Hegel on Political Identity Jeffrey Church2

8/13/2019 Hegel on Political Identity Jeffrey Church2

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Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism,Nationality, Cosmopolitanism

Lydia L. Moland, Hegel on Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality,Cosmopolitanism , Northwestern University Press, 2 !!, 22"pp., #$%.%& 'h()*, I+ N%- ! !2-/! .

0eviewed (y 1e rey Ch3rch, University o Ho3ston

G.W.F. Hegel fascinates many political philosophers because he synthesizes politicalaims long thought to be in conflict with one another -- rights and duties, identity anddifference, individuality and community. Yet on one issue, namely, the persisting tension

between nationalism and cosmopolitanism -- a tension that has erupted into politicalupheaval and violence in urope in recent months -- the nation-state-centric Hegel seems

unfortunately to come down s!uarely on one side. "n her insightful and timely boo#,$ydia %oland argues that Hegel rather ought to be understood as a defender of nationalidentity tempered by cosmopolitan ethical principles and institutions. &hifting deftly

between te'tual analysis and contemporary application, Hegel on Political Identity ma#esa strong case for Hegel(s relevance to contemporary attempts to reconcile patriotism andcosmopolitanism.

"n ma#ing her case, %oland challenges the traditional way of reading Hegel(s distinction between )ob*ective spirit) -- the sphere of political right and )ethical life) -- and )absolutespirit) -- the sphere of universal human self-reflection in art, religion, and philosophy.&cholars tend to argue either that absolute spirit has nothing to do with the independently

developing ob*ective spirit, or the universal perspective transcends that of the parochial political perspective. "nstead, %oland brings out the several ways in which these spheresare separable yet interdependent in Hegel(s te'ts. +he )particular) devotion to a nationalway of life fuels our attachment to abstract )universal) principles instantiated in themodern state and in cosmopolitan norms and institutions. "n turn, the modern state andinternational norms cultivate a reflective citizenry that can shape a national way of life sothat it fits with these principles.

+he difficulty %oland(s interpretation faces is that Hegel says very little about therelationship between ob*ective and absolute spirit, and so several of her conclusionsre!uire inferring Hegelian views from Hegelian principles. "n interpreting Hegel, %oland

eschews the practice of cleaving scrupulously to Hegel(s views. "nstead, she defends an)open) Hegelian system in which she deploys Hegelian principles sometimes againstHegel himself e.g., on his views about the necessity of war for the ethical health ofstates . +his interpretive approach invites certain challenges -- "(ll suggest one below --

but overall %oland ma#es a persuasive case.

+o summarize the argument %oland understands Hegel(s central concern to be findingthe conditions for individuals to become autonomous agents. /n agent does not achieve


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freedom through a process of abstraction from her desires, as for 0ant. 1ather, anindividual becomes free )through her desires,) specifically by molding )her desires insuch a way that she can reflectively endorse them) 23 . For Hegel, %oland argues, anindividual achieves this ability to mold and reflect on desires through relationships ofmutual recognition with others, in which the individual shapes her desires to help pursue

common purposes the individual shares with others. 4nly through ethical participation ininstitutions of the family, estates and corporations, and the state can individuals developthe reflectiveness to ma#e their otherwise arbitrary desires their own. 5y focusing on theconditions for autonomous agency in chapters 2 and 6, %oland follows recent non-metaphysical interpreters of Hegel(s practical philosophy such as +erry 7in#ard and1obert 7ippin. +his interpretation has become !uite influential in Hegel scholarship inthe last twenty years as it provides a philosophically compelling theory of action andnormativity that is social or )intersub*ective) in nature and avoids the dangers of abstract0antian rigorism on the one hand and relativism on the other.

With this interpretive approach, %oland turns in chapter 6 to Hegel(s theory of the state.

&he challenges the received view of Hegel that the )state) is a monolith incorporatingeverything from cultural mores to legal institutions within it. "nstead, she claims, Hegeldistinguishes patriotic support for the state from the affection a member feels for one(snation. &he substantiates her claim with a careful te'tual study and an illuminatinghistorical conte'tualization of the changing meaning of )patriotism) in the uropean

nlightenment era. "n his lectures on The Philosophy of Right , %oland argues, Hegelshifts between two meanings of )patriotism) he gleaned from the age -- a traditionalGerman )patriotism) e'pressed in local philanthropic associations, which Hegelappropriates in his discussion of corporations, and a 5ritish sense of patriotism for therational institutions of government, which is compatible with a critical stance towardse'isting government if it fails to carry out its rationally ordained function. %oland hence

argues that Hegel does not support what would become the destructive form of)patriotism) in nineteenth-century Germany, that of the chauvinist nationalism that putsone(s nation above all others 89-:2 . +hough %oland provides a much needed historicalconte't, she has difficulty e'plaining some of Hegel(s uses of )patriotism) in which hesuggests that citizens also have patriotism for the customs, mores, and cultural meaningsand goods that ma#e up a )nation) 33, 2;2n6 .

