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AUGUST, 2002
PREPARED BY
HAZARD STUDYFOR THE BULK POL FACILITIES
IN THE PORT OF ANCHORAGE AREAANCHORAGE, ALASKA
Report to
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Golder Associates Inc. 1750 Abbott Road, Suite 200 Anchorage, AK USA 99507 Telephone: (907) 344-6001 Fax: (907) 344-6011
OFFICES ACROSS ASIA, AUSTRALASIA, EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, SOUTH AMERICA
REPORT ON
HAZARD STUDY FOR THE BULK POL FACILITIES
IN THE POA AREA
Submitted to:
Municipality of Anchorage
POL Task Force August 9, 2002
DISTRIBUTION: 4 Copies Municipality of Anchorage, Anchorage, Alaska, Douglas Askerman 1 Copy Municipality of Anchorage, Anchorage, Alaska, Jacques Boutet 4 Copies Government Hill Community Council, Anchorage Alaska, Steve Gerlek 4 Copies Chevron, Phil Wetmore 1 Copy Williams, Anchorage, Alaska, Belinda Breaux 1 Copy AFSC, Anchorage, Alaska, Tom Mushovic 1 Copy Tesoro, Anchorage, Alaska, Ron Noel 1 Copy Alaska Railroad Corporation, Anchorage, Alaska, Ernie Piper 1 Copy Golder Associates Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, Mark Musial 1 Copy Golder Associates Ltd., Calgary, Brian Griffin
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
ABSTRACT
ES 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................ES-1 ES 1.1 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................ES-1 ES 1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE..............................................................................ES-2 ES 1.3 SCOPING AND PUBLIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT (PHASE I) ....................ES-4 ES-1.4 RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT (PHASE II) ............................................ES-7 ES-1.5 RISK MITIGATION PLAN (PHASE III)..........................................................ES-8 MEASURES EVALUATED...............................................................................................ES-9 COST BENEFIT SURVEY AND RECOMMENDED PLAN..........................................ES-11 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY..................................................................................ES-14 LIMITATIONS..................................................................................................................ES-14
1. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1 1.1 BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................1 1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE ..............................................................................................2 1.3 SCOPING AND PUBLIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT (PHASE I) ....................................3 1.4 RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT (PHASE II) ............................................................4 1.5 RISK MITIGATION PLAN (PHASE III) ..........................................................................4 1.6 REPORT ORGANIZATION ..............................................................................................5
2. STUDY FACILITIES................................................................................................................6 2.1 FACILITIES DESCRIPTION.............................................................................................6 2.2 FACILITIES OPERATION ................................................................................................7 2.3 HISTORICAL INCIDENTS ...............................................................................................8
2.3.1 Records Review ........................................................................................................8 2.3.2 Data Summary ........................................................................................................11
2.4 AIR QUALITY MONITORING.......................................................................................15 2.5 SITE CONTAMINATION HEALTH AND ECOLOGICAL RISKS ..............................16 2.6 SITE TOUR.......................................................................................................................17 2.7 FIRE FIGHTING AND EVACUATION PLAN ..............................................................17
3. LAND USE REGULATIONS.................................................................................................18 3.1 BACKGROUND...............................................................................................................18 3.2 CODES AND STANDARDS ...........................................................................................18
3.2.1 Fire Codes ...............................................................................................................18 3.2.2 Industry Standards ..................................................................................................20
3.3 GUIDELINE REVIEW.....................................................................................................20 3.3.1 American Planning Association..............................................................................20 3.3.2 HUD Guidelines......................................................................................................20 3.3.3 US Coast Guard ......................................................................................................21
3.4 SELECTION OF COMMUNITY SPECIFIC REGULATIONS ......................................21 3.4.1 Denver, Colorado....................................................................................................22 3.4.2 Coos Bay, Oregon...................................................................................................22 3.4.3 Fairbanks, Alaska....................................................................................................22 3.4.4 Long Beach, California...........................................................................................23 3.4.5 Fort Collins, Colorado ............................................................................................23
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3.4.6 1996 Review by the Municipality of Anchorage ....................................................23 3.5 SUMMARY OF SETBACK REQUIREMENTS .............................................................23
4. PUBLIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT (PHASE I).....................................................................25 4.1 METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................25
4.1.1 Risk Assessment Approach.....................................................................................25 4.1.2 Definition of a Hazard Scenario..............................................................................26 4.1.3 Study Risk Matrix ...................................................................................................27
4.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .........................................................................................29 4.3 RISK ESTIMATION ........................................................................................................35
4.3.1 Consequence Analysis ............................................................................................35 4.3.2 Frequency Analysis.................................................................................................39 4.3.3 Risk Estimates.........................................................................................................43
4.4 RISK RANKING ..............................................................................................................43
5. RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT (PHASE II) .................................................................45 5.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES....................................................45 5.2 CURRENT OR PLANNED RISK MITIGATION MEASURES.....................................46
6. RISK MITIGATION PLAN (PHASE III)...............................................................................55 6.1 METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................55 6.2 HIGHER RISK HAZARD SCENARIOS.........................................................................55 6.3 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES AND ALTERNATIVES ..........................................56
6.3.1 Measure 1) – Continue to Implement Current Measures ........................................57 6.3.2 Measure 2) – Implement Planned Measures ...........................................................57 6.3.3 Measure 3) - Ongoing Risk Communication ..........................................................57 6.3.4 Measure 4) - Buffer Zones ......................................................................................59 6.3.5 Measure 5) - Engineering Controls.........................................................................61 6.3.6 Measure 6) - Quantitative Risk and Engineering Assessment ................................61 6.3.7 Measures 7) and 8) - Risk Elimination ...................................................................62
6.4 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS...........................................................................................63 6.5 RISK MITIGATION PLAN .............................................................................................67 6.6 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY .................................................................................70
6.6.1 Continue to Implement Current Measures ..............................................................70 6.6.2 Implement Planned Measures .................................................................................70 6.6.3 Implement Recommended Alternate Measures ......................................................71 6.6.4 Limitations ..............................................................................................................72
7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....................................................................................................73
8. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................74
TABLES FIGURES APPENDICES
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 POL Facility Operations in the POA Area .......................................................................9 Table 2.2 Incident Data Summary (From Appendix B) .................................................................12 Table 2.3 Spill And Fire Incident Distribution (Number of Incidents) ..........................................14 Table 3.1 Summary of Setback Requirements In Codes, Standards, and Guidance ......................24 Table 3.2 Setback Requirements for Tanks in Selected Communities...........................................24 Table 4.1 Study Risk Matrix ..........................................................................................................28 Table 4.2 Hazard Scenario Worksheet ...........................................................................................30 Table 4.3 Summary of Fire Hazard Scenario Frequency Estimates...............................................40 Table 4.4 Summary of Consequence Severity Estimates ...............................................................41 Table 4.5 Hazard Study Risk Profile ..............................................................................................44 Table 5.1 Checklist to Identify Risk Mitigation Measures.............................................................47 Table 5.2 Current or Planned Risk Mitigation Measures ...............................................................48 Table 6.1 Higher Risk Hazard Scenarios .......................................................................................56 Table 6.2 Summary of Cost Benefit Analysis ................................................................................64 Table 6.3 Ranking of Mitigation Cost Benefit ...............................................................................68
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Project Location Map Figure 1.2 Hazard Study Area and POL Operators Figure 2.1 Schematic of Petroleum Product Flows Through the Terminals Figure 2.2 POL Facilities and Surrounding Land Use Figure 4.1 Hazard Scenario Schematic Figure 4.2 Generic POL Release Consequence Event Tree Figure 4.3 Example Fire Modeling Results Figure 5.1 Risk Mitigation Scenario
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A Facility Layout Schematics for Each POL Operator Appendix B Historical Spill Incidents and Fire Incidents Appendix C Site Photographs Appendix D Description of ARCHIE Consequence Model Appendix E Consequence Modeling Appendix F Frequency Assessment
Golder Associates
ABSTRACT
Hazard Study for the Bulk POL Facilities
in the Port of Anchorage Area
In response to public concerns regarding the petroleum storage (POL) facilities, the Municipality of Anchorage formed a Task Force and commissioned Golder Associates Inc. to carry out a hazard study addressing the following questions: 1. Is there a public hazard (the potential for harm from fires) associated with the POL
facilities?
Golder – There is a risk from potential fires at the POL facilities that is defined by eighteen representative hazard scenarios having event frequencies ranging from 1 in <10 years to 1 in >10,000 years and event consequences that range from “site fire safety issues” to” public exposure to fatality from a fire”. 2. If there is a public hazard, what can be done to mitigate the risk associated with the
public hazard, if anything?
Golder - POL operators are implementing codes, regulations, and operating procedures to reduce public risk. However, a number of additional measures are outlined in the report to further reduce the frequency and/or consequences associated with the fire hazard scenarios (Table 6.3). 3. What is the cost benefit of implementing mitigation measures?
Golder - Comparison of mitigation costs and benefits (i.e., relative decrease in risk per dollar spent) indicates that the optimum use of POL operator and community resources involves implementation of the current and planned mitigation measures, along with additional mitigation measures addressing the reduction of both fire frequency and consequence (p. 67 and Table 6.3). A Phased approached is recommended for the additional mitigation measures to first implement those required to better define risk and cost.
Many industry experts, third party reviewers, and concerned citizens provided input to this study. The resulting risk profile shows what Golder Associates consider to be a small public risk, because of prevention measures in place and the existing distance between the POL facilities and adjacent neighborhoods described in the report. However, it is recognized that different conclusions may be drawn. In order to minimize potential differences between stakeholders, it is important that dialog continues between the public, industry and government on future plans, projects, and changes at the POL facilities. While addressing the fire hazards associated with operation of the POL facilities in the POA area may serve to mitigate other hazards present, it is important to note that these other hazards were not specifically addressed by this study, as described in the report.
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ES 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ES 1.1 BACKGROUND
The handling and distribution of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) through bulk terminals at
the Port of Anchorage (POA) has been carried out since before 1950. However, as POL
operations have grown over the years, so has the interest of the nearby Government Hill
neighborhood and the general public in public health and safety consequences associated with
these facilities. A number of historic and recent incidents have raised public concern that some
mitigation or control of risk is required to guide both existing and future neighborhood and POL
development. In response to public concerns, the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA) formed a
Task Force to address three questions regarding the POL facilities:
• Is there a public hazard associated with the POL facilities?
• If there is a public hazard, what can be done to mitigate the risk associated with the public
hazard, if any?
• What is the cost benefit of implementing mitigation measures?
The Task Force is comprised of the following stakeholders:
• Municipality of Anchorage.
• Government Hill Community Council.
• POL Operators - Anchorage Fueling and Service Company (AFSC); Chevron Products
Company (Chevron); Tesoro Alaska Company, Anchorage Terminals #1 and #2 (Tesoro);
and Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. (Williams).
• Alaska Railroad Corporation (ARRC).
To assist their investigation, the MOA, with oversight by the Task Force, commissioned Golder
Associates Inc. (Golder) to carry out a Hazard Study for the bulk POL facilities in the POA area.
This study was divided into the following three phases that generally correspond to the three
questions posed to the Task Force:
• Phase I Scoping and Public Hazard Assessment.
• Phase II Risk Mitigation Alternates Assessment.
• Phase III Risk Mitigation Plan.
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ES 1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The objectives for the Hazard Study are to identify public hazards from POL facilities in the POA
area, estimate and rank the associated risks, and evaluate potential risk mitigation measures. The
study area (Figure ES-1) includes the POL bulk terminal facilities located in the POA area,
bounded by the C Street/Ocean Dock Rd. interchange to the south, Government Hill to the east,
Gull Avenue and the POL marine terminals to the north, and Knik Arm to the west.
The specific objective for the Hazard Study is to evaluate public health and safety risks to the
adjacent residential neighborhood of Government Hill posed by fires at the POL facilities.
Additional public receptors potentially exposed to POL risks include other facilities and activities
nearby the POA such as Air Force housing, industrial workers in the POL area, and people
traversing the POA area. The risks to these additional public receptors are not specifically
evaluated in this study, but the Task Force can evaluate these more generally based on the risk
results for the Government Hill residents.
The scope of work carried out to achieve the study objectives included the following tasks:
1. Data collation and tour of facilities.
2. Hazard identification.
3. Safeguard evaluation.
4. Code compliance review.
5. Accident scenario annual frequency analysis.
6. Accident scenario public consequence analysis.
7. Public risk estimation and ranking.
8. Alternative risk mitigation measures.
9. Risk benefits and costs.
10. Risk mitigation plan.
11. Stakeholder communication.
12. Reporting.
TITLE
DESIGN
PROJECT No. FILE No.
CADD
CHECK
REVIEW
SCALE
PROJECT
REV.
013-5504.001
~1"=900' 0
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
HAZARD STUDY AREAAND POL OPERATORS
AIRPHOTO_ES1.CDR
FIGURE ES-1
APPROXIMATE SCALE, FEET
0 900 1800
REFERENCE:Aerial photography provided by AEROMAP U.S.of Anchorage, dated 9/20/2001
Port of Anchorage (POA)Port of Anchorage (POA)
ElmendorfAir Force BaseElmendorfAir Force Base
POAVY (Spaghetti Farm)POAVY (Spaghetti Farm)
Ship CreekShip Creek
Alaska RailroadAlaska Railroad
Government Hill CommunityGovernment Hill Community
Former Defense Fuels SiteFormer Defense Fuels Site
Bluff RoadBluff Road
Squirrel CageSquirrel Cage
Ocean
Do
ck
Rd
.O
cean
Do
ck
Rd
.
STUDY AREASTUDY AREA
Tesoro #1Tesoro #1
ChevronChevron
AFSCAFSC
WilliamsWilliams
Tesoro #2Tesoro #2
POA MarineTerminal
POA MarineTerminal
CS
treet
Bri
dg
eC
Str
eet
Bri
dg
e
Loop Road
Loop Road
MRM 01/02
CAV 02/02
BG 08/02
MRM 08/02
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ES 1.3 SCOPING AND PUBLIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT (PHASE I)
Phase I of the Hazard Study documented historical issues and provided a basis for the Task Force
to evaluate potential public risks. The work used risk analysis methods to identify accident
hazard scenarios, estimate associated risks, and rank the risk results. Public safety risks
associated with accidental fire or explosion at the POL facilities in the POA area were defined as
a measure of both the likelihood and the severity of harm to nearby people and structures.
Although safety was the primary focus, the potential for damage to public property was also
addressed. Environmental risks from an accidental spill that does not lead to a fire or explosion
are dealt with through the Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plans, that are regularly
updated and submitted by the POL terminal operators to the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation (ADEC). Public health risks from air quality issues, such as chronic exposure to
fugitive emissions from terminal operations, are discussed based on historical studies in the area,
but detailed evaluation was not included in the scope. Human health and ecological risks from
POA area contamination were also documented from previous studies but not included in this
study.
Hazard scenarios leading to a fire or explosion were first identified through a “What If” analysis
based on industry and site experience. A workshop was held with Task Force members to
incorporate stakeholder experience in developing the hazard scenarios. A total of 18
representative hazard scenarios describing the range of fire risks associated with the POL
facilities were identified as follows:
1. Liquid leak from storage tank inlet or outlet piping
2. Vapor escaping from liquid leak from storage tank
3. Liquid leak from tank bottom
4. Liquid spill during tank filling
5. Rupture of tank inlet or outlet piping
6. Catastrophic tank/piping/valve rupture
7. Catastrophic tank rupture (toppling or buckling) from earthquake
8. Catastrophic tank rupture from sabotage
9. Large leak from pipeline valve
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⇑ Increasing Risk
10. Large leak from pipeline pumps
11. Pipeline leak
12. Underground pipeline rupture
13. Pipeline rupture from earthquake (included in Scenario 7 above)
14. Spill while loading trucks
15. Spill from truck rollover
16. Spill while unloading rail cars
17. Spill from rail car derailment
18. Spill from loading/unloading at marine terminal
All of the above hazard scenarios were only assessed for the fraction of spill incidents that lead to
fire consequences. Risks were then estimated using the study Risk Matrix approach based on
order-of-magnitude levels of frequency and public consequence. The frequency and public
consequence indices for the study Risk Matrix were developed specifically for this study in the
Task Force workshop. The consequence index defines public exposure to evacuation, injury, or
fatality, and this exposure is the potential for fire consequences to reach residences. Actual harm
would only occur if residents were home and in harm’s way during the fire, therefore actual harm
would occur at annual probabilities much less than those shown in the study Risk Matrix. Fire
risks for each principal hazard scenario were estimated by locating all scenarios within this Risk
Matrix. Finally, risks were ranked according to three levels in the Risk Matrix that were also
developed in the Task Force workshop.
