocation system, throwing workers into an embryonic labor market,and implementing a labor contract system, the 1995 Labour Law deliveredthe final verdict that consigned life-long employment to the dustbin ofhistory (Josephs 1995). This Law was promulgated in 1994 and becameeffective in 1995. Before its enactment, various laws were made to guidethe contractual employment relations in enterprises of multifarious own-erships (such as SOEs, private firms, joint ventures, wholly foreign-fundedcompanies, etc.). The Labour Law unifies the labor contract system andlabor standards across firms of all types of ownership by compiling thealready existing regulations and practices into one single law (Warner


1996). The Law legalizes not only open-ended contracts, but alsofixed-term labor contracts and contracts for specific tasks, which offerworkers fewer protections. In 2008, the Labour Contract Law was enac-ted. In addition to the three types of contracts covered by the 1995 LabourLaw, this new law also allows for precarious part-time employment.

The labor contract system affirmed by these laws transforms Chineseworkers into sellers of their labor power, while the capitalists are the buyers.The two parties are mostly considered juridico-political individuals ratherthan class agents; they encounter each other in the market as exchangers of‘free’ and ‘equal’ commodity, for they are supposedly able to enter intolegal contracts out of their own ‘free’ will. Therefore, at the legal level,workers are viewed as on an equal footing with capitalists, regardless of theformer’s economic and political subordination (Poulantzas 1973; Harvey1985). Many critical scholars dismiss this kind of liberty and equality asabstract and formal in nature rather than concrete and substantial(Poulantzas 2000, 2008; Hunt 1976; Klare 1978). This is because inreality, workers, who have no control over the means of production, haveno choice but to sell their labor power to earn a living (Hyman 1975). It isnot an equal exchange between commodity exchangers either, because theproduct of workers invariably exceeds, in value, what capitalists pay them.Capitalists offer a price for workers’ labor power in the labor market;workers, then, are compelled to sell it under conditions that mostly favorthe buyers.

The abstract and formal equality between Chinese workers and capi-talists manifests in various newly adopted laws in the reform era. The 1995Labour Law states that ‘[c]onclusion and modification of a labor contractshall follow the principles of equality, voluntariness and agreement throughconsultation…’ (Article 17). And the 2008 Labour Contract Law alsocontains similar provisions. Unlike serfs in feudalism, Chinese workers arenot dictated by the state’s direct political coercion to render their laborpower to capitalists; rather, they are ‘free’ to choose whether to enter intolabor contracts with employers or not. The legal form of labor contractscontributes to the apparent equality between antagonistic classes in China.Another reason that labor contracts appear just and fair stems from theirregulation by laws with coercive capacity that is, supposedly, appliedevenly. In theory, any parties, regardless of their social and economic

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status, that violate the contracts have to assume legal responsibilities andface punitive sanctions without discrimination.

In a nutshell, the labor contract system established in the post-Maoperiod legalizes and crystallizes the inequality and restrictions heaped uponworkers in the name of universality, equality, and freedom; all of which isderived from a structural inability to be independent from capitalists towhom they sell their labor power. Put another way, labor contracts, whichhave replaced life-long employment, are a legal form of promoting andreproducing the commodification of labor power in the labor market. Theyare abstracted from the real social relations of production, and thus, cannotguarantee substantial egalitarianism.

2.3 Capitalist Wage Setting

Maximization of profits is of prime importance to capitalists; therefore,boosting surplus value production and minimizing labor costs (the variablecapital in Marxian terms) are key concerns. To achieve this aim, the newlydeveloped labor–capital relations in China and the labor law reforms havebestowed vast power upon employers to minimize wages.

Socialist worker wages were based on seniority and determined by astandard wage system; this was gradually dismantled in the course ofChina’s passive revolution. For the state sectors, in 1985, the Ministry ofLabour decided that overall wages allocated to SOEs should be linked totheir economic performance (Yueh 2004). In the same year, some stateenterprises were allowed to not follow the standard wage scale and establishtheir own wage determination system (Lau 1997). In 1992, the StateCouncil issued a circular permitting all SOEs to set their internal wagestructures, so long as their overall wages did not exceed the total budget.Later, many SOEs adopted the ‘position and skills wage system’ to replacethe standard wage system. Under the new wage system, worker wagesconsisted of a number of components: position wage, skills wage, senioritywage, efficiency wage, bonuses and so forth (Lau 1997). In 1993, theparty-state decided to abolish the standard wage system by 1995–1996; by1994, 90,000 SOEs had already adopted the new wage system (Lau 1997).

Worker salaries under the old standard wage system were not linked totheir positions, skills, or efficiency, but under the new system, they weredirectly associated with these factors. In other words, the new wage systemvalues efficiency over socialist equality; and


[w]ages are to be determined with ‘efficiency being given priority’ byenterprises ‘autonomously determining their own wage levels and internaldistribution methods in accordance with changes in the supply and demandof employment and relevant government regulations’. (Lau 1997, 51)

For Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), the Regulations on LaborManagement in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investmentissued by the State Council in 1980 specified that wages in FIEs shouldamount to 120–150% of real wages of SOE workers in the same region, butsome cities had different stipulations (Zheng 1987). In 1986, theInvestment Provisions and Personnel Regulations were issued to provideuniform wage standard for FIEs, stating that the board of directors of FIEscould fix worker wages as long as they were equal to or above 120% of theaverage wages of SOE workers in the same region. Also, it allowed FIEs tonot increase wages if they were unprofitable (Zheng 1987). The 1995Labour Law then unified the wage determination mechanism for bothSOEs and FIEs, underscoring that ‘[t]he employing unit shall, based onthe characteristics of its production and business operation as well aseconomic results, independently determine the form of wage distributionand wage level for its own unit according to law’ (Article 47). The Lawdiscards socialist values that guided wage setting; instead, it endorses theprinciple of wage flexibility and links wage levels to the economic perfor-mance of firms. In this way, worker wages have changed from state-fixed tomarket-determined. The principle of wage flexibility approved by law givesenterprises discretion to determine wage distribution and wage levels, i.e.,the variable capital. The lower the variable capital, the greater the amountof surplus value that can be generated. In short, the new legally sanctionedwage system allows for maximization of surplus value and capital accu-mulation for enterprises.

Wages in China are not entirely determined by the market mechanismbecause the 1995 Labour Law stipulates a minimum wage (Article 48).Even before the adoption of the Labour Law, the Regulations ConcerningMinimum Wages in Enterprises was promulgated in 1993 to governminimum wages in all types of firms across the country. The Regulationswere replaced by the Provisions on Minimum Wage issued by the Ministryof Labor and Social Security in 2004. Two points about the Chineseminimum wage system should be highlighted. First, the Labour Law givesprovincial and municipal governments the authority to fix their minimumwage rate. Five factors, including labor productivity and regional economic

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development, should be taken into consideration in deciding this rate(Article 49).10 This is a legal affirmation to relate worker wages to theirproductivity and economic performance. It is, in other words, a legal moveto detach wage setting from the socialist concept that the value of laborhinges on the time expended on an object rather than worker economicoutput. In Marxian language, worker wages are now linked to the quantityof surplus value that they can create.

Second, it is true that the minimum wage system sets a floor wage forChinese workers in the market economy, but the protection offered by the1995 Labour Law is actually weakened, not only in comparison to thestate-socialist policies, but also when compared to the standards set by the1980 Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using Chineseand Foreign Investment and the 1986 Investment Provisions andPersonnel Regulations; both of these stipulate clearly that FIE workerwages should not be lower than 120% of their state counterparts. Whenassessing the development of wage regulation in China from a broadertemporal perspective, it is evident that the 1995 Labour Law did not makeprogress in wage protection as some researchers believe. Rather, the stateabandoned a better practice that emerged in the 1980s and decided toendorse less favorable wage protections. The Chinese legal reform thatsanctions linking wages to labor productivity and efficiency helps suppressworker wages to a low level, thus boosting surplus value production forenterprises.

Another characteristic of the new wage system imposed by China’spassive revolution is that it provides an individual, rather than collective,legal framework. Although several laws provide for collective consultation,detailed legal regulations on such mechanisms are absent. As there is nosingle unified law on collective negotiation, many employers deem it notobligatory to conduct collective consultation with employee representa-tives. When employers/enterprises face pressure from trade unions orgovernments to carry out collective consultation, many of them merelynegotiate out of formality; consultations are usually not serious, or theysimply do not take place (Chan 1998; Clarke et al. 2004).11 Chen (2007)highlights that the Chinese labor laws put more stress on individual rights(such as those related to wages, pensions, contracts, etc.), while the col-lective rights of workers (such as the right to strike, collectively bargain andorganize) have not been provided for in any meaningful way. Thisunbalanced legal emphasis is, by no means, a coincidence. As some criticallegal theories suggest, the juridico-political structures conceal class


exploitation and political contradictions by decomposing the working classas a collective force into political ‘individual persons’ and ‘subjects of law’so as to reduce their bargaining power and pre-empt the formation of aself-conscious class (Poulantzas 1973). Being deprived of substantial col-lective rights, Chinese workers do not have a collective means to bargainfor their wages, and thus, most enterprises unilaterally decide their wages.Under these circumstances, worker wages are further suppressed by cor-porations that seek to keep surplus value high.

In brief, to propel the transition from a socialist wage system to a flexiblemarket wage system, the Chinese party-state has enacted various labor lawsto prioritize wage flexibility, labor productivity, and efficiency. In addition,by not giving concrete content to laws related to collective bargaining, thelabor law system deprives workers of a legal collective means to negotiatewages with employers; therefore, wages remain an individual concern,rather than a class concern.

2.4 Resolution of Labor–Capital Conflict

To maintain a stable production environment is of tremendous significancefor capitalists because instability disrupts capital accumulation. In the eventthat employers fall short of securing labor compliance and labor–capitalconflicts arise, the Chinese party-state, who seemingly withdrew fromdirect economic relations (but has in fact been forcefully driving the cap-italist passive revolution), steps in to help resolve the disputes. In this way,the party-state is able to maintain conditions for production (and thuscapital accumulation) and political stability (which can be shaken by labordisputes that explode into larger social conflicts if handled improperly).That is to say, in order to maintain economic stability and political har-mony, the newly transformed capital–labor relations in China need theback-up of legally and politically sanctioned mechanisms to settle labordisputes, which include the mediation, arbitration, litigation, and appealsystems.

A labor dispute resolution system was put in place in 1950 shortly afterthe founding of the PRC, which was guided by the Organization andOperation Rules of Labor Dispute Arbitration Commission issued by theLabour Ministry. This system was deemed unnecessary and abolished in1955 because the socialist industrial relations were supposedlynon-antagonistic (Zhao 2009). Shortly after the inauguration of the passiverevolution, the party-state restored the system. In 1987‚ the Provisional

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Regulations on the Handling of Labour Disputes in State Enterprises wasissued, stating that SOEs should set up industrial dispute resolutioncommittees, which are comprised of representatives from management,workplace trade unions‚ and Staff and Worker Congresses (Lau 1997).Later, upon the promulgation of the Regulations Concerning theHandling of Labour Disputes in Enterprises in 1993, the labor disputesettlement system was extended to the non-state sector (Thireau and Hua2003). Furthermore, the 1995 Labour Law established a unified procedurefor handling labor disputes, which includes mediation, arbitration, litiga-tion, and appeal. In 2008, against the background of escalating laborunrest, the Law on Labor-Dispute Mediation and Arbitration was enactedto outline specific details for the four-stage system established by the 1995Labour Law.

The Chinese labor dispute settlement mechanism, which helps maintaina stable environment for capital accumulation, has a number of charac-teristics. First, it favors mediation over arbitration and litigation as reflectedby the 2008 Law on Labor-Dispute Mediation and Arbitration, whichstates: ‘[l]abor disputes shall be resolved on the basis of facts and pursuantto the principles of lawfulness, impartiality and timeliness, with stress onmediation, in order to protect the lawful rights and interests of the partiesaccording to law’ (Article 3).12 Moreover, when compared to the 1995Labour Law, the 2008 Law vests greater power to mediation committeespermitting workers to apply for payment orders directly from the court,without going through arbitration if employers fail to execute the media-tion agreement concerning matters of wages, medical expenses for workinjuries, economic compensation, etc. (Article 16). Furthermore, the 1995Labour Law suggests that mediation should be conducted by enterprisemediation committees (Articles 79 and 80), but the 2008 Law allowsmediation to be carried out by mediation institutions at various adminis-trative levels (Article 10).

The new emphasis conferred on the mediation system by the 2008 Lawis not simply an attempt to reduce soaring caseloads of arbitration andcourt trials, but it is also part of the party-state’s effort to promote ‘har-monious and stable labor relations’.13 Mediation is a traditional form ofgrievance redress that existed even in the Maoist time; People’s MediationCommittees were established at the village, community, workplace, andgovernment unit levels to mediate disputes between people. It has beendeemed to be a less antagonistic means of solving disputes because noformal legal judgment on who is right or who is wrong is decided, instead,


agreements on how disputes would be settled are produced from thesemediations. Mediators from mediation institutions do not only appeal tolegal regulations when mediating a case, they also make use of pressure andpersuasion to drive employers and workers to reach agreements. Anoverhaul of the mediation system by the 2008 Law seeks to provide greaterincentives to workers to resolve disputes through the mediation systemeither before they enter into binding legal procedures or before their dis-putes explode into deeper social conflicts.

The second characteristic about the labor dispute settlement process inChina is that, similar to the rest of the labor law system, it mostly relies on anindividual-based legal framework (Chen 2007). This means workers’ grie-vances are treated as individual matters rather than collective or systematicissues. Despite the fact that the 2008 Law on Labor-Dispute Mediation andArbitration permits workers to designate one representative in mediation,arbitration, or litigation for group disputes involving more than 10 people(Article 7), the labor dispute resolution system in reality focuses mainly onworkers’ individual rights and seeks to individualize collective disputes.For example, when labor disputes in SOEs reached a peak due to privati-zation, the Supreme Court announced in 2003 that civil courts would nolonger accept collective labor disputes pertinent to SOE restructuring.14

Furthermore, it is common for courts to break collective cases down intoindividual cases (Chen and Tang 2013). In addition, judges resort to divideand conquer tactics to persuade some workers in collective disputes towithdraw their cases, which would weaken the confidence of fellow workersto continue their litigation (Chen and Tang 2013). Considering that therights of workers to strike (which means their rights to stop selling theirlabor power to capitalists) was removed from the 1982 Constitution, andtheir rights to collective bargaining (which means their rights to negotiate acollective price for their labor power) have still not been properly legalized,it is evident that the current labor law system is trying to discourage workersfrom undertaking collective means to settle labor disputes, enclosing themwithin individualized spheres. This has happened because collective actionsof workers are deemed to provoke and exacerbate labor–capital antagonism,which in turn endangers conditions for production and political stability. Ina nutshell, the labor dispute settlement mechanism and the labor law systemin China help prevent the formation of worker collectivity and turn theworking class into atomized legal subjects.

Third, similar to the previous discussion on private property rights, theChinese labor dispute resolution system, despite its class bias, assumes an

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appearance of fairness and impartiality. The relevant Chinese laws proclaimthemselves to be upholding ‘the principle of legality, justness andpromptness’,15 settling disputes in ‘an impartial and timely manner’.16 Thebiased labor dispute resolution process takes a legal form that disguisesthem as fair, just, and impartial. As will be elucidated in the comingchapters, this legal framework strengthens legal hegemony in China, butsome workers are able to see through the capitalist nature of the labor lawsystem and transgress this legal hegemony.

2.5 Controlled Class Organizations

As Poulantzas (1973) points out, one of the goals of the capitalist state’sintervention into capital–labor relations is disorganizing the working class(while organizing the capitalist class). While the Chinese labor disputeresolution system seeks to individualize worker grievances with legal tac-tics, the party-led official trade unions attempt to mediate industrial rela-tions with a quasi-collective approach. During the Maoist era, state–laboremployment relations were deemed harmonious since workers were sup-posed to have the same economic and political interests as state enterprises.The Chinese trade unions, therefore, did not represent workers vis-à-vis themanagement as both were indiscriminately regarded as SOE employees.Instead, they acted as transmission belts between the party-state andworkers (Clarke 2005). On the one hand, they conveyed top-downinstructions from the party-state to workers, mobilising the latter to sup-port the party-state’s propaganda and production goals. At the same time,they were designated to organise workers’ welfare, transmitting workerinterests and concerns upward for consideration by the party-state (Pringleand Clarke 2011). This constituted a state corporatist structure in thestate-socialist China (Unger and Chan 1995) which has continued in thereform era.

This socialist corporatist structure has laid a solid foundation for theparty-state’s absorption of opposition leaders, i.e., trasformismo inGramsci’s term, during China’s passive revolution. Understanding theimportance of trade unions in counteracting capitalist dominance (Hyman1975), the Chinese party-state in the reform era continues to co-opt tradeunions into its governing structures; this trasformismo tactic is also backedby the labor law system. While the right to independent organizing isdenied, the official trade unions are designated by the 1995 Labour Lawand the 2001 Trade Union Law to represent the interests of workers vis-à-


vis management and protect legal rights of workers. However, as China’spassive revolution advances, the party-state’s trasformismo strategy tocontrol labor has by and large failed because many workers find officialtrade unions unable to safeguard their interests, and they have, therefore,taken to the streets (see Chaps. 4–6). In light of their incapability tochampion worker interests, some scholars consider the trade unions to beshams (Taylor and Li 2010), transmission belts (Chan 2008; Warner1996), a layer of government bureaucracy (Friedman 2009), a part of theparty apparatus (Lee 2006), or part of the developmentalist machine(Gallagher 2004).

Due to the inadequacy of official trade unions to promote workerinterests, labor protests have been surging in China, and they increasinglytake collective forms (Chan 2010; Chan and Hui 2012). In addition, theirdemands during strikes have gradually shifted from rights-based tointerest-based (Chan 2011; Chan and Pun 2009). The former indicatesthat worker demands are based on their legal entitlements (such as mini-mum wage, standard working hours, social insurance, etc.), and thus, canbe met by pursuing legal means. The latter refers to worker requests thatgo beyond the legal standards (for example, decent wages beyond the legalminimum, trade union reform and so forth), and thus, cannot be satisfiedby simply enforcing existing laws. Because of these changes, Chineseworkers, more and more, resort to collective action to pursue theirdemands. In light of this, the party-state, adhering to its trasformismotactic, has utilized trade unions to circumscribe workers’ collectivitythrough various strategies.

First, since 2000, the ACFTU has carried out unionization campaigns inFIEs, trying to mediate workplace labor disputes, but this has happenedwithout much success. In 2004, a government report found that labor lawswere not well respected by FIEs. Following that, the ACFTU blacklistedsome FIEs, trying to encourage others to establish trade unions. In March2006, then President Hu Jintao ordered that ‘Do a better job of buildingParty organizations and trade unions in Foreign-Invested Enterprises’(CLB 2006). Since then, the ACFTU has intensified its efforts to unionizeFIEs, paying particular attention to Fortune 500 companies (Chan 2005).By the end of 2008, most Fortune 500 companies in China agreed to setup trade unions.17 However, many of them were merely ‘paper unions’(Taylor and Li 2007).

Second, the ACFTU has deployed new strategies to organize workers.For instance, they use worker collective action to pressure enterprises to set

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up trade unions and develop new organizational forms of trade unions toorganize workers that have been easily excluded under current organizingstructures (Taylor and Li 2010).18 Despite these new endeavours, theparty-state’s aim of containing labor unrest continues to be a crucial drivingforce in this effort. The third means to circumscribe workers’ collectivitywithin the party-state’s control is through promoting workplace collectiveconsultation. The 2001 Trade Union Law spells out that trade unions shall‘make equal consultations and sign collective contracts with enterprises…’

(Article 20). As elaborated previously, collective consultations in China aregenerally a formality, but labor strikes in recent years have forced ‘collectivebargaining by riot’ upon company managers (Chan and Hui 2014). Toforestall collective bargaining by riot, the government currently seeks topromote a party-state-led approach to collective negotiation through offi-cial trade unions. The fourth measure taken by trade unions to containlabor unrest is to promote democratic union elections at the plant level,which aims to heighten the representativeness of unions and increaseworkers’ sense of control over trade unions. However, some studies findthat these elections are only indirect and quasi-democratic and not nec-essarily able to pacify aggrieved workers (Hui and Chan 2015).

In brief, if the party-state cannot completely forestall the formation ofworkers’ collectivity, the party-state would prefer to let it growwithin a cageofthe party-state’s design. The quasi-collective strategies of official trade unionstry to address the growing interested-based demands ofworkers and tackle theincreasingly collective forms of labor resistance through containing workers’collectivity within the party-state’s control apparatuses. However, as will beelucidated in the coming chapters, these quasi-collective strategies are notcompletely successful, and someworkers are trying to break through the cage.

3 THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE STATE AND LAWS

Thus far, I have elucidated five crucial dimensions of China’s passive revo-lution: the making of the capitalist class along with the endorsement ofprivate property rights, the creation of a labor market augmented by theimplementation of a labor contract system, the introduction of capitalist wagesetting, individualized resolution of capital–labor conflicts‚ and control overclass organizations for workers. In addition, I have illustrated in what waysthe party-state has reformed the legal system and the labor law system inorder to engineer this passive revolution that aims to foster the growth ofcapitalism and shape the nascent labor–capital relations in favor of employers.


In this section, I discuss the wider implication of China’s passive revo-lution for state–capital–labor relations in the country. At the level of pro-duction, state–labor relations in socialist workplace were transformed intolabor–capital relations in the reform period. No longer acting as workers’employers, the party-state has detached itself from direct production andemployment relations, allowing the newborn labor market to regulaterelations of production. However, it has not completely withdrawn fromcapitalist industrial relations and capitalist production; instead, its inter-vention in the economics now takes an indirect and legal-political form.First, it has created a formal and abstract equality among exchangers oflabor power (i.e., labor and capitalists) through the labor contract systemand the labor market. Workers are now deemed to be ‘free’ to enter intolabor contracts with employers and ‘equal’ with capitalists at the legal level.Second, the party-state now appears to be standing apart from capital–laborrelations; it acts as a neutral and impartial mediator of these relationsthrough the enforcement of labor laws and official dispute resolutionmechanisms. It ‘impartially’ sets the rules for industrial relations throughvarious labor laws. When labor disputes arise, it provides ‘neutral’ and‘impartial’ legal vehicles through which workers can resolve these disputes.These two newly gained characteristics of the Chinese party-state provide astrong foundation for the establishment of legal hegemony; this will befurther elaborated upon in the coming three chapters.

Poulantzas’s concept of relative autonomy of the capitalist state (1973,1978) can help us examine the changing role of the Chinese party-state inconnection to state–capital–labor relations. This concept is alreadyexplained in Chap. 2, but I will briefly recap it here in light of its signifi-cance to my arguments. Poulantzas proposes that capitalist social forma-tions consist of the economic, political, and ideological instances. Thepolitical and the ideological, he argues, cannot be reduced to the eco-nomic, though the economic level determines them in the last instance. Associal formation is shaped by the overdetermined effects of the ensemble ofthese three levels, Poulantzas further contends that the state is relativelyautonomous from capital. Comparing capitalism with feudalism, he comesto the conclusion that the relative separation between the state and theeconomy is an inherent characteristic of capitalism. Feudalism requires thestate to exercise direct political force to extract surplus labor from serfs,who, to a certain degree, had economic possession of the land. Workers

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under capitalism, who do not own the means of production, appear to be‘free labourers’; the state’s intervention into surplus value extraction takesan indirect and legal-political form by creating formal and abstract equalityamong exchangers of commodities in the market.

China did not enter its capitalist stage from feudalism, but from statesocialism. Yet, Poulantzas’s insight still has a lot to offer to us. In thestate-socialist China, the party-state directly organized production and theeconomy; it deployed workplace trade unions, party branches and othermeans, rather than political and legal coercion as in feudalism, to mobilizeworkers (who supposedly had economic ownership of state enterprises) toproduce surplus value. Seen from this light, the Chinese party-state and theeconomy were intertwined in the state-socialist era. After its transition tocapitalism, the overlap of the political and the economic has given way to arelative separation of the two spheres‚ and the party-state has gained arelative autonomy vis-à-vis the capitalists. The Chinese party-state nolonger needs to organize production directly and has disengaged itself fromdirect employment relations. Instead, it has constructed a labor marketwherein workers are turned into ‘free’ sellers of their labor power. And, ithas put relations of production, the process of production, and the orga-nizing of productive forces into the hands of enterprises which are primarilyregulated by market forces and various laws. In this way, the Chineseparty-state’s role in the economic has changed from direct intervention forsurplus value extraction into ensuring a formal and abstract equality amongsellers and buyers of labor power through the labor law system, as well asinto mediating labor–capital conflicts through individualized legal means.

One important point to note is that the Chinese party-state’s relativeautonomy is not only manifested in the economic realm, but also in thepolitical realm. The party-state has shifted from a self-proclaimed workingclass state to one that intends to appear impartial and neutral from classinterests in the reform period. During state socialism, workers were sup-posedly the masters of the country. However, following the opinions of the1981 Resolution on Party History, the 1982 Constitution was made lessclass antagonistic, spelling out that all ‘citizens’ are equal before the lawbecause of the ‘decline of exploiting classes and the resulting conditions ofsocial equality among members of society’ (Potter 1994, 335). JiangZemin’s advocacy of the Three Representatives further marks the


party-state’s detachment from the working class and its closer alliance withthe capitalists. Politically and legally speaking, the capitalist class in Chinahas been elevated to the same status of workers while maintaining theireconomic superiority. The Chinese party-state, however, tries to concealthe rising status of the capitalist class and the regime alliance with capitalistsby appealing to juridico-political means that give all ‘citizens’ formalequality, regardless of their differing economic status (Poulantzas 2000,2008).

Compared to Western liberal capitalist states that appear neutral andautonomous, the Chinese state still occasionally declares itself to be pro-tecting worker interests due to its socialist legacy (though at the same timeit claims itself to be representing the interests of all people). Its pro-labordeclaration is not merely rhetoric, but also backed by labor legislation andsocial policies, which have seemingly imposed some constraints onemployers. Due to its sometimes pro-labor appearance, some workers havebeen led to regard the party-state en bloc or the central government aslabor friendly; for them, if there were any socio-economic problems, it wasonly because the party-state as a whole does not possess adequate capabilityto dictate local governments to enforce its ‘good’ policies (see Chap. 4). Inbrief, the state’s somewhat pro-labor image has contributed to its relativeautonomy from capital.

As a consequence of the aforementioned changes in the economic andpolitical realm, the Chinese party-state has become relatively autonomousfrom the economic and business when compared to its former role instate-socialism. However, this does not mean that it is neutral or classless innature. As illustrated, the Chinese party-state has concomitantly initiatedeconomic and legal reform to replace: public ownership with privateproperty rights, the central job allocation system with the labor market,life-long employment with the labor contract system, and the socialist wagesystem with flexible market wages; it has also forged the emergence of acapitalist class and a state–capital alliance. All of these have promoted thecommodification of labor power and facilitated capital accumulation. Aswill be elucidated in the following chapters, the relative autonomy of thepost-Mao party-state has laid a crucial foundation for the reproduction oflegal hegemony.

In addition to the relative autonomy of the Chinese party-state, thepassive revolution has contributed to the emerging relative autonomy ofthe legal system vis-à-vis both capital and the state’s executive bureaucracy.

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In this book, I see laws neither as pure instruments of the state and thecapitalist class, nor as fully autonomous from them (as legal liberalismbelieves19). Instead, I hold that the Chinese labor law system has graduallydeveloped its own logic, specificities‚ and relative autonomy, though it ishardly neutral or classless in essence. In his early essay MarxistExamination of the Contemporary State published in 1964, Poulantzasinsists that the Marxian approach to laws must contain two importantinsights. First, it should criticize any theories that accept the ‘formal,general and abstract specificity of law’ (Poulantzas 2008, 38). Second, itshould ‘uncover the mediations between the base and this superstructure[laws] while respecting its current specificity’ (Poulantzas 2008, 38).Poulantzas opposes the reduction of the legal into the economic. Heunderscores that laws, on the one hand, mediate labor–capital relations infavor of the capitalist class; on the other, they formulate their own speci-ficities and crystallized values, such as (formal and abstract) equality andliberty, that do not necessarily serve the immediate interests of the capitalistclass (Poulantzas 2008, 4–5).

Echoing Poulantzas’s insights, Burawoy also holds that laws enjoy arelative autonomy from the capitalists because

[T]he political, legal, and ideological instances are not implicated in themode of production itself, so we can talk about the political, legal, andideological as separate spheres of activity. We can even talk about their rel-ative autonomy. The legal structure…has a coherence and dynamic of its own,and its precepts cannot be arbitrarily changed by external forces. (Burawoy1978, 302)20

However, Burawoy at the same time underlines the class tendency of laws.The legal masks relations of production, he explicates, by obscuring thedistinction between subjects of different economic status and by recon-structing class actors into ‘free and equal’ citizens (Burawoy 1978, 302).

Pertinent to the relative autonomy of laws vis-a-vis the capitalists, theChinese labor law system has allowed for legislation and judiciary rulingsthat sometimes contradict the short-term interests of capitalists as indi-viduals (but not to the long-term interests of capitalists as a class). This hasprompted some scholars to conclude that labor laws are a means to repairunbalanced labor relations in China. For instance, Gallagher (2004, 22)argues that the labor contract system newly introduced to China intends to


reduce labor exploitation in the private sectors by stipulating the basicrights of workers and the responsibilities of employers. Cooney et al.(2007, 801) conclude that the Labour Contract Law ‘makes a contributionto addressing some of the egregious abuses that occur in China. There is now amuch better system of norms, having the status of national law’.21 Josephs(1995, 559) suggests that the 1995 Labour Law ‘lends an importance toworker rights which they did not have previously and demonstrates a con-scious effort of the Chinese government to bring its system of labor law andindustrial relations into closer compliance with international standards’.22

I do not challenge the argument of these studies that certain labor lawscan address grievances of workers as individuals, nor do I suggest thatChinese workers need no legal protection. However, if analyzed throughthe above-illustrated theoretical lens that simultaneously highlights therelative autonomy of laws and their class inclinations, it is clear that thepro-labor legal contents of laws are simply expressions of the relativeautonomy of Chinese laws. As elaborated in section two, legal reform andthe labor law system initiated by the passive revolution strengthen capi-talism in various crucial dimensions. The Chinese laws are in no waycompletely autonomous from the capitalists as a class. At most, they protectworkers’ rights vis-à-vis the capitalists as individuals within the frameworkof capitalism. The Chinese legal system therefore inevitably hindersworkers from challenging and attempting to overcome capitalism.

Pertinent to the relative autonomy of laws vis-a-vis the Chinese statebureaucracy, Potter (2004, 472) is quite dismissive, noting that the relativeautonomy of the Chinese legal system is more limited than its Europeanand North American counterparts because, in some circumstances, theChinese laws remain politically contingent. This comment from the per-spective of an international comparison is not incorrect, but anational-temporal comparison of the Chinese legal system will allow us tobetter understand the significance of the emerging relative autonomy ofChinese laws.

As explicated before, the Maoist state manipulated or marginalized thelegal system during state socialism; the laws were used to implement theparty-state’s policies, rather than being allowed to develop its own specificlogic and coherence. During the reform era, it has been permitted toformulate its own legal logic, operations‚ and mechanisms. The rule of lawis now heavily stressed (though its implementation is not without criti-cism); numerous laws have been made to regulate the criminal and civildomains; the judiciary system has been rebuilt through professionalizing

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judges and lawyers; laws are made according to specific legal proceduresand are open to broader consultation before legislation; mediation, arbi-tration, and litigation are handled by designated judiciary organs thatsupposedly conform to legal regulations. All these give the appearance thatlaws are somehow autonomous from the state bureaucracy; this relativeautonomy of the Chinese legal system is another vital foundation for theestablishment of legal hegemony in China, as will be expounded on in thecoming three chapters.

The rising relative autonomy of laws vis-à-vis the state in China, how-ever, is still fragile. In terms of juridico-political structures, the Chineselegal system is subject to the CCP’s strong influences via the CCP Politicsand Law Commission (PLC) (zhengfawei). The PLC is a powerful partyorgan established at different administrative levels to oversee legal andpolitical affairs. It supervises and leads all the law enforcement agencies,including the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Supreme People’s Court,the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry ofState Security (Li 2012; Oksenberg 2001). In the past, the PLC secretaryused to be a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which isthe apex of power in the CCP. However, after the outbreak of politicalconflict related to the former PLC secretary, Zhou Yong Kang, who wassentenced to jail for acts of corruption, the new secretary has only beenelected into the Central Committee of the Politburo in the 18th CCPNational Congress held in 2012 rather than into the Standing Committee.The PLC is highly sensitive and low-profile. My interviewees that are legalscholars, judges‚ and lawyers all revealed that they do not know muchabout its operations; some described it as a ‘devil’ because it is highlyinfluential yet not transparent.23

In addition to the PLC, the party-state influences the legal systemthrough other mechanisms. Officially, People’s Congresses at the local levelhave the power to appoint and dismiss judges and court’s leadership, but inreality, the local party branches exercise actual power (Clarke et al. 2008).Moreover, the finances of courts are dependent on local governments. As aresult of this, decisions of judges and courts have been highly affected bythe economic concerns of local governments (Friedman and Lee 2010;Lubman 1999). Additionally, it is difficult to enforce court orders due tolocal protectionism and weak legal punishment (Liebman 2007).

Considering the above-elaborated development of relations between thelegal system and the party-state, I contend that the relative autonomy ofthe former vis-à-vis the latter is emerging, but it is still fragile. Nonetheless,


it has contributed to the formation of legal hegemony, as will beexpounded on in the coming chapters.

4 CONCLUSION

In the early stage of China’s passive revolution, there existed no dominantclass that possessed mature hegemonic capacity to elicit the popular masses’consent for capitalist development. Therefore, the Chinese party-state hadto play a dominant and forceful role in driving the economic reform, whichconcomitantly induced a legal reform that helped consolidate the infantcapitalism in the country. The newly developed legal system and labor lawsystem cover some key dimensions. First, they have helped create andlegitimize the rising capitalist class which was non-existent in the Maoistperiod. It now consists of multifarious components: transnational capital-ists, private-domestic capitalists, cadre-turned-capitalists, state-capitalists,and petty-bourgeoisie. To facilitate capital accumulation, the legal systemhas endorsed private property rights, which were discredited in statesocialism but are prerequisite for the growth of capitalism in the reform era.Applying trasformismo strategies, the party-state has co-opted the newlyarisen capitalist class into the ruling bloc, forming a transformed regimealliance. As will be discussed in the coming chapters, after carrying outeconomic reform for over three decades, the ruling class has graduallydeveloped some hegemonic capacity, however minimal, in such ways thatthe subordinate class has given greater consent to capitalist development.

Second, following the party-state’s abandonment of the working class ina social class alliance, the working class that was once hailed as the coun-try’s master has been turned into the exploited class. This has beenachieved partly with the help of the labor law system. Due to the abol-ishment of work units, rural communes, the central job allocation system‚

and life-long employment, workers and peasants are now forced into anincipient labor market that commodifies labor power. Under the legal laborcontract system, the selling and buying of labor power is deemed ‘fair’ and‘equal’ because both workers and employers are ‘free’ to enter into con-tracts. In addition, the socialist wage system has been substituted by themarket wage system, which prioritizes wage flexibility and labor produc-tivity, or, in Marxian terms, the minimization of variable capital andmaximization of surplus value.

Third, the party-state is relatively autonomous from the capitalists andthe economy in the reform era. As state–labor relations in formerly socialist

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workplaces have been transformed into labor–capital relations, theparty-state has stepped back from direct production. It now behaves as animpartial mediator of industrial relations through the legislation andapplication of labor laws. However, it is by no means classless in essence.Alongside the economic and legal measures summarized above thatexpedite capital accumulation, the party-state attempts to maintain a stableenvironment for production by co-opting potential class organizations(i.e.,trade unions), channeling disgruntled workers into official disputeresolution mechanisms that turn them into atomized legal subjects‚ andforestalling the formation of workers’ collectivity through thequasi-collective approaches of trade unions (such as large-scale unioniza-tion, party-state-led collective bargaining, workplace union elections, andnew forms of worker organizing).

The legal system and labor law system are important vehicles throughwhich the party-state has fueled the passive revolution. However, they arehardly mere political or economic instruments. They are relatively auton-omous from both capitalists and the party-state. During economic reform,the Chinese party-state has allowed for the growth of the legal system. Thishas led to the development of its own legal logics and rules of operation,which make it not completely susceptible to manipulation by theparty-state, especially in comparison to its subordinate role in statesocialism. The Chinese legal system and labor law system are also relativelyautonomous from capitalists in the sense that they allow for laws andjudiciary rulings that deny the short-term interests of capitalists and thatmitigate labor exploitation (though only within the framework of capital-ism). However, these systems, in fact, are juridico-political endorsements ofthe abolition of socialist life-long employment, legal affirmations of privateproperty rights and the incipient capitalist economy, the lawful engines forthe development of the labor market and commodification of labor power,the legal propellants for the formation of a capitalist class and an exploitedclass, as well as the judicial pretext that masks unequal relations of pro-duction with formal and abstract emphases on equality and freedom ofchoice. By giving the labor market, the labor contract system‚ and capital–labor relations a form of equality, fairness‚ and legality, the labor law systemhides its own tendencies and those of the party-state towards the capitalists,masking the economic differences between the conflicting classes andfragmenting the Chinese workers into individualized legal subjects.

By now, it should be clear that China’s passive revolution is not simplyabout the transition from state-socialism to capitalism; it is also about the


recomposition of state–capital–labor relations in the country. In thecoming three chapters, I illustrate that after implementing economicreform for more than three decades the party-state and capitalist class, i.e.,the ruling bloc, have acquired a certain degree of political, moral, andethical leadership over the working class, and that the recently establishedlabor law system, the labor market, the relative autonomy of the Chineseparty-state, and of labor laws have laid down a crucial foundation for theconstruction of capitalist hegemony in the country.

NOTES

1. All English quotations of the Chinese law in this book are taken from thewebsite of the National People’s Congress (see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/Frameset-index.html), unless otherwise specified.

2. However, there exist some provincial laws on collective negotiation. Forexamples, the Guangdong Provincial Regulations on Collective Contractsfor Enterprises was promulgated in 2014, which states that enterprisescannot fire worker representatives while they are performing their duties ofnegotiation, but the Regulations also makes it illegal to strike duringnegotiations—the first such law officially prohibiting strikes.

3. See http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1271&CGid=,accessed on 24th May 2013.

4. See http://news.now.com/home/international/player?newsId=94775,accessed on 26th March 2014.

5. See http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae5c731a-a3bb-11e3-aa85-001-44feab7de.html#axzz2x4SRmaz3, both accessed on 26th March 2014.

6. See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-26/china-s-billionaire-lawmakers-make-u-s-peers-look-like-paupers.html, accessed on 26thMarch 2014.

7. Galvanized by the civil rights movement in the USA during the 1950s and1960s (Tushnet 1991), a group of radical lawyers, law teachers and stu-dents organized the first Conference on Critical Legal Studies in 1977 toformulate critiques on the tradition of legal formalism and liberalism.Thereafter, the CLS conference is held annually, and the influence of CLShas become quite remarkable (Gabel and Harris 1982; Hunt 1986;Tushnet 1991).

8. However, as it evolves, it also breeds the creation and circulation of ficti-tious capital that is based on future realization of surplus value (Marx1993).

9. These regulations include the Interim Regulations on the Implementationof Labor Contracts in State-Owned Enterprises, Interim Regulations on

98 E.S.I HUI

http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/Frameset-index.html

http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/Frameset-index.html

http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1271&CGid=

http://news.now.com/home/international/player?newsId=94775

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae5c731a-a3bb-11e3-aa85-00144feab7de.html%23axzz2x4SRmaz3

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae5c731a-a3bb-11e3-aa85-00144feab7de.html%23axzz2x4SRmaz3

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-26/china-s-billionaire-lawmakers-make-u-s-peers-look-like-paupers.html

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-26/china-s-billionaire-lawmakers-make-u-s-peers-look-like-paupers.html

the Recruitment of Workers by State-Owned Enterprises, InterimRegulations on Dismissal by State-Owned Enterprises of Employees inViolation of Discipline, and Interim Regulations on UnemploymentInsurance For Employees of State-Owned Enterprises.

10. The three other factors are: the minimum living expenses of labourersthemselves plus that of the average of all dependents that they support, theaverage wage level of society as a whole‚ and the employment rate.

11. For the development of collective bargaining in different periods in China,see Chan and Hui (2014).

12. My own emphasis.13. See Article 1, Law on Labor-Dispute Mediation and Arbitration.14. See http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/chinas-labour-dispute-resolution-

system, accessed on 22nd May 2013.15. Article 78, 1994 Labour Law.16. Article 1, the Law on Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration.17. Christian Science Monitor, Unions in China Still Feeble, But Gaining a

Foothold, 29 September 2008.18. The new organizational forms are United Trade Unions in FIEs, United

Unions or Union Committees, and Community Unions (Taylor and Li2010, 419).

19. Legal liberalism asserts that law should be politically neutral, objective,rational and autonomous (Hunt 1986, 1993), should treat all citizensequally (Klare 1978) and should be able to be used by disadvantagedgroups to redress their grievance (Hunt 1993).

20. My own emphasis.21. My own emphasis.22. My own emphasis.23. Interview H3.

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CHAPTER 4

Workers’ Active Consent

1 INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter, I elaborated on the party-state’s legal interventionswhich have fueled China’s passive revolution. Turning China into a capi-talist country was initially a state-directed project.1 It was neither led by anydominant social forces, nor supported by the popular masses. Instead, itwas mostly built upon the authoritarian practices and strong political powerof the party-state. Having carried out the economic reform for more thanthree decades, the state’s effort to foster capitalism and capitalist socialrelations of production has resulted in the formation of a capitalist class andan exploited class. While workers are no longer treated as a key componentof the ruling class as in the state-socialist era, the party-state and thefledgling capitalist class have started to form a ruling bloc. This develop-ment has a three-fold implication.

First, instead of remaining state-imposed, the capitalist reform in Chinais gaining a social base and being embraced by a rising social force, thecapitalist class. In other words, the passive revolution is no longer purelypassive; it has become actively pursued from below. Second, those whohave been turned into the exploited class through the mechanisms elabo-rated on in Chap. 3, especially migrant workers, increasingly contest ele-ments of this newborn capitalist economy, as manifested by theproliferation of labor protests (Lee 2007; Chan 2010). Third, the risingcapitalist class has joined hands with the party-state to promote the capi-talist economy, forming a ruling bloc that has gradually acquired political,


105

moral, and ethical leadership over the working class, as will be explicated inthis chapter. In this way, the Chinese party-state has been undergoing ahegemonic transformation—a process of changing its role from vigorouslyengineering the passive revolution from above to helping obtain thebottom-up consent of workers for capitalist development.