5y contrast to this largely reflective )patriotism) for rational state institutions, %olandargues in chapter


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"n chapters 8 and :, %oland e'tends this insightful )interdependence thesis) further andsuggests that )absolute spirit) helps rationalize national identity for Hegel. +hese aree'citing chapters, because most Hegel scholars either ignore Hegel(s reflections on worldhistory or thin# that absolute spirit is irrelevant to or transcends politics in the form of art,religion, and philosophy. %oland argues that the crucial point of Hegel(s philosophy of

history is often obscured by Hegel(s implausibly strong teleological view of history andthe unfortunate things Hegel says about places li#e /frica and the )4riental World)22: . +he crucial point is that Hegel(s Philosophy of History establishes the freedom of

all individual agents as the universal standard against which all nations ought to be *udged. +hus, world history provides a cosmopolitan perspective from which to evaluateone(s own national identity and hence to reflectively shape and endorse it. Furthermore,%oland argues that Hegel(s views of art, religion, and philosophy, rather than being

beyond state and nation, can help perfect them. ven in modernity, art can bring self-reflection to a nation(s people, as %oland demonstrates through an analysis of Hegel(slectures on aesthetics particularly interesting here is a short section on Hegel(s reading ofFriedrich &chiller(s plays The Robbers and Wallenstein, 2


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Hegel follows =ohn $oc#e(s insight that by investing my labor on something, " transformthat thing in accordance with my own self and thereby ma#e that thing my own . "n many

passages of The Philosophy of Right , Hegel even spea#s of the institutions of public lifeas the results of human )wor#) see, for instance, %oland(s citations on her pages ::, :>,9: . 5y focusing on a reflective form of autonomy, %oland downplays this self-

determining form. /s a result, she e'aggerates the critical distance state institutions canachieve toward national character, missing the ways in which Hegel characterizes stateinstitutions and laws as e'pressions of national self-determination.

"(m s#eptical, then, that reflection can play the tempering role %oland wants it to. " alsoworry that %oland puts more weight on the capacity of human reflection to motivateethical action than Hegel does, especially when it comes to an )ethical cosmopolitanism.)For Hegel, modern individuals ta#e interest in ethical actions only when it serves theirself-interest, which is why Hegel thin#s philanthropy is not a real solution to the problemof poverty and instead he loo#s for structural solutions that would draw on, rather thanencourage the transcendence of, self-interest. +he problem with an )ethical

cosmopolitanism) is that there is no structural solution available, and so any #ind ofcosmopolitan ethical action would be of the reflective, philanthropic type, such as ethicalconsumer activity or microloans. )"nternational trade unions,) by contrast, Hegel mightworry about since they are not circumscribed by a world government and so mightdevolve into the )miserable guild system) Hegel bemoaned in his day 236 .

Hegel would, " thin#, be more pessimistic about )ethical cosmopolitanism) than %olandthin#s. +his isn(t to say that Hegel wouldn(t recognize the #ind of cosmopolitan moralclaims %oland points to -- he does -- but it is to say that "(m not convinced that Hegelwould thin# reflection can play the shaping role in the identity and ethical behavior ofaverage citizens in the way %oland wants it to do. 1ather than giving politics or

philosophy this tas#, Hegel would be more li#ely to loo# to religion to serve thecosmopolitan ethical ideals %oland points toward.

+hough ultimately %oland does not offer a convincing case that Hegel can be marshaledto reconcile nationalism and cosmopolitanism, nonetheless she has written an e'cellent,thoughtful, engaging boo#, a )must-read) for scholars of Hegel(s political philosophy. "applaud her efforts to ma#e Hegel relevant to the contemporary world, since his wisdomabout modern life should be shared not only among Hegel e'perts, but with all moderncitizens.

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Hegel on Political Identity Jeffrey Church2