The study Risk Matrix shown in Table ES-1 includes a three-level ranking system highlighted by
shading. An estimated risk profile for the POL facilities in the POA area is overlaid on this
ranking system. Risks estimated for the identified hazard scenarios may therefore be ranked as
follows:
6 Hazard Scenarios (1, 4, 6, 7&13, 8, 14)
11 Hazard Scenarios (2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18)
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The 17 hazard scenarios listed in Table ES-1 have been located in the study Risk Matrix
according to their estimated risks. Hazard Scenario 13 was included with Hazard Scenario 7
because they have a common cause (earthquakes) and therefore a total of 17 risks were estimated.
Hazard Scenarios 4, 6, 7 & 13 and 8 are shown in brackets on the Risk Matrix because their
frequency estimates are expected to be lower than Level 1. The cumulative risk for each fire
consequence is shown at the bottom of the study Risk Matrix. For example, the cumulative risk
of a small site fire (Consequence Severity Level A) is approximately one every 2 years.
The study Risk Matrix presents a risk profile of the POL facilities in the POA area that provided a
basis for Phases II and III of the Hazard Study. The discrete scenarios shown in the Risk Matrix
are a representation of many different combinations of frequency and consequence that present
less risk than the scenarios depicted.
ES-1.4 RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT (PHASE II)
Phase II of the Hazard Study examined risk mitigation strategies and documented alternative risk
mitigation measures. A second workshop forum was used to identify the significant current and
planned risk mitigation measures associated with each of the 18 Hazard Scenarios. Task Force
participants in the second workshop included all POL operators and the Municipality of
Anchorage.
Risks may be mitigated at any stage of a hazard scenario by implementing measures to reduce the
frequency, the severity of consequence, or both of these attributes of risk. Four different
strategies for mitigating risk were identified as failure prevention, safeguards, impact limitation
and receptor protection or relocation. The most effective risk mitigation strategy is first to
prevent or reduce the likelihood of hazardous accidents through application of good engineering
practice and use of industry standards and then second, be prepared to respond and mitigate the
consequences. Examples of industry standards include API 653 and 2610 to mitigate terminal
and tank facility risks. Diversity of risk mitigation measures may also be an effective overall
strategy when a number of measures are applied at different stages of the hazard scenario.
Over 100 risk mitigation measures currently being implemented at the POL facilities were
collated according to both prevention and consequence mitigation measures for all of the hazard
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scenarios identified in Phase I of the study. These measures are based on both industry
experience and the specific experience of operations in the POA area. Industry experience is
incorporated through codes and practices and through bulletins, alerts, lessons learned and
symposia. POA area experience is incorporated through the implementation of measures to
prevent re-occurrence of past incidents and through incident management systems. These
measures are expected to reduce the risk of all hazard scenarios shown in the study Risk Matrix,
since the risk estimates are based on pre-1990 industry data. Since 1990, industry has continued
to mitigate risk based on the historical performance.
ES-1.5 RISK MITIGATION PLAN (PHASE III)
A plan for the implementation of mitigation measures was developed using a risk based
approach. The risk profile for the POL facilities presented in Table ES-1 from Phase I provided
the base assessment. Seven hazard scenarios associated with higher risks were selected by the
Task Force for incorporation in the Phase III risk mitigation plan as summarized in Table ES-2.
Table ES-2
Higher Risk Hazard Scenarios
Risk Estimate (See Table ES-1) Hazard Scenario
Frequency Consequence Severity 1) Tanks - Small Pipe Leak 4 (1 event in 10 years) A (Site Safety Issue)
14) Trucks - Loading Spill 4 (1 event in 10 years) A (Site Safety Issue)
4) Tanks - Overfilling Spill 1 (1 event in 10,000 years) C (Public Exposure to Injury)
6) Tanks - Catastrophic Failure 1 (1 event in 10,000 years) D (Public Exposure to Fatality)
7 & 13) Tanks - Large Quake Spill 1 (1 event in 10,000 years) D (Public Exposure to Fatality)
8) Tanks – Sabotage 1 (1 event in 10,000 years) D (Public Exposure to Fatality)
This approach to select higher risk hazard scenarios prioritizes the allocation of resources to gain
the most effective benefit in terms of risk reduction.
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MEASURES EVALUATED
The risk mitigation measures identified in Phase II were further evaluated for the higher risk
scenarios, along with six alternate measures encompassing intermediate levels of mitigation as
well as the boundary condition of risk elimination. Although the focus of Phase III is the higher
risk scenarios, implementation of the phase III measures for higher risk hazard scenarios will also
reduce the risks of the remaining scenarios. Eight measures were evaluated as follows:
1) Continue to Implement Current Measures Identified in Phase II. These represent the
Operators’ present and ongoing investment in code compliance, efforts to improve safety,
and in many cases “best practices” for dealing with the hazard scenarios considered. The
current measures also reflect expenditures for both prevention and consequence
mitigation, which is a desirable feature of risk mitigation strategy, as previously discussed
in Section 5, Phase II.
2) Implement Planned Measures Identified in Phase II. These are measures identified in
Phase II that were being planned for implementation this year at some terminals.
3) Ongoing Risk Communication. Ongoing Risk Communication is the first of the
alternate mitigation measures considered. The measure includes the following elements.
• 3a) – Formal monitoring of risks by operators on a regular (yearly) basis.
• 3b) – Certification by terminal managers that operations abide by required
regulations and that risk is managed to industry standards.
• 3c) – Formalize fire response tabletop exercises.
• 3d) – Form Stakeholder Advisory Group.
• 3e) – Evaluate major new developments when they are proposed for the POA area in
relation to the risk profile presented in the study risk profile.
• 3f) – Benchmark comparisons of Study Risk Profile with other terminals.
4) Buffer Zones. The creation of a buffer zone or setback distance between the POL
facilities and the public can decrease the public risk identified in Columns C and D in the
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Study Risk Profile (Table ES-1). Rather than further decrease the scenario frequency, the
buffer zone approach to risk mitigation would reduce (or eliminate) the consequence
severity in a manner similar to that used by HUD. The following were evaluated.
• 4a) – Minimum Buffer (fatality exposure zone) – move 4 residences.
• 4b) – Buffer (injury exposure zone) move 10 tanks.
• 4c) – Buffer (fatality/injury exposure zone) – move 10 residences
• 4d) – Buffer (injury exposure zone) regrade terminal sites to impoundment basin.
5) Engineering Controls. Engineering controls serve to either limit the width of the
exposure zone or reduce the frequency to a very low level through measures that can be
added to the existing tank facilities.
• 5a) – Engineering Controls, Install annular pontoon roofs with full seal in tanks near
residences.
• 5b) – Engineering Controls, Keep products with lower thermal radiation effects in
tanks near residences.
• 5c) – Engineering Controls, Install new industry measures that are not yet part of
regulations.
6) Quantitative Risk and Engineering Assessment. These measures involve performing
additional studies to prepare explicit comparisons of risk and cost-benefit.
• 6a) – Comparative Risk Analysis.
• 6b) – Detailed Cost Benefit Analysis.
• 6c) – Site Specific Seismic Evaluation.
7) Move 150 Residences and commercial properties west of Loop Road. Moving the
public receptors west of Loop Road was included as a boundary condition of risk
elimination for the nearby residences in Government Hill.
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8) Move Terminals. Moving the terminals can eliminate risk to the public identified in this
study, but the move also transfers environmental risks to another area and may transfer
public risk depending on the new location for the terminal. The 11 hazard scenarios with
risks located in Column A of the Study Risk Profile (Table 4.5) are site safety issues and
would not be impacted directly from moving the terminals (however there may be indirect
impacts such as decreased third party traffic, etc).
The risk of Hazard Scenario 8) included sabotage. Given that industry data described in the
report indicates that POL terminals are not typically targets for sabotage, and that ongoing
vulnerability assessments for the port area are being carried out by the operators and government
authorities, no further cost benefit analysis was performed for this study.
COST BENEFIT SURVEY AND RECOMMENDED PLAN
An order of magnitude analysis of costs and benefits for risk reduction was carried out to provide
a basis for a recommended risk mitigation plan. The Study Risk Profile was developed for order
of magnitude estimates to facilitate the use of such qualitative analysis. Costs were estimated
from operator judgements and easily available references. Risk reduction benefits were
qualitatively estimated based on historical performance and professional judgement.
Each measure was assigned an estimated cost and reduction in risk in order to make a qualitative
comparison of cost-benefit and provide a basis for recommending further mitigation efforts.
Table ES-3 shows each risk mitigation measure ranked according to cost. We did not rank
Measures 1 or 2 because these are already budgeted by the operators and either currently
implemented or being planned for implementation. Some measures mitigate risk by helping to
prevent the hazard scenario from developing, (reduce frequency) while others serve to reduce the
consequences, and still others do both, which is also shown in Table ES-3.
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Table ES-3
Ranking of Risk Mitigation Cost-Benefit
Risk Mitigation Measure Estimated Cost
Reduce Frequency
Reduce Consequence
Current and Planned Measures 1) Continue current measures in Table
5.2 for Prevention $ 490,000 Yes Yes
1) Continue current measures in Table 5.2 for Consequence Mitigation
$ 200,000 Yes Yes
2) Implement planned measures in Table 5.2 (where not already implemented)
$ 70,000 Yes Yes
Alternate Measures 6) Quantitative Risk and Engineering
Assessment $ 130,000 Yes Yes
3) Ongoing Risk Communication $ 160, 000 Yes Yes 5c) Engineering Controls – Install new
industry measures that are not yet part of regulations
$ 400,000 Yes Yes
5a) Engineering Controls – Install annular pontoon roofs with full seal in tanks near residences
$ 500,000 Yes Yes
4a) Buffer (injury exposure zone) – move 4 residences
$ 2,000,000 No Yes
5b) Engineering Controls – Keep products with lower thermal radiation effects in tanks closest to residences
$ 2,000,000 No Yes
4d) Buffer (injury exposure zone) – regrade sites to impoundment basin
$ 2,000,000 No Yes
4c ) Buffer (fatality/injury exposure zone) – move 10 residences
$ 4,500,000 No Yes
4b) Buffer (injury exposure zone) – move 10 tanks
$ 40,000,000 No Yes
7) Move residences west of Loop Road (1,500-2,000 ft buffer)
$ 55,000,000 No Yes
8) Move terminals (>2,000 ft buffer) $ 340,000,000 No Yes
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The recommended risk mitigation plan includes implementing the current or planned measures
(Measures 1 and 2), as well as the alternate measures aimed at improving allocation of resources
for both prevention and consequence mitigation (Measures 3, 5a, 5c, and 6), as noted below.
• Continue to Implement Current Measures (Measure 1). These should be continued, since
they are already budgeted for and being done.
• Implement Planned Measures (Measure 2). These measures are being planned and
budgeted for, and should be implemented.
• Alternate Measures (Measures 3, 5a, 5c, and 6). The additional risk mitigation included in
this group represent approaches for managing risk according to the risk profile represented in
the study Risk Matrix. Decisions about future terminal operations and other developments in
the Port Area can now incorporate public risk as described in this report. Formalizing these
additional measures would have the advantage of moving some of that process into the public
arena, which will serve to better involve and integrate the various emergency response
agencies and improve public awareness of the risks posed.
Implementation of the measures providing focused consequence mitigation (Measures 4a, 4b, 4c,
4d, and 5b) is not recommended at this time. These measures are an intermediate level of hazard
reduction between what is currently being done and eliminating the risk. They cover a wide
range of costs ($2,000,000 to $40,000,000 each) and in many instances are very focused in their
application. However, the need for implementing these measures may be modified based on the
results from some of the work in the recommended plan. Of course, there may be other social or
political reasons for selecting measures that are not recommended in this cost-benefit analysis.
The risk elimination measures (Measures 7 and 8) have high costs associated with them, as well
as some degree of uncertainty as to the feasibility of implementing them due to suitable space and
potential permitting difficulties. Although they can eliminate risk to current residents, the hazard
could be simply transferred to another stakeholder group, depending on the site selected.
Consequently, from a cost-benefit perspective, neither of the risk elimination measures is
recommended. In general, the risk elimination options would only be made as political decisions
in which the broader society decides that some options are not desirable or worth actively
managing.
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IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
Implementation of the recommended risk mitigation measures will require the terminal operators
to continue implementing current and planned measures in addition to formalizing some activities
in a public forum. However, other measures will require additional expenditures, as well as a
commitment from the public, industry, and the government to maintain a transparent and active
dialog.
It is likely that a phased approach will be the best strategy for implementation of the alternate
mitigation measures described above. Those tasks aimed at better defining risks and costs are
logically the tasks that should be accomplished first.
LIMITATIONS
The implementation strategy presented in this report is intended to address the hazards associated
with operation of the POL facilities in the POA area. The hazards specifically addressed are
those relating to fire, including exposure to thermal radiation, smoke, and explosion. While
addressing the fire hazards may serve to mitigate others, it is important to note that there are other
hazards that are not specifically addressed by this study as described in the report.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The handling and distribution of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) through bulk terminals in
the Port of Anchorage (POA) area has been carried out since before 1950. The POA area is a mix
of commercial and industrial properties situated north of downtown Anchorage (Figure 1.1) and
adjacent to the Government Hill neighborhood, which is one of the oldest residential areas in
Anchorage.
As POL operations have grown over the years, so has the interest of the nearby Government Hill
neighborhood and the general public in public health and safety consequences associated with
these facilities. A number of historic and recent incidents have raised public concern that some
mitigation or control of risk is required to guide both existing and future POL development. In
response to public concerns, the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA) formed a Task Force to
address three questions regarding the POL facilities:
• Is there a public hazard associated with the POL facilities?
• If there is a public hazard, what can be done to mitigate the risk associated with the public
hazard, if any?
• What is the cost benefit of implementing mitigation measures?
The Task Force is comprised of the following stakeholders:
• Municipality of Anchorage.
• Government Hill Community Council.
• POL Operators. Anchorage Fueling and Service Company (AFSC); Chevron Products
Company (Chevron); Tesoro Alaska Company, Anchorage Terminals #1 and #2 (Tesoro);
and Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. (Williams).
• Alaska Railroad Corporation (ARRC).
To assist their investigation, the Municipal Task Force commissioned Golder Associates Inc.
(Golder) to carry out a Hazard Study for the bulk POL facilities in the POA area. This study was
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divided into the following three phases that generally correspond to the three questions posed to
the Task Force:
• Phase I Scoping and Public Hazard Assessment.
• Phase II Risk Mitigation Assessment.
• Phase III Risk Mitigation Plan.
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The objectives for the Hazard Study are to identify public hazards from POL facilities in the POA
area, estimate and rank the associated risks, and evaluate potential risk mitigation measures. The
study area (Figure 1.2) includes the four POL bulk terminal facilities located in the POA area,
bounded by the C Street/Ocean Dock Rd. interchange to the south, Government Hill to the east,
Gull Avenue and the POL marine terminals to the north, and Knik Arm to the west.
The specific objective for the Hazard Study is to evaluate public health and safety risks to the
adjacent residential neighborhood of Government Hill posed by fires at the POL facilities.
Additional public receptors potentially exposed to POL risks include other communities nearby
the POA such as Air Force housing, industrial workers in the POL area, and people traversing the
POA area or using adjacent public facilities. The risks to these additional public receptors are not
specifically evaluated in this study, but the Task Force can evaluate these more generally based
on the risk results for the Government Hill residents.
The scope of work carried out to achieve the study objectives included the following tasks:
1. Data collation and tour of facilities.
2. Hazard identification.
3. Safeguard evaluation.
4. Code compliance review.
5. Accident scenario annual frequency analysis.
6. Accident scenario public consequence analysis.
7. Public risk estimation and ranking.
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8. Alternative risk mitigation measures.
9. Risk benefits and costs.
10. Risk mitigation plan.
11. Stakeholder communication.
12. Reporting.
1.3 SCOPING AND PUBLIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT (PHASE I)
Phase I of the Hazard Study documented historical issues and provided a basis for the Task Force
to evaluate potential public risks. The work used risk analysis methods to identify accident
hazard scenarios, estimate associated risks, and rank the risk results. Public safety risks
associated with accidental fire or explosion at the POL facilities in the POA area were defined as
a measure of both the likelihood and the severity of harm to nearby people.