As Gramsci (1971, 195) underscores, the state often uses laws to ‘as-similate’ the masses into the dominant class and to ‘educate’ them toconform to conditions that are ‘useful to the ruling group’s line of devel-opment’. In this chapter and the following three chapters, I explore theemerging hegemonic capacity of the party-state by focusing on the labor lawsystem. These chapters investigate four key questions: (1) through whatmechanisms the labor law system has mediated hegemonic relations among thestate, capital, and labor; (2) to what extent Chinese workers have been sub-jected to legal hegemony; (3) under what situations workers will conform with,negotiate‚ or transgress hegemonic boundaries; and (4) what the factors con-tributing to the fragility and instability of legal hegemony in China are.

I contend, in this book, that Chinese workers have accepted or rejectedthe capitalist leadership mediated through the labor law system to differingextents—some workers have conferred active consent to legal hegemony,some have only given passive consent, while some have completely rejectedit. In the following section, I put forward a typology of worker susceptibilitytowards legal hegemony so as to provide an analytical tool for examining thehegemonic impact of the labor law system. In addition, through anato-mizing stories of workers with different labor dispute experiences, Sect. 3focuses on workers who have granted active consent to hegemony mediatedby the labor law system (while Chaps. 5 and 6 will illuminate workers whohave rendered passive or no consent to legal hegemony respectively).Section 4 pinpoints the mechanisms through which the labor law systemmediates hegemonic relations between the state, capital, and labor, andsummarizes the major arguments of this chapter.

2 THE TYPOLOGY OF LEGAL HEGEMONY

Having systematically analyzed my fieldwork data and interviews withworkers, I create a typology of legal hegemony, propounding that Chineseworkers manifest five different types of attitude—affirmative, indifferent,ambivalent, critical, and radical—towards legal hegemony (see Table 1).Workers are classified into these five modes according to three criteria. The

106 E.S.I HUI

Tab

le1

Aself-constructedtypo

logy

ofworkersusceptib

ility

towards

legalh

egem

ony

Activeconsent

Passive

consent

Com

pleterejection

Affirm

ative

workers

Indifferent

workers

Ambivalent

workers

Criticalw

orkers

Rad

ical

workers

1)Relevancy

oflawsto

workers

∙Level

oflegal

know

ledg

e∙Motivationto

learnabou

tlabo

rlaws

Afair

unde

rstand

ing

oflabo

rlaws

Nobasicidea

oflabo

rlaws.

Unm

otivated

tolearnlaws

Afairun

derstand

ing

oflabo

rlaws

Afairun

derstand

ing

oflabo

rlaws

Afairun

derstand

ingof

labo

rlaws

2)Degreeof

trust

ordistrust

towards

labo

rlaws

∙Towhatextent

they

accept

orreject

official

legal

discou

rses

andlegal

practic

es

End

orsemen

tNospecial

opinions;

resign

ation

Partiala

cceptance

andpartiald

iscred

itDisc

redit

Rejectio

n

3)Degreeof

susceptib

ility

tolegalh

egem

ony

∙Havethey

iden

tified

anylegal

defects?

∙How

dothey

accoun

tfor

defects?

Iflegal

loop

holesexist

atall,they

are

caused

byindividu

als

Nospecial

opinions;

resign

ation

Legal

loop

holesare

caused

byindividu

als.

Critic

ismsare

fram

edwith

the

rulin

gclass’slogics

andtarget

implem

entatio

nal

issues

Legal

loop

holesare

caused

byindividu

als.

Critic

ismsare

fram

edwith

the

rulin

gclass’slogics

andtarget

implem

entatio

nal

issues

Legal

defectsare

results

ofsystem

icsocio–

econ

omic

asym

metry.

Activecontestatio

nof

therulin

gclass’s

worldview

sreprod

uced

throug

hthelabo

rlaw

system

WORKERS’ ACTIVE CONSENT 107

first criterion is the level of their knowledge of labor laws and their motivationto gain such knowledge. This reflects if, and to what degree, workers regardlabor laws as relevant to them. As will be explained, if workers have highmotivation to learn about labor laws or have fair legal knowledge, they aremore easily (though not necessarily) subject to legal hegemony. If theyhave low motivation to learn about labor laws and have poor legalknowledge, the labor law system tends to exert limited hegemonic impacton them.

The second criterion is the degree to which workers accept or reject thelabor law system, which consists of the party-state-constructed legal discoursesand legal practices. This reflects how much they trust or distrust the laborlaw system. Concerning the official legal discourses, the rule of law (fazhi)is one of the predominant discourses promulgated by the party-state. Aselaborated on in Chap. 3, the legal system was marginalized during theMaoist period, but it has been given greater weight in the reform era. The1982 Constitution was the first step in changing the party-state’s mode ofgovernance from basing it on the CCP’s socialist policies to one basedupon laws (Lubman 1999). In 1985, the NPC Standing Committeeadopted a resolution that highlighted the importance of placing ‘the law inthe hands of the masses of people so that they will know what the law is,abide by the law, acquire a sense of legality and learn to use the law as aweapon against all acts committed in violation of the Constitution and thelaw’ (Gallagher 2006, 793). In 1999, the PRC Constitution was amendedto pronounce that China is a socialist country under the rule of law. Therule of law in China is demonstrated by the establishment of new legalinstitutions, a greater emphasis on procedures and rules, professionalizationof legal practitioners, increasing legislation, and the reducing importance oftraditional grievance resolution mechanisms (Gallagher 2006; Friedmanand Lee 2010).

Prior research suggests that the Chinese party-state has promoted therule of law to the public through law dissemination campaigns (pufayundong) in institutions such as schools and workplaces (Exner 1995;Gallagher 2007), as well as with the help of the ACWF and CCYL (Exner1995). The media also plays a crucial role in diffusing legal knowledge bycovering legal news and information (Gallagher 2006). My research find-ings echo these studies. Some of my worker-informants first learned aboutthe rule of law in their schools, others from online media, newspapers, andTV programs. In addition to this, some of them have become aware of therule of law through the course of labor disputes.

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The rule of law in China has been heavily criticized. Lubman (1999)highlights the discrepancy between the state’s claim of upholding the ruleof law and the CCP’s absolute dominance over the legal system in reality,which suggests that the party-state is unwilling to establish a meaningfulrule of law. Peerenboom (2002) shows greater optimism, arguing thateconomic reform has necessitated the party-state’s increasing reliance onthe legal system, which lays the foundation for the rule of law in China.Gallagher (2004) argues that the rule of law is a state-led project whichoffers a certain degree of political liberalization, but without compromisingthe CCP’s political power (2006). Potter holds that China practises ‘rulethrough law’ rather than ‘rule of law’ because the Chinese laws do not aimto protect the rights of individuals or constrain the party-state; they aremerely ‘a mechanism by which political power is exercised and protected’(Potter 1999, 674). Similarly, Lee distinguishes between the rule of lawand the rule by law, contending that China is only enacting the latter as itslegal system is ‘committed to the primacy of state power’ (Lee 2002, 195).

Another important legal discourse related to labor–capital relations isrights-defense according to law, or legal rights defense (yifa weiquan). The5th five-year plan for legal promulgation and education made by theMinistry of Justice and the Propaganda Department of the CCP consideredmaking education and guidance of the popular masses to carry out legalrights defense one of the major goals, emphasizing that laws should beactively enforced within enterprises and that the government and partycadres should ‘actively guide workers to learn laws and use laws…heightenworkers’ awareness of legal rights defense, of fulfilling their legal duties and ofbearing their responsibilities’.2 In 2013, when the 6th five-year plan of theMinistry of Justice began, the Ministry’s goal was to bring laws to ruralareas through, among other things, guiding the rural masses to carry outlegal rights defense and fulfilling their legal duties.3 However, the notion ofrights defense is highly ambiguous in China (Benney 2013). It was firstdeveloped and disseminated by the party-state to direct grievances ofworkers and people through legal channels, but by 2001, it was appro-priated and redefined by various social actors, such as rights-lawyers,workers, social groups, human rights advocates and so forth, to advancetheir resistance. Thereafter, the government has used the term legal rightsdefense less often, but it has not abandoned it completely. The party-statehas never openly condemned this idea or any rights defense activities car-ried out within the legal realm (Benney 2013). The term is still widely usedby the media, public, and some government officials.


Alongside promulgating legal discourses such as the rule of law andrights-defense in accordance with laws, the Chinese party-state hasstrengthened legal practices in connection to the labor law system in orderto better handle volatile labor relations. These legal practices include leg-islating labor laws which set the minimum standards for labor issues,introducing party-state-led collective negotiation, setting up a mediation,arbitration‚ and litigation system (see Chap. 3), sending judges to protestspots to mediate industrial conflicts (He and Yang 2010)‚ and so forth. Aswill be elucidated, if workers show a high degree of acceptance of legaldiscourses and legal practices, this indicates that they trust the labor lawsystem and are susceptible to legal hegemony. On the contrary, if theydemonstrate a high degree of skepticism, this implies that they distrust thelabor law system and are less vulnerable to legal hegemony.

The third criterion according to which workers are classified in thetypology is whether they have identified any defects in the labor law system;if yes, how they account for these defects. If workers attribute these defectsto the faults of individual officials, local governments, and employers, theyare considered more susceptible to legal hegemony. If they attribute thesedefects to systemic causes pertinent to the legal system, the state, and themarket economy, they are considered less susceptible to legal hegemony.As pointed out by many scholars, workers’ attribution of their suffering tostructural causes is an indicator of a certain level of class consciousness(Portes 1971; Dahrendorf 1965). Therefore, the third criterion I formulatehere indicates the degree to which workers are susceptible to the values andideologies the labor law system reproduces.

In brief, the first criterion about the level of legal knowledge of workersand their motivation to gain such knowledge reflects the ‘relevancy of laws’to workers. The second criterion on legal discourses and legal practiceindicates their ‘degree of trust/distrust’ towards the labor law system. Thethird criterion on how they account for legal defects reveals their ‘degree ofsusceptibility’ to the values embodied in the labor law system. These threecriteria combined will shed light on the varying degrees of impact imposedby legal hegemony on workers.

Distinguishing between the concepts of ‘active consent’ and ‘passiveconsent’ rendered by workers to capitalist leadership (Femia 1975, 32–34),I argue that the affirmative workers have granted active consent to legalhegemony whereas the indifferent, ambivalent‚ and critical workers haveonly rendered passive consent; the radical workers have rejected it alto-gether. Active consent indicates that workers have internalized capitalist

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worldviews, and their consent ‘takes the form of active commitment, basedon a deeply held belief that the superior position of the ruling group islegitimate’ and that the capitalist class represents the interests of largersociety (Femia 1987, 32). Passive consent signifies that workers have onlypartially assimilated into capitalist values, or that they feel the status quo isinequitable, but there is not viable alternative. Workers have developedpassive consent ‘not so much because the masses profoundly regard thesocial order as an expression of their aspirations as because they lack theconceptual tools’ to conceive of viable alternatives (Femia 1987, 33).

Under my self-constructed typology, the affirmative group of workersdisplays active consent to legal hegemony. They feel the relevancy of laborlaws to them, and have endorsed the party-state-constructed legal dis-courses and legal practices in such ways that they have internalized thevalues associated with state–capital–labor relations reproduced by laws. Forthis kind of worker, if legal loopholes exist at all, they are only caused bypersonal misbehavior rather than by manipulations of the ruling class.

The indifferent group of workers has rendered passive consent to legalhegemony as they are full of resignation and submissiveness. They faceunfair treatment at work, but feel that labor laws are irrelevant to them;they do not have any basic awareness of labor laws and are unmotivated togain that legal knowledge. Due to this sense of irrelevancy and apathy, theydo not care to trust or distrust the labor law system. Neither are theyconcerned about the causes behind legal flaws. They simply submitthemselves to the socio-political and economic status quo.

The critical group of workers discredits the legal discourses and legalpractices, but this does not imply that they are not susceptible to legalhegemony. Their criticism of the labor law system is framed within thelogics advocated by the state and market economy; they attribute theshortcomings of the system to individual acts and do not fundamentallyquestion the state and the capitalist class. The ambivalent group of workersis those who hover between the affirmative and critical types. They partlyendorse the official legal discourses and legal practices, yet they partlydiscredit them. They see the positive sides of the labor law system, but theyare at the same time aware of legal loopholes which they attribute to theimproper behavior of individuals rather than systemic bias. Although boththe critical and ambivalent workers have not fully internalized the capitalistvalues, and they both have criticisms against the socio-economic and legalsystems, they have partially assimilated to capitalist logics. In other words,


they have conferred passive consent to capitalist hegemony that has beenmediated through the labor law system.

The radical group of workers grants no consent, not even passive con-sent, to legal hegemony. They reject the party-state-constructed legaldiscourses and legal practices, thereby rejecting the dominant class’sworldviews that are reproduced through the labor law system. For them,legal shortcomings are not simply the results of personal misdeeds (as thecritical and ambivalent workers believe), but that of the structural socialand economic asymmetry, such as unequal social relations, and theparty-state’s bias towards the wealthy classes.

This self-constructed typology benefits the study of legal hegemony intwo ways. First, as explicated in Chap. 2, hegemony is a historical process ofclass struggles from which a balance of the forces between antagonisticclasses is derived. Hegemony cannot be regarded as something that eitherexists or does not exist, or as something that the ruling class either fullypossesses or does not possess. Instead of conceiving of hegemony as azero-sum phenomenon, this typology permits us to conceptualize thediffering degrees of hegemonic effect transmitted through the labor lawsystem and the varying extents of worker susceptibility towards legalhegemony. Second, while previous studies on hegemony in China focus onhow the ruling class reproduces dominance (Blecher 2002, 2004), thistypology points to the possibility of transforming workers’ susceptibility tolegal hegemony. Ideas and values are ‘neither consistent over time nornecessarily coherent’ (Femia 1975, 34). Workers categorized into differentmodes under the typology are not stationary; their positions may shift fromone mode to another over time as a result of changing life experiences andclass consciousness. This possibility of transformation hints at the instabilityof legal hegemony and highlights the fact that it remains a product ofcontinuous class struggles between classes in conflict.

Having formulated a critical typology of legal hegemony, in the fol-lowing section, I examine the affirmative workers who have conferredactive consent to legal hegemony.

3 AFFIRMATIVE WORKERS

3.1 Workers Without Labor Dispute Experiences

Comparatively speaking, the worker-interviewees that never ran into labordisputes viewed labor laws in a more positive light, and they were quite

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receptive to legal hegemony. Many of them manifested an affirmativeposition towards labor laws and the values the laws embody.

Zhi Hui, a 23-year-old male from Hunan, is a second-generationmigrant worker.4 He completed vocational secondary school and is bettereducated than his parent’s generation. He has been hired by a large-scalefactory in Guangzhou, which supplies spare parts to Toyota, one of thebiggest Japanese automobile manufacturing companies. The automobileindustry is a vital pillar for the Chinese economy and has been stronglysupported by the government. In 2009, China surpassed the USA tobecome the world’s largest auto market (Hui 2011). The automobileindustry demands workers that are equipped with a certain skill level, and ithas recently become quite strike-prone, as exemplified by the 2010 Hondaworkers’ strike (Chan and Hui 2012). Due to its economic significance andenterprise concern for maintaining a stable skillful workforce, employmentconditions in the automobile industry are more attractive than in otherindustries. Zhi Hui’s basic monthly salary is around 2600 yuan, double thatof the Guangzhou minimum wage (which is 1300 yuan at the time ofresearch).5 Similar to most car factories, every year the factory distributes alump-sum bonus to workers; in 2012, he received a bonus equivalent to4.5 times of his basic monthly salary. Unlike workers from the shoe, gar-ment or electronics industries, he is not required to work much overtimeand can enjoy two days off every week as prescribed by the Labour Law.According to the fieldwork investigation, car factories in Guangzhou havebeen more willing to raise wages subsequent to the Honda strike. Many ofthem have started to conduct annual collective wage negotiation with theirenterprise trade unions.

Zhi Hui has worked in this factory for 5 years and does not have manycomplaints about his job. He has a fair understanding of labor laws. Forinstance, while some workers are still unaware of their legal entitlementconcerning overtime payment, he correctly explains that workers areentitled to 1.5 times their regular wages when working overtime onweekdays, 2 times when working on rest days‚ and 3 times when workingon statutory holidays. He states, ‘We know how to calculate overtimecompensation. We keep a record of our overtime work.’ On the topic ofwhether labor laws and the Chinese state have offered proper protectionsto workers, the following conversation with Zhi Hui ensued.


Researcher: Do labour laws provide sufficient protection to workers?Zhi Hui: Various laws exist, but I don’t have a deep understanding of

them. I think the laws are fair and treat people equally, andthey safeguard our legitimate interests [hefa liyi]. I think wecan trust the laws. When we took political classes invocational secondary school, the teachers told us that therewere labour laws.

Researcher: What did the teachers say about labour laws?Zhi Hui: They said the laws are just and fair‚ and serve the people.Researcher: Do you believe that?Zhi Hui: Yes, I do.Researcher: Then has the government provided sufficient protection to

workers?Zhi Hui: How should I say this….I don’t know much…um…it’s ok

[hai keyi].Researcher: You think it’s ok?Zhi Hui: I’ve come across news report on greedy and corrupt

government officials, but my friends say we shouldn’t focusnarrowly on one point. They say the government’s big, andwe shouldn’t let individual officials stain our impression of thewhole government, and we shouldn’t conclude that thegovernment’s bad simply because of individual corruptofficials.

Researcher: Do you agree with your friends?Zhi Hui: Yes, I think if the government knew about any corruption, it

wouldn’t tolerate it.

Zhi Hui holds a positive view of labor laws. This is probably not onlybecause of indoctrination from his teachers, but, more importantly, isbecause his work experiences do not clash with official legal discourses andthe image of the law implanted in him. As explicated, his factory does notsimply follow legal regulations; it also offers wages and benefits that sig-nificantly exceed legal requirements. No major episode in his working lifecontradicts the official representation of the labor law system; therefore, hetends to accept state-constructed legal discourses.

Concerning the party-state, Zhi Hui is cognizant of government cor-ruption and shows a slight disdain for it. He understands corruption as aresult of the misbehavior of individual cadres rather than as that of systemicproblems within the political system. His opinion can be explained by the

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decentralized politics in China. As Lee (2007) points out, local govern-ments are responsible for economic accumulation whereas the centralgovernment is more concerned with political legitimacy. The consequencesof this division are that, local governments have established close ties tobusiness, which often use bribery of material advantage in exchange forgovernment patronage. Conversely, in the face of grave public dissatis-faction, the central government has taken stringent measures to stamp outcorruption. When compared to Jiang Zemin, the Hu-Wen government hastaken corruption and bribery more seriously. The new president Xi Jinpinghas stepped up efforts further to combat both ‘corrupt flies and tigers’(laohu cangying yiqi da) within the political regime. Many official circularshave been issued to ban government practices that may create opportu-nities for corruption.6 It is estimated that 19 provincial cadres were sus-pended in 2013 due to suspected corruption.7 The most scandalous caseswere related to Liu Zhijun, the former railway minister, Bo Xilai and ZhouYongkang, former members of the CCP Politburo, Xu Caihou, the retireddeputy commander of the People’s Liberation Army. For Zhi Hui andsome of the informants, the central government’s endeavor to fight againstcorruption is evidence that the government, as a whole, does not colludewith business, and that the greed of individual cadres is where corruptionand bribery mainly stem from.

Qiang Lai’s background is quite different from Zhi Hui’s.8 He is about40 years old and briefly lived through the socialist state period. He only hasa primary school education. He moved from Sichuan to work in the citiesin 1988; about 10 years ago, he was hired by a domestically owned elec-tronics factory in Shenzhen. His basic salary equals Shenzhen’s legalminimum wage (1500 yuan), which is much lower than Zhi Hui’s (2600yuan). He has a positive opinion of labor laws, remarking that ‘it is betterto have labor laws than be without them’. He made this comment mostlikely because he lived through the period when the 1995 Labour Law hadnot yet been legislated (he first came to work in the cities in 1988). Herecalls that during the 1980s, laws were not much emphasized, and the ruleof law was weakly upheld, but now they are better implemented. When hefirst worked in Chongqing during the 1980s, he did not possess much legalknowledge; it was only in the 1990s that he started to take initiative tolearn about labor laws because ‘society has changed, people should follow’.After clarification, I realized that what he means by ‘changed’ is that moreand more labor disputes are now resolved through legal channels; he,therefore, deems it necessary to gain some legal knowledge.


Regarding whether labor laws protect workers, Qiang Lai replies thatworkers wish to earn better salaries, but employers want to pay less; it istherefore difficult to reach a balance. He adds:

Laws cannot maintain a perfect balance, only a relative balance. Only whenlaws exist can there be standards for social practices; otherwise, there wouldbe no [social] standards…I think labour laws are partial towards workersmore than towards employers, as is the government. For example, the gov-ernment and labour laws require employers to sign employment contractswith workers and buy social insurance for them.

On the topic of rights-defense according to laws, Qiang Lai comments thatit is a good idea because there are laws to protect him; when he runs intolabor disputes, he can resolve them through legal channels. In addition, heshows appreciation for the rule of law, which for him signifies that the NPCmakes laws to regulate society, and that people have to comply with themafter promulgation. The rule of law, according to him, is adequatelyimplemented in China; evidence lies in the improvement of public safetyover the years. Both Zhi Hui and Qiang Lai endorse the labor law system,albeit for different reasons. Zhi Hui’s affirmation is due to external impo-sitions of the party-state-constructed legal discourses, which fit squarelywithin his lived experiences as a post-90s worker hired by a law-abidingfactory. Qiang Lai’s approval stems from a comparison between his presentexperience and his former exposure during the early reform period whenlabor laws and the rule of law were not yet promoted.

Qiang Lai’s principal concern is low wages; his 1500 yuan monthlysalary hardly allows him to accumulate any savings. Talking about China’seconomic development and opening up, the following dialogue occured.

Researcher: In your opinion, what changes have been brought about bythe economic reform?

Qiang Lai: Following China’s opening up, we can now go to work andearn money in the cities. The supply of electronic applianceswas limited in the pre-reform days, but now we have bettermaterial lives. Before the reform, we were contained withinsmall towns and couldn’t travel across provinces, but now wecan move around easily to get a job.

Researcher: What do you think about the wealth gap in China?Qiang Lai: It’s huge.

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Researcher: What are the causes?Qiang Lai: Those who were born in the 1980s received more education

than those who were born in the 1970s; they, therefore, earnmore. Regional difference is another reason; the coastal areasare better developed than the inland areas. This is related tothe government’s policies, which were to first conducteconomic reform in the coastal areas. It started to promotewestern development (xibu kaifa) only after 2000.

Researcher: Have you heard the slogan ‘let some people get rich first’?Qiang Lai: Yes, it was proposed by Deng Xiaoping.Researcher: What do you think about it? Is it a good policy?Qiang Lai: It’s good if implemented well; it’s bad if poorly carried out.Researcher: Could you explain more?Qiang Lai: If those who get rich first help other people get rich, then it’s

a good policy. If they get rich but don’t help others, then it’sbad policy.

Researcher: Which scenario is happening in China?Qiang Lai: I think it’s the former case [i.e., it’s good policy]. After some

people get wealthy, they become employers and hire us. Thishas boosted the Chinese economy.

Qiang Lai provides two explanations for the serious wealth gap inChina, as reflected by the proximity to 0.5 on the Gini coefficient scale.9

The first explanation is tied to the personal attributes of workers—somepeople earn less because they are less educated. This reflects the liberalmarket ideology of individualism, self-sufficiency, and self-reliance that hasemerged in the reform period, replacing collectivism and the socialist stateethos (Won 2004). This new ideology offers workers, like Qiang Lai,individual explanations to socially created problems—workers are poorbecause they lack the qualities that would make them self-sufficient andself-reliant rather than because of the capitalist mode of production. Theliberal ideology disseminates the idea that some people received moreeducation, and therefore, they have acquired the qualities that enable themto sell their labor power for higher prices.

His second explanation is the state’s uneven developmental strategies.He is right that the social inequality in China is rooted to state policies. Theparty-state took advantage of the expansion of global capitalism to turn thecountry into a global manufacturing hub. It has ensured an abundantsupply of labor by abolishing work units and communes, and by loosening


the household registration system (hukou) to allow peasants to work in thecities (Solinger 1999). It also suppresses labor costs by keeping the legalminimum wage much lower than average wages in cities,10 by turning ablind eye to company legal violations‚ and by banning independent workerorganizations which would strengthen workers’ collective bargainingpower vis-à-vis employers (see Chap. 3). In addition, it has put abundantresources into the socio-economic advancement of southeastern China, butneglected the development of western and inland areas until recently(McNally 2004). Plainly speaking, the party-state’s uneven developmentalstrategies have turned some social groups into the wealthy class at theexpense of the majority. Qiang Lai is dissatisfied with his low wages and thewidening wealth-gap in China; he understands well that they are the resultsof the state’s biased policies. However, paradoxically, he believes that thesepolicies are, overall, beneficial to workers because they are now given theopportunity to work and earn money, and they can also take part in somematerial enjoyment, which they were denied before the reform.

Qiang Lai shows strong approval of capitalist economic development,though he does not benefit much from it in terms of wages. He regards hispersonal interests and the Chinese economy as closely tied to the success ofa particular social class, which has been able to create job opportunities forworkers [‘After some people get rich, they become employers and hire us.This has boosted the Chinese economy’]. Other interviewees share asimilar view. One of them notes, ‘It would help the employment situationif the government supports businesses. If companies earn more, we, as theiremployees, will take pride in them. If the government helps the enterprises,it will benefit us, too, because it will be easier for us to get a job’.11 This‘common sense’, or ‘spontaneous feeling’ (Gramsci 1971, 198) abouteconomic development is widely held by my informants, although it doesnot serve their interests. Qiang Lai and some workers endorse theparty-state’s policy of ‘let some people get rich first’, which resembles theliberal ‘trickle-down’ theory whereby the government’s support of busi-nesses and the rich will subsequently benefit other members of societybecause the capitalist class will have driven the economy as a whole. Viewedfrom a Gramscian perspective, Qiang Lai has conferred active consent tothe capitalist leadership and interprets his living experience from thedominant class’s worldviews—a neo-liberal framework that sees capitalistsas creating jobs for workers and economic prosperity for the country,rather than a perspective that views employers as exploitative. This reflectsthat to a certain degree, the capitalist class in China has gained a trans-class

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appeal, and its interests are being universalized as the interests of both theworking class and the country.

Acquiescing to capitalist hegemony does not imply that Qiang Lai isoblivious to the negative impacts imposed by the market economy, such asthe widening wealth gap and social inequality. However, these side effectsare somehow offset by the labor law system, which he considers able to dohim justice. Qiang Lai thinks that the government prejudices towardsworkers more than towards employers because labor laws requireemployers to sign labor contracts with workers and buy social insurance forthem. Moreover, he believes he can entrust workplace disputes to the legalsystem, should they arise in future. Qiang Lai’s viewpoints demonstratethat labor laws have buffered the market economy and the state fromfundamental criticism. First, labor laws make Qiang Lai feel as if the currentsocio-economic system is not completely unfair or biased, and that theexploitation he encounters is not systemic; if his employer were to commitany wrongdoings, he would be able to seek redress through the labor lawsystem. In other words, Qiang Lai deems the labor law system to be able tocurb misdeeds in the economic sphere, rather than seeing it as an apparatusthat facilitates economic accumulation through sanctioning capitalist ex-ploitation (as explained in Chap. 3). Second, for Qiang Lai, the ‘protec-tion’ given by labor law is proof that the state cares about workers. He,therefore, does not attribute his personal poverty to the party-state’s biastowards the wealthy class. And he does not blame the party-state as a wholefor the plight of workers.

It is important to note that legal hegemony is not equivalent to a falseconsciousness imposed on workers (Jessop 1982). In order to acquireworker acquiescence to capitalist leadership and forestall them fromrevolting against the capitalist system, the ruling bloc has to grant con-cessions on secondary issues to them. In China, these concessions havepartly taken the form of legal protections that are compatible with thecapitalist juridico-political structures (see Chap. 3). The reform of the labormediation, arbitration‚ and litigation systems, the promulgation of theLabour Law and the Labour Contract Law, etc. are legal concessionsfought for by the working class. They contradict the short-term interests ofindividual capitalists, but through the above-elaborated buffering effects onstate–capital–labor relations, at the same time, they help strengthen theleadership of the capitalist class in the long run.

The buffering effects of the labor law system are observable in many ofmy informants. In her early 20s, Xiao Mei came from Shanxi to work in a


domestically owned electronics factory in Shenzhen in 2007.12 After a fewyears of effort, she became a team leader of a production line. She has areasonable understanding of labor laws; in our interview, she keenlyexplained to me the implementation of the 2011 Social Insurance Laws inShenzhen. She complains that inflation is too high, and her salary canhardly keep up.13 Working as much overtime as she can, every month sheearns about 3000 yuan, from which over 800 yuan are spent on rent andabout another 1500 yuan on food, water, electricity‚ and other dailynecessities. Since her little brother is studying at home, she also needs tosend money back to her parents. Therefore, there is not much left for hersavings.

Researcher: Do you think workers are sharing the fruits of the economicgrowth?

Xiao Mei: We can’t catch up in many aspects…we haven’t benefitedmuch from the rapid development. Although our wages havegone up, prices increase faster.

Researcher: Has economic development brought about any positiveimpact?

Xiao Mei: It probably has. At least our country has grown stronger. Thisis not really related to us, but when our country is strong,other countries will respect it in regards to issues like theDiaoyu Islands.

Researcher: What are the benefits for workers if our country is strong?Xiao Mei: For us….we can’t get any substantial benefit in economic

terms, I think probably not much. It [China being a strongnation] doesn’t affect us much. However, it’ll be good for usif our nation is stable. If it were stable, we wouldn’t havemuch to worry about.

Researcher: So you want our country to grow stronger, right?Xiao Mei: Yes. Who wants their own nation to be worse off than

others’? I suppose everybody thinks like this.Researcher: Have you heard about the slogan ‘let some people get rich

first’?Xiao Mei: This means letting a group of people become wealthy first,

and they’ll then help others get rich…this is what ourtextbooks in school say.

Researcher: What do you think about this?

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Xiao Mei: I think it’s what ought to be done. If there are no employers,how can people like us get jobs, right? Only when they’re richand successful can they hire us.

Researcher: Don’t you think some employers earn a lot but still don’t payworkers decent wages?

Xiao Mei: I haven’t thought about this much. Even when I think aboutit, there’s no way to change it, right? It’s ok as long asemployers pay our wages according to the Labour Law. I’vealready worked in this factory for 5 years and there haven’tbeen any labour disputes. Basically this factory is ok.

Despite her complaint that inflation grew faster than her wages, she stillexpresses approval towards the meager wages offered by employers. Forher, if employers do not violate the Labour Law, then paying workers lowwages is not unjust. Such a belief in the legitimacy and authority of laborlaws is commonly held by workers who have never been involved in labordisputes. One female worker remarks, ‘I go to work according to schedule;it is fair and just, so long as my employer does not underpay me.’14

Another male worker notes that ‘labor laws must have been passed forgood reason. They were made by professionals; they, thus, must have takeninto consideration national and social needs’.15 Another male intervieweecomments that ‘laws are products of many peoples’ efforts and are made bythe nation, therefore, they have their legitimacy’.16 Social and legalstructures are the aggregate consequences of the actions of people in thepast; yet the elaboration and continuation of these structures over timemakes them appear as external objects to social actors (Archer 1982).Labour laws are one such object for some workers; they seldom go so far asto challenge whether the legal contents are just, or to question the unequalpower relations dictating the law-making process. For these workers, lawsare credible and authoritative yardsticks for judging employers—ifemployers act lawfully, then there is no ground to blame them for theplight of workers.

Moreover, although Xiao Mei feels that workers do not share the fruit ofeconomic progress, she nonetheless endorses the state’s developmentalpolicy of ‘let some people get rich first’, which favors certain social classesover another. She does not attribute workers’ exclusion from economicprosperity to the state’s support to the capitalist class. Similar to Qiang Lai,she interprets her work experiences from a neo-liberal lens, which con-ceives of capitalists as creating jobs and driving the economy rather than


exploiting workers. Xiao Mei does not question the unbalanced economicdevelopment, which has led to meager wages of workers, not only becauseof her employer’s lawful acts, but also because of nationalist sentiments.She deems economic growth as not so much related to herself individuallyas to the nation. Although she recognizes that she has not benefited fromChina being strong, she considers it important for China to be powerful sothat it can possess political and economic leverage over other countries.The Diaoyu Island dispute she mentioned refers to a long-running disputebetween China and Japan over a group of outlying islands in the EastChina Sea, which are believed to contain rich natural resources. Over theyears, the two countries have, from time to time, incurred serious politicalstrife over the islands. In 2012, after the Japanese government nationalizedthe Diaoyu Islands, the relationship between the two countries turnedsour. In China, numerous protests against the Japanese government brokeout in August and September that year. The news reported that someJapanese brand cars parked by the roadside were damaged by demon-strators,17 and a Japanese diplomat in Beijing was stopped in his car bydemonstrators who removed the Japanese flag from his car.18

Xiao Mei’s national sentiment, as expressed in her comment on theDiaoyu Islands, is also witnessed in other informants. A female workerremarks, ‘I have not gained any personal benefits from the economicdevelopment, but it is good for the country.’ 19 As a matter of fact, oneimportant ideological construction of the Chinese party-state is nationalismand anti-western sentiments. No longer organizing the people according toclass, the party-state now seeks to maintain its legitimacy partly byappealing to national identity (Zhao 1998; Breslin 2007). Chinese na-tionalism has fostered people’s sense of pride in the country’s economicsuccess, as well as creates an impression that some Western countries areattempting to suppress China’s development; for this reason, theparty-state needs to defend national interests (Breslin 2007). Thisnationalistic and anti-western ideology has helped mobilize people from allclasses, including victims of high-speed growth like Xiao Mei, to supportthe party-state and economic development. In China, hegemony is notonly about approving the market economy; it is simultaneously blendedwith state-led nationalism, which has added a national-popular appearanceto the capitalist leadership.

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3.2 Workers with Individual Labor Dispute Experiences

In comparison to workers who encountered no industrial disputes previ-ously, workers who have experienced industrial disputes (individual andcollective alike) have nurtured a better understanding of labor laws andlegal procedures for dispute resolution. Some of them even assist fellowworkers in need with active cases in the capacity of volunteers, agent adlitem (gongmin daili)‚ or NGO staff.

Qing Fa is 28 years old and has completed vocational school.20 In 2011he worked in an electronics factory in Shenzhen, but his employer decidednot to hire him after the probationary period for unspecified reasons.Moreover, asserting that Qing Fa performed his duties poorly, his boss onlypaid him half of the monthly wages for a month of work. Qing Fa lodged acomplaint with the labor bureau, but action was only taken after he hadgone to the office four times. The labor bureau officer called his boss toenquire about the case, after which a mediation meeting was held betweenQing Fa and his boss. At the end, his employer paid him back the other halfof his monthly salaries.

Qing Fa holds a high opinion of the labor law system, most likelybecause he managed to retrieve his half-month wages through labormediation. He states:

In my case, labour mediation helps a lot. The labour bureau officers have thecapability to implement the laws, but sometime they just don’t do it. Actually,they have improved a lot; many government officials are now scared of peo-ple’s complaints because these may affect their careers. Some governmentofficials may appear indifferent; but if you are persistent and determinedenough to go through the process, they will have to handle your case properly. Onthe contrary, if you go to the labour bureau just once or twice, they won’thandle your case seriously. The key to rights-defense is persistence and deter-mination. If you don’t strive for your own interests, they won’t help you.

Qing Fa rightly points out the problem of weak legal implementation,which has been highlighted by many studies (Gallagher 2004; Wang et al.2009; Lubman 1999). When I asked him if poor legal enforcement wascaused by the government’s bias towards employers, Qing Fa firmly saidno. He reiterates, ‘as long as you are determined to defend your rights,they will help you, and you will get what you deserve. But this process maybe quite long and complicated because they need time to verify and discussyour case.’ When explaining why some workers cannot successfully defend


their interests, he puts the blame on their inadequate persistence anddetermination rather than on the loose implementation of labor laws or thegovernment’s ineffective monitoring of enterprises [‘The key torights-defense is persistence and determination. If you don’t strive for yourown interests, they won’t help you’]. In other words, he attributes workers’suffering to their own psychological and behavioral shortcomings ratherthan deeming it a failure of the labor law system.

Despite Qing Fa’s affirmation towards the labor law system, he doesnotice its weaknesses. When I asked him if China was a society based on therule of law, he responded:

Government departments have the capacity to enforce laws, but in many cases,they do not do their jobs. At the moment, we have laws, but they are ill-implemented. If you complain to a government department, the officers willsay that they are busy, and they always delay handling your case. If you urgethem, they will tell you that they don’t just serve you, and that they have totake care of many other matters. They are very polite, but they just don’t helpyou resolve the disputes.

Qing Fa attributes the failure of the labor law system in protecting workersto the irresponsibility of government officers rather than to the party-state’ssystemic bias towards capitalists.

In his mid-forties, Ah Wen has been working in the cities since 1985.21

Belonging to the first generation of migrant workers who witnessedChina’s opening up, he opines that Chinese society has become better afterthe economic reform because ‘at least peasants from villages can come towork in the cities’, and they now ‘have greater access to education’. At thesame time, however, he notes that workers do not benefit from China’seconomic development—‘although our wages have gone up, prices havebecome very high. It’s very hard to raise a family’.

Ah Wen’s finger was cut by a machine in an accident when he worked ina metal factory in Dongguan. According to the Regulation onWork-Related Injury Insurance, employers have a legal responsibility toapply to the Social Security Department for a determination ofwork-related injury (gongshang rending) within 30 days of the occurrenceof the incident. Should employers fail to comply with this, worker-victimscan apply for the determination themselves within a year. Assuming thatthe employers concerned had contributed to the Work-Related InjuryInsurance for their workers according to law (which may not often be the

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case), the Insurance should pay for medical expenses and food subsidies forvictims during the period of medical treatment (yi liaoqi). In addition, theemployers have to pay victims their average monthly salaries until they haverecuperated and are able to return to work. After the victims recover, orwhen their health situation stabilizes, an assessment of work capability(laodong nengli jianding) to determine the level of permanent harm thathas been inflicted by the work injury to the victims’ work performancecapabilities must be conducted. The employers have to pay a lump sumcompensation in accordance with the assessments.

On the surface, the legal procedures related to the handling of workinjuries seem straightforward and protective of workers. However, inreality, many injured workers encounter obstacles when asserting their legalrights. In the case of Ah Wen, his factory initially agreed that the accidentwas work-related and the Social Security Department had already deter-mined so. Nonetheless, after Ah Wen conducted the assessment of workcapabilities, his employer started to dispute that the accident waswork-connected. His boss argued that Ah Wen did not immediately reportthe accident or go to the hospital right after the accident broke out, butonly did so on the following day; it was, therefore, possible that he did nothurt himself at work. His employer applied to the Dongguang city gov-ernment for administrative reconsideration (xingzheng fuyi) of the case,which adhered to the initial decision that his injury was work-related.22 Hisboss then filed an appeal to the court against the decision of the SocialSecurity Department; the court case was yet to be heard at the time of ourinterview.

Ah Wen believes that the labor law system is fair and can protectworkers. Similar to Qiang Lai, having lived through a period when mostlabor laws were not yet enacted probably makes him feel the positiveimpact of labor laws on workers. He opines that ‘the laws made by thecentral government are very just and fair’, but their implementation at thelocal level is unsatisfactory. He takes the Labour Contract Law as anexample, pointing out that although it requires employers to sign laborcontracts with workers, many of them, including his employer, do not doso; many government officials simply turned a blind eye to the situation. Inother words, for him, the labor law system is protective of workers, but thepersonal misdeeds of employers and government officials have contributedto its lax enforcement.


Ah Wen demonstrates a trust in labor laws and gives them his activeconsent.

Researcher: What do you think about your boss? Are you angry with him?Ah Wen: Being angry or not makes no difference. I act according to

laws. If he loses the court case, he has to compensate me.Even if I’m angry, it’s useless. Things need to be decidedthrough the legal platform.

Researcher: Were you scared when talking to your employer and thelabour bureau officers?

Ah Wen: There is nothing to be scared of. No matter howhigh-ranking they are, they’re just human beings; I am ahuman being, too. We’re equal before the law. What should Ibe scared of? It’s fine as long as I don’t violate any laws.

Researcher: If your employer wins the court case, what will you do?Ah Wen: I will appeal to the intermediary court.Researcher: Will you consider taking extra-legal actions?Ah Wen: I will only consider legal means.Researcher: Why?Ah Wen: If the judge rules that my boss is wrong, then he must be wrong.

But if the judge decides that this is not a work injury, I probablydon’t have any legal grounds; then I’ll accept it.

The above dialogue illustrates that labor laws simultaneously emboldenand debilitate Ah Wen’s rights-defense. First, they lend confidence to him.Acting through legal channels assures him that he has done the ‘rightthing’ and that he possesses the right to do the ‘right thing’ [‘It is fine aslong as I do not violate any laws’]. Moreover, laws make him feel that hisboss and government officials are not superior, but are ‘human beings’ likehim [‘We are equal before the laws’]. In this regard, the Chinese labor lawswield a positive impact, however limited, on workers, providing a weaponfor their resistance and boosting their courage to assert their rights (withinlegal boundaries). This observation echoes the reminder by some scholarsthat laws, despite their capitalist nature, are not completely detrimental(Poulantzas 2000), and that the working class can utilize them proactivelyto safeguard their interests (Thompson 1977), as will be elaborated morein the next two chapters.

