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#8/23$6+2 HEARING DAY ONE Bruce Power Inc.: Application to consider an amendment of the operating licence for the restart of Bruce A Units 3 and 4 THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. We will now move to Hearing Day One of a two-day process on the matter of the application by Bruce Power Inc. to consider an amendment to the operating licence for the restart of Bruce A Units 3 and 4. MR. LEBLANC: The Notice of Public Hearing 2002-H18 was published on September 20, 2002. December 16th was the deadline set for filing by the applicant and by CNSC staff. January 8th was the deadline for filing of supplementary information by the applicant and Commission staff. 03-H5.1 / 03-H5.1A Oral presentation by Bruce Power Inc. THE CHAIRPERSON: I would like to begin by calling on Bruce Power Inc. for their oral presentation, as outlined in CMD documents 03-H5.1 and CMD 03-H5.1A.

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Page 1: HEARING DAY ONEnuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/pdf/transDay1-03-H5.pdf · Commission received a detailed report of the work undertaken to meet the technical requirements for

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HEARING DAY ONE�

Bruce Power Inc.:�

Application to consider an amendment of the�

operating licence for the restart of Bruce A Units�

3 and 4�

THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning.�

We will now move to Hearing Day�

One of a two-day process on the matter of the�

application by Bruce Power Inc. to consider an

amendment to the operating licence for the restart�

of Bruce A Units 3 and 4.��

MR. LEBLANC: The Notice of Public��

Hearing 2002-H18 was published on September 20,��

2002. December 16th was the deadline set for��

filing by the applicant and by CNSC staff.��

January 8th was the deadline for filing of��

supplementary information by the applicant and��

Commission staff.��

03-H5.1 / 03-H5.1A�

Oral presentation by Bruce Power Inc.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: I would like to��

begin by calling on Bruce Power Inc. for their��

oral presentation, as outlined in CMD documents��

03-H5.1 and CMD 03-H5.1A.��

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I will turn it over to the�

President and CEO, Mr. Duncan Hawthorne.�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Madam President,�

Members of the Commission, good morning.�

My name is Duncan Hawthorne, and I�

am Bruce Power's Chief Executive Officer.�

With me today are Robert Nixon,�

our Executive Vice-President of Production, Ken�

Talbot, Executive Vice-President and Chief

Engineer, and Ron Mottram, Vice-President Bruce A�

Restart.��

Bruce Power is pleased to be here��

today at the second of three days of regulatory��

hearings required to restart Bruce A Units 3 and��

4. We appeared before the Commission on December��

12th to report on the 22-month comprehensive��

environmental assessment which produced nine��

technical support documents reviewing 132 possible��

effects.�

Today we are here to report on the�

licensing requirements.��

Prior to coming here we have met��

CNSC staff many times and addressed 53 identified��

requirements in 22 submissions in response to��

their requests.��

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In advance of this meeting the�

Commission received a detailed report of the work�

undertaken to meet the technical requirements for�

a safe restart. The purpose of this presentation�

is to provide an overview of the key points in the�

submission.�

As part of its nuclear plant�

recovery program the previous licensee had removed�

Units 1, 3 and 4 from operational service by the

spring of 1998, Unit 2 having been laid-up in�

1995. At the time they were laid-up, Units 3 and��

4 were known to have operational life and there��

were no technical issues that factored into the��

closure decision.��

A detailed lay-up program was��

produced and the plant lay-up followed. While��

Bruce A was in a laid-up state, it continued to be��

a Class 1 facility and Bruce Power continued to��

oversee the facility as such. This ensured that�

operator rounds and maintenance activity continued�

and that Bruce A was maintained in a well��

controlled state.��

Over 200 staff were involved in��

lay-up activities and security was maintained to��

the appropriate standards.��

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Units 1 and 2 continue to remain�

under the control of the lay-up program.�

Bruce Power made the decision to�

restart Units 3 and 4 based on the clear market�

demand and a belief that remnant life remained in�

the asset. The Ontario electricity market needs�

additional generating capacity, and Bruce A Units�

3 and 4 are capable of adding 1500 megawatts of�

much needed safe, clean and reliable power.

A rigorous condition assessment�

indicated that there were no significant technical��

impediments to the restart. All the critical��

elements to justify the restart were included in��

the scope of the project. My colleagues will��

address these elements in their comments.��

A detailed business plan was��

developed which was accepted by the Bruce Power��

Board.��

Bruce Power was confident that its�

employees had the expertise necessary to proceed�

with the restart and a highly effective project��

team was established by drawing on experienced��

staff from Operations, Engineering and Maintenance��

and augmented by external staff under the control��

of Bruce Power management.��

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Embarking on a significant restart�

project so soon after assuming operational control�

was not a decision taken lightly by the Bruce�

Power board.�

We had to be satisfied that it�

would be possible to maintain and enhance the�

performance of the Bruce B units while we�

proceeded with this restart project.�

Prior to launching the restart

program, Bruce Power conducted a comprehensive�

assessment to ensure that both the technical��

capability and staff expertise existed on the��

site.��

We determined the necessary human��

resources were on site and were able to be��

redeployed and to be retrained if that was��

necessary. Many of the staff had more than 20��

years' experience with the operational Bruce A.��

As the restart proceeded, Bruce�

Power worked hard to lay the foundation for the�

transition to a six-unit site.��

As the major employer and the��

economic engine to our immediate area, Bruce Power��

has a major impact on the region. We have worked��

hard to integrate ourselves within the community��

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and established strong links with community�

organizations and local government.�

The Bruce A restart is a major�

development for our region and Bruce Power has�

worked very closely with the community. Members�

of our Executive Team are active participants in�

Economic Development, Joint Liaison and Impact�

Advisory committees. We have strived to keep the�

community informed of our progress on the restart

and to address any concerns they may have.�

The Bruce A restart is strongly��

supported by our local community and that is��

demonstrated by the many supportive interventions��

made during the environmental assessment hearings��

held on December 12th.��

I would now like to introduce our��

Vice-President of Bruce A Restart, Ron Mottram,��

who will outline the steps Bruce Power has taken��

to ensure the safe and timely return to service of�

Units 3 and 4.�

MR. MOTTRAM: Thank you, Duncan.��

Madam President and Members of the��

Commission, my name is Ron Mottram and I am the��

Vice-President of the Bruce A Restart.��

Bruce Power embarked on one of the��

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most comprehensive assessments of a CANDU station�

in July 2000. This "Condition Assessment" project�

was tasked with determining the detailed scope of�

all activities that would be required to return�

the Bruce A Units 3 and 4 back to full power�

operation.�

The condition assessment project�

was completed by March 2001, within budget and to�

schedule. Using the scope and restart timeline, a

business model was constructed and we were able to�

confirm that there was a business case to restart��

Units 3 and 4.��

The predicted life of the units��

was eight years for Unit 3 and 13 years for Unit��

4. The estimated cost of the project was $340��

million.��

The conclusions of the condition��

assessment were reviewed by an independent panel��

comprised of experts from CANDU industry, British�

Energy Director of Engineering and USA consultants�

prior to the presentation of the business case to��

the board. They endorsed not only the technical��

merits of the case but also endorsed the remnant��

life predictions.��

After the go-ahead was given the��

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project was divided into four main areas:�

(1) safety and licensing�

requirements -- for example, safety analysis and�

probabilistic risk assessment, and so on;�

(2) projects to be completed by�

external contracts like qualified power supply�

upgrades and internal projects and plant�

maintenance, such as overhaul of low pressure�

service water pumps;