Although safety was the primary focus, the potential for damage to public property was also
addressed. Environmental risks from an accidental spill that does not lead to a fire or explosion
are dealt with through the Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plans, that are regularly
updated and submitted by the POL terminal operators to the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation (ADEC). Public health risks from air quality issues, such as chronic exposure to
fugitive emissions from terminal operations, are discussed based on historical studies in the area,
but detailed evaluation was not included in the scope. Human health and ecological risks from
POA area contamination were also documented from previous studies but not included in this
study.
Hazard scenarios leading to a fire or explosion were first identified through a “What If” analysis
based on industry and site experience. A workshop was held with Task Force members to
incorporate stakeholder experience in developing the hazard scenarios, which were only assessed
for the fraction of spill incidents that lead to fire consequences. Risks were then estimated using
the study Risk Matrix approach based on order-of-magnitude levels of frequency and public
consequence. The frequency and public consequence indices for the study Risk Matrix were
developed specifically for this study in the Task Force workshop. The consequence index defines
public exposure to evacuation, injury, or fatality, and this exposure is the potential for fire
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consequences to reach residences. Actual harm would only occur if residents were home and in
harm’s way during the fire, therefore actual harm would occur at annual probabilities much less
than those shown in the study Risk Matrix. Fire risks for each principal hazard scenario were
estimated by locating all scenarios within this Risk Matrix. Finally, risks were ranked according
to three levels in the Risk Matrix that were also developed in the Task Force workshop.
1.4 RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT (PHASE II)
Phase II of the Hazard Study examined risk mitigation strategies and documented alternative risk
mitigation measures. A second workshop forum was used to identify the significant current and
planned risk mitigation measures associated with the hazard scenarios identified in Phase I of the
study. Task Force participants in the second workshop included all POL operators and the
Municipality of Anchorage.
Over 100 risk mitigation measures currently being implemented at the POL facilities were
collated according to both prevention and consequence mitigation measures for all of the hazard
scenarios identified in Phase I of the study. These measures are based on both industry
experience and the specific experience of operations in the POA area. Industry experience is
incorporated through codes and practices and through bulletins, alerts, lessons learned and
symposia. POA area experience is incorporated through the implementation of measures to
prevent re-occurrence of past incidents and through incident management systems. These
measures are expected to reduce the risk of all hazard scenarios shown in the study Risk Matrix,
since the risk estimates are based on pre-1990 industry data. Since 1990, industry has continued
to mitigate risk based on the historical performance.
1.5 RISK MITIGATION PLAN (PHASE III)
A plan for the implementation of mitigation measures was developed using a risk based approach.
The risk profile for the POL facilities presented in Phase I provided the base assessment. Seven
hazard scenarios associated with higher risks were selected by the Task Force for incorporation in
the Phase III risk mitigation plan.
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This approach to select higher risk hazard scenarios prioritizes the allocation of resources to gain
the most effective benefit in terms of risk reduction. However, current and planned risk
mitigation measures addressing both higher and lower risk, hazard scenarios were collated in
Phase II. Many measures addressing the higher risk scenarios in Phase III will also reduce the
risks of the remaining scenarios.
An order of magnitude analysis of costs and benefits for risk reduction was carried out to provide
a basis for a recommended risk mitigation plan. Costs were estimated from operator judgements
and easily available references. Risk reduction benefits were qualitatively estimated based on
historical performance and professional judgement.
1.6 REPORT ORGANIZATION
This report for the Hazard Study is organized according to the following topics:
• Study Facilities. A discussion of existing facilities, historic spill and fire incidents, air
quality monitoring, contaminated site issues and site photographs.
• Land Use Regulations. A discussion of regulations and guidance impacting siting and
development of bulk fuel facilities, including a selection of regulations by other communities.
• Risk Assessment. A discussion of the methodology, identification of hazard scenarios,
estimation of risk and ranking of risk.
• Risk Mitigation Assessment (Phase II). An overview of risk mitigation strategies, along
with a summary of risk mitigation measures currently being implemented or planned at the
POL facilities.
• Risk Mitigation Plan (Phase III). Presentation of a mitigation plan that was developed
using a risk based approach based on the results of Phase I and II of this study, along with an
order of magnitude analysis of costs and benefits
• Appendices.
- A - Facility Layout Schematics for each POL Operator - B - Historical Spill and Fire Incidents - C - Site Photographs - D - Description of ARCHIE Consequence Model - E - Consequence Modeling - F - Frequency Assessment
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2. STUDY FACILITIES
2.1 FACILITIES DESCRIPTION
The general configuration of the terminal facilities in the POA area was previously presented in
Figure 1.2. Detailed layouts of the storage tanks for each bulk POL terminal are shown in the
schematic layout drawings from each operator presented in Appendix A, along with a schematic
of the marine terminal with POL 1 and 2 piers. In addition to layout drawings, Appendix A
includes tables of the following information describing individual storage tanks and the products
stored:
• Date of fabrication, construction standards, and design type
• Nominal and operating capacity
• Product stored
• Corrosion protection
• Tank capacity – nominal and maximum operating
• Inspection record (applicable code)
• Containment dike characteristics
• Age of tanks and most recent inspection date
• Spill mitigation controls
The above tank information varies among the four POL terminal operators in the referenced
documents provided in Appendix A. The lighter (more volatile) products such as gasoline and
ethanol are stored in covered tanks with internal floating roofs, while the remaining tanks with jet
fuel and other products have fixed cone roofs. The asphalt tanks have internal heating systems.
In addition to storage tanks, each operator has support facilities to receive and distribute refined
products. These support facilities are described in the following section. Further detailed
descriptions of the facilities are provided in the operation manuals and spill contingency plans for
each operator.
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2.2 FACILITIES OPERATION
The POL bulk terminal facilities are operated by AFSC, Chevron, Tesoro and Williams to receive
various refined petroleum products, store the products in atmospheric tanks (i.e., tanks that vent
to the atmosphere and are not under high pressure), and distribute them as required by
commercial agreements. A schematic of the flow of refined products through each of the
terminals is presented in Figure 2.1. As shown in this schematic, refined products are received
via ship and barge, rail car, and cross-country pipeline (from refineries outside of Anchorage).
These products are transferred via terminal pipelines into tanks at the four terminals (Tesoro
operates two terminals, #1 and #2). Products are then distributed via terminal and cross-country
pipelines to the Anchorage International Airport and Defense Energy Supply Center, as well as to
tank trucks and ships or barges.
The locations of the receiving, storage and distribution facilities described above are shown
approximately in Figure 2.2. A summary of each facility is also described below.
• POL Terminals. There are five bulk fuel terminals at in the POA area (Tesoro operates two
terminals, #1 and #2). The tanks at these facilities typically cycle from empty to full due to
regular product turnover.
• Rail Car Unloading. Fuel transfers from railcars occurs daily in the POA area. Of the three
railcar unloading facilities, the Williams site is presently the most active. Transfers at the
Tesoro site (for Williams) are less frequent, and the Chevron site is not used for normal
operations.
• Truck Loading. Transfer of fuel occurs regularly from Williams and Tesoro terminals #1
and #2.
• Marine Loading/Unloading. Fuel transfer at the POA Marine terminal is most common in
the summer, but does occur year round.
• Cross Country Pipelines. A pipeline from the Kenai Peninsula refinery feeds the Tesoro
and AFSC Terminals. Product is distributed via pipelines to the Anchorage airport and the
Defense Energy Supply Center.
• Terminal Pipelines. Terminal pipelines are used to transfer fuel in and out of the storage
tanks. Outside the terminals, these pipelines are routed through valve stations at the POA and
Squirrel Cage sites in the POA area.
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The proximity of these facilities to various public receptors is also shown in Figure 2.2. The
predominantly mobile POL storage at the Alaska Railroad is a facility that could either be a
receptor or pose a public risk, however, it is not addressed within the scope of this study.
Each of the four POL terminal operators handles a different mix of products and use different
facilities to handle those products. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the principal POL products
handled by each operator, the feed mode to the facility, the storage facilities (tank capacities,
diked secondary containment volumes, and terminal pipelines), and the distribution mode from
the facility. The principal refined products identified in Table 2.1 range from those with lower
flash point temperatures such as gasoline, to those with higher flash points such as diesel and
asphalt. These product characteristics and facility modes of product transfer and storage were
assessed to identify principal hazard scenarios for the risk assessment.
2.3 HISTORICAL INCIDENTS
Review of historic aerial photography shows that development of POL facilities in the POA area
occurred between 1942and 1950 (Varnes, 1969). However, the storage tanks currently in service
were constructed from 1958 to 1993, as shown in the Appendix A information. Although some
tanks were constructed over 40 years ago, there have been ongoing upgrades and improvements
throughout the life of the facilities to mitigate risk and conform to improvements in industry
standards as described in operator documents. These safeguards were summarized for the risk
assessment and are presented in Section 4.
In addition to the five existing terminals, the military operated a terminal along Bluff Road
(former Defense Fuels site) that was removed in 2000.
2.3.1 Records Review
Historical product spill and fire incidents were collated from recent public records in order to
document operating performance at the POL facilities. The principal sources of spill incident
information were the spill contingency plans submitted by each operator to the environmental
regulators who require complete documentation. These were checked against the ADEC spill
database. In addition, the Anchorage Fire Department (AFD) provided log records of response
events since 1992, which were also checked against operator records.
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Table 2.1 POL Facility Operations in the POA Area
FACILITY OPERATOR
PRINCIPAL POL PRODUCTS
FEED MODE TO FACILITY
STORAGE FACILITIES
DISTRIBUTION MODE FROM FACILITY
AFSC Plant #12 Jet Fuel (A)
• 10” and 12” pipelines from POA Marine Terminal (ship or barge) (40%)
• 12” pipeline from Williams Rail unloading at Tesoro terminal (60%)
• 10” Tesoro pipeline (<5,000 bbl/week)
• 9 out of 9 tanks in service (36,000-110,000 bbl capacity –nominal total 554,400 bbl)
• All tanks within fully lined earthen diked secondary containment area with 180, 900 bbl capacity
• Internal pipeline system
• 12” pipeline to airport • [Tank trucks]
Chevron1 Jet Fuel (JP-8)
• 2 - 10” pipelines from POA Marine Terminal (barge) (75%)
• 10” pipeline from Williams (via squirrel cage) (25%)
• [Rail car unloading rack with spill containment (5,000 gal oil-water separator and 20,000 gal overflow tank)]*
• 8 out of 17 tanks in service (39,000-95,200 bbl capacity –nominal totals 540,550 bbl in service, 700,000 bbls in terminal). 1 mix and 1 secondary containment tank
• All tanks within earthen (parts with asphalt top) and some concrete diked secondary containment area with 98,000 bbl capacity and 13,500 ft2 surface area. Remote impounding basin adds 21,000 bbl, volume is pumped to a secondary containment tank
• Internal pipeline system
• 10” and 6” pipelines to Defense Energy Supply Center
• [can pump to other terminal operators]
• [Rail Cars]
Tesoro3
Terminal 1 (50%)
Jet Fuels Motor Gasolines Diesel Fuels Ethanol
• 10” pipeline from refinery • [Tank truck]
• 8 of 8 tanks in service (8,700-48,100 bbl
capacity –nominal total 219,000 bbl) • All tanks within 3 fully lined (geomembrane),
diked secondary containment areas with following capacities:
North Area – 89,500 bbl Center Area – 47,100 bbl South Area – 47,100 bbl • Internal pipeline system
• Tank trucks (bottom
loading)
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Table 2.1 POL Facility Operations in the POA Area (continued)
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FACILITY OPERATOR
PRINCIPAL POL PRODUCTS
FEED MODE TO FACILITY
STORAGE FACILITIES
DISTRIBUTION MODE FROM FACILITY
Tesoro3 Terminal 2 (50%)
Jet Fuels Motor Gasoline Diesel Fuels Ethanol Gasoline Additive
• 10” pipeline from refinery
(85%) • 4 – 12” and 1 - 6” pipelines
from POA Marine Terminal, Ship & Barge (15%)
• [Can pump from other terminal operators]
• [Rail car –see Williams]
• 19 of 20 tanks in service (380-100,000 bbl
capacity –nominal total 676,500 bbl) • All tanks within fully lined (geomembrane),
diked secondary containment area with 116, 200 bbl capacity
• Internal pipeline system
• Tank trucks (bottom
loading) (75% ) • 4=12” and 1=6” pipelines
to POA Marine Terminal (25%)
• [Can pump to other terminal operators]
Williams4 Jet Fuels (A-50) Motor Gasoline Diesel Fuels Ethanol Naptha Gasoline Additive Asphalt AC5 Asphalt Additive
• 6”, 12” and 2 - 10” pipelines from POA Marine Terminal (10%)
• 6”pipeline from Tesoro (via Squirrel Cage)
• 3 rail car unloading racks (1 asphalt, 1 light products and 1 at Tesoro) with spill containment (5,000 gal oil-water separator/sump and 20,000 gal overflow tank) (90%)
• [Can pump from other terminals]
• 18 of 21 light product tanks (179-107,550 bbl capacity –nominal total 691,290 bbl)
• All tanks within 3 separate earthen (parts with asphalt top) and some concrete diked secondary containment area (fully lined, geomembrane) with 90,000, 65,000, and 130,000 bbl capacity, respectively
• 7 of 10 asphalt tanks (500-30,000 bbl capacity –Nominal total 57,000 bbl)
• All asphalt tanks within concrete diked secondary containment area with 12,000 bbl capacity
• Internal pipeline system
• 6”, 12” and 2 - 10” pipelines to POA Marine Terminal and to Chevron (50%)
• Pipeline to AFSC (10%) • 2 tank truck loading racks
with spill containment (5,000 gal overflow tank) (bottom & top loading) (10%)
• Rail cars to Tesoro Rail rack (30%)
• [Can pump to other terminal operators]
1. Chevron Products Company 2. Anchorage Fueling & Service Company 3. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company 4. Williams Alaska Petroleum Inc. * [Not normally in operation] (%) Percentage indicates estimated percentage of total product
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The recent historical POL spill and fire incident record is presented in Appendix B according to
the following data for each of the four POL operators:
• Date.
• Cause.
• Consequence.
• Risk mitigation measures.
References were also documented in the Appendix B table along with recent ADEC and AFD
data. Risk mitigation measures were documented to describe the improvements in operations
through prevention or consequence mitigation. These historical incidents and associated risk
mitigation measures were utilized in developing hazard scenarios for the risk assessment.
2.3.2 Data Summary
The available data describe a number of historical spills and fires associated with POL operations
in the POA area. These data illustrate the range of historical incidents in terms of location, type
of activity, amount of spill and fire consequences. In addition, the implementation of risk
mitigation measures to reduce the risk of similar future incidents is described. Industry practices
have also improved over the historical time frame shown in the incident record and more recent
risk mitigation measures such as new API guidelines in the early 1990s are described in
Section 4.2.
The data presented in Appendix B do not comprise a complete spill record. Reporting
requirements have changed over time and there was no attempt to verify all incidents. Incident
databases were not consistent among the different sources described above. In addition, operators
have changed at some facilities and older records are not readily available. A few of older
incidents such as the 1964 earthquake and the 1979 Defense Fuels fire are described in the risk
assessment, however, there are no comprehensive records to incorporate in Appendix B data.
The time period for spill and fire incidents for each operator also varies. Finally, the former
Defense Fuels Site was removed from service in 2000 and the historic spill records for this site
was not included in this study.
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A summary of the data from Appendix B is collated in Table 2.2. As shown in this summary, a
total of 63 POL product incidents are included in the record. This history was addressed in the
risk assessment based on the caveats described above.