On the other hand, labor laws debilitate Ah Wen’s activism by shapinghis values and constricting his actions within legal channels. For him, labor

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laws and courts rulings are authoritative yardsticks of what are right andwhat are not—if the judge rules that his boss loses the case, then his bossmust be wrong; otherwise, his claims are not well grounded. Thisdemonstrates how the labor law system has justified his employer’s actions,even though the boss is considered unscrupulous from a critical point ofview; the legal justifications confound Ah Wen from discerning that laborlaws are skewed towards the dominant class. Moreover, labor laws havebecome a guide for Ah Wen’s actions. Should he lose the court case relatedto his work injury, he would only ‘consider the legal means’ as a follow-up;actions beyond the legal platform are out of the question for him. Otherinterviewees of mine also express the same kind of legal conformity. Onestresses, ‘If I lose my case, I won’t take extra-legal actions. It’s helpless.I think we should only use legal means to resolve disputes.’23

Concerning the dispute with his employer, Ah Wen once sought legaladvice from a labor NGO. He never approached trade unions for aid as he‘doesn’t know much about them’ and thought ‘they wouldn’t help’. Someof my interviewees share this feeling, and therefore, resort to NGOs forassistance. One interviewee remarks, ‘I never went to consult trade unionsbecause they are only a formality; they can’t do or say much for workers.Although their money comes from workers, they are under the leadershipof the government.’24 Another worker shares, ‘The staff and participants inlabor NGOs are friendlier; there is no distance between us. Rights-defenseis easy on paper, but it is very challenging in reality. The NGO staff havehelped me a lot.’25

Ah Rong, in his mid-forties, first came from his hometown in Yunnan towork in the cities in 2000.26 For him, the economic reform has positivelyinfluenced workers’ lives because it has attracted numerous foreign com-panies to invest in China, which in turn improves people’s living standardsand job opportunities. Since 2005, he has been working in an electronicsfactory in Shenzhen. Unfortunately, he hurt his back in 2011 when movingheavy boxes in the workplace. His employer denies responsibility for hiswork injury. Therefore, he appealed to the Labour Bureau, Social SecurityBureau, and eventually to the court to resolve the dispute, which was stillongoing at the time of our interview. This was not the first industrialdispute he had run into. In 2005, when he worked in another factory, hisboss did not pay him legal overtime compensation. He complained to theLabour Bureau and the Social Security Department a number of times.Initially, they did not give him any proper feedback; he thus kept callingthem. Later, he went to talk to the official in charge, after which she called


the factory manager and pressured him to rectify the problem. At the end,his boss gave him back the due compensation.

Although Ah Rong faced huge obstacles when championing his rights,he views the labor law system in a positive light.

Ah Rong: Labour laws are quite fair and can protect workers, who are amarginalized social group (ruoshi qunti). Employers are insuperior positions; when they like, they give you more, butwhen they don’t, they give you nothing. Luckily, the laborlaws made by the central government contain compulsoryregulations that employers must follow. Many regulations areclearly written into laws; the problem is that they can’t be fullyimplemented.

Researcher: What do you think about the labour bureaus? Do theyprotect workers or enterprises?

Ah Rong: I think the labour bureaus at the street-level are slantedtowards employers, who have brought them tremendous advan-tages. Many enterprises regularly present gifts to LabourBureau officers. My factory even organised a free trip toTaiwan for them. The Labour Bureaus and the street-levelgovernments want to keep businesses in their districts so thatthey can save up some wealth. Comparing the contributionsmade by workers to that by enterprises, which one’s greaterin the eyes of the street-level governments? For the districtgovernment, who’s deemed to have created economicgrowth?

Researcher: What do you think about the Social Security Department?Ah Rong: I think it’s better. Judging from how it’s handled my

work-injury case, I can tell it’s fairer. Overall, governmentdepartments above the district level are fairer and moreneutral because they don’t have a tight economic relationwith enterprises in the community; their interests are,therefore, not closely linked to enterprises. They’ll examineyour case from a more objective position.

Ah Rong distinguishes between government officers/departmentsabove the district level and those at the district level or below, suggest-ing that the more distant (in terms of hierarchical positions) the

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government officers are from enterprises at the community level, the moreneutral they are; the closer they are to enterprises, the more biased they aretowards the latter, and thus, less willing to enforce labor laws. His obser-vations echo the findings of some studies. Naughton (2008) notes thatlocal officials have forged close alliances with local businesses. Lee main-tains that local government officials have benefited individually and col-lectively from taxes and management fees collected from enterprises; thishas given rise to the ‘permissive regime of labour regulation’ (Lee 2002,201).

Ah Rong is right to point out the variations within the Chinese gov-ernment regarding their bureaucratic practices and relationships with firms.However, the belief that higher-level government departments and thecentral state are more autonomous from businesses, and that they seek toconstrain enterprises with labor laws, is disputable. As Friedman and Leeunderscore, violations of labor rights ‘cannot be attributed to the activity ofa few “bad apples”, but rather, are a fundamental feature of the model ofdevelopment that the Chinese state has pursued over the past 30 years’(2010, 513). The labor law system creates the perception that the centralstate is relatively autonomous from the capitalists. Ah Rong considers laborlaws fair and protective of workers because the central government hasmade them mandatory [‘the labor laws made by the central governmentcontain compulsory regulations that employers must follow’]. Although heis aware of the implementation problems of the labor law system, heattributes them to the close ties between district-level governments andbusinesses in the community rather than to the inbred tendency of thewhole government towards capitalist accumulation. The labor law systemhas shifted his criticism from the central government’s developmentstrategies and the deep-seated state–capital collusion to the misdeeds ofindividual government officers or local governments.

After the outbreak of his labor disputes, Ah Rong actively equips himselfwith legal knowledge through reading books on labor laws. Like Ah Wen,he also sought assistance from a labor NGO staff, who visited him andother work injury victims in the hospital. Subsequent to his release fromthe hospital, he frequently visited the NGO, attending their classes onlabor laws, forums on social affairs‚ and various educational activities.Additionally, as he has become more knowledgeable about labor laws thatare connected to work injury, he often joins the NGO’s outreach activities


in industrial areas to provide legal consultation to workers in need. AhRong holds high opinions of labor NGOs:

Labor NGOs help workers exercise their rights which are enshrined by laborlaws; they teach us laws and tell us about our rights. Various governmentdepartments provide legal services, but those offered by the district-levelgovernments are skewed towards employers. They don’t treat our concernsseriously, always shifting their responsibilities or delaying actions.

The experience of labor disputes and positive encounters with labor NGOsdo not only heighten Ah Rong’s awareness of labor rights, but also imbuein him a feeling of class identification and empathy. Wherever he goes now,and whenever he sees workers taking actions to defend their rights, hestops and observes them. When opportunities arise, he talks to them,finding out their problems and giving them information on rights-defense.This is because he ‘know[s] how they feel’ and ‘workers are walking thesame path (tonglu ren)’. Ah Rong’s rights-defense was triggered by hisemployer’s challenge to his economic interests. The negative experienceswith government officials, the NGO’s support of his rights assertion‚ andthe encounter with other workers in the NGO made him realize that theconflict with his boss was not a particular or discrete instance, and thatthere exist wider antagonisms between workers as a social group andemployers. Due to his understanding of the shared positions and interestsof workers, he has taken initiative to help other workers.

3.3 Workers with Collective Labor Dispute Experiences

Liu Chi is in his early thirties and has completed college-level education.27

He has worked for 4 years as a quality-control engineer in a factory thatsupplies a Japanese automobile brand in Guangzhou. In 2010, the Hondaworkers in Foshan struck for 17 days to demand an 800 yuan monthlywage increase and the democratic reform of their workplace trade union;this sparked a wave of extra-trade union strikes in the automobile industryand other industries in the PRD (Chan and Hui 2012; Hui 2011).According to Chen Weiguang, the president of the Guangzhou Federationof Trade Unions at the time, several tens of thousands of workers fromover 60 factories in Guangzhou walked out over wage issues in the 2months following the Honda strike.28 Liu Chi was hired by one of thesestriking factories, which employed about 1200 workers. Workers in this

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factory went on strike for one and a half days to demand a 500 yuanmonthly wage increase and better benefits. The Labour Bureau officials andmanagement came to talk to the strikers, pressuring them to resumeworking. After some negotiations between the strike representatives andmanagement, the company raised worker monthly wages by 300 yuan.

Some workers informed Liu Chi about the walkout and mobilized himto join it. Strongly agreeing with the strike demands, he followed otherworkers by halting work. It was his first strike experience. He commentsthat the momentum of this strike came from the rank-and-file workers andtechnical workers, whose wages were inadequately low; ‘a few hundredyuan wage increase is crucial to us, though it means nothing to themanagerial-level staff, who earn high salaries’. When asked if he was wor-ried about retaliation from management for walking out, he responded: ‘Iwas not afraid at that time because so many workers joined the strike. Thefactory would not fire all of us because if it did so nobody would beproducing for it.’ A combination of factors drove Liu Chi to participate inthe strike. First, his (and other workers’) meagre wages provided a materialincentive for his walkout. Second, subjected to peer influence, he feltemboldened by the collectivity of and solidarity among the strikers. Whilelabor laws emboldened Ah Wen (Sect. 3.2) to pursue his interests, Liu Chidemonstrated that workers’ collectivity could also spur worker resistance.Third, Liu Chi understood well that labor power hinged on their pro-ductive capacity, and hence, did not fear retaliation or losing his job forwalking out.

Upon the district-level trade union’s request, the workplace trade unionin Liu Chi’s factory was set up in 2008. Not much different from typicalChinese trade unions, it focused mostly on provision of welfare to workers,such as organizing recreational activities and gift-giving to workers at thetime of festivals. However, its failure to address workers’ concerns, such aspoor wages and welfare, provoked workers to bypass the workplace unionand walk out. As pointed out, similar strike stories were witnessed in otherautomobile factories in the PRD following the Honda strike. In light ofthis, the Guangdong Federation of Trade Unions subsequently tookgreater initiative to promote workplace union elections and collective wagenegotiation in the automobile industry to stabilize volatile labor relations.As a result, ‘democratic’ and ‘direct’ trade union elections and wage bar-gaining became more common in automobile factories.29 The higher leveltrade unions now provide more training and assistance concerning wagebargaining to trade union officials in some automobile factories.30


Additionally, in 2011 the Federation of Trade Unions for the Spare AutoParts Industry was set up in the Guangzhou Economic and TechnologicalDevelopment Zone to advance unionization and wage negotiation in theindustry.31 In the wake of this development, Liu Chi ran for the workplacetrade union election in 2011 and was elected as the union official. Heremarks, ‘After the strike, I think I can help improve worker well-beingthrough talking to the boss via the platform of a trade union; therefore, Idecided to run for the election.’ The strike experience made him realize theopposing interests between workers and management, motivating him totake steps to further workers’ common interests.

Subsequent to the strike, Liu Chi notes, the company became lessautocratic and would consult the trade union before making importantdecisions. In the past, the management never conducted wage negotiationswith the trade union, but now it is done once every year. He, as a tradeunion official, participated in the wage negotiations in 2012. In his opinion,labor laws, especially those related to collective consultation, are fair andjust; they are of ‘great use’ to workers because they lay down the directionand procedures for wage negotiation so that the company cannot unilat-erally decide workers’ pay raises as it did previously. His positive assessmentof labor laws is grounded on a comparison between the period when hisfactory conducted no wage negotiations and that wherein it follows legalguidelines to negotiate wages with the trade union. In this sense, Liu Chi issimilar to some affirmative workers in this chapter, whose endorsement ofthe labor law system is based on the feeling that they are now betterprotected by labor laws than during the period wherein no or few laborlaws existed.

When I asked Liu Chi how his trade union pressured the company toagree to higher wage increases during negotiations, he replied:

We can negotiate for as long of a period as we want; the longer the nego-tiation lasts, the greater the pressure facing the company. The workers’ sal-aries increase every year in July and they have already built up an expectationaround this. If the company does not do so, workers get restless and easily takeradical actions such as strikes; this would seriously affect production or even thatof other supplying factories.

Liu Chi is cognizant of workers’ workplace bargaining power derived fromtheir strategic position in the car industry (Silver 2003; Wright 2000). Inthe PRD, many industrial zones are established for car making, wherein

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supplying factories specialized in producing automobile componentscluster together to expedite Post-Fordist just-in-time production. Whenstrikes break out in one of these factories that constitutes the productionchain, workers in other supplying factories quickly learn the news becausetheir production would soon be affected by the striking factory.32 Thisechoes what Silver propounds about ‘…workers who are enmeshed intightly integrated production processes, where a localized work stoppage ina key node can cause disruptions on a much wider scale than the stoppageitself’ (Silver 2003: 13). The fieldwork reveals that many automotiveworkers are aware of their workplace bargaining power. One of them says,‘If management does not agree to our wage proposals, we will go on strike.This will bring a great loss to the company, and may also affect nearby carfactories’.33

When asked what constitutes a fair wage, Liu Chi stresses:

The legal minimum wage is not enough for worker survival. A fair pay riseshould take into consideration inflation, food prices, companies’ profits‚ and soforth. Factories should adequately distribute their profits to workers as wages.However, when there isn’t much profit, workers shouldn’t be too aggressive andopening their mouths wide like hungry lions (shizi kai dakou). Our boss is acapitalist, who regardless, needs to extract surplus value from workers andmaximize profits; he has no reason for making a deficit in order to raiseworker wages.

Unlike Xiao Mei (sect. 3.1) who considers her employer fair for paying herlegal minimum wage, Liu Chi does not deem legal minimum wage just.Instead, he reckons that workers’ wages should be set in relation to theprice level and enterprise profits. At the same time, however, he shows anunderstanding, if not approval, of the core capitalist practices: appropria-tion of surplus value and maximization of profits, believing that workers’wage increases should be linked to company profits (i.e., the realization ofsurplus value) rather than workers’ input or the value produced by workers.The higher-level trade union officials stress to him that workers are a part ofthe company, and thus, should think for the company and not request‘unreasonable’ wage increases. Liu Chi’s opinions reveal that althoughhigher-level trade unions and government have promoted wage bargainingmore actively, which grants workers salaries higher than the legal minimumstandards, they at the same time seek to ‘manufacture consent’ (Burawoy


1979) among workers towards a ‘reasonable’ level of wage increase, whichis argued to be linked to company profits.

Cai Lin is in her early thirties and has finished junior high school in herhometown in Guanxi.34 She works in a Japanese electronics factory inShenzhen. Compared to the automobile industry, wages and employmentconditions in the electronics industry are worse off. Most electronics fac-tories in the PRD pay workers salaries that are equal to or even lower thanthe legal minimum wage (Smith et al. 2006), but automotive worker sal-aries are usually higher than the legal requirement, and collective wagenegotiations have become more commonly witnessed in automobile fac-tories after the 2010 strike wave. Electronics workers are usually not welleducated (some of whom have not even completed primary school) andless skillful than car worker (many of whom are graduates from vocationalsecondary schools). As explicated previously, automobile workers possessstrong workplace bargaining power, but their counterparts in electronicsfactories do not. It is because they produce cheap, low-end products, andthus, their skills are highly replaceable. Moreover, the labor regime inelectronics factories tends to be despotic (Lee 1995); arbitrary and disci-plinary managerial practices are commonly witnessed (Xue 2008). Incontrast, following the promotion of ‘direct’ elections and collective wagenegotiation in the automotive industry in the PRD, as explained earlier, thelabor regime in car factories has shown signs of transforming into thehegemonic regime (Burawoy 1979; Chan and Hui 2016).

In Cai Lin’s factory, workers have to work overtime everyday, and theyonly enjoy two rest days per month, rather than four days as stipulated bythe Labour Law. Workers have to apply for permission from their super-visors before going to the washroom. They are allowed to excuse them-selves for at most once every 2 hours and for no more than 5 minutes eachtime; otherwise, they are fined. Moreover, workers can be fined 20–50yuan for talking to each other, using cell phones, not tidying up their hairand so forth while working. Cai Lin comments, ‘I have learnt nothing fromworking in this factory. Everyday, I spend 10 hours in a work space of onemeter square; my work is meaningless.’

Cai Lin’s monthly wages totaled 480 yuan when she first joined thisfactory in 2004. When the government increases the minimum wage rate,her salary is adjusted upwards to the new level. She remarks that theminimum wage can only feed workers with enough food, but not nutri-tious food; it only keeps them from dying. Cai Lin is correct in her

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observation. Although the 2004 Provisions on Minimum Wage suggeststhat the minimum wage should be set around 40–60% of the averagemonthly wage in the corresponding city, the levels in many cities are stillbelow this benchmark.35 Moreover, the average monthly wages of migrantworkers are far below the national average; in 2011, the former was about75% less than the latter (see Graph 1). In addition, workers’ pay raises areoften partly, if not largely, cancelled out by the high inflation rate of foodproducts; in 2008 and 2011, inflation was only slightly lower than theaverage wage increase of workers (see Graph 2).

Despite the complaint that her wage cannot afford her a decent living,Cai Lin does not show great dissatisfaction because it is ‘in line with legalstandards, and the boss does follow regulations for the minimum wage’. Itis of little use, she opines, to bring the issues of wages and benefits to thecompany’s attention because it already follows labor laws. In other words,labor laws have stopped her from proactively questioning the minimumwage system, which indeed helps keep worker wages at a low level.However, when workers act collectively, it becomes easier for them toovercome legal boundaries. In 2010, Cai Lin’s factory decided to reducethe time for each production process from 44 to 39 seconds in order toboost labor productivity; this made the workers furious. Furthermore,workers were discontented with their meager wages (1200 yuan at thetime) and poor benefits. They, therefore, staged a wild-cat strike for less

Graph 1 Comparison between migrant worker average monthly wages and thenational average. Source China Labour Bulletin 2013 (Compiled with data fromNational Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2012) http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china


http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china


than a day; some workers blocked the factory entrance to bar the car of theJapanese CEO from leaving. With mediation led by local Labor Bureauofficials, management agreed to restore production time to 44 seconds,increase workers’ basic monthly salaries by 8.3%‚ and raise housing andliving allowances.

Cai Lin followed others in the walk out because ‘everybody stoppedworking and it was for a good cause’. Like Liu Chi, Cai Lin felt embold-ened when acting collectively with other workers. For her, the seeds ofdiscontent with capitalist production had already been sown; when workersacted in unison, she was emboldened to and did overcome legal hege-mony, which directed workers to resolve labor conflicts through individ-ualized legal channels. She notes that in addition to applying pressure toemployers, strikes could also arouse the Labor Bureau’s concern forindustrial conflicts so that they would also push employers to improvewages and other employment conditions. At the time of the strike, she didnot fear retaliation or other adverse consequences:

I was not worried at all. In the worst case, I might not be able to get my salaryor get fired. But this is not really a big issue.

Graph 2 Worker average wage increase and inflation rates. Source China LabourBulletin 2013 (Compiled with data from China Statistical Yearbook 2012) http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china

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In China, turnover rates in factories are high because, first, the disorga-nized despotic labor regime (Lee 1999) developed in the labor intensiveand export-oriented manufacturing industries usually offers employmentterms that just meet minimum legal standards, or, in some of the worsecases, below legal standards; therefore, they cannot keep workers, who caneasily find a similar job in the market, for long. Second, labor shortage inthe PRD has increased workers’ marketplace bargaining power (Silver2003; Chan 2010). Waves of labor shortages have emerged in the countrysince late 2003 (Chan 2010). They were caused by, first, higher labordemand created by rising inflow of FDI after China’s admission to theWTO in 2001. Second, since 2004, the central government and someprovincial governments have adopted policies that led to the increase offarming income36; as a result, some migrant workers, especially older ones,have been incentivized to return to their home villages (Chan 2010).Third, increasing industrial development in inland areas has discouragedsome migrant workers from seeking jobs in the coastal areas. Fourth, theone child policy, which has been implemented for decades, has led to asignificant reduction of the labor force (Kuruvilla et al. 2011). As a con-sequence of these factors, the overall supply of labor in the market hasdiminished, and many workers try to improve their income through fre-quent job-hopping. As the span of time in which workers will remain in afactory is usually short, maybe ranging from a year to a few at most, goingon strike does not cost them much; at most, it costs them a job withsecond-rate employment conditions. One NGO staff person remarks,‘What strikers fear least is being fired. If a factory fires workers, it has togive them compensation. But if workers quit by themselves, the factoriesdo not need to compensate them for anything. Therefore, if workers arediscontented with a factory, it is all for the better that the factory firesthem.’37

Initially Cai Lin knew nothing about labor laws, of which her school andthe factory did not inform her. She came to learn more about labor laws ina labor NGO in Shenzhen. Now, she often tells other workers about lawsand refers them to this NGO if they have problems. Cai Lin opines thatlabor laws are of great help to workers for they spell out what rightsworkers hold, such as entitlements to minimum wages, social insurance‚and overtime compensation. She notes:


In the past, there were no regulations on wages, and we just earned a little.But now, enterprises must follow the laws and pay us the minimum wage.Our situation is much better now, though some employers still underpayworkers.

Like Qiang Lai (sect. 3.1), Cai Lin’s positive evaluation of labor laws aregrounded on a comparison between the period (during the 1990s) whereinonly a few legal protections for workers existed but were usually poorlyimplemented, and the period (during 2000s) wherein more labor laws havebeen put into place and relatively better enforced. This type of comparisonis more frequently demonstrable in older migrant workers (usually born inthe 70s or early 80s), who have work experience in both periods. Incontrast, the younger generation, who are usually born after the mid-80sor 90s and have not worked in the period when the labor law system was inits infancy, do not hint at this comparison as often.

Despite her positive opinion of labor laws, Cai Lin remarks that ‘thedegree of protections offered by labor laws depends on law-enforcemententities; if they do not implement the laws, then the laws are useless’.Taking minimum wages as an example, she points out that some factoriesdo not pay workers the minimum wage, but the Labor Bureaus take noaction. Like many workers, she reckons that the legal deficits lay at theimplementation level and are caused by the failings of law enforcers.Moreover, she believes that the degree of protection rendered by laborlaws also hinge on workers themselves, ‘if they are not persistent in pur-suing their own rights, nobody can help them’. A similar comment is madeby Qing Fa (sect. 3.2). This reflects that some workers tend to attribute thefailure of workers’ rights-defense to inadequate personal qualities, i.e.,insufficient persistence and determination rather than a failure of the laborlaw system.

4 SUMMARY DISCUSSION: DOUBLE LEGAL HEGEMONY

In this chapter, I put forward a typology to illustrate Chinese workersusceptibility to legal hegemony during the party-state’s hegemonictransformation from engineering the country’s passive revolution toestablishing capitalist ethico-political leadership. Workers are classified intoaffirmative, indifferent, ambivalent, critical, and radical modes according tothree criteria: (a) their level of legal knowledge and motivation to acquirelegal information, (b) the degree of their acceptance or rejection of the

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labor law system, including official legal discourses and legal practices, and(c) justification of legal defects, including whether they result from per-sonal misconduct or structural asymmetry. The affirmative workers, aselucidated in this chapter, grant their active consent to legal hegemony,positively accepting the values and ideas disseminated through the laborlaw system. The indifferent, ambivalent, and critical workers, as will beillustrated in Chap. 5, have conferred passive consent to legal hegemony,either showing resignation to the status quo, or criticizing thesocio-political, legal, and economic system within the capitalist-legalframework. The radical workers, as will be elaborated on in Chap. 6,have rendered no consent to legal hegemony, actively challenging theworldviews reproduced by the labor law system.

Thus far, I have expounded on how the affirmative workers perceivelabor laws, and their relations with the state and market economy. All theinformants in this chapter endorse economic reform and development inChina, believing that it has brought them material enjoyment and jobopportunities, though at the same time, they complain about high infla-tion, low wages‚ and uneven social development. Some regard theirwell-being as closely connected to the success of the wealthy class becausethe latter has become rich and is able to hire them. Some even approve ofthe capitalist appropriation of surplus value and maximization of profits. Inthe following, I summarize the mechanisms through which the labor lawsystem exercises double hegemonic effects on state–capital–labor relations,thereby simultaneously buffering the capitalist economy and party-state fromsystemic challenges from workers.38

4.1 Labor Laws Buffer the Capitalist Economy

The labor law system has buttressed the capitalist economy against fun-damental challenges from affirmative workers to the capitalist operationallogics through two mechanisms: a normalizing mechanism and counter-vailing mechanism.

First, some affirmative workers (such as Xiao Mei, Ah Wen and Cai Lin)see labor laws as having taken on their own life, rather than as shaped bythe ruling bloc. For them, laws are reified, authoritative and legitimatebarometers for measuring employers’ actions—if employers conform tolabor laws, then they have not committed any wrongdoing, and thus,should not be reproved for paying workers meager wages. This


normalizing mechanism hinders workers from discerning that labor lawsare skewed towards the dominant class, and makes laws seem incontro-vertible. This mechanism is so strongly in operation that some workersdeem actions beyond legal channels as out of the question.

Burawoy (1979) argues that collective bargaining and the hegemoniclabor regime in factories in the USA obscure the process of surplus valueextraction in the workplace. Post-Mao China, however, is different fromthe Western context within which Burawoy conducted his study. Whilecollective bargaining is poorly implemented in China (Chan and Hui2014), and the Chinese labor regime is largely despotic rather thanhegemonic (Lee 1995, 1999) (especially in low-end industries), theChinese labor law system is playing a more crucial role in veiling surplusvalue appropriation by normalizing wage-labor relations built uponunequal exchange between capitalists and workers, and upon‘market-oriented, voluntaristic and individualistic’ labor contracts(Friedman and Lee 2010, 509). The labor law system permits surplus valueextraction from labor and regulates employer only under this precondition.It strengthens and reproduces capitalist hegemony by normalizingwage-labor relations, values, and practices that are conducive to capitalistaccumulation. Due to the authoritative and reified appeal of labor laws,some workers readily measure their employers through the lens of thesebiased laws, thereby accepting the worldviews that they reproduce.

In addition to its normalizing mechanism, the labor law system but-tresses the market economy with a countervailing mechanism. Althoughmany workers have encountered unfair treatment at work, the labor lawsystem, to a certain extent, provides them a channel for redressing grie-vances; this has convinced some workers that the socio-economic system isnot completely inequitable (for example Qiang Lai). Due to this coun-tervailing mechanism, some informants (such as Cai Lin, Qiang Lai, QingFa) attribute workers’ plight to individually inadequate personal qualities,such as poor education and lack of persistence in rights-assertion ratherthan to the market economy. Put simply, the labor law system counteractssome adverse impacts imposed by capitalism on workers. The affirmativeworkers express appreciation for the labor law system, through which theybelieve they can resolve disputes with their employers. For them, labor lawsare a tool to curb misbehavior within the economic arena rather than ajuridico-political apparatus for normalizing wage-labor relations and sus-taining capital accumulation, as explained in Chap. 3. They regard the

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labor law system as standing apart from the economic, rather than being(partly) subsumed under the economic.

Poulantzas’s concept of relative autonomy of laws (see Chap. 3) canhelp us comprehend the apparent separation between laws and the eco-nomic, as well as the countervailing mechanism of the Chinese labor lawsystem. The protections offered by labor laws, however limited, are reallegal constraints imposed on businesses and are antithetical to theshort-term interests of individual capitalists. This is why many enterprisesand business associations fiercely opposed the legislation of the LabourContract Law and other labor regulations (Gallagher and Dong 2011).The affirmative workers, therefore, have come to believe that labor laws areable to rein back employers’ misdeeds in the economic sphere, while inreality labor laws are only relatively autonomous from the capitalist classbecause the juridico-political structures in reform China have been laiddown to propel capital accumulation and perpetuate the long-term dom-inance of the capitalist class (see Chap. 3).

4.2 Labor Laws Buffer the Party-State

The labor law system does not only deflect workers’ criticism away fromthe capitalist economy; it also buttresses the party-state from the criticismof reproducing capitalist class superiority. In Western society, parliamentarydemocracy and the division of governmental power help secure the consentof the subordinate class to government (Hobsbawm 1977; Merrington1968). While parliamentary democracy is absent in China, the labor lawsystem has, to a large extent, performed this function. The fact that laborlaws have endowed a certain degree of protection to workers, such asminimum wage, overtime compensation, rest days, social insurance, laborcontracts‚ and so forth have convinced some workers (such as Qiang Lai)that the party-state is on the side of workers and not favoring businessinterests. With this concealing mechanism, the labor law system hassomehow covered up the party-state’s bias towards the capitalist class,bestowing upon it an outlook of autonomy from capitalists. This mecha-nism induces some workers (such as Qiang Lai, Cai Lin, Qian Fa) toattribute workers’ plight to individually inadequate psychological or per-sonal qualities, rather than to the party-state or the failing labor law system.In brief, the availability of legal vehicles has masked some workers fromrecognizing the state’s support to the capitalist economy.


The pro-labor perception of the party-state held by some affirmativeworkers and the concealing mechanism of the labor law system have to beunderstood in reference to Chinese state socialist history. Althoughsocialist ideology has significantly declined in reform China, the impressionthat the party-state safeguards worker interests lingers. As mentioned inChap. 3, the Chinese state still occasionally declares itself to be protectingworkers’ well-being; and the actual promulgation of some legal protectionsfor workers has resonated with the lingering socialist image of the state,inducing some workers to believe that the state, as a whole, stands apartfrom business. In other words, in some workers’ eyes, the labor law systemis proof that the Chinese party-state is autonomous from the capitalists,while in reality this is only a relative autonomy of the Chinese state, as itsattempt to restrain businesses with labor laws has, indeed, contributed tothe long-term domination of the capitalist class through eliciting workeracquiescence to its leadership.

Moreover, the labor law system buffers the party-state through thetransmuting mechanism. The decentralized politics in post-Mao China hasalso created the pro-labor perception of the central party-state, transmutingworker discontent from targeting the party-state as a whole to honing in onlocal governments or individual officials. Having delegated the mission ofeconomic accumulation to local governments, the central government ismore concerned with political legitimacy, and thus, appears to be impartialwith regard to capital–labor relations, if not labor-friendly. In terms ofrhetoric, it always holds high the banner of the rule of law. For example,almost every year the State Council work-report highlights that theparty-state has adopted the rule of law and rules the country according tolaws. The rule of law is one of the twelve core socialist values promoted bythe Xi-Li government.39 The Decision of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of China on Some Major Issues ConcerningComprehensively Deepening the Reform adopted in 2013, an importantCCP document guiding the next stage of China’s economic reform, hasvowed to continue upholding the rule of law.40

In terms of laws and policies, the Hu-Wen government promulgated theLabour Contract Law, the Law on Labor-Dispute Mediation andArbitration, and the Social Insurance Law, which are conceived to beprotection for workers. Under the Xi-Li government, one of the emphasesmade by the 18th CCP Congress was raising average income and deep-ening reform for an income redistribution mechanism.41 Also, in 2013, theState Council released the Opinion on Deepening the Reform of Income

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Distribution Mechanisms to all local governments and agencies.42 All ofthese, among other things, have created the impression that the centralgovernment is not inclined towards capitalists. Due to the perceivedautonomy of the central party-state from businesses, and its apparentattempt to constrain the latter with laws, many workers regard governmentcorruption and its bias towards enterprises as a result of immoral acts ofindividual cadres or problems of idiosyncratic local governments, ratherthan originating from systemic collusions between the party-state and thewealthy class. This transmuting mechanism has shifted the target ofworkers’ criticism from the economic and political system to individuals, orfrom the party-state as a whole to local governments (see Ah Rong, CaiLin, Zhi Hui, Ah Wen, Qing Fa). It should be noted that the transmutingmechanism of the labor law system echoes and capitalizes on the culturalperception of the Chinese state as a protector of the people and as a benignruler (Wong 2011). As Lee (2007, 28) underscores, workers hold ‘ahierarchical political imagination—the central state is the source ofomnipotent power and paternal authority from which flows protection forworkers’. And Perry (2008, 45) highlights that many protests in China seekto remove unpopular government officials from lower levels rather thanchallenging the CCP’s authority or its ruling ideology.

4.3 Interplay Between Worker Subjective Experiencesand the Hegemonic Effects of Laws

It should be highlighted that worker susceptibility to legal hegemony is notsolely a result of the above-explained constitutive mechanisms embeddedin the labor law system. It is also shaped by the lives and work exposure ofworkers as well as other subjective experiences. First, workers who havepositive work experiences (usually in more advanced industries that offeremployment conditions above legal standards) and have never encounteredlabor disputes are more easily subject to legal hegemony. It is because theofficial legal discourses have not contradicted their work experience. Also,no concrete work exposure has ever triggered their reflection on the officialrepresentation of the labor law system.

Second, workers who have lived through the period wherein no or fewlabor laws existed tend to appreciate the labor law system. It is because theywere exposed to poorly regulated working conditions, and thus, stronglyfeel the improvements brought about by the labor laws. For them, animperfect labor law system is better than having no laws at all. As


underscored in Chap. 2, capitalist hegemony is built upon concessions tothe subordinate class. The affirmative workers confer their consent tolegally mediated hegemony because of the legal concessions given to them,which in turn brings them a minimal degree of economic concessions.Prior to enactment of the labor laws, workers’ wages and benefits werepurely determined by market forces. Although the labor laws cannot fullyeradicate the race-to-the-bottom practices in the labor market, they set theminimum standards pertinent to wages, working hours, overtime paymentand so forth, with which employers need to comply.

Third, for workers who have encountered individual labor disputes,their exposure in the process of legal mobilization has shaped their vul-nerability to legal hegemony. Those workers who manage to win, orpartially win, a dispute tend to deem the labor law system fair and just.Their active consent given to the labor law system is, indeed, closely relatedto their successful legal rights-defense; without these positive legal expe-riences, many of them would have become critical or radical in relation tothe system, as will be illustrated in the coming two chapters. Graph 3

Graph 3 Analysis of cases accepted by arbitration committees, 1996–2008.Source http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/statistics/disputes/Results_of_cases_accepted_by_arbitration_committees_1996-2008.pdf, accessed on 1stJuly 2014

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http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/statistics/disputes/Results_of_cases_accepted_by_arbitration_committees_1996-2008.pdf

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/statistics/disputes/Results_of_cases_accepted_by_arbitration_committees_1996-2008.pdf

displays the results of arbitration cases from 1996 to 2008; the number ofcases won by workers and partially won by both employers and workersexceedingly outnumber those won by employers. Friedman and Lee(2010) find that about 50–80% of worker grievances can be addressedthrough arbitration. Chen and Tang underscore that there is a high successrate for worker cases in courts (2013). To reiterate, legal hegemony is notsimply a matter of ideological influence; it is grounded upon concrete legalconcessions granted to individual workers. For the labor law system toexercise hegemonic effects, it must, to a certain extent, be able to addressworker grievances favorably.

Fourth, for workers who have experienced collective labor disputes, it isoften workers’ collectivity and solidarity rather than labor laws (as in thecase of some workers who underwent individual disputes) that emboldensthem to take action to defend their interests. They somehow transcended,at least during the course of their collective actions, the normalizingmechanism of legal hegemony to question the minimum standards set bylabor laws, such as minimum wages. However, they still hold an affirmativeattitude towards the labor law system because subsequent to the disruptiveconjuncture, i.e., strikes or other collective actions, the companies or thestate utilize labor laws to pacify them. For example, in Liu Chi’s case, hisfactory organized ‘democratic’ trade union elections and collective wagenegotiations in accordance with various labor laws after the waves of laborstrikes in 2010. His consent to legal hegemony is based on a comparisonbetween the period wherein his factory unilaterally fixed workers’ wagesand the period wherein it conducts wage negotiations with worker repre-sentatives and ‘democratic’ elections according to laws.

In brief, I have captured the interplay between the hegemonic mecha-nisms of the labor law system and the subjective experiences of workers inshaping the latter’s vulnerability towards legal hegemony. However, ashighlighted at the beginning of this chapter, not all workers are susceptibleto legal hegemony; the indifferent, ambivalent, critical, and radical workershave rendered passive or no consent to it. This implies that legal hegemonyin China is neither sturdy nor stable and contains fragile elements; someworkers are able to transgress legal hegemony, as will be elucidated in thecoming two chapters.


NOTES

1. This, however, does not mean that the party-state is a unitary actor orwithout any internal conflicts. In fact, some studies point out that thefactions within CCP held different attitudes towards the economic reform,resulting in internal power conflicts and fluctuating state policies during the1980s. For example, Deng Xiaoping strongly pushed for the reform whileChen Yun and Li Xiangnian were not enthusiastic. Since the mid 1990s,however, the party-state has become less fragmented and economic reformhas become a more accepted goal within the CCP (Naughton 2008).

2. http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohzcfgs/s6525/200804/18397.shtml,accessed on 3rd April 2013. My own emphasis.

3. http://www.xchen.com.cn/jihua/sifagongzuojihua/624539.html, acces-sed on 3rd April 2013.

4. Interview Q7.5. Still, Zhi Hui’s salaries are much lower than the 5313 yuan monthly

average wage of Guangzhou.6. See for example, http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/

20140213/18624150, accessed on 28th March 2014.7. http://news.now.com/home/international/player?newsId=90473,

accessed on 28th March 2014.8. Interview Q6.9. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/

IW3P/IB/2013/06/13/000158349_20130613150441/Rendered/PDF/WPS6482.pdf, accessed on 28th March 2014.

10. See graph 1 in sect. 3.3.11. Interview Q9.12. Interview Q10.13. See graph 2 in sect. 3.3.14. Interview Q9.15. Interview Q316. Interview Q1.17. http://news.now.com/home/international/player?newsId=43102,

accessed on 2nd July 2014.18. http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/international/art/20120828/18001946

, accessed on 1st July 2014.19. Interview Q220. Interview Q14.21. Interview Q12.22. Article 2, the Law on Administrative Reconsideration stipulates that citi-

zens can “apply to administrative organs for administrative reconsideration

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http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohzcfgs/s6525/200804/18397.shtml

http://www.xchen.com.cn/jihua/sifagongzuojihua/624539.html

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/20140213/18624150

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/20140213/18624150


http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2013/06/13/000158349_20130613150441/Rendered/PDF/WPS6482.pdf




http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/international/art/20120828/18001946

when they consider that certain specific administrative acts infringe upontheir lawful rights or interests”.

23. Interview Q15.24. Interview Q18.25. Interview Q14.26. Interview Q18.27. Interview Q19.28. http://column.global-labour-university.org/2011/01/trade-unions-and-

worker-struggles-in.html, accessed on 12th December 2011.29. Some studies, however, show that these elections are not completely direct

or democratic (Hui and Chan 2015).30. Interview Q21, S11, R18, S9, S10, G1.31. http://gonghui.luogang.gov.cn/gz33cmsweb/CMShtml/xwzx/xwzw_

gzdt/2011-8/1/09_25_33_961.html, accessed on 30th March 2014.32. Interview S15 and S11.33. Interview S14.34. Interview Q20.35. For example, the minimum wage rate in Shanghai in 2012 was only 31% of

the city’s average wage while in Beijing and Chongqing in 2011, they were,respectively, 25% and 26% of the city’s average wage. For detail, see http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china, accessed on 10th July 2014.

36. For example, policies that abolished the agricultural tax and providedagricultural subsidies to farmers.

37. Interview S4.38. The term “double hegemony” is inspired by Scherrer (2001), who argues

that US hegemony exerted in the world market is interlinked with hege-mony of the corporate internationalists within the country.

39. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/25/c_126190257.htm, accessed on 2nd April 2014.

40. http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494_9.htm, accessed on 1st April 2014.

41. http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/jjggyfz/201311/t20131111_289477.htm,accessed on 1st April 2014.

42. http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130205/201514511683.shtml,accessed on 1st April 2014.




http://gonghui.luogang.gov.cn/gz33cmsweb/CMShtml/xwzx/xwzw_gzdt/2011-8/1/09_25_33_961.html

http://gonghui.luogang.gov.cn/gz33cmsweb/CMShtml/xwzx/xwzw_gzdt/2011-8/1/09_25_33_961.html



http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/25/c_126190257.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/25/c_126190257.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494_9.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494_9.htm

http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/jjggyfz/201311/t20131111_289477.htm

http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130205/201514511683.shtml

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Exner, Mechthild. 1995. The Convergence of Ideology and the Law: TheFunctions of the Legal Education Campaign in Building a Chinese LegalSystem. Issues and Studies 31 (8): 68–102.

Femia, Joseph V. 1975. Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of AntonioGramsci. Political Studies 23 (1): 29–48.



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Gallagher, Mary E. 2004. Time is Money, Efficiency is Life: The Transformation ofLabor Relations in China. Studies in Comparative International Development 39(2): 11–44.

Gallagher, Mary E. 2006. Mobilizing the law in China: ‘‘informed disenchant-ment’’ and the development of legal consciousness. Law & Society Review 40(4): 783–816.

Gallagher, Mary E. 2007. Hope for Protection and Hopeless Choices: LabourLegal Aid in the PRC. In Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China,ed. Elizabeth J. Perry, and Merle Goldman. London: Harvard University Press.

Gallagher, Mary E., and Baohua Dong. 2011. Legislating Harmony: Labor LawReform in Contemporary China. In From Iron Rice Bowl to InformalizationMarkets, Workers, and the State in a Changing China, ed. Sarosh Kuruvilla,Ching Kwan Lee, and Mary E. Gallagher. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

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He, Xin, and Su Yang. 2010. Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of LaborProtest in South China. Law and Society Review 44 (1): 157–184.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1977. Gramsci and Political Theory. MARXISM TODAY, July.Hui, Sio-Ieng Elaine. 2011. Understanding Labour Activism in the Chinese

Automotive Industry—The Case of Honda Workers’ Strike. In China’s LaborQuestion, ed. Christoph Scherrer. Mering: Rainer Hampp Verlag.

Hui, Sio-Ieng Elaine, and King-Chi Chris Chan. 2015. Going beyond theUnion-Centred Approach: A Critical Evaluation of Recent Trade UnionElections in China. British Journal of Industrial Relations.

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Kuruvilla, S., C.K. Lee, and M.E. Gallagher. 2011. From Iron Rice Bowl toInformalization: Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing China. Ithaca,NY: ILR Press.

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Lee, Ching Kwan. 2002. From the Specter of Mao to the Spirit of the Law: LaborInsurgency in China. Theory and Society 31: 189–228.


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Peerenboom, Randall P. 2002. China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.

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Foreign Economic Policymaking. Amerikastudien/American Studies 46 (4):573–591.


Smith, Ted, David Allan Sonnenfeld, and David N. Pellow. 2006. Challenging theChip: Labor Rights and Environmental Justice in the Global Electronics Industry.Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

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CHAPTER 5

Workers’ Passive Consent

1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I have constructed a typology of Chinese migrantworker susceptibility towards legal hegemony and elucidated four mecha-nisms through which the labor law system exercises a double hegemoniceffect to buttress both the party-state and capitalist economy. In addition, Ihave elaborated on in what ways affirmative workers grant their activeconsent to legal hegemony and readily embrace capitalist values. In thischapter, I focus on the indifferent, ambivalent, and critical workers, all ofwhich render passive consent to legal hegemony, either being partiallyassimilated to capitalist worldviews or exhibiting signs of submissiveness.

2 INDIFFERENT WORKERS

Indifferent workers are those who found labor laws irrelevant to them,caring little about legal regulations or whether their employers violate laborlaws or not. They are usually unmotivated to gain legal knowledge; all ofthem have not encountered any disputes. They neither actively endorsecapitalist values, nor do they demonstrate any criticism towards the legal,political, and economic systems. They instead, reveal a strong sense ofpassivity and apathy, believing that the socio-political and economic statusquo cannot be changed.