(3) support systems which looked�

at things like operational experience and quality��

assurance requirements; and��

(4) operations division, which��

will be the group left to run the plant after the��

restart has been completed.��

The organization structure��

reflected this approach. A significant part of��

the work was scheduled to be completed by "in��

house" staff, therefore ensuring that they would�

be experienced in the A Station plant after�

restart.��

The overall philosophy was to use��

the B Station basic systems approach, modified as��

appropriate.��

The project timeline was��

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considered to be driven by the work required to�

update the Safety Case.�

It was recognized that there would�

need to be a number of CNSC hearings. These would�

be to hear the environmental assessment and then�

the licence application hearings.�

The environmental assessment of a�

nuclear station restart, as per the Canadian�

Environmental Assessment Act, had only been

completed once before in Canada. The�

environmental assessment process provided a clear��

road map and defined the scope and sequence. This��

information was built into the restart planning.��

The existing safety analysis,��

which supported the safety case, was known to��

require revision due to methodology changes that��

had occurred since the shutdown of Bruce A. The��

work required to bring the analysis up to date was��

technically challenging and time consuming. Once�

the safety analysis activities had been factored�

into the overall restart plan, it became the��

critical path for the project.��

During the course of the project a��

change to the scope of the regulatory steps for��

the environmental assessment occurred to further��

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enhance the transparency of the regulatory�

process.�

The work required to safely return�

the plant to service was collated by two main�

routes: improvement projects that were known to�

be required and work to overcome known plant�

defects or to complete routine inspections.�

The detailed scope was defined by�

the creation of multidiscipline teams who walked

all 109 plant systems and produced System Restart�

Scoping Reports.��

The results of the condition��

assessment report defined that some additional��

inspections were required on steam generators and��

these were completed. The independent panel was��

reconvened to assess the further data.��

During the project there has been��

an amount of discovery work. Two examples of this��

would be the need to carry out extensive work on�

the 13.8 kV transfer system and to complete the�

cleaning of the internal surfaces of the main��

generator stator conductors.��

The total volume of "in house��

work" was 240,000 hours, excluding the routine��

effort required to maintain the lay-up state. In��

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addition, approximately 100 individual projects�

were identified.�

I would now like to turn the�

presentation over to Ken Talbot.�

MR. TALBOT: Thank you, Ron.�

My name is Ken Talbot and I am�

Executive Vice-President and Chief Engineer.�

In order not to unduly distract�

Bruce B operations with the Bruce A restart

program, the restart project to date has been�

under my purview. This has enabled us to ensure��

the appropriate utilization of resources across��

the site.��

After taking over the design��

authority for the Bruce units, we set about��

ensuring we could maintain the technical��

engineering expertise to support outstanding��

performance of both the A and B units. We have��

done this by several means.�

We have combined site engineering�

and project staff with past Bruce A and B��

experience with the operations and maintenance��

people to form the restart team. They have been��

planning and performing the necessary restart��

activities and regenerating the expertise to��

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safely operate and maintain the plant.�

We have been recruiting and�

training our own engineering resources in the�

design disciplines and are establishing�

contractual arrangements with external sources of�

specialized CANDU expertise.�

Our continuing participation in�

the CANDU industry groups, such as the CANDU�

Owners Group (COG), in support of the research and

development on generic and other CANDU engineering�

related issues.��

We are in the process of��

negotiating with other potential partners to��

maintain the life cycle management of critical��

components such as steam generators and fuel��

channels.��

The Bruce A restart project itself��

was founded on an extensive assessment of both the��

physical condition of the systems, structures,�

components and the supporting design basis�

documentation.��

From this assessment spawned the��

need to upgrade the plant to further reduce the��

operational risk and in turn the business risk.��

These improvements included environmental��

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qualification, fire protection, seismic capacity,�

electrical power distribution and security. These�

will be completed to the necessary degree prior to�

restart.�

All of these improvements are�

either complete or nearing completion and further�

enhance our safety case and the life cycle�

management programs. All improvements and changes�

are being performed to strict engineering change

controls and even though many of these changes are�

being performed by independent contractors, site��

engineering and design staff are approving all��

changes and verifying appropriate completion��

quality.��

Significant upgrades have also��

been made to our security capabilities. Security��

facilities, equipment, training and response��

capability have all been enhanced. The details��

are "security protected" and not appropriate for�

discussion in this forum, but CNSC staff are fully�

apprised of the enhancements.��

Our Technical Surveillance��

Program, with its comprehensive reporting on the��

health of all operational systems, is already��

being applied to Bruce A as systems are placed��

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into service.�

This information is being fed into�

maintenance and plant life cycle management which�

ensures a seamless transfer of inspection,�

maintenance and improvement programs from the�

restart phase to long-term operation. Not only�

are these arrangements demonstrating improved�

equipment health and reliability at Bruce B, they�

have also received accolades from peer

organizations such as WANO.�

I would now like to turn the��

presentation over to Robert Nixon.��

MR. NIXON: Thank you, Ken.��

Madam President and Members of the��

Commission, my name is Robert Nixon and I am��

Executive Vice-President of Production for Bruce��

Power.��

Bruce Power plans to manage the��

site as an integrated six-unit facility through a�

phased approach.�

Currently the work management and��

outage management processes are already being��

applied to Bruce A to ensure a smooth transfer.��

There are sufficient maintenance and engineering��

resources to safely operate and maintain all six��

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units, and the majority of engineering and�

maintenance staff presently involved in the�

restart activities will remain beyond restart.�

The restart is being handled in�

three phases:�

In Phase One, which is prior to�

fuel loading, all restart activities were the�

responsibility of Restart Vice-President, Ron�

Mottram.

In Phase Two, as fuelling�

commences, all activities and plant systems that��

maintain the Guaranteed Shutdown State will come��

under my oversight as Executive VP - Production.��

On removal of the Guaranteed��

Shutdown State, the responsibility for the safety��

of operations for the entire unit transfers to my��

department.��

As the first unit is placed into��

service, maintenance direction comes from the site�

maintenance organization under the EVP-Chief�

Engineer, Ken Talbot. That is to maintain the��

focus of the Restart Team on restart activities.��

Then in Phase Three when both��

units are in service, all engineering and��

maintenance functions for the six units will be��

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under the direction of the EVP-Chief Engineer, and�

operations for all six units will be under the�

control of myself as EVP-Production.�

In the area of training and�

staffing, it is worth noting that the required�

staffing has been maintained to provide continuing�

operational oversight of the Bruce A plant in its�

laid-up state. From that position, Bruce Power�

has identified staffing and training as an ongoing

challenge and has acted to address critical areas.�

We have conducted a long-term��

staffing capability assessment and are recruiting��

new staff. Approximately 400 new staff have been��

recruited, including key staff areas such as��

control technicians and nuclear operators.��

A new intensive First Line��

Managers program has been introduced to ensure all��

supervisors possess the management tools for their��

role. This received a very positive review as an�

industry strength in a World Association of�

Nuclear Operators review.��

Bruce Power has put in place a��

two-tier training oversight committee to ensure��

training standards are established and met, that��

training needs are effectively addressed, and that��

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both the licensed and non-licensed training�

programs are being upgraded.�

This meets best industry practice�

world-wide.�

Training and qualification of�

licensed staff are in progress and will be�

completed along with the issuance of CNSC staff�

certificates prior to the start of the first unit.�

Bruce Power is committed to

ensuring that Bruce A will have well-trained,�

first-class staff committed to safe reliable��

operations.��

Bruce Power is committed to��

operating the Bruce Nuclear facility as a six-unit��

site. This will allow us to integrate our systems��

and maximize our resources to ensure safe and��

reliable consistent operations.��

It is useful to review the CNSC��

ratings for Bruce B as a benchmark of Bruce�

Power's operational success. This review covered�

all programmatic areas for Bruce A and B and all��

the relevant operational aspects.��

On the program side, the CNSC��

identified our emergency preparedness under��

safeguards as exceeding requirements and all other��

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aspects as meeting requirements.�

On the implementation side,�

emergency preparedness, environmental performance�

and safeguards all exceeded requirements.�

However, the CNSC noted that while our performance�

assurance program met requirements, our�

implementation needed improvement. This is a�

priority for Bruce Power and we have been actively�

addressing this area.