Table 2.2 Incident Data Summary
(From Appendix B, ? indicates unrecorded data)
Operator Location Year Spill Fire Worker Public Environment Volume POL Impacts Impacts Impacts Impacts (Gallons) Product (Contained / Remediated)
AFSC Terminal 1983 1,260,000 Jet A X Marine Dock 1985 2,557 Jet A X - mostly 1986 ? Jet A 1987 225 Jet A X Terminal 1988 7,000 Jet A X 1994 500 Jet A X - mostly 800 Jet A X 1998 20 Jet A X 2001 50 ? X 2001 ? ? X Total 10 1,271,152
Chevron Terminal 1990 55 Techroline X 1992 112 Techroline X 1997 ? ? 1998 ? ? Total 4 167
Tesoro Terminal #1 1974 500 Diesel 1975 12,600 JP-4 X - 30% 400 Diesel 1976 3,500 Diesel 1978 336 Diesel 1989 ? ? X 1992 100 ? 1993 3,990 Jet A X 1994 ? ? X 1997 800 Gasoline X - 25% Total 10 22,226 Terminal #2 1995 35 Av Gas 1996 428 Ethanol 1997 125 Gasoline 2000 ? ? Total 4 588
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Operator Location Year Spill Fire Worker Public Environment Volume POL Impacts Impacts Impacts Impacts (Gallons) Product (Contained / Remediated)
Williams Terminal 1986 100 Jet A X 500 Turbine Oil X 1988 365 Gasoline X 17 Gasoline X 300 Heating Fuel X 2,000 Diesel X 1990 10 Gasoline X 25 Gasoline X 1991 25 JP-4 X 15 Gasoline X 1993 3 Turbine Oil X 5 Gasoline X 3 Turbine Oil X 7 Gasoline X 80 Diesel X 1 Jet A X 1995 Truck Site
Truck Site 1996 50 Gasoline X 1997 30 Jet A X ? ? X 1999 30 ? X 40 Diesel X 2000 1 Jet A X Tank Site Smoke 10 Jet A X 10 Glycol X 7 Jet A X 2001 2 ? X 2 ? X 1 Turbine Oil X ? Nat. Gas Truck Site Truck Site Total 34 3,639
Port of Anchorage
Marine Dock 1995 ? ?
1997 2 ? X 2001 ? ? Total 3 2
Incident data collated in Table 2.2 above were also summarized according to spill size
distribution to illustrate the range and frequency of this history. The spill size and fire type
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distributions are presented in Table 2.3. Spill data were separated by operator location and date
before and after 1990. As mentioned, the records are more complete in the past decade and
therefore, conclusions on incident historical trends between decades can not be derived from this
data. The fire response data lists 5 fires at the terminals that have involved POL products since
1990. Other fires have been reported in the area that are not associated with POL terminal
operations, as well as false alarms and responses to medical emergencies. In addition, the GHCC
provided a newspaper article showing a tank fire on the west end of the bluff in 1965. None of
the reports indicated a spread of the fires to the nearby neighborhood.
Table 2.3 Spill And Fire Incident Distribution
(Number of Incidents)
SPILL Spill Size (Gallons) TOTAL Location 100 1000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
Before 1990 AFSC 1 2 1 4 Chevron 1 1 Tesoro 3 2 5 Williams 4 3 1 8
TOTAL 5 7 5 0 1 18
After 1990 AFSC 2 2 4 Chevron 1 1 Tesoro 2 3 1 6 Williams 19 19 Marine Terminal 1 1
TOTAL 25 5 1 0 0 31
30 12 6 0 1 49 All Years 61% 24% 12% 0% 2% 100%
FIRES Truck Unloading Tank Cleaning After 1990 Williams 4 1
The spill and fire incident data described above is used in the Phase I risk assessment (Section 4)
to confirm the reasonableness of estimated scenario frequencies.
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2.4 AIR QUALITY MONITORING
The Anchorage Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the ADEC monitored air
quality in the Government Hill area during 1993 as part of a broader study of volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) in Anchorage (Taylor and Morris, 1996; ADEC, 1996). These studies were
initiated in response to concerns from the Government Hill neighborhood about petroleum odors
from fuel storage facilities adjacent to the neighborhood, particularly the former Defense Fuels
site. Monitoring stations were established at three locations on Government Hill:
• Site 2 – Delaney St & W. Cook Bluff (in residence back yard)
• Site 3 – Cunningham St. & E. Manor Ave.
• Site 4 – Government Hill Elementary School
The objective was not to address health risks, but to obtain accurate data on the VOCs tested.
Average annual benzene concentration ranged from 1.76-3.74 ppbv. The highest VOC
concentrations at Government Hill were measured at Site 2, and the concentrations away from the
bluff decreased to levels roughly comparable to those at other neighborhoods in Anchorage. The
data also indicated peak benzene concentrations in summer, rather than in winter like in other
parts of Anchorage. This difference was interpreted to indicate that warm weather evaporative
emissions were the primary concern rather than mobile sources as in other parts of Anchorage.
The data from the other sites indicated impacts from both evaporative and mobile sources.
The only monitoring that has been performed since 1993 was for about 1 month of during the first
quarter of 2002 near the Williams rail unloading racks. Results from this monitoring will be
incorporated into a larger air quality study being conducted for the Anchorage International
Airport.
Air quality has likely changed since 1993 due to removal of the Defense Fuels tanks and
regulatory changes that took effect on June 1, 1995. These regulations required emission controls
on volatile liquid storage tanks, including installation of internal floating roofs to reduce
evaporative emissions, and use of vapor recovery systems for loading racks and delivery tanks.
The Alaska air quality regulations require controlling truck and rail loading emissions to a higher
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degree than required by federal regulation and that floating roofs be upgraded to the highest
federal standard (40 CFR 60, Subpart Kb) by 2004.
2.5 SITE CONTAMINATION HEALTH AND ECOLOGICAL RISKS
There are a number of contaminated sites surrounding the Government Hill neighborhood,
including the POL terminals or associated facilities, the former Defense Fuels Site, and the
ARRC property. Contamination includes floating product, as well as impacted soil and
groundwater as described below.
• POL Terminals. A considerable amount of work has been conducted at the POL Terminals
to assess and evaluate site contamination and health and ecological risks. Work prior to 1992
was summarized in a Risk Assessment Feasibility Study that was prepared in 1993 for the
POA Petroleum Users Group (PUG) [America North/Emcon, Inc., 1993]. This feasibility
study addressed human health and ecological risks from ground contamination in the POA
area. The results of this study indicated that with further site characterization, potential
human exposure pathways could be shown to be incomplete. Inhalation of volatile organic
compounds by on-site workers was expected to be the predominant exposure pathway. The
study also concluded that an ecological risk assessment may be feasible but not practical.
The PUG became inactive before further studies could be submitted to ADEC. We
understand that the operators are now managing their sites independently (ADEC, 2002a).
• Former Defense Fuels. The former Defense Fuels site, or Defense Fuel Support Point-
Anchorage (DFSPA) encompasses approximately 69 acres. Historically the DFSPA
received, stored and issued fuel since 1942, but the DFSPA has been closed down since 1996.
The tanks and associated piping were removed in 2001, along with approximately 20,000 cy
of contaminated soil. A Record of Decision is scheduled for May 2002 that should include
required institutional controls to address soil, groundwater, and surface water, as well as the
type of acceptable land use (ADEC, 2002b).
• Alaska Railroad. The Alaska Railroad property is the third large site adjacent to
Government Hill with documented contamination. ADEC has indicated that this facility is in
a monitoring mode, with the emphasis on ecological impacts to Ship Creek (ADEC, 2002a).
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Oversight of ongoing site remediation and evaluation of health and ecological risks at these sites
is managed by the ADEC Contaminated Sites Remediation Program (CSRP).
2.6 SITE TOUR
A tour was conducted in January 2002 around each of the four POL terminal operations, the POL
marine terminal, the general POA area, and the surrounding area. Each of the POL operators
participated in the tour and provided documentation and explanations to describe their individual
operations. Selected photographs from the tour are presented in Appendix C.
During the tour, discussions were held with members of the Government Hill Community
Council, and a workshop was held with stakeholders as described in Section 1.
2.7 FIRE FIGHTING AND EVACUATION PLAN
The Anchorage Fire Department (AFD) was contacted to confirm fire fighting capabilities and
emergency response (AFD, May 2002). If a fire occurs in the POA area, the AFD will assume
responsibility for fire fighting once they arrive on site. In addition to the AFD, Elmendorf Air
Force Base will provide assistance with personnel, equipment, and foam, provided the mission of
the base can be met with their remaining resources. The AFD also has capabilities to apply both
foam and water to a fire, and can access additional foam from the Anchorage International
Airport. In addition to the fixed foam systems on the tanks themselves, there are approximately
40 fire hydrants in the POA area with a spacing of about 300 ft and flows between 2,300 – 3,000
gallons per minute (AFD, June 2002).
Emergency response plans have been developed for a variety of scenarios, including evacuation
of nearby residents. The Anchorage Police Department (APD) will be the lead agency in the
event of an evacuation.
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3. LAND USE REGULATIONS
3.1 BACKGROUND
Fire codes, industry standards, planning documents, and community ordinances were reviewed in
order to provide an understanding of different regulations that govern siting and development of
bulk fuel facilities. The focus of this review was to document a selection of setback distances
between POL facilities and the public as established by codes and other, more stringent
community specific requirements.
Siting and development of POL facilities is typically regulated by state and local statues that are
based on fire codes and industry standards, which are described in Section 3.1. Other guidance
regarding siting and separation distances is provided by groups such as the American Planning
Association (APA), US Coast Guard (USCG), and Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), as discussed in Section 3.2.
Individual communities, including Anchorage, adopt a combination of state statues, community
zoning requirements, and other guidance to define where bulk POL terminal facilities can be
situated and how close they can be to public receptors. A selection of community setback
requirements is presented in Section 3.3 to illustrate the wide range of requirements that have
been developed by local communities and to describe the basis for their development. The
examples describe in Section 3.3 include cities that rely exclusively on fire codes and others that
have built upon the fire codes, industry standards and other guidance in order to address local
issues.
3.2 CODES AND STANDARDS
3.2.1 Fire Codes
There is no single, national fire code. Rather, local and state governments usually adopt one of
the three codes listed below and published by national organizations.
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• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) publishes NFPA Code 30, Flammable and
Combustible Liquids Code, 2000 Edition.
• International Code Council (ICC) publishes the International Fire Code 2000 (IFC).
• Western Fire Chiefs Association (WFCA) publishes the Uniform Fire Code 2000 Edition
(UFC).
Many topics are addressed in the codes, including tank spacing and separation from the public.
The published spacing requirements between tanks and the public do not specify the basis for the
recommendations, but they appear to have been developed to respond to minimizing the potential
for one tank fire to escalate to multiple tanks and to maximize access for fire fighting.
The State of Alaska adopted the IFC effective September 2001, and the Municipality of
Anchorage is in the process of adopting the IFC. Chapter 34 of the IFC is the most applicable to
the bulk terminal operations in the POA area. It provides guidance for prevention, control, and
mitigation of dangerous conditions related to storage, use, dispensing, mixing, and handling of
flammable and combustible liquids. The IFC references NFPA 30, which establishes the
following separation distances for the range of tank sizes at the POA.
• 15-175 ft from the line of a lot that can be built on or the opposite side of a public way, or
half the tank diameter; minimum 5 ft.
• 5-60 ft from the nearest side of a public way or nearest important building on the same
property or 1/6 time the tank diameter; minimum 5 ft.
Before adopting the IFC, the State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage followed the
UFC. The 2000 version of the UFC presents the same values for setback as the IFC and NFPA
30 tables the code is referenced to. However, the distances in the UFC 2000 edition differ from
those in the 1997 Edition, which were as follows.
• 50 ft from the nearest important building on the property,
• 50 ft from a fuel dispenser,
• 50 ft from the nearest public way, and
• 75 ft from a property line.
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3.2.2 Industry Standards
There are a large number of industry standards that have been developed to address safe operation
of POL facilities. Many have been adopted in the fire codes, with the remainder being consensus
standards that are applied on a voluntary basis. The standards are developed by national
organizations such as the American Petroleum Institute (API), which have been established by the
affected industries. The API has published the broadest set of standards, while most of the other
organizations, such as the Steel Tank Institute (STI), focus on specific topics.
3.3 GUIDELINE REVIEW
3.3.1 American Planning Association
The American Planning Association (APA) publishes Industrial Performance Standards for a
New Century (1993), which is a guide to assist communities in developing industrial performance
codes. The APA document presents a conceptual framework for a code, along with case studies,
sample ordinances, and a listing of other resources for further information.
Specific components of performance standards are described, including fire and explosion
hazards. The APA notes that the storage of flammable and other materials poses one of the most
serious potential threats to surrounding land uses of any of the issues addressed in performance
standards; however, there are extensive resources and guidance for managing these hazards and
providing proactive solutions. Resources include local fire departments, state fire marshals, and
fire codes and industry standards.
3.3.2 HUD Guidelines
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) publishes a guidebook, Siting
of HUD-Assisted Projects Near Hazardous Facilities: Acceptable Separation Distances from
Explosive and Flammable Hazards (1987). The guidebook was developed specifically for
implementing the technical requirements of 24 CFR Part 51, Subpart C of the Code of Federal
Regulations. The guidebook presents a method for calculating a level ground separation distance
(ASD) from pool fires that is based on simplified radiation heat flux modeling. The ASD is
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determined using nomographs relating area of the fire to the following levels of thermal radiation
flux.
• Thermal Radiation – Buildings. The standard of 10,000 BTU/ft2-hr. is based on the thermal
radiation flux required to ignite a wooden structure after an exposure of approximately 15 to
20 minutes, which is assumed to be the fire department response time in an urban area.
• Thermal Radiation – People. The standard of 450 BTU/ft2-hr. for people in unprotected
outdoor areas such as parks is based on the level of exposure that can be sustained for a long
period of time.
Applying the HUD guidance to a range of typical scenarios (see Section 4.3.1 and Appendices D
and E for a discussion on consequence modeling) yields ASD values of between 130-155 ft for
buildings and 650-775 ft for people. The HUD document notes that the calculated distances will
be reduced or eliminated depending upon factors such as variations in topography that act as a
barrier to a level ground fire, but specific guidance is not provided for addressing these issues.
3.3.3 US Coast Guard
The USCG provides guidance on the safe distance for people and wooden buildings from the
edge of a burning spill in their document Hazard Assessment Handbook, Commandant
Instruction Manual M 16465.13. Safe distances range widely depending upon the size of the
burning area, which is assumed to be on open water. For people, the distances vary from 150 ft to
10,100 ft, while for buildings the distances vary from 32 ft to 1,900 ft for the same size spill. The
spill radius for these distances ranges between 10 ft and 2,000 ft,
3.4 SELECTION OF COMMUNITY SPECIFIC REGULATIONS
The following sections describe a selection of community specific regulations that are included to
show the variety of ways in which setback requirements are used to address local concerns.
Communities have the option of developing codes that are more restrictive that those adopted by
the states. These codes cannot be less stringent than state statues, but they can address unique
conditions in communities. In the extreme, local regulations can completely prohibit certain
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types of uses. Information from a survey of setback requirements that was previously performed
by the Municipality of Anchorage (1996) is also described.
3.4.1 Denver, Colorado
Denver developed their regulations partly in response to a large fire at the Stapleton Airport in
1990 involving multiple tanks containing jet fuel. The fire began at a damaged pump and
expanded due to significant code violations. Bulk POL facilities are limited to specific industrial
zoned areas. In addition, the Denver code provides for a minimum of 1,000 ft separation from a
protected use, as defined by the fire department. Such spacing may be reduced by zoning
administrator with review and concurrence of fire department (Denver Municipal Code Title II,
Ch. 59, Article III, Div. 24).
3.4.2 Coos Bay, Oregon
Coos Bay is an older coastal city with an established port area and limited bulk POL storage. The
population is less than 15,000, but it is adjacent to the much larger city of North Bend. There are
residences nearby the POL storage, as well as a major highway. In addition, Coos Bay is near to
an environmentally significant estuary with a separate management plan.
Aboveground storage tanks (ASTs) are regulated under Ordinance No. 239, which allows ASTs
in areas zoned for commercial, industrial, quasi-public, and reserved for future planning. Storage
is limited to specific classes of liquids defined by flash point and boiling point. Applicable
regulations are the 1994 UFC, UFC Standard 79-7, and the Oregon State Fire Code 7901.1.3. A
separation distance of 400 ft from residential areas is specified for general industrial and
waterfront industrial areas.
3.4.3 Fairbanks, Alaska
The City and Borough of Fairbanks defers to guidance from the State Fire Marshal, which are the
IFC/UFC/NFPA 30 requirements for separation of bulk POL storage facilities. However, bulk
storage is only allowed as a conditional use in areas zoned as heavy industrial and general use. A
conditional use permit is required for development.