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Ah Qing is a 36-year old female worker.1 Coming from Hunan pro-vince, she now works in a Taiwanese-invested shoe factory, one of thedeclining industries in Shenzhen. In Shenzhen and some parts of thecoastal area, factory relocation has become commonplace due to theGuangdong provincial government’s plans for an industrial upgrade.2

According to a retired provincial trade unionist, the Shenzhen governmentintends to relocate 15 thousands firms from the city within 5 years in orderto make space for the development of high-value industries.3 Since theeconomic reforms in 1978, Shenzhen and the PRD have been manufac-turing hubs for labor intensive, low-end, export-oriented industries, butnow, the Guangdong government is attempting to direct these industriesto the second tier cities in the province or to other inland provinces so as totransform the first-tier city economy into one concentrated on high-valueproduction, and the financial and service industries. To achieve this goal,the government has reduced tax breaks and land privileges to low-endfactories, disallowed factories that did not meet legal environmental stan-dards to stay in cities and so forth.4 As a result, many factories in Shenzhenare facing relocation, which has consequently triggered a growing numberof strikes to demand compensation and back pay of benefits.5

Working in a shrinking industry, Ah Qing does not earn much. Hermonthly basic salary is the same as Shenzhen’s legal minimum wage, whichis 1500 yuan at the time of the interview. She has to work much overtimein order to gain a monthly gross income of around 3000 yuan, which is stillfar lower than the average wages in Shenzhen in 2012 (4918 yuan). I metAh Qing when joining a labor NGO outreach activities in an industrialarea. She pays no attention to labor laws as she deems it unnecessary, ‘Mysalary is ok. It’s higher than what I earned back home. I would just quit myjob if there are any problems with the factory.’ During our conversation, Ifound out that Ah Qing’s employer has not paid her the overtime premiumaccording to labor laws; the overtime compensation she receives is simplythe same as the straight piece-rate wages, rather than 1.5–3 times thepiece-rate as required by the 1995 Labour Law. Ah Qing is unaware of thislegal regulation, which is common knowledge among many, if not most,workers. Her initial response to my legal advice was objection, insistingthat she was not entitled to 1.5–3 times overtime compensation as she wasa piece-rate worker, not a hourly-rate worker. I then gave her a bookletproduced by the NGO, which explained the labor laws on overtime work.I encouraged her to take a look at it or to consult the labor bureau, hintingthat she could file a complaint for it. Later she became uncertain with her

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original view and revealed greater interest in what labor laws stipulate, butshe still reiterated several times that she would just quit her job and returnto the rural village if the factory work became problematic.

Building upon Hirschman’s insights (1970), Freeman suggests thatworkers have the option of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ if there are gaps between theactual and expected outcomes concerning their jobs (Freeman 1976; Allen1984). It is obvious that Ah Qing tends to choose ‘exit’ if ‘silence’ is nolonger an optimal strategy for her. She does not care about labor laws andher manager’s illegal action because she considers her monthly gross salaryacceptable when compared to the meager income she earned in herhometown. She thinks that she can escape from unpleasant situations atwork by exercising her ‘freedom’ to exit the factory. As explicated inChap. 3, the legal system has turned workers from class agents intojuridico-political individuals whom are thought to be on an equal footingwith employers. Affected by this constitutive effect of the labor contractsystem, Ah Qing believes that she is ‘free’ to end the labor contract withher boss whenever she likes.

Ah Qing’s indifference to labor laws can be explained by age-, gender-‚and education-related factors, all of which have created a feeling ofimpotence for her and a sense of alienation from urban lives. She is a typicalfirst-generation female migrant worker (see Pun and Lu 2010), born in the70s and deemed old for factory jobs when compared to post-80s andpost-90s workers6; she only has primary schooling while second-generationmigrant workers have usually graduated from junior secondary schools orvocational schools; she bears heavy familial responsibilities as she has fivedependents, including three children at home, whereas second-generationmigrant workers are usually unmarried and free from this kind of burden;she views her employment and life in the city as transitory and considers herhome village to be where she will stay in the long term while youngmigrant workers aspire to urban lives. Due to her weak marketplace power(Silver 2003) and detachment from cities, Ah Qing regards the undesirableand illegal work environment she faces as tolerable and transitory.Therefore, she is unmotivated to change it. She also deems laws, whichcould be a means of pursuing a change, to be irrelevant to her.

A Ying shows similar apathy towards labor laws.7 I came to know herwhen I paid a visit to workers in their dormitories in Shenzhen. We talkedfor an hour in her room shared with three other workers. Ah Ying is34 years old and has completed primary school. Her husband and her

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2-year-old daughter live in her hometown in Hunan. She started to work inurban cities in 2004, but on and off, she has gone back home and helpedher father with farming. She now has a job in an electronics factory thatproduces watch components for a famous Japanese brand. As mentioned inChap. 4, electronics production is one of the key export-oriented industriesin China, yet its employment conditions are quite terrible. Wages belowthe legal standards, long working hours, no rest days, and despotic man-agement are all commonly practiced in electronics factories (Xue 2008).This has, therefore, provoked many labor strikes in the past decade. Tryingto stabilize the working force, some big or strike-prone firms offer workersbetter pay and benefits. This is why Ah Ying, working in a large-scaleelectronics factory, earns 1700 yuan a month, which is 200 yuan higherthan the Shenzhen minimum wage.

While talking to me, Ah Ying was stitching a piece of embroidery at thesame time. She proudly explained to me that she would use it to decorateher home in Hunan. Like Ah Qing, she has no plan to settle down in thecities; she mentions to me a few times that she may quit her job and returnhome before the Lunar New Year. When I asked for her opinions on laborlaws, she responds, ‘I don’t know much about laws. I have neverencountered any labor disputes; labor laws are not useful to me. I don’tknow whether they are good or not.’ She adds, ‘What can I do if there areproblems with the factory? I think I could simply leave the factory.’ Talkingabout the economy and the party-state, she reveals a sense of passivity,noting, ‘Economic development is not so much related to me and thegovernment is far away from me. I cannot do anything even if I am dis-contented, right? If I am unhappy with my life in the city, I better go backhome’.

On the surface, ‘exit’ seems to be Ah Ying and Ah Qing’s personalpreferences. However, their choices are indeed made under the constraintsimposed by socio-economic structures. Migrant workers are facing iniq-uitous social treatment; it is only after 2002 that the party-state recognizesthem as a part of the working class, and thus, deserving some protectionand basic civil rights (Wong 2011). The household registration system andother labor and social policies have contributed to the spatial separation ofproduction in urban cities and reproduction in rural areas (Pun and Lu2010). Migrant workers like Ah Qing and Ah Ying are encouraged to selltheir labor power in cities under poorly regulated conditions, but they are

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denied proper social benefits that urban citizens enjoy. The party-state hasattempted to reform the household registration system and provide bettersocial welfare protection to migrant workers, as reflected by the 2003Suggestion for Advancing the Reform of the Hukou AdministrationSystem in Small Cities and Towns issued by the State Council, the 2006Certain Opinions of the State Council on Solving the Problems of PeasantWorkers, the 2014 Opinion on Further Reform of the HouseholdRegistration System issued by the Political Bureau of the CCP8; but mi-grant workers still receive unequal social treatment concerning medicalcare, housing, their children’s education‚ and so forth. Discriminatorysocial and welfare policies plus poor wages mean that migrant workers andtheir family cannot live decently in cities; but at home, prices are moreaffordable and they still own a piece of land from which they can derivesubsistence. The labor and social policies have forced Ah Qing and Ah Yingto consider their life in cities as transitory. Therefore appalling workingconditions and/or illegal practices of employers do not seem to be a seriousconcern for them as long as their employers pay them the promised wageson time. For indifferent workers, labor laws are irrelevant to them; theyhave neither actively embraced the values reproduced by the labor lawsystem, nor have they formulated any doubts over it. However, they arepassively assimilated into some of the ideas of the dominant class, such ascontractual equality. They exhibit a sense of submissiveness and apathytowards the socio-political and economic status quo, believing that itcannot be altered or challenged. In other words, they render passiveconsent to legal hegemony.

3 CRITICAL WORKERS

The critical workers have also conferred passive consent to legal hegemony,but in different ways from the indifferent workers. Although many of themreveal an air of resignation to the status quo, they do not deem the laborlaw system irrelevant to them and demonstrate a certain level of criticism ofit. However, their disapprovals are framed along the lines of the dominantideologies as they have not yet developed an alternative worldview thatallows them to formulate discontent ‘manifest in the activity uniting them“in the practical transformation of reality’’’ (Femia 1975, 33).


3.1 Workers Without Labor Disputes Experiences

Zhang Lin is a production worker in an electronics factory.9 After finishingthe vocational secondary school three and a half years ago, she left herhome in Henan to work in Shenzhen. She is 21 years old and earns lessthan 3000 yuan per month. The first factory where she worked did not payher overtime compensation according to labor laws, but she did not bringup the issue with her managers or the Labour Bureau.

Researcher: Did you demand the managers to pay you the legal overtimepremium?

Zhang Lin: Talk to them? Many people in that factory have worked likethis for years. Would it make any changes for a newcomer likeme to rebel?

Researcher: So you did not bring this issue up to the boss?Zhang Lin: Society is like that. If you think it’s fine to work in this factory,

stay here; otherwise, just leave. What bargaining power do Ihave? When the enterprise offers you a contract, you can sign itor turn it down if you don’t like the terms. How can I talk tothem about it now (after signing the contract)?

Researcher: Do labour laws protect workers or employers?Zhang Lin: Laws…I think they are of little use to us.Researcher: Why?Zhang Lin: Although there exist certain legal stipulations, employers can

make use of their guanxi [connections with governmentofficials] to avoid the laws. They own the factories; what theysay must be followed. If you think the working conditions areunacceptable, you can leave the factory.

Me: Is it better to have labour laws or not?Zhang Lin: Of course it is better to have labour laws. They certainly offer

us some degree of protection, but they are not comprehensiveenough.

Shaped by the labor contract system, Zhang Lin believes that workersare ‘free’ to enter into labor contracts with employers and ‘free’ to end thecontracts [‘If you think it is fine to work in this factory, stay here; other-wise, just leave it…When the enterprise offers you a contract, you can signit, or turn it down if you don’t like the terms’]. In the end, she exercisedher abstract and formal ‘freedom’ to quit this problematic factory afterhaving worked there for 6 months. As explained in Chap. 4, workers’ life

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and work experiences shape their attitude towards the labor law system.Due to that unfair experience where her employer took advantage of herillegally, Zhang Lin has developed a critical attitude towards labor laws,which she regards as offering limited protection to workers. In contrast,Zhi Hui (Chap. 4, Sect. 3.1) takes labor laws as just and fair because he hasnot suffered from any illegal treatment afflicted by his employer.

Zhang Lin attributes the weak legal protection for workers to guanxipolitics in China, i.e., the politics associated with the interwoven personalconnections among government officials and corporations. As explicated inChap. 4, local governments are responsible for economic accumulation,and thus, have cultivated close relations with enterprises and the rich(Pearson 1997). The businesses bring investment and economic growth tothe locality, while local governments offer them formal privileges, such astax breaks, cheap land and informal benefits, including lax implementationof labor laws. Some local governments have even turned themselves into‘entrepreneurial states’ as they are directly involved in running businesses(Blecher and Shue 1996). The strong connections between local govern-ments and businesses often result in corruption (Wedeman 2005).A human resources manager from a domestic firm in Shenzhen notes to methat ‘cadres and businesses always shelter each other when one of them getinto trouble…they always do things in the black box. In the least devel-oped areas in China, it is easier to cover things up…’.10 This remark reflectswhat some scholars call ‘network capitalism’ (McNally 2008), or the‘guanxi capitalism’ (Yang 2002; McNally 2011) in China. Zhang Linregards the shortcomings of the labor law system as being rooted in theintricate connection between local governments and businesses.

Chen Fei is a 23-year old male production worker.11 From 2008 to2011, he worked in a large state-owned electronics factory in Zhuhai. Histeam leader would deduct 50 yuan from the wages of workers that did notagree to work overtime, and workers had to have lunch while working onthe assembly line. Some of his colleagues brought these issues to theattention of a higher-level manager. Later in a meeting, the team leaderthreatened them not to make any trouble and warned them to ‘watch out’.Chen Fei’s colleagues then complained about these issues to the LaborBureau, which, did not respond. Chen Fei was frustrated by the experienceof his colleagues, feeling that lodging complaints was useless and that laborlaws could barely safeguard worker interests. He, therefore, bore in silencethe team leader’s illegal treatment for 3 years. In 2012, when he wasinformed of a job opportunity in a foreign-owned factory in Guangzhou, it


took him less than a few minutes to decide to travel immediately fromZhuhai to Guangzhou for an interview. He passed the interview and hasbeen working in that factory since then.

Chen Fei comments that the Chinese labor laws are good enough onpaper, but the problem lies in their weak implementation. He says thatmany government officials do not enforce the laws strictly and are actingwith ‘one eye closed, one eye open’ towards the legal violations of factories;therefore, ‘laws have been turned into a blank sheet of paper’. His remarkechoes the findings of current studies on the lax implementation of laborlaws (Gallagher 2004, 23; Wang et al. 2009, 486; Lubman 1999). Whenasked about the reasons for poor legal enforcement, he replied, ‘Guanxiplays an important role in China, and everything is about guanxi.’ Ourfurther conversation on this topic revealed the following:

Researcher: Have you heard about yifa weiquan [legal rights defense]?Chen Fei: Um…weiquan [rights-defense]…like in my previous factory,

what was the result of workers’ rights-defense? The LaborBureau didn’t respond to us or take any action. We don’thave confidence in them.

Researcher: How does one solve this problem? What should thegovernment do?

Chen Fei: How can I put this …China is corrupted from outside toinside, and it’s hard to change it. China is big; it’ll take a longtime to change it. I’m not sure if we will witness the changebefore our death.

Researcher: Is it a problem of the government being biased towardsemployers or that of individual irresponsible governmentofficials?

Chen Fei: Probably individuals, many individuals. At the grassrootslevel, the relations between government cadres and busi-nesses are well established; and so are they at the higherlevels, too. Anyways, many individuals contribute to thisproblem.

Compared to the affirmative informants who have encountered no labordisputes in Chap. 4, Chen Fei is more critical towards the labor law systemand the state. The affirmative interviewees (such as Xiao Mei and QiangLai) take labor laws as fair and just, but Chen Fei points to discrepanciesbetween the laws on paper versus the laws in reality. Some affirmative

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informants display positive sentiments towards the state (such as Xiao Mei),but Chen Fei casts serious doubts over government officials. However, itshould be highlighted that although Chen Fei does not trust the labor lawsystem, his disapproval is formulated within the boundaries set by legalhegemony. His criticism of labor laws hovers at the level of implementationrather than pinpointing the unbalanced power relations embedded into thelaws and the law-making process. His skepticism towards the state remainsat the level of individual government officials rather than targeting thestate, as a whole, in supporting the wealthy class. For him, labor laws onpaper are protective of workers; it is only the fault of individual governmentcadres that cause workers to suffer from weak legal implementation. Theexistence of the theoretically protective labor laws buffers the state, as awhole, against the criticism of leaning towards the privileged class (i.e., theconcealing mechanism of labor laws); and, hence, individual cadres at thelocal level serve as scapegoats for the systemic failure of thejuridico-political system in safeguarding workers (i.e., the transmutingmechanism). In brief, the party-state en bloc or the central government issomehow legitimized in the eyes of Chen Fei due to the hegemonic effectsof the labor law system.


In his mid-forties now, Shu Ren first came from Henan to work in thecities in 1989.12 He is now working at a Taiwanese furniture factory inDongguan. When we were talking about economic development, Shu Renhighlighted the huge wealth gap in China, ‘The rich and the poor work thesame number of hours and put in the same amount of labor, but theirincomes are not comparable.’13 Also, he criticizes the household registra-tion system, which in his opinion has restrained migrant workers fromobtaining the same social welfare that urban citizens get, for exacerbatingsocial disparity.

In 2008, Shu Ren’s left eyeball was hurt in an occupational accident.When he was hospitalized, another work injury victim gave him a laborNGO-produced booklet on labor laws connected to occupational healthand safety. He considered this booklet ‘a treasure’ for it contained usefulinformation on how work-accident victims can pursue their legal rights.Later, he called the NGO’s hotline enquiring about questions such aswhether his employer was responsible for paying him wages during his


recuperation, if yes, how much it should be, etc. Following this, he met theNGO staff and found out even more about his legal rights.

Shu Ren always watches TV news and a TV program called ‘walkingtogether with laws’ (yufa tongxing); he already had a rough idea of whatlabor laws were prior to his work injury. However, when he needed toapply the labor laws to his own case, he was uncertain about what heshould do exactly; he thus, sought help from the NGO. After beingreleased from the hospital, he attended the classes on labor laws organizedby the NGO and became an active participant; he has, thus, become morelegally knowledgeable. Similar to Ah Rong and Ah Wen in Chap. 4(Sect. 3.2), Shu Ren has an affirmative appraisal of the NGO due to itsintense support to him. Despite the fact that local trade unions werealleged to provide greater legal assistance, consultation, and representationto workers (Chen 2004), he was unaware of the existence ofenterprise-level or higher-level trade unions at the time; therefore, he didnot approach them for help. However, having learned more about themsubsequently, he reflects that ‘trade unions don’t exercise any real power;they are like decorations’.

When Shu Ren was still undergoing medical treatment, his employerurged him to conduct an assessment of work capability so that he couldreturn to work as soon as possible (see Chap. 4 for the legal procedures forhandling work accidents). His employer threatened to discontinue hismonthly salary should he refuse to do the assessment. Being well-equippedwith legal knowledge, Shu Ren talked to his employer. He recounted thesituation as the following:

I told my boss, ‘My eye still hurts. According to labor laws, I’m stillundergoing medical treatment. Why are you urging me to conduct theassessment? You said you would stop my salary if I don’t do the assessment.But our national laws stipulate clearly that work injury victims are entitled tosalaries equivalent to their average monthly pay as well as other benefits duringthe period of medical treatment. I have to remind you that I can sue you for notpaying me my due salary’ My employer responded, saying that he didn’tknow about these laws. I said, ‘No problem. I can show you some infor-mation. You can decide what to do after reading them.’ Everything that I saidto him at the time had legal grounds. If what I said were inconsistent with thelaws, he could simply ignore me, right? After reading the information I gavehim, he didn’t reply to me or discontinue my salary.

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Shu Ren demonstrates a high degree of confidence when confronting hisemployer, who used to be in a superior position in the workplace [‘I haveto remind you that I can sue you for not paying me my due salary’]. Laborlaws have emboldened him to overcome the uneven power relationsbetween himself as wage-labor and his manager so that he could reasonwith him as an equal. Although the legal system and the labor law systemhave turned workers from class agents into juridico-political subjects,blurring capitalist domination over workers, the same systems havebestowed workers with a feeling of equality in relation to their bosses.Undeniably, it is only an abstract and formal equality, but in some cir-cumstances, it gives workers courage to confront their employers.

Another illegal practice of Shu Ren’s employer is connected to thework-related injury insurance. According to the Regulation onWork-Related Injury Insurance, employers must contribute to theInsurance on the basis of the gross income of workers, which covers basicsalary, overtime pay, and other monetary benefits. However, Shu Ren’sboss only paid the Insurance according to his basic salary which amountedto 760 yuan (whereas his actual average monthly salary was around 900yuan). Due to his boss’s underpayment, the work-related injury insurancegave him a lump-sum of disability allowance on the basis of 760 yuanrather than 900 yuan. As a consequence, the allowance he received wasaround 2000 yuan less than what he was entitled to. Shu Ren brought thisissue up to his employer‚ but he did not properly respond to him. He thencomplained to the Social Security Department. The officer there asked himto apply for arbitration from the Labor Bureau, but he insisted that theSocial Security Department should rectify the matter for him. Later ahigh-ranking officer intervened; Shu Ren showed him a leaflet produced bythe Social Security Department on work injury insurance, saying to him:

The Social Insurance Laws are made by our government, not by me. Theresponsibility of the Social Security Department in regards to social insuranceis clearly written here, right? Please enact the legal regulations; it’s not good toshift your responsibility. Your subordinate asked me to apply for labor arbi-tration, but it’s unnecessary. Here is the Social Security Department, but youfail to protect me (on issues related to the work injury insurance). What I amdemanding is what has been stipulated by laws. I am not cheating you. I wouldrather not have to face such a situation. If you could cure my eye, I wouldprefer that over getting a single cent from you. I wish I could have a healthybody rather than having to get any money from you.


This high ranking officer did not give Shu Ren any immediate reply. ShuRen then went to talk to his employer again, who unexpectedly agreed topay back the insurance he owned. Shu Ren guesses that the Social SecurityDepartment had probably given his boss pressure. This incident attests tothe emboldening effect of labor laws on Shu Ren once again. He does notonly display a high level of familiarity with labor laws, but also strongconfidence and audacity in front of government officials [‘Please enact thelegal regulations; it’s not good to shift your responsibility’, ‘What I amdemanding are what have been prescribed by laws’]. He has skillfully andvigorously applied his legal knowledge to champion his rights.

This labor dispute has made Shu Ren critical of the labor law system. Hewas dismissive of the legal discourses on the rule of law and rights-defenseaccording to laws.

Researcher: Have labour laws offered enough protection to workers?Shu Ren: I think the government doesn’t care. It doesn’t know how

much value workers have created. It only sees the valuecreated by firms and doesn’t know that the value created bybusinesses are, in fact, produced by workers. If workers don’twork, enterprises wouldn’t be able to produce any value.

Researcher: Are you referring to the central government or localgovernments?

Shu Ren: I think the central government doesn’t have any problems; ithas legislated many labor laws to protect workers. The problemlies with the local governments who protect businesses toomuch.

Researcher: Can you elaborate more?Shu Ren: When workers complain about their employers providing

illegal working conditions, the most that the Labor Bureausdo is call the factories asking about what happened; it seldomconducts on-site investigations or punishes factories. In manycases, worker complaints end up nowhere (bu liaoliao zhi). TheLabor Bureaus seldom go to check if factories have signedlabor contracts with workers, if their labor contracts conformto labor regulations, etc. This so called rule of law and legalrights-defense are deceiving.

In contrast to the affirmative workers, Shu Ren is skeptical of the officiallegal discourses and renders no active consent to the labor law system [‘The

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so called rule of law and legal rights-defense are deceiving’]. He attributesthe failing labor law system to local government officials who lean towardsenterprises and turn a blind eye to worker grievances [‘it seldom conductson-site investigations or punishes the factories. In many cases, workercomplaints would end up nowhere’]. For him, the central government hasmade numerous labor laws, and thus, has accomplished its duties; it is thelocal governments that value businesses over workers and contribute toinfringement of labor rights [‘the central government doesn’t have manyproblems; it has made many labor laws to protect workers. It’s the problemof local governments’]. The transmuting mechanism of the labor law sys-tem shifts the target of his criticism from the central government, whichhas, indeed, strongly driven the capitalist economic reform, to local gov-ernment officials‚ who are the ones that do not perform their dutiessatisfactorily.

Another fact to note is the normalizing effect of laws on Shu Ren’sperception of worker resistance. Although he does not disapprove ofworker strikes or other collective actions, he tries to justify them by ref-erencing laws. He imparts:

Workers carry out strikes and other forms of disturbances only to express theirreasonable demands, which are supposed to be legally protected. Their demandsare in line with legal regulations. Occasionally, something disruptive mayhappen, but we can’t help it. The government departments fail to do theirjobs (bu daowei)—workers complain to them, but they do not take anyactions. When workers are left with no other means to solve their problems, theyare forced to take extreme actions. All workers want harmony and fairness;nobody wants to fight or argue with others.

Taking the law as the cornerstone, Shu Ren holds that the demands ofworkers are legally grounded, and thus, their extra-legal actions are justi-fied. In his opinion, labor strikes do not affect social stability. If they engagein disruptive actions that transgress laws, it is only because their legallyreasonable demands have been denied [‘The government departments failto do their job…When workers are left with no other means to solve theirproblems, they are forced to take extreme actions’]. For him, workersprefer ‘harmony’ and try to act within the legal arena, but they are ‘forced’to take extra-legal actions.


Fu Shan is in her mid-twenties and has completed vocational secondaryschool.14 She has not stayed the whole time in cities; on and off, she returnsto her home village in Guizhou as her children are being raised there. As amigrant worker, she is denied proper social welfare in cities; therefore, sheis compelled to work in urban factories to earn money but fulfill herreproductive responsibilities in the rural village. Currently, she has beenhired by a Japanese electronics factory in Shenzhen.

In 2010, she happened upon a recruitment counter set up by a dispatchcompany on the street (which is a frequent occurrence in industrial areas).After she decided to go for the job, the recruitment personnel of thedispatch company took her to the factory to sign an employment contract;then, she started to work there. Labour dispatch has become commonplacein FIEs, SOEs, or even government departments in China. It has beenestimated that there were 37 million dispatch workers in China in 2012.15

The factories for which dispatch workers generate surplus value do notestablish any employment relations with the workers, but they still exercisestrict control over the latter. Dispatch workers sign labor contracts withdispatch companies who obtain service payments from factories, retain asubstantial proportion of the payment and then pay the remaining todispatch workers as wages. Under this mode of employment, dispatchcompanies can send dispatch workers to work in any factory to which theyassign dispatch workers. Firms prefer using dispatch workers over directemployment because it reduces their costs and increases operational flexi-bility (Xu 2009). It has been reported that in some big SOE, one-third totwo-thirds of the staff are dispatch workers (Xu 2009). One of my inter-viewees estimates that dispatch workers made up three-fifths of the totalworkforce in the FIE factory he worked for.16 Despite new legal regula-tions on labor dispatch,17 this form of precarious work continues to resultin labor abuse, such as unequal pay for equal work, and thus, triggeringlabor protests.18

At the time, Fu Shan knew nothing about the labor dispatch system; thedispatch company explained nothing to her. She thought she had signed acontract with the factory, rather than with the dispatch company. Afterworking in the factory for a month, she found out her wages were belowthe city’s minimum standard, and she also did not receive any overtimecompensation. Fu Shan then talked to the factory’s manager, who revealedthat the dispatch company was her actual employer and that the factoryalready gave the company her wages, thus fulfilling its obligations. Fu Shanhad no idea how to reach the boss of the dispatch company as she was

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never given any contact information. She went to report the case to thepolice, but officers said labor disputes were not within its jurisdiction. Sheseverely criticizes the government for giving inadequate attention to labordisputes; even though workers are underpaid by employers and incurmonetary losses, the latter are not dealt with as seriously as other lawbreakers simply because ‘they have not hurt you physically or robbed yourmoney like bandits’. However, for her ‘the degree of harm imposed byemployers on workers is the same as that by bandits’. At the time, when sheencountered this labor dispute, non-payment of wages was considered acivil dispute. However, in 2011, the Criminal Law was amended to make ita criminal offence. In 2012, 120 employers were sentenced for wages inarrears.19 This is a small number in comparison to the 9.24 million, 4.13million, 3.39 million‚ and 2.02 million migrant workers suffering fromwages in arrears in the years from 2008 to 2011 respectively.20

Fu Shan then filed a complaint to the local Labor Bureau. At first, anofficer asked her to talk to the factory. Upon her second visit to the bureau,however, another officer said she had to talk to the dispatch company as shehad established the employment relation with the dispatch company, notthe factory. In her two visits to the Labor Bureau, none of the officers tookthe initiative to investigate her case. Fu Shan comments:

To make it plain, labor laws do not protect workers, only the rich. How can wetrust the Chinese labor laws? When nothing happens, the Labor Bureauclaims that it protects workers and their interests; but when you have an issue,it says it can’t handle your case because it is a third party, and it simply asksyou to talk directly to the factory.

The labor law system is supposed to safeguard worker interests, opines FuShan, but the labor bureau she encountered is not on the side of workers.She has not opted for labor mediation or arbitration because it would takea long time. According to my lawyer-informants, labor arbitration inShenzhen usually takes 4–6 months, though the Labor Dispute Mediationand Arbitration Law (Article 43) stipulates that it must be concludedwithin 2 months21; arbitration and litigation together often last for as longas a year.22 Moreover, in 2013 an official TV channel estimated thatworkers need to spend at least 820 yuan for various charges when goingthrough the whole process of mediation, arbitration, and litigation. If onetakes the time costs into consideration, legal rights-defense costs workers atleast 1571–2254 yuan,23 which roughly equals 1 month of pay. In light of


the complicated legal procedures and the related costs, many workers, likeFu Shan, simply give up defending their rights.

Fu Shan did not seek help from lawyers, as hiring one would beexpensive in comparison to the amount of money the dispatch companyowed her. She never thought of approaching trade unions either, as she didnot know what they were at the time. Her teacher in vocational secondaryschool advised her to contact the ACWF, but she did not do so, believingthat it would not be helpful. Neither did she solicit aid from any laborNGOs as she did not know any. Other workers hired by the dispatchcompany, indeed, encountered the same problem. Fu Shan stresses that itwould help if all of them were to unite together to put pressure on thecompany; but they quit, one by one, rather than stand up in unity againstthe company. Fu Shan reflects:

Other workers left the company. We were not so close to each other. But ifwe united together, I think the boss would have given us back our money. Weshould have all gone to talk to him. If he did not give us any response, wewould have then gone together to the Labor Bureau. They would help ussince we would have had so many people. Solidarity means power (tuanjiejiushi liliang).

Fu Shan realizes that workers as individuals can do little in defense of theirrights, even if their claims are legally grounded, and that they have vasterpower if united together. This illustrates her awareness that workers sharecommon interests vis-à-vis the capitalists and that their resistance canbecome more powerful when they act collectively.

Despite her disapproval of the labor law system and law enforcementagencies, the normalizing effect of legal hegemony is evident in Fu Shan.She opines:

Plainly speaking, workers are selling their labor power (chumai laodong li). Aslong as what I gain matches the amount of labor power I put in, it is okay. Aslong as my boss pays me wages and overtime compensation according to laborlaws, it is okay.

She also comments that

If I become a boss one day, I would definitely pay workers according to labourlaws. If I were to earn more, I might be able to give them more. But it isimpossible for me to give them all of my money. I couldn’t give them 0.5

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million if I only got 1 million. I have to buy all the machinery and productiontools in order to create the wealth; workers are just hired by me, right? Iwould only pay workers what their labor power was worth; if it was worth 10yuan, I couldn’t pay them 100 yuan, right?

No matter whether Fu Shan is a worker or a boss, she considers employersfair and above reproach if they pay workers in accordance with labor laws,which for her are a barometer to measure capital–labor relations. The laborlaw system has normalized surplus value extraction and other capitalistpractices. As long as employers observe legal standards, Fu Shan does notconsider them exploitative.

Fu Shan believes Chinese economic development has had both positiveand negative impact on workers. On the one hand, peasant-workers cannow ‘get a job and earn money with their own labor’, whereas prior toeconomic reform, they ‘farmed everyday but earned very little; what theycultivated could only feed themselves for a while’. On the other, she says itis unfair that workers work diligently but earn poor wages when comparedto their bosses, who do not labor much. Despite her ambivalence oneconomic development, she expresses approbation of the policy of ‘letsome people get rich first’. In her opinion, China cannot afford to adoptdevelopmental strategies that seek to make all people wealthy at the sametime; the geographical differences between villages and cities, hilly areasand non-hilly areas determine that ‘letting some people get rich first’ is abetter policy for China.

In her early twenties, Xin Xin began to work in the cities in 2005 aftergraduating from junior high school in Henan.24 She was diagnosed withleukemia after working in an electronics factory in Shenzhen for 4 years.She believes her illness is caused by the frequent use of benzene and otherchemicals at work. Her factory once arranged a health inspection forworkers; with the exception of her, all workers were given their healthreports. She, therefore, suspects that the factory tried to hide somethingfrom her.

She applied for a diagnosis of occupational disease from the ShenzhenPrevention and Treatment Center for Occupational Disease according tothe 2011 Law on the Prevention and Control of Occupational Diseases. Itwas, however, determined that her leukemia was not caused by her job.Later, she applied for a verification of occupational disease from themunicipal public health administration department, but again, her illnesswas diagnosed as non-occupationally related. She then applied for


verification from the provincial-level public health administration depart-ment, which came to the final conclusion that her leukemia was notoccupationally related.

Xin Xin admits that the evidence she submitted for the first diagnosiswas not well-prepared because she was unfamiliar with the procedure andbarely knew what do to. However, she finds the two verifications con-ducted by the public health departments problematic. The officers from thecity-level public health department arranged factory investigations thatconflicted with her medical treatments. As a result, she was not able toparticipate in the investigations which were guided only by the factorymanagers. Besides‚ according to Xin Xin‚ the two verifications relied mostlyon the reports submitted by the factory. I had no means to verify whetherXin Xin’s leukemia was, indeed, occupationally caused. However, it ispossible, in China, for public health departments to help cover up employerwrongdoings. In 2009, a worker named Zhang Haichao was denied adiagnosis of pneumoconiosis, an occupational disease, by the Preventionand Treatment Center for Occupational Disease in Zhengzhou, which wasattempting to shelter Zhang’s employer. In order to prove that he hadpneumoconiosis, he insisted on surgically open his lungs to examine thelung issues (kaixiong yanfei).25 After numerous protests against the gov-ernment, at the end he was diagnosed as having job-relatedpneumoconiosis.

Xin Xin is critical of the labor law system, discrediting it for not moni-toring factories rigorously. She comments:

Many labour laws are ill-implemented; otherwise I would not have suffered somuch. I was perfectly healthy before working in this factory, but I got leu-kemia after working there. Why do I have to go through so many compli-cated legal procedures to prove that my leukemia is occupational-related?Why does the government not monitor the factory?

In her opinion, the government is on the side of employers because thelatter have created immense wealth for the country and given a vastamount in taxes to the government, whereas workers only contributemeagerly to government income. She notes:

The capitalists have fostered the mushrooming of corrupt officials at the locallevel. They earn profits through exploiting workers, and thus, need the shelter

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of government officials. They bribe officials through different means; therefore,the officials keep one eye open and one eye shut to their illegal activities.

Xin Xin opines that economic reform mostly benefits the rich, enterprises,and the government; workers create wealth for them but cannot profitsimilarly from the economic growth. Despite blatant government corrup-tion, she believes that there are some good officials executing the centralgovernment’s policies and laws for the benefit of the people. For her, thecentral government is better than local governments, and it is not as cor-rupt as the latter. However, ‘the emperor is far away and the mountains arehigh’ (shangao huangdi yuan), and thus central government orders oftenlook different once they reach the lower-levels of government. The trans-muting mechanism of the labor law system deflects Xin Xin’s criticism awayfrom targeting the central government and the party-state, as a whole, andlands onto local government officials.

Due to her own experience, Xin Xin is skeptical and disappointed aboutthe discourse on legal rights defense, criticizing that the road forrights-defense is ‘craggy’. In spite of this, she is not utterly disillusioned,noting that there are successful cases in which workers win what theydeserve, and that ‘we won’t know the outcomes of our rights-assertionsunless we strive to the end’. This shows that she preserves a minimal degreeof hope in legal rights-defense.

Prior to the labor dispute, Xin Xin knew nothing about labor laws andtook no initiative to learn about them. This dispute has transformed herfrom being in an indifferent mode into taking on the critical mode. Duringthe course of her dispute, a labor NGO offered her great aid, informing herof labor laws and affording her psychological support. She also sought helpfrom her enterprise trade union, which organized a fundraiser amongfactory workers and gave her a 26,000 yuan donation. However, it pro-vided no assistance to her application for the diagnosis of occupationaldisease. The manager once threatened that if she did not give up herclaims, the trade union would stop raising money for her. She was notintimidated at all and decided to continue her rights-defense. She pointsout that the workplace trade union is led by managers, and thus, it isimpossible to serve worker interests.

Xin Xin feels grateful towards the labor NGO and is determined to learnmore about labor rights and help other workers through this NGO. Shehopes to ‘inform more workers of their rights so that they can go influencea lot more workers’. Like Ah Rong in Chap. 4 (Sect. 3.2), she has


developed class empathy for and class connection with other workers. Sherealizes that many workers are facing unfair treatment inflicted byemployers and she is ready to devote her energy to help advance theirrights.

3.3 Workers with Collective Labor Disputes Experiences

Originally from Meizhou, You Yang has worked in the cities for over10 years.26 He used to be a skilled worker in a small moulding factory inShenzhen, which had to be relocated to another city against the policies ofindustrial upgrade in Shenzhen and Guangdong. According to the LabourContract Law (Articles 46 and 47), employers need to compensate workersin cases of termination (which amount to their monthly wages times thenumber of years of service). Yet it is unclear if employers need to pay anycompensation in situations of factory relocation, which for many workers isequivalent to forced cessation of employment relations. To evade com-pensating the workers, You Yang’s boss tried to make the senior workersresign by altering their job duties and reducing their salaries. You Yang andsome workers who had worked in the factory for five to 10 plus years wereassigned new positions that were lower than their original ones. Forinstance, some skilled workers were asked to perform custodial duties, andtheir salaries were decreased to the level of ordinary workers. Despite thesetricks, the boss was not considered to be acting illegally because the laborcontracts stated that the factory could change the positions of workers onceevery year.

You Yang’s boss did not officially announce the factory’s relocation, butthe news still reached the workers. In the face of these ploys by the boss,You Yang and other workers started to strategize their response. Theyconsulted a labor NGO, which advised them to gain leverage over the bossthrough exposing his illegal labor practices. For example, the factory didnot fully contribute to the social insurance fund for the workers; everydaythey worked 2–4 hours of uncompensated overtime; they enjoyed no paidleave, maternity leave and so forth. Moreover, the NGO staff reminded theworkers that according to the Labour Contract Law, firms need to informand consult enterprise trade unions in regards to important matters such asmassive lay-offs, dismissals, and changes in employment conditions.The NGO staff advised them to form a workplace trade union so as toacquire greater power over the factory on issues related to compensation.

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Following the NGO’s suggestions, in September 2011 You Yang andother core workers initiated a joint letter to the district trade union,requesting to join the workplace trade union as members. More than 90workers signed the petition (out of 300 workers in the factory). In theletter, they wrote:

The current trade union representatives were appointed by managementrather than being elected by the workers. The enterprise trade union existsonly in name and not in practice (mingcun shiwan). Moreover, the tradeunion does not have a single member. To safeguard worker rights, we nowurgently request to join the trade union.

The district trade union gave no response to the workers, who then sentthe joint letter to the Shenzhen city trade union and went to discussmatters with its officials. The officials replied that the district trade unionwas handling their case and directed them to contact it. Therefore, YouYang and other workers went to the district trade union’s office, whereofficials alleged that a trade union already existed in their factory, and theyshould apply for trade union membership from that trade union. Theworkers responded that they were unknowledgeable about the identity ofthe enterprise union chair, the identity of committee members‚ and thenumber of union members. The district union official stated that he neededsome time to further investigate the matter.

Later, the district union officials communicated to the workers that itwould help establish a trade union in their factory soon. On the 19thOctober 2011, the factory called a meeting about the formation of aworkplace union, to which none of the workers who signed theabove-mentioned joint letter were invited. Only upon workers’ oppositionwere two of them allowed to sit in the meeting. In the meeting, the districtunion officials explained the procedures for forming workplace unions. Inaddition, they handed out membership forms to the attendees, who wouldsupposedly distribute them to workers that were interested in joining theunion.

On the 21st October, the worker representatives from the DevelopmentDepartment and the Quality Control Department submitted 98 unionapplication forms to the district trade union, while the director’s officesubmitted 37. On the same day, management transferred some workersthat had applied for union membership to new, inferior, less-skilled posi-tions. The workers took this as revenge from the factory for their activism.


Ten days later, management posted a notice announcing the suspension ofduties for five workers, who were the most active in pushing for reactiva-tion of the workplace union. To block them from influencing otherworkers, management did not allow these five workers to reenter thefactory.

Later in November, more than 30 workers each paid 400 yuan to hire alawyer to handle their case. However, the lawyer did not do much forthem; You Yang recalls, ‘Everything was ok for him before we paid him; hetold us he was optimistic and had great confidence. But in reality, he didnot help us much.’ The lawyer only met with the workers twice, givingthem the same suggestions made by the NGO staff: organize a factoryunion. With the excuse that not all workers paid him had agreed to disclosetheir authorization of his representation to the factory and governmentagencies (due to the workers’ fear of revenge), the lawyer ultimately didnot help the workers write any letter to the factory or government agen-cies, not to mention negotiate on behalf of the workers. In retrospect, YouYang realizes that the lawyer could have represented the workers who werewilling to disclose their identities, but the lawyer chose not to do so. YouYang thinks that the 12000 yuan paid to the lawyer was ‘misspent’.

In late November, the factory and district trade union notified workersthat they would soon organize elections for factory union representatives,but they did not specify the date. In China, enterprise trade union elec-tions, if even held at all, usually first let members elect union representa-tives, who then elect the trade union committee members (Hui and Chan2015). On the unannounced election day, union members in eachdepartment voted for a certain number of union representatives. Aftercollecting the ballots, district union officials did not count the vote insidethe factory; instead, they wished to do the tallying at the union office.Worried that the district trade union might play tricks, You Yang and otherworkers opposed this arrangement. Afterwards, two workers were allowedto go with the union officials to their office to witness the vote-counting. Atthe end, 19 union representatives were elected, 14 of which wererank-and-file workers and 5 were managerial staff.

A few days after announcing the election results, the factory posted anotice stating that the trade union preparation committee, which wasresponsible for conducting and monitoring union elections according tolegal guidelines, had just been organized and that its five members were allmanagerial level staff. The workers were resentful because, first, accordingto the 1992 Temporary Regulations on the Elections for Grassroots Trade

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Unions and the 2008 Measures for the Implementation of the TradeUnion Laws in Shenzhen, the union preparation committee must beformed prior to the election of union representatives rather than after theelection. Second, the factory did not explain how the preparation com-mittee was selected, and why it solely consisted of the managerial staff. YouYang and other workers went to the district union enquiring about thisissue. The officials did not give them a convincing answer, reiterating thatthe preparation committee members had to be well educated (zhishi hua),young (nianqing hua), and members of the CCP. The workers putthemselves forward as candidates of the preparation committee members,but the district union officials insisted that ordinary workers were notqualified and that ‘you [they] can’t do things as you [they] like’.

