Codenomicon Ltd.

Säkerhetsdagen, Göteborg

Heartbleed discovery

Tomi Väisänen, Account Executive

2014-09-18

• This is a high level presentation, low technical content

• The information is based on interviews of the relevant people

• The information is presented from Codenomicon point of view

Disclaimer

Road to discovery, part 1

CODENOMICON START

Why does software fail ?

• Oulu University Secure Programme group

• Protos 1996

• Testing ASN.1 1999

• Realising the scale

There are vulnerabilities

– MIME in 1998

– ASN.1/SNMP in 2001/2002

– Apache IPv6-URI 2004

– Image formats in 2005

– XML libraries in 2009

– Linux Kernel IPv4 and SCTP in 2010

– strongSwan in 2012

– OpenSSL and GnuTLS in 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2014

• ASN.1 1999-2002 • Multiple

vulnerabilities

Codenomicon 2014

Kn

ow

n

Appcheck Scanning of applications for OpenSource components and known vulnerabilities in them

Un

kno

wn

Defensics

Robustness and Security testing

Wh

at o

the

rs a

lrea

dy

kno

w

Abuse SA

Situational awareness for protection of critical infrastructure

Road to discovery, part 2

IKEV2 AUTHENTICATION BYPASS

Subtle faults

• User was able to access the server

with bogus Ikev2 credentials =>

Authentication Bypass

Problem to be solved –not all SW crash

SafeGuard Concept

SafeGuard

• Detects:

• Authentication bypass

• Weak cryptos

• Amplification problems

HEARTBLEED

This is how it looks in reality

How it unfolded

2014-04-02: Wednesday night

• New build of SafeGuard features installed and put to nightly test runs against OpenSSL

• During the night between April 2nd and April 3rd multiple alerts were raised by Defensics SafeGuard feature

2014-04-03 Thursday morning

• Riku & Antti start investigating the alerts

2014-04-03 Thursday noon

• Further discussion and assesment of the alerts • New custom anomaly was created to verify severity

2014-04-03 Thursday afternoon

• CROSS = Codenomicon Robust Open Source Software

• CROSS report was written and send to NCSC-FI for review

2014-04-03 Thu Late evening

• New build of Defensics SafeGuard created and sent to NCSC-FI for verificating the vulnerability

• Thursday night: NCSC-FI verified the finding, and verified it also leaks PKI (severity level much higher)

HEARTBLEED THE NEXT DAY

2014-04-04 Friday Client-side-verified

Friday thru Sunday

• Q&A prepared • Heartbleed.com reserved • Crisis communication prepared with CERT-FI to handle potential media queries

and ensure correctness of the message • CERTs and open source communities around the world work round the clock

patching systems in silence

2014-04-07

• OpenSSL releases information and HeartBleed becomes known

• Heartbleed.com is launched

• Media stories are carefully monitored

• Lot of work around the world and through communities to ensure this is taken seriously and message is correct

Days after public disclosure by OpenSSL

0

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

April 7th

April 8th

April 9th

April 10th

April 11th

April 12th

Visitors heartbleed.com

0

5

10

15

20

25

April 8th April 9th April 10th April 11th April 12th April 14th April 20th

Vuln Scanning from nro of countries

Proof-of-concept for 16kb

0

5

10

15

20

25

April 8th April 9th April 10th April 11th April 12th April 14th April 20th

Vuln Scanning from nro of countries

Proof-of-concept for 64kb

0

5

10

15

20

25

April 8th April 9th April 10th April 11th April 12th April 14th April 20th

Vuln Scanning from nro of countries

Botnet integration

Today 2014-09-18

• Heartbleed Scanning still ongoing in the wild

• SafeGuard released in Defensics • SafeGuard Checks implemented for other protocols as well • Appcheck alerts on usage of vulnerable libraries in software

Summary

• Heartbleed was discovered through normal development procedures • SafeGuard checks are part of Defensics • Appcheck alerts on usage of vulnerable libraries in software • Codenomicon technology helps buyers to raise product security

requirements

• Have you identified all client-side code that uses OpenSSL?

• Have you checked if your VPN or mesh networks use OpenSSL?

• Have you checked if any of your connected devices are using OpenSSL?

• Have you checked if your back-end systems are using OpenSSL?

• Have you checked if any of your embedded systems are using OpenSSL (many embedded OS use OpenSSL)?

• Do you have browser based customer interfaces for situation awareness, billing or reporting over SSL/TLS?

• Have you checked third-party binaries/firmware for the existence of OpenSSL?

Questions for Audience