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3.4.4 Long Beach, California
Long Beach is a major west coast port. Local ordinances require that bulk POL facilities comply
with the requirements of the UFC. There are no specific zoning restrictions related to POL
facilities.
3.4.5 Fort Collins, Colorado
Fort Collins has a performance-based standard along the lines of the recommendations by APA.
The standard requires that projects be designed in compliance with applicable codes. In addition,
a hazardous material impact analysis is required to determine potential off-site impacts and
mitigation precautions. The hazardous material impact analysis must conform to the
requirements of the fire authority.
3.4.6 1996 Review by the Municipality of Anchorage
In about 1996, the Municipality of Anchorage conducted a review of bulk fuel storage zoning
requirements for ten selected cities across the US. The trends noted in that study were: a) the
UFC was the most common standard used, including setback requirements from lot lines,
b) buffer zones separate industrial zone from residential zones, c) strict, mandatory landscaping
and screening standards, d) height and size regulations for tanks, and e) conditional use permits
used in a variety of fashions.
3.5 SUMMARY OF SETBACK REQUIREMENTS
Codes and other guidance documents establish minimum setback requirements, which are
summarized in Table 3.1. However, local and state governments can establish other criteria
based on local conditions or concerns, as indicated in Table 3.2
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Table 3.1 Summary of Setback Requirements In Codes, Standards, and Guidance
Code, Standard, Guidance Setback Requirement for Tanks from Public Use
Variables
IFC 2000 (Adopted in Alaska and proposed in Municipality of Anchorage)
5-175 ft Tank size and type of adjacent use
UFC 2000 (Pre 2001 in Alaska) 5-175 ft Tank size and type of adjacent use
UFC 1997 50-75 ft Type of adjacent use APA Performance Standard Site specific and process driven HUD Buildings: 130-155 ft
People: 650-775 ft Product and tank size
USCG (Open Water Fire) 150->10,000 ft Diameter of spill
Table 3.2 Setback Requirements for Tanks in Selected Communities
Community Setback Requirement for Tanks Planning & Zoning Requirement
Long Beach, CA 5-175 ft (UFC) None, but bulk fuel facilities situated in historic industrial area
Fairbanks, AK 5-175 ft (Alaska State) Industrial/General use with conditional use permit
Coos Bay, OR 400 ft General & Waterfront Industrial Denver, CO 1,000 ft from protected use Industrial Ft. Collins, CO Performance Standard Project specific
The data summarized in Table 3.2 and described previously show that different communities
manage POL facilities in different ways and for different reasons. Fire code standard appear to
be the most common guide used, but other zoning and land use regulations may be in place. It is
important to understand the context in which the setback requirements were developed and how
they are applied.
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4. PUBLIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT (PHASE I)
4.1 METHODOLOGY
4.1.1 Risk Assessment Approach
The study used risk analysis methods to identify accident hazard scenarios, estimate associated
risks and rank the risk results. Public safety risks associated with accidental fire or explosion at
the POL facilities in the POA were defined as a measure of both the likelihood and the severity of
harm to nearby people. Although safety was the primary focus, the potential for property damage
was also addressed. The first step in the risk assessment approach involved the identification of
potential hazard scenarios due to fire or explosion that may impact public health or safety. A
hazard scenario is defined in the following subsection. The methodology used for this task was a
“What-If” analysis as described further in references such as [AIChE, 1992]. This analysis used
industry and site experience to identify significant hazard scenarios including their causes and
consequences and existing risk mitigation measures.
A workshop format was used to incorporate the knowledge base from the Task Force stakeholder
team in order to identify potential hazard scenarios. This workshop was led by Golder Associates
with participation by Task Force member groups, including facility operators, Government Hill
residents, and the Port of Anchorage. The second objective of the workshop was to develop a
Risk Matrix to estimate risks for each hazard scenario based on professional judgement as
described in the following subsections. Results from the workshop were documented and
distributed to the Task Force members.
Risks were then estimated using the study Risk Matrix defined in Subsection 4.1.3. This
approach was based on order-of-magnitude levels of frequency and public consequence that
provided a wide range of values for estimating the risk associated with each hazard scenario. The
more severe fire consequences were also modeled to confirm the risk estimates. Frequencies
were estimated from analysis of industry and site performance. Risks for each principal hazard
scenario were then estimated by locating all scenarios within the Risk Matrix. Finally, risks were
ranked according to three levels in the Risk Matrix.
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Existing risk mitigation measures were identified, and the results were documented for use in the
Phase II and III assessments. Additional stakeholder workshops are planned throughout the
study.
4.1.2 Definition of a Hazard Scenario
The first step of the risk assessment methodology was to identify hazard scenarios that may
adversely affect public health or safety. Hazard scenarios may be described in terms of causes
and consequences for an accidental fire or explosion, as shown schematically in Figure 4.1. A
hazardous accident for this study would involve the release of product, which in turn becomes a
spill or vapor release with fire or explosion consequences that may affect the exposed public.
Potential fire or explosion events may also occur without a spill. For example, a fire or explosion
may occur from improper maintenance procedures with flammable vapor still in a tank. Such a
scenario occurred at a now decommissioned POA facility in 1979 that resulted in a worker
fatality. Finally, some hazard scenarios may not involve an accident such as those caused by
deliberate sabotage.
For this study, the hazards represented in Figure 4.1 are the flammable POL products received,
stored and distributed by the four terminal operators in the POA area. These hazards require a
base cause and a sequence of causal factors to result in a hazardous accident, shown in the center
of this figure and defined as a release of product. A series of different hazardous accidents may
be defined according to the size of release, location of release, or other characteristics. In most
accidents, a number of causal factors had to occur before the accident occurred. For example,
when filling tanks, correct operating procedures, redundant tank level alarms, and in some cases
automatic shutdown of pumps all need to fail before an over filling incident can occur.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the hazard effects from a hazardous accident are defined by a series of
consequence factors that may escalate the severity of consequences due to the transport of
released product, ignition, and escalation of fire size. The hazard zones represented in Figure 4.1
are defined by fire, thermal radiation from a fire, smoke from a fire, or explosion overpressures
(and debris from explosions). The final hazard effect is the level of harm to the public that may
be exposed within the hazard zone. This path for one hazard scenario represented by the red line
in Figure 4.1, is one of many paths associated with each hazardous accident. Representative
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hazard scenarios were identified in the “What If” analysis presented in the next section to
describe the range of risks associated with the POL facilities.
4.1.3 Study Risk Matrix
Risks for each significant hazard scenario were estimated using Risk Matrix methodology
(FEMA, 1989; CAN/CSA-Q634-91, 1991; AIChE, 1992). A Risk Matrix is comprised of one
index representing the measure of frequency and another index representing a measure of
consequence severity. As previously described in Section 1, public safety risks associated with
the POL facilities in the POA were defined as a measure of both the likelihood and the severity of
harm to nearby people from an accidental fire or explosion at the facilities. Both these frequency
and consequence severity measures are described through the Risk Matrix. The risk of a
specified hazard scenario is therefore estimated by locating it within a Risk Matrix.
The Hazard Study Risk Matrix is presented in Table 4.1. The Frequency Index ranges from a low
Level 1 (between 1 event in 1,000 years and 1 event in 10,000 years) to a high Level 4 (1 event in
10 years or greater). These order-of-magnitude levels incorporate a wide range of frequencies for
estimating hazard scenario risks and therefore define a more general level of accuracy for the
purposes of this study. The Consequence Severity Index ranges from a Level A (consequences
restricted to the terminal sites, i.e., site fire safety issue) to a Level D (public exposure to fatality
from a fire). Level A may in fact comprise a very serious consequence for the terminal operators
but would not impact the nearby public. It should be noted that the POL terminal operators
manage these Level A risks to ensure their own employee safety. Public consequence severity
are described in terms of exposure to harmful effects, which is less restrictive than criteria for
harm actually occurring. This study Risk Matrix shown in Table 4.2 provides a valuable resource
for communicating results and for implementing effective risk mitigation options.
A three level risk ranking system is shown through shading in the study Risk Matrix. The
ranking system corresponds to roughly equivalent levels of risk that increase from the lower left
corner to the upper right corner of the matrix. This matrix ranking system is similar to that used
by [FEMA, 1989] in addressing community emergency response concerns.
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4.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
A “What If” risk analysis methodology was used to identify accidents or failures that may adversely affect public health or safety. Hazard scenarios were described in terms of cause and consequence as presented in the previous section. The approach was to divide the bulk POL terminal facilities into principal operating systems and evaluate each system by asking “What If” questions about potential for releases and fires or explosions. A protocol of questions included:
• Inputs and outputs for the system. • Environmental impacts. • Operating modes. • Protection safeguards. • Equipment fit for use. • Process operations and control. • Maintenance and management systems.
The POL terminal facilities were divided into five systems for risk assessment including tank terminal operations, transfer and facility pipelines, tank truck operation, rail car operation, and marine terminal operations. A team of experienced risk, operating, and technical people developed potential hazard scenarios to reflect the range of fire and explosion risks associated with each system and reviewed these with the Task Force team. Involvement of the task force team was important to incorporate community issues and site specific experience. Hazard scenarios were documented in a worksheet with the following information:
• “What If” question. • Potential cause(s). • Potential consequence(s) for harm. • Existing risk mitigation measures (both prevention and consequence mitigation measures can
vary among the four operators). • Notes.
The worksheet is presented in Table 4.2 documenting the above information for the representative hazard scenarios identified for each of the five systems. This table also includes columns to record the estimated risk for each hazard scenario as described in the following sections. Information relating the hazard scenario to historical incidents from POL facilities and more generally from industry operations is included in the notes column.
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Table 4.2 Hazard Scenario Worksheet
Risk* What If Causes Consequences Risk Mitigation Measures
F C Notes
Tank Terminal Operations 1) Liquid leak from storage tank inlet or outlet piping
• Failure of valve packing, gaskets
• Loose bolt connection • Incorrect installation
a) Spill of 50 bbl contained, ignites causing fire
• Containment • Drainage paths away from tanks • Operating procedures (Inspections) • Maintenance procedures • Above ground piping within containment
area • Fire fighting equipment (including foam
systems and monitors), procedures (including ignition prevention)
4 A More common industry scenario with upper range of spill volume. POL facilities history (Section 2.3.2) shows that 85% of spills involved < 25 bbl.
2) Vapor escaping from liquid leak from storage tank
• Improper practice during maintenance/water drawdown
a) Spill 500 bbl, flammable vapor cloud on site ignites causing fire
• Containment • Drainage paths away from tanks • Operating procedures • Maintenance procedures • Fire fighting equipment, procedures
3 A Historical incident at previous POA facility involving ignited vapor cloud (while cleaning) and resulting in worker fatality, impacts limited to site.
3) Liquid leak from tank bottom
• Corrosion a) Chronic spill into ground until detected
• Cathodically protected to API 652 • API 653 inspections • Maintenance procedures • Inventory control • Internal liner extends 3 ft up sidewalls • Double bottom on some tanks
3 A Industry scenario and 1 historical leak in POA facilities history. No corrosion detected from recent inspections.
4) Liquid spill during tank filling
• Operator, detection equipment failure
a) Overtop 10,000 bbl before detection and shut down, spill contained, ignites causing fire
• Redundant and automatic tank gauging • Audible Hi/Lo level alarms • Operating procedures (training) • Containment • Fire fighting equipment, procedures
1 C This historical industry scenario is being addressed through increased standards. Cause of largest historical spill at POL facilities.
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Table 4.2 Hazard Scenario Worksheet (continued)
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Risk* What If Causes Consequences Risk Mitigation Measures
F C Notes
5) Rupture of tank inlet or outlet piping
• Over-pressuring system
• Falling ice • Incorrect installation
a) Spill of 500 bbl, contained, ignites causing fire
• Failsafe tank safety valves • Protection barrier from falling ice • Operating procedures • Maintenance procedures • Containment • Fire fighting equipment, procedures
2 A Historical incident at POA facilities. Mitigation measures have since been implemented.
6) Catastrophic tank/piping/valve rupture
• Brittle fracture a) Spill of tank contents – max 98,000 bbl, majority (70%) contained, remainder overflows containment due to wave action, ignites and causes fire in contained area
• Engineering design practice • Containment • Fire fighting equipment, procedures
1 D Given the cold climate, brittle fracture is assumed to be the most likely failure mode.
7) Catastrophic tank rupture (toppling or buckling)
• Earthquake magnitude >>M=9
• Severe storm event (Tsunami, Flood)
a) Spill of tank contents of 32,000 - 98,000 bbl, majority (70%) contained, remainder overflows containment due to wave action, ignites and causes fire in contained area
b) b) Spill from multiple tanks, containment breached and massive spill flows towards Knik Arm
• New tanks designed to Earthquake Zone 4 seismic conditions (highest level)
• All tanks designed to API 12c or 650 for applicable earthquake hazards
• Tank ringwalls, diameter:height ratio 3:1 provide seismic stability
• All but one old tank survived 1964 earthquake (>8.4-9.2 magnitude)
• Following any seismic activity, tanks, piping, pumps and control units are visually inspected.
• Storm design and mitigation for potential flooding
1 D Failure cause is inadequate design flexibility for an earthquake. See Scenario 13 for pipelines. Tsunami Warning Center indicates an extreme vertical sea floor shift in Cook Inlet is less likely cause. Contents of one truck spilled during 1964 earthquake, but no fire.
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Table 4.2 Hazard Scenario Worksheet (continued)
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Risk* What If Causes Consequences Risk Mitigation Measures
F C Notes
8) Catastrophic tank rupture • Sabotage, vandalism, vehicle or aircraft crash
a) Spill of tank contents – max 98,000 bbl, majority (70%) contained, remainder overflows containment due to wave action, ignites and causes fire in contained area
• Military flight procedures • Some fencing • Some security policing • Lighting
<1
D All these causes were combined with a maximum spill consequence scenario.
Transfer & Facility Pipelines 9) Large leak from valve • Improper maintenance
• Corrosion • Valve failure
a) Spill of 50 bbl, contained, ignites causing fire
• SCADA detection, ESD (dynamic & static)
• Containment • Level alarm in valve box • Maintenance procedures • Fire fighting equipment, procedures
3 A Leak scenario with upper range of spill volume. POL facilities history (Section 2.3.2) shows that 85% of spills involved < 25 bbl.
10) Large leak from pumps • Mechanical failure (seals)
a) Spill of 100 bbl, contained, ignites causing fire
• Operating procedures (regular visual detection)
• Maintenance procedures • Pumps located outside of containment
area • Fire fighting equipment, procedures
3 A Higher probability of ignition is associated with this scenario. POL facilities history includes 1 spill incident with no fire.
11) Pipeline leak • Coating failure/damage
• Corrosion • Third party damage • Incorrect installation
a) Chronic leak of 100 – 1,000 bbl, pooling of product on surface, ignites causing fire
• Coating quality control • Hydrostatic testing on underground
pipelines • Cathodic protection NACE RF-01-69 • SCADA detection, ESD (dynamic &
static) • Operating procedures (regular visual
detection of aboveground piping) • Maintenance procedures
2 A Industry performance shows a greater potential for leaks compared to ruptures. Incidents recorded in the POL facilities history.
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Table 4.2 Hazard Scenario Worksheet (continued)
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Risk* What If Causes Consequences Risk Mitigation Measures
F C Notes
12) U/G Pipeline rupture • Third party excavation (POA area)
• Overpressure • Incorrect installation
a) Spill of 500 –5,000 bbl, ignites causing fire
• One call system • Line marking • Work permit system • Fire fighting equipment, procedures
2 B Spill is outside of impoundment. Maximum spill size of 150 bbl for hot-oil trace system (Williams)
13) Pipeline rupture
• Earthquake magnitude >>M=9 (See Hazard Scenario 7)
a) Spill of pipeline contents • Implementing flexibility into design • Automatic valves
-- -- Included with Scenario 7
Tank Truck Operations 14) Spill while loading • Overfilling, hose
failure, improper procedure
a) Spill of 30 bbl of light product, contained, ignites causing (explosion and) fire
• Impoundment and collection tank (5,000 gal) holds spill of largest single compartment
• Operating procedures –continuous monitoring
• Automatic (& manual) foam fire fighting system
• Ignition prevention
4 A This historical industry scenario is being addressed through increased standards. Historical spills and fires at POL facilities.
