Health Risk Assessment Report for - PDO 2014/… · Health Risk Assessment Report for ... Gas dehydration and RSH removal ... process equipment; oil stabilizer on export line

Printed: 24/04/2014 Printed copies of this document should be treated as information of temporary value and destroyed after use

Health Risk Assessment Report

for

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

06.07.2013

by Fourie, Natashia

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Table of Contents

0. Introduction to the HRA report ______________________________________________________________________ 3

1. HRA Scope __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3

2. HRA Team ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 5

3. Remedial Actions____________________________________________________________________________________ 6

4. Health Hazard Inventory and Detailed Risk Appraisals _____________________________________________13

5. Generic Controls, Recovery Measures and Remedial Actions _____________________________________57

6. Control statements for Low RAM Hazards _________________________________________________________58

Appendix 1: Definitions _______________________________________________________________________________59

Appendix 2: Risk Assessment Matrix _________________________________________________________________61

Appendix 3: Overview of Detailed Risk Appraisals ___________________________________________________62

Appendix 4: Yibal Khuff FEED Combined HHI 23 May 2013 ___________________________________________64

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0. Introduction to the HRA report

The Health Risk Assessment (HRA) report is created from oneHealthIT

, the global system used by Shell

Health to process and store health related information.

The report starts with a description of the scope of the HRA and the persons involved in sections 1 and 2.

The remedial actions from the HRA are presented in report section 3, and are sorted by priority. Section 4

provides information from the detailed appraisals. The focus here is on High and Medium RAM rated risks.

Section 5 provides an overview of generally applicable controls and recovery measures. Section 6 lists the

status of the Low RAM rated risks that were reviewed during the HRA. The report concludes with definitions

and a diagram of the RAM risk matrix in appendices 1 and 2. Appendix 3 contains an overview of the

detailed risk appraisals and their page numbers.

Blank cells in tables in the report indicate fields that are available for containing information, but are currently

not populated in oneHealthIT

.

1. HRA Scope

This is the Yibal Khuff (YK) Project FEED HRA. This HRA does not cover the construction activities for the

facility. The purpose of the HRA is to identify high level potential health hazards associated with the YK project and the controls necessary to manage health risks to ALARP once the project is in operational phase. During FEED, there is an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of engineering controls in the

design, that when implemented, can reduce personal exposures to ALARP through the application of the hierarchy of controls. This report also identified areas that need to be re -assessed and these items are captured as remedial action.

An HRA workshop was held in PDO FEED offices on the 16th and 23rd May 2013. With the input from the attendees of this workshop, a high level health risk was prepared (attached to this HRA) which was used to

prepare this HRA.

The Yibal Khuff Sudair integrated project provides the opportunity to safely develop the Yibal Khuff/Sudair reservoirs to realize synergy between the depletion of the Upper Khuff oil rim and its AG, and Khuff-5 and Sudair NAG reservoirs. This development will add directly to PDO’s future oil production potential through

the development of an oil rim with STOIIP of 127 mln m3, and through oil benefits that may be realised from utilising the majority of the produced gas for power generation and EOR developments. The project is strategic in nature, as the sweet export gas from gas -in-place volumes totalling ~78 bln Sm3 will go to

supporting Oman’s mid to long term gas supply requirements. The major objectives of the YK Project are as follows:-

a. Production of sour oil & gas from the Upper Khuff Associated Gas (AG) reservoir and gas & condensate from the Lower Khuff and Sudair Non Associated Gas (NAG) reservoirs by means of an optimised integrated

depletion strategy. b. Export of sweet gas to the Government Gas System to support Oman’s mid to long term gas demand and PDO’s internal need for EOR projects and power generation.

c. Production of stabilised oil which is exported to the Main Oil Line (MOL) at Yibal A. d. Produced water treatment and disposal by routing to the water injection and disposal system at Yibal A.

The facility will consist of on- and off plot facilities. a. A description of the on-plot facilities are as follows:

A new CPF location to the southwest of the Yibal field area.

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2-phase inlet separator to receive and separate liquid and gas.

Acid Gas Removal Unit (AGRU) using Shell Sulfinol X where deep removal of H2S, CO2, RSH and COS is accomplished.

Gas dehydration and RSH removal (Mol sieve) unit for water and trace RSH removal to meet 5 ppmv total S specifications.

Gas conditioning (Hydrocarbon dew pointing) unit to meet cricondentherm specifications of export

gas.

Gas export facilities comprising 1 x 100% single stage, fixed speed centrifugal machine.

Nitrogen Removal Unit (NRU) to meet the nitrogen specification in the sales gas. Mercury removal is installed upstream of the NRU.

Export gas compression.

Acid Gas Enrichment Unit (AGEU) using Shell ADIP-M to make the acid gas from AGRU suitable for processing in the Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU).

Sulphur Recovery comprising 2 x 65% SRU, sulphur degassing and

incinerator and CANSOLV SO2 scrubbing to meet sulphur recovery efficiency and

SO2 emissions regulation.

Sulphur handling comprising liquid sulphur storage and sulphur blocking facility.

Oil handling system comprising 3-phase separation, flash gas compression, oil dehydration &

desalting, stabilization, storage and export.

Water handling system comprising 2 x 100% sour water stripping, water storage and disposal pumps.

A 50 MW Power plant using a Frame 6B gas turbine and HRSG, utilising steam to supplement the steam being generated from waste heat recovered in the sulphur recovery process. A back- pressure Steam turbine generator using MP steam as the motive fluid.

Steam generation and distribution for Mo and LP level with 2 MP auxiliary boilers.

A closed chilled water cooling medium system with mechanical refrigeration unit using R-134a as refrigerant.

Water wells to supply raw water from the Yibal shallow aquifer to the CPF.

A utility complex including raw water treatment facilities to produce demineralised and boiler feed

water, closed drain system, instrument and breathing air systems, fire water, and nitrogen generation.

A waste and produced water disposal pipeline tied into the water flood and disposal system to Yibal

A.

Flare system (AP, LP, and Cryogenic for NRU).

Drain Systems.

Provisions for future depletion compression, including plot space and process tie-ins.

Waste handling and effluent treatment facility.

b) A description of the off-plot facilities are as follows:

47 well sites, each comprising the wellhead, Instrumented Over -pressure Protection System (IOPPS), choke valve, chemical injection skids, hydraulics package, wellhead control panel, Fire and

Gas detection and CCTV.

Each well site is tied back to one of three Remote Manifold Gathering Stations (RMS) through 6 inch GRE buried Flowlines.

Three new Remote Manifold Gathering Stations (RMS); West RMS located 11 km to the North West of the Yibal Khuff CPF, East RMS located 12.4 km to the North East of the Yibal Khuff CPF and the South RMS located 7.5 km to the North-East of the new CPF location.

The West RMS will have 9 wells, the East RMS will have 17 wells and the South RMS will have 21 wells.

Each RMS will comprise production and test manifolds, a Multiphase Flow Meter (MPFM), chemical injection skids, maintenance flare with combined flare and drains drum, pig launchers, control and

safeguarding panel, Fire and Gas detection and CCTV.

A single 11 km 14 inch buried carbon steel pipeline from the West RMS, a single 7.5 km 16 inch buried carbon steel pipeline from the South RMS, and dual 12.4 km 12 inch buried carbon pipelines

from the East RMS.

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A single 9.7 km 16 inch buried CS Gas Export Pipeline from new YK-CPF to Yibal-GGP to be tied in upstream of the existing 36 inch Government Gas Pipeline.

A single 11 km 8 inch buried CS Oil Export Pipeline from new YK-CPF to Yibal-A station, with tie-ins at the existing dehydration tanks and downstream of the existing 16 inch MOL.

A single 10.4 km 8 inch buried CS-PE lined Produced Water Export Pipeline from new YK-CPF to Yibal-A station, with tie-in at the existing skim tanks.

2. HRA Team Responsible for HRA: Fourie, Natashia Input Provided By: Greg Hampson - HSE Advisor

Input also received from:

PDO-HSE-FEED

Safety Engineering

Production Chemist

PDO Occupational Health

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3. Remedial Actions

Priority Work Area Hazard, RAM Rating and Scenario Recommended Remedial Action

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Heat Stress / Hot Temperature Differentials

Medium

All staff working on process facilities and near flare has the potential risk of exposure to heat when working outdoors, typical temperature

ranges being 32-40 degrees Celsius. Working with BA (breathing apparatus) and confined space entry work presents an additional risk

factor due to the increased metabolic rate due to PPE load.

Process design/equipment standards - Provide confirmation

of a BA portable system. Complete (Updated BA Philosophy and Safety Equipment Specification – Jan 31, 2014 GJH). Include MCOH BA Quality Specification.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Provide verification

of how air quality and temperature of BA air will be regulated. MCOH Feb 15, 2014.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Define the range of climatic conditions for “normal”, “restricted” and no work

under BA sets. Provide rule-set for working under SCBA/BA in high temperatures (work rest regimen) Use the OGP protocol – MCOH Feb 15, 2014. Compliment with SP-1231.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited

schedules - Define critical activities and conduct risk assessment for use of BA sets. (1.) FTW protocol – MCOH to provide, 2.) Review the Shell (Natashia), Harweel and

Kashagan procedures and provide guidance on recommended good practice for YK and BIP – MCOH Feb 28, 2014.