As their resistance mounted, You Yang discloses, some workers dis-agreed with the approach of hiring the lawyer and filing a lawsuit againstthe factory for it was time-consuming. They believed that the factory wasillegal in many respects and that if the workers took collective action, thecompany would bow to their pressure. Therefore, in mid-December,shortly before the Lunar New Year, they mobilized the workers to petition(shangfang) the Shenzhen Labor Bureau, the Shenzhen Trade Union, andthe Letter and Visits Office of the Shenzhen Party Committee. Later intheir last move, a hundred workers petitioned the Letter and Visits Officeof the Shenzhen government; this aroused great concern from the gov-ernment. City government officials invited workers’ representatives toconverse in their offices; district government representatives were alsopresent, and they promised to handle the case properly and persuaded theworkers to return to the district. The government officials even arrangedtwo coaches to send the workers back to the factory.

After returning to the factory, the managers, Labor Bureau officers,district government officials, and worker representatives immediately held ameeting. The boss proposed to pay workers 75% of the compensation theydemanded, stressing that there was no room for negotiation. The workersrepresentatives agreed to the company’s offer. Upon receipt of theircompensation, You Yang and around 100 workers resigned. Being relievedfrom workers’ pressure, union elections in the factory stopped altogether.

For You Yang, labor laws have not helped them much, and he isskeptical towards the officially promulgated idea of legal rights-defense. Inhis opinion, labor laws fail to protect workers due to misbehavior ofproblematic government officials. In his case, officials from the LaborBureau, higher level trade unions, and the Shenzhen city government were


in support of his boss because ‘he pays taxes to the government’. Hecomments:

If workers don’t make their issues big (naoda), the government officials willjust ignore you. In our case, they always stood on the side of the boss, sayingthat he had health problems and his business was not doing well, and theyalways asked us to be cooperative. There may be some good governmentcadres who care about the well-being of workers, but not any that we haveencountered.

He adds, ‘We could not have gotten any compensation by simply followingthe laws and not taking any collective action. Those workers who werecompelled to quit their jobs but took no action, received no compensation,and those who resigned after us got nothing either’. You Yang summarizesthat they deployed a two-track strategy in their struggle. The first strategywas rights-defense through organizing (zuzhi weiquan). This meansmobilizing and consolidating workers in the name of forming a tradeunion, thereby pressuring the factory with the collective power of workers.The second strategy was rights-defense through laws (falv weiquan), whichmeans seeking help from a lawyer and following legal procedures tocomplain about their boss. In his opinion, rights-defense through orga-nizing is more effective than rights-defense through laws, but still theycannot completely neglect the laws:

Even if you take the route of rights-defense through organizing, legalknowledge is indispensable because your collective actions are still related tolaws; otherwise, it’s difficult to succeed.

From You Yang’s point of view, labor laws provided useful resources totheir rights-defense through organizing; the Trade Unions Law was theground upon which their actions took place. At the same time, he iscautious of not crossing the legal boundaries. He explains that if workerswere legally insensitive, their actions might easily violate laws, and theythus, would be jailed by police. In such a situation, rights-defense throughorganizing would no longer be effective because ‘the hardcoreworker-activists would be arrested for breaching the laws, and then thewhole core would collapse, and the struggle would be forced to an end’.You Yang demonstrates an understanding of the double-edged blade of thelegal system. On the one hand, he recognizes that workers’ collective

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actions utilizing labor laws are more powerful than simply exhausting legalchannels in wringing compensation from employers. On the other, hebelieves that workers cannot unrestrainedly transgress legal and politicalconstraints. Therefore, he consciously kept their actions within legalboundaries so as to make their struggle sustainable and achievable.

You Yang discloses that his fellow workers initially were not unitedbecause many of them did not know their rights, the functions and mis-sions of trade unions and so forth. However, as their struggle developed,they became highly unified and better organized. More than 30 workersmet among themselves once every few days, exchanging updates, dis-cussing their actions and plans, and building up consensus. Around 20 coreworkers each contributed 100 yuan to set up an action fund supportingtransportation fees and other expenses related to their actions. This is not alarge amount of money, but You Yang considers it an indication of thecommitment of the workers to the struggle. He recalls, ‘The core workersknew that if they did not unite together, they would be the next ones to beforced to quit their jobs by the factory.’ In other words, they realized theirshared interests vis-à-vis the employer and understood that if they did notjoin hands together, their interests would be undermined. You Yang ishighly committed to the struggle and even prepared himself for the com-pany’s revenge, ‘At that time, I did not think too much. Of course, I knewrevenge was possible, but I could not worry too much. Actually in the laterstages, I anticipated that the factory would terminate me.’

4 AMBIVALENT WORKERS

Rather than being clearly affirmative or critical, some interviewees hoverbetween the two. They partly accept the official legal discourses, yet partlydisapprove of the legal practices, expressing ambivalent opinions towardsthe labor law system, the state, and the economy. They usually believe thatwhat legal discourses advocate are somehow good for workers, but at thesame time, they criticize the labor law system for having many loopholes,which they think are caused by the misbehavior of some governmentofficials. They have not rendered active consent to legal hegemony but arein a state of uncertainty and submissiveness.



Ah Xi is a 40-year old worker who has finished primary schooling. He hasworked in the cities for more than 10 years and has now been hired by asmall electronics company in Shenzhen.27 He has a fair knowledge of laborlaws and is aware of key legal regulations, such as those regarding socialinsurance, labor contracts, overtime compensation, minimum wage‚ and soforth. He has not encountered any labor disputes but has heard many storiesfrom friends who have been treated unfairly at work. For example, one of hisfriends was denied proper compensation after a work accident; another onewas forced to work unpaid, overtime work. When asked if labor laws couldprotect workers, he replied, ‘Yes, they certainly do. Otherwise what wouldbe the use of having a government?’ However, when faced with the ques-tion about whether labor laws are skewed towards workers or employers, hebecame less affirmative. He responded, ‘It depends on the situation. Butsociety is presently like this, whoever has money is the big brother [laoda].The laws have some loopholes.’ By ‘big brother’, he is referring to wealthyand powerful employers who take advantages of legal loopholes in one wayor another. Our conversation continued as follows:

Researcher: Has the government offered enough protection to workers?Ah Xi: Um… I have never seen any government cadres inspecting

my factory. Only the fire department has come a few times.Researcher: So the government is biased towards employers?Ah Xi: I am not sure about that.Researcher: Which areas should the government improve?Ah Xi Labor inspection. They should inspect factories more

frequently.

Unlike the critical workers in this chapter, Ah Xi reveals a more positiveopinion of labor laws and tends to regard them as providing some pro-tections to workers [‘yes, certainly they do. Otherwise what’s the use ofhaving the government?’]. Nevertheless, unlike the affirmative workers inChap. 4 who show little doubt about the labor law system, Ah Xi realizesthat the rich can easily manipulate legal loopholes to their advantage.Concerning his position about the government, he believes the purpose ofhaving the government is to protect workers, but at the same time, heknows that many government officials favor employers, and thus, fail tocarry out labor inspections properly. Femia notes that some workers‘possesses a “contradictory consciousness”: his [their] perceptions and

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evaluations of social life exhibit inconsistency and superficiality, whichexpress the gap between the dominant interpretation of reality and his[their] own objective situation’ (1987, 185). Ah Xi’s ambivalence andmixed feeling towards the labor law system and the government is due to,on the one hand, the common sense reproduced by the ruling classregarding the juridico-political system and, on the other, the reality that hehas witnessed and experienced (i.e., the rare inspection of factories bygovernment officials) and the stories of exploitation from his friends.

Ah Kong is in his early 20s.28 After finishing tertiary education in Hubei,he came to work in Shenzhen one and a half years ago. He is nowemployed at an electronics factory, taking care of warehouse logistics. Hisbasic monthly salary is the same as the city’s minimum wage. Includingovertime payment, every month he earns less than 3000 yuan. When askedif labor laws are skewed towards employers or workers, he said the laws arefair, but the critical issue is whether government officials are fair.

Researcher: What do you think about labor laws? Can they protectworkers?

Ah Kong: Protect workers? Um…I don’t know what to say. If you saythey don’t protect workers, that’s not true; they offer somedegree of protection. But are they comprehensive? Certainlynot. How can I put this? Ummm…they protect some thingsbut not others.

Researcher: What do you think about legal rights-defense? Do you thinkworkers can defend their legal rights?

Ah Kong: If the idea of legal rights-defense could be effectively enacted,it would be good for workers; these are their rights ascitizens. However, in reality you cannot implement them thateasily. You cannot easily change guanxi politics; moneymakes everything, right?

Researcher: What do you think about the rule of law?Ah Kong: The rule of law means that things have to be done in

accordance to laws. Under the rule of law, present-daysociety is not as chaotic as in the past.

Researcher: Is the rule of law well-established in China?Ah Kong: Yes, it is; otherwise our society would become chaotic.

However, some peoples’ rights aren’t being protected… Thelaws are ok [hai keyi], some of them are quite fair and just.


Ah Kong’s ambivalence in regards to the labor law system is manifestedin his simultaneous endorsement and disapproval of the state-constructednotions of legal rights defense and the rule of law, as well as the legalpractices associated with them. First, he holds that the notion of legal rightsdefense offers some protection to workers and that some laws are fair andjust. However, at the same time, he finds it difficult to defend one’s legalrights because government officials are closely linked to the businesses[‘You cannot easily change the guanxi politics; money can make every-thing, right?’]. Second, Ah Kong approves of the rule of law for preventingsociety from falling into chaos, but at the same time, he realizes that somepeoples’ rights are not well protected under the rule of law. Ah Kong’scomment on social chaos resonates with the state-promoted ideology of‘social stability’, which stresses that socio-economic and socio-political‘stability’ are prerequisite for economic growth and social prosperity(Breslin 2007). This ideological construction plus the political and socialturmoil in the pre-reform era (such as the Cultural Revolution) have mademany Chinese people prefer ‘social stability’ as articulated by the party-stateover social chaos, as is associated with the country’s turbulent contempo-rary history.

In brief, the discrepancies between legal rights-defense and the rule oflaw as legal ideals and as actual legal practices have not led to Ah Kong’sfull rejection of these notions as the critical informants have; he waversbetween showing both appreciation for and doubts over the labor lawsystem.


Originally from Guizhou, Gui Nan has worked in Shenzhen for 9 years.29

He is in his late twenties and has a job at a logistics company at the time ofour interview. In 2010, he and his wife were recruited by a dispatchcompany, which sent them to work in a small factory in Shenzhen. Thedispatch company paid Gui Nan an hourly wage of 6 yuan with a maximumlimit of 10 hours per day. Within these 10 hours, he had to produce adesignated amount of products. If he had to work overtime to accomplishthe task, his boss would pay him no compensation. To add insult to injury,the dispatch company paid him no wages after he had worked in the factoryfor more than a month.

Gui Nan complained to the street-level Labor Bureau. The bureauofficer required him to support his claim with evidence, such as the dispatch

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company’s license, wage slips and so forth, none of which the company hadever given him. The officer said he would not be able to help much anddirected Gui Nan to apply for labor arbitration. Gui Nan told me, ‘At thattime, I knew nothing about labor arbitration or how to fight for myinterests.’ Feeling frustrated, he went to talk to the dispatch company’smanager and had a fierce quarrel with him. At the end, the manager onlyagreed to give him 1000 yuan, which barely covered what the companyfully owed him. However, as Gui Nan had no plans to stay with thecompany, he just hoped to resolve the dispute as soon as possible, so heaccepted the money and quit. Gui Nan’s decision was not unique; asexplained earlier, many workers give up pursuing their legal rights becauseof time-consuming legal procedures.

Gui Nan’s assessment of the labor law system vacillates between dis-satisfaction and affirmation. At one point of our interview, he condemnedlabor laws for their improper implementation and the lack of supervisionover firms. He observes:

Labor laws certainly cannot give workers enough protection. The legalsupervision over factories is unsatisfactory. Many small domestically ownedfactories infringe on labor rights, yet nobody oversees them. Many localfactories have horrible working conditions, but when workers complain to theLabor Bureaus, they always shirk their responsibilities.

On other occasions, however, Gui Nan shows approval of the labor lawsystem, noting that ‘the laws are well observed by some factories. Forexample, many foreign-owned enterprises observe labor laws well, andsome local governments properly enforce them.’ He comments thatChinese labor relations are generally ‘acceptable’, stating, ‘Our country isdeveloping rapidly, hence some things are not well established. But gen-erally speaking, there has been progress.’ Similar to the affirmative workersin Chap. 4, Gui Nan’s opinion of the labor law system is principallygrounded on the level of implementation rather than the actual legalcontents. The uneven enforcement of labor laws across different types offactories (such as small versus large, foreign-owned versus domestic) con-tribute to his occasional denouncement and intermittent approval of thelabor law system.

Gui Nan complains to me about soaring inflation and low wages in thecities, which all create huge pressure for him. When asked if workers benefitfrom economic development, he reveals an uncertainty and submissiveness.


He agrees that workers cannot enjoy economic prosperity, but he seems tohave accepted the unfairness embedded into the socio-economic system.He imparts, ‘Injustice and unfairness are everywhere in society. Whereveryou go, you can feel it. But what can we do about this? Thesecond-generation of the high-ranking government officials are very rich,but they were born to inherit this wealth; it’s not a matter of fairness or not,right?’ Gui Nan has revealed a strong sense of resignation towards theinjustice facing workers.

Talking about the challenges to workers’ rights-defense, Gui Nan notesthat workers are not sufficiently united in their resistance, or they have notyet developed a rights-awareness—‘many of them think it’s fine as long asthey have something to eat and wear’. That said, he observes that someworkers, having worked in cities for a long time, have become increasinglyconscious of their rights and have learned more about labor laws andrights-defense. Another obstacle to workers’ rights-defense is, suggests GuiNan, that they do not know how to assert their rights, for instance whichgovernment departments should be approached when problems arise. Inthese cases, he says‚ some workers simply give up their rights, but some willtake extra-legal actions, such as road-blockages, rallies or committing sui-cide. He opines:

From a legal point of view, I think these [extra-legal] actions are not appro-priate. But workers have no other means (qiuzhu wumen); there is nobody tohelp them, and they don’t know what to do. A strong fire burns inside theirhearts, and therefore, they resort to these ‘extreme’ actions; they are forced by thecircumstances (bichu lai)!

Gui Nan’s comments illustrate the legal influence on workers’self-understanding of resistance. Labour laws do not simply define what isright and what is wrong in the eyes of some workers (such as Ah Wen fromChap. 4), they also guide workers’ perceptions of what forms ofrights-defense activities are appropriate and what are not. Like the criticalworker Shu Ren who was elaborated upon in the previous section, Gui Nanhas partially submitted to legal logic, concurring that workers’ actionsshould conform to laws [‘From the legal point of views, I think these[extra-legal] actions are not appropriate’]. However, in his opinion, sincelabor laws cannot always do workers justice, workers are forgivable fortaking ‘extreme’ extra-legal actions. Similarly, another interviewee notes,‘Rights-defense is about safeguarding your rights within the legal arena.

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Ordinary people don’t want to take extreme actions, they are forced to doso. I stand up for my rights only because my boss is too unfair (tai guo-fen).’30 Consciously or unconsciously taking legal channels as a normativemeans for rights-defense, some interviewees try to justify the extra-legalactions of workers by highlighting employer unfairness and worker help-lessness. In this way, they have, though unintentionally, reinforced the le-gitimacy of legal vehicles and the illegitimacy of extra-legal means inresolving labor conflicts.

Jian Hua is in his late thirties. He suffered an occupational accidentwhen working for an electronics factory in Dongguan in 2012.31

According to law, during his period of medical treatment, his boss shouldhave paid him a monthly salary equivalent to his average wage from theyear prior to the accident (which was around 3000 yuan), but in reality, heonly received the city’s minimum wage (which was 1100 yuan). In addi-tion, Jian Hua was a skilled worker earning around 4000 yuan per monthprior to the work injury, but afterwards, his manager downgraded him to aposition of an ordinary production worker (whose salary was only about2000 yuan including overtime payment). This violated the terms andconditions stated in the labor contract signed between Jian Hua and thefactory.

Jian Hua attended a mediation session organized by the mediationcommittee in his factory, but he could not reach an agreement with hisemployer who insisted that paying him the minimum wage was legal. Hisboss offered him a lump sum compensation to settle the dispute, but theamount was less than what he was entitled to. Therefore, Jian Hua turneddown the proposal:

My boss is not following labor laws; he bargained with me as if we were at themarketplace. The lump sum he offered me was much less than what lawsprescribe. Therefore, I did not accept his offer and decided to take legalactions to resolve the dispute.

He then applied for arbitration at the Labor Bureau, and his case was to beheard 10 days after our interview. He shows great confidence in arbitra-tion, trusting that it would do him justice. He tells me assuredly, ‘If yourclaims have legal grounds, you will win the case. On the contrary, if theyare unreasonable and lack evidence, then you will lose the case’. Similar toAh Wen from Chap. 4, the normalizing mechanism of the labor law system


induces Jian Hua to believe that legal prescription and court rulings mustbe right and unimpeachable.

The impact of the normalizing mechanism is further manifested in howJian Hua perceives ‘fairness’ and ‘exploitation’. When asked if someemployers are exploitative, Jian Hua replies, ‘I have not seen any ex-ploitation in the factories where I have worked before. They are usually bigcompanies, and they comply with labor laws and are quite fair. But I don’tknow what happens in other factories and whether they breach laws.’32 Forhim, the definition of ‘exploitation’ and ‘fairness’ are associated with legalstandards; ‘exploitation’ refers specifically to illegal treatment of workersand ‘fairness’ equals being legally-compliant. As long as employers followlabor laws, they are not exploiting workers and are being fair.

Jian Hua knew little about labor laws before his work injury and hadonly come across some sketchy legal information on TV. When he studiedin vocational secondary school, there was a class on laws, but back then, hedeemed it unnecessary to grasp legal knowledge. Having suffered a workinjury and experiencing the dispute, he realizes that ‘many things in realityare closely linked to laws’. Therefore, he now ‘tr[ies] hard to learn laborlaws’ and ‘rel[ies] more on the laws’. As stressed in Chap. 4, worker sus-ceptibility towards legal hegemony is not stagnant; changing life experi-ences may trigger a change of their position among the five categories. JianHua used to be indifferent to labor laws, but the conflict with his employerpropelled him to be more legally-conscious.

Commenting on whether labor laws offer workers adequate protection,at one point, Jian Hua reveals some confidence in the laws, without whichhe believes he might not be able to wrest any compensation from thefactory.

Labor laws are fair; workers can use them to defend their rights because theystipulate what you can do if your legal rights are violated. I think they are fairas far as my case is concerned. Without them, I would have been left with nomeans to make my boss accountable for my injury.

That said, at another point, Jian Hua manifests a degree of criticismtowards the labor law system.

Labor laws, especially those related to work injuries, are loosely enforced. Ifthey are not strictly implemented, employers won’t follow them because itwould cost them nothing to disobey the laws. Many law enforcers do not do

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their jobs well (bu daowei). If they seek to cover up the faults of enterprises, thelaws are just empty words.

Jian Hua’s ambivalence towards the labor law system can be explained bythe fact that, on the one hand, he (like Ah Wen from Chap. 4) has livedthrough the period when the Labour Law, Labour Contract Law, SocialInsurance Law, Provisions on Minimum Wage‚ and so forth were not yetenacted. He, thus, has experienced the differences between an absence anda presence of labor laws, and has profoundly felt the benefits of having legalvehicles, which were unavailable to workers in the past, to pursue hisinterests. However, as official legal discourses have induced high expecta-tions from workers in the labor law system, workers also quickly showfrustration and disapproval when witnessing the discrepancies between thelegal ideals and the legal reality.

When Jian Hua was hospitalized, a lawyer came to promote his businessto him and other work injury victims, encouraging them to seek his legalassistance. After being released from the hospital, Jian Hua went to consultthe lawyer in his office for an hour, which cost him 100 yuan. If Jian Huawould have asked this lawyer to handle the case, he would have needed topay a service charge. Jian Hua found the legal consultation provided by thelawyer unhelpful:

The legal consultation was not very useful. If I would have used the con-sultation fee to buy books on labour laws, which only cost 40 yuan, I wouldhave benefited more. What the lawyer said was the same as what the bookstell me; I think the 100 yuan was wasted.

Later Jian Hua got in touch with a labor NGO and attended classes onlabor laws. He discloses that had he known the NGO earlier, he would nothave spent any money on consulting a lawyer. He thinks positively of theNGO, which has ‘offered [him] immense help’ and ‘enlightened [him]about labor laws’. Now he is highly active in the NGO, often visitinghospitalized, injured workers together with its staff and giving them adviceon how to handle their cases. In the same way as Ah Rong from Chap. 4,Jian Hua has developed a sense of class empathy for workers who sharesimilar exploitative experiences. Having encountered the obstacles inrights-assertion and gaining the support of the NGO in this process, herealizes that many workers are as helpless as he is and that ‘it is my[his]responsibility to help other workers in need’.


Jian Hua stresses that workers contribute considerably to the Chineseeconomy and that ‘if workers do not produce, enterprises cannot survive’.He thinks that workers have benefited from economic development; in thepast, there was no electricity or even proper roads in rural areas, but nowpeasant-worker living standards have improved and their wages havegrown. That said, he admits that sometimes workers are not fairly treated,for which enterprises should bear the major responsibilities because theyhave failed to observe labor laws. He also suggests the government hasresponsibility for not monitoring factories rigorously. In his opinion, localgovernments are biased towards employers and are quite corrupt, but thecentral government is better.


Chang Shan, in his early twenties, was hired by a motor parts supply factoryin the PRD where workers walked out in 2010, demanding an 800 yuanwage increase and democratic trade union reform.33 As a student from avocational secondary school, he initially came for an internship in thefactory in 2007 and was hired on as a formal worker after graduation.Later, he was promoted to deputy group leader, a low-level supervisoryposition. The strike in his factory was initiated by rank-and-file workers,but he highly supported it and later became an active leader. He recalls:

Initially, many supervisory staff in our department did not dare to join thestrike. But I had close relationships with the rank-and-file workers, and Ifound their demands very reasonable. I started to work in the factory in2007; my wages had increased by only around 20 yuan over the course of4 years. Our wages were too low; therefore, I gave my full support to the strikers.If we did not go on strike, the company might only give us a thirty yuan payrise.

During the course of the strike, management threatened workers, sayingthat strikes were illegal in China. Chang Shan verified this allegationthrough researching laws and consulting a legal scholar. He found out thatChinese laws do not spell out whether strikes are legal or illegal. Neitherthe Constitution nor other laws explicitly prohibit worker strikes. Neitherdo they prescribe what makes strikes legal or illegal. In other words, thereexists a legal grey area concerning worker strikes. That said, during thestrike Chang Shan and other strike leaders kept reminding workers that

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they should stage a ‘civilized strike’ [wenming bagong], and that theyshould not destroy any machines or property, or injure anybody. As thelegality of strikes is an ambiguous legal matter, Chang Shan thought theirstrike should be carefully staged so that the police would have no excuse toarrest strikers.

At first the company refused to negotiate with the strikers, but later, itarranged a negotiation meeting with Chang Shan and other worker rep-resentatives due to rising social pressure. Finally, it conceded to a monthlywage increase of around 32.4% for formal workers and about 70% forstudent interns. Subsequent to the strike, the provincial trade unionstepped in to push forward workplace trade union elections and annualwage negotiations in the factory.

Chang Shan did not learn about any labor laws in school, but he wouldresearch them when unsure. To prepare for the strike negotiations, ChangShan spent great effort to study the laws associated with collective con-sultation. His evaluation of the labor law system swings betweenendorsement and disapproval. On the one hand, he finds labor laws ‘moreor less just’ and ‘protective of workers’, though employers often exploitlegal loopholes, and implementational problems of labor laws are easilyidentified. He notes that if strikers’ demands were to have legal grounds,they would be ‘more confident’ (diqi zu yidian). Taking trade unionmember rights as an example, he comments:

It is good that the Trade Union Law has spelt out union members’ rights andobligations. In the past, I did not know what rights I had as a union member,but during the strike I found out that the Law has ensured our rights, such asthe right to recall incompetent union officials. This has emboldened us(danzi dale) and given us greater confidence.

On the other hand, Chang Shan is skeptical of the rule of law, suggestingthat it only protects the rich, not the poor. From the news, he has learnedthat some rich people kill the poor and pay someone else to go to jail intheir place; he criticizes that ‘the rule of law does not exist in any genuinesense’. In addition, he realizes there is a gap between labor laws as writtenon paper and labor laws as enacted in reality. He is disappointed with the‘invisible administrative intervention’ from the managers and higher-leveltrade unions on the post-strike trade union reform in his factory:


According to the Trade Union Law, union members have the right to recallthe chair if he [she] does not fulfill his [her] duties. However, in reality, it isdifficult to do this. First, will the company and higher-level trade unions agreeto the recall? Second, will they approve the person supported by the majorityof members to be the new chair? All these are not legal questions. If the chaironly has workers’ support but without approval from the company and thegovernment, he [she] would come under great pressure.

In the post-strike trade union elections in his factory, management andhigher-level union officials deliberately excluded a popular strike leaderfrom running in the elections and thus, from being elected. They dissuadedworkers from voting for this strike leader at the departmental-level elec-tions; the trade union election preparatory committee, which was domi-nated by managerial staff, voted her down as a candidate for election to thetrade union committee. Moreover, management and higher-level tradeunions backed a high-ranking staffperson to be the chair, who commencedworking at the factory only after the strike. Many workers felt that he was‘designated’ to be the chair, though formal elections were held. In theory,labor laws have enshrined the trade union rights of workers, but, as ChangShan highlights, the extra-legal influence imposed by the company andhigher-level union officials has hindered workers from truly upholding theirlegal rights.

Chang Shan’s assessment of the Chinese government also manifests anair of ambivalence. On some occasions, he says they are neutral but inothers, he suggests they are pro-business. On the one hand, he opines thatthe government does not necessarily favor enterprises and that their prin-cipal concern is maintaining social stability (weiwen); if workers do notcause trouble (nao dashi), the government would tolerate protests. In thepost-strike trade union elections and collective wage negotiations in hisfactory, suggests Chang Shan, the local government and higher-level tradeunion officials were neither on the side of the company nor on that of theworkers. In other words, he believes they were ‘autonomous’ from thecompany.

The provincial trade union official [that intervened in the post-strike indus-trial relations in the factory] tried not to offend either the company or theworkers. He stressed that the enterprise had to survive and the workplaceunion should not request too high of a wage increase. Moreover, he accen-tuated that the company and the workplace union should compromise with each

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other in order to find an equilibrium, and that this would lead to a mutualvictory [shuangying]. I think he has not taken any sides.

On the other hand, he underscores that the provincial and city governmentare not necessarily ‘good’ because they often focus only on the GDP and‘neglect the well-being of the people’. Because they endeavor to attractbusinesses to their cities, complains Chang Shan, they are unwilling toimprove worker welfare, such as social insurance and minimum wages, orto enforce labor laws stringently. However, he thinks the central govern-ment is ‘good’, and its policies and laws are ‘pro-labor’. For him, ‘a lot ofpeople approve’ of the central government, but many local governmentsdo not follow its orders:

The policies and laws made by the central government are good, but they arenot implemented effectively because ‘the emperor is far away in the highmountains’. The local governments have not executed the central government’slaws and policies seriously.

Being affected by the transmuting mechanism of legal hegemony, ChangShan attributes workers’ plight to local governments, which are responsiblefor capital accumulation at the local level, rather than to the central gov-ernment which has been forcefully driving economic reform at a broaderlevel. As a result, the legitimacy of the central government or theparty-state en bloc remains unchallenged.

Chang Shan also expresses vacillating views about Chinese economicdevelopment. On the one hand, he complains that the economy hasdeveloped too rapidly and that the local governments have blindly pursuedGDP at the expense of workers. He reckons that ‘without workers’ sacri-fice, China would not have achieved the progress that it has made’. On theother, he expresses appreciation for the economic growth. He recalls thathe was able to eat meat only once a week when he was young, but now, associety becomes more prosperous, he and his family in the rural village canafford to eat meat every day. He opines, ‘It is everyone’s responsibility tohelp pursue a higher GDP. Our country comes first, and then our family;we need to have a strong country before we are able to have a stable family.If our country is strong, we won’t need to be afraid of other countries.’Like Xiao Mei in Chap. 4, he reveals strong nationalist sentiments,believing that his well-being is closely linked to the country’s economicdevelopment. He discloses that he does not mind working hard, as long as


he witnesses the changes of the country. Overall, he endorses the centralgovernment’s development strategies:

China has only opened up for a short period of time, but the GDP has goneup swiftly. If we do not sacrifice workers’ well-being, China’s reform wouldgo very slowly, and our country might not be as strong as it is. I can sacrificefor my country, though only for a certain amount of time.

5 CONCLUSION

Having actively endorsed the labor law system and internalized the valuesand ideas it reproduces, the affirmative workers in Chap. 4 have conferredactive consent to legal hegemony. In contrast, the indifferent, critical, andambivalent workers in this chapter render passive, not active, consent tolegal hegemony. Some of them demonstrate a feeling of impotence andresignation; some are only partially assimilated to the legally mediatedcapitalist worldviews and demonstrate varying degrees of criticism over thelabor law system, the state, and the capitalist economy.

For the indifferent workers, the labor and social policies (such as thehousehold registration system) and their personal attributes related to age,education, and gender role, have tied them to their rural origins. They feelalienated in the cities and consider their work life there transitory; hence,they see labor laws and socio-economic development as irrelevant to them.If there are any problems with their bosses, they would opt to quit theirjobs, rather than resorting to legal or extra-legal channels to resolve issues.Their rejection of the legal frame of reference is not a result of consciousreflection, but that of social alienation created by the state’s economic andsocial policies. The social exclusions that the indifferent workers experiencein cities have impeded the labor law system from securing their activeconsent. However, this does not necessarily mean that they are insuscep-tible to legal hegemony. Although they have not actively consented to thelegally mediated worldviews, they have passively submitted themselves tothe status quo and capitalist values normalized by the labor law system.Due to the legal labor contract system, both Ah Qing and Ah Ying believethat they are ‘free’ to withdraw from employment relations whenever theylike. As they are full of apathy and submissiveness, the indifferent workersare not a serious threat to the capitalist social and economic order.

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Workers that have experienced individual or collective labor disputesseldom fall into the indifferent category for they usually find labor lawsrelevant to their rights-assertion in one way or another. Most, if not all, ofthem have actively acquainted themselves with legal knowledge during thecourse of championing their rights. Some of them have already paidattention to labor laws prior to their disputes. Some, however, only startedto become conscious of legal regulations subsequent to the outbreak oflabor disputes (such as Xin Xin and Jian Hua). While pursuing their rights,many of them have gained deeper legal knowledge and developed partic-ular views of the labor law system. None of them find labor laws irrelevantto them. In other words, the labor–capital conflicts have transformed someworkers from an indifferent mode into other modes.

The critical workers discredit the labor law system, including the rele-vant legal discourses and practices. The exploitative experience incurred bymy informants has shaped their attitudes towards labor laws. Some criticalworkers were treated unfairly or illegally in workplace, but they did notreport their grievances to managers or the government. This was eitherbecause they thought it was useless (Chen Fei), or they believed laborcontracts were ‘fair’ and ‘equal’ deals with employers, and thus, theyshould simply quit their job if they felt unsatisfied (Zhang Lin). Althoughthis type of critical worker has not engaged in any open disputes with theirbosses, the unfair treatment they have encountered makes them critical ofthe labor law system, which they deem unable to protect workers due toimplementational deficits.

For the critical workers that have experienced individual labor disputes,they sought to address their grievances through legal channels, but metsubstantial difficulties. They, therefore, have become skeptical of legaldiscourses such as rights defense according to laws and the rule of law. Inspite of their disapproval for the labor law system, they are not completelyimmune to its double hegemonic effects. Their criticism of labor laws isconfined within the capitalist-legal logics, usually targeting implementa-tional issues rather than unbalanced power relations inherent in the laws.This, indeed, echoes what Femia highlights: ‘while the masses may bedissatisfied, while they may sense the contradiction between the positiveofficial definition of reality and the starkness of their own subordination,they are unable even to locate the source of their discontent, still lessremedy it’ (1975, 33–34). Many of these kinds of critical workers hold thatthe central government has good intentions to protect workers with laborlaws; they attribute the failures of the labor law system to the faults of local


governments who do not effectively enforce labor laws, have strong con-nections with the businesses and/or benefit tremendously from the pres-ence of these firms (see Zhang Lin, Chen Fei, Shu Ren, and Xin Xin). Theconcealing mechanism of legal hegemony convinces this group of workersthat the existence of numerous labor laws is proof that the central gov-ernment is pro-labor and autonomous from businesses. Moreover, thetransmuting mechanism of legal hegemony helps shift worker criticismfrom targeting the party-state as a whole (which has been engineeringcapitalist reform at the macro level) to local government officials (who aredelegated the task of capital accumulation at the local level). In addition tobuttressing the party-state, legal hegemony is able to normalize the capi-talist logics with regard to this type of critical worker. A few of them,though not all, believe that employers are above reproach were they to payworkers wages according to labor laws; some say they would do the same ifthey were to hire workers one day (Fu Shan). For these workers, labor lawsare a legitimate yardstick to measure employer behavior. Since labor lawsapprove of and normalize wage-labor, surplus value extraction‚ and max-imization of profits by capitalists, some critical workers find these capitalistpractices unproblematic.

The critical workers that have encountered collective labor disputesdiscredit the labor law system for similar reasons held by critical workersthat have experienced individual labor disputes. Yet, the former’s attitudetowards rights defense are distinct from the latter’s. For the critical workersthat have undergone individual labor disputes, legal hegemony still shapestheir understanding of the appropriate form of rights defense (see ShuRen). They see rights defense as an action that ought to be carried outwithin the legal arena; hence, they try to justify extra-legal worker actionsby stressing the legality of their demands and the lack of alternative meansto redress their legitimate grievances. Some of them (see Xin Xin) still haveconfidence in legal rights defense, even though they were frustrated bytheir own experience and know it is not easy. In contrast, the criticalworkers that have experienced collective labor disputes seem to be lessconvinced of the approach of legal rights defense (see You Yang). Theyrealize the limitations of solely utilizing legal channels in advancing workerinterests and understand that if workers do not make their complaints a bigissue, the government will not give them proper attention even if theirdemands are legally grounded. They believe that utilizing labor laws toconsolidate workers’ collective power into extra-legal forms is more

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effective than pursuing individualized legal channels in pushing the gov-ernment to take corrective actions.

For the ambivalent workers, they simultaneously approve and discreditthe labor law system. On the one hand, they consider the labor law systemfair and protective of workers. On the other, they reproach it for improperlegal implementation and lack of supervision over firms. The uncertainattitude of ambivalent workers towards the labor law system is rooted inthe discrepancies between the legal ideals promoted by the party-state andthe legal reality they witness. Some ambivalent workers believe in theparty-state-constructed ideology that the government is pro-labor andautonomous from businesses, but at the same, they are aware that somegovernment officials are biased towards the rich and that some firmsmanipulate legal loopholes to their advantage (Ah Xi). Some ambivalentworkers feel the benefits, however minimal, from the establishment of therule of law and a proper legal system, which help maintain ‘social stability’(that was absent during the political and social turmoil in Maoist China);yet they notice that workers’ rights are not fully respected (Ah Kong). Aslabor laws are unevenly applied across the country, some factories betterobserve them while some ignore the law; therefore, some ambivalentworkers occasionally discredit the labor law system, while at times they willalso show appreciation (Ah Xi).

Although the ambivalent workers do not give their full consent to thelabor law system, it still exercises a certain degree of hegemonic effect onthem. Due to the normalizing mechanism of labor laws, some ambivalentworkers hold that what labor laws prescribe and whatever the courts decidemust be right and indisputable (Jian Hua). For some of them, ‘fairness’ and‘justice’ mean observing legal standards. Moreover, similar to some criticalworkers that have had individual labor dispute experiences, they considerrights defense via legal channels an appropriate form of labor activism,believing that workers’ resistance should be carried out within legalboundaries (Gui Nan); but, at the same time, they try to justify ‘extreme’actions by workers. Also, some of them express greater confidence whentheir demands have legal grounds (Chang Shan). Furthermore, due to thetransmuting mechanism of legal hegemony, most of the ambivalentworkers think that the central government is pro-labor, and that it is thecorrupt local governments that have failed to enforce labor laws rigorously.They do not challenge the legal content or the rule-setters that favor thecapitalist mode of production.


Two last points must be noted in regards to the critical and ambivalentworkers. Despite their skepticism over labor laws, labor laws have helpedsome of them overcome hierarchical relations at the workplace so that theywere able to negotiate with their bosses on equal footing (Shu Ren and JianHua). Labor laws also embolden some workers to talk to governmentofficials audaciously and hold them accountable for their failure in legalimplementation. As elaborated in Chap. 3, the labor law system has turnedworkers from class actors into juridico-political subjects so as to maskcapitalist domination; but it somehow has bestowed workers with a feelingof ‘equality’ with their bosses, fuelled their rights defense and assertion‚and given them courage to confront employers and government officials.Because of this kind of legal impact, some scholars argue that laws haveparadoxically become ‘political resources’ that Chinese workers can utilizeto defend their interests (Chan 2012, 325). Some scholars also hold thatthe proliferation of labor laws, the party-state’s emphasis on the rule of lawand the rights discourse have emboldened aggrieved groups to ‘fight thepower’ (Diamant et al. 2005; Chen and Xu 2012, 90) and help raisedrights consciousness and legal consciousness of workers (Chen and Tang2013, 576). It has even led to the mushrooming of ‘rightful resistance’ inChina (O’Brien and Li 2006), in which the claims of protesters are basedon laws, policies and official rhetoric while they carry out some disruptive(but not unlawful) collective action in order to curb the power of gov-ernment officials. All these observations echo Thompson’s argument(1977) that legal rhetoric has been proactively adopted by the subordinateclass to protect their interests and to refrain the ruling class. However,Poulantzas reminds us that workers only enjoy an abstract and formalequality and that ‘[i]n this sense and this alone does modern law set thelimits of the exercise of power and of intervention by the state apparatuses’(2000, 92).

Finally, most critical and ambivalent workers, like the affirmativeworkers, view Chinese economic reform in a positive light and haveendorsed the developmental strategy of letting some people becomewealthy first, even though they are aware that the well-being of workers isbeing sacrificed (see Chang Shan). They approve of economic developmentbecause it has brought them job opportunities and better living standardsin comparison to the pre-reform period (see Jian Hua), and it has madetheir country strong vis-à-vis other countries. Despite their generalapproval of economic development, they, nevertheless, complain about lowwages, unequal social benefits among migrant workers and urban citizens‚

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and the widening income gap. Still, some workers reveal a sense of resig-nation towards unbalanced economic development (Gui Nan). A fewworkers (like Xin Xin) have displayed disapproval towards economicdevelopment, criticizing it for being beneficial to the rich and the gov-ernment only. They understand that workers help the rich to create wealthbut barely enjoy the fruits of economic prosperity.

In brief, although the indifferent workers have manifested apathy andresignation to the labor law system, and both the critical and ambivalentworkers do not place complete trust in it, it is still able to secure theirpassive consent because their worldviews and actions are somehow con-strained by capitalist-legal boundaries.

NOTES

1. Interview T1.2. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-06/15/content_15503

891.htm accessed 2nd February 2014.3. Interview G1. Also see 2010 at http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/jx.

xinhuanet.com/news/2009-12/10/content_18459005.htm, accessed on12th July 2014.

4. Interviews with over 25 representatives from overseas business chambers inChina between April and July 2011.

5. Interview G1. Also see http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wage-arrears-cases-continue-dominate-worker-protests-November, accessed on 24thJuly 2014.

6. A labor NGO staff in Shenzhen shares with me that most factories want tohire workers of age from 18 to 25.

7. Interview T2.8. See http://finance.sina.com.hk/news/-33452-6821719/1.html, accessed

on 26th July 2014.9. Interview R2.

10. Interview E1.11. Interview R3.12. Interview R4.13. According to the Report on the Social Development in China 2014

(Zhongguo Minsheng Fazhan Baogao 2014) by the Institute of SocialScience Survey of the Beijing University, the top 1% of the wealthiestfamilies own more than one-third of the total wealth in China while thepoorest 25% own only 1% of the national wealth. See http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/realtime/china/20140726/52732681, accessed on 27thJuly 2014.


http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-06/15/content_15503891.htm

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-06/15/content_15503891.htm

http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/jx.xinhuanet.com/news/2009-12/10/content_18459005.htm

http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/jx.xinhuanet.com/news/2009-12/10/content_18459005.htm

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wage-arrears-cases-continue-dominate-worker-protests-November

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wage-arrears-cases-continue-dominate-worker-protests-November

http://finance.sina.com.hk/news/-33452-6821719/1.html

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/realtime/china/20140726/52732681

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/realtime/china/20140726/52732681

14. Interview R6.15. See http://www.worldlabour.org/eng/files/Dispatch%20labour%20a%

20preliminary%20study%20%28chinese%20report%29.pdf, accessed on25th July 2014.

16. Interview R14.17. For example, the 2008 Labour Contract Law, the 2013 Measures for the

Implementation of Administrative License for Labor Dispatch, the 2014Temporary Regulation on Dispatch Labour.

18. See http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130206/151614521283.shtml, accessed on 25th July 2014 and http://www.worldlabour.org/eng/files/Dispatch%20labour%20a%20preliminary%20study%20%28chinese%20report%29.pdf, accessed on 25th July 2014.

19. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china, accessed on 5th April2014.

20. http://big5.cntv.cn/gate/big5/news.cntv.cn/special/opinion/laborsalary/, quoting the figures from the national statistic bureau, acces-sed on 5th April 2014.

21. Interview F1.22. Interview H1.23. http://big5.cntv.cn/gate/big5/news.cntv.cn/special/opinion/

laborsalary/, accessed on 5th April 2014.24. Interview R10.25. See http://www.infzm.com/content/92430, accessed 11th July 2014.26. Interview R11.27. Interview P2.28. Interview P1.29. Interview P5.30. Interview Q15.31. Interview P3.32. Interestingly, even though his last employer did not pay him compensation

according to the labor laws and he had to resort to the legal channel tosolve the disputes, he still considered his boss not exploitative.

33. Interview P8.

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Allen, Steven G. 1984. Trade Unions, Absenteeism, and Exit-Voice. Industrial andLabor Relations Review 37 (3): 331–345.

Blecher, Marc, and Vivienne Shue. 1996. Tethered Deer: Government and Economyin a Chinese County. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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http://www.worldlabour.org/eng/files/Dispatch%20labour%20a%20preliminary%20study%20%2528chinese%20report%2529.pdf


http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130206/151614521283.shtml

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Chan, King Chi Chris. 2012. Class or Citizenship? Debating Workplace Conflict inChina. Journal of Contemporary Asia 42 (2): 308–327.