Our number one value at Bruce�

Power is safety first, because we recognize the��

fact that the most commercially successful nuclear��

power operations are also the safest. This leads��

to improved public confidence in our operations.��

Contributing to this confidence is��

reliable, high-quality human performance in the��

day-to-day operation of the plant as measured by��

event-free operations.��

All our initiatives, including the�

use of event-free tools, field observation and�

coaching and planned inspections have been applied��

across the site, including Bruce A and Bruce B.��

The improving trend has been achieved through��

productivity improvements, enabling us to free��

staff to assist with the complex task of��

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restarting Bruce A Units 3 and 4.�

For example, in the area of�

industrial safety, programmatic efforts such as�

the implementation of the International Safety�

Rating System, ISRS, in combination with our joint�

union-management sponsored target zero initiative�

are having a positive impact in that we are seeing�

an improving trend at Bruce A and Bruce B.�

I would now like to turn the

presentation back to Duncan Hawthorne.�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Thank you, Robert.��

Clearly my colleagues have��

outlined what is a very complex and multi-task��

project. It is helpful, recognizing that many of��

the tasks are still ongoing, to give the��

Commission a general view of current progress in��

some of the major areas.��

Environmental assessment. The��

CNSC Screening Report was accepted in January�

2003.�

Some of the larger projects, the��

introduction of a qualified power supply upgrade��

is some 70 per cent complete, with full completion��

shortly.��

Class 1 battery banks replacement��

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is more than 75 per cent complete.�

Emergency Coolant Injection�

Strainer System is more than 88 per cent complete.�

Emergency Filtered Air Discharge�

System is greater than 50 per cent complete.�

On Units 3 and 4 themselves,�

replacement of the Class 1 battery banks is more�

than 75 per cent complete.�

Steam line relocation is complete,

awaiting start up to commission.�

Fuel channel repositioning --��

which is a major project itself -- on Unit 3 is��

more than 80 per cent complete, with full��

completion by January 19th.��

Fuel channel Spacer Location and��

Repositioning of Unit 4 is now fully complete.��

Madam Chair and Members of the��

Commission, Bruce Power feels confident that we��

have completed or will complete all of the�

necessary components to ensure a safe, reliable�

and timely return to service of Bruce A Units 3��

and 4.��

If the Commission approves the��

licence amendment, Bruce Power will fulfil its��

plan to become a fully operational six-unit site��

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by the summer of 2003.�

We will then prepare for regular�

outages and continue the periodic inspection�

program and in-service inspection program to�

ensure that Bruce A, Units 3 and 4 provide safe,�

reliable electricity to the people of Ontario.�

Thank you for your attention. We�

would be happy to answer any questions.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very

much.�

I will now turn to CNSC staff for��

their presentation before we open the floor for��

questions.��

��

03-H5��

Oral presentation by CNSC staff��

THE CHAIRPERSON: I would like to��

ask Mr. Blyth to address the CNSC presentation as��

outlined in CMD document 03-H5.�

Mr. Blyth.�

MR. BLYTH: Thank you very much,��

Madam President, Members of the Commission.��

Again for the record my name is��

Jim Blyth. With me today are Mr. Jim Douglas, who��

is the CNSC's Director of Compliance and Licensing��

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at the Bruce site; Mr. Maury Burton, Project�

Officer at our office at Bruce A who played a�

major role in preparing the staff document and has�

been project managing our part of the Bruce A�

restart.�

We are presenting CMD 03-H5 to the�

Commission for a decision regarding Bruce Power's�

application for an amendment to the Bruce Nuclear�

Generating Station A operating licence to allow

the restart of Units 3 and 4.�

The current licence for this��

station will expire on October 31, 2003. Hearings��

for the renewal of this licence will take place��

later this year.��

I will now turn the presentation��

over to Mr. Burton.��

MR. BURTON: Thank you, Jim.��

Good morning, Madam President and��

Members of the Commission. I am Maury Burton, a�

Project Officer in the Bruce Compliance and�

Licensing Division.��

This presentation summarizes CNSC��

staff's review of Bruce Power's licence amendment��

application for Bruce A and the licensees��

performance during the current licensing period,��

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including the Bruce A restart project.�

The CMD contains further details�

in support of this summary.�

At present at Bruce A all four�

units are in a laid up guaranteed shut down state�

in accordance with the current operating licence.�

Bruce Power has indicated that they would like to�

restart Units 3 and 4 and operate these units for�

eight and 13 years respectively.

The Commission held a one-day�

hearing in December 2002 on the environmental��

assessment screening report for the Bruce A��

restart application. The Commission rendered its��

decision on this environmental assessment��

screening report on January 6, 2003.��

The Commission also held a one-day��

hearing in December 2002 on allowing a designated��

officer to consider Bruce Power's application to��

amend the Bruce A operating licence to allow the�

refuelling of Units 3 and 4. In its decision�

rendered on January 6, 2003, the Commission��

decided to allow the designated officer to��

consider the application.��

To update the Commission, the��

Bruce A power reactor operating licence was��

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amended by a designated officer on January 13,�

2003 to permit the refuelling of Units 3 and 4.�

The restart of Units 3 and 4 is�

being considered at this hearing. Day 2 of this�

hearing is scheduled for February 26, 2003.�

On November 16, 2001, Bruce Power�

applied to the Commission for an amendment to its�

power reactor operating licence to allow the�

restart of Bruce A Units 3 and 4.

Staff has reviewed the application�

and concludes that it contains all the information��

prescribed by the General Nuclear Safety and��

Control Regulations and the Class 1 Facility��

Regulations.��

Acceptance of the licence��

amendment and staff recommendations by the��

Commission would be the first step towards the��

restart of Bruce A Units 3 and 4.��

Actual restart of these reactors�

is still several months off. As can be seen from�

the Appendix C of CMD 03-H05, a considerable��

amount of work has yet to be completed by Bruce��

Power.��

On January 31, 2002, CNSC staff��

send a letter to Bruce Power outlining staff��

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requirements for the review of the licence�

amendment application. The staff review of Bruce�

Power's submissions on these requirements form the�

basis of staff's conclusions and recommendations.�

Some of the requirements include:�

that all previously identified and committed�

safety upgrades be completed; a comprehensive�

safely assessment be completed reviewing the�

station against modern codes and standards; all

upgrades essential to safety identified as a�

result of the comprehensive safety review be��

installed prior to restart; and improvement��

programs started by Ontario Power Generation at��

Bruce B be implemented at Bruce A to a level��

similar to Bruce B.��

CNSC staff has reviewed the��

information submitted by Bruce Power in its��

application to restart Bruce A and has assessed��

the adequacy of the program descriptions.�

CNSC staff has also assessed the�

implementation of these programs, mainly using the��

following two sources of information. CNSC staff��

has used Bruce Power's past performance in the��

context of Bruce B operation to assess the��

implementation of programs that are generic to the��

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operation of Bruce A and B.�

For example, staff has assessed�

the implementation of Bruce Power's environmental�

monitoring program using information that is�

available from its operation of Bruce B.�

Staff has also used information�

gained from Bruce Power's performance in the�

context of activities carried out for the restart�

of Bruce A. For example, CNSC staff has used

Bruce Power's performance in carrying out restart�

training activities to assess the implementation��

of the training program.��

Staff's overall rating of the��

licensee's performance is "B. Meets Requirements".��

This was determined by evaluating the licensee's��

programs and performance in each of the nine��

safety areas.��

The radioactive emissions from the��

station are well below regulatory limits and the�

radiological risk to workers and the public are�

acceptably low.��

As well, programs are being��

implemented as part of the restart project��

improving station safety and reliability.��

There are two areas of licensee��

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performance that fall below CNSC requirements and�

are rated by staff as "C". They are training,�

examination and certification in the performance�

assurance safety area and structural integrity in�

the equipment fitness for service safety area.�

In October 2002 CNSC staff raised�

concerns regarding the lack of training that had�

occurred to date and requested training material�

and schedules from Bruce Power.

At the present time staff is�

concerned that the majority of training is being��

developed and delivered on a just-in-time basis.��

In particular, the quantity of training that��

station modifications could require may result in��

an overly aggressive training schedule. Should��

the Commission amend the licence and accept CNSC��

staff recommendations, staff will require that��

prior to restart Bruce Power submit evidence that��

all workers have successfully completed refresher�

and upgrade training appropriate to the knowledge�

and skill requirements of their position to regain��

their full competence.��

The area of structural integrity��

covers three of the most critical components in a��

nuclear station: steam generators, pressure tubes��

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and feeder pipes. At the present time there are�

outstanding dispositions on feeder pipes and�

pressure tubes that are required before CNSC staff�

can complete an assessment of the fitness for�

service of these components.�

The periodic inspection plans�

required by licence condition 5.2 for Units 3 and�

4 were submitted by Bruce Power on December 13,�

2002 and are currently being reviewed by CNSC

staff.�

If the Commission amends the��

licence and accepts CNSC staff recommendations,��

these outstanding issues will need to be resolved��

before the Bruce A units can be restarted.��

Due to the fact that Bruce A��

restart is an ongoing project there were a number��

of items that were not complete at the time of��

writing CMD 03-H05. These items are listed in��

Appendix C of the CMD. These items are considered�

by CNSC staff to be necessary for the safe�

operation of Bruce A or must be completed to meet��

the assumptions used in the preparation of the��

environmental assessment screening report.��

If the Commission amends the��

licence and accepts CNSC staff recommendations,��

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then the items listed in Appendix C will require�

written assurances of completion from Bruce Power�

and CNSC staff verification before the removal of�

the guaranteed shutdown state for either Unit 3 or�

4.�

Bruce Power has undertaken a�

number of safety upgrades to the station. These�

include:�

the addition of a secondary

control area to provide monitoring and shutdown�

capability remotely from the main control room��

should it become uninhabitable;��

upgrading the backup emergency��

electrical power supply, known as the qualified��

power system, to improve both functionality and��

reliability;��

environmentally qualifying the��

station to protect against harsh environments��

caused by postulated high-pressure steam or water�

line failures;�

installing seismic upgrade��

modifications; and��

installing improved fire��

protection capabilities.��

As noted previously, the��

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Commission held a one-day hearing in December 2002�

on the environmental assessment screening report�

required for this application. The Commission has�

concluded that the screening report meets all the�

requirements set out in the approved EA guidelines�

and subsection 16(1) of the Canadian Environmental�

Assessment Act.�

The Commission will not refer the�

project to Federal Minister of the Environment for

his referral to a panel, review or mediator.�

The project, taking into account��

the appropriate mitigation measures, is not likely��

to cause significant environmental effects and,��

consistent with the course of action described in��

paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Canadian Environmental��

Assessment Act, the Commission will proceed with��

the consideration of Bruce Power Inc.'s��

application for the amendment of the Bruce A power��

reactor operating licence.�

CNSC staff concludes that Bruce�

Power is qualified to operate the Bruce A Nuclear��

Generating Station in the current guaranteed��

shutdown state and respond to any emergency��

situation.��

Staff further concludes that once��

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Bruce Power has met the prerequisites listed in�

Appendix C of the CMD, Bruce Power will be�

qualified to operate Bruce A Units 3 and 4 at�

power, making adequate provision for the�

protection of the environment, the health and�

safety of persons and the maintenance of national�

security and measures required to implement the�

international obligations to which Canada has�

agreed.

CNSC staff recommends that the�

Commissioners accept CNSC staff's conclusions and��

amends the licence as proposed.��

If the Commission amends the��

licence as proposed, staff further recommends that��

the Commission allow a designated officer to��

consider Bruce Power's application for an approval��

to restart the reactors pursuant to condition 11.4��

of the proposed licence.��

This concludes staff presentation.�

CNSC staff are available to answer any questions�

the Commission may have.��

Thank you.��

MR. BLYTH: That completes staff's��

presentation.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Blyth,��

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before we open the floor for more general�

questioning, I just have a specific question that�

I believe would help complete the record. I will�

be asking Bruce also.�

I note on CMD 03-H05 on page 40,�

my interpretation is that the current licence for�

Bruce A facility does not include conditions with�

respect to financial guarantees, either�

operational or decommissioning and that you refer

to these as unresolved licensing issues. That can�

be discussed further.��

However, because we had a��

discussion yesterday about operational financial��

guarantees at a meeting of the Commission -- just��

for the record and for the transcript, the��

transcripts of the meeting minutes will be��

available, however just to form that linkage back��

to this discussion and to ensure that it is on��

this record with regards to Bruce A, I wonder if�

you could do a short synopsis from the staff's�

point of view and then I will ask Bruce Power if��

there needs to be additions to that.��

I just feel for the record we��

should have the operational financial guarantees��

for Bruce A on the record for this licence.��

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First of all, am I correct about�

the current licence, and then the synopsis,�

please.�

MR. BLYTH: Yes, Madam President,�

you are correct.�

I will ask Mr. Paquette, Mr.�

Philippe Paquette of our Bruce Compliance and�

Licensing Division to provide that synopsis.�

MR. PAQUETTE: Thank you, Mr.

Blyth.�

Philippe Paquette, for the record.��

Bonjour madame la présidente,��

bonjour messieurs et mesdames les membres de la��

Commission.��

On December 23 Bruce Power��

announced that a consortium of Canadian-based��

companies had agreed in principal to purchase��

British Energy's share in Bruce Power. Financial��

closure is expected to take place in mid-February�

for this deal. In the meantime, the financial�

guarantees in the Bruce B licence are being��

provided by the U.K. government. CNSC staff��

believes that this guarantee is acceptable as an��

interim provision.��

After financial closure, CNSC��

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staff intends to proceed on two fronts: establish�

acceptable interim measures and identify an�

acceptable long-term solution.�

In terms of interim measures for�

Bruce A, by Day 2 of the current hearing CNSC�

staff will provide the Commission for its�

consideration and decision a revised proposed�

licence. This revised licence will include a�

condition on financial guarantees that is

consistent with the Bruce B licence.�

With regards to long-term��

solution, CNSC staff is currently trying to obtain��

the services of an independent firm that will��

provide expert advice on the form and amount that��

the long-term financial guarantee solution should��

take.��

CNSC staff will pursue its��

discussions with Bruce Power and will present the��

proposed long-term solution to the Commission at�

the Bruce A and B licence renewal hearings later�

this year for consideration and decision of the��

Commission.��

As Mr. Blyth mentioned earlier in��

his presentation, these licences expire in October��

of the current year.��

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THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.�

Are there any additions, Mr.�

Hawthorne, that you would like to make with�

regards to operational financial guarantees?�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Yes, Madam�

President.�

Just for clarification, one�

further issue that staff did put forth yesterday�

was an acceptance that the current quantum of

financial guarantee was considered adequate to�

support both Bruce B and Bruce A since the sum��

that had been calculated was based on a six month��

of the total site operation and maintenance cost��

and that isn't affected by the number of��

operational units.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: Is that correct,��

Mr. Blyth?��

MR. BLYTH: Yes, that is correct.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very�

much. I just thought it was really important for�

us to transfer the information from yesterday to��

today with regards to Bruce A.��

With that, on the record I will��

start now with more general questioning.��

Dr. Barnes.��

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MEMBER BARNES: To Bruce Power,�

just out of interest, you referred on page 2 of�

your presentation that Units 1 and 2 were�

remaining in lay-up stage.�

Do you plan at this stage to�

consider bringing those back?�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Duncan Hawthorne.�

I think it is fair to say that we have always�

focused our attention on Units 3 and 4 for a

number of reasons.�

One, we understand the remnant��

operational life that remains in Units 3 and 4 and��

that is not the case in 1 and 2. In order to��

restart those there is very significant capital��

investment, such as pressure tubes and steam��

generator replacement.��

Secondly, our assessment of our��

technical and operational staffing capability��

would only ever have allowed us to tackle to at�

this time.�

Thirdly, frankly, there is an��

obvious financial burden required in order to��

raise the investment. Clearly our view would be��

that having successfully restarted Units 3 and 4��

on time, on budget, we would have a different view��

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perhaps. Clearly there are obvious issues in the�

Ontario marketplace that might or might not�

dictate the validity of a business case to restart�

Units 1 and 2.�

MEMBER BARNES: On page 14 of your�

presentation you gave a table which is the CNSC�

staff report card. But the designations in that�

were different from the report card of staff in�

CMD 03-H05(ii). For example, in the staff one

there are two "C" designations and you only have�

one. There is one "A" in yours under��

environmental performance, which is a "B".��

I'm not quite sure why this is the��

case.��

MR. HAWTHORNE: I also had the��

confusion and if I could just explain.��

This report card that we represent��

here is actually an extract from the CNSC's annual��

review of regulatory performance. So this table�

is a direct take from that.�

MEMBER BARNES: Okay. Maybe to��

staff, on page 10 of your presentation, "3.2.3.1.��

Training Program Evaluation", this is an��

indication that at the present time this is not��

meeting CNSC requirements.��

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As I understand it, is that right�

under Appendix D that Bruce Power will have to�

give you firm assurance of meeting this before�

startup?�

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas,�

Director of Compliance and Licensing at Bruce.�

Yes, that is true. We are after�

firm assurance that everyone is qualified to�

operate these reactors and in the meantime we are

doing evaluations of the training program to make�

sure it is being improved and meeting our��

expectations.��

MEMBER BARNES: To Bruce Power,��

referred to really in the staff presentation CMD��

03-H05, pages 28 and 29, dealing with feeder��

piping under the general category of��

"Supplementary Inspection Program", it is pointed��

out that:��

"... even under the most�

favourable scenarios, some�

feeders could require��

replacement after operating��

periods ranging from 2 to 2.8��

years."��

Within the lifespan of the startup period.��

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One has to wonder why those are�

not being replaced at this stage as opposed to�

within a couple of years after startup. Do I�

understand that correctly?�

MR. MOTTRAM: Yes. Ron Mottram,�

Vice-President, Bruce A.�

The inspections we have done on�

feeders have a set of criteria which says that if�

they are greater than 80 per cent in original

size, then they are not reportable. Eighty per�

cent to 60 per cent falls into the reportable��

category and lower than that, lower than 60 per��

cent is dispositionable. We have to disposition��

he indication.��

All of the feeder measurements we��

have carried out show that all feeders -- most of��

the feeders at 2.5 inch diameter. There is a��

small number on row A which are two inch diameter��

and they are the ones that see the most velocity�

and flow.�

All of the feeders on 3 or 4 are��

actually in the reportable but not dispositionable��

category and therefore we don't expect any��

difficulty, with the exception of one feeder,��

which is A15 East, and it shows that it is��

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dispositionable.�

We have actually reported that,�

but the code we used in the report we made was,�

again, an inappropriate code and that is in the�

process of being resubmitted.�

Having said that, the position of�

the degradation in that particular feeder is in a�

totally different place as all the rest.�

Typically the extrados of the bend which has the

highest velocity, this particular feeder is�

actually a straight section after the bend and we��

believe that the results are not to do with��

accelerated corrosion at all but just an initial��

anomaly in the construction of that particular��

feeder.��

So it is the only feeder that is��

in a condition of needing any disposition. We can��

disposition it against the current conditions, but��

we intend to inspect it again to demonstrate that�

it is an anomaly in the original feeder geometry�

of that one isolated feeder.��

MEMBER BARNES: Maybe a final��

question to staff.��

On page 30 of your presentation,��

"3.4.3.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment", in the��

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last paragraph on that page you indicate that:�

"... probabilistic risk�

assessments are currently not�

a regulatory requirement."�

Just for my interest, should they�

be or are they being considered to be in future?�

MR. BLYTH: Yes, in future all�

power reactors in Canada will have a probabilistic�

risk assessment and CNSC staff have produced

policy to that effect, but they are not in place�

at all facilities at this time.��

MEMBER BARNES: So when is the��

future? When will they be in place and required?��

MR. BLYTH: I will ask Mr. Hawley��

of the System Engineering Division to respond to��

that.��

MR. HAWLEY: This is Pat Hawley,��

Director of the Systems Engineering Division.��

As Mr. Blyth stated, we do have�

policy in draft form at the moment. It is going�

through internal consultation. It has been out��

for external consultation. It is our top priority��

to have out in final form for this fiscal year, or��

the fiscal year coming out.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Barnes, I��

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just wanted to perhaps build on your question with�

regards to the report cards.�

Perhaps reading into your�

question, I wonder if Bruce Power wishes to either�

comment on the report card as a summary as noted�

in (ii) of the staff CMD 03-H5 now or on Day 2 in�

terms of bringing this up to date for Bruce A.�

Would you like to make any�

comments now or would you like to bring that back?

MR. HAWTHORNE: Certainly if it�

helps the Commission today we could give a brief��

overview of where these two issue lie.��

The two issues that we refer to��

are training standards and certification and��

structural integrity matters.��

On a training issue, clearly one��

of the key concerns that staff have highlighted is��

the just-in-time nature of the delivery of some of��

their training packages. As I mentioned in my own�

remarks it is an ongoing project. We see this�

particular area of concern to be related to nine��

modifications which are still in progress and as��

yet not complete and therefore the training of��

this is indeed being carried out just in time in��

that we want to have the modification work��

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complete in order to delivery timely and relevant�

training information to our staff.�

So I guess, frankly, in that�

regard the question isn't about quality, it is�

about ensuring the timeliness and adequacy of that�

training as those systems are brought into�

service.�

So again I think it is an agreed�

Schedule C content, that as we do these

modifications an important piece of training will�

have to be completed prior to restart.��

On the structural integrity issue,��

I think we recognize also some of the��

documentation continues to be conveyed between��

ourselves and CNSC staff to support pressure tube��

flaw disposition and some of the feeder pipe stuff��

we have just spoken about.��

I guess with respect to pressure��

tubes itself, there are a number of issues there�

which are not specifically to Bruce, they are�

actually industry generic issues in terms of��

overall flaw disposition and code. We continue to��

work with our other utility colleagues as well as��

CNSC staff to resolve those matters.��

Again, we understand that as a��

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requirement prior to restart.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, I�

should have been more specific actually.�

When you look at the table which�

is (ii) -- and Dr. Barnes will correct me if I am�

wrong here, or the staff -- is there are two�

areas: equipment fitness for service and�

environmental performance -- this is in CMD 03-H5�

-- where the ratings of staff for Bruce A, and we

understand that, are different than the staff�

report card which you correctly say is from the��

status report.��

So there are two areas, equipment��

fitness for service and environmental performance.��

I don't know, Dr. Barnes, if there were others��

that you noted. Those are those two.��

Mr. Blyth would like to comment��

and then I will go back to Mr. Hawthorne.��

MR. BLYTH: I am going to ask Mr.�

Douglas to provide the clarification on this�

point.��

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas, for the��

record.��

Yes, these are the two areas that��

are below acceptance level, mainly because at the��

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time we wrote the CMD a lot of this material�

hadn't been submitted to us for review or hadn't�

been assessed. This is an ongoing process.�

Obviously before restart�

everything will meet requirements.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, it�

must be the full moon. We still don't have it.�

Actually, environmental�

performance is not below requirements, it is "B".

So we weren't talking about the two C's, we were�

talking about the two areas where Bruce A appears,��

from your (ii) chart, to be not different, not to��

the same level as the staff report card on what I��

understand is Bruce A and B based on the status��

report on reactors that is done, the annual��

report.��

I am comparing page 14 of Bruce,��

which is what Dr. Barnes did, to (ii) of CMD 03-��

H5.�

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas again.�

From reading Bruce Power's��

presentation, they used the ratings for Bruce B.��

They don't match our ratings. Their ratings were��

purely on Bruce A restart.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess I will��

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go back to Mr. Hawthorne.�

Dr. Barnes' and my assessment is�

equipment fitness for service is a "C" in�

implementation and environmental performance are a�

"B". Now, knowing that you have some station-wide�

programs versus specific programs from Bruce B�

versus Bruce A, would you like to make any�

comments now?�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Yes. Firstly I

would like to apologize for any confusion here,�

Madam President.��

Actually, on our table we are��

referring to CMD 02-M38, which is the annual��

review of regulatory performance. It did include��

an assessment of Bruce A. What it does do is it��

rules inapplicable elements of it clearly because��

the units are non-operational. So I guess from��

our point of view it was reasonable to reflect the��

most recent global view of this.�

However, with respect to the two�

issues specifically raised by Commissioner Barnes,��

equipment fitness for service I think, as Mr.��

Douglas indicates, is an indication of assessment��

at a point in time. Clearly we did have a program��

to ensure the equipment fitness for service and��

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that was rated as "B", but actually the�

implementation of that program at the time staff�

created the CMD was still an area that they were�

seeking performance improvement.�

Our general view would be that as�

this project unfolds, then we will be in a�

position to satisfy staff that we have in fact met�

the requirements. I think in that regard we are�

perhaps saying the same thing.

THE CHAIRPERSON: And the�

environmental performance "B" for Bruce A versus��

"A" for Bruce B?��

MR. HAWTHORNE: Madam President, I��

believe it is largely the same thing. These are��

works in progress.��

I guess with respect to Bruce A��

hearings staff appropriately felt that it was��

reasonable to benchmark Bruce A on its own. We��

ourselves see this program being such that we�

integrate across a six-unit site with common�

standards for all.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Barnes?��

MEMBER BARNES: I am still��

confused. I am quite happy to leave this until��

Day 2 if you like, but in reply to Mr. Douglas'��

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comment, if I go back to page (i), the first�

bullet that you have there you say:�

"CNSC staff has used Bruce�

Power's past performance in�

the context of Bruce B�

operation to assess the�

implementation of programs�

that are generic to the�

operation of Bruce A and B."