15) Spill from rollover • Driving accident, equipment failure (blown tire, brake failure), third party cause
a) Spill 200 bbl (100% of cargo) of gasoline, ignites causing fire
• Operating procedures –low speeds, training
• Controlled traffic flow • Maintenance procedures
2 A Industry history shows a lower probability for a large spill (complete load)
Rail Car Operations 16) Spill while unloading • Hose failure, improper
procedure a) Spill of 60 bbl of light product, contained, ignites causing (explosion and) fire
• Impoundment and collection tank (20,000 gal) holds spill of largest single compartment
• Operating procedures -continuous monitoring
• Automatic (& manual) foam fire fighting system
• Ignition prevention
3 A Asphalt spill will cool immediately into solid. Light product selected to address more severe consequences.
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Table 4.2 Hazard Scenario Worksheet (continued)
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Risk* What If Causes Consequences Risk Mitigation Measures
F C Notes
17) Spill from derailment
• Procedures (Push vs. pull), car misalignment, third party (level crossing)
a) Spill 200 bbl of heavier product (30% cargo loss through 2 inch hole), ignites causing fire
• Equipment and procedure actions identified through a rail risk assessment (Alaska Railroad)
• Operating procedures –low speeds, training
• Maintenance procedures
2 B Asphalt spill will cool immediately into solid. Industry history shows greater potential for selected spill size.
Marine Terminal Operations 18) Spill from loading/unloading
• Hose failure, improper procedure
a) Spill 200 bbl of light product onto dock (and water) before flow shut in, ignites causing fire
• Operating procedures (certification required)
• Maintenance procedures (regulated) • Vessel operations (Coast Guard
requirements) • Continuous visual inspection • Ignition prevention • Fire fighting equipment
1 A POL spill history includes much smaller spills and no fires.
* F = Frequency, C = Consequence Level from Study Risk Matrix.
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Hazard scenarios are identified according to the “What If” questions 1 through 18 and their
associated consequence. One earthquake scenario has two consequences identified to illustrate a
range of effects.
4.3 RISK ESTIMATION
4.3.1 Consequence Analysis
Consequences from a POL spill and fire or explosion in the POA area that may impact public
safety were evaluated for each of the hazard scenarios identified in Section 4.2. A generic event
tree was developed to describe how a release of POL flammable material may lead to a fire or
explosion as shown in Figure 4.2. This schematic shows that an accidental POL release will
result in either a liquid or vapor that could be flammable and subject to ignition.
There are many types of release that are represented by the generic event tree. For example,
vapor may be released into the seal area of the floating roof in a storage tank, or liquid may flow
from a failed pipe in the storage tank containment area and follow the topography within the
containment area. Vapor released from a liquid spill may travel downwind. Storage tanks can
have product released into the rim seal area, into roof pontoons, onto floating roofs, out the roof
into the containment area, through the tank bottom, and through failed pipe connections at flanges
or valves. Pipelines can leak, rupture, and have product released through failed pumps and
valves. Other potential system releases are described in the hazard scenarios. Extensive spill and
release mitigation measures are described in the operator spill contingency plans to deal with
environmental impacts.
Should an ignition source ignite the flammable portion of a vapor cloud or a liquid release, then
the consequences can escalate to a fire or explosion. For example, a recent study on large
diameter petroleum tank fires found lightning was the principal ignition source for some 60% of
fires [Myers, 1996]. Other causes, such as hot work and static electricity, each account for less
the 4% of fires. Industry codes and practice as noted previously in Table 2.1 mitigate the
potential for ignition. However, some hazard scenarios such as a leak from a pump are associated
with higher ignition likelihoods due to the nature of the incident (moving parts in a pump, etc.).
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Different types of fines and explosions may occur following ignition. A flash fire from igniting
the flammable portion of a vapor cloud shown in Figure 4.2 is a short-term fire that can flash
back to the liquid pool, if that was the source for the vapor. Confined vapor, for example, in a
tank, may explode and unconfined vapor clouds outside may also explode and burn. A pool of
flammable fuel, if ignited, will burn and thermal radiation will radiate from the fire. Fire fighting
measures are used to minimize the consequences from all types of potential fires. Small fires can
escalate into larger fires, but historical incidents have shown this to be rare. For example, a
recent study of large diameter petroleum tank fires found that only 1 of 55 small rim fires in
floating roof tanks escalated to a full surface fire [Myers, 1996]. Only 12 of 107 fires studied
over a 15 year period involved multiple tanks.
Smoke from a POL product fire is a consequence not shown in Figure 4.2 because the nature of
the public risk is different from the fire risk that is the focus of this study. However, smoke can
also impact the public, who may be exposed to the associated particulate matter via inhalation of
ingestion pathways. Photographs showing the nature of the plume formed by two historical fires
in the POA area are presented in Appendix B. The characteristics of both the POL product and
resulting fire scenario along with the weather conditions will effect the smoke plume and its
impact distance from the source. In general, the heat from a fire will cause the smoke plume to
rise and depending on weather conditions, the plume particulates will disperse downwind.
Prevailing winds are from the south from May to August and from the North the remainder of the
year [Anchorage Airport 1961-1990]. Modeling of smoke dispersion was not included in the
study scope, however the potential for public evacuation due to smoke was estimated based on
the size of a fire.
The public risk defined in this study is associated with potential exposure to a fire, thermal
radiation or smoke from a fire and overpressures from an explosion. Exposure is moderated by
the following:
• Separation of facilities. The separation of the POL terminal facilities from the public is in
compliance with applicable industry standards as described previously in Section 3.
Although the spacing requirements between tanks and the public (e.g. NFPA 30) do not
specify the basis for the recommendations, they appear to respond to minimizing the potential
for one tank fire to escalate to multiple tanks and to maximize access for fire fighting.
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• Time of fire. Public risk is also related to potential exposure to the risk, or the time that a
fire is burning. Recent fire fighting responses in the storage tank industry have required
varying times to extinguish fires (some 20% burned out without being extinguished) [Myers,
1996].
• Proximity to fire. Although storage tank fires are extremely hazardous, especially if people
were involved in the ignition event, there have only been a few that have involved fatalities to
fire fighters or the public.
Thermal Modeling
Thermal radiation modeling can be used instead of code values to develop separation distances
from POL facilities and the public. Model results provide a separation distance based on a known
set of parameters. However, care should be used interpreting any model results, since their
reliability may be limited by the assumptions used in the model or our ability to define key
parameters.
One model was described previously in Section 3 that is used when evaluating public facilities
funded by HUD. The HUD model is generally considered to be conservative because it is based
on a simplified analytical model and set of input variables. Therefore, example consequences
from a pool fire were also modeled using the Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident
Evaluation (ARCHIE) program published by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Department of Transportation and Environmental Protection Agency [FEMA, 1989]. A summary
of the objectives, features, and principal models from ARCHIE is presented in Appendix D. The
ARCHIE program also provides conservative results when compared to more complex models,
due to the assumptions incorporated in the analysis, but it is a more specific approach to
conditions at this site than the HUD model.
Summary of Consequence Analysis
Results from the consequence analysis for pool fires and flash fires are presented in Appendix E
and provide hazard zones associated with a range of product properties and spills. The objective
was to provide an overview of potential consequence severity associated with the study hazard
scenarios. These results may be interpolated to generally apply to various locations and
conditions throughout the POA area. Two example applications are shown schematically in
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Figure 4.3. In this figure, the potential hazard zones are overlaid at the following two locations in
the POA area:
• The East diked area of the Williams terminal containing the storage tanks closest to the
Government Hill neighborhood.
• The remote impounding basin of the Chevron terminal located to the North of the
Government Hill neighborhood.
The hazard zones shown in Figure 4.3 are simplified modeling results based on thermal radiation
criteria described in Appendix D. The East diked area modeling results are based on a 10,000 bbl
gasoline spill from one of the tanks while the modeling results from a 10,000 bbl naphtha spill
were used as a surrogate for the potential aviation fuel spill in the Chevron remote impounding
basin. A zone is shown to illustrate the variation in potential distances depending on actual
scenario characteristics. Three exposure zones associated with the study Risk Matrix
consequences are identified in Figure 4.3 for each location:
• Wood Ignition Zone. Wood burning criteria relate to a thermal radiation incident flux of 24
kW/m2, and they are associated with property damage and forest fire potential (such as along
the Government Hill bluffs).
• Injury Exposure Zone. Human injury exposure criteria relate to a thermal radiation incident
flux of 5 kW/m2 that will cause second-degree burn injuries on bare skin if the duration of
exposure is about 45 seconds if a person does not move from the area or find
shelter/protection.
• Fatality Exposure Zone. Fatality exposure assumes that people will not move away from the
fire or seek shelter. Exposure criteria relate to a thermal radiation incident flux of 10 kW/m2
that will quickly cause third-degree burns that are likely to lead to fatality if a person does not
move from the area or find shelter/protection.
During an actual fire scenario, potential consequences may be significantly less than the modeling
results due to many mitigating factors. Factors mitigating the harmful effects from thermal
radiation include wearing clothing or using other shielding measures such as seeking cover,
topographic or constructed barriers, and the physical act of moving away. The effects criteria
used for the simple ARCHIE consequence model are conservative in predicting receptor
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response, and have been used in the study Risk Matrix to represent exposure to harm rather than
occurrence of harm.
4.3.2 Frequency Analysis
A frequency analysis was carried out for each of the hazard scenarios based on industry and site
experience and the consequence effects described in Section 4.3.1. The objective was to estimate
frequencies within the order of magnitude levels described in the study Risk Matrix presented
previously in Table 4.1.
The approach to estimating hazard scenario frequencies involved using average national accident
rates collated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA, 1989] and relevant
exposure data. Accident rates and conditional consequence probabilities were averaged in the
reference based on a survey of relevant databases and published data in the US and worldwide.
These data addressed the following activities associated with the transportation and storage of
hazardous materials:
• Bulk storage facilities
• Bulk transportation by truck
• Bulk transportation by rail
• Bulk transportation by barge or other marine vessel
• Transportation by pipeline
Exposures such as the volume of truck unloading operations were based on the operations at the
POL facilities. Additional estimates were based on other assumptions where required.
A summary of the frequency estimates is provided in Table 4.3 and the consequence severity
estimates in Table 4.4. The estimates according to the order-of-magnitude frequency and
consequence severity indices in the study Risk Matrix are further described for all hazard
scenarios in Appendix F.
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Table 4. 4 Summary of Consequence Severity Estimates
Fire Hazard Scenario Type of Spill Type of Fire Receptor Impact Risk Matrix
Size (bbl) Contained On-Site Range Level
Tanks 6) Catastrophic Failure
32,000-98,000 70% within diked area, remainder overflows in POA area, may reach Knik Arm
Pool fire, duration variable from hours to days with fire fighting response
• Heavy smoke depending on product & duration • Nearby trees may be ignited depending on
location, leading to property damage • Nearby public may be exposed to thermal injury
or fatality zone depending on location • See modeling results for example hazard zones
A-D D
Tanks 7 & 13) Large quake spill
a) 32,000-98,000 b) multiple tanks
a) 70% within diked area, remainder overflows in POA area, may reach Knik Arm b) Containment breached
Pool fire, duration of days, if containment breached –more severe fire follows topography west towards Knik Arm
• Quake damage may be more severe than fire damage
• Heavy smoke depending on product & duration • Nearby trees may be ignited depending on
location, leading to property damage • Nearby public may be exposed to thermal injury
or fatality zone depending on location • See modeling results for example hazard zones
A-D D
Tanks 8) Sabotage 32,000-98,000 70% within diked area, remainder overflows in POA area, may reach Knik arm
Fire caused directly from incident, duration variable from hours to days with fire fighting response
• Heavy smoke depending on product & duration • Nearby trees may be ignited depending on
location, leading to property damage • Nearby public may be exposed to thermal injury
or fatality zone depending on location • See modeling results for example hazard zones
A-D D
Tanks 4) Large overfilling spill
10,000 Within diked area Pool fire, duration variable over many hours with fire fighting response
• Heavy smoke depending on product & duration • Nearby trees may be ignited within 67-134 ft
depending on location, leading to property damage
• Nearby public may be exposed to thermal injury or fatality zone depending on location
• See modeling results for exposure zone details: Example for gasoline/naptha:
-Wood ignition exposure: up to 130 ft from fire -Thermal injury exposure: up to 470 ft from fire -Fatality exposure: up to 300 ft from fire
A-D C
Pipelines 12) Underground rupture
500-5,000 Within POA area of rupture
Pool/groundfire, duration variable over many hours with fire fighting response
• Heavy smoke depending on product & duration will require evacuation
A-B B
Rail Cars 17) Derailment spill 200 Within POA area of derailment
Ground fire of heavy product, duration variable over hours with fire fighting response
• Heavy smoke depending on product & duration will require evacuation
A-B B
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Fire Hazard Scenario Type of Spill Type of Fire Receptor Impact Risk Matrix Size (bbl) Contained On-Site Range Level
Tanks 1) Small pipe leak 0-50 Within diked area Ground fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A A
Tanks 2) Moderate leak, vapor
500 Within POA area Vapor fire, duration very short – liquid fire duration variable over hours with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site • Explosion overpressure decays quickly
A-B A
Tanks 3) Chronic bottom leak
0-50 Within diked area (mixed with soil)
Ground fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A A
Tanks 5) Pipe rupture 500 Within diked area Pool/ground fire, duration variable over hours with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A-B A
Pipelines 9) Valve leak 0-50 Within valve area Ground fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A A
Pipelines 10) Pump spill 100 Within pump sump/area
Pool fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A A
Pipelines 11) Chronic leak 100-1,000 Within POA area (mixed with soil)
Ground fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A A
Tank Trucks 14) Loading spill 0-30 Within loading area Vapor fire, duration very short - pool fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site • Explosion overpressure decays quickly
A A
Tank Trucks 15) Rollover spill 200 Within POA area of rollover
Ground fire of light product, duration variable over hours with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A-B A
Rail Cars 16) Unloading spill 60 Within unloading area Ground fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A A
Marine Terminal
18) Marine transfer spill
0-200 Not contained if on water
Pool fire, duration short with fire fighting response
• Variable smoke conditions offsite limited by size & duration
• Thermal exposures limited to site
A-B A
Notes: Risk Matrix Level A: Site Safety Issue Risk Matrix Level B: Public Exposure to Evacuation Risk Matrix Level C: Public Exposure to Injury Risk Matrix Level D: Public Exposure to Fatality
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Each hazard scenario frequency estimate shown in Table 4.3 was calculated by multiplying the
spill frequency, conditional spill size probability, exposure (in units matching the spill frequency)
and conditional fire probability together to derive an estimate in events per year. The frequency
estimate was then translated into the order-of-magnitude levels identified through the study Risk
Matrix.
4.3.3 Risk Estimates
The 17 hazard scenarios described in Section 4.2 have been located in the study Risk Matrix
according to their estimated risks as shown in Table 4.5. Hazard Scenario 13 was included with
Hazard Scenario 7 because they have a common cause (earthquakes) and therefore a total of 17
risks were estimated. Hazard Scenarios 4, 6, 7 & 13 and 8 are shown in brackets in Table 4.5
because their frequency estimates are expected to be lower than Level 1. The cumulative risk for
each fire consequence is shown at the bottom of the study Risk Matrix. For example, the
cumulative risk of a small site fire (Consequence Severity Level A) is approximately one every 2
years.
The study Risk Matrix presents a risk profile of the POL facilities in the POA area that provided a
basis for Phases II and III of the Hazard Study. The discrete scenarios shown in the Risk Matrix
are a representation of many different combinations of frequency and consequence that present
less risk than the scenarios depicted.
4.4 RISK RANKING
As described previously, the Study Risk Profile shown in Table 4.5 includes a three level ranking
system highlighted by the shading representing roughly equivalent levels of risk based on
professional judgement. An estimated risk profile for the POL facilities in the POA area is
overlaid on this ranking system. Risks estimated for the identified hazard scenarios may
therefore be ranked as follows:
⇑ Increasing Risk
6 Hazard Scenarios (1, 4, 6, 7&13, 8, 14)
11 Hazard Scenarios (2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18)
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5. RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT (PHASE II)
5.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Risks may be mitigated or eliminated through various strategies. In general, risks may be
mitigated at any stage of the hazard scenario that was previously illustrated through Figure 4.1.