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Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Hydrogen sulfide containing streams with H2S > 1000 ppm mole (600 mg/kg) or >100 ppm vapour space (7783-06-4)

Medium

Mechanical/instrument maintenance operators are potentially exposed to Hydrogen Sulfide during normal operations and during invasive

maintenance. Exposure scenario's exists in process streams (both operations and maintenance); well pad works, well testing

(new wells), remote manifolds; leaks from process equipment; oil stabilizer on export line (H2S scavenger); spend dessicant from the

MSU and sampling.

Process design/equipment standards - Provide ALARP demonstration for flanges above ground vs pits.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm a respirator fit testing procedure. Verify fit testing program for persons

with facial hair. (MCOH to provide new procedure Procedure addressing Quantitative and Qualititative requirements for fit testing by March 31, 2014).

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Legionella bacteria (waterborne) Medium

All staff (on plot and off plot) has the potential to be exposed to the following Legionella

sources: showers/ aerolised water, water from fire water systems, potable water, any scenario where ambient temperature water may

become airborne and inhaled.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Determine water treatment/equipment maintenance philosophy to reduce bio -filming and scale prevention. (Legionella monitoring

program planned in PDO in 2014).

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that the design of potential water sources prevents aerosols, dead legs and stagnant water. FEED HSE to review and confirm

any issues by Jan 31, 2014.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Identify and document water systems and equipment that are a potential source of Legionella; assess water systems and equipment

for the risk of Legionella and define a monitoring and control programme. 1.) FEED HSE to identify any risks. 2.) MCOH to work with PT HSE to provide appropriate control

measures for the risks identified – April 30, 2014.

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Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Psychological Hazards and Stress High

All staff (on and off plot ) have the potential to experience isolation from family and friends,

especially those on rotational duty; working on

dead-lines, pressure owning to the nature of the work environment is inherent.

Local Remedial Action - Implement entertainment and other facilities for long term shift staff in accommodations. PT-OR&A – Closed - Entertainment facilities are provided at the

existing Yibal camp.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm that PDO expectations for shift rotations and employee welfare included in Contractor Agreements. PT – complete during

the Execute phase.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Confirm that a monitoring system is in place to verify Contractor compliance to local Labour Law pertaining

to work cycle and annual leave. PT – complete during the Execute phase.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Confirm a fatigue risk management program is

available for implementation covering HSE critical jobs. MCOH to confirm forward strategy for fatigue management in PDO and advise by Jan 31, 2014.

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2 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Sulfur dioxide- SO2 (7446-09-5) Medium

Potential exposure for all site staff during flaring of gas containing H2S; Pouring of Sulfur

blocks; Liquid sulfur; Sulfur fires and Jet/pool fires. Operations and Maintenance staff have an increased risk of potential exposure to

sources mentioned here.

Local Remedial Action - FEED HSE to verify that the Control Room is in a safe location for toxic SO2 endurance in accordance with PDO SP 1190. Open – MCOH, FEED

HSE and PT HSE and PT Op’s to meet to review and agree on the criteria – January 16, 2014.

Process design/equipment standards - Verify that observation ports on run down lines are included in design

philosophy. Confirmed.

Process design/equipment standards - State what the ALARP effort is in the event where the degasser does not work efficiently (leading to increased potential for SO2 and

HS2 emissions during pouring operations). Provide PDO occupational exposure criteria and environmental air quality criteria. FEED HSE to complete by January 31, 2014.

Process design/equipment standards - Demonstrate ALARP

for the absorber by-pass to meet environment and occupational tolerability criteria through the CANSOLV design. Confirmed. See CANSOLV Stack technical note.

Process design/equipment standards - Verify provision of

dilution gas when flaring acid gas to complete the combustion process and improve dispersion standards. Confirmed.

4 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Visible light (too much; too little) - wavelength

400 - 780 nm (non-ionizing radiation) Low

All staff are potentially exposed to insufficient lighting and poor night time illumination of the

plant and facilities.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm design in

accordance with HFE DEP’s and FEED Emergency lightning guideline (GU/705). FEED HSE to Confirm by 90% Model.

Process design/equipment standards - HFE study to include

lessons learned from previously poorly designed Control Rooms in PDO facilities. FEED HSE to confirm by Jan 15, 2014.

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TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Air pollution (environmental health hazard) Low

Potentially impacted staff are on-plot and maintenance staff who work around flues with

incinerators; working on plat forms with poor

ventilation. Other sources are process leak sources/valves/flanges etc.

Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing fugitive emissions monitoring programs will be implemented. 1.) MCOH to advise whether the risk should be increased to

“M” basis recent developments with exposure to diesel engine exhaust. Also advise on monitoring program planned in PDO – January 31, 2014. 2.) FEED HSE to

update HRA with inputs from MCOH. 3.) PT HSE to confirm environmental monitoring requirements for the new facilities. 4.) PT HSE to confirm any requirements for Fugitive

Emissions monitoring and any design implications – clarification of SP-1005 requirement. Update IA as required.

TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Amines [e.g., Ethylenediamine (1,2-

Diaminoethane), methylamine, diethylamine, mono-, di-, and tri -ethanolamine ]

Medium

Production operators and maintenance staff

are potentially exposed to Amines during maintenance, loading of new material and unloading of spent material in the CANSOLV

(novel), AGRU and AGEA (MDEA) units. Rich

amines are considered sour and can contain H2S and SO2.

Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Include in

chemical approval process (CAP). Develop and implement a SHOC card. MCOH – verify existence of SHOC card for amines. Develop as required – January 31, 2014.

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TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Freon (HCFC) Low

Production Operators and Maintenance staffs have a potential to exposure to

Tetrafluoroethane (R134a) in the chilling and cooling system. Tetrafluoroethane is a colorless gas with a slight ethereal odor.

Vapors are heavier than air. Vapors can replace the available oxygen. Vapors may cause dizziness or asphyxiation without

warning. Vapors from liquefied gas are initially heavier than air and spread along ground.

Contact with gas or liquefied gas may cause

burns, severe injury and/or frostbite. Fire may produce irritating, corrosive and/or toxic gases.

Process design/equipment standards - Verify that the cooling system that uses direct process cooling will be protected with passive fire protection where required (during

the passive fire protection study). FEED HSE to verify – reference study from RHI.

Containment / Isolation - Verify that the process for initial fill (first fill) will reduce frequency of connection between bottles

and connection point. PT OR&A\CP – confirm ability to procure R134A in bulk containers – End of FEED.

TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Hydrazine and compounds (302-01-2) Medium

Hydrazine and Ammonium Bisulphate is used

as oxygen scavengers. Production Operators and Maintenance staff have the potential for

exposure in the following areas: IBC's (storage

area), waste water treatment plant and the outlet of the sour water stripper.

Substitution - Identify a safer option for hydrazine. Hydrazine has been removed and replaced with

Diethylhydroxyl amine (DEHA).

TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Hydrocarbons, VOC (total vapor) Low

Production and Maintenance staff has potential

exposure to hydrocarbons (in various concentrations) throughout production facilities.

Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing fugitive emissions monitoring programs for hydrocarbons

will be implemented. Refer to air polution hazard.

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TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Manual Handling - Lifting, Lowering Medium

Operators, Maintenance and Technicians are required to move materials, open and close

valves and manually manipulate controls.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that design include HFE DEP 30.00.60.10. FEED HSE by 90% PDMS Review.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that 3D

model reviews are carried out for outdoor installations to identify and address ergonomic issues. Confirmed.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that ALARP DEP (all of HSE critical tasks) are completed. FEED HSE –

90% PDMS.

Local Remedial Action - Confirm that mechanical handling exercise is initiated. FEED Piping will produce a Mechanical Handling Report – 90% PDMS Review.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that access

to valves and sampling points are included during HFE screening – part of model review. Confirmed. Reference FEED HFE Study reports.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that

modeling will be completed to verify adequate space for lifting devices such as mobile cranes, li ft-out pumps and heavy items. 1.) FEED Piping to provide Mechanical

Handling report – 90% PDMS Review.

TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA Sulfur Low

Production Operators, Maintenance Staff and Contractors (for sulfur handling) are potentially

exposed to liquid molten sulfur in the sulfur

recovery unit, sulfur handling area, leaks from CPF (increased burns from molten sulfur) and

during over-pressure events in the liquid sulfur

storage tanks with loss of containment.

Contractors (sulfur handling) are potentially

exposed to solid sulfur in the blocking plant and CPF.

Process design/equipment standards - Verify that observation ports on run down lines are included in design (for liquid sulfur molten). Confirmed. 1.) Confirm

availability of a SHOC for sulfur.

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TBD Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA General

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Site verification is required to finalize the effectiveness of controls, recovery measures and final

exposure ratings mentioned in this HRA. 1.) PT-HSE - Exposure ratings will be developed during the Execute Phase when the task details become available.

Emergency / safety showers - Select safety showers/eye

wash stations that have the capability to cool water during summer period. 1.) PT-HSE to confirm requirements. 2.) FEED HSE to develop safety equipment specification for

Safety Showers. (FEED HSE to confirm requirement for eye wash stations at wells and RMS.)

New Actions (Jan 07, 2014 Review):

1.) MCOH – Rev iew the CRR and provide the updated assessment in the HRA report for any changes – Jan 31, 2014.

2.) FEED HSE to schedule a meeting with PT HSE and PT Ops to review any update to the assessments and agree on the proposed controls from- Jan 31, 2014.

4. Health Hazard Inventory and Detailed Risk Appraisals

Work Area Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA

Hazard Air pollution (environmental health hazard)

RAM: Low

Acute Potential Health

Effects

Respiratory tract irritation; aggravation of asthma

RAM: 3B

Chronic Potential Health Effects

Respiratory irritation, increase in allergic symptoms and asthma RAM: 3A

Scenario Potentially impacted staff are on-plot and maintenance staff who work around flues with incinerators; working on platforms with poor ventilation. Other sources

are process leak sources/valves/flanges etc.