Whereas you said, I think, that�

that assessment was for Bruce A.��

So I think both of you, both CNSC��

staff and Bruce Power are trying to deal with the��

same table, but at the moment we have on the��

public record a table which just has those two��

discrepancies "Equipment Fitness for Service" is��

"C" on the staff and it is "B" on the Bruce Power��

table. For "Environmental Performance" it is "B"��

on CNSC document and it is listed as "A".�

I don't think we should�

necessarily take too much more time here, but I��

think it should be clarified for the public record��

at maybe Day 2. That is the best way to deal with��

it.��

MR. HAWTHORNE: Perhaps, Madam��

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President, if I could just make one final comment.�

The table in the CMD 02-M38, which�

does show Bruce A and Bruce B, under the area of�

equipment performance it actually has is non-�

applicable, so clearly staff have sought to�

introduce gradings for areas of Bruce A that were�

not graded as part of the annual review.�

That seems like a reasonable�

benchmark from both Bruce Power and CNSC staff to

work from.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: To just provide��

an elaboration, then, on what Dr. Barnes has��

asked, I think it is important that we not have��

confusion. We are kind of new at these report��

cards in general, but for Day 2 hearing I think we��

need to have a staff report card on Bruce A, that��

is a reasonable thing to do, and it will be out in��

enough time for Bruce Power to look at this and to��

provide any consideration of whether you agree or�

feel that there is documentation needed on Bruce�

A. We will kind of, if we could, put aside the��

idea of the annual report card as a model.��

I just don't want to confuse the��

public at all, or the intervenors, or the��

Commissioners. It is hard to believe that that��

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would be possible, but anyway.�

--- Laughter�

THE CHAIRPERSON: We will move,�

then, to Dr. McDill.�

Dr. Giroux.�

MEMBER GIROUX: Yes, a few�

questions to Bruce Power.�

On page 11 of your presentation�

you refer to the upgrading and the seismic

assessment and you mentioned that you chose a�

review level earthquake which was in line with the��

historical data in the area but also challenging��

enough.��

Could you describe or define what��

is the review level that has been used and how��

would it compare, for instance, with something in��

the St. Lawrence Valley?��

MR. MOTTRAM: I am unable to tell��

you the exact acceleration that was used. The�

original assessment is done against a .182�

acceleration earthquake. That was the first level��

of seismic margin assessment that we looked at.��

The thing was then reviewed to bring the impact��

used in the EPRI guidelines down to a lower impact��

break size to see what needed to be done in terms��

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of that.�

That work has led to a series of�

improvements that we need to make to the plant,�

which reflect back again under the arrangements�

under the EPRI system of reflecting on the�

repeatability in real time of earthquakes.�

It is a curious process, but at�

the end of the day the "B" station was designed�

against a 3,000-year repeat earthquake frequency

which then give a damage arrangement. Our�

intention in "A" station is to ensure that the��

plant is able to meet exactly those standards and��

different improvements reflect on the ability to��

withstand that repeatability of earthquakes of an��

increasing size through time.��

So actually the methodology��

doesn't fix the earthquake dimension, it just says��

what is the repeatability of a thing of that size��

and what do you need to do to get the plant to a�

condition which it will be able to meet.�

Our intention down line over the��

next few years is to take it to a 10,000-year��

repeatable earthquake capability.��

MEMBER GIROUX: Okay. Thank you.��

My second question is for staff.��

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You mentioned, staff, on page 4 of your CMD that�

you have confidence in the management ability of�

Bruce Power to manage the operations for the�

restart of Units 3 and 4.�

My question is: Are you referring�

to the management of the six-unit organization�

that will result from restarting 3 and 4, if it�

happens?�

Does that also refer to the three

phases that Mr. Nixon has indicated with the�

shifting responsibilities between the Executive��

Vice-Presidents?��

If not, what were you talking��

about?��

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas, for the��

record.��

We were talking about the current��

organization. We haven't reviewed in detail yet��

the six-unit organization. We have recently�

started to get submissions on this and we are�

reviewing it.��

We are looking at the current��

organization at the station and looking ahead to��

what will happen now that refuelling has started��

and the staff that are in place.��

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MEMBER GIROUX: So your judgment�

is based on the current organization and staffing?�

MR. DOUGLAS: That is correct.�

MEMBER GIROUX: That is your�

answer?�

MR. DOUGLAS: Yes.�

MEMBER GIROUX: Thank you.�

My final question is a question of�

detail, but it struck me.

In the licence conditions, licence�

condition 3.2 -- that is on page 4 of 24 in the��

proposed licence. In 3.2 you discuss the levels��

of power and you mention the maximum power for one��

fuel bundle and then maximum power for one fuel��

channel. Then in (c) you say:��

"the total thermal power from��

the reactor fuel does not��

exceed 2619.6 megawatts..."��

I was wondering if you are�

referring to one unit or the two units?�

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas.��

We are talking about one unit.��

MEMBER GIROUX: Is that clear for��

all readers, that is the maximum for one reactor?��

MR. DOUGLAS: That is a clause��

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that has been in all the licences over the years�

and it is always taken as one unit.�

MEMBER GIROUX: Thank you.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: Just to maybe�

elaborate, Dr. Giroux, on your question, Mr.�

Douglas, you answered that you are currently�

basing it on the management that is in place at�

this time and you haven't turned your mind or had�

time to look at the organization that will be put

in place for Bruce A and/or Bruce A and B�

together.��

Will we expect an update on this��

for Day 2? I think this would be an extremely��

critical issue, which is management capability. I��

think we would want to know something sooner or��

later on that.��

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas.��

Yes, we can give you an update on��

that.�

We have turned our mind to it, but�

we haven't reviewed it in detail. We have had��

presentations set up and talked about it, but we��

haven't actually reviewed the details yet.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe, Dr.��

Barnes, you have a supplementary on that and then��

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I will turn to Mr. Hawthorne.�

MEMBER BARNES: I had the same�

question that Dr. Giroux is going to ask anyway,�

but I have the same concern to your reply, because�

under Phase 2, to quote page 12 of Bruce Power,�

once fuelling commences all activities and plant�

systems maintain guaranteed shutdown come under�

the oversight of the V-P Production.�

Refuelling has already started.

Correct? So in a sense there has been this�

transition from what I think you referred to as��

the current management structure to transition��

into a new one, or did you mean when you referred��

to the "current structure" that as of, in a sense,��

today with this change already happening?��

MR. DOUGLAS: Yes. What I meant��

was they haven't totally implemented a six-unit��

organization at the moment, but the organization��

that in place at Bruce A in our opinion is�

adequate to maintain the safe operation of the�

plant.��

Within the licence that was issued��

this week for refuelling we have details about the��

number of people who must be in the control room,��

et cetera, and we are satisfied that the minimum��

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complement will be met in emergencies and such�

like.�

MEMBER BARNES: So for Day 2 you�

will address this issue of management in the three�

phases that Robert Nixon referred to for Bruce�

Power?�

MR. DOUGLAS: Yes, we will.�

MEMBER BARNES: Okay. Thank you.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Hawthorne,

would you like to add something to that?�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Yes, Madam��

President. I think there are a couple of useful��

data points that the Commission should be aware��

of.��

When we originally requested a��

licence as Bruce Power we provided a quality��

assurance plan and in that we set forth our��

organizational structure and arrangements for��

control of the facility.�

We have recently submitted to�

staff a revision to that document, management��

system manual. Within that we explained all of��

the methodology for a six-unit site operation. We��

have passed it to staff for their approval. So��

the document is with staff for review.��

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The intention of that clearly is�

to set the organization up as a six-unit facility�

proactively before the units come back to service.�

So certainly that document and the approval of�

that document should give the Commission�

confidence that there is indeed a structure.�

Separate and distinct from that�

clearly is the requalification of staff on Bruce�

A. All of our authorized nuclear operators have

indeed passed training and are now actually back�

in place at Bruce A. It was that sort of��

qualification of staff that allowed the CNSC staff��

to give us permission to move into the refuelling��

stage.��

So certainly there is no question��

of us having adequately qualified staff for the��

phase that the plant is currently in.��

Our view is that we have in fact��

begun, as we mentioned previously, some things�

such as work management and other areas begun to�

integrate with the six-unit organization. These��

are not normally changes that would require CNSC��

staff approval because they are clearly things of��

an organizational efficiency nature, but��

nonetheless all of these things are included in��

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the documentation that we have submitted for�

staff's assessment.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.�

Dr. McDill.�

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.�

With respect to your document page�

22 and the implementation of a bar coding system�

for waste source identification, I wonder if you�

could tell me if the technology you have selected

for this system will have a longevity needed to, I�

don't know, assist my grandchildren when they come��

across a green garbage bag with a bar code on it?��

MR. HAWTHORNE: These are always��

interesting questions when you talk about life��

cycle of software systems.��

One of the things I can tell you,��

because we introduced similar systems in the U.K.,��

and the one thing that has remained standard��

throughout developments in technology is the bar�

code itself. Our view is that that will continue�

to be the case.��

It tends to be very much��

developments and readers retention of memory��

display and processing of the data, but the bar��

code -- in fact we were involved at one time in��

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the case studies that I say developed this, and�

clearly there has always been an issue about a�

technology that is intended to -- a bit like�

Carbon 14, it is intended to date things over a�

long period of time and putting that in a�

software-based mechanism was always a cause for�

concern. At that time it was agreed that the code�

system, code generation would remain standard and�

it would be the scanning technology that would be

developed over time.�

MEMBER McDILL: Do you know the��

bar code you are using? Is it a 2 of 5, 3 of 9?��

No? I was just curious.��

My second question is with respect��

to CMD 03-H05, page 11, and the exams. I asked��

this question of other operators, so I would like��

to ask you.��

What is a "pass"?��

--- Pause�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Since it was a�

staff document I assumed you were asking them.��

Yes, 70 per cent is a pass mark.��

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.��

As I asked this question of the��

other operators, to be fair: Are you in��

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compliance with the Professional Engineers Act of�

