Health and Safety Executive

Health and Safety Executive

Energy Sector - EU/UK Regulatory and Legal framework, Safety CasesKevin MyersDirector General Regulation

Health and Safety Executive, UK

EU-US Joint Conference on OSH

Fort Worth, Texas 17-19 September 2015

Background principles

• 28 Member States in EU

• Each has its own history and OSH legal framework

• EU OSH Legislation is largely expressed through “Directives”…….

• Developed from experience of incidents eg Seveso, Deepwater Horizon

• Which are transcribed into National legislation………

• And in doing so inevitably reflect history, legal system, philosophy………

• So I will cover this through the UK perspective

Fundamentals of UK’s OSH system

• A (largely) goal-setting regulatory framework• The business/employer is responsible for identifying

and managing risk and establishing the appropriate control measures - not the Regulator

• This outcome-focused approach is underpinned by risk assessment to determine the appropriate controls

• But the important thing is delivery of the controls – not the piece(s) of paper!

Energy Sector

• Traditional OSH activities – working with electricity, falls from height etc– failures are comparably high frequency, but

‘low’ consequence– tend to regulate through core OSH regulations

• “major hazard” activities - Oil and gas exploration, refining etc - failures are comparably low frequency but high

consequence- tend to regulate through ‘safety case’ regimes

• Emerging technologies– under development?!

‘Traditional’ OSH risks I

Covered by a ‘Framework’ Directive setting out general principles of prevention:

• hierarchy of risks – avoid, evaluate, control at source

• adapt the work to the individual and prioritise collective over individual protective measures

• adapt to technical progress

• developing a coherent overall prevention policy

• consult/engage with the workforce and provide adequate training

• workers to co-operate, use machinery and ppe etc correctly and notify employer of shortcomings and /or danger

‘Traditional’ OSH risks II

Framework Directive supported by over 20 “Daughter” Directives – either sector or cross-cutting hazard-based

• ppe, manual handling, display screen equipment, vibration, noise, work equipment

• chemical agents, carcinogens, asbestos, biological agents, explosive atmospheres

• construction

• oil and gas extraction

• mining

Major Drivers for Change

Technology Manageme

nt Systems

BehaviouralHuman Factors?

Time

Acc

idents

Risk

Time

“Safety Case” Regime

• Businesses need the regulator’s agreement or consent before they can start operation:– Safety Cases/Safety Reports /Licences– Often this includes the regulator’s agreement on

aspects of the design, construction and commissioning of the plant as well

• Dependant on the business/employer demonstrating that the risks are controlled ‘as low as is reasonably practicable’ - ALARP.

• Regulator’s role is to assess and verify that the case for safety has been made and the risks effectively managed and controlled.

Inspection

• Risk based and targeted

• Takes account of company performance

• But also topic-based

• Primary purpose is to verify that the control measures described in Safety Case/Report actually exist on the ground and are resilient

Investigation

• High public expectations

• Hold accountable those responsible

• Establish root causes:– Technical– Managerial– Cultural

• Learn and share lessons

IncidentHazard

Incident

RealityIdeal

Hazard

Swiss Cheese Model of Defence

Swiss Cheese Model of Defence

Advantages/Disadvantages of Safety Case Regime

• No prescription - so flexibility and alternative ways of reaching the desired outcome

• Enables – indeed encourages - innovation• Need for good guidance, industry codes and

standards to establish good practice in achieving compliance

• Need for an on-going dialogue with industry and its involvement in developing and owning guidance and standards

• The role of the regulator• The business value of the safety case• It is no guarantee of safe production/operation

Key Lessons from UK experience

• It’s often the routine day to day tasks and activities that go wrong not the unusual/obscure

• There are no new incidents just new people repeating the same mistakes

• Tomorrow’s major accident is lurking in the organisation today. A seismic quake is always preceded by warning signs

• Importance of leading indicators

• No clear sense of vulnerability. Belief in the infallibility of control system

• Regulatory Codes can at best only be a imperfect fit to risk management – not a guarantee of safety

• What can go wrong?

• Where within the facility will these challenges to integrity be most critical?

• What systems are in place to manage those challenges?

• What does success look like?

• What are the critical activities which must work right to deliver the intended outcome?

HSE publication HSG254

Thank you for listening!