Route & Form of Exposure

Inhalation Gas

Frequency & Duration of Exposure

Variable 2 - 4 hours

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Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating & Justi fication

ALARP Status Assessment incomplete

ALARP Justification

Controls Effectiveness

Recovery Measures Effectiveness

Remedial Actions Priority

Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing fugitive emissions monitoring programs will be implemented.

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Hazard Amines [e.g., Ethylenediamine (1,2-Diaminoethane), methylamine,

diethylamine, mono-, di-, and tri-ethanolamine ]

RAM: Medium


Effects

Moderate/severe irritant to skin, eye and respiratory tract; absorbed through skin

RAM: 3B


Skin & respiratory sensitizer; repeated overexposure may produce liver, kidney damage RAM: 3C

Scenario Production operators and maintenance staff are potentially exposed to Amines

during maintenance, loading of new materi al and unloading of spent material in the CANSOLV (novel), AGRU and AGEA (MDEA) units. Rich amines are considered sour and can contain H2S and SO2.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Dermal, Inhalation

Liquid



Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


PPE-Other - Fixed BA system for routine maintenance activities.



Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Include in chemical approval process

(CAP). Develop and implement a SHOC card.

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Hazard Anti-foam agents (silicone based)

RAM: Low

Acute Potential Health Effects

Effects will be substance specific and will require confirmation for chemical species RAM: 1B

Chronic Potential Health

Effects

None known

RAM:

Scenario Maintenance operators have potential exposure scenarios during maintenance tasks on the CANSOLV and AGRU units.


Dermal, Inhalation Liquid

Frequency & Duration of

Exposure

Variable

2 - 4 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Local Control - ALARP demonstration (controls) the same as for Corrosion and Scale Inhibitors.



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Hazard Carbon monoxide- Gas (630-08-0)

RAM: Medium


Effects blood , resulting in carboxyhaemoglobinemia and cardiac disorders . Can be fatal. RAM: 4B


Effects

EU Risk Category 1 Teratogen, may cause harm to unborn child.

RAM: 4B

Scenario All on-plot staffs have potential for exposure through gas turbine generators, power boilers, regen gas heater, combustion sources, trenching and confined space entry.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Inhalation

Gas



Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification




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Hazard Catalyst - Alumina (activated)/Bauxite (Fresh and Spent)

RAM: Low


Mechanical irritation to eyes, skin, and respiratory tract RAM: 1B


None known RAM:

Scenario Production Operators/Assistants and Maintenance staffs has potential for

exposure during work on the sulfur recovery units.


Inhalation Dust / Particulate



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification




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Hazard Caustics (weak alkalis) pH < 11.5

RAM: Low


Irritant to skin and eyes. Respiratory irritant, may cause pulmonary edema RAM: 2C


None known RAM:

Scenario Maintenance Operators have a potential exposure scenario during work on

CANSOLV unit caustic polishing and SO2 absorbent unit.





Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Local Control - ALARP demonstration (controls) the same as for Corrosion and Scale Inhibitors.



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Hazard Citric Acid (77-92-9)

RAM: Low


Irritation of eyes, skin and respiratory system RAM: 2B


Possible tooth erosion RAM: 3A

Scenario Potential exposure exists for any person entering the water treatment plant

(DEMIN water) and IBC's (storage).





Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Chemical warehouse designed to accommodate separation of incompatible materials.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - A chemical compatibility study was undertaken.

Local Control - Reduced manual handling (large containers vs. smaller containers).



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Hazard Corrosion and Scale Inhibitors

RAM: Low


Corrosive to skin, eyes and respiratory tract. Can cause kidney failure, brain damage or blindness. RAM: 3B


Effects

Defatting of the skin, dermatitis. Effects on CNS.

RAM: 2B

Scenario Maintenance staffs, Production Operators and Truck Drivers are potentially exposed in the following work areas: Chemical storage (facilities), chemical injection skids, injection pumps, offloading facilities, lines (marked), CPF, well

heads and RMS. Demulsifier (PT3265) - skid package (Upstream) and RMS.


Dermal Liquid



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Written procedure/safe work practice - Chemical approval procedure (CAP) in place with chemical compatibility study.

Process design/equipment standards - Allocated chemical storage areas. Containment / Isolation - Storage areas are designed to be shaded, bunded and have an

appropriate slope towards rain.

Process design/equipment standards - Fittings/couplings designed for chemicals. Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - PDO requires SHOC cards to be available

and displayed where product is stored.


Emergency / safety showers - Safety shower/eye wash stations in facility design where a risk of splash/spill has been identified.


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Hazard Ethyl Mercaptan (odorant additive)

RAM: Low


Nuisance odor, nausea RAM: 2B


None known RAM:

Scenario Maintenance staff is potentially exposed during work on MSU (mol sieve 4year

frequency), and working on the gas compressor.


Inhalation Gas



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Ventilation-General dilution - Maintenance activities in well naturally ventilated areas under PTW.



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Hazard Food and water borne pathogens

RAM: Medium


Food poisoning; hepatitis A, amoebic dysentery, giardiasis, typhoid, cholera RAM: 3C


Carrier of disease without having symptoms RAM:

Scenario Food and/or drinking water is handled and provided to staff.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Ingestion

Other


3 x Daily 2 - 4 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification Site verification of controls and recovery measures required


Written procedure/safe work practice - A Catering Contractor will be selected based on

having a food safety management system (FSMS) aligned with HACCP. The Catering contract will include requirements for Good Hygiene Practices and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point, as is the practice in PDO.

Audits and Inspections - FSMS audited internally and SME's to conduct external audits. Process design/equipment standards - Dedicated food preparation and eating facilities as part of catering approval process. Food handling facilities are planned, designed and constructed meeting local and international best practices (aligned with PDO catering

requirements).

Vector control measures - Effective pest control and sanitation programs. Fitness to Work - Fitness to Work protocols implemented for food handlers meeting

country specific or Shell Health protocols (whichever is more stringent).



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Hazard Freon (HCFC)

RAM: Low


Asphyxiant (for RAM see Simple Asphyxiant), frostbite, cardiac effects, forms Phosgene if ignited RAM: 2B


Effects

None known

RAM:

Scenario Production Operators and Maintenance staffs have a potential to exposure to Tetrafluoroethane (R134a) in the chilling and cooling system. Tetrafluoroethane is a colorless gas with a slight ethereal odor. Vapors are heavier than air. Vapors

can replace the available oxygen. Vapors may cause dizziness or asphyxiation without warning. Vapors from liquefied gas are initially heavier than air and spread along ground. Contact with gas or liquefied gas may cause burns, severe

injury and/or frostbite. Fire may produce irritating, corrosive and/or toxic gases.





Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Closed loop system. The design allows for an indirect chilling of the process with water to prevent potential for fire impacting onto the refrigerant system. This reduces the potential for hydrofluoric acid release.

Process design/equipment standards - Design accommodates recovery of refrigerant

during turn-around activities (no venting).



Process design/equipment standards - Verify that the cooling system that uses direct process cooling will be protected with passive fire protection where required (during the passive fire protection study).

Containment / Isolation - Verify that the process for initial fill (first fill) will reduce frequency

of connection between bottles and connection point.

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Hazard HIV virus

RAM: Medium


HIV positive; Hepatitis B infection. RAM: 4B


HIV infection, AIDS, secondary infections. RAM: 4B

Scenario Potentially exposed groups, i.e. staff (on and off plot), medical and first aiders

have exposure risk only when exposed to body fluids of HIV/Aids infected person(s).


Penetration Other


Exposure

Variable

8 - 12 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Training and information on hazard - Periodic awareness provided as part of health awareness campaigns, typically coinciding with World Aids Day activities.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Medical waste procedure in place (covered as

hazardous waste).

Local Control - HIV screening tests are a prerequisite for entry visa applications in Oman.



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Hazard Heat Stress / Hot Temperature Differentials

RAM: Medium


Heat stroke leading to death (lesser symptoms: exhaustion, cramps, rash, fatigue) RAM: 4B


Effects

Dermatitis

RAM: 2C

Scenario All staff working on process facilities and near flare has the potential risk of exposure to heat when working outdoors, typical temperature ranges being 32-40 degrees Celsius. Working with BA (breathing apparatus) and confined space

entry work presents an additional risk factor due to the increased metabolic rate due to PPE load.



Exposure

Daily

> 12 hours

Exposure Limit





Process design/equipment standards - Air temperature of BA air is regulated by underground piping.

Process design/equipment standards - Design makes provision for separate resting areas

with AC and fresh, cool water supply (Sulfur Blocking area and FAR buildings).

Fitness to Work - Medical fitness to work standards has been established for users of BA sets.

Training and information on hazard - Processes and procedures in place for effective supervision.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Provisions made

for shaded areas and cool drinking water. Offices with AC are available on plot, for example the Central Control Room.



Process design/equipment standards - Provide confirmation of a BA portable system.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Provide verification of how air quality and temperature of BA air will be regulated.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Define the range of climatic conditions for “normal”,

“restricted” and no work under BA sets. Provide rule-set for working under SCBA/BA in high temperatures (work rest regimen)

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Define critical activities and conduct risk assessment for use of BA sets.