Ontario with respect to your engineering staff?�

MR. TALBOT: Yes, we are.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms MacLachlan.�

MEMBER MacLACHLAN: Thank you very�

much.�

This is a question of staff and it�

relates to the recommendations that were being put�

forward on page 12 of CMD 03-H05. I just wanted

to understand the sequencing and the current�

status in light of the refuelling of Units 3 and��

4.��

It is my understanding that staff��

has been spending quite a bit of time on��

establishing standards for recertification of��

operations and that the recommendation had been --��

and I would assume continues to be -- amendment of��

the existing licence to require certification and��

recertification in accordance with the new�

standards.�

Can you give us assurance that the��

personnel on staff during refuelling either have��

met these standards, if the standards have��

actually been finalized, or provide us with��

assurance of the standards that these staff have��

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had to meet for CNSC staff approval?�

MR. BLYTH: I will ask Ms Adrianna�

Nicic to address that question.�

MS NICIC: For the record,�

Adrianna Nicic, Director of Human Performance�

Division.�

Yes. The answer to the question�

is yes. All the certified operators and the shift�

supervisors were currently in the certification

program which is conducted by the licensee with�

assistance from CNSC.��

At this point in time our��

certification exam conducted by CNSC and staff for��

the fuel state are going to go through these��

normal procedures.��

MEMBER MacLACHLAN: I'm sorry, I'm��

not sure that I quite understood that.��

Yes to the continued��

recommendation of staff for inclusion of an�

amendment of recertification standards.�

That is one question and one��

answer. Is that correct?��

MS NICIC: We are talking about��

two types of certification, about initial��

certification, which is this case. As we talked��

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yesterday, we are talking about the�

recertification program which has a duration of�

five years.�

In this case, we are under the so-�

called initial certification program and all staff�

is going through the adequate training and a�

comprehensive exam which is administered by the�

licensee and a certification exam which is�

administered by the CNSC staff.

MEMBER MacLACHLAN: I think I�

understand you and you are saying that the Bruce��

Power staff that were employed during refuelling��

of Units 3 and 4 were certified in accordance with��

the initial certification standards?��

MS NICIC: Yes, this is correct.��

MEMBER MacLACHLAN: Right. Okay.��

Then the recertification standards are another��

issue?��

MS NICIC: Yes, this is correct.�

MEMBER MacLACHLAN: Thank you.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Dosman.��

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you, Madam��

Chair. I have several questions.��

There has been considerable��

discussion on training and there is just one point��

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I would like to ask CNSC staff to clarify a little�

further.�

You referred in your presentation�

to "overly aggressive training schedule". Would�

you be willing to perhaps provide more detail on�

the situation that led to this statement?�

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas.�

I will ask François Rinfret to�

respond to that. His division did evaluations of

the training program and he knows more of the�

detail.��

MR. RINFRET: Good morning. My��

name is François Rinfret, Licensee Program��

Evaluation Division.��

Just a brief introduction. Staff��

from our division are inspectors that go out at��

the various licensees to do specific program��

evaluations such as training. Training involves��

looking at a process that is being developed by�

the licensees and also at the product.�

When we look at the process, you��

find recommendations in each of our evaluations to��

the licensees.��

In this case, when considering��

restart staff started discussing in 2001 with the��

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licensees on requirements and formulated the�

requisites for restart.�

Discussion went on and over 2000,�

as you can read in the staff report, there have�

been, let's say, two specific evaluations done at�

the site. These led to various recommendations�

that are also available.�

We find that in order to achieve�

the restart date, in our opinion -- and this is an

opinion -- it will take a considerable amount of�

resources in order to develop, prepare and��

implement the training necessary.��

While doing this we looked at the��

product that was being given. We found little��

difficulties with the process being used. I will��

give you a brief example.��

When you are about to train your��

staff on upgrades in your station one has to look��

at first of all what is the upgrade, especially�

what is in detail the upgrade that is being put�

together, using what detailed engineering��

technology for example.��

If you make an early judgment of��

your training necessary and you do not have put��

together the detailed engineering of the��

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modification, you might conclude wrong or slight�

erroneous judgment of what to be trained for your�

staff working at the plant.�

This is one of the points of�

discussion with the licensees in their process of�

putting together their product, that is training�

material for dealing with the upgrades to their�

staff, things of that nature.�

These have been discussed with

Bruce staff and they are aware of our requirements�

and there is ongoing discussion about what needs��

to be done to the satisfaction of CNSC staff��

before allowing restart.��

I hope that answers your question.��

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.��

I seek advice, Madam Chair. Would��

it be reasonable to ask Bruce Power, perhaps at��

the second day, to respond to these issues in��

detail?�

Would Bruce Power be willing to�

respond to these comments?��

MR. HAWTHORNE: Yes, of course.��

We would expect at Day 2 to have the opportunity��

to update our progress on these things.��

As I said previously, we do��

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understand that there is a training workload here�

still to be done. I can give some figures now,�

but perhaps it is probably more relevant to come�

back in Day 2 and report the progress that has�

been made in closing out this concern.�

MEMBER DOSMAN: Is Bruce Power�

confident that they can meet these issues?�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Yes. Yes, we are.�

The reality of it is that we have bolstered our

training organization, we have taken people�

through this.��

What gives me confidence about��

where we are right now is that we have 100 pass of��

all of our authorized nuclear operators. A very��

aggressive requalification program.��

The initial training program for��

people who had been there 20 years largely assumed��

that they would just come in the door, but they��

went through all of that with 100 per cent pass�

rate.�

Frankly, my view would be that the��

very significant part of the manuals related to��

training is behind us now, given that we have��

qualified the certified staff.��

What we have to do is to deal with��

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a number of modifications that have some element�

of training with them, I don't dispute that, but I�

equally do not see it as something that we can't�

manage.�

MEMBER DOSMAN: May I, Madam�

Chair?�

I take it the issue is, in part,�

the confluence of the technical changes and the�

training appropriate to those engineering

alterations. Am I correct in that assessment?�

MR. HAWTHORNE: Yes, you are��

correct.��

Perhaps if I give an example. One��

of the modifications I reported progress on was��

the installation of the qualified power supply��

system. Clearly, in doing so there are a number��

of changes and operational procedures, et cetera,��

once a qualified power supply is in place. It��

would be inappropriate at this stage to train�

people on the system until we actually have it�

fully complete.��

But again, when you assess the��

requirements the engineering assessments of the��

training may result in a small number of manuals��

per person. Clearly it can be dealt with through��

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a required reading format, it can be dealt with�

with a walk through, it can be dealt with in�

workshop training, et cetera, and that is the�

element of development that is ongoing in parallel�

with the modification.�

As I say, we have done an overview�

assessment. We have supported the training staff�

because we do understand -- it is an important�

element for ourselves as well as CNSC that our own

people are fully conversant with the status of the�

plant before it is brought back into service.��

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.��

May I entertain another two��

questions?��

I am just curious about the��

secondary control area that is being built. Would��

Bruce Power be willing to elaborate on the degree��

to which the secondary control area could assume��

function for the primary control area if�

necessary?�

MR. MOTTRAM: Yes. The secondary��

control area in "A" station was built to cover��

three specific events.��

The first one was a loss of water��

in the spent fuel area, which happens to sit��

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underneath the control room and hence would need�

the main control room being left.�

The second one was a terrorist�

attack, that the control was taken over by�

somebody outside the plant who had bad motives in�

mind.�

The third one was the fire in the�

control room itself.�

So the secondary control area is

being constructed to provide the capability of�

shutting down the plant and controlling the��

cooling of the plant in those three specific��

areas.��

MEMBER DOSMAN: Will the secondary��

control area be fit for operation at the time of��

restart?��

MR. MOTTRAM: Yes, it will.��

MEMBER DOSMAN: May I, Madam��

Chair?�

One additional question which�

refers to the independent panel. I am just��

wondering if Bruce Power would be willing to��

elaborate somewhat on the independent panel.��

Where do they come from, qualifications, and do��

they have specifically any association with Bruce��

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Power?�

MR. HAWTHORNE: For the record,�

Duncan Hawthorne.�

Clearly one of the key issues for�

our investors was that this is a major financial�

investment. The risk in that was that the project�

team themselves convinced themselves as to the�

adequacy of their plan. The important thing our�

shareholders wanted to do was to bring in

technical experts with no specific involvement in�

the project itself to conduct a cold body review��

of the project plan.��

We have done that on two or three��

cases and, frankly, whenever there has been an��

area that we have considered to be judgmental and��

material we have tended to call an independent��

panel. We have used it for two or three cases,��

the disposition of pressure tube and steam��

generator and inspections being one.�

The initial project itself, the�

project plan before it went to the board, the��

board of British Energy had put in place��

arrangements to ensure that when the Board��

deliberated on a submission from the project team��

that they would receive a separate and independent��

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report from the independent panel.�

As such, specifically we have used�

British Energy's Director of Engineering to come�

across. He has no involvement at all in this plan�

or this design but many years of operational�

experience.�

We have brought some people from�

the U.S., a chap called Daryl Einsenhutt was part�

of the team. He is someone who is an ex-NRC

inspector. One of the gentlemen sitting behind�

me, Glenn Archinoff was part of that independent��

panel also.��

So we have had a number of people��

who are very well versed in CANDU technology,��

specifically looking at safety analysis, material��

findings that might require disposition.��

But the panel, as I say, was quite��

a challenging group, none of whom had any direct��

loss or gain, if you like, as a result of any of�

the decisions taken.�

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Graham.��

MEMBER GRAHAM: The advantage of��

being last, you get most of your questions��

answered. They were around training and��

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evaluation, also the feeder pipe. But I do have�

just two questions.�

The first question is to Bruce�

Power regarding employment.�

You talked in your presentation�

this morning about 400 new staff. Sometime ago --�

and I maybe stand to be corrected -- I understood�

or saw in a press release that there would be�

downsizing of staff at Bruce.

Could you clarify that? It wasn't�

in a presentation here. It was something I had��

seen or read in the past that there would be��

downsizing and now you are saying 400 new. Could��

you clarify that?��

MR. Hawthorne: Yes. I think the��

subject does warrant a bit of a discussion.��

When we can here initially and��

talked about relicensing of this site we��

identified a significant demographic challenge on�

the site. We inherited a workforce with an�

average age of 49. The previous arrangements on��

the site I would sort of characterize as a famine��

and feast recruitment policy and there hadn't been��

any real recruitment for eight or 10 years. So��

not only did we have an average age of 49, but��

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amongst 3,200 employees we only had 35 people�

under the age of 35. So it was a very aging�

workforce.�

We said initially that our�

intention was to recruit 50 young people per year.�

Partly I came to lower the average age in case�

anyone was worrying about it.�

--- Laughter�

MR. Hawthorne: Only by a

fraction.�

But the reality was that we��

conducted a five-year capability view of the site��

in total. We understood that if we didn't��

aggressively deal with demographics then it wasn't��

really an issue about downsizing, it was a loss of��

skill, it was a loss of qualification. So we��

chose to hire aggressively and critically.��

For example, this year we will��

hire a further 130 operators. The reason for�

doing that, even though we are only 20 below our�

full complement, is that we understand it is a��

long training pipe to fill so we want to make sure��

we have a significant body of staff well in��

advance of any retires.��

Notwithstanding that, again we��

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have done the same in physicists and control�

technicians, whatever we felt is a critical skill�

that we need to bring in in advance of the loss of�

staff we have tended to do that.�

So our average age today is 46 and�

there are something like 270 people under the age�

of 35. So we have tried to bring the demographic�

down. Equally we have tried to recruit�

experienced staff that can quickly come and

contribute.�

Nonetheless, we have continued to��

express the view that -- I don't like to use best��

in class because that is not really particularly��

relevant, but observation on site has been and��

continues to be that productivity improvements��

could be made. We think we have made some.��

Nonetheless, if you were to look��

at the site you generally have a belief that it is��

capable to run the site with fewer staff. We have�

said our view would be that a section at site�

would be more like 2,700 or 2,800 as opposed to��

the current 3,200.��

I expect, frankly, that two years��

from now we will a section at site with maybe��

2,800 staff, but something like 900 of those will��

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be new people who we have brought in to manage the�

demographic.�

MEMBER GRAHAM: In other words,�

then, the 400 are not additional, they are new to�

replace the demographics. I appreciate your�

answer.�

The only other question I have,�

and it is to CNSC staff, at page 46, Appendix C of�

your presentation I think is an excellent listing.

In Day 2 the Appendix C, will you leave 1 to 55�

there but give status reports on each one as you��

go along?��

I think it is a good way of��

following through, but on Day 2 can we have a��

status report on each of the issues as they are��

listed so we don't have to go finding them on a��

certain page and then say "No. 6 be on page 20 and��

then No. 8 be on page 16". Can they be itemized��

exactly the way Appendix C is indicated?�

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas.�

Yes, we will do them that way. It��

will make it easy for us as well. Thank you.��

MEMBER GRAHAM: Thank you. That's��

all I have, Madam Chair.��

THE CHAIRPERSON: I think it is an��

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important issue that we have looked at with other�

CMDs. Because this really is a work-in-progress�

it is important for us to have a sense that this�

is moving forward at an appropriate rate that we�

feel comfortable in looking at this project.�

Questions for round two. Dr.�

Barnes.�

MEMBER BARNES: Just one. It is a�

continuance of the Appendix C issue to Bruce

Power.�

This is obviously one of the most��

important parts of the staff document listing the��

55 items that are prerequisites to the restart of��

Bruce A Units 3 and 4. Some of them are perhaps��

relatively small and straightforward, others seem��

to me to require quite a lot of work.��

To Bruce Power, when you survey��

this list of 55, are you confident at this point��

that you will be able to complete these within, at�

the present time, your anticipated schedule for�

startup?��

MR. HAWTHORNE: Duncan Hawthorne.��

Yes. Actually, we do have Table��

55 in order, if that helps staff.��

I guess the reality of it is that��

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even as we sit here today there aren't 55�

outstanding items we did see it as a dynamic�

process and we will clearly be working closely�

with staff to work off this list.�

But frankly, we understand all of�

these issues and we would be confident on our�

ability to disposition them on time, yes.�

MEMBER BARNES: Thank you.�

THE CHAIRPERSON: I think, Dr.

Barnes, actually that is an important refinement,�

because I think that it will be important to have��

the update for Day 2 -- knowing that we have a��

fairly aggressive schedule for Day 2, I think that��

has to be acknowledged -- and then a sense of the��

answer to the question that Dr. Barnes has put��

forward really for the items. I think we would��

like a view from the staff and from Bruce about��

the achievability of this, knowing that the��

facility will not go, not matter what the schedule�

is, without the completion of this.�

I think it is very important for��

Day 2 that we reassure the public of the controls��

that will be in place from both Bruce Power's��

point of view and from the CNSC staff point of��

view, assuming that the staff remains with its��

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recommendation of a designated officer.�

So I really think this is a�

confidence issue of, frankly, a very large list of�

areas. Restarts are not happening every day here,�

so it is important for us to be as clear as�

possible.�

Dr. Barnes.�

MEMBER BARNES: I just want to ask�

one other question of staff.

Is this list of 55 complete? At�

this stage or in the next month or beyond that do��

you anticipate adding others or is this it?��

MR. DOUGLAS: Jim Douglas.��

It is complete. These are the��

major safety issues that we are going to see��

completed to our satisfaction before we will allow��

the unit to go out of the guaranteed shutdown��

state.��

MEMBER BARNES: Okay.�

Closing��

MR. LEBLANC: This hearing is to��

be continued on the 26th day of February 2003 here��

in the CNSC offices.��

The public is invited to��

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participate, either by oral presentation or�

written submission on hearing Day 2. Persons who�

wish to intervene on that day must file�

submissions by February 17, 2003.�

The hearing is now adjourned to�

February 26, 2003.�

Merci.