Chen, Feng. 2004. Legal Mobilization by Trade Unions: The Case of Shanghai.China Journal 52: 27–45.


Chen, Feng, and Xu Xin. 2012. “Active Judiciary”: Judicial Dismantling ofWorkers’ Collective Action in China. China Journal 67 (January): 87–107.

Diamant, N., S. Lubman, and K.J. O’Brien. 2005. Engaging the Law in China:State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Femia, Joseph V. 1975. Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of AntonioGramsci. Political Studies 23 (1): 29–48.


Freeman, Richard B. 1976. Individual Mobility and Union Voice in the LaborMarket. American Economic Review 66 (2): 361–368.

Gallagher, Mary E. 2004. “Time is Money, Efficiency is Life”: The Transformationof Labor Relations in China. Studies in Comparative International Development39 (2): 11–44.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hui, Sio-Ieng Elaine, and King-Chi Chris Chan. 2015. Going Beyond theUnion-Centred Approach: A Critical Evaluation of Recent Trade UnionElections in China. British Journal of Industrial Relations.

Lubman, Stanley. 1999. Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years.Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 20: 383–424.


McNally, Christopher. A. 2011. China’s changing guanxi capitalism: Privateentrepreneurs between Leninist control and relentless accumulation. Businessand Politics 13 (2): 1–28.

O’Brien, Kevin J., and Lian Jiang Li. 2006. Rightful Resistance in Rural China.Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Pearson, Margaret M. 1997. China’s New Business Elite. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 2000. State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso.Pun, Ngai, and Lu Huilin. 2010. Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger, and

Class Action among the Second Generation of Peasant-Workers in Present-DayChina. Modern China 36 (5): 493–519.





Wedeman, Andrew. 2005. Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification ofCorruption in China. Journal of Contemporary China 14 (42): 93–116.


Xu, F. 2009. The Emergence of Temporary Staffing Agencies in China.Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 30 (2): 431–462.

Xue, Hong. 2008. Local Strategies of Labor Control: A Case Study of ThreeElectronics Factories in China. International Labor and Working-Class History73: 85–103.

Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui. 2002. The Resilience of Guanxi and its New Deployments:A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship. The China Quarterly 170: 459–476.

196 E.S.I HUI

CHAPTER 6

Workers’ Refusal to Consent

1 INTRODUCTION

In Chaps. 4 and 5, I illustrate, respectively, in what ways the affirmativeworkers have granted active consent to legal hegemony and in what waysthe indifferent, ambivalent, and critical workers have rendered passiveconsent to it. In this chapter, I focus on the radical workers who are ratherinsusceptible to legal hegemony, refusing to consent to the values andworldviews it promulgates.

2 RADICAL WORKERS


It is uncommon for the workers-informants that have not encountered anylabor conflicts to develop a radical attitude towards labor laws and thesocio-economic and political worldviews that they reproduce. Wang Lin isone of the few exceptions. She is 25 years old and has obtained a universitydegree.1 She is an assistant to a division head in a Japanese car factory inGuangzhou, earning around 5000 yuan per month. Compared to otherinterviewees that have not experienced any overt industrial conflicts, sheknows more about labor laws. In our interview, she keenly explained to mesome legal differences between Guangzhou and Shenzhen. She has takengreat initiative to look up information on labor laws and politics through,for example, TV news, web surfing, online fora and so forth. She even


197

applies the technique of ‘Fanqian’ (which means using a Virtual PrivateNetwork, or VPN) to gain access to foreign websites banned by theChinese government, believing that many Chinese online sources areunreliable. She notes that labor laws offer workers some degree of pro-tection; hence, she is motivated to gain legal knowledge so that she wouldknow what to do if her boss were to act illegally. However, she has alsoformulated radical opinions on labor laws, the state and the economy.

Researcher: Have you heard of rights-defense according to laws?Wang Lin: Yes, but the laws guiding rights-defense are very broad and

vague. Therefore, only those who have power [quan] candefend their rights. If you don’t have any power, you can’t doso.

Researcher: What difficulties are there for ordinary people to defend theirrights?

Wang Lin: First, the legal system has defects [bu wanshan]. Second,guanxi politics [the politics of personal connection] are toodeep-seated in China. If we do not eradicate these twoproblems, rights-defense is difficult for ordinary people.

Researcher: What legal defects are you referring to?Wang Lin: There exist many legal loopholes of which businesses have

taken advantage. Labor laws only spell out the general rules,but their specific details are subject to the interpretation andmanipulation of some people. In my opinion, the legaldefects are linked to defects in the [political] system [tizhi buwanshan]; there isn’t a big difference between having laws ornot.

Researcher: What do you mean by the ‘defects of the [political] system’?Wang Lin: For example, if Jiang Zemin’s son killed somebody, he might

be sentenced to jail for only 5 years; but if an ordinary personwere to do something like that, he would need to compen-sate a life with his life. This example shows that the guanxinetwork in China is too complicated, and that the legalsystem is not well developed and has many loopholes.

Researcher: What do you think about the rule of law?Wang Lin: I really think laws should be something useful to ordinary

people. Now, the mandate of laws does not come from thepeople; they are used to govern [zhili] and manage [guanli]us. Laws are made by administrators [guanli renyuan];

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what’s the use for us? Ordinary people should be the point ofdeparture for laws; only when people believe that certainrules are protective, only then should they be turned intolaws. What’s the point of making laws that don’t protect us?Right now, we don’t know who makes the laws and whattheir purposes are.

Researcher: Do you think labor laws are neutral, or do they favorbusinesses?

Wang Lin: I have read through some labor laws; theoretically speaking,some of them seek to protect workers, but in reality, they endup being utilized differently from their intentions whenoriginally implemented.

While the affirmative workers in Chap. 4 and some ambivalent workersin Chap. 5 approve of the discourses of legal rights-defense and the rule oflaw, Wang Lin is highly skeptical of these notions, hinting that unequalsocial power relations make the rights-defense of ordinary people difficult[‘If you don’t have any power, you can’t do so’]. She critiques guanxipolitics in China for leading to lax legal enforcement; she does not onlyblame individual government cadres for this, but also the tizhi, the politicalsystem. She recognizes that the legal and political spheres are intricatelyrelated, and that the latter contributes to the former’s defects [‘the legaldefects are linked to the defects of the [political] system’]. She considersthe current legal system dominated by the political system rather thanresponding to people’s needs. In contrast to the workers that see labor lawsas authoritative yardsticks for judging employers and the government,Wang Lin regards the objectives of laws to be ‘managing’ and ‘governing’the people.

As Wang Lin hints, the legal system is inseparable from the state andpower relationships in society. Our conversation on the party-state andChina’s economic development continues below.

Researcher: Do you think the government is neutral or…?Wang Lin: For sure it is biased towards businesses. The Chinese

government’s economic performance depends heavily onthem; companies pay much more taxes than individuals do.

Researcher: Is it the central government or local governments that arebiased towards businesses?

WORKERS’ REFUSAL TO CONSENT 199

Wang Lin: The central government leans towards whoever has money…that’s my feeling. Ordinary people’s rights-defense activitiesare very difficult. If the media were to report their issues andeverybody knew about them, then local governments wouldno longer be able to shelter the businesses, and they wouldhave no choice but to follow normal procedures. But ifworkers’ issues are not reported on or made big, nobodywould know what the government would do.

Researcher: Some people suggest that if the Chinese people could electtheir own government, they would be better protected. Whatdo you think about this?

Wang Lin: Like the election system in the USA?Researcher: Yes, or like grassroots elections in some Chinese villages.Wang Lin: It certainly would be better. However, there is a population

of 1.4 billion people in China; it would be difficult to do this.Researcher: Why would it be difficult?Wang Lin: Even if we were to change the government officials, they

would always be from the CCP as only one party exists inChina. Nobody can supervise and monitor them; even ifthere would be, they’d still be from the CCP. It is‘self-supervision’ [zijiren jiandu zijiren]. Nothing goodcomes out of this. Even if we have a vote, it’s useless [meiyouyong]; those elected are always from the few [political]circles that exist. Elections are useless unless two or threepolitical parties are allowed to compete in elections. Only inthis situation can poorly performing government officials bekicked out of office. Only then can we truly achieve thepurpose of democratic elections. Nowadays in China, even ifall the people were to have the right to vote, those electedwould be from the CCP. What’s the use of that? It’s useless.

Researcher: What do you think about China’s economic development?Wang Lin: The economy has developed rapidly, too rapidly. China’s

economy has integrated globally [yu guoji jiegui], but whenwill our wage levels be synchronized with global standards?It’s true that China is getting rich, but the money has gone tothe government and the rich, not to ordinary people.

Researcher: Do you think workers can share in the fruits of the economicdevelopment?

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Wang Lin: No. It [economic development] is useless. China’s economygrows speedily and prices increase quickly, but ordinarypeople’s wages can’t catch up with inflation. The money goesto the government, and it’s kept by the government.Ordinary people don’t know how the government spendsthe money, but we know for sure it is not spent on thepeople.

Wang Lin’s comments on the party-state and economic developmentare substantially distinct from the workers in the previous two chapters.Instead of seeing the party-state as neutral or inclined towards workers, sheunderscores the symbiotic relationship between the government and thecapitalists—the party-state depends on business investments for taxes andeconomic growth [‘The Chinese government’s economic performancedepends heavily on them; companies pay much more taxes than individualsdo’] while the wealthy class gains socio-economic privileges under theshelter of the government [‘If the media were to report their issues andeverybody knew about them, then local governments would no longer beable to shelter the businesses, and they would have no choice but to follownormal procedures. But if workers’ issues are not reported on or made big,nobody would know what the government would do’]. Unlike someaffirmative and ambivalent workers, she does not thank capitalists for jobcreation or see the fast-growing economy as an object of national pride.Instead, she feels that the economy has been developing too rapidly andthat workers barely benefit from it. For Wang Lin, peoples’ livelihoodscannot be improved by simply changing the laws (because they are dom-inated by the political regime), by replacing the government with anotherCCP faction, or by simply giving people the right to vote. The root of theproblem lies in the current political system which bars competition amongcandidates that hold different political beliefs.

Although she has no labor dispute experiences, Wang Lin is able tocultivate radical positions towards legal hegemony probably because of herrelatively higher education which allows her to think independently.Moreover, she is interested in political issues and is motivated to learncritical information about the country and society through the internet. Asa young migrant worker, she is well equipped with technological knowl-edge (Qiu 2009) which permits her to access websites banned by theparty-state. This might also have contributed to the formation of herradical positions.



Lin Xia is 20 years old.2 When studying in vocational secondary school, shehad an internship at a hotline center for a telecommunication company inGuangzhou. Under the current educational system, students from voca-tional schools must complete internships for a period of 1 year or moreduring their 3 years of study in order to obtain academic qualification. Thedisproportionately long internships are results of the state’s effort tochannel cheap, young‚ and semi-skilled labor into secondary industries.Many factories abuse this system by offering student interns wages, bene-fits, and working conditions below legal standards while assigning them thesame duties as normal workers. Yet these factories are not violating anylabor laws because student internships are regulated through the EducationLaw; the labor law system does not consider student interns to be workers,they are thus denied proper legal protection, though they produce surplusvalue for factories in the same ways as normal workers. News about theill-treatment of student-interns is widely reported in China; the mostnotable cases are related to Nanhai Honda and Foxconn (Chan and Pun2010; Chan and Hui 2012).

When this telecommunication company came to recruit student internsin Lin Xia’s school in Guangxi, it promised them basic monthly salaries of1200 yuan plus commission. However, when she and other students wentto the office in Guangzhou, the manager asked them sign internshipagreements that only offered them monthly salaries of 800 yuan. Initiallyshe insisted on not signing the agreement; she called her teachers for help,but they did not follow up with her complaint. Later, her managerthreatened her that if she did not sign the agreement, she would not beable to complete the internship, and thus, could not graduate from school.In the end, she bowed to the pressure. After working there for threemonths, she quit and found another job at a trading company as areplacement for her internship. In 2012, she graduated from vocationalsecondary school and was hired by an automobile factory in Foshan as aproduction worker.

Having learned some legal knowledge in school, Lin Xia says she knows‘what labor contracts are, what they should cover‚ and what is consideredillegal’. When she first entered the automobile factory, the managers fur-ther explained labor laws connected to holidays, rest days, and the otherlabor rights. When I asked for her opinions on labor laws, she responded:

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Many policies and laws are made within a small circle of the government. Laborlaws are made to employers’ advantage. Take statutory holidays as an example;workers are only entitled to 11 days of paid statutory holidays every year,which is absolutely insufficient. The labor law system does not consider thesituation of workers; it only serves the capitalists. Employers think that ifworkers have too many statutory holidays, nobody would work for them, and theywould need to pay more, and thus earn less.

Different from the affirmative, ambivalent, and critical workers whosecriticism of the labor law system focuses on the enforcement level, Lin Xiasharply points out the ingrained inclinations of labor laws towards thecapitalists [‘Labor laws are made to employers’ advantage’] and theundemocratic nature of legislation in China [‘Many policies and laws aremade within the small circle of the government’]. In addition, she criticizesthe slogan of rights-defense in accordance with laws:

Rights-defense? Who defends our rights? Who helps us? The government? Itdoesn’t care about us. When workers are in need, where is the government?We know we should defend our rights, but who should we appeal to? Theroad of rights-defense in China is very long; it takes years. During the pro-cess, one encounters lots of frustrations and difficulties. Right now, theproblem is not that people do not know their rights, it is that they don’t know whocan help them.

In contrast to Qing Fa from Chap. 4 who views workers’ determinationand persistence as key to rights-defense, Lin Xia censures the governmentfor not providing proper assistance and infrastructure for workers’rights-defense. Instead of attributing unsuccessful rights-defense to thepoor psychological qualities of individuals, she believes the government isobligated to handle worker grievances and facilitate their rights-defense[‘When workers are in need, where is the government?’]. The govern-ment should ‘serve the people’, opines Lin Xia, but the Chinese people donot exercise any power over the government. She also criticizes tradeunions for failing to aid workers’ rights-defense: ‘they only organizerecreational activities and from time to time give workers small gifts andcoupons’.

Compared to Ah Wen from the affirmative group (Chap. 4), Jian Huafrom the ambivalent group‚ and Fu Shan from the critical group (Chap. 5),the normalizing mechanism of legal hegemony has exerted a less


remarkable impact on Lin Xia. She does not take labor laws as thebenchmark for measuring fairness or exploitation. Instead, she uses the gapbetween how much workers gain and how much factories earn, i.e., thesurplus value appropriated by capitalists, as an indicator. She stresses:

My company uses all kinds of excuses for not giving us a decent wage increaseand fair annual bonus. But actually, the money it earns from selling just onetransformer would be enough for granting all production workers a yearlybonus equivalent to two months of salary for them. They think we don’tknow mathematics. Capitalists are capitalists; they always put their owninterests as the top priority. It’s so unfair that we work so hard but earn so littlein comparison to them.

Lin Xia knows clearly how much the factory’s products are sold for, howmuch workers are paid‚ and thus how much her employer earns. Therefore,even though her boss offers wages higher than legal minimum rate, she isunsatisfied and feels the wages are unfair. She is asking for decent wagesand a fairer distribution of profits between workers and employers ratherthan the legal minimum wage.

Most likely due to her acute awareness of capitalist exploitation, Lin Xiaexpresses deeper discontent towards Chinese economic development incomparison to the other types of workers. Instead of approving of thestrategies of ‘let some people get rich first’, she decries uneven develop-ment and the grave wealth disparity within the country, ‘The governmenthas allowed people from the urban areas to become wealthy first andinvests a lot in the coastal areas; therefore, people want to leaveunderdeveloped areas and rush to the more developed ones. As a conse-quence, there is a great disparity between different regions.’

As pointed out by some studies (Pun and Lu 2010; Chan and Hui2012), the second generation of migrant workers are less tolerant of unjusttreatment at work in comparison to the older generation. Belonging to thisnew generation of workers, Lin Xia is more radical in response to herexperience with unfairness. Moreover, in contrast to workers in somelow-skilled industries that have usually only finished primary or juniorsecondary school, Lin Xia is comparatively well educated. Having workedin the automotive industry, which has been an important pillar of theChinese economy, and possessing semi-skilled labor in production, hermarketplace and workplace bargaining power are relatively bigger; hence,she is more confident and vocal.

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Xiao Bao came to work in the cities in 2002.3 When she studied invocational secondary school, her teachers always stressed the ‘professionaletiquette’ of workers, teaching them to be legally compliant when workingin cities. Xiao Bao discloses:

The teachers told us to be obedient and loyal to companies, and to followmanagers’ orders. But having worked in the cities for some time and wit-nessing all kinds of unfairness facing workers, such as work accidents, longwork hours‚ and exploitative wages, I realize that nobody has ever told uswhat to do if our employers were to violate labour laws.

The discrepancies between what her teachers taught her and how fac-tories operate in reality disillusion Xiao Bao. She witnesses and experiencesunequal power relations between workers and employers, which leads herto reflect on the ‘unreasonable distribution of profits’ (fenpei bu heli). Shequestions why managers and employers who do not produce commoditiesearn far more than workers do. Similar to Lin Xia, for Xiao Bao, fairness isnot the mere fulfillment of legal standards but is related to how profits aredistributed between workers and employers.

Xiao Bao started out as a production worker in a state-owned enterprisein Shenzhen; after 2 years, she was promoted to be a clerk. In 2002, shecame to know a labor NGO close to her factory called Sunrise. At first, shewent to Sunrise just ‘for fun’ (qu wan), reading books from its library andchatting with other workers. Later, as she experienced more social injusticeand understood Sunrise’s mission better, she became an active volunteer inthe NGO and strongly identified with it. Through Sunrise, Xiao Baorealized ‘what workers should do if their rights are infringed upon’. Sherecalls:

In one of Sunrise’s meetings, its staff said workers can help improve society;then, I wondered how we had anything to do with social progress. The staffexplained that workers form society and contribute to its positive develop-ment; therefore, we have the power to change it‚ and each one of us is closelylinked to social progress.

In this factory, if workers resign a month prior to completion of theiremployment contracts, the manager deducts 350 yuan from their 590 yuanmonthly wages; if they resign less than a month before the contract ended,700 yuan would be deducted.4 In addition, workers only receive 80% of


wages owed to them if they cannot complete their contracts. In the early2000s, this kind of illegal practice was highly common in China. Xiao Baowas unaware that the factory had contravened labor laws until Sunrise staffinformed her. At the time, she had many opportunities to talk to workerswho planned to quit as she was responsible for handling documents relatedto their resignations. She would tell them about the company’s illegalpolicy, encouraging them to talk to the manager in groups to retrieve theirmoney from the factory. Inspired by Sunrise, Xiao Bao demonstrates aconsciousness of labor–capital conflicts, as well as a concern for otherworkers facing injustice.

Xiao Bao did not like her job, which was to discipline workers and finethem (5–20 yuan) for inappropriate behavior and non-compliance withdress code, such as not cutting their nails, not drying their hands afterwashing up, not wearing socks‚ and so forth. She felt depressed andunhappy with her disciplinary role‚ and found vast inequality embedded inlabor relations. Therefore, she resigned after working in this factory for 3years. As per practice, her manager deducted a portion of money from herfinal month’s salary. She then went to negotiate with him, and finally, got300 yuan back. During the process of her rights-defense, she tried to seekhelp from the enterprise trade union, but it was not responsive and so sheturned to Sunrise for support.

After quitting this state-owned factory, Xiao Bao worked in aTaiwanese-owned electronics factory as a clerk in 2005. Encouraged andsupported by Sunrise, she decided to join the workplace union and run inthe union official elections. However, only two people, including Xiao Bao,joined the election, and there were not enough candidates to form a propertrade union. At the end, the company dissolved the trade union altogether.Xiao Bao wrote a letter of opposition to the deputy CEO but received noresponse.

Xiao Bao learned in Sunrise what trade unions ought to do and whattheir objectives should be, but she realized that in reality, many tradeunions do not perform their duties of serving worker interests. Thismotivated her to run for the election so as to arouse workers’ awareness ofthe proper role of trade unions and to initiate reform of her enterpriseunion. Xiao Bao explicates:

I think the labor movement in China needs trade unions as a vehicle toorganize workers collectively. Workers need to realize that collective powercan make a change. Without this vehicle, it is difficult to build up a strong

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labor movement. However, workers’ trade union consciousness is still verylow; they don’t know that unions should represent them and have notdeveloped an awareness that they need to monitor unions. Right now, theChinese unions remain welfare providers rather than being vehicles to fightfor the real interests of workers.

In fact, some labor NGOs in the PRD have adopted the same strategyconcerning trade unions. Since independent unions are forbidden in China,labor NGOs cannot openly advocate for them. Instead, these NGOsbelieve that exposing the discrepancies between the ideal functions ofunions and their actual performance can heighten workers’ consciousnessof their rights as union members. They also believe that encouragingworkers to exercise their union members’ rights actively might be able topressure official unions to reform.

Xiao Bao discerns a huge gap between what labor laws should be andwhat they are in reality. She gauges that labor laws do not protect workers.

Many factories do not abide by the laws. I don’t think labor laws offerworkers much protection. Although it has become more common foremployers to sign labor contracts with workers, it is still difficult to makethem follow contractual terms and labor laws; they always manage to getaround the laws. The rule of law is deceiving. Labor laws are tilted towards thecapitalists; the government seldom punishes employers operating illegally,but, instead, allows them to continue their unlawful practices.

She stresses that some new laws have made workers worse off whilebenefiting employers. For instance, the 1988 Regulations Concerning theLabour Protection of Female Staff and Workers spelt out that employersmust not assign women workers certain tasks during their menstrual per-iod,5 but this stipulation has been removed from the 2012 SpecialProvisions on Labour Protection for Female Employees.6 This has deprivedwomen workers of certain protections and permits employers to exploittheir labor fully. Unlike the affirmative, ambivalent, and critical workers,Xiao Bao does not simply associate problems with the labor law system toirresponsible government departments or corrupt officials; neither do hercriticisms focus solely on legal implementation. Instead, she views the laborlaw system and the process of legislation as inherently biased towards thecapitalists [‘The rule of law is deceiving. Labor laws are tilted towards thecapitalists’]. For her, the rule of law is deceiving because it has establishedrules that favor employers and tolerates their illegal practices.


Xiao Bao worked in the Taiwanese factory for a year before she becamea staff-person at Sunrise in 2005. She is now responsible for activitiesrelated to women workers, including visiting women workers in theirdormitories and hospitals, organizing focus groups‚ and so forth. Sheexplains that Sunrise helps workers in a number of ways. First, it informsworkers of labor laws and labor rights through classes on labor laws andfocus group discussions. It helps workers to ‘understand how they havebeen discriminated against and oppressed in the workplace and society’.Second, Sunrise provides a platform for workers from different factories toshare their frustration and grievances at work, and to discuss ways ofdealing with them. Also, it endeavors to promote mutual support andsolidarity among workers. Third, it aims to boost workers’ confidence,encouraging them to express what they think and to strive for what theydeserve. For example, a woman worker was accused of sleeping with a boyin her dormitory in the daytime; the company fined her 300 yuan anddenounced her in a public notice as a filthy, disgusting animal (zhugouburu). The woman worker felt humiliated and was extremely upset. Withthe encouragement and support given by Sunrise, she exposed this issue tothe media.

Fourth, Sunrise helps workers to defend their rights and strengthen their‘capacity for action’ (xingdong li). The staff always discuss ‘the strategies andactions’ for redressing a variety of workplace issues with workers. WithSunrise’s support, some workers have taken collective action to improvetheir working conditions. In one case, five women workers initiated apetition among their fellow workers to demand a high-temperature subsidyfrom their factory. In another case, a group of women workers, who weredissatisfied with the poor quality of meals offered by the factory (whichmainly consisted of sour green beans), collected more than two hundredsignatures from co-workers to demand better food. Fifth, increasingly moreNGOs, including Sunrise, try to intervene in workers’ collective actions,such as strikes. However, due to the suppressive political environment inChina, their intervention is usually carried out in a low-key manner.


Zhi Wan is responsible for management of facilities at a factory located inPanyu city-district of the city of Guangzhou.7 He is over 30 years old andhas completed the vocational secondary school. Having self-studied laborlaws since 2006, he passed the legal examination and obtained a lawyer’s

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practice certificate. He is active in providing legal advice to other workersand representing them in courts and arbitration as an agent ad litem. In hisopinion, the living standards and material life of the Chinese people haveimproved; now, most people own electronic appliances, cell phones and soforth. However, he notes, it is still unsatisfying in terms of peoples’ spiritualand psychological development. For example, due to the discriminatoryhousehold registration system many migrant workers’ children are leftbehind and raised in villages by their grandparents while their parents haveto work in the cities; this, he suggests, has detrimental impact on thegrowth of the next generation.

Zhi Wan has been active in the labor movement for some years‚ and hasrich experiences in both individual and collective rights-defense. With thesupport of a labor NGO, he and some workers have formed a ‘volunteergroup’ in Panyu, aiming to promote worker rights. Since 2011, they haveinitiated a series of legal actions to challenge the legality of the minimumwage standard in Panyu. According to the Provisions on Minimum Wage,each province should set the minimum wage rate in different cities under itsadministrative rule. Guangdong province has a four-tier minimum wagestandard. The first tier minimum wage rate is the highest one and applies tothe biggest cities that are well-developed and have higher living standards;the fourth tier rate is the lowest and applies to the least developed citieswithin the province. Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province, has12 regions which are subject to different minimum wage rates. In 2011,Panyu and four other city-districts were assigned the second-tier minimumwage rate (1100 yuan per month at the time) while the other 7 regionswere given a first-tier rate (1300 yuan).

In 2011, Zhi Wan and his fellow workers found that the Notice on theMinimum Wage Standards issued by the Guangzhou Municipal HumanResources and Social Security Bureau (hereafter referred to as theGuangzhou Social Security Bureau) did not conform to the documentissued by the Guangdong provincial government, which has greaterauthority. The provincial document stated that Guangzhou’s monthlyminimum wage in 2011 was 1300 yuan (i.e., the first-tier rate) and did notdictate that Panyu must implement the second-tier minimum wage, butthe city document determined that Panyu should apply the second-tierminimum wage rate (which was 1100 yuan).8 Zhi Wan and five otherworkers held that Panyu’s minimum wage standard as decided by theGuangzhou Social Security Bureau was unlawful because city policiesshould not override provincial ones. Different from some affirmative,


ambivalent‚ and critical workers that took labor laws as a yardstick formeasuring fairness and justice, Zhi Wan and his fellow workers overcamethe normalizing effects of the labor law system to challenge the legalstandards concerning minimum wages. As will be elucidated shortly, theycontested the legality of Panyu’s minimum wage through various legalactions: (1) applying for disclosure of information from the GuangzhouSocial Security Bureau; (2) applying for administrative reconsiderationfrom the Guangdong Social Security Bureau; (3) applying for review ofadministrative documents from the Legislative Affairs Office of theGuangzhou Municipal Government (hereafter referred to as theGuangzhou Legislative Affairs Office); and (4) suing the Guangzhou SocialSecurity Bureau.

According to the 2008 Regulations on the Disclosure of GovernmentInformation,9 the government at different levels should operate in atransparent manner by disclosing information that is pertinent to theinterests of citizens, legal persons, and organizations, that needs to bespread widely throughout society, that is related to the structures of gov-ernment departments, missions‚ and work procedures, as well as disclosingpolicies and rules that are based on established laws (Article 9). TheRegulations also grants citizens the right to apply for disclosure of theaforementioned information from ministries under the State Council,governments at different levels, and government agencies above the countylevel (Articles 13 and 20). Appealing to the Regulations, in June 2011, ZhiWan and his team submitted a joint letter to the Guangzhou SocialSecurity Bureau enquiring about the factors that it had taken into con-siderations for the determination of the Panyu’s minimum wage level. It isworth noting that their endeavor reflects a rising trend in broader society.According to an official newspaper report, more people increasingly fileadministrative cases to demand the disclosure of government informa-tion.10 For example, in Beijing, the number of these cases jumped from 10in 2008 to 551 in 2012, witnessing a 55 fold increase within 5 years.

In July 2011, the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau replied to Zhi Wanand other workers, alleging that the information that they requested didnot fall within the scope of its responsibilities, and thus, ‘should not bedisclosed by the Bureau’.11 Dissatisfied, in September 2011, Zhi Wan andhis team applied for reconsideration from the Guangdong Social SecurityBureau regarding whether the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau’s replyto their enquiry was appropriate. According to the 2007 Regulations onthe Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law, citizens

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have the right to apply for administrative reconsideration in situationswhereupon their legal rights are infringed (Article 6). The GuangdongSocial Security Bureau determined in December 2011 that its subordinateat the city level was unreasonable in claiming itself to hold no authority toexplain why Panyu’s minimum wage was 1100 yuan rather than 1300yuan. It invalidated the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau’s reply to theworkers and ordered it to issue an appropriate reply.

In March 2012, the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau issued a newreply. It held that according to Article 13 of the 2008 Regulations on theDisclosure of Government Information, only when the information theyrequest is related to their production, livelihood, scientific‚ and techno-logical research can they apply for its disclosure. As they had not provedthat they worked in Panyu and that their wages were at the legal minimumlevel, alleged the Bureau, they failed to prove that the information theyrequested was related to their livelihood or production, and thus, were notin the position to apply for the disclosure of information concerningPanyu’s minimum wage. Shortly after its reply, a high ranking official fromthe division of wages and welfare (gongzi fuli ke) under the GuangzhouSocial Security Bureau called them to arrange a meeting. In the meeting,this official promised them that the Bureau would disclose the requestedinformation and that the minimum wage rates within Guangzhou wouldbe unified soon. Later Zhi Wan and his volunteer group organized aseminar on minimum wages, inviting this official and a legal professor-cumlawyer from a university in Guangzhou to be the speakers. In the seminar,Zhi Wan had a heated debate with this official who denied what he pro-mised in the private meeting with the workers.

Along with their legal actions based on the laws concerning informationdisclosure and administrative reconsideration, their third legal front wasrelated to the review of administrative documents. In August 2011, theyapplied for review of whether the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau’snotice was made according to the 2011 Provisions of GuangzhouMunicipality on Administration of Normative Administrative Documentsfrom the Guangzhou Legislative Affairs Office. This Provision specifies thatany normative documents issued by the government at various levels ortheir agencies can only be promulgated upon approval from the LegislativeAffairs Office at the corresponding level; otherwise, citizens have the rightto not comply with them (Article 16). In addition, the normative docu-ments prepared by the government departments must be approved by thecorresponding government (Article 17). Therefore, in theory the notice


issued by the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau on Panyu’s minimumwage rate should have been reviewed and approved by the GuangzhouLegislative Affairs Office and the Guangzhou Government. However, thisnotice cannot be found in the Guangzhou government’s online database—the ‘administrative regulatory document full-text search system’12—whichcompiles all of the city’s normative documents. Because of this, Zhi Wansuspects that this notice might not have been issued in accordance withlegal procedures, and thus, should be considered legally null.

After investigating Zhi Wan and other workers’ inquiries, theGuangzhou Legislative Affairs Office determined in October 2011 that theGuangzhou Social Security Bureau’s notice was made in accordance withlegal procedures—the Bureau had asked for the Guangzhou government’sinstructions, and the latter had then sought the agreement of otherdepartments concerned. In addition, the Guangzhou Legislative AffairsOffice stressed, in its reply, that Guangzhou has always used two minimumwage rates for its districts, which did not violate the principle underscoredby the Guangdong government’s notice that ‘all Prefecture-level cities inprinciple should unify the minimum wage standard. Any districts [underthe prefecture] that can afford it, may set a higher standard, and [if so]should file a report to the Guangdong Social Security Bureau’. Zhi Wanwas unconvinced at all by the reply from the Guangzhou Legislative AffairsOffice, rebutting that the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau’s notice set alower, rather than a higher, minimum wage standard for Panyu and otherdistricts.

The fourth legal front initiated by Zhi Wan and his team took place inthe courts. According to the Administrative Procedure Law, citizens cansue a government department when their ‘lawful rights and interests havebeen infringed upon by a specific administrative act of an administrativeorgan’ (Article 2). As the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau denied themaccess to information concerning Panyu’s minimum wage, they filed anadministrative lawsuit in May 2012 against the Guangzhou Social SecurityBureau in the district court, requesting an explanation of the rationalebehind its minimum wage policies. This reflects another rising trend oflegal activism in China. It has been reported that an increasing number ofpeople file lawsuits against government agencies in courts for failure todisclose government information. However, citizen’s chances for winningthese cases remain slim. For instance, in Beijing in 2012, only 17.6% of theplaintiffs won the case.13 According to an NGO staff that I interviewed,

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more workers in Shenzhen have sued the Labor Bureau and the SocialSecurity Bureau for not monitoring firms closely which eventually harmsworker interests.14 As a means of pressuring government agencies toresolve workers’ issues, administrative lawsuits are a worker strategy forcircumventing the long, drawn-out procedures related to labor mediation,arbitration, and litigation.

In August 2012, echoing the legal reasoning issued by the GuangzhouSocial Security Bureau, the court ruled against Zhi Wan and his fellowworkers, stating that they could not prove the information they requestedwas related to their production, livelihood, or scientific and technologicalresearch. Some workers from Zhi Wan’s team, who were able to provetheir working status in Panyu and their wages with their employmentcontracts, then applied for information disclosure from the GuangzhouSocial Security Bureau once more in November 2012; the Bureau againrefused to disclose the rationale of its minimum wage policies. In January2013, these workers filed another administrative lawsuit against theBureau. In March 2013, the court ruled in favor of the workers, orderingthe Bureau to respond to their information disclosure request.

Although their campaign largely resorted to legal means, Zhi Wan andhis team mobilized immense extra-legal resources to support their legalfronts. First, they sought to generate wider support and stronger solidarityamong workers. Before commencing their legal campaigns, they organizeda meeting with workers in 2011 to discuss the minimum wage policies inGuangzhou. They also went to industrial areas to talk to workers about theissue. Second, they tried to connect with academics. Upon referral from thelabor NGO that had been supporting Zhi Wan and the volunteer group formany years, the legal scholars-cum-lawyers and law students from a uni-versity in Guangzhou gave vast support to their legal activism. They helpedthe workers conduct research, organize seminars, and render aid to theirlawsuit against the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau. Zhi Wan notes thatthis labor NGO was a vital source of support to their campaign throughprovision of advice and resources. He also shows substantial appreciation tothe assistance offered by the legal scholars and students.

Third, in hopes of mobilizing greater social support, they invitednewspapers to cover their stories.15 However, only two were willing toreport their actions, while most of the state-owned newspapers inGuangzhou declined. Zhi Wan reflects that ‘these newspaper work for thegovernment rather than for the people’. Being denied wider access to


mainstream media, they utilized Weibo, the Chinese equivalent to twitter,to spread news of their actions. The updates on their legal mobilizations,press releases‚ and so forth were posted onto Weibo, which was beingfollowed by around 900 people.

Their last strategy was to petition the government. In 2012, during theperiod of the meeting of the Guangdong People’s Congress, 16 workerspetitioned Congress members. As of June 2013, the Guangzhou SocialSecurity Bureau still has not replied to their request for information dis-closure, telling them that it is considering appealing to a higher courtconcerning the district court’s ruling. In spite of this, the Guangzhougovernment announced that starting in 2013, the minimum wage stan-dards in all districts under the jurisdiction of Guangzhou would be unified;this means that Panyu’s minimum wage rate would be raised to a higherstandard. Regarding this as a triumph, Zhi Wan believes their series ofactions has successfully pressured the government to change its minimumwage policies.

Zhi Wan and his team’s campaign for a higher minimum wage in Panyuillustrates that labor laws are not simply instruments for class control, butalso a terrain for class struggle. On the one hand, the Chinese ruling blocseeks to mediate state–labor–capital relations in favor of capital accumu-lation through the labor law system; on the other, some workers, like ZhiWan and his fellow workers, endeavor to advance their interests bystrategically utilizing legal resources and invoking legal logics in order toconstrain the ruling class with the same legal rhetoric it advocates. For thelabor law system to exercise double hegemony effectively, it must, to acertain extent, appear to be just and independent from manipulation byupholding some of its logics because the legal forms of equity and uni-versality are the basis upon which the ruling class’s legitimacy is built. Inother words, in order to maintain their legitimacy, the ruling class is subjectto the rule of law as much as the ruled are. Thompson summarizes thisdynamic well:

One the one hand, it is true that the law did mediate existent class relations tothe advantage of the rulers…as the century advanced the law became asuperb instrument by which these rulers were able to impose new definitionsof property to their even greater advantage…On the other hand, the lawmediated these class relations through legal forms, which imposed, again andagain, inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers….And not only were therulers (indeed, the ruling class as a whole) inhibited by their own rules of law

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against the exercise of direct unmediated force…, but they also believedenough in these rules, and in their accompanying ideological rhetoric, toallow, in certain limited areas, the law itself to be a genuine forum withinwhich certain kinds of class conflict were fought out. (Thompson 1977, 265)

In China, the ruling bloc apparently has not observed the labor lawsystem fully, but neither has it neglected the rule of law completely. Tomaintain the authority of the legal system, hegemony of the party-state andthe capitalist economy, the ruling class has, to a certain degree, subjecteditself to the legal rules and logics with which it seeks to constrain theChinese working class, as demonstrated in Zhi Wan’s case. Understandinglaws as an arena for class struggle, the struggles of Zhi Wan and his fellowworkers further demonstrate that some laws and policies ‘were defined andwon in struggle against the dominant interests in society not bestowed onsociety by theory’ (Hall 1980, 10).

When Zhi Wan first studied the law, he thought that they were fair andjust, and that the society could attain equality through laws. However,having been involved with the labor movement for some time now, he hasbecome disillusioned and strongly feels that the labor law system cannot doworkers justice. In other words, he has shifted from the affirmative modeinto the radical mode over the years. While some affirmative workers inChap. 4 view labor mediation and arbitration as useful means forrights-assertion, Zhi Wan criticizes them for wasting worker energy andtime:

What’s the purpose of establishing this system of labor arbitration? Thegovernment says it is to help resolve disputes quickly and timely. But a largepercentage of workers who have gone through arbitration will resort to thecourts eventually. So why make labor arbitration compulsory, makingworkers waste so much energy on arbitration? Why not allow them to bringtheir cases to courts directly?

In addition, Zhi Wan disapproves of the courts for their partiality. As alegal agent, he represented five other workers in the lawsuit against theGuangzhou Social Security Bureau. In court, the judge asked Zhi Wan,‘Have you ever thought about the consequences for getting involved withthis lawsuit?’ Zhi Wan took this as a threat from the court, which indeedacted on behalf of the government. In China, as explicated in Chap. 3, thecourts are still subject to the government’s influence because local


courts are financially dependent on local governments, and their judiciarypersonnel are appointed by local party-members and the government(Liebman 2007). It is a common occurrence in which ‘the courts are underenormous pressure to respond to political contingency’ (Friedman and Lee2010, 515).

In the past Zhi Wan used to attribute workers’ plight only tounscrupulous employers, but now he realizes that the government serves as‘a protective shield for employers’ (baohu san) and helps employers evadelegal responsibilities. In his opinion, the government does not safeguardworker interests, only those of the capitalists; it grants capitalists numerousrights and privileges, but does not request them to fulfill their legalobligations.

For example, the Labour Contract Law stipulates that employment contractsshould clearly state workers’ duties and work locations, but I have comeacross many cases in which these items have not been specified in contracts.Many employers simply put ‘worker’ as their duties. Because of this loophole,employers can assign tasks to workers arbitrarily, thus exploiting them fully.

Both the local and central government are the same. They always say laborlaws protect workers; then, at least they have to take a neutral position. Butcurrently, they are not even neutral; they are on the side of the firms.

In contrast to workers who are influenced by the transmuting mecha-nism of legal hegemony and thus only blame local governments for beingpartial towards employers, Zhi Wan is critical of both the local and centralgovernment. He understands that the central government and the localgovernment are no different; both of them do not safeguard workerinterests or are not even neutrally positioned in labor–capital relations. Hehighlights that the governments and the capitalists are intricately linked,and that the party-state acts as the capitalists’ ‘protective shield’. The‘people’ are supposed to monitor the government, he comments, but,“Who are the ‘people’? When the people really monitor the government,they would say that we are crazy.”

From Zhi Wan’s point of view, it is difficult for workers to carry outrights-defense according to laws due to weak legal implementation andinsufficient monitoring over the government.

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Legal rights defense eats up worker time and energy. Some workers spend alot of time on court cases, but cannot get a cent even if they win their casesbecause the courts do not enforce their rulings strictly and allow employers toget away with it.

Many workers can’t afford resolving their cases through time-consuminglabour mediation, arbitration and litigation; they then go to make trouble toarouse the government’s attention (naoshi). In China nowadays, if you maketrouble you can get some compensation; if you don’t make any trouble, you getnothing. Rather than creating ‘social harmony’, the current political and legalregime encourages workers to make trouble.

Zhi Wan regards compulsory labor arbitration as a hindrance to workers’rights-defense. He rightly reveals that many court rulings remain unim-plemented because employers can disappear or delay paying workerscompensation without being penalized. He questions why the courts do notpressure employers to fulfill court orders, ‘If somebody owes the judgesome money, I am sure the judge would make them pay by any meansnecessary.’ Zhi Wan’s opinion somehow echoes the findings of manystudies; the difficulties in implementing court orders in China are caused bythe governments’ protection of firms, weak punishment (Liebman 2007)‚and corruption of judiciary personnel (Lubman 1999).

Zhi Wan observes that workers’ rights consciousness has heightened.Regarding Panyu’s minimum wage being lower than some districts inGuangzhou, he notes that in the past workers accepted what the govern-ment decided without any complaint. Now, they are not only discontented,but also willing to take action to redress the inequality. He emphasizes thatthis case about Panyu’s minimum wage does not simply concern individualworkers, ‘We do not struggle for our own sake, we struggle together as agroup of workers in unity; this case is related to the interests of workers as abloc.’ Zhi Wan notes that many workers are active and willing to contributeto the legal campaign, offering help on their own initiative. This exhibits thegradual formation of their class consciousness and class identity.

Shao Jian works closely with Zhi Wan in the legal campaign pertinent toPanyu’s minimum wage.16 He is over thirty-years-old and has finishedvocational secondary school. He started to self-study laws in 1997, and hasrepresented workers in arbitration and litigation since 2003. In 2007, ShaoJian incurred a work accident, but his boss did not pay the medicalexpenses for him as required by law. Trying to hold him accountable, Shao


Jian resorted to legal channels, and the whole process took more than half ayear. He is now active in providing legal advice to workers who are in need,and also in representing workers in courts or arbitration.