Page 27 of 74



Hazard Hepatitis Virus B, C and unspecified hepatitis virus

RAM: Medium


Hepatitis B / C infection, flu-like symptoms RAM: 4B


Liver failure, jaundice, weakness, liver cancer RAM: 4B

Scenario Potentially exposed groups, i.e. staff (on and off plot), medical and first aiders

have exposure risk only when exposed to body fluids of infected person(s). Travelers/transferees from areas of low prevalence, travelling to areas of high prevalence have an increased health risk.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Penetration

Other



Exposure Limit





Training and information on hazard - Periodic awareness provided as part of health

awareness campaigns, typically coinciding with World Aids Day activities.

Vaccination - Hep B vaccinations offered to medical staff, first aiders and business travelers.



Page 28 of 74



Hazard Hydraulic and Heat Transfer Fluids

RAM: Low


Mildly irritation to skin, eyes, respiratory tract RAM: 2B


Defatting of the skin, dermatitis RAM: 3B

Scenario Production Operators/Assistants and Maintenance staffs has potential for

exposure during work on chemical injection skids, lube skids compressors, well pads and well safe guarding.




Exposure

Variable

2 - 4 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Containment / Isolation - Pumps for decanting, dedicated storage areas.



Page 29 of 74



Hazard Hydrazine and compounds (302-01-2)

RAM: Medium


Corrosive to skin, eyes and respiratory system. Can be fatal by inhalation or skin absorbtion. Can effect liver, kidney or CNS. RAM: 4B


Effects

Possibly carcinogenic to humans (IARC 2B), skin sensitizer, suspect mutagen,

damage to liver,kidney and CNS. RAM: 4B

Scenario Hydrazine and Ammonium Bisulphate is used as oxygen scavengers. Production Operators and Maintenance staff have the potential for exposure in

the following areas: IBC's (storage area), waste water treatment plant and the outlet of the sour water stripper.


Dermal, Inhalation, Splash Liquid


Exposure

Variable

1 - 2 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification



Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - PDO requires SHOC cards to be available


Containment / Isolation - Storage areas are designed to be shaded, bunded and have an appropriate slope towards rain.

Process design/equipment standards - Fittings/couplings designed for chemicals. Allocated chemical storage areas.



Substitution - Identify a safer option for hydrazine.

Page 30 of 74



Hazard Hydrocarbons, Light (<C5's), Hydrocarbon Gas (EP), Liquefied Petroleum

Gases (e.g. Propane)

RAM: Low


Effects

Asphyxiant (for RAM see Simple Asphyxiant), headaches, giddiness, nausea,

cold burns from liquefied gas RAM: 2B


None known RAM: 1A

Scenario Potential exposure to Methane exists for Production Operators working in

production facilities.


Inhalation Gas



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Leak detection & repair surveys - Potential leak sources identified in design process. Process design/equipment standards - Equipment and lines labeled in design process. Ventilation-General dilution - Natural ventilation considered in design process, where mechanical ventilation is not practicable due to facility layout that prefers no enclosed spaces.

Process design/equipment standards - Sampling points - close system design in

accordance with PR 1096.



Page 31 of 74



Hazard Hydrocarbons, VOC (total vapor)

RAM: Low


Narcotic effect, CNS depression, irritant to eyes and respiratory tract. RAM: 2B


Effects on liver, kidney and CNS, peripheral neuropathy. RAM: 3B

Scenario Production and Maintenance staff has potential exposure to hydrocarbons (in

various concentrations) throughout production facilities.


Inhalation Vapour



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Sampling points - close system design in accordance with PR 1096.



Monitoring: other measurements - Verify whether ongoing fugitive emissions monitoring programs for hydrocarbons will be implemented.

Page 32 of 74



Hazard Hydrochloric Acid (7647-01-0)

RAM: Medium


Corrosive to skin and eyes. Respiratory irritant, may cause pulmonary edema RAM: 4B


Impairment of lung function, tooth erosion RAM: 2B

Scenario RO Plant Operator(s) have potential exposure scenarios when working

in/around the sour water stripper and RO plant for PH adjustment, IBC's storage.





Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Chemical warehouse designed to accommodate separation of incompatible materials.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - A chemical compatibility study was undertaken.




Page 33 of 74



Hazard Hydrogen sulfide containing streams with H2S > 1000 ppm mole (600

mg/kg) or >100 ppm vapour space (7783-06-4)

RAM: Medium


Effects

Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness,

fatality RAM: 4C


Damage to nasal tissues. RAM: 2B

Scenario Mechanical/instrument maintenance operators are potentially exposed to

Hydrogen Sulfide during normal operations and during invasive maintenance. Exposure scenario's exists in process streams (both operations and maintenance); well pad works, well testing (new wells), remote manifolds; leaks

from process equipment; oil stabilizer on export line (H2S scavenger); spend dessicant from the MSU and sampling.


Inhalation Gas


Exposure

Variable

> 12 hours

Exposure Limit





Local Control - PDO occupational exposure criteria and environmental air quality criteria established.

Process design/equipment standards - Fixed BA system for routine maintenance activities

in the sour system.

Process design/equipment standards - Design uses mechanical seals on pumps and dry gas seals on sour gas compressors.

Leak detection & repair surveys - Leak sources are minimized through leak path reduction.

Monitoring: Other measurements - H2S detectors and warning system strategically

positioned throughout the facility for easy gas detection leaks (TLV 5ppm).

Process design/equipment standards - No atmosphere relief valve to atmosphere in sour surface.

Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Signs and labeling in accordance with PDO SP 1284, SP 1166 and HFE DEP 30 00 60 21.

Process design/equipment standards - Instrument vents in sour service are to the LP flare

or to safe location.

Process design/equipment standards - Sampling points are designed to facilitate close system sampling in accordance with PDO PR 1096.

Local Control - Purging procedure using sweet gas prior to dumping spent dessicant from the MSU.

Process design/equipment standards - Degassing unit removes H2S.


Emergency response procedures - Emergency escape provisions included in facility

design.


Process design/equipment standards - Provide ALARP demonstration for flanges above ground vs pits.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm a respirator fit testing procedure. Verify fit testing program for persons with facial hair.

Page 34 of 74



Hazard Iron Sulfide

RAM: Low


Mechanical irritation of eyes skin and respiratory tract from dust RAM: 1B


Effects on lung function RAM: 2B

Scenario Potential exposure exists for Maintenance staff during routine maintenance as

iron sulfide may accumulate in plant. Secondary exposure scenario exists during pigging.




Exposure

Variable

2 - 4 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Extensive amount of CRA (corrosion resistant alloy) in on-plot design and GRE (glass re-enforced epoxy) piping for the flow lines.



Page 35 of 74



Hazard Legionella bacteria (waterborne)

RAM: Medium


Pontiac fever (mildest form of infection); Legionairres ' disease - pneumonia (severest form of infection - may be fatal) RAM: 4B


Effects

Effects on lung function

RAM: 3B

Scenario All staff (on plot and off plot) has the potential to be exposed to the following Legionella sources: showers/ aerolised water, water from fire water systems, potable water, any scenario where ambient temperature water may become

airborne and inhaled.


Inhalation Other



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication




Written procedure/safe work practice - PDO Legionella management procedure is in place, ready for implementation. The procedure requires that water systems and equipment that are a potential source of Legionella are identified, documented, assessed

and a monitoring and control program defined.



Written procedure/safe work practice - Determine water treatment/equipment maintenance philosophy to reduce bio-filming and scale prevention. MCOH – Complete.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that the design of potential water sources prevents aerosols, dead legs and stagnant water. [HOLD – FEED HSE to review and

confirm any issues]

Written procedure/safe work practice - Identify and document water systems and equipment that are a potential source of Legionella; assess water systems and equipment for the risk of Legionella and define a monitoring and control programme. MCOH –

Monitoring program to commence in PDO during 2014.

Page 36 of 74



Hazard Man made or synthetic vitreous fibers

RAM: Low


Respiratory and skin irritation RAM: 2B


Effects on lung function RAM: 2B

Scenario Maintenance staff is potentially exposed to piping insulation and refractory

fibers.


Inhalation, Dermal Other



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Written procedure/safe work practice - Asbestos containing materials are prohibited in design and procurement process.



Page 37 of 74



Hazard Manual Handling - Lifting, Lowering

RAM: Medium


Acute strain or sprain to muscles and joints RAM: 3C


Chronic musculo-skeletal disorders RAM: 3D

Scenario Operators, Maintenance and Technicians are required to move materials, open

and close valves and manually manipulate controls.




Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Design include HFE DEP 30 00 60 10. 3D model reviews carried out for outdoor installations to identify and address ergonomic issues. Access to valves and sampling points included during HFE screening (part of model

review).



Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that design include HFE DEP 30.00.60.10.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that 3D model reviews are carried out for outdoor installations to identify and address ergonomic issues.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that ALARP DEP (all of HSE critical tasks)

are completed.

Local Remedial Action - Confirm that mechanical handling exercise is initiated.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that access to valves and sampling points are included during HFE screening – part of model review.

Process design/equipment standards - Confirm that modeling will be completed to verify adequate space for li fting devices such as mobile cranes, lift-out pumps and heavy items.

Page 38 of 74



Hazard Mercury (7439-97-6)

RAM: Medium


Acute poisoning, neurological effects RAM: 3B


Effects on kidneys and central nervous system, emotional and pyschological disturbances, effects on reproduction.

RAM: 3C

Scenario Production Operators and Maintenance staffs has potential exposure from mercury sulfide solids in condensate, although considered to be a low risk. A potential long-term accumulation risk in sludge exists.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Dermal

Liquid



Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Written procedure/safe work practice - Approved Company procedure in place for

handling and disposal of Mercury (PR -1516).