Risks may also be eliminated if the hazard is removed from the receptor of concern (although if
the hazardous activity continues, risk may be transferred to other receptors).
The mitigation or reduction of risk involves the implementation of measures to reduce the
frequency, the severity of consequences or both these attributes of risk. Risks can only be
eliminated if the hazard is eliminated or if the receptor is not exposed.
Different strategies are applied to different stages of the hazard scenario in order to halt its
development. Four different strategies and their points of application are illustrated using the
hazard scenario schematic presented in Figure 5.1 and described below.
• Failure Prevention. Failure prevention measures reduce the frequency (or possibly
eliminate) the base causes of hazardous accidents releasing POL materials. These include
design, procedures for operating, maintenance and inspection, training, equipment
specifications and risk analysis. They are typically addressed by using best practices and
industry standards.
• Safeguards. Safeguards provide redundancy of protection. If failure occurs, then safeguards
reduce the probability of it leading to an accidental release that results in serious
consequences or they limit the extent and thus consequences of the release. Safeguards
include additional safety equipment, management systems, administrative controls and
operating procedures.
• Impact Limitation. Following a release, impact limitation measures such as the detection
and isolation of releases, ignition prevention, fire protection and emergency response reduce
the size of resulting hazard zones. Reliability and controllability of prevention is much more
assured before an adverse event occurs rather than after it occurs and therefore, prevention
measures are of primary interest. However, in high risk situations it may be warranted to
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ensure that serious consequences from a release can be mitigated through measures such as
emergency response.
• Receptor Protection. The effects from a hazard on the receptors can be mitigated by
implementing measures to protect the receptor or reduce the consequence severity. These
include buffer zones or setbacks, sheltering of receptors (e.g., providing barriers to thermal
radiation) and evacuation.
The most effective risk mitigation strategy is first to prevent or reduce the likelihood of hazardous
accidents through application of good engineering practice and use of industry standards and then
second, be prepared to respond and mitigate the consequences. Examples of industry standards
include API 653 and 2610 to mitigate terminal and tank facility risks. Diversity of risk mitigation
measures may also be an effective overall strategy when a number of measures are applied at
different stages of the hazard scenario illustrated in Figure 5.1.
5.2 CURRENT OR PLANNED RISK MITIGATION MEASURES
In general, there are two classes of risk mitigation measures: 1) those measures such as design
and training that can prevent a spill or ignition and 2) those measures such as fire fighting and
emergency response that can mitigate the severity of consequences.
Risk mitigation measures were collated for each principal hazard scenarios according to these two
classes in Phase II of the Hazard Study.
Various existing risk mitigation measures were collated from the operator plans in Phase I of the
Hazard Study. These measures were documented according to the associated hazard scenarios as
previously presented in Table 2.2. The estimated risk profile, including these specific risk
mitigation measures for the POL facilities in the POA area, was then presented in risk matrix
format (Table 4.5). In Phase II of the Hazard Study, a more comprehensive list of risk mitigation
alternatives was developed based on the results of a workshop with Task Force and POL
operators in the POA area.
A workshop forum was used to identify the significant risk mitigation measures associated with
each of the identified hazard scenarios. The checklist presented in Table 5.1 was used by the
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workshop participants to assist in this task. As shown in Table 5.1, three types of mitigation were
included. Construction and operation standards were reviewed. Seven standard elements of a
risk management program were incorporated. Finally, the implementation schedule was
identified.
Table 5.1 Checklist to Identify Risk Mitigation Measures
Type of Mitigation Construction &
Operation Standards Risk Management
Elements Implementation
Schedule 1) Risk Reduction
through Prevention (reduce likelihood)
2) Risk Reduction through Consequence Mitigation (reduce consequence severity)
3) Risk Elimination
1) Industry (i.e. API and others)
2) Government (i.e. Adopting International or Uniform Fire Code)
3) Operator (i.e. practices more stringent than requirements)
1) Engineering Design 2) Safety Equipment 3) Facility layout 4) Operating Procedures 5) Maintenance Procedures 6) Emergency Response 7) Management Systems
- QA Program - Hazard Assessment - Management of Change - Auditing - Incident Investigation - Documentation - Training - Lessons Learned - Lookbacks
1) Complete (all POA Area facilities)
2) Partial (% of POA Facilities)
3) Future
The alternative risk mitigation measures identified from Phase I and the Phase II workshop are
collated in Table 5.2. For each of the 18 identified hazard scenarios, risk mitigation measures are
listed according to both prevention measures and consequence mitigation measures. Details for
each hazard scenario were described previously in Table 2.2 and only short titles are repeated in
this table. The last column in Table 5.2 describes the implementation schedule for each risk
mitigation measure at all POL facilities. Different measures have been implemented at different
facilities and may be fully or partially implemented at this time. A number of measures such as
the consequence mitigation of fire fighting are common to many or all hazard scenarios. These
measures are described for Hazard Scenario 1) or another applicable scenario and referenced as
appropriate for those hazard scenarios that follow.
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Table 5.2 Current or Planned Risk Mitigation Measures
Hazard Scenario Risk Mitigation Measures Implementation Schedule for
POL Facilities Prevention Measures
1) Twin Seal valves (Bubble tight, positive insulation). Secondary valves are API 607 Fire-safe valves. Hydraulic Fail-Safe Tank isolation valves.
50% of tank farms
2) All cast iron valves removed 100% of tank farms 3) All valves are chained and locked as appropriate 100% of tank farms 4) Valves are closed when not in use 50% of tank farms 5) No ignition source from pumps (located outside tank dykes
including those tanks closes to residents); remaining pumps meet current standards.
75% of tank farms
6) API 2610 Management and Operation of Terminals 100% of tank farms this year 7) Use of fully trained contractors (rather than low bid approach) 100 % of tank farms 8) Industry experience documented through API alerts, bulletins,
lessons learned etc. 100 % of tank farms
9) Incident management and tracking systems (uses proactive analyses to mitigate risk and prevent accidents)
100% of tank farm operators
Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) Containment 100% of tanks - Topographical containment in addition to diking 15% of tanks - swales around piping 25% of tank farms by year end - a remote impound basin with topographic containment 25% of tank farms
2) Drainage paths away from tanks to remote impound basin - Ability to pump tank farm to secondary containment
25% of tank farms
3) Documented daily operator inspections 100% of tank farms 4) API 570 inspection program (recently implemented) 100% of tank farms 5) Preventative Maintenance Program 100% of tank farms 6) Detection: above ground piping within containment area 75% of tank farms; additional 5%
of piping will be daylighted this year
7) Fire fighting a) Fixed foam systems 100% of light product tanks
Tanks 1) Small Pipe Leak
b) Systems maintained and periodically tested in accordance with NFPA25
100% of tank farms
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Hazard Scenario Risk Mitigation Measures Implementation Schedule for
POL Facilities c) Tabletop drills 100% of tank farms d) Operator training / fire training:
(OSHA requires annual training on fire equipment) 100% of tank farms
- Specific petroleum fire fighting training provided to staff 100% of tank farms - Coordination/training with Anchorage Fire Department 100% of tank farms - Funding provided to support external petroleum fire training
for Anchorage Fire Department 50% of tank farm operators
8) 4 types of spill response plans: 1. OPA 90 Plan (EPA/USCG) 2. Coast Guard Operations Manual (USCG) 3. SPCC Plans (Kept at facility) 4. ADEC Spill Contingency Plan
100% of tank farms
9) On-site spill containment equipment 100% of tank farms
Tanks 1) Small Pipe Leak (cont)
10) CISPRI; members of Cook Inlet Spill Response Group 100% of tank farm operators Prevention Measures
1) Maintenance procedures to prevent accumulation of flammable vapors and to prevent ignition
100% of tank farms
2) Water draws are fully attended 100% of tank farm operators 3) 3rd party contractors are required to participate in training for
maintenance and accident prevention 100% of tank farm operators
4) Ignition source mitigation includes hot work permitting system; established procedures whenever possibility of vapor cloud exists, de-energize electrical power as appropriate. Traffic is most probable ignition source. Immediate mitigation: stop or restrict traffic. Transformers on overhead lines and substations are less likely sources
100% of tank farm operators
5) Water draws are locked when not being operated 100% of tank farms 6) Anti-freeze Twin Seal valves on water draws 25% of tank farms 7) Loss Prevention Systems (operator task analyses) 100% of tank farm operators Consequence Mitigation Measures
Tanks 2) Moderate Leak, Vapor
See Scenario 1) Measures 5), 7)b - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Cathodically protected to API 65 100% of tanks with single bottoms
2) API 653 inspections 100% of tanks 3) Internal liner extends 3 ft up sidewalls 60% of tanks; additional 10% of
tanks in future 4) Double bottom 3 of 30 Williams tanks and 10 of
10 Chevron tanks Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) Inventory control (leak detection) 100% of tanks 2) Monitoring Wells 100% of tank farms
Tanks 3) Chronic Bottom Leak
See Scenario 1) Measures 1) - 11)
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Hazard Scenario Risk Mitigation Measures Implementation Schedule for
POL Facilities Prevention Measures
1) Overfill protection systems are redundant and independent 100% of tank farms 2) Operating procedures (training) 100% of tank farm operators 3) Manned receipts and transfers 100% of tank farm operators Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) Instrumentation system initiates automatic and independent Emergency Shutdown activates four Motor Operated Valves
25% of tank farms
Tanks 4) Large Overfilling Spill
See Scenario 1) Measures 1) - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Protection barrier from falling ice for critical equipment 75% of tank farms currently have falling ice protection, remaining 25% plan to in future
2) Systems are operated w/in engineered, designated requirements for pressure relief
100% of tank farm operators
3) Process relief in addition to requirements 25% of tank farm operators 4) Hydro testing 25% of tank farm operators 5) Piping designed for flexibility 25% of tank farm operators 6) All pressure relief valves tested annually per USCG regulations 100% of tank farm operators Consequence Mitigation Measures
Tanks 5) Pipe Rupture
See Scenario 1) Measures 1) - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Engineering design practice (tanks assessed for brittle fracture in accordance with API 653)
100% of tank farms
2) All cast iron fittings and valves have been removed 100% of tank farms 3) Regular testing for tank integrity per API 653 100% of tank farms Consequence Mitigation Measures
Tanks 6) Catastrophic Failure
See Scenario 1) Measures 1) - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Tanks designed to API 12c or 650 for applicable earthquake hazards [The only failure in the 1964 earthquake (8.4 - 9.2 magnitude) was from a nozzle on one tank]
100% of tank farms
2) Following noticeable seismic activity, tanks, piping, pumps and control units are visually inspected before operations are continued
100% of tank farms
3) Facilities have completed seismic studies and implemented recommendations such as adding annular plates, lowering liquid levels and providing flexibility for appurtenances (in addition to code requirements)
75% of tank farms
4) Static leak detection system on Airport and Nikiski pipelines (dynamic system also on Airport pipeline)
Airport and Nikiski pipelines
5) Leak detection on transfer piping 50% of tank farms 6) Piping designed for flexibility 100% of tank farms 7) Elevation of berms/facilities limits impact from flooding or tsunami
hazard (which has been reported as low) 100 % of affected tank farms
8) Storm design and mitigation for potential flooding 100% of tank farms Consequence Mitigation Measures
Tanks 7 & 13) Large Quake Spill
See Scenario 1) Measures 1) - 11)
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Hazard Scenario Risk Mitigation Measures Implementation Schedule for
POL Facilities Prevention Measures
1) Ongoing port security effort including grant application for federal funds in March 2002
100% of tank farms
2) Security of terminal sites (fully fenced with barbed wire) approved by audit performed USCG/Army Counterintelligence after 9/11/01
100% of tank farms
3) Internal and third party audits 100% of tank farms 4) Port security, including random patrols by APD and Coast Guard
security 100% of tank farms
Consequence Mitigation Measures
Tanks 8) Sabotage
See Scenario 1) Measures 1) - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Twin Seal Valves, Bubble tight, positive isolation. Secondary valves are API 607 Fire-safe valves. Hydraulic Fail-Safe Tank isolation valves
50% of tank farms
2) Engineered system. No buried valves or installations in unlined pits where leakage can penetrate into ground and accumulate to a fire hazard.
100% of pipelines
3) API 570 Inspection program and valve assessment for leaks 100% of tank farms 4) Jersey barriers on road side Squirrel Cage and POAVY 5) All cast iron fittings and valves removed 100% of pipelines 6) First valve in yard is regulated by OPS 100% of pipelines 7) Airport and Nikiski pipelines are regulated by OPS Airport and Nikiski pipelines Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) Level alarm in valve box Airport pipeline 2) Static leak detection on Airport and Nikiski pipelines (dynamic
system also on Airport pipeline) Airport and Nikiski pipelines
Tanks 9) Valve Leak
See Scenario 1) Measures 1) - 11) Prevention Measures
1) No ignition source from pumps (located outside tank dykes including those tanks closes to residents); remaining pumps meet current standards.
75% of tank farms
2) Operating procedures (regular visual detection) 100% of pumps 3) Nitrogen seals 25% of tank farms Consequence Mitigation Measures
Pipelines 10) Pump Spill
See Scenario 1) Measures 7)b - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Coating quality control 100% of pipelines 2) Cathodic protection NACE RF-01-69 100% of pipelines 3) Integrity management requirements are operated under OPS for
Airport and Nikiski pipelines Airport and Nikiski pipelines
4) Line marking for Airport and Nikiski pipelines Chevron will mark additional line (POAVY) in near future
5) Operating procedures (regular visual detection of aboveground piping)
100% of pipelines
6) One Call system for locates when work being done in area 100% of pipelines 7) Excavation procedures Airport and Nikiski pipelines
Pipelines 11) Chronic Leak
8) Hydrostatic testing on underground pipelines 100% of pipelines
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Hazard Scenario Risk Mitigation Measures Implementation Schedule for
POL Facilities Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) SCADA detection, ESD (dynamic & static) Airport and Nikiski pipelines
See Scenario 1) Measures 7)b - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Work permit system 100% of pipelines 2) Operator training 100% of pipelines 3) Operator Qualification Program Airport and Nikiski pipelines;
implemented in 2002 to OPS requirements
4) ARRC off-plot procedures 100% of pipelines 5) Communications systems 100% of pipelines See Scenario 11, Measures 7) - 8) Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) Process relief Airport and Nikiski pipelines
Pipelines 12) Underground Leak
See Scenario 11) Measure 1); see Scenario 1) Measures 7)b - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Operating procedures –continuous monitoring, random physical inspection of trucks
100% of facilities
2) Brake interlock while any hose is hooked up 100% of facilities 3) All loading is done by bottom loading 100% of facilities 4) Filling procedures to minimize and dissipate static, including the
addition of static inhibitor to product 100% of facilities
5) Product loading sequence to minimize static 100% of facilities 6) Ignition prevention - Traffic control on gasoline-powered vehicles
on site Future opportunity to control traffic off-site and control smoking in designated areas off-site to the same degree as on-site. NFPA requirement is 50 ft, but needs to be enforced by Fire Marshall off property
7) Truck Inspection Program – all trucks loading at rack required to provide documentation showing that all safety equipment inspected and operational
100% of facilities
Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) Impoundment and collection tank (5,000 gal) holds spill of largest single compartment
100% of facilities
Trucks 14) Loading Spill
2) Automatic foam fire fighting system & shut down 100% of facilities See Scenario 1) Measures 5), 7) - 11)
Prevention Measures
1) Operating procedures – low speeds, training (Driver attends 8 hour Hazwoper Training, Operators attend 24 hour Hazwoper Training, Terminal Manager attends Incident Commander Training, Terminal Manager attends tank truck rollover school)
100% of trucks
2) Controlled traffic flow 100% of trucks 3) Annual DOT inspection requirements 100% of trucks 4) Random checks at weigh stations by state troopers 100% of trucks
Trucks 15) Rollover Spill
5) Plans to remove at-grade rail crossings at access road Future implementation
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Hazard Scenario Risk Mitigation Measures Implementation Schedule for
POL Facilities 6) Certification to load for every vehicle and driver; each is checked
at every loading, if not current, no loading is allowed 100% of trucks
Consequence Mitigation Measures
See Scenario 1) Measures 5), 7)b - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Operating procedures – continuous monitoring 100% of facilities 2) Ignition prevention 100% of facilities 3) Rail car inspection prior to unloading 100% of facilities 4) Continuously manned during transfer operation (brakes are set,
wheels chocks applied, blue flag to prevent locomotive from coming in)
100% of facilities
5) Regular, formal inspection by railroad of track and railcar integrity 100% of facilities 6) Hot work permit system in place 100% of facilities 7) Rail and rack are bonded to mitigate potential ignition source 100% of facilities Consequence Mitigation Measures
1) Impoundment and collection tank (20,000 gal) holds spill of largest single compartment
100% of facilities
2) Automatic foam fire fighting system 100% of facilities
Rail 16) Unloading Spill
See Scenario 1) Measures 5), 7) - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Equipment and procedure actions identified through a rail risk assessment (Alaska Railroad)
100% of cars
2) Operating procedures – low speeds, training 100% of cars 3) ARRC preventative maintenance procedures 100% of cars Consequence Mitigation Measures
Rail Cars 17) Derailment Spill
See Scenario 1) Measures 5), 7)b - 11) Prevention Measures
1) Operating procedures (certification required) Both loading docks 2) Annual, regulated hydrostatic testing of hoses Both loading docks 3) Vessel operations (Coast Guard requirements, tug stays with
vessel) Both loading docks
4) Continuous visual inspection Both loading docks 5) Ignition prevention Both loading docks 6) Direct and continuous communication from unloading to terminal
facility (tankerman on vessel to dock; dock to terminal) Both loading docks
7) Facility meets USCG requirements. (port commissions annual 3rd party audits with recommendations incorporated into facility maintenance schedule)
Both loading docks
Consequence Mitigation Measures
Maine Terminal 18) Marine Transfer Spill
See Scenario 1) Measures 7), 10), 11)
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A wide variety of risk mitigation measures are identified in Table 5.2 covering the four areas of a
developing hazard scenario previously described through Figure 5.1. Many measures are
common to all facilities while other alternatives have been implemented at different facilities.