For Shao Jian, labor laws are unjust and of little use to workers.

Corporations have a wealth of resources, such as lawyers and staff, so thatthey can easily exploit legal loopholes. Both firms and the government preferworkers to resolve disputes through legal means. But the laws kill us (bawomen gaosi) because workers usually get little compensation or nothing atall out of the long and complicated legal procedures. Some of them give uptheir claims because they are unable to spend so much time on the legalprocess.

Like Zhi Wan, Shao Jian realizes the negative impact of the labor lawsystem on workers’ rights defense. Its time-consuming nature excludes theworkers that could not afford to play the legal game; the government andbusinesses prefer workers to resolve labor disputes through legal means asthis puts workers in a disadvantaged position. Moreover, contrary to thebelief of some workers (see Chap. 4) that everybody is equal in front of thelaw, Shao Jian points out that in reality, workers and employers are not onan equal footing within the legal realm [‘Corporations have rich resources,such as lawyers and staff, so that they can easily exploit the legal loop-holes’]. The businesses exercise greater leverage in the legal arena as theyown a wealth of resources that enable them to manipulate legal loopholeswhile some workers do not even possess the time and money to play thelegal game. For Shao Jian, rights-defense according to laws is ‘not mean-ingful’ (mei shenme yiyi). The term ‘rule of law’ sounds appealing, but hequestions how many employers and government officials follow the laws inreality. He advocates that ‘taking extra-legal actions and holding equalnegotiations with employers are more effective ways of rights-defense’.A group of workers sought help from him because their factory had failedto contribute to their social insurance fund according to law. Althoughthey had applied for labor arbitration, they decided to put greater pressureon the employer through extra-legal actions. In the end, the employercompensated them before the arbitration even began. For Shao Jian, laborlaws are merely ‘rhetoric’ and ‘only when workers initiate collective actioncan their interests be better safeguarded’.

Shao Jian suggests that trade unions are basically non-existent (xingtongxushe); they offer workers little help in their rights defense or are simply

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absent during labor disputes. In cases where they intervene, they oftenpersuade workers to stop extra-legal actions rather than help them cham-pion their rights. Therefore, he considers the trade union slogan of ‘har-monious labor relations’ to be sarcastic and ironic. He opines thatharmonious labor relations are impossible in China, ‘If capital–labor rela-tions are unequal, and workers do not enjoy any bargaining status, it is hardto establish harmonious labor relations. To have harmony in the workplace,the official unions must function properly (zuowei), if not, they shouldallow workers to build their own trade unions.’

During the course of the legal actions regarding Panyu's minimum wagelevel, somebody came to talk to Shao Jian as a government representative,asking him questions and giving him pressure to ease their organizing. Thiswas not the first time that he has come under pressure from the governmentor businesses. In 2009, Shao Jian and some workers from the jewelryindustry sued their employer for labor disputes. Their employer thenblacklisted them and posted their information onto the internal website ofthe Panyu Jewelry Manufacturer Association. Because of this, they facedtremendous difficulties in getting jobs in the jewelry industry.17 They thenfiled a lawsuit against their employer, after which some undercover securitypolice pressured them into stopping litigation. In China, it is common forthe government to send undercover security officials to talk to people thatare considered a threat to the political regime, such as political activists, staffof labor NGOs, human rights activists, strike leaders, etc. Most labor NGOsand right-lawyers I interviewed are regularly approached by undercoversecurity officials. Facing this kind of political pressure, Shao Jiang does notfeel threatened, ‘I am very willing to take all these rights-defense actions.What I am doing is all legal. Of course, there is huge pressure for me to stop,but as this is related to the well-being of all workers, I will definitely carry on.’As elucidated in Chap. 2, the state always exercises coercion alongsideconsent-building to maintain the superiority of the ruling class. While thecoercive side of the Chinese party-state is not so noticeable in the life andwork experiences of the affirmative, indifferent, ambivalent, and criticalworkers, it is clearly manifested in that of the radical workers that attempt totake extra-legal collective actions to struggle for their interests. Governmentsurveillance and other forms of coercion generally surface in the event thatlegal hegemony fails to tame defiant workers.

Mei Xia is in her early twenties.18 She used to work in an automobileparts factory in the PRD where workers walked out in 2010 to demand an800 yuan wage increase and democratic trade union reform. At first, she


was a student intern in the factory and was hired as a formal productionworker after graduation. During on-site training, she thought that thefactory was good and that she would be able to learn something new.However, after formally starting her job, she found the work in assemblylines extremely boring and exhausting. Although workers’ salaries in thisfactory were higher than the city’s legal minimum wages, Mei Xia and herfellow workers considered them insufficient for a decent standard of living.They believed they deserved higher wages as they had worked hard toproduce huge profits for the company. That was the reason that they wenton strike.

Mei Xia was one of the leaders of the 2010 strike. She had close relationswith the rank-and-file workers from her department, many of which wereclassmates in vocational secondary school. They always gathered togetherto share their grievances. When they were vexed by the management ordiscontented with their work, they often said to each other, ‘One day,when I leave this factory, I will disrupt the assembly line so that themanagement will know I am not a coward’. The 2010 strike was kicked offby two workers from Mei Xia’s department, who submitted their resig-nation letters before the strike began. They cut off the electricity supply tothe production lines; then, many workers from the department stoppedworking and ran to the open area on the factory premises. The newsquickly spread to workers in other departments who then joined the strike.Mei Xia confessed that initially, she and other workers did not plan seri-ously for a strike. They only wanted to let out their emotion and anger, andthey simply wondered, ‘Why are we working so hard for such low wages?’In Mei Xia’s opinion, the management, who at first refused to talk to thestrikers and unilaterally proposed to raise their living subsidy by only 55yuan, had fuelled the resentment of strikers and made them even moredetermined to carry on with the strike. The antagonism between theworkers and management, as well as the tenacity of workers in their re-sistance, intensified during the process of the strike. In Thompson’s lan-guages (1980), the workers developed a stronger class consciousness in theprocess of collective struggle.

During the strike, the company deployed various intimidation tactics todemoralize the strikers, such as videotaping the strikers and pressuringstudent interns to sign a document declaring that they would not lead,organize‚ or join any strikes. In addition, it kept alleging that the strike wasillegal and had arranged legal experts to talk the workers into dropping the

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strike. Furthermore, in a meeting between the strike representatives andthe CEO of the automobile group to which their factory supplied spareparts, this CEO warned the worker representatives that their strike wasillegal and ordered them to resume production, threatening them that theiractions would affect their friends and families and that they would not beable to bear the consequences for violating the laws. Mei Xia attended thismeeting and was in quite a panic at the time as she knew little about thelegal regulations for strikes. She had little knowledge of labor laws prior tothe strike; both the vocational school she attended and the factoryneglected to inform her about the laws. During the meeting, she consultedwith supporters from some social groups through text messaging, and theytold her that there was legal ambiguity concerning strikes. Initially, Mei Xiadid not know how to respond to the CEO’s accusations, but later she madeup her mind:

No matter how the CEO threatens us, we should have no fear. We shouldcontinue our strike. Although I know nothing about the laws, and amuncertain about what he says about strikes, I should not be scared. As long asthe workers are united and do not resume their work, the company can’t doanything to us.

Mei Xia then asked the CEO exactly which clause in which law forbadestrikes, but the CEO could not give her a definite answer. All the repre-sentatives denied that their strike was illegal. Unsure of whether their strikewas legal or not, labor laws were not the catalyst for Mei Xia’s resistance asin the case of some affirmative, ambivalent‚ and critical workers. It wasworkers’ unity and collectivity that gave Mei Xia, a subordinate worker, thecourage to carry on the strike and emboldened her to overcome hierar-chical relations in the workplace to challenge management’s authority.

Subsequent to the meeting with the CEO, Mei Xia and other strikeleaders studied the labor laws more closely. Mei Xia got in touch with alegal scholar, as well as a labor scholar and student, who reassured her thattheir strike was not illegal; this made her feel relieved. The labor scholarand student advised her and other core leaders on how to organize theworkers, raise public support‚ and bargain with the company. The legalscholar later agreed to be the workers’ legal consultant in their wagenegotiations with the company. In the end, the company conceded to amonthly wage increase of around 32.4% for formal workers and about 70%


for student interns. Mei Xia highly appreciated the support rendered by thelegal scholar, stating, ‘He is a legal expert whose presence in the negoti-ations gave us confidence and helped our negotiations.’ She remarks thatthey might have been unable to settle the strike smoothly without any helpfrom the scholar.

Mei Xia distrusts the labor law system for ‘it contains many legalloopholes that are abused by businesses’. For example, she points out, aslong as companies pay workers the legal minimum wage, they do notbreach any laws, and thus, cannot be penalized, even though theiremployees are poorly remunerated. She challenges, ‘Is the minimum wageenough for a decent living? Whose interests does the government, who isresponsible for determining the minimum wage, serve?’ As illustrated inprevious chapters, the labor law system, in particular the minimum wagepolicy, has normalized the capitalist system of wage labor in post-socialistChina; some workers thus deem their bosses fair and above reproach forrendering them the minimum wage. Mei Xia, however, has overcome thenormalizing effect of the labor law system and contests the idea that what isstipulated in the law must be correct and fair.

Mei Xia also condemns the idea of legal rights-defense because workershave to pay high costs for doing so:

For workers seeking to defend their rights through legal channels, many needto give up their jobs as the legal procedures usually take a long time, maybemore than a year. Workers do not have much savings; they can’t afford tohave no job and spend most of their time on legal procedures. Therefore,many of them simply give up pursuing their rights through legal means.

In addition, Mei Xia points out that the rule of law in China is deceptivebecause the government does not respect laws. Since they want to retaininvestments in the city, local governments do not implement labor lawsstringently, or they often help employers control workers through theiradministrative powers. Taking the strike in her factory as an example, shemaintains that the district-level and town-level governments were backingthe factory rather than ‘being neutral’ as portrayed in the news. Thegovernment officials kept pressuring the strikers to resume work.Additionally, during wage negotiations with management, they kept per-suading the strike representatives to accept the company’s offer, suggestingthat it was already higher than the wages rendered by nearby factories.Moreover, after the strike ended, the government sent a student intern to

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investigate Mei Xia, trying to find out, for example, her work schedule, herfinancial situation, what she did in her spare time, etc. In order to give hergreater pressure, her father who lived a rural village was brought by thegovernment to the city to meet with the government officials.Furthermore, her communications were spied on by government officialsand higher level trade union officials, who were aware of her communi-cation exchange with supporters from various social groups.19 She wasinvited to an academic conference in Beijing to share her strike experience,but a provincial trade union official tried to deter her from going. Inaddition, she was given an award by a newspaper that organized a cere-mony to acknowledge the contribution of migrant workers to the coun-try,20 but she was stopped by the government from attending the awardceremony.21 Mei Xia points out that outsiders and the public might thinkthe government is neutral and does not take sides, but ‘in reality, they arepro-business’. Mei Xia is able to see through the apparent autonomy of theChinese government from businesses, and thus, does not consider the stateneutral or standing apart from the society.

The above-mentioned examples of government pressure on Mei Xiaillustrate their coercive tactics in taming worker activists. As reiterated,coercion and persuasion are both the ruling strategies of the state. TheChinese party-state’s coercive tactic are exemplified in a number of labordisputes that have arisen recently; for instance, twelve hospital securityguards in Guangzhou were detained for more than 50 days and convictedof ‘disturbing the peace’ for launching a protest in August 2013,22 aworker-activist in Shenzhen joined a strike in May 2013, and was thusdetained for over a year, facing criminal prosecution that was later drop-ped.23 My fieldwork finds that the party-state is relatively tolerant withworkers that only join protests or strikes, and do not directly organize them(like Liu Chiu and Cai Lin from the affirmative group). This type of workerseldom experiences the coercive side of the government. However, when itcomes to strongly committed worker-activists, like Mei Xia, who haveovercome legal hegemony to organize collective resistance, the party-stateresorts to forceful means to curb their activism.

It is worth highlighting that Mei Xia’s radical attitude towards the laborlaw system has developed out of her work and struggle experiences overtime. At first, she knew nothing about labor laws; then, during the strike,the fleeting moment of desire to be lawful emerged when she was warnedabout the alleged illegality of the strike. However, during the latter half ofthe strike and subsequent to it, she developed a radical criticism of the


labor law system, realizing that the laws were asymmetrically designed andexecuted.

Mei Xia reveals discontent towards Chinese economic development.Although China is the second largest economy in the world, she notes, itsper capita GDP still ranks low, and the wealth gap in the country hascontinued to widen24:

Our economy has been developing at the expense of workers. The governmenthas attracted foreign investment with a cheap labour force; our growing GDPhas been created in exchange for the sacrifice made by workers. Workers havecontributed tremendously to our country, but they can’t share in the fruits ofdevelopment. The government has channeled them into work in the cities,but under the current household registration system, they are ‘dumped back’into villages when they get old. Economic development has already reached acertain standard; the government should make sure that workers haveenough social protections.

Mei Xia does not endorse the capitalist mode of accumulation as it is,criticizing that China’s economic growth is built upon the sacrifice ofworkers, who can hardly share in the economic progress that has beenmade. She also denounces the governments for utilizing workers for eco-nomic development, but constraining them from enjoying proper socialwelfare and benefits with its household registration policies.

3 CONCLUSION

This chapter demonstrates that the radical workers have refused to renderany consent, not even passively, to legal hegemony. Various hegemonicmechanisms embedded into the labor law system have failed to shape theirworldviews and actions in favor of capital accumulation. The radicalworkers have overcome double hegemonic effects to formulate radicalchallenges to both the capitalist economy and the party-state. Concerningcapital–labor relations, first, while many affirmative, ambivalent, and criticalworkers have taken labor laws as a benchmark to gauge the behavior ofemployers and as a reference for defining fairness and justice, the radicalworkers are relatively immune to the normalizing mechanism of legalhegemony that seeks to normalize wage labor, surplus value extraction,profit maximization, and other capitalist managerial practices. The radicalworkers do not consider the legal minimum wage to be fair. Instead, they

224 E.S.I HUI

are aware of the huge gap between how much workers make and howmuch their factories earn; therefore, they ask for fair distribution of com-pany profits as wages. Some of them actively contest the legal minimumwage standards that they deem unfair through both legal and extra-legalactions, while some strive for fair wages through staging strikes. Moreover,they do not thank the corporations for creating jobs for workers, rather,they emphasize workers’ contributions to both the huge profits of com-panies and China’s high GDP.

Second, as expounded upon in Chap. 4, the labor law system hascountervailed some adverse impacts imposed by the market economy onworkers in such ways that some affirmative workers think that the eco-nomic system is not completely exploitative, and that the labor law systemcan redress their grievances and curb illegal labor practices of employers. Inother words, for them the legal is autonomous from the economic.However, the countervailing mechanism of legal hegemony has notinfluenced the radical workers to such an extent. Some of them understandthat the legal and the economic are not independent or autonomous fromeach other, that the law-making process and legal content are biasedtowards capitalists‚ and that workers and capitalists are on unequal footingin the presence of the law. Some realize the systematic problems of laborlaws, pointing out that it reflects and reproduces unequal social relations.Some reject the mediation, arbitration‚ and litigation systems, which someaffirmative and ambivalent workers praise, for wasting workers’ time andenergy. Due to these reasons, the radical workers distrust the notion of ruleof law and legal rights defense. Overall, the radical workers condemnChinese economic development in a more critical manner than other typesof workers. Many of them think workers cannot benefit from economicreform‚ and decry the party-state’s development strategy of letting somepeople get rich first. They also criticize economic development for creatinggrave wealth disparity in the country, though a few of them believe that ithas raised workers’ living standards in comparison to the pre-reformperiod.

Third, concerning state–labor relations, due to the concealing mecha-nism of legal hegemony, some affirmative and ambivalent workers believethat the existence of numerous labor laws is evidence of the party-state’spro-labor inclinations. For these workers, the party-state appears to beautonomous from the capitalists because it puts into place a labor lawsystem that is thought to be able to curb economic misdeeds. Furthermore,the decentralized politics in China have contributed to the transmuting


mechanism of labor laws. The fact that local governments are largelyresponsible for capital accumulation, and thus, have not stringentlyenforced labor laws, whereas the central government is more concernedabout political legitimacy, and thus has made many labor laws, has inducedmany affirmative, ambivalent, and critical workers to attribute the politicalbias towards businesses to local governments and their officials; and manyof them consider the central government good and pro-labor. In contrast,the concealing mechanism and the transmuting mechanism of legalhegemony have little effect on the radical workers. The radical workers seethrough the intricate relations between the government and businesses,believing that the party-state is not autonomous or neutral from the cap-italist class. Some see no essential differences between the central govern-ment and local governments, viewing them both as protective shields forthe capitalists. Some understand that the legal system is subsumed underthe political system‚ and that legal problems do not simply lie at theimplementational level, but are also rooted in a political system that isundemocratic and partial towards capitalists. Some realize that althoughthe party-state should serve the interests of workers and the peoples, inreality, it protects that of the capitalists. Some reject the officially con-structed discourses of the rule of law and legal rights defense because theyrealize how the legal system and the labor law system in reality protect theinterests of capitalists.

Finally, it is worth reiterating that despite the hegemonic effects of thelabor law system, labor laws should not be simply conceived of as a pureinstrument for class rule; it is, in fact, one terrain for class struggle andreflects the balance of forces between the classes. While the ruling classcontinuously seeks to acquire worker consent to its rule mediated throughthe labor law system and control their actions with coercive capacities, theworking class attempts to carry out resistance in the legal terrain, to con-strain the ruling class with the legal logic and rhetoric that it reproduces,and to advance their interests through any means possible, including bothlegal and extra-legal tactics. In some cases, workers are able to win somerights, laws‚ and pro-labor policies; laws, in fact, organize ‘the structure ofthe compromise equilibrium permanently imposed on the dominant classesby the dominated’ (Poulantzas 2000, 91). However, the legal system is nota level playing field, but merely a sloped terrain of class struggle withinwhich the ruling class and the working class do not have similar access topower because the juridico-political structures in capitalist society havebeen asymmetrically established as previously explained.

226 E.S.I HUI

NOTES

1. Interview S1.2. Interview S5.3. Interview S2.4. In the past, it was a common practice for factories to keep two months of

worker salaries. For example, if a worker started working in a factory inearly January, the salary for that month would only be released to theworkers at the end of February.

5. See Article 6, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-09/08/content_1068863.htm, accessed 10th May 2014.

6. See http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-05/07/content_2131567.htm, acces-sed on 10th May 2014.

7. Interview S6. In 2005, the administrative area of Panyu was reduced, andGuangzhou was restructured to include 10 city-districts (including Panyu)and two county-level cities, see http://www.gz.gov.cn/publicfiles//business/htmlfiles/gzgov/s2768/list.html, accessed on 11th June 2014.

8. For the document issued by the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau seehttp://www.hrssgz.gov.cn/zwxxgk/xxgkml/gzwj/bmgfxwj/201105/t20110526_163111.htm, accessed on 1st January 2014. For the documentissued by the Guangdong province government, see http://www.gdhrss.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/zwgk/1315/201204/33993.html, accessed on 5th February 2014.

9. See http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/24/content_592937.htm, acces-sed on 1st January 2014.

10. See http://english.people.com.cn/90882/8426667.html, accessed on11th May 2014.

11. The informants gave me a copy of the Guangzhou Social Security Bureau’sreply. Their legal actions have also been reported by a newspaper, seehttp://www.nfgb.com.cn/NewsContent.aspx?id=27418 and http://right.workercn.cn/c/2012/09/05/120905110244905720755.html,accessed on 3rd May 2014.

12. See http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383912.htm, accessed on 7th May 2014.

13. See http://english.people.com.cn/90882/8426667.html, accessed on 14thApril 2014.

14. Interview S4.15. See http://www.nfgb.com.cn/NewsContent.aspx?id=27418 and http://

right.workercn.cn/c/2012/09/05/120905110244905720755.html,accessed on 11th July 2014.

16. Interview S7.


http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-09/08/content_1068863.htm

http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-09/08/content_1068863.htm

http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-05/07/content_2131567.htm

http://www.gz.gov.cn/publicfiles//business/htmlfiles/gzgov/s2768/list.html

http://www.gz.gov.cn/publicfiles//business/htmlfiles/gzgov/s2768/list.html

http://www.hrssgz.gov.cn/zwxxgk/xxgkml/gzwj/bmgfxwj/201105/t20110526_163111.htm

http://www.hrssgz.gov.cn/zwxxgk/xxgkml/gzwj/bmgfxwj/201105/t20110526_163111.htm

http://www.gdhrss.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/zwgk/1315/201204/33993.html



http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/24/content_592937.htm

http://english.people.com.cn/90882/8426667.html

http://www.nfgb.com.cn/NewsContent.aspx?id=27418

http://right.workercn.cn/c/2012/09/05/120905110244905720755.html


http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383912.htm

http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383912.htm

http://english.people.com.cn/90882/8426667.html




17. See the news report http://nfgb.com.cn/NewsContent.aspx?id=6467,http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2009-05/20/content_574000.htm,http://www.nfgb.com.cn/NewsContent.aspx?id=3794, accessed on 11thMarch 2014.

18. Interview S8.19. According to my fieldwork, this is not specific to Mei Xia, and indeed, is a

common strategy deployed by the Chinese government to monitor andcontrol labor and political activists.

20. http://gongyi.oeeee.com/zxtj/201205/t20120515_1293812.html,accessed on 1st August 2014.

21. However, the government, the trade union and the factory also tried totame her with soft tactics, for example, arranging for her to attend Japaneselessons in the factory, granting her a scholarship for her studies after herresignation.

22. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/hospital-security-guards-detained-50-days-after-staging-protest, accessed on 2nd July 2014.

23. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/trial-labour-activist-wu-guijun-eventually-gets-underway-shenzhen, accessed on 2nd July 2014.

24. China’s per capita GDP in 2013 was only 6807 USA dollar, which is lowerthan many developed countries’. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W?display=default, accessedon 3rd August 2014.

REFERENCES


Chan, Jenny, and Ngai Pun. 2010. Suicide as Protest for the New Generation ofChinese Migrant Workers: Foxconn, Global Capital, and the State. TheAsia-Pacific Journal 37 (2): 1–50.


Hall, Stuart. 1980. Drifting into a Law and Order Society. London: Cobden Trust.Liebman, Benjamin. 2007. China’s Court: Restricted Reform. China Quarterly

191: 620–638.Lubman, Stanley. 1999. Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years.

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 20: 383–424.Poulantzas, Nicos. 2000. State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso.

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http://nfgb.com.cn/NewsContent.aspx?id=6467

http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2009-05/20/content_574000.htm


http://gongyi.oeeee.com/zxtj/201205/t20120515_1293812.html

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/hospital-security-guards-detained-50-days-after-staging-protest

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/hospital-security-guards-detained-50-days-after-staging-protest

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/trial-labour-activist-wu-guijun-eventually-gets-underway-shenzhen

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/trial-labour-activist-wu-guijun-eventually-gets-underway-shenzhen

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W?display=default

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W?display=default

Pun, Ngai, and Huilin Lu. 2010. Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger, andClass Action among the Second Generation of Peasant-Workers in Present-DayChina. Modern China 36 (5): 493–519.

Qiu, J.L. 2009. Working-Class Network Society: Communication Technology and theInformation Have-Less in Urban China. London: MIT Press.


Thompson, E.P. 1980. The Making of the English Working Class. Harmondsworth:Penguin.


CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: The Chinese State, the Law,Labor Relations, and Hegemony

1 THE CHINESE STATE: FROM PASSIVE REVOLUTION

TO HEGEMONY

As the title of this chapter suggests, this book investigates four cardinal andinterrelated subjects: the Chinese state, the labor law system, labor relations,and hegemony. This concluding chapter encapsulates the hegemonicmechanisms inherent in the labor law system, the characteristics of legalhegemony, worker vulnerability towards legal hegemony‚ and the precar-iousness of legal hegemony. Finally, directions for future research on thehegemonic capacity of the Chinese state are proposed.

The overarching conceptual framework of this book posits that, in anattempt to cope with the socio-political and economic impasse thatemerged during the state-socialist era, the Chinese party-state has com-menced a top-down capitalist revolution, beginning in 1978. This revo-lution is in sharp contrast to bottom-up bourgeoisie revolutions that tookplace in France and other countries. The Chinese passive revolution sig-nifies that the country has started to implement capitalism (be it statecapitalism, bureaucratic capitalism, or guanxi capitalism), but with noimmediate engagement of the capitalist class as it did not readily exist in theearly reform period. Without a dominant capitalist class to exercise moraland ethico-political leadership over the popular masses, the party-state hadto navigate the passive revolution with mostly naked power so as to quellsocial protests and political opposition against the revolution. Therefore,the early reform period witnessed an authoritarian state applying


231

heavy-handed measures (as manifested in the Tiananmen Massacre and theclampdown on independent trade unions and political groups) to secure astable economic and socio-political environment for the growth of capi-talism. Many studies upholding the authoritarian state thesis have alreadycaptured this side of the Chinese party-state. Moreover, the passive revo-lution has dictated that the party-state must play a strong role in planning,organizing, and facilitating the capitalist economic development. Scholarshailing from the developmental state perspective (and similar contendingperspectives) have grasped this dimension of the party-state. Furthermore,in order to pre-empt the formation of opposing forces, the party-state hasadopted a strategy of trasformismo, maintaining the state corporatiststructures laid down in the socialist period to co-opt working class leaders.Studies advocating the state corporatist approach have underscored thischaracteristic of the party-state. I argue in this book that these threeapproaches –authoritarian state, developmental state, and corporatist state–to the Chinese state are not contending or unrelated perspectives, but aredifferent parts of the same whole. It is, thus, more meaningful to comprehendthem in juxtaposition with each other against China’s broader social, polit-ical, and economic transformations.

Following the commencement of the passive revolution, the party-statehas forcefully steered the process of class recomposition in the country.Through affirming private property rights, establishing a labor market,commodifying labor power, adopting a market wage system, and imple-menting the labor contract system, the party-state has demoted the workingclass from the country’s master to the exploited class that is compelled to sellits labor power to the capitalists. On the other hand, through its legal,economic, and social policies, the party-state has forged the formation of thecapitalist class, which consists of foreign capitalists, private domestic capi-talists, cadre-turned-capitalists, state capitalists, and the petty bourgeoisie.The rise of the capitalist class has not only been witnessed in the economicrealm; the party-state has also bestowed certain political power to it bypermitting capitalists to join the CCP, the National People’s Congress, andthe People’s Political Consultative Conference. Having forsaken the work-ing class and peasants in its social class alliance, the post-Maoist party-statehas established a regime alliance with this newborn capitalist class.

The implementation of capitalism, the recomposition of class forces, andthe formation of a state–capital alliance have triggered escalating socialdiscontent and protests in the reform era, especially in connection withlabor relations. While economic reform was a top priority for the second

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and third generation of Chinese leaders, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin,social equality and harmony are considered an equally crucial agenda by thefourth generation of leaders, the Hu-wen government, who keenly prop-agate the hegemonic project of the harmonious society‚ and have enactednumerous labor laws to pacify the aggrieved workers. The newly inaugu-rated Xi-Li government has been mobilizing people to pursue ‘China’sdream’ and build up a ‘moderately prosperous society’. All these indicate achanging role for the party-state in driving the capitalist economy—afterthe formation of a dominant class, its rule is no longer merely based oncoercion, but also on garnering the subaltern class’s consent to the newruling bloc. That is, the Chinese party-state has been undergoing a hege-monic transformation, and its role has been gradually shifting fromforcefully steering the passive revolution into establishing capitalist hege-mony in such a way that the popular masses will actively or passively followthe ruling bloc’s moral and ethico-political leadership.

2 THE LABOR LAW SYSTEM AND DOUBLE HEGEMONY

2.1 Four Hegemonic Mechanisms

The labor law system is a vital vehicle through which the Chineseparty-state has constructed the capitalist hegemony. It has produced doublehegemony, which seeks to deflect workers’ opposition against both themarket economy and the party-state. Concerning capital–labor relations,the normalizing mechanism embedded in the labor law system has legit-imized capitalist principles such as private property rights, surplus valueextraction, waged labor, commodification of labor‚ and so forth. Manyworkers have taken labor laws as a yardstick for measuring employerbehavior. Even though they are not completely happy with their jobs, theyconsider their bosses to be fair and just as long as they are legally compliant.Moreover, the labor law system upholds labor mediation, arbitration, andlitigation as the most appropriate channels for dispute resolution. Stressingindividual forms of labor activism amounts to marginalizing and stigma-tizing collective forms, such as strikes and protests. Extra-legal actions arethus out of the question for some workers, whereas others, also affected bythe norms imposed by the labor law system, try hard to justify extra-legalactions.

The countervailing mechanism, incorporated into the labor law system,also buttresses capitalist dominance. Despite its pro-capital essence, the

CONCLUSION 233

labor law system provides aggrieved workers with a platform for resolvinglabor disputes. Many workers, therefore, believe that the market economyis not structurally exploitative, and that their hardships are a result of theirown inadequate personal qualities (such as being poorly educated orirresolute in rights-defense) or a result of erratic misdeeds from idiosyn-cratic employers. For these workers, the juridical sphere is autonomousfrom the capitalist economy, and labor laws are a useful tool for remedyingmisbehavior occurring in the economic realm. However, in Poulantzas’sterms, this perceived autonomy of the juridical is only a relative autonomyas the labor law system is structured to preserve the long term dominanceof the capitalist class.

Concerning state–labor relations, the abundance of labor laws, whichseemingly try to regulate capitalists, has convinced some workers that theparty-state is protective towards workers. They, thus, attribute workers’misfortunes to their own poor psychological and behavioral traits ratherthan to the state’s pro-capital bias. This concealing mechanism embedded inthe labor law system induces some workers to believe that the politicalregime is ‘autonomous’ from the market economy and is willing to curbeconomic misdeeds. Hence, they do not fundamentally challenge theparty-state’s legitimacy.

In addition to the concealing mechanism, the transmuting mechanismalso bulwarks the Chinese party-state from workers’ radical challenges. Dueto the decentralized politics of China, local governments are delegated thetask of capital accumulation, while the central government is preoccupiedwith maintaining political legitimacy and social harmony. Some workers,therefore, perceive government corruption and its pro-businesses bias asbeing caused by local governments or individual officials. They do notcriticize the central government or the party-state as a whole, which theyconsider independent from capitalists. Put in another way, the transmutingmechanism shifts the target of workers’ contempt from systemic state–capital collusion to individual officials and/or local governments.

Through these four mechanisms, the labor law system has been able toimpose double hegemony on some workers. However, it should behighlighted that these mechanisms have not completely eradicated workerdiscontent towards the market economy or the party-state. In fact, hege-mony is not about the complete submission of workers to the ruling classor full elimination of social discontent or opposition. It is only an unstableequilibrium of compromises (Poulantzas 2000, 31) between class oppo-nents at any given historical moment. If worker contestation does not aim

234 E.S.I HUI

to shake the foundation of the market economy and the party-state, and arecontained within a capitalist framework, then they are perfectly compatiblewith capitalism, and thus, are often allowed and tolerated by the rulingbloc.

2.2 Characteristics of Legal Hegemony

Based on the discussions of the previous chapters, I summarize the char-acteristics of legal hegemony and, broadly, capitalist hegemony in China inthe following ways. First, capitalist hegemony has developed concurrentlyalongside the economic and political lines in such ways that it has acquired anational-popular appearance. Workers’ commonsensical judgment of eco-nomic development is often marked by nationalist sentiments activelyimbued by the party-state (see Xiao Mei, the affirmative worker fromChap. 4). Although soaring economic growth in China has not benefitedthem much, some workers endorse it due to the belief that economicprosperity is good for the nation and can increase the nation’s power overits rivals. Some workers (such as Chang Shan, the ambivalent worker inChap. 5) are aware of employers’ exploitation, but are willing to ‘sacrifice’themselves for the country’s economic prosperity. All of this echoes whatGramsci highlights: ‘the development and expansion of the particulargroup are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of auniversal expansion of a development of all the “national” energies’(Gramsci 1971, 182).

However, the economic should not be understood as simply relying onthe political. It is true that the capitalist leadership is bolstered by state-lednationalism, but the Chinese party-state’s political legitimacy hinges,consequently, upon economic growth and capital accumulation, especiallywhen democratic elections are absent in the country. The party-state setsgoals for economic development and mobilizes the nation to achieve them;afterwards, it propagates throughout the country that these goals havebeen attained in order to secure its legitimacy. This is what Breslin called‘performance based legitimacy’ (2007, 44). The interdependence betweenthe political and the economic contributes to a symbiotic relation betweenthe party-state and capitalists in China. In Anglo-Saxon and WesternEuropean countries, satisfactory economic performance may partly con-tribute to the stability of the political regime, but their legitimacy is largelyderived from the political system of representative democracy, which isabsent in China. Compared to its Western counterparts, it is imperative for

CONCLUSION 235

the Chinese party-state to maintain its legitimacy through driving eco-nomic development. As a matter of fact, one reason that Deng Xiaopinghad to launch the passive revolution was to resolve economic (and political)deadlock facing the CCP at the time (McNally 2008; Gray 2010).

Second, legal hegemony in China capitalizes on the lingering memories ofa socialist legacy and history. The economic hardship during thestate-socialist era has induced some workers who grew up during thosetimes to feel grateful for the greater material benefits, however basic,brought about through economic reform (see Qiang Lai and Ah Rong, theaffirmative workers in Chap. 4). Official discourses on economic progress,such as pursuing the China’s dream and moderately prosperous society,have struck a responsive chord among the workers exposed to that periodof disquieting experiences, especially the first generation of migrantworkers; they are, thus, susceptible to the economic and moral worldviewsbeing reproduced by the capitalist class. Moreover, political and socialchaos during the Cultural Revolution has left many workers ready to acceptthe party-state’s discourse on social stability (see Ah Kong, the ambivalentworker from Chap. 5). For them, the ‘rule of law’ is a means by which toprevent social disorder. Their trust in the legal system is the starting pointat which the labor law system can exercise double hegemonic effects.

Furthermore, although socialist ideologies have declined in China, thepro-labor image of the party-state lingers in the purview of the minds ofsome workers. Numerous legal measures that were legislated by theparty-state in the reform period to guard against unfair employer treatmentof workers continue to reinforce this perception held by some workers. Forthem, the party-state is autonomous from the capitalists and is able toconstrain them. Some scholars have analyzed how socialist legacy wasutilized by state workers in their protests (Lee 2007). This book has shedlight on the other side of the coin—how the remnants of socialist thoughtsare manipulatively invoked to strengthen capitalist leadership over theworking class.

The third characteristic of legal hegemony is that it builds upon legalconcessions. The consent given by the working class is exchanged for con-cessions made by the hegemonic dominant class. The Chinese labor lawsystem offers workers a certain degree of protection so that more of themdo not interpret their miserable experiences as originating from thestructurally biased market economy or the pro-capital party-state.However, as Gramsci stresses, the concessions granted by the capitalist classare usually ‘of an economic-corporate kind…such sacrifices and such a

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compromise cannot touch the essential…’ (Gramsci 1971, 161).Therefore, in China, legal concessions often take the forms that are com-patible with a capitalist-legal framework, rather than ones that essentiallyalter the asymmetrical capital–labor relations. These legal concessions maycontradict the short-term, particular interests of individual capitalists, butin the long run, they will consolidate the general interests of capitalism as asystem and of the capitalists as a class.

However, it should be noted that legal concessions, as exemplified innumerousChinese labor laws, are by nomeans granted readily or willingly bythe ruling class. As Poulantzas underscores, the law ‘has inscribed within itthe material concessions imposed on the dominant classes by popularstruggles’ (Poulantzas 2000, 84); and in fact, the legal system is a site for classstruggle, as Thompson suggests, though it is an uneven, biased, and partialsite. Legal concessions in China are the hard-fought products of workingclass struggles. The 1995 Labour Laws was legislated not only to guide thelabor market and wage labor relations, but also to alleviate the intensifyinglabor discontent as manifested in the 1989 Tiananmen DemocraticMovement, the post-1989 labor protests‚ and the protests related to theZhili fire that broke out in 1993 (Ngok 2008).1 The 2004 Provisions forMinimum Wage were implemented to ameliorate escalating labor unrestsubsequent to China’s admission to the WTO in 2001. The 2007Arbitration Laws and the 2008 Labour Contract Law were enacted to fur-ther dampen burgeoning labor strikes in the country (Hui and Chan 2012).

The legal concessions won by the Chinese workers have, in turn, led to aminimal degree of economic concession. Prior to the enactment of variouslabor laws, wages and benefits of workers were determined byrace-to-the-bottom competitions among capitalists in the market.Although these laws cannot fully eradicate race-to-the-bottom practices,they set the minimum standards regarding wages, working hours, overtimepayment‚ and so forth, with which employers supposedly must comply.Although weak legal implementation and local protectionism in Chinaimply that not every worker actually benefits from the legally-derivedeconomic concessions, some studies show that employers have becomemore legally compliant (Chan 2013). It is important to underline thateconomic concessions given by the capitalist class in China has, thus far,been secured mostly through legal means; it seldom takes the form ofregular and institutionalized collective agreements between corporationsand workers (as in some Western countries) because collective bargaininghas been poorly executed in China.

CONCLUSION 237

Fourth, as explicated in Chap. 2, the ruling class rules with persuasionalongside coercion, but under normal situations, the latter is often invisible.Poulantzas highlights:

…in every State, law is an integral part of the repressive order and of theorganization of violence. By issuing rules and passing laws, the state estab-lishes an initial field of injunctions, prohibitions and censorship, and thusinstitutes the practical terrain and object of violence. (2000, 77)

And once political power was institutionalized, these States had less recourseto such violence in normal contexts of domination—even though they nowenjoyed a monopoly of its legitimate use. (2000, 80)

The role of coercion in securing subordination of the Chinese workingclass is not so discernible in the worker-interviewees who have run intoindividual industrial disputes or experienced no disputes at all. However, itis prominent in those who have vigorously championed collective workerinterests. The state’s coercive activities have taken a number of forms. Atthe mildest level, with its Great Firewall system, the party-state blockswebsites that cover sensitive political and social issues, such as those relatedto Falungong, the Tiananmen democratic movement, and any informationabout ‘rebellious’ organizations and dissidents.2 For instance, Twitter,Flicker and YouTube were blocked ahead of the 20th anniversary of theTiananmen movement in 2009.3 The popular masses (including WangLing, the radical worker in Chap. 6) need to utilize a special techniquecalled ‘Fanqian’ to get around the state’s cyber controls. The other statemeasures to exercise online control include prosecuting vocal ‘internetcelebrities’ from time to time4 and hacking into internet service providers’databases and servers.5 In addition, bowing to the state’s pressure, manyinternet companies act as accomplices to internet control. For instance,China Yahoo provided the state with a journalist’s email to a US websiteregarding the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen movement as evidencefor his prosecution; he was later sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment.6

Google China acceded to filtering out information that is consideredunwanted by the state from user search results.7

Surveillance over labor activists is the second form of party-state coer-cion concerning labor relations. According to the fieldwork, manypro-labor NGO staff, rights lawyers, scholars, and worker activists areregularly approached by the party-state’s security personnel, who ask them

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for details on their activities and updates on other activists and organiza-tions. In addition to this, if these labor advocates become directly involvedin specific labor actions, the security personnel or government officials maygive them covert or overt pressure, warning them not to step out of line.For example, the legal scholar introduced in Chap. 6 was instructed by thegovernment not to raise the issue of trade union reform in the negotiationmeetings with Mei Xia’s factory; the government tried to constrain MeiXia’s activism through spying on her communications and forbidding herto join high-profile activities; Shao Jiang (the radical worker in Chap. 6)was given pressure through security personnel to halt the campaign aboutPanyu’s legal minimum wage.

The severest form of state coercion is forceful clampdowns on laboractivists or organizations that are deemed ungovernable and causing seri-ous trouble. As explicated in Chap. 6, some strike leaders have beendetained, prosecuted, or thrown into jail. Also, more than 10 labor NGOsin the PRD suffered from a government crackdown in 2012; they wereinvestigated in a harassing manner by various government departments(such as the Tax Bureau, Fire Bureau, etc.) and accused of breachingdifferent rules and laws; some of them were forcefully evicted from theiroffices by their landlords, who admitted that they were also under gov-ernment pressure.8 And in 2015 seven labor NGO activists fromGuangzhou, who were actively involved in workers’ strikes, were placedunder ‘criminal coercive measures’. They were accused of ‘disturbingpublic order‚ or committing fraud, adultery and embezzlement’.9

2.3 Worker Susceptibility to Legal Hegemony

In spite of its hegemonic capacity, not all workers have bought into doublehegemony wielded by the labor law system. Endeavoring to examine thedegree to which workers have rendered allegiance to capitalist leadership, Ihave constructed a typology of worker susceptibility towards legal hege-mony in Chap. 4. Under this typology, workers are classified into five modes—affirmative, indifferent, ambivalent, critical, and radical—according tothree criteria. The first criterion is the level of knowledge regarding laborlaws and the level of motivation to gain such knowledge. This reflectswhether, and to what degree, workers regard labor laws as relevant to them.The second criterion is the degree to which workers accept or reject thelabor law system, which consists of party-state-constructed legal discourses(such as the rule of law and legal rights-defense) and the actual legal

CONCLUSION 239

practices. This indicates how much workers place trust, or distrust, in thelabor law system. The third criterion is whether they identify any defectsinherent in the labor law system; if yes, whether they attribute these defectsto the faults of individual government officials or employers, or systemiccauses lying within the legal system, the state and/or the market economy.This criterion reflects the reasons behind distrust of the labor law system andthe degree to which workers are vulnerable to the values and ideologiesreproduced therein.

The affirmative workers approve of the official legal discourses and laborlaw practices, and have readily rendered active consent to capitalist lead-ership through the mediation of the labor law system. Most of them per-ceive of capitalist reform and economic growth in a positive light. Theyendorse the state’s development strategy of ‘let some people get rich first’,which is akin to the liberal ‘trickle down’ theory, believing that economicprogress fuelled by the state’s pro-businesses policies will eventually benefitother members of the society. Many of the affirmative workers believe thatemployers would have been above reproach had they paid workers wagesaccording to labor laws. The market economy and the wealthy class arethought to have created jobs for workers and economic prosperity for thecountry, rather than exploiting labor. In other words, the capitalist class’sinterests have been universalized as that of the working class and thenation; the affirmative workers have interpreted their life and work expe-riences from the perspective of the dominant class.