Written procedure/safe work practice - Approved waste management strategy in place for safe removal and disposal, meeting as a minimum the local legislative requirements. Removed mercury is not allowed to be stored in site.



Page 39 of 74



Hazard Natural Gas Condensate (C5-C10 hydrocarbons)

RAM: Medium


Irritation of the eyes and respiratory tract, CNS depression RAM: 2C


Human carcinogen (IARC 1), damage to bone marrow and immune system, dermatitis.

RAM: 4B

Scenario Production operators and maintenance staffs (of crude and condensate handling systems) are potentially exposed to these sources: All off-plot production gathering facilities; inlet separation (Unit 30); condensate stabilization plant (Unit

33); LP separation (Unit 31); oil storage and pumping (Unit 34) and during sampling and analysis.




Exposure

Variable

1 - 2 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Good engineering design practice in accordance with CP117, GU611, SP 1190 and SP 1078. Lab design completed in accordance with

DEP 34 17 10 31. The design of sampling equipment and sampling points to minimize personal exposure risks.

Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - Equipment and lines labeled in accordance with SP 1284, SP 1166 and DEP 30 00 60 21.

Ventilation-General dilution - Natural ventilation.



Page 40 of 74



Hazard Naturally Occurring Ionising radiation (NORM)

RAM: Medium


No known effects RAM:


Human carcinogen (IARC 1), Damage to reproductive system and blood cells. RAM: 4B

Scenario Operations and Maintenance staff have the potential for exposure to NORM

during opening of vessels or pigging lines, working on Xmas trees, flow lines and test separators.




Exposure

Variable

2 - 4 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Monitoring: Other measurements - If deposits are found, monitoring is required and actions implemented as per Management of NORM procedure, SP-1170 (Management of

NORM).

Written procedure/safe work practice - Waste management strategy (Document number KHF-00-000000-HX-5980-00001-0000) addresses disposal location of NORM contaminated materials/equipment.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Sampling and disposal in accordance with SP-

1170.



Page 41 of 74



Hazard Noise

RAM: Medium


Loud steady noise: temporary threshold shift. Impact noise: rupture of eardrum; acoustic trauma. RAM: 2C


Effects

Noise induced hearing loss (permanent threshold shift); tinnitus (ringing in ears)

RAM: 2D

Scenario All staff working on process facilities has the potential for exposure to plant noise and equipment. Potential sources of noise in process facilities include noisy plant (e.g. air coolers, heaters, flare etc) and noisy equipment (e.g. chemical

injection pumps, transfer pumps etc).




Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication




Process design/equipment standards - Predictive noise modeling during FEED. Process design/equipment standards - Equipment sourced for emissions lower than 85dB(A) - included in the equipment BID data sheets.

Noise silencer / Muffler / Damper - Silencers on air vents and deaerator and let down

valves.

Process design/equipment standards - Noise criteria (base of flare) DEP 80.45.10.10 followed.


Event-based: IH monitoring - Noise mapping during commission - Company hearing conservation plan implemented for areas exceeding 85dB(A).


Page 42 of 74



Hazard Particulates (total, not classified)

RAM: Low


Upper respiratory and eye irritation RAM: 1C


Effects on lung function RAM: 2C

Scenario Exposure to desert dust, shamal.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Inhalation

Dust / Particulate


Daily 8 - 12 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Local Control - All work is stopped and staff is advised to seek shelter during a sand storm

- Work stoppages (MOPO). Dampening of road surfaces during excavation for dust suppression<(>,<)> where reasonably practicable.

PPE-Eye and face protection - In addition to standard safety glasses, workers are also issued with rubber-rimmed safety glasses to prevent foreign articles from

entering/damaging eyes.

PPE-Respirator - Staff is advised to cover their mouths and noses to prevent inhalation of desert dust (disposable dust masks or scarves).

Process design/equipment standards - Vehicles fitted with AC. Cranes, forkli fts, excavators etc have cabins fitted with AC.

Local Control - Dampening of road surfaces, during excavation etc where reasonably

practicable.



Page 43 of 74



Hazard Psychological Hazards and Stress

RAM: High


Stress symptoms like headaches, high blood pressure, sleep disturbance, irritability RAM: 2D


Effects

Anxiety, depression, absenteeism

RAM: 4D

Scenario All staff (on and off plot) have the potential to experience isolation from family and friends, especially those on rotational duty; working on dead-lines, pressure owning to the nature of the work environment is inherent.

Route & Form of

Exposure


Exposure Limit





Stress - generic organisational controls - Clear organisational structure with adequate

human resources.

Local Control - Good camp, welfare and sport facilities. No overcrowding in facilities or in accommodations.

Training and information on hazard - Periodic health awareness (with focus on suicide prevention) and general stress awareness provided at all work locations by PDO

Occupational Health team (e.g. during HSSE meetings).


Stress - generic recovery measures - Employee assistance program (call centre during office hours).


Local Remedial Action - Implement entertainment and other facilities for long term shift staff in accommodations.

Written procedure/safe work practice - Confirm that PDO expectations for shift rotations

and employee welfare included in Contractor Agreements.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Confirm that a monitoring system is in place to verify Contractor compliance to local Labour Law pertaining to work cycle and annual leave.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Confirm a fatigue

risk management program is available for implementation covering HSE critical jobs.

Page 44 of 74



Hazard RSI Risk from Computer/Display Screen Equipment

RAM: Medium


Muscular discomfort; eyestrain; soreness to soft tissues (e.g. wrist) RAM: 1D


Work-related upper limb disorders, repetitive strain injury RAM: 3D

Scenario Poor workplace design can lead to repetitive movements and awkward static

postures, excessive stretching, bending and force exertion in office and Operations staff who are users of VDU's, keyboards, mice and control panels.



Exposure

Variable

2 - 4 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Ergonomic workplace assessment - HFE screening for project and control room completed by HFE professional (input from Shell Health) and results of analysis

implemented for FEED.

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Rotation schedule considered.

Ergonomically designed furniture & workstations - PDO approved furniture.


RSI Case management - Return to work practice in consultation with PDO Occupational Health team.


Page 45 of 74



Hazard Relative Humidity

RAM: Medium


Heat stroke leading to death (lesser symptoms: exhaustion, cramps, rash, fatigue) RAM: 4B


Effects

Dermatitis

RAM: 2C

Scenario Exposure to relative humidity when working outdoors.



Daily 4 - 8 hours

Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification Requires site verification.


Process design/equipment standards - Design makes provision for separate resting areas with AC and fresh, cool water supply (Sulfur Blocking area and FAR buildings).



Page 46 of 74



Hazard Simple Asphyxiants- Nitrogen Blanket, Inert Gases, Oxygen Depletion, and

Gas Releases

RAM: Medium


Effects

Asphyxiation, to be addressed in HEMP or Safety Case

RAM: 4C


None known RAM:

Scenario Maintenance staff and Production Operators who are involved in gas tests, purging, confined spaces etc have potential exposure to Nitrogen through these

sources: Nitrogen supply system for purging on plot vs. piping in vessels; Nitrogen cylinders at well pads for purging piping; suction strainer change out for pumps (maintenance); filter change-outs (e.g.amine, deslating maintenance etc);

equipment isolation (spectable blind) maintenance; vessel entry (maintenance); nitrogen trucks for supply of large volumes during shut-downs and re-instatements. All workers who use the cascade breathing air system.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Inhalation

Gas



Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Nitrogen purged through hard pipe system (near to

vessel) and vented to flare (also during commissioning).

Process design/equipment standards - Fixed connection points. Process design/equipment standards - Safe guarding system for the breathing air supply system. System designed to provide safe air for breathing purposes (CSA Standard Z180

Compressed Breathing Air and Systems).



Page 47 of 74



Hazard Sodium hypochlorite (bleach)

RAM: Low


Severe eye irritant, corrosive to mucous membranes, choking, coughing, pulmonary edema RAM: 3B


Effects

Dermatitis

RAM: 2B

Scenario Sodium hypochlorite planned to be used as a biocide. Production Operators and Maintenance Staff (pump maintenance) have potential exposure scenarios when working on: water inlet and treatment systems, fire storage system (batch

treatment) and the IBC's (storage area).





Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Biocides cleared through CAP (Chemical approval process).

Local Control - Use of chlorine in addition to UV treatment (holding tanks). Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - PDO requires SHOC cards to be available




Page 48 of 74



Hazard Sulfur

RAM: Low


Irritating to the eyes and skin, can inflame the respiratory tract. May off gas H2S and SO2. RAM: 2C


Effects

Dermatitis and chronic bronchitis.

RAM: 3B

Scenario Production Operators, Maintenance Staff and Contractors (for sulfur handling) are potentially exposed to liquid molten sulfur in the sulfur recovery unit, sulfur handling area, leaks from CPF (increased burns from molten sulfur) and during

over-pressure events in the liquid sulfur storage tanks with loss of containment. Contractors (sulfur handling) are potentially exposed to solid sulfur in the blocking plant and CPF.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Dermal, Inhalation, Splash

Liquid



Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Cantilever system for sulfur pouring opposed to a

wheeled system.

Decontamination of equipment - Use of nit rogen and fuel gas for clearing sulfur run-down blockages.

Process design/equipment standards - External heating on the liquid sulfur molten tanks opposed to internal heating coils.

Process design/equipment standards - Design incorporates pouring arms to divert/spread

sulfur in the sulfur blocking/CPF plants.

Process design/equipment standards - Layout separation between the sulfur blocks, CPF and power plant (following 200m good practice rule). Wind direction taken into consideration when deciding block location.



Process design/equipment standards - Verify that observation ports on run down lines are

included in design (for liquid sulfur molten).

