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Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R. Huber

Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

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Page 1: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations;

Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013

PowerPoint by Brad R. Huber

Page 2: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Introduction

1. Humans often behave altruistically in non-kin,

unreciprocated contexts

2. Explanations that focus on individual dispositions and

cultural norms are relevant

3. As are explanations that examine altruism from a

Darwinian perspective.

Page 3: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

What Is Altruism From A Darwinian Perspective?

1. altruism is a behavior that benefits the reproductive success of the

recipient at a cost to that of the provider.

2. one condition under which altruistic tendencies evolve is reciprocity

3. altruistic dispositions can also evolve via inclusive fitness and kin

selection theory

4. an often overlooked neo-Darwinian model is induced altruism via

kin cue manipulation

Page 4: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

1. This article explores costly altruism exhibited in non-kin

organizational contexts

2. Examples include organizations that call for:

a. vows of celibacy,

b. suicide bombing, and

c. combat suicide

Page 5: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

The Induced Altruism Model

1. Induced Altruism

a. increases the reproductive success of its recipient at a cost to the

altruist

b. altruistic behavior can be elicited through

i. coercion,

ii. manipulation, or

iii. deception

Page 6: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

2. human history has many examples of costly behavior induced by

force, such as enslavement and imprisonment

3. most relevant to this paper is induced altruism as a result of

manipulation of relatedness cues, or kinship deceit

4. deceit and manipulation are central to human social interactions

Page 7: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Human Kin Recognition Cues

1. Association is correlated with genetic relatedness (e.g.,

kibbutzim, altruism, and sexual aversion)

2. Phenotypic similarity is another cue tied to kin recognition

and altruism

3. Kin terms denote genetic relationships

Page 8: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Predictions

1. Attempts to induce altruism by means of kinship deceit should

involve:

a. association,

b. phenotypic similarity,

c. and kin terms

Page 9: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

2. Institutions demanding costly sacrifice should encourage:

a. close associations that replicate natural kin contexts,

b.the use of false phenotypic matches such as uniforms, hairstyle,

c. the use of linguistic kin referents,

d.prefer young recruits (malleable),

e. discourage association with actual kin (substitute attachments are

more easily formed when familial ties are severed)

Page 10: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Institutional Celibacy: Monasticism In Christianity, Buddhism & Hinduism

1. Reveals a recurring pattern of the five predicted practices:

2. Recruits are typically

a. Young,

b. Renounce family ties,

c. Separated from family and community,

d. Wear uniform clothing, hairstyles, and

e. Non-kin are denoted with sibling and parental terms

Page 11: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

An Extended Example Of Institutional Celibacy: Aztec Priests

1. Took a vow of chastity,

2. Wore uniform and distinctive clothing and feather work,

3. Did not cut or wash their hair,

4. As young children they were sent to special schools attached to temples,

5. The emperor was called father and mother to all

Pattern of wealthy, powerful non-kin organizations whose leaders acquire and

control resources from recruits via means of institutionalized celibacy

Page 12: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Aztec Priests, Codex Mendoza

Page 13: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Organizations Employing Suicide Bombing

1. For example, Liberation Tigers, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Chechen separatists, Al

Qaeda, Muslim brotherhood, Lebanese Shiites

2. These organizations also exhibit the predicted pattern of training

a. recruits include young and unmarried recruits,

b. separated from family and community,

c. training camps with recruits wearing uniforms,

d. Use of kin terms, such as brother and sister, and elder brother for the leader

Page 14: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Police in Afghanistan stopped a young militant By JACK LOSH Published: 29th October 2012

Page 15: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Combat Suicide

1. Definition: an act that occurs during military combat, involving sacrifice of

life for comrades, and certain and immediate death

2. Basic training in all armies creates group bonding via a close, intense

association

3. Many armies include mandatory phenotypic similarity involving hairstyles,

uniforms, emblems, and equipment,

4. the use of kinship symbolism to bond members (“Band of Brothers”)

Page 16: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

What kinds of societies tend to use Induced Altruism?

1. 19 of 22 societies in which non-kin, institutionalized celibacy occurred

were small or large states

2. suicide terrorism occurs in the context of states to which terrorist

organizations are opposed,

3. combat suicide occurs in the context of armies, which are characteristic

of large societies

Page 17: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Why?

1.Social interactions is larger societies often involve non-kin

2.Adaptations related to inclusive fitness are increasingly irrelevant

in organizing people.

Page 18: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Discussion: Institutional Celibacy

1. Communal groups control individual and kin-based interests by either

accommodating or minimizing the influence of families through the control

of sexuality

2. The Oneida community required communal sexuality

3. The Shakers required celibacy

4. Both approaches lead to the replacement of kin ties with non-kin bonds

5. Resources are directed to the group's leaders or the group as a whole

Page 19: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Discussion: Combat and Terrorist Suicide

1. Motives for fighting in small-scale groups are typically individual or kin

related, including hunting resources, trespassing, women, revenge,

accusations of sorcery, mutual suspicion, sheer pugnacity

2. These motives are related to increasing somatic and reproductive success

3. Authoritative political systems are characterized by people engaging in

greater and more deadly fighting

Page 20: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

4. Under these conditions,

a. Professional armies and soldiers emerge, and

b. Motives for combat do not involve individual and kin level concerns

5. Socialization and training become more important

6. Training takes place in the context of small groups, and

7. The predicted pattern of practices that reinforce bonding in non-kin

contexts becomes typical

Page 21: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

What factors besides evolutionary ones influence costly sacrifice?

1. Costly sacrifice is influenced by a combination of personality,

experiential, ideological, and other factors, and cannot be

explained solely in evolutionary terms

2. In addition to positive kin cue manipulation, terrorist organizations

may offer material and status rewards to human bomber’s kin

Page 22: Hector Qirko’s Induced Altruism in Religious, Military, & Terrorist Organizations; Cross cultural research; 47 (2): 131-161; 2013 PowerPoint by Brad R

Final Remarks

1. Organizations are collections of individuals with competing

interests.

2. Leaders of religious, military, and terrorist organizations are not

typically engaged in costly sacrifice themselves, and

3. Leaders often indirectly benefit in terms of reproductive success

from the actions of their recruits