The indifferent, ambivalent, and critical workers have only renderedpassive consent, rather than active consent, to capitalist leadership—theyhave neither completely assented to it, nor fundamentally challenged it.The indifferent workers are unmotivated to gain legal knowledge and havesubmitted themselves to the economic and political status quo. The laborand social policies (such as the household registration system) and personalattributes in relation to age, education, and the gender role have tied themto their rural origins. They feel detached from the cities and consider theirworking life there transitory. Therefore, they see labor laws andsocio-economic development as irrelevant to them. Believing in freemarket ideology, they opt for quitting their jobs when faced with prob-lematic bosses, rather than resorting to the labor law system.

Both the ambivalent and critical workers do not place full trust in thelabor law system because of the gap between their work experiences andofficial legal rhetoric, i.e., the unfulfilled promises of the latter. However,

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the labor law system is still able to elicit passive consent because their‘spontaneous discontent is contained by the pre-existing categories of thedominant ideology’ (Femia 1987, 137). Although the critical workersdiscredit the labor law system and the ambivalent workers partially disap-proved of it, their criticism usually targets implementation issues ratherthan asymmetrical power relations embedded within the system. Many ofthem opine that the central government holds good intentions to protectworkers with labor laws; they attribute the failing labor law system to thefault of local governments or officials, who either do not enforce labor lawseffectively or have strong connections with businesses.

For the radical workers, the hegemonic mechanisms embedded in thelabor law system have failed to elicit active or passive consent. They haveformulated radical challenges to both the capitalist economy and theparty-state. They are relatively immune to the normalizing mechanism oflegal hegemony, which seeks to normalize wage labor, surplus valueextraction, property rights, and other capitalist practices. In addition, theyare not influenced much by the countervailing mechanism; some of themunderstand that the legal and the economic are not independent of eachother, that the law-making process and legal content are biased towardscapitalists‚ and that workers and capitalists are on unequal footing withinthe legal realm. Moreover, the concealing mechanism and the transmutingmechanism have little effect on them; they see through the intricate rela-tions between government and businesses, and do not construe theparty-state, as a whole, as autonomous from the capitalist class. In brief, theradical workers have rejected the labor law system and fundamentallycontest the capitalist worldviews it reproduces. They have also refused tofollow the ruling bloc’s leadership and seek to challenge capitalistdomination.

This self-constructed typology allows us to conceptualize the differingdegrees of hegemonic effects mediated through the labor law system,rather than comprehending hegemony as a zero-sum phenomenon.Hegemony is a provisionary product and a terrain of continuous classstruggles. It is possible for Chinese workers to negotiate, contest, ortransgress these hegemonic boundaries. This typology also permits us tounderstand worker susceptibility to legal hegemony as non-static andever-changing, thus opening up the way for conceptualizing the possibilityof workers to overcome double hegemony and transform the exploitativesystem.

CONCLUSION 241

3 THE FRAGILITY OF LEGAL HEGEMONY

Hegemony is not static or stationary. The ruling bloc needs to continue tostrive for reproducing its ideological and moral ascendency over theworking class so as to forestall the latter’s revolt. Legal hegemony in Chinamust be conceived of as unstable and precarious in nature, rather than assturdy and stationary. This book has illustrated that double hegemonymediated through the labor law system has influenced Chinese migrantworkers in an uneven manner. The affirmative workers have granted activeconsent to the ruling class’s leadership, whereas the indifferent, ambivalent,and critical workers have rendered passive consent. Finally, the radicalworkers have acceded no consent at all. This exposes the fragility andprecariousness of legal hegemony in China.

The critical workers distrust official legal discourses and legal practicesbecause their working experiences have clashed with the legal ideals pro-moted by the party-state in such ways that they have become disillusioned.They have started to develop criticisms of the labor law system andsocio-economic system after witnessing discrepancies between legal idealsand legal reality. In comparison to the affirmative workers that have con-ferred active consent to legal hegemony, the labor law system imposesweaker hegemonic effects on the critical workers. They do not give anyactive consent to the ruling class’s leadership and disapprove of the laborlaw system, but only for non-systemic reasons. If the party-state and thecapitalist class continue to fail in creating ‘legal’ working experiences forthis type of worker, it is possible that they will increasingly contest legalhegemony, especially as their class consciousness continues to grow in theprocess of collective struggle. In short, although they are subject to legalhegemony, the critical workers are in a state of acute volatility; they can betransformed into the radical type and take extra-legal actions if externalconditions were to provide fertile soil. On the other hand, as these workersbelieve that the injustices heaped on workers are rooted in the lax imple-mentation of labor laws, they can be changed into the affirmative mode ifthe party-state is able to create legal working conditions for them.

The ambivalent workers have only partly accepted official legal dis-courses, realizing that the labor law system is tainted by legal loopholes.Similar to the critical workers, they do not render active consent to theruling class’s leadership because they are sometimes frustrated by the legalreality they witness; yet their world conceptions are still articulated in termsof the capitalist values and ideas. If the ruling class were to create legal

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working conditions for them, the ambivalent workers would be likely todevelop into the affirmative mode. Should the ruling class fail to do so,their contestation of legal hegemony may escalate, and it would be possiblefor them to transform into critical or even radical workers.

For the indifferent workers, various labor and social policies have boundthem to their rural origins, and thus contribute to their sense of alienation,detachment, and resignation in the cities. Even though they receivetreatment below legal standards, they perceive of labor laws as irrelevant tothem. Their apathy towards the labor law system is not a result of consciouschoices, but that of the social alienation created by the state’s economicand social policies. In other words, the party-state’s failure in securing theiractive consent to legal hegemony is an outcome of its own making.

Due to their sense of apathy and irrelevancy concerning the labor lawsystem, it is possible that the indifferent workers will take extra-legal meansto fight for their interests if they become extremely agitated or if their classconsciousness matures. It is because the party-state-constructed legal dis-courses and legal knowledge have not yet become common sense for them;the belief that legal channels are the most appropriate means for settlingdisputes has not taken root in their minds. If economic and legal conces-sions are prerequisite for securing worker allegiance to a capitalist economy,then those workers that do not feel accepted into the cities and benefit littlefrom those concessions are unlikely to confer active consent to legalhegemony. In other words, the state’s social and labor policies, which havehelped expedite economic accumulation based on blatant exploitation andthe separation of production and reproduction, have weakened the foun-dation for the hegemonic leadership of the capitalist class.

The radical workers have formulated fundamental criticism of the sys-temic problems connected to uneven economic development, the politicalregime, and the labor law system. They are aware that the legal system ismanipulated by the party-state‚ and that the capitalists and governmenthave a symbiotic relationship. They do not acquiesce to capitalist leadershipand have managed to transcend capitalist hegemony. The radical workershave developed stronger class and political consciousness. Therefore, theseworkers cannot be placated by merely creating legal working conditions forthem or by making employers legally compliant. They do not simplydemand legal minimum wages, but wages in fair proportion to the laborthat they put in. Hence, they represent a serious threat to capitalistdominance.

CONCLUSION 243

The affirmative workers have already conferred active consent to theruling bloc through the mediation of the labor law system; theirendorsement of the system is based on the coherence between what theyhave been indoctrinated into and the legal reality, and the comparisonbetween a period with and without labor laws. It is likely that they willremain affirmative if the ruling bloc is able to produce legal workingexperience for them; otherwise, they may shift into the ambivalent, critical,or even radical mode.

Three more points should be noted about the fragility of legal hege-mony. First, the unevenly developed economy and growing social inequalityhas sown seeds for the precarious root of hegemony. In order to acquire auniversal appeal, the capitalist class needs to address and incorporate thesubaltern class’s interests into theirs. Capitalist hegemony should be builtupon economic concessions given by the dominant class in such ways thatthe working class feels ‘shared’ interests with the former, and as a resultrender their allegiance to it. In post-war USA and Britain, one of the keypillars for capitalist hegemony was the politics of mass production and massconsumption (Rupert 1995; Rhiannon 2000). This economic model turnedclass conflicts into class compromise and cooperation. Politicians andbusinesses in these countries propagated the idea that class conflict could beameliorated through increasing production, productivity, and economicgrowth‚ and that if businesses did well, workers would also benefit. As amatter of fact, during the post-war period, worker wages were on the riseand could ‘share’ in the fruits of economic growth. They thus gave theirconsent to capitalist leadership.

Such a concessionary mechanism has not been built into the Chineseeconomic model, which has relied immensely on export-oriented,low-technology‚ and labor intensive manufacturing industries. Under thismodel, Chinese employers seek to increase surplus value through adoptingsuper-exploitative measures rather than motivating workers to raise theirproductivity with a growth-sharing ideology. As a result, labor share in thecountry’s economy has declined to a level of less than 50% since the late1990s (see Graph 1). Although the Chinese party-state has implemented aminimum wage system, it has only secured minimal economic concessionsfrom employers. The minimum wage as a proportion of average wages inthe country has dropped from close to 50% in 1994 to below 25% in 2009(see Graph 2).

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Graph 1 Labor share of GDP in China. Source: Hao (2014)16

Graph 2 Minimum wage as a proportion of the average wage in China. Source: Liand Sicular (2014)

CONCLUSION 245

Capitalist hegemony in China has not been sturdily built upon eco-nomic concessions or legal concessions. Although many of theworker-informants see economic development in a positive light, they arenot without complaints about rising social inequality, skyrocketing infla-tion, and a widening income gap. The material seeds for their discontenttowards the market economy have already been sown; the super-exploitative economic model pursued by the party-state has ironicallyendangered the foundation of capitalist hegemony and, thus, the modelitself. It is possible that latent worker dissatisfaction with the economy willburst into overt resistance against the ruling bloc’s leadership shouldenabling conditions emerge in future.

The second point to underscore about the fragility of legal hegemony isrelated to the role of Chinese trade unions. Trade unions in the Westerncapitalist societies have played a crucial role in reproducing capitalisthegemony. In both the post-war USA and Britain, trade unions wereincorporated into the production politics of mass production. Acting as the‘partners’ to capitalists, they abandoned the goal of radical social andeconomic reform, and sought to defend worker interests within the capi-talist framework. By concentrating on collective bargaining and agendascompatible with capitalism, they were able to, on the one hand, wrest acertain degree of short-term material gains from employers. On the other,they helped strengthen capitalist hegemony by endorsing private propertyrights, wage labor, employer authority over production processes, and theideology of individual rights (Rupert 1995; Rhiannon 2000). The Chinesetrade unions have not performed such functions. They have failed to secureworker acquiescence to the state–capital nexus through advancing imme-diate worker interests through wage bargaining or other effective means.On the contrary, they are commonly seen by workers as supportive andsubordinate to the party-state and businesses; in many cases, they intensifyworker discontent rather than ameliorate it. All in all, Chinese trade unionshave not developed a hegemonic capacity in the same way as their Westerncounterparts; they basically have failed to absorb labor unrest intostate-sanctioned legal channels, that is, contain it within the capitalist-legalframework. They, therefore, have become a key factor in contributing tothe precariousness of capitalist hegemony in China.

The third point to highlight about the precariousness of legal hegemonyis related to the role of labor NGOs in China. As elaborated in this book,when facing disputes, some worker-informants have sought aid from laborNGOs. Most of them opine that labor NGOs were helpful to their

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rights-defense and they have shown vast appreciation for the NGOs’support. However, due to the labor NGOs’ legalistic approach and theiremphasis on workers’ legal rights, some scholars criticize the labor NGOsfor individualizing labor disputes and channeling them into legally sanc-tioned procedures (Chan and Siu 2012; Friedman and Lee 2010).Moreover, the labor NGOs were criticized for participating in theparty-state’s project of the rule of law (Friedman and Lee 2010), and foracting like ‘anti-solidarity machines’ (Lee and Shen 2011, 173). This kindof criticism is partly, but not completely, valid. It is important to note thatthese NGOs are not homogenous. They differ in objectives, values, andoperational arrangements. It is true that some NGOs have confinedthemselves within capitalist-legal boundaries and help, maybe uncon-sciously, atomize workers’ activism, keep them within the legal sphere‚ andreproduce capitalist values embedded into the labor law system. However,some labor NGOs have transcended capitalist-legal boundaries. As elabo-rated from Chaps. 4 to 6, some NGOs work under legal pretexts, but theyaim to heighten workers’ awareness of labor rights (not only legal rights)and foster their class collectivity through organizing focus group discus-sions, encouraging the sharing of workplace grievances among workers,facilitating the discussion of social and labor policies, and engaging inaction-planning on issues that concern workers. Due to the encounterswith workers facing similar situations and the consciousness-raising activ-ities of NGOs, some of the worker-interviewees have developed classempathy for and a class identification with other workers, realizing thattheir plight is not specific to themselves and that other workers also sufferfrom unfair situations This prompts them to take steps to question thecommonsense about capital–labor relations. Some workers’ class identifi-cation is so strong that they have dedicated themselves to helping fellowworkers in need. While the ruling class attempts to fragmentize anddecompose the working class, and the official trade unions have acted as itsaccomplice, some NGOs have helped to establish class connections andsolidarity among workers and raise their class consciousness. This in turnshas made legal hegemony precarious and fragile.

In brief, the precariousness and fragility of legal hegemony in China arethe results of a number of factors: (1) the party-state has failed to consis-tently uphold the legal ideals it has reproduced; the discrepancies betweenlegal ideals and legal reality have disillusioned some workers; (2) labor lawsstill have not turned into commonsensical knowledge for a segment ofworkers; (3) the party-state’s social and labor policies, which have triggered

CONCLUSION 247

workers’ sense of apathy and irrelevancy concerning labor laws, haveparadoxically hindered its elicitation of the active consent of some workers;(4) unbalanced economic development and growing social inequality havelaid the material foundation for worker contestation to capitalist leadership;(5) the party-led trade unions are unable to secure short-term materialconcessions for workers and, hence, worker allegiance to the ruling bloc;and (6) some labor NGOs have helped raise workers’ class consciousness,which, to a certain extent, aids workers to overcome legal hegemony.

4 FUTURE RESEARCH

This book sheds light on the hegemonic capacity of the Chinese party-stateduring the course of its hegemonic transformation. Due to space limita-tions, it only explores embryonic hegemony in China by concentratingon the labor law system and capital–labor relations at the point of pro-duction. The other aspects, however, are worthy of further attention in thefuture.

First, certain developments occurring in China may alter the quality andcharacteristics of its incipient hegemony. At the economic level, China hasbeen trying to carry out industrial upgrades and create a domesticconsumption-based economy. Li (2011) estimates that the latter goalwould be possible if corporate profits were cut by 15% and redistributed aswages. Furthermore, the party-state has made greater efforts to improvethe social insurance system, as exemplified by implementation of the SocialInsurance Law in 2011. The hukou system is also under reform, howeverminimal. In 2014, the CCP Political Bureau adopted the Opinion onFurther Reforming the Hukou System, suggesting, among other things,granting residential status to migrant workers who have lived in the citiesfor a long time.10 And under the 2011–2015 Five-Year-Plan, theparty-state was seeking to raise the minimum wage rate by 13% annually.11

If all of these are achieved successfully, they may help transform thesuper-exploitative economic model in China and reduce the income gap. Ifthat is the case, what will be the impact on worker vulnerability tohegemony?

At the level of class organizations, it is foreseeable that the party-statewill continue to allow the ACFTU to monopolize the organizations oftrade unions, but may push for reforms such as democratic trade unionelections and effective collective wage bargaining. These policies, ifimplemented meaningfully, may persuade some workers that the party-led

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trade unions can, somehow, represent them and fight for their interests;this in turn may strengthen the role of trade unions in manufacturingworker consent at the point of production (Burawoy 1979).

At the social level, the party-state has adopted a dual-track approachtowards civil society. First, although civil society organizations remainclosely monitored by the state, there are signs that it may loosen itsgrip. For example, innovative social administration (shehui guanlichuangxin) has been widely promoted in Guangdong province since 2012;registration for civil organizations at the Bureau of Civil Affairs has beenmade easier; increasingly, more government agencies subcontract socialservices to social organizations. Second, the party-state has becomeextremely harsh with vocal labor NGOs, as illustrated by its crackdown onlabor NGOs and NGO activists in 2012 and 2015. What are the influencesof these new trends on the development of Chinese civil society, and thuson its role in cultivating capitalist hegemony?

Second, alongside workplace issues, social concerns over environmentalsecurity, land expropriation and housing demolition have provoked gravediscontent from the popular masses. As a matter of fact, protests related tothese issues have been multiplying in China and are sometimes larger inscale than labor protests. For example, in 2011, the villagers in Wukan inGuangdong province staged protests against corrupt government officialsthat illegally appropriated their farmland and sold it to developers.12 In2013, some residents in Beijing drank pesticide to protest against thedemolition of their homes by the government.13 In 2014, in Maoming,Guangdong‚ several hundred people staged serious protests against thegovernment for planning to build a paraxylene (PX) plant in the city.14

Also, in the same year, thousands of people from the county of Boluo inGuangdong took to the streets to protest against the construction of atrash incinerator.15 Like labor, nature is a fictitious commodity (Polanyi2001), which is one of the indispensable production factors in capitalism.How has the ruling bloc organized its moral and ethico leadership over thesubaltern class on these key issues?

Third, the Chinese party-state is continuously being contested bypolitical activists and dissidents. Its governing strategies for dealing withpolitical challenges still depend heavily on coercion. For instance, shortlyahead of the 25th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre in 2014, itlaunched a large-scale detention and prosecution of political activists,including the seasoned reporter Gaoyu, rights-lawyers Pu Zhiqiang and XuZhiyong, a Hong Kong book publisher working on a politically sensitive

CONCLUSION 249

book and so forth. Has political suppression by the party-state offset itshegemonic attempts in other dimensions, such as industrial relations? Ifyes, in what ways and to what extent?

In summary, this book illuminates the ways in which the Chineseparty-state has developed an embryonic hegemonic capacity through thelabor law system during its hegemonic transformation. A thoroughunderstanding of the above-elaborated issues would help us further graspthe hegemonic capacity of the Chinese party-state and the developmentalpath of embryonic hegemony in the country.

NOTES

1. The Zhili Fire took place in Zhili Toy Factory, which produced for anItalian brand. It was the normal practice of the factory to lock all doors andwindows in the factory premises and dormitories so as to keep the workersinside of the factory. When the fire broke out, the workers were lockedinside and could barely escape. As a result, 87 workers died in the fire(Ngok 2008, 62). The Zhili fire provoked many overseas social groups toprotest against the employer and government for the maltreatment of theworkers.

2. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/dec/14/china-tightens-great-firewall-internet-control, accessed on 1st January 2014.

3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8460129.stm, accessed on 11thJuly 2014.

4. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1299281/chinese-american-venture-capitalist-charles-xue-taken-away-beijing-police?page=all.

5. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/may/13/china-cracks-down-on-vpn-use, accessed on 5th May 2014.

6. http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/cases/china-shi-tao, accessed on12th July 2014.

7. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/may/13/china-cracks-down-on-vpn-use, accessed on 12th July 2014.

8. Interview D1, D3, D6 and D12.9. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-details-accusations-against-detained-

labor-activists-1450807379, accessed on 4th March 2016.10. http://finance.sina.com.hk/news/-33452-6821719/1.html, accessed on

11th August 2014.11. http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-02/13/content_24624457.

htm, accessed on 15th September 2014.12. http://www.scmp.com/topics/wukan, accessed on 13th September

2014.

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http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/dec/14/china-tightens-great-firewall-internet-control

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/dec/14/china-tightens-great-firewall-internet-control

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8460129.stm

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1299281/chinese-american-venture-capitalist-charles-xue-taken-away-beijing-police?page=all

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1299281/chinese-american-venture-capitalist-charles-xue-taken-away-beijing-police?page=all

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/may/13/china-cracks-down-on-vpn-use


http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/cases/china-shi-tao



http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-details-accusations-against-detained-labor-activists-1450807379

http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-details-accusations-against-detained-labor-activists-1450807379

http://finance.sina.com.hk/news/-33452-6821719/1.html

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-02/13/content_24624457.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-02/13/content_24624457.htm

http://www.scmp.com/topics/wukan

13. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/12/11/china-residents-drink-pesticide-to-protest-bulldozing-homes/, accessedon15th September 2014.

14. Paraxlyene is a dangerous chemical that can damage abdominal organs andthe nervous system if inhaled or absorbed into body. For the protest, seehttp://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1465140/people-maoming-and-shenzhen-stage-fresh-protest-over-planned-px-plant, accessed on 11thAugust 2014.

15. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-protesters-march-against-trash-incinerator/2014/09/13/17646b78-3b2a-11e4-a023-1d61f7f31a05_story.html, accessed on 15th September 2014.

16. Hao (2014) argues that the apparent rise of the labor share after 2007 was aresult of an increasing number of worker struggles against deterioratingemployment conditions in the aftermath of the global economic crisis.

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Chan, Anita, and Kaxton Siu. 2012. Chinese Migrant Workers: FactorsConstraining the Emergence of Class Consciousness. In China’s Peasants andWorkers: Changing Class Identities, ed. Beatriz Carrillo and David S.G.Goodman. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publisher.




Gray, Kevin. 2010. Labour and the State in China’s Passive Revolution. Capitaland Class 34 (3): 449–467.

Hao, Qi. 2014. The Labor Share Question in China. Monthly Review 65 (8).Hui, Sio-Ieng Elaine, and King Chi Chris Chan. 2012. The “Harmonious Society”

as a Hegemonic Project: Labour Conflicts and Changing Labour Policies inChina. Labour, Capital and Society 44 (2): 153–183.

CONCLUSION 251

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/12/11/china-residents-drink-pesticide-to-protest-bulldozing-homes/

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/12/11/china-residents-drink-pesticide-to-protest-bulldozing-homes/

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1465140/people-maoming-and-shenzhen-stage-fresh-protest-over-planned-px-plant

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1465140/people-maoming-and-shenzhen-stage-fresh-protest-over-planned-px-plant

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-protesters-march-against-trash-incinerator/2014/09/13/17646b78-3b2a-11e4-a023-1d61f7f31a05_story.html




Lee, Ching Kwan, and Yuan Shen. 2011. The Anti-Solidarity Machine?: LaborNongovernmental Organizations in China. In From Iron Rice Bowl toInformalization: Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing China, ed.Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee, and Mary Elizabeth Gallagher. CornellUniversity Press.

Li, Minqi. 2011. The Rise of the Working Class and the Future of the ChineseRevolution. Monthly Review 63 (2): 38.

Li, Shi, and Terry Sicular. 2014. The Distribution of Household Income in China:Inequality, Poverty and Policies. China Quarterly 217: 1–41.



Polanyi, Karl. 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Originsof Our Time Author. Boston: Beacon Press.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 2000. State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso.Rhiannon, Vickerss. 2000. Manipulating Hegemony: State Power, Labour and the

Marshall Plan in Britain. Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd.Rupert, Mark. 1995. Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and

American Global Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

252 E.S.I HUI

APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF INFORMANTS

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018E.S.I Hui, Hegemonic Transformation, Series in Asian Laborand Welfare Policies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-50429-6

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Num

bering

Dateof

interview

(DD-M

M-Y

ear)

Gender

Experience

oflabor

dispute

Workin

which

city

Indu

stries

Years

ofwork

experience

Position

Age

Edu

cation

level

Relations

with

trad

eun

ion

Affirm

ativemod

eQ1

15-12-20

12Male

No

experien

ceGuang

zhou

Car

indu

stry

Over5

years

Eng

ineer

Over

30University

Enterprisetrade

unionofficial

Q2

22-11-20

12Fe

male

No

experien

ceGuang

zhou

Car

indu

stry

Over3

years

Rankandfile

Early

20s

Vocational

second

ary

scho

ol

Enterprisetrade

unionofficial

Q3

15-12-20

12Male

No

experien

cePa

nyu

Electronics

indu

stry

Over11

years

Eng

ineer

Late

20s

University

N/A

Q4

15-12-20

12Male

No

experien

ceSh

enzh

enElectronics

indu

stry

Over7

years

Skilled

worker

Early

30s

University

Enterprisetrade

unionofficial

Q5

16-01-20

13Male

No

experien

ceSh

enzh

enElectronics

indu

stry

Over2

years

Rankandfile

Early

20s

Vocational

second

ary

scho

ol

N/A

Q6

Qiang

Lai

16-01-20

13Male

No

experien

ceSh

enzh

enElectronics

indu

stry

Over20

years

Rankandfile

Over

40s

Prim

ary

scho

olN/A

Q7

Zhi

Hui

19-01-20

13Male

No

experien

ceGuang

zhou

Car

indu

stry

5years

Rankandfile

23Vocational

second

ary

scho

ol

Trade

union

mem

ber

Q8

15-12-20

12Fe

male

No

experien

ceSh

enzh

enElectronics

indu

stry

Over7

years

Team

leader

Late

20s

University

Trade

union

mem

ber

Q9

16-01-

2013

Female

No

experien

ceSh

enzh

enElectronics

indu

stry

2years

Rankandfile

20Junior

high

scho

olN/A

Q10

XiaoMei

16-01-20

13Fe

male

No

experien

ceSh

enzh

enElectronics

indu

stry

Over5

years

Team

leader

Early

20s

Senior

high

scho

olN/A

Q11

06-01-20

13Fe

male

No

experien

ceGuang

zhou

Electronics

indu

stry

2years

Rankandfile

Early

20s

Junior

high

scho

olTrade

union

mem

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Q12

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24-03-20

13Male

Individu

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Don

gguan

Molding

indu

stry

29years

Rankandfile

Mid

40s

Prim

ary

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Q13

24-03-20

13Male

Individu

aldisputes

Don

gguan

Furnitu

reindu

stry

Over5

years

Rankandfile

Over

30s

Prim

ary

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Q14

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14-10-20

12Male

Individu

aldisputes

Shen

zhen

Wareh

ouse

logistics

6years

Rankandfile

28Vocational

second

ary

scho

ol

N/A (con

tinue

d)

In-dep

thinterviewswithworke

rs254 APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF INFORMANTS

(con

tinue

d)

Num

bering

Dateof

interview

(DD-M

M-Y

ear)

Gender

Experience

oflabor

dispute

Workin

which

city

Indu

stries

Years

ofwork

experience

Position

Age

Edu

cation

level

Relations

with

trad

eun

ion

Q15

14-10-20

12Male

Individu

aldisputes

Shen

zhen

Furnitu

reindu

stry

12years

Rankandfile

Over

40Prim

ary

scho

olN/A

Q16

17-11-20

12Male

Individu

aldisputes

Shen

zhen

Electronics

indu

stry

7years

Rankandfile

Over

40Prim

ary

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Q17

17-11-20

12Male

Individu

aldisputes

Shen

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Electronics

indu

stry

8years

Rankandfile

Over

40Prim

ary

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Q18

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-10-20

12Male

Individu

aldisputes

Shen

zhen

Log

istic

s14

years

Rankandfile

Over

40Junior

high

scho

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Q19

Liu

Chi

1-12

-201

2Male

Collective

disputes

Guang

zhou

Auto

indu

stry

5years

Techn

ician

Early

30s

University

graduate

Enterprise

trade

unionofficial

Q20

Cai

Lin

22-11-20

12Fe

male

Collective

disputes

Shen

zhen

Electronics

indu

stry

4years

Rankandfile

Early

30s

Prim

ary

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Q21

14-03-20

13Male

Collective

disputes

Guang

zhou

Auto

indu

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trade

unionchair

Indifferen

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11-09-20

12Fe

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No

experien

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3years

Rankandfile

36Prim

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T2

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08-12-20

12Fe

male

No

experien

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indu

stry

9years

Rankandfile

34Prim

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T3

15-10-20

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No

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ceHuizh

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indu

stry

2years

Rankandfile

28Junior

high

scho

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T4

11-11-20

12Male

No

experien

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Furnitu

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stry

5years

Rankandfile

30Prim

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T5

12-11-20

12Fe

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No

experien

ceHuizh

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indu

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3years

Rankandfile

26Prim

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scho

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T6

18-12-20

12Fe

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No

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4years

Rankandfile

Over

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18-12-20

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6years

Rankandfile

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40Did

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03-01-20

13Fe

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experien

ceGuang

zhou

Electronics

indu

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5years

Rankandfile

30Junior

high

scho

olN/A (con

tinue

d)

APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF INFORMANTS 255

(con

tinue

d)

Num

bering

Dateof

interview

(DD-M

M-Y

ear)

Gender

Experience

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dispute

Workin

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Position

Age

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College

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13-01-20

13Male

No

experien

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indu

stry

Over10

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Rankandfile

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40Prim

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P3 Jian

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16-12-20

12Male

Individu

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Don

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Electronics

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11years

Rankandfile

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P416

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12Male

Individu

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Furnitu

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4years

Rankandfile

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30s

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P5 Gui

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13-01-20

13Male

Individu

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Shen

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Log

istic

company

9years

Rankandfile

Late

20s

Junior

high

scho

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P612

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12Fe

male

Individu

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Huizh

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5years

Rankandfile

Late

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Prim

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P713

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12Fe

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Individu

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Huizh

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3years

Rankandfile

24Junior

high

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P8 Chang

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4-11

-201

2Male

Collective

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Foshan

Auto

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5years

Deputylin

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Mid

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Vocational

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Early

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P10

25-11-20

12Male

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Mid

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P11

13-01-20

13Male

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Shen

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5years

Driver

Mid

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16-01-20

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Team

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22Vocational

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256 APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF INFORMANTS

(con

tinue

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Num

bering

Dateof

interview

(DD-M

M-Y

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Gender

Experience

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Workin

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16-12-20

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8years

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Over

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21-10-20

13Male

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23-03-20

13Male

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7years

Divisionleader

Early

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12Fe

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Mid

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Mid

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12Male

Collective

disputes

Shen

zhen

Electronics

indu

stry

7years

Rankandfile

Early

30Junior

high

scho

olN/A

S14

13-12-20

12Fe

male

Collective

disputes

Foshan

Auto

indu

stry

3years

Rankandfile

Over

20s

Vocational

second

ary

scho

ol

Trade

union

mem

ber

S15

14-12-20

12Male

Collective

disputes

Foshan

Auto

indu

stry

3years

Deputylin

eleader

Mid

20s

Vocational

second

ary

scho

ol

Trade

union

mem

ber

S16

22-11-20

12Male

Collective

disputes

Guang

zhou

Auto

indu

stry

8years

Divisionleader

Early

30s

Vocational

second

ary

scho

ol

Enterprisetrade

unionchair


Interviews with labor NGO staff

Numbering Date of interview Based in which city

D1 11-12-2012 ShenzhenD2 14-10-2012 ShenzhenD3 14-04-2013 ShenzhenD4 15-04-2013 ShenzhenD5 15-03-2013 DongguanD6 10-10-2012 Hong KongD7 11-02-2013 Hui ZhouD8 01-03-2013 Hong KongD9 01-03-2013 Hong KongD10 24-03-2013 ShenzhenD11 12-12-2012 Hong KongD12 14-12-2012 DongguanD13 18-02-2012 ShangdongD14 06-12-2012 Hong KongD15 15-12-2012 GuangzhouD16 15-12-2012 GuangzhouD17 04-02-2012 PanyuD18 04-02-2012 PanyuD19 29-03-2012 Dongguan

Interviews with scholars


H1 (also a registered lawyer) 13-12-2012 ShenzhenH2 (also a registered lawyer) 29-12-2012 GuangzhouH3 (also a registered lawyer) 14-01-2013 GuangzhouH4 04-02-2013 GuangzhouH5 13-04-2013 Hong KongH6 29-11-2012 GuangzhouH7 28-10-2012 Shenzhen


Interviews with lawyers and judges


F1 Lawyer 14-11-2012 ShenzhenF2 Lawyer 20-11-2012 ShenzhenF3 Lawyer 15-12-2012 ShenzhenF4 Legal practitioner 15-12-2012 ShenzhenF5 Lawyer 04-02-2013 Hong KongF6 Judge 03-03-2013 DongguanF7 Judge 24-02-2013 DongguanF8 Judge 19-10-2012 Dongguan

Interviews with government officials


J1 13-11-2012 Retired government official at the town levelJ2 16-12-2012 Official from CCP Politics and Law CommissionJ3 18-12-2012 Official from CCP Politics and Law CommissionJ4 03-02-2013 Government official at town level

Interviews with trade unionists


G1 27-12-2012 Cadre from Guangdong provincial trade unionG2 07-12-2012 Cadre from Guangdong provincial trade unionG3 23-04-2013 Cadre from Guangdong provincial trade unionG4 21-04-2013 District level cadre in ShenzhenG5 13-03-2013 Cadre from Shenzhen city trade union


Interviews with employers


E1 14-11-2012 Electronics factory in ShenzhenE2 15-11-2012 Electronics factory in ShenzhenE3 13-12-2012 Furniture factory in ShenzhenE4 13-02-2013 Watch factory in Dongguan


INDEX

A

Acquiescence, 10, 21, 119, 142, 246Active consent, 5, 27, 46, 105–107,

110, 118, 126, 139, 144, 151, 162,175, 188, 197, 240, 242–244, 248

Activism, 6, 7, 126, 171, 191, 212,213, 223, 233, 239, 247

Affirmative, 27, 28, 105–107, 110–113,132, 138, 139, 141, 144, 145, 158,160, 162, 176, 179, 192, 199, 203,207, 215, 219, 223, 225, 235, 239,240, 242, 244, 254

All-China Federation of Trade Unions(ACFTU), 5, 16, 18, 23, 27, 72, 88,248

Ambivalent, 27, 28, 105, 110, 111,138, 151, 175, 188, 191, 193, 199,203, 207, 219, 224, 225, 235, 239,240, 242, 243, 256

Arbitration, 6, 7, 71, 84–86, 119, 161,165, 181, 215, 217, 218, 233

Authoritarian, 1, 9–12, 17–19, 22, 43,57, 63, 232

B

Burawoy, 20, 45, 57, 58, 60, 62, 93,133, 140, 249

C

Capital accumulation, 5, 23, 28, 63, 69,72, 75–77, 82, 84, 85, 92, 96, 97,140, 141, 187, 190, 197, 214, 224,226, 234, 235

Capitalism, 2, 3, 13, 23, 24, 27, 45, 46,48, 50, 62, 69, 74, 78, 91, 94, 96,97, 117, 157, 231, 237, 249

Capitalist class, 1, 4, 5, 46, 48, 51, 57,60, 62, 69, 73–76, 87, 92, 93, 96,105, 111, 118, 141, 231, 232, 237,242, 244

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 3, 5,7, 10, 13, 16, 20, 26, 54, 70, 73, 75,76, 95, 108, 109, 115, 142, 155,200, 201, 236, 248, 261

Civil society, 5, 9, 16–18, 23, 46, 47,53, 56, 58, 249

Coercion, 4, 19, 23, 46, 47, 51, 57, 63,219, 233, 238, 249

Coercive, 5, 6, 19, 20, 57, 64, 223,226, 239

Collective bargaining, 60, 72, 84, 86,89, 97, 118, 140, 237, 246

Collectivity, 86, 88, 89, 97, 131, 145,221, 247

Common sense, 21, 23, 54, 58, 60, 61,64, 118, 177, 243

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018E.S.I Hui, Hegemonic Transformation, Series in Asian Laborand Welfare Policies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-50429-6

263

Concealing, 52, 141, 142, 159, 190,225, 226, 234, 241

Concession(s), 8, 52, 60, 64, 119, 144,145, 236, 237, 243, 244, 246, 248

Consciousness, 6, 25, 26, 45, 52, 60,110, 112, 119, 192, 206, 207, 220,243, 247, 248

Consent, 1, 2, 8, 9, 20, 23, 27, 57, 58,61, 96, 105, 106, 110–112, 133,139, 145, 188, 197, 233, 240, 242,244, 249

Counter-hegemony, 21, 62Countervailing, 139–141, 225, 233,

241Critical, 27, 43, 47, 62, 80, 105,

110–112, 139, 151, 157, 168, 176,180, 188–191, 197, 203, 210, 221,226, 240, 242, 243, 256

D

Discourse(s), 8, 20, 55, 56, 76, 108,110–112, 114, 116, 162, 169, 175,189, 199, 236, 240, 243

Dispute(s), 26, 79, 84–86, 88, 97, 112,119, 122, 123, 127, 129, 140, 144,154, 162, 165, 169, 179, 182, 189,201, 215, 219, 234, 243, 254–259

Dominant class, 2, 5, 47, 49, 51, 52,60, 62, 112, 140, 226, 236, 240,244

Domination, 2, 5, 46, 50, 55, 58, 64,161, 241

E

Economic reform, 1, 2, 13, 16, 21, 55,73, 74, 97, 105, 124, 139, 152, 167,169, 192, 232, 246

Ethico-political, 3, 4, 6, 56, 60, 64,138, 231, 233

Exploitation, 4, 24, 84, 94, 97, 119,177, 182, 204, 235, 243

Exploited class, 2, 3, 47, 48, 61, 69, 97,105, 232

Extra-legal, 127, 163, 180, 181, 186,190, 213, 218, 219, 226, 233, 243

G

Good sense(s), 61Gramsci, 1, 2, 5, 6, 20, 27, 43, 45–47,

51–53, 57–60, 69, 235, 237Gramscian, 5, 21, 23, 45, 54–56, 118

H

Hegemonic, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 19–23, 27,46, 52, 56, 57, 60, 61, 64, 96, 105,106, 112, 140, 151, 224, 231, 236,241, 246, 250

Hegemony, 1, 5–7, 21–25, 27, 28, 43,46, 51, 52, 54–58, 61–63, 90,105–107, 110–112, 119, 138, 140,144, 145, 155, 187, 190, 197, 215,224, 226, 231, 233, 235, 239,241–244, 246, 248, 250

Household registration system, 118,154, 155, 159, 188, 209, 224, 240

I

Ideological, 1, 3, 5, 13, 16, 19, 22, 23,46, 47, 49, 52, 53, 59, 61, 62, 77,93, 145, 242

Indifferent, 27, 28, 105, 106, 111, 123,139, 151, 169, 188, 189, 197, 240,243, 255

264 INDEX

J

Jessop, 12, 16, 44, 47, 49–51, 53, 54,57, 58, 119

LLabor-capital relations, 25, 62, 64, 81,

89, 90, 93, 97, 109, 214, 216

Labor law system, 1, 69, 72, 105, 151,197, 203, 233

Labor relations, 105Labor unrest, 4–6, 85, 89, 237, 246Leadership, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 16, 20, 21, 46,

52, 57, 60–62, 95, 106, 110, 119,122, 138, 231, 235, 239, 240, 242,243, 246, 249

Legal system, 6, 23, 55, 58, 69–73, 77,89, 94–97, 108, 109, 111, 161, 198,199, 226, 236, 243

Legitimacy, 3, 8, 9, 13, 20, 54, 55, 121,181, 214, 234–236

M

Marx, 5, 44, 46, 76–78Mediation, 7, 71, 84–86, 95, 123, 136,

165, 181, 217, 240, 244Migrant workers, 21, 22, 24, 25, 105,

135, 137, 153–155, 159, 192, 209,223, 236, 242, 248

Minimum wage(s), 4, 60, 82, 88, 118,133–135, 137, 138, 152, 177, 183,209–214, 217, 222, 224, 248

N

Nationalism, 20, 55, 122, 235National-popular, 60, 64, 122, 235

NGOs, 16–18, 23, 26, 27, 127, 130,166, 207, 208, 219, 246, 247, 249

Normalizing, 139, 140, 145, 163, 181,182, 210, 224, 241

O

Organic intellectuals, 54, 61

PParty-state, 1, 3, 5–8, 11, 16, 20, 22,

27, 43, 58, 69, 73, 84, 87, 89, 90,92, 94, 97, 98, 108, 109, 117, 122,142, 154, 192, 197, 216, 225,232–236, 238, 241–243, 246–250

Passive consent, 28, 105, 110–112,139, 151, 193, 241, 242

Passive revolution, 1–4, 8, 9, 23, 43,51, 62, 72, 73, 76, 78, 83, 84, 88,89, 92, 97, 105, 231, 232, 236

Persuasion, 23, 43, 46, 57, 62, 64, 86,223, 238

Political society, 5, 46, 57, 58, 61Poulantzas, 6, 19, 27, 43, 44, 47–53,

59, 61, 84, 90, 93, 192, 238Precariousness, 21, 69, 231, 242, 246,

247Protest(s), 4–6, 25, 88, 122, 168, 223,

231, 236, 237, 249

R

Radical, 7, 27, 69, 105, 110, 112, 132,139, 145, 197, 201, 204, 223–226,238, 241, 242, 244, 258

Relative autonomy, 27, 48, 49, 52, 69,72, 90–95, 98, 141, 142, 234

INDEX 265

Resistance, 21, 24, 26, 89, 109, 126,131, 163, 166, 173, 180, 191, 192,220, 221, 223, 226, 246

Rights-defense, 109, 110, 116, 123,124, 126, 127, 130, 144, 158, 162,163, 169, 173, 174, 177, 180, 181,198–200, 203, 217, 219, 239, 247

Rule of law, 7, 58, 70, 94, 108–110,116, 142, 177, 178, 185, 191, 207,215, 226, 247

Ruling class, 1, 2, 20–23, 50, 52, 57,61, 62, 64, 105, 107, 111, 112, 192,214, 215, 226, 237, 242, 247

S

State, 1–4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, 19,23, 28, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 53, 55,57, 59, 63, 70, 72, 74, 79, 87, 89,93, 96, 98, 105, 106, 109, 115, 119,141, 143, 159, 191, 213, 231, 232,234, 238

State-capital-labour relations, 69Strike(s), 72, 113, 130–132, 136,

184–186, 220–223, 239Struggle(s), 21, 46, 49, 52, 60, 62, 63,

174, 215, 220, 241, 242Subaltern, 2, 55, 62, 64, 233, 244, 249

Subordinate class, 2, 4, 46, 58, 64, 96,141, 192

Surplus value, 48, 76–78, 82, 83, 91,133, 139, 140, 190, 224, 244

Susceptibility, 26, 27, 105, 107, 110,112, 138, 151, 239, 241

T

Trade union(s), 4, 5, 10, 26, 27, 69, 83,87–89, 127, 131, 132, 160, 169,171–173, 185, 186, 206, 207, 219,232, 247, 248, 261

Transformation, 4, 8, 23, 43, 56, 63,69, 106, 138, 155, 233, 250

Transmuting, 142, 143, 159, 163, 187,191, 225, 234, 241

Trasformismo, 2, 87, 88, 96, 232

W

Working class, 1, 2, 5, 20, 22, 46, 47,54, 56, 60, 61, 75, 86, 92, 98, 119,215, 232, 236, 238, 244, 247

Worldview(s), 22, 26, 57, 60, 64, 111,118, 151, 193, 197, 236, 241

266 INDEX