Page 49 of 74



Hazard Sulfur Trioxide (7446-11-9)

RAM: Medium


Corrosive to skin and eyes. Respiratory irritant, may cause pulmonary edema RAM: 4B


Carcinogen IARC 1, impairment of lung function, tooth erosion RAM: 4B

Scenario Maintenance staffs have potential for exposure to Sulfur Trioxide (in liquid and

gas phase). Exposure scenario's exists in CANSOLV unit (pre-treatment) and RO feed water system from the CANSOLV quench.


Dermal, Inhalation Gas


Exposure

Variable

1 - 2 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Closed system - Closed system design.



Page 50 of 74



Hazard Sulfur dioxide- SO2 (7446-09-5)

RAM: Medium


Corrosive to eyes and lungs, fatality RAM: 4C


Respiratory Sensitizer, Asthma RAM: 3C

Scenario Potential exposure for all site staff during flaring of gas containing H2S; Pouring

of Sulfur blocks; Liquid sulfur; Sulfur fires and Jet/pool fires. Operations and Maintenance staff have an increased risk of potential exposure to sources mentioned here.

Route & Form of

Exposure

Inhalation

Gas


Daily 8 - 12 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - Flare stack height designed to have acceptable

level of ground level concentration in case of flaring. Stack height is based on safe disposal of pollutants.

Local Control - Plant design allows a high level of automation to reduce personal level of exposure (design philosophy). Examples of automation in design include automatic

skimming in the AGRU; using nitrogen and fuel gas for clearing sulfur run down blockages; closed drain systems; CANSOLV unit and remote activated fire water monitors in the Sulfur block.

Process design/equipment standards - Plant layout has taken into consideration prevailing

wind directions from on plot areas.

Process design/equipment standards - Design facilitates environmental emissions limit of 35mg/m3 (point source emissions).



Local Remedial Action - FEED HSE to verify that the Control Room is in a safe location for toxic SO2 endurance in accordance with PDO SP 1190.

2

Process design/equipment standards - Verify that observation ports on run down lines are

included in design philosophy.

2

Process design/equipment standards - State what the ALARP effort is in the event where the degasser does not work efficiently (leading to increased potential for SO2 and HS2 emissions during pouring operations). Provide PDO occupational exposure criteria and

environmental air quality criteria.

2

Process design/equipment standards - Demonstrate ALARP for the absorber by-pass to meet environment and occupational tolerability criteria through the CANSOLV design.

2

Process design/equipment standards - Verify provision of dilution gas when flaring acid gas to complete the combustion process and improve dispersion standards.

2

Page 51 of 74



Hazard Sulfuric Acid (7664-93-9)

RAM: Medium


Corrosive to skin and eyes. Respiratory irritant, may cause pulmonary edema RAM: 4C


Carcinogen IARC 1, impairment of lung function, tooth erosion RAM: 4B

Scenario Plant Operators have potential exposure scenario's when working on the

CANSOLV Unit (pump system for injection to scrubber) - initial activation of CANSOLV solvent; IBC (storage) and water treatment plan (DEMIN water).




Exposure

Variable

1 - 2 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Chemical compatibility study undertaken.

Process design/equipment standards - Chemical warehouse designed to accommodate

separation of incompatible materials.



Emergency / safety showers - Safety shower/eye wash stations in facility design where risk of exposure has been identified.


Page 52 of 74



Hazard Ultra violet light (UV) - wavelength 100 - 400 nm (non-ionizing radiation)

RAM: Medium


Arc eye; erythema, skin burn RAM: 2C


Skin cancer (Human carcinogen IARC 1) RAM: 4B

Scenario All staff (on plot and off plot) is exposed to direct sun in desert environment. In

addition, welding activities adds another source of exposure for welders (for example during gas welding).



Exposure

Daily

8 - 12 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


PPE-Eye and face protection - Eye protection with UV filters issued to staff and contractors.

PPE-Skin protection:gloves, clothing - Full length coveralls, gloves and hard hats

obligatory throughout work areas. PPE's issued in accordance with PDO Standard SP 1234).

Process design/equipment standards - Plant layout makes provision for sheltered areas to provide relief from sun exposures.



Page 53 of 74



Hazard Visible light (too much; too little) - wavelength 400 - 780 nm (non-ionizing

radiation)

RAM: Low


Effects

Eyestrain, headaches, decreased efficiency, increase in work errors.

RAM: 1C


None known RAM:

Scenario All staff are potentially exposed to insufficient lighting and poor night time illumination of the plant and facilities.

Route & Form of

Exposure



Exposure Limit


ALARP Status Yes

ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - HFE screening completed to assess if a detailed

survey was required.

Local Control - CCTV to reduce operator frequency of walkabout.



Process design/equipment standards - Confirm design in accordance with HFE DEP’s and FEED Emergency lightning guideline (GU/705).

4

Process design/equipment standards - HFE study to include lessons learned from previously poorly designed Control Rooms in PDO facilities.

4

Page 54 of 74



Hazard Waxes and related products

RAM: Low


Hot wax fumes irritate the eyes and respiratory tract; burns from molten wax RAM: 1B


None known RAM:

Scenario Production Operators and Maintenance staff have potential exposure scenarios

when working in the chemical storage area and working on well heads.


Dermal, Splash Liquid



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification



Hazard identification by signs/warnings/labels - PDO requires SHOC cards to be available and displayed where product is stored.

Containment / Isolation - Storage areas are designed to be shaded, bunded and have an

appropriate slope towards rain.

Process design/equipment standards - Fittings/couplings designed for chemicals. Allocated chemical storage areas.



Page 55 of 74



Hazard Work Environment - Indoor climate

RAM: Low


General discomfort, e.g. feeling too hot/too cold, stiff neck, dry throat/eyes, headaches RAM: 1D


Effects

None known

RAM:

Scenario Office based and control room staff have potential exposure scenarios to indoor air temperatures that are too hot/cold, causing discomfort.



Exposure

Daily

4 - 8 hours

Exposure Limit



ALARP Justification


Process design/equipment standards - HVAC system designed with adjustable temperature controls. Design follows DEP 34.17.00.32 & DEP 30.00.60.15.



Page 56 of 74



Hazard X Rays wavelength < 10 nm (ionising radiation)

RAM: Medium


Cell damage e.g. skin burns, sickness, loss of hair - potentially fatal RAM: 3B


Human carcinogen (IARC 1), Damage to reproductive system and blood cells. RAM: 4B

Scenario NDT Operators have potential exposure to sealed sources/NDT, as well as staff

providing in-field oversight.


Dermal Other



Exposure Limit

Exposure Rating &

Justi fication


ALARP Justification


Written procedure/safe work practice - Work executed in compliance with the extensive safe work procedure that is in place - a condition of PTW system. Emergency response plan has been approved by regulatory authority (Omani Ministry of Environment).

Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Exclusion zone. Local Control - Use of a registered contractor. Wear of radiation badges.



Page 57 of 74


5. Generic Controls, Recovery Measures and Remedial Actions



Written procedure/safe work practice - PDO standard will be followed during procurement

of PPE (gloves, coveralls, face shield, goggles).

Local Control - PPE, competency and procedures.

Containment / Isolation - The facility layout is designed purposefully to prevent delivery trucks from entering the facility. The chemical offloading bay is located outside of the fence.



Administrative controls, such as area restrictions and limited schedules - Site verification is required to finalize the effectiveness of controls, recovery measures and final exposure ratings mentioned in this HRA.

TBD

Emergency / safety showers - Select safety showers/eye wash stations that have the

capability to cool water during summer period.

TBD

Page 58 of 74


6. Control statements for Low RAM Hazards

Work Area Hazard Controlled through standard

procedures and staff competencies. There are no indications for over-

exposure.

Page 59 of 74


Appendix 1: Definitions

Acute Health Effect Health Effect that occurs immediately or a short time (seconds to hours) following exposure, such as heat stroke, chemical burns and asphyxiation.

Agent See Hazard

ALARP - As Low As Reasonably Practicable The point at which the cost (in time, money and effort) of further Risk reduction is grossly disproportionate to

the Risk reduction achieved. Barrier

A Risk Control or a Recovery Measure. Barriers provide the means of preventing an Event or Incident, or of mitigating the Consequences. A Barrier can be an item of equipment or a human intervention, and can also be a Control on an Escalation Factor.

Chronic Health Effect Health Effect that occurs gradually over a long period of time (months or years), generally following repeated

and prolonged exposure. In specific cases a short term exposure may result in a chronic health effect. Consequence

An Effect on people, assets, the environment or reputation as a result of a Hazard being released. Control

A means of preventing an Incident. Controls can be engineering, procedural or behavioural. Critical Activity

An activity necessary for the development, implementation or maintenance of a Barrier established for managing Hazards with RAM red Risks.

Effect The Consequence of the release of a Hazard.

Escalation Factor A situation, condition or circumstance that may lead to the partial or full failure of a Barrier. Event

An Incident that occurs when a Hazard is released. Exposure Limit

The airborne concentration of chemical agents and levels of physical agents to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed day after day without adverse Effect.

Exposure Rating The chance of over-exposure to a health hazard when compared against agreed control standards. The exposure rating is evaluated as Very Low, Low, Medium or High.

Hazard An agent with the potential to cause harm to people, damage to Assets, or an Impact on the environment or

reputation. Health Hazard

A factor of a physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic or psychological nature with the potential to cause harm to the health of people.

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HRA - Health Risk Assessment A process of identifying, evaluating, controlling and managing Health Risks, associated with work to prevent

acute and chronic health Effects. Incident

An unplanned Event or chain of Events that has, or could have, resulted in injury or illness or damage to Assets, the environment or reputation.

Likelihood The probability that a specified Consequence will happen.

OEL – Occupational Exposure Limit The airborne concentration of chemical agents and levels of physical agents to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed day after day without adverse effect.

RAM - Risk Assessment Matrix A tool used to assess the Consequences and Risks of Hazards to HSSE. The results are referred to as a

RAM Severity rating and a RAM Risk rating. Recovery Measure

A Barrier that reduces the Consequences of the release of a Hazard as a result of an Incident. Recovery Measures can be engineering, procedural or behavioural measures.

Remedial Action Plan RAP - A Plan to implement corrective action items.

Risk The combination of the Consequence of a specific Hazard being released and the Likelihood of it happening.

Risk Assessment The process of identifying the Consequences of the Worst Case Credible Scenario arising from the release of a Hazard, and estimating the Likelihood of that scenario.

Severity A level of Consequence on the RAM on a scale of 0 to 5.

TBD To be determined.

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Appendix 2: Risk Assessment Matrix

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Appendix 3: Overview of Detailed Risk Appraisals

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 13 Air pollution (environmental health hazard) _________________________________ 13

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 15 Amines [e.g., Ethylenediamine (1,2-Diaminoethane), methylamine, diethylamine,

mono-, di-, and tri-ethanolamine ] _________________________________________ 15 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 16

Anti-foam agents (silicone based) _________________________________________ 16 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 17

Carbon monoxide- Gas (630-08-0) _________________________________________ 17 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 18

Catalyst - Alumina (activated)/Bauxite (Fresh and Spent) _____________________ 18 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 19

Caustics (weak alkalis) pH < 11.5 __________________________________________ 19 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 20

Citric Acid (77-92-9) ______________________________________________________ 20 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 21

Corrosion and Scale Inhibitors ____________________________________________ 21 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 22

Ethyl Mercaptan (odorant additive)_________________________________________ 22 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 23

Food and water borne pathogens __________________________________________ 23 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 24

Freon (HCFC) ___________________________________________________________ 24 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 25

HIV virus________________________________________________________________ 25 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 26

Heat Stress / Hot Temperature Differentials _________________________________ 26 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 27

Hepatitis Virus B, C and unspecified hepatitis virus __________________________ 27 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 28

Hydraulic and Heat Transfer Fluids ________________________________________ 28 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 29

Hydrazine and compounds (302-01-2) ______________________________________ 29 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 30

Hydrocarbons, Light (<C5's), Hydrocarbon Gas (EP), Liquefied Petroleum Gases (e.g.

Propane)________________________________________________________________ 30 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 31

Hydrocarbons, VOC (total vapor) __________________________________________ 31 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 32

Hydrochloric Acid (7647-01-0) _____________________________________________ 32 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 33

Hydrogen sulfide containing streams with H2S > 1000 ppm mole (600 mg/kg) or >100 ppm vapour space (7783-06-4)_____________________________________________ 33

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 34 Iron Sulfide _____________________________________________________________ 34

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 35 Legionella bacteria (waterborne)___________________________________________ 35

Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 36

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Man made or synthetic vitreous fibers______________________________________ 36 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 37

Manual Handling - Lifting, Lowering________________________________________ 37 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 38

Mercury (7439-97-6) ______________________________________________________ 38 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 39

Natural Gas Condensate (C5-C10 hydrocarbons) ____________________________ 39 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 40

Naturally Occurring Ionising radiation (NORM) ______________________________ 40 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 41

Noise ___________________________________________________________________ 41 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 42

Particulates (total, not classified) __________________________________________ 42 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 43

Psychological Hazards and Stress _________________________________________ 43 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 44

RSI Risk from Computer/Display Screen Equipment _________________________ 44 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 45

Relative Humidity ________________________________________________________ 45 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 46

Simple Asphyxiants- Nitrogen Blanket, Inert Gases, Oxygen Depletion, and Gas

Releases________________________________________________________________ 46 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 47

Sodium hypochlorite (bleach) _____________________________________________ 47 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 48

Sulfur __________________________________________________________________ 48 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 49

Sulfur Trioxide (7446-11-9) ________________________________________________ 49 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 50

Sulfur dioxide- SO2 (7446-09-5) ____________________________________________ 50 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 51

Sulfuric Acid (7664-93-9)__________________________________________________ 51 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 52

Ultra violet light (UV) - wavelength 100 - 400 nm (non-ionizing radiation) _______ 52 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 53

Visible light (too much; too little) - wavelength 400 - 780 nm (non-ionizing radiation)53 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 54

Waxes and related products ______________________________________________ 54 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 55

Work Environment - Indoor climate ________________________________________ 55 Yibal Khuff Project FEED HRA 56

X Rays wavelength < 10 nm (ionising radiation) _____________________________ 56

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Appendix 4: Yibal Khuff FEED Combined HHI 23 May 2013

CHEMICAL AGENT POTENTIAL EXPOSED GROUPS

SOURCE POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECT ALARP EFFORTS

Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)

All operations and maintenance staff

Sulfur contractors

Flaring of gas containing H2S

Pouring of Sulfur blocks

Liquid sulfur Sulfur fires

Jet/pool fires

Acute: Corrosive to eyes and lungs, fatality Chronic: Respiratory Sensitizer, Asthma

Flare stack height designed to have acceptable level of ground level concentration in case of flaring.

Stack heights is based on safe disposal of pollutants.

Plant layout has taken into consideration prevailing wind directions from on plot areas. FEED HSE to verify the CR is in a safe location for toxic SO2 endurance in accordance with PDO SP 1190.

High level of automation to reduce personal level of exposure (design philosophy) e.g. automatic skimming, automatic skimming in the AGRU contactors and using nitrogen and fuel gas for clearing sulfur run down blockages. Closed drain systems CANSOLV unit, remote activated fire water monitors in Sulfur block.

Verify that observation ports on run down lines are included in design.

State what the ALARP effort is in

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the event where the degasser does not work efficiently (Leading to increased potential for SO2 and H2S emissions during pouring operations). Provide PDO occupational exposure criteria and environmental air quality criteria.

Design facilitates environmental emissions limit 35mg/m3 (point source emissions).

The CANSOLV design needs to demonstrate ALARP for the absorber by-pass to meet environment and occupational tolerability criteria.

Verify provision of dilution gas when flaring acid gas to complete the combustion process and improve dispersion standards.

PPE, procedures and competence.

Hydrogen Sulfide Mechanical/Instrument maintenance operators

Invasive maintenance

Process streams (both operations and maintenance)

Well pads

Well testing (new wells)

Remote manifolds Leaks from process

equipment

Oil stabilizer on export line (H2S scavenger)

Spend dessicant from

Acute: Chemical asphyxiant causing respiratory paralysis, irritant; unconsciousness, fatality; Chronic: Damage to nasal tissues.

Flare ALARP as mentioned above.

PDO occupational exposure criteria and environmental air quality criteria.

Fixed BA system for routine maintenance activities in the sour system.

Use of double mechanical seals on pumps.

Use of dry gas seals on sour gas

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the MSU

Sampling

compressors.

Minimize leak sources through leak path reduction.

H2S detectors and warning system strategically positioned throughout facility for early gas detection leaks (TLV 5ppm).

No atmosphere relief valve to atmosphere in sour surface.

Signs and labeling in accordance with PDO SP 12 84, SP 1166 and HFE DEP 30 00 60 21.

Instrument vents in sour service are to the LP flare or to safe location.

Sampling points are designed to facilitate close system sampling in accordance with PDO PR 1096.

Provide ALARP demonstration for flanges above ground vs. pits.

Rule-set for working under SCBA/BA in high temperatures (work rest regimen).

Confirm a respirator fit testing procedure. Verify respirator fit testing program for persons with facial hair.

Emergency escape provisions included in facility design.

Purging procedure using sweet gas prior to dumping spent dessicant from the MSU.

Degassing unit removes H2S.

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Liquid Sulfur Molten

Production Operators & Maintenance staff

Contractors - Sulfur handling

Sulfur recovery unit Sulfur handling area

Leaks from CPF (increased burns from molten sulfur)

Over-pressure events in liquid sulfur storage tanks with loss of containment

Acute: Severe skin burns Cantilver system for sulfur pouring opposed to wheeled system.

Verify that observation ports on run down lines are included in design.

Use of nitrogen and fuel gas for clearing sulfur run down blockages.

External heating on the tank as opposed to internal heating coil.

PPE, competency and procedures.

Solid Sulfur Contractors - Sulfur handling Blocking plant

CPF

Acute: Mild irritant of mucous membranes; Sulfur dust is mild irritant of upper respiratory system; H2S residue may cause shortness of breath, breathing failure, coma and death; Chronic: Not known

Pouring arms to divert/spread sulfur.

Layout separation between the Sulfur blocks, CPF and power plant (200m good practice).

Wind direction taken into consideration when deciding block location.


Sulfur Trioxide SO3 (In liquid and gas phase)

Production Operators Maintenance

CANSOLV unit (pre-treatment)

RO feed water system from the CANSOLV quench

Acute: Corrosive to mucous membranes; skin and respiratory tract irritant; On contact with water, converts to Sulfuric acid with same acute effects Chronic: Carcinogenic

Closed system. PPE, competency and

procedures.

Methane Production Operators

All production facilities Acute: Headaches, dizziness, drowsiness, nausea; respiratory irritant. Leaks may

Potential leak sources identified in design.

Equipment and lines labeled.

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cause freeze burns Natural ventilation (mechanical ventilation not practicable due to no enclosed spaces).


Hydrocarbons (in various concentrations)

Production operators and maintenance staff

As above Acute: Simple Asphyxiants, headaches, giddiness, nausea, cold burns from liquefied gas Chronic: None known

Verify whether ongoing fugitive emissions monitoring programs will be implemented

Sampling points – close system design in accordance with PR 1096.

PPE , competency and procedures

Mercury Production operators and maintenance staff

Mercury sulfide solids in condensate although low risk

Potential long-term accumulation (sludge)risk

Acute: Acute poisoning, neurological effects Chronic: Effects on kidneys and central nervous system, emotional and psychological disturbances, effects on reproduction.

Approved Company procedure in place for handling and disposal of Mercury (PR-1516).

Approved waste management strategy is in place for safe removal and disposal, meeting as minimum local legislative requirements. Removed mercury not stored on site.

Suitable PPE identified in JHA/under PTW activity

Surveillance plans are implemented to measure mercury sulfide in condensate once annually.

Surveillance program in place to measure mercury in export gas.


Chemicals (such as corrosion inhibitors,

Maintenance staff

Production Operators

Chemical Storage (facilities)

Chemical injection skids

Acute: irritant/sensitizer to eyes, skin, moderately irritant to lungs; dermal sensitizers

Chemical approval procedure (CAP).

Allocated chemical storage

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Methanol etc) Truck drivers Injection pumps

Offloading facilities

Lines (marked) CPF

Well heads

RMS

Chronic: Effects will be substance specific and will require confirmation from MSDS

areas.

Chemical compatibility study.

Safety shower/eye wash stations in facility design where risk of exposure exists.

Storage areas are shaded, bunded and have appropriate slope towards rain.

Part of design is that no chemical trucks will enter the facility (offloading facility outside of fence).

Fittings/couplings designed for chemicals.


Amines Production Operators

Maintenance staff (maintenance activities & loading new and unloading spent material)

CANSOLV Unit (novel)

AGRU (x)

AGEU (MDEA)

Acute: Corrosive, irritating Chronic: Amines may react with nitrites and form nitrosamines which are carcinogenic.

Include in chemical approval process (CAP). Develop and implement a SHOC card.

Rich amines considered sour and can contain H2S and SO2.

ALARP efforts for BA above.


Wax inhibitors Production Operators

Maintenance staff

Well heads

Chemical storage area

Chemical approval process (CAP). SHOC card.

As production chemical above. PPE, competency and

procedures.

Oxygen scavenger (Ammonium bisulphite) and hydrazine(?))

Production Operators Maintenance staff

IBC’s (storage area) Waste water treatment

plant

Outlet of sour water stripper

As above Identify a safer option for

hydrazine


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Biocides (Sodium hypochlorite)


Maintenance staff (pump maintenance)

Water inlet and treatment systems

Fire water storage system (batch treatment)

IBC’s (storage area)

Acute: Corrosive and harmful by skin, inhalation and ingestion

Biocides cleared through CAP.

Use of chlorine in addition to UV treatment (holding tanks).

SHOC card. PPE, competency and

procedures.

Demulsifier (PT3265)

Production Operators Maintenance staff

Skid package: Upstream RMS

ALARP demonstration same as scale inhibitors.


Tetrafluoroethane (R134a)


Maintenance staff

Chilling & cooling system

Acute: Overexposure may cause dizziness, loss of concentration. At higher levels CNS depression, cardiac arrhythmia; asphyxiation when vapors displace air

Closed loop system.

An indirect chilling of the process with water to prevent potential for fire impacting onto the refrigerating system (reducing potential for release of hydrofluoric acid).

Verify that the cooling system that uses direct process cooling will be protected with passive fire protection where required (during the passive fire protection study)

Design accommodates recovery of refrigerant during turn around activities (no venting).

Verify that the process for initial fill (first fill) will reduce frequency of connection between bottles and connection point.


Iron Sulphide Maintenance staff (also during pigging)

Accumulate in plant Acute: Eye and respiratory irritant

Extensive amount of CRA (corrosion resistant alloy) in on

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plot design and GRE (glass re-enforced epoxy) piping for the flow lines.


Solid activated alumina catalyst

Maintenance staff

Service contractors

Sulfur recovery unit Acute: Powder is eye and respiratory irritant


Hydraulic Oils Production Operators & Assistance

Maintenance staff

Chemical injection skids

Lube skids compressors

Well pads Wells safe guarding

systems

Acute: Mild irritant Chronic: Prolonged skin contact may cause dermatitis

Trolleys for lifting.

Pumps for decanting.

Dedicated storage areas. PPE, procedures and

competence.

Acids: Sulfuric Production Operators CANSOLV Unit (pump system for injection to scrubber)- initial activation of CANSOLV solvent

IBC (storage)

Water treatment plant (DEMIN water)

Acute: Corrosive, causes burns to skin, eyes and respiratory system Chronic: Carcinogenic

Safety shower/eye wash stations in facility design where risk of exposure exists.

Chemical compatibility study.

Chemical warehouse designed to accommodate separation of incompatible chemicals.

Reduced manual handling (large containers vs. smaller containers).


Acids: Hydrochloric

RO Plant Operator

Sour water stripper & RO plant for PH adjustment

IBC’s (storage)

Acute: Corrosive, causes burns to skin, eyes and respiratory system

As above

Citric acid Water treatment plant (DEMIN water) IBC’s (storage)

As above

Nitrogen Maintenance Staff Production Operators (gas

Nitrogen supply system for purging on plot vs

Acute: Simple asphyxiant, frost burns

Nitrogen purged through hard pipe system (near to vessel) and

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tests, purging, confined space)

piping in vessels

Nitrogen cylinders at well pads for purging piping

Suction strainer change out for pumps (maintenance)

Filter change outs (eg amine, desalting etc)-maintenance

Equipment isolation (spectacle blind)-maintenance

Vessel entry –maintenance

Nitrogen trucks for supply of large volumes during shut downs and re-instatements

vented to flare (also during commissioning).

Fixed connection points.

Hardstands for N2 cylinders (off plot HOLD).


Carbon Monoxide All site staff Gas turbine generators, power boilers, regen gas heater, combustion sources

Trenching, CS Entry

Acute: Asphyxiants, headaches, nausea, dizziness, confusion and hallucinations Chronic: Teratogen


Fumes/fugitive emissions

All site staff

Maintenance staff (working around flues with incinerators; working on platforms with poor ventilation)

Process leak sources/valves/flanges/etc

Acute: Eye and respiratory irritation

Confirm a fugitive emissions monitoring program in accordance with SP 1005.


Radon (from gas phase) Concentration levels very low;

Maintenance staff Low risk – not considered a threat for YK

Acute: Chronic: Cancer


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no accumulation in process stream; on depressurizing of vessels eliminated.

Particulates (total, not classified)

All Work in desert Shamal

Acute: Upper respiratory and eye irritation Chronic: Potential effects on lung function

Vehicles fitted with AC. Cranes, forklifts, excavators etc

have cabins fitted with AC.

Work stoppages (MOPO).

Provide disposable dust masks. Dampening of road surfaces,

during excavation etc where reasonably practicable.


Mercaptan Maintenance Work on MSU (changing mol sieve 4 yr frequency)

Working on regeneration gas compressor

Acute: Nuisance odor, nausea Chronic: None known

Activity under PTW.

Adequate ventilation supplied. PPE, procedures and

competence.

Condensate Production Operators Maintenance staff (crude

and condensate handling systems)

All off plot production gathering facilities

Inlet separation (Unit 30)

Condensate Stabilization Plant (Unit 33)

LP separation (Unit 31)

Oil storage and pumping (Unit 34)

Sampling and analysis

Acute: Narcotic vapour can cause headaches, dizziness, drowsiness, nausea, respiratory and skin irritant Chronic: Benzene is carcinogenic (leukemia, nervous system damage)

Good engineering design practice in accordance with CP117 and GU611 and SP 1190 and SP 1078.

Equipment and lines labeled PDO SP 12 84, SP 1166 and HFE DEP 30 00 60 21.

Natural ventilation. Lab design as per DEP

34.17.10.31.

Design of sampling equipment and sampling points minimizes personal exposure risks.

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Asphyxiants gases from breathing air

All workers using cascade system

Breathing air supply from cascade system

Acute: Headaches, nausea, potential fatalities Chronic: Respiratory illness

Safe guarding system for the breathing air supply. See utilities SGM.

System provides safe air for breathing air purposes (CSA Standard Z180 Compressed Breathing Air and Systems).

Synthetic Fibres Maintenance Piping insulation

Refractory fibres

Acute: Irritant –skin and eyes Chronic: Cat 2A carcinogen

Asbestos containing materials are prohibited in design and procurement.


H2S Scavenger Operators Maintenance

Sulfur degasser bypass line (unit 47)

Effects will be substance specific and will require confirmation for chemical species

ALARP demonstration - see production chemicals.

Caustics Operators Maintenance

CANSOLV unit caustic polishing and SO2 Absorbent purification unit

Acute: Corrosive to skin and eyes. Respiratory irritant, may cause pulmonary edema. Chronic: Corrosive effect on skin and respiratory system.


Antifoams Operators Maintenance

CANSOLV

AGRU

Effects will be substance specific and will require confirmation for chemical species


Documents

Health Risk Assessment Report for - PDO 2014/… · Health Risk Assessment Report for ... Gas dehydration and RSH removal ... process equipment; oil stabilizer on export line