Measures currently in place are identified along with those planned for implementation this year.
The risk mitigation measures summarized in Table 5.2 are based on both industry experience and
the specific experience of operations in the POA area. Industry experience is incorporated
through codes and practices and through bulletins, alerts, lessons learned and symposia. POA
area experience is incorporated through the implementation of measures to prevent re-occurrence
of past incidents as described previously in Section 2.3 and through incident management systems
as described in Table 5.2. These risk mitigation measures currently being implemented are
expected to reduce the risk of all hazard scenarios shown in the risk matrix presented in Section
4.3. As previously described, the study risk profile was based on historical industry data (Pre-
1990). The current operations at the facilities are expected to reduce this risk profile as a result of
industry efforts to improve operations through implementation of Consensus Standards such as
those from API.
As discussed previously, there are other measures that are not currently planned that could be
implemented to eliminate some risks. These measures, such as setbacks, are addressed in Phase
III of the Hazard Study (Section 6).
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6. RISK MITIGATION PLAN (PHASE III)
6.1 METHODOLOGY
A plan for the implementation of mitigation measures was developed using a risk based approach.
The Study Risk Profile for the POL facilities presented in Table 4.5 of Phase I provided the base
assessment. Current and planned risk mitigation measures addressing each of the 18
representative hazard scenarios were collated in Phase II, Table 5.2. Hazard scenarios associated
with higher risks were selected by the Task Force for incorporation in the Phase III risk
mitigation plan. This approach prioritizes the allocation of resources to gain the most effective
benefit in terms of risk reduction. However, many measures addressing the higher risk scenarios
in Phase III will also reduce the risks of the remaining scenarios.
Measures were identified to cover the range of alternatives from eliminating or transferring risk to
mitigating higher risk scenarios to lower risk levels as described in the following subsections of
Section 6. A qualitative cost benefit analysis was carried out on this range of risk mitigation
alternatives for the selected higher risk scenarios. The order of magnitude costs for implementing
the measures were compared to the benefits in risk reduction (or elimination). As described
previously in Section 5.1, benefits in risk reduction may include reduction in the likelihood of
occurrence of an undesirable public health and safety event or a reduction in the severity of its
consequences or both. The recommended risk mitigation plan was developed from the risk based
cost benefit analysis. An implementation strategy was then recommended for the preferred
mitigation plan.
6.2 HIGHER RISK HAZARD SCENARIOS
Seven hazard scenarios associated with higher risks were selected by the Task Force for
incorporation in the Phase III risk mitigation plan. These hazard scenarios are listed in Table 6.1
along with their estimated risk from their location in the Study Risk Profile shown previously in
Tables ES-1 and 4.5.
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Table 6.1
Higher Risk Hazard Scenarios
Risk Estimate (See Table 4.5) Hazard Scenario
Frequency Consequence Severity 1) Tanks – Small Pipe Leak 4 (1 event in 10 years) A (Site Safety Issue)
14) Trucks – Loading Spill 4 (1 event in 10 years) A (Site Safety Issue)
4) Tanks – Overfilling Spill 1 (1 event in 10,000 years C (Public Exposure to Injury)
6) Tanks – Catastrophic Failure 1 (1 event in 10,000 years D (Public Exposure to Fatality)
7 & 13) Tanks – Large Quake Spill 1 (1 event in 10,000 years D (Public Exposure to Fatality)
8) Tanks – Sabotage 1 (1 event in 10,000 years D (Public Exposure to Fatality)
Estimated risks for hazard scenarios 1) and 14) shown in Table 6.1 are higher frequency but
lower consequence severity (site safety issues). Estimated risks for the remaining hazard
scenarios 4), 6), 7), 13) and 8) are much lower frequency but higher consequence severity (public
exposure to injury or fatality from a fire).
6.3 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES AND ALTERNATIVES
Current and planned risk mitigation measures addressing each of the 18 representative hazard
scenarios were collated in Table 5.2 of Phase II. The measures described in Phase II (Section 5)
encompass a variety of mitigation alternatives that vary between measures to eliminate or transfer
risk to measures aimed at mitigating higher risk scenarios to lower risk levels. The risk
mitigation measures identified in Phase II are further evaluated for the higher risk scenarios in the
following section, along with a number of other additional measures encompassing intermediate
levels of mitigation as well as the boundary condition of risk elimination. Although the focus of
Phase III is the higher risk scenarios, implementation of the additional Phase III measures for
higher risk hazard scenarios will also reduce the risks of the remaining scenarios.
The risk of Hazard Scenario 8) included sabotage as one of the causal factors and the associated
frequency estimate was based on an assumed value. This risk for the POL facilities in the POA
area is difficult to compare to industry given the varied security and potential target issues,
especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center in New
York. Petroleum terminals are generally not a target for terrorist acts (Geomatrix, May 2002);
however, security issues are dealt with through confidential assessments. Ongoing vulnerability
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assessments for the port area are carried out by the operators, as well as a separate sub-committee
that includes the military. Site specific security and audit prevention measures to mitigate these
risks were included in Table 5.2 and are not further evaluated in the cost benefit analysis.
Phase II, i.e., risk mitigation measures currently in place or being planned for future
implementation (Measures 1 and 2), are further evaluated for the higher risk scenarios in the
following sections.
6.3.1 Measure 1) – Continue to Implement Current Measures
A number of risk mitigation measures were identified previously in Table 5.2. They represent the
Operators’ present and ongoing investment in code compliance, efforts to improve safety, and in
many cases “best practices” for dealing with the hazard scenarios considered. The current
measures also reflect expenditures for both prevention and consequence mitigation, which is a
desirable feature of risk mitigation strategy, as previously discussed in Section 5, Phase II.
6.3.2 Measure 2) – Implement Planned Measures
In addition to the measures presently being implemented, there were others being planned for
implementation this year at some terminals. Implementing the planned measures will further
reduce risk and move the risk profile towards the lower left corner of the Study Risk Profile, i.e.,
in the direction of decreasing risk.
6.3.3 Measure 3) - Ongoing Risk Communication
Ongoing Risk Communication is the first of the alternate mitigation measures considered.
Communicating the implications of very-low-probability events is a difficult task in that
perceptions become important and these events are intuitively perceived as more likely than they
are (Margolis, 1996), even by those with expertise evaluating risk. Different people will also
likely have different interpretations of the same study, even when the process and results were
accepted by all. For example, when stakeholders compare two statistically equivalent hazards,
they will perceive one to be less “risky”: if it produces significant social or personal benefit, is
voluntarily excepted, is perceived as controllable, or is well understood (Slovic, 1992).
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Consequently, ongoing risk communications are an important part of an overall risk mitigation
plan.
Ongoing risk communication measures may include multi-stakeholder groups and terminal
specific efforts that serve to address both the causes and consequences of a hazard scenario.
Examples of these efforts include the following:
• Measure 3a) - Formal monitoring of risks by operators on a regular (yearly) basis. This
is a procedural measure that is already carried out by some operators. It entails the operators
undertaking annual facility audits by a knowledgeable auditor and programming
recommended upgrades or changes into the maintenance and operations budget. A summary
of these audits would be available to fire officials or other appropriate parties involved with
emergency response, and as a result subject to independent verification on a random basis.
• Measure 3b) - Certification by Terminal Managers that Operations Abide by Required
Regulations and that Risk is Managed to Industry Standards. This is an increasingly
common requirement at industrial facilities as a way to involve front line managers in
implementing corporate policy, as well as making them accountable. These certifications
could be part of the audit summaries described above.
• Measure 3c) - Formalize Fire Response Table Top Exercises. Tabletop exercises are part
of the contingency planning at each facility. Participants should include the fire department,
military, ADEC or others who would be involved in responding to a fire will provide a
significant benefit to the operators and emergency response agencies. In addition, such
exercises should include an invitation to the Government Hill Community Council.
Formalizing these exercises by submitting the results and recommendations to the fire
department or other appropriate authorities (similar to the SPCC plans being submitted to
ADEC) will serve to address community concerns that fire response capabilities are
inadequate or poorly coordinated. Examples of these concerns cited in our meetings with the
community include the belief that fire fighting response has been hampered by widely spaced
hydrants and the anecdotal information that emergency responders from the military did not
know their way to a facility where there was a tank fire. In fact, in the POA Area, there are
approximately 40 hydrants available within a 300 ft spacing, which is closer than the normal
500 ft spacing (AFD, June 2002). All but two of the hydrants have fireflows of 3,000 gallons
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per minute (gpm) or greater. Recommendations from these exercises may include
requirements for more detailed audits or other studies where improvements might be made.
• Measure 3d) - Form Stakeholder Advisory Group. This group would be an extended
version of the existing Task Force. In addition to current representatives, it should include
participation by fire, planning, health, and the military. Meetings should occur at least
annually and be facilitated to encourage proactive exchange of risk concerns and solutions.
Minutes should be published and action items set with direction from the MOA.
• Measure 3e) - Evaluate Major New Developments in Relation to the Risk Profile
Presented in the Study Risk Profile. Project proponents should submit a risk review as part
of their project development planning. The Stakeholder Advisory Group should review and
approve the risk review, since this group would be familiar with the present Study Risk
Profile.
• Measure 3f) - Benchmark comparisons of Study Risk Profile with other terminals. This
measure would provide a better context for interpreting the incident history and improve the
estimates in the Study Risk Profile. Such studies are dependent on the availability of relevant
data, and improved data reporting requirements from regulatory agencies can assist in these
performance benchmarking studies. This work would also expand on the Comparative Risk
Analysis (Measure 6a).
6.3.4 Measure 4) - Buffer Zones
The creation of a buffer zone or setback distance between the POL facilities and the public can
decrease the public risk identified in Columns C and D in the Study Risk Profile (Table 4.5). Five
representative hazard scenarios were identified in these columns; all with low estimated
frequencies in the order of 1 event in 10,000 years or less. Rather than further decrease the
scenario frequency, the buffer zone approach to risk mitigation would reduce (or eliminate) the
consequence severity.
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Buffers address the consequences of the hazard scenario by separating the receptors from the fire
hazard. The width of the buffer zone defined by thermal modeling results was described in Phase
I and is similar to the method of determining buffers used by (HUD 1987). The actual buffer
distance would need to be defined based on further analyses. However, representative concepts
include the following.
• Measure 4a) - Minimum Buffer (fatality exposure zone) – move 4 residences. Four
homes presently are within the fatality exposure zone shown in Figure 4.3. They would be
moved in this option. Other homes would remain with the zone of public exposure to injury
from a fire.
• Measure 4b) - Buffer (injury exposure zone) - move 10 tanks. The selected distance for a
buffer can be based on more detailed modeling of thermal radiation from potential fires. This
measure entails moving tanks so that homes would be outside of the zone of public exposure
to injury from a POL fire. We have assumed that the nearest 10 tanks would need to be
moved. However, the actual number would be determined based on further analyses.
• Measure 4c) – Buffer (fatality/injury exposure zone) – move 10 residences. In this
option, residences within the zone of public exposure to fatality or injury would be moved.
We have assumed that this would include 10 residences presently along the bluff on Delaney
Street. However, the actual number would be determined based on further analyses.
• Measure 4d) - Buffer (injury exposure zone) - regrade terminal sites to impoundment
basin. This option entails creating a buffer by grading the terminal sites to drain to an
impoundment basin sufficiently distant to remove residents from the zone of exposure to
injury from fire. This would mitigate fire from spills but the (rare) scenario of a tank surface
fire may not be impacted, depending upon the location of the tank in relation to the nearest
residence. Reconstruction of secondary containment would be required in some cases.
Another type of buffer includes a transitional commercial space between industrial uses and
residences. This would most typically be implemented as part of a planning process and not in an
already established neighborhood, and was not considered further.
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6.3.5 Measure 5) - Engineering Controls
Engineering controls serve to either limit the width of the exposure zone or reduce the frequency
to a very low level through measures that can be added to the existing tank facilities.
• Measure 5a) – Engineering Controls, Install annular pontoon roofs with full seal in
tanks near residences. Annular pontoon roofs can be used to significantly reduce the
frequency of a fire, thereby mitigating the causal factor of this hazard scenario. If the
frequency of a hazard can be reduced sufficiently, the consequences become less relevant.
This option only applies to tanks containing higher volatility products such as aviation or
motor gasoline, but not for diesel or jet fuels, since these have lower emissions at ambient
temperatures.
• Measure 5b) – Engineering Controls, Keep products with lower thermal radiation
effects in tanks near residences. This measure would serve to limit the width of the
exposure zone and the number of homes encompassed by it. Implementing this measure
would require the operators to shift fuel and may also require refitting some tanks for the new
product. Detailed fire effects modeling should be carried to estimate the risk impact of
selected products.
• Measure 5c) – Engineering Controls, Install new industry measures that are not yet part
of regulations. The petroleum industry, through groups like API, is in a constant process of
developing new standards that serve to reduce risks in the industry. Many of these measures
are adopted as consensus standards, but the process can take years. However, some
companies adopt these practices well before the consensus standards come into effect. This
measure would involve local adoption of best appropriate technologies before they become
part of the national codes.
6.3.6 Measure 6) - Quantitative Risk and Engineering Assessment
These measures involve performing additional studies to prepare explicit comparisons of risk and
cost-benefit.
• Measure 6a) - Comparative Risk Analysis. The risk to an individual of being hurt once
exposed to a hazardous situation is significantly different from the risks presented in this
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study. Evaluation of individual fatality risks will involve more detailed risk analysis and
results may be compared, if desired, to other fatality risks that society faces. Comparison of
risk is a common approach used by risk experts to put specific risks in context with others
that receptors are exposed to. Although these comparisons can be an effective part of an
overall communications strategy, it is imperative that such comparisons consider distinctions
that stakeholders feel are important. Comparing psychologically different risks can in fact
create significant barrier to effective risk communication rather than promote it (Sandman,
1993).
• Measure 6b) - Detailed Cost-Benefit Analysis. The risk matrix approach used in this study
is useful for comparing and ranking risks and understanding significant hazards. However, it
does not lend itself to a more detailed cost-benefit analysis to quantify the value of reducing
hazards from one category to another. Such detailed analyses may be appropriate to support
decisions requiring significant expenditures.
• Measure 6c) - Site Specific Seismic Evaluation. This measure involves analyzing the site
specific seismic response at terminals and comparison of the results with tank construction
details. This measure will not reduce risk but could increase confidence in the estimated risk
or could lead to recommendations for focused risk reduction such as expanding the existing
POA buttress to limit lateral spreading, foundation improvements, tank improvements, or
modification of safe fill heights.
6.3.7 Measures 7) and 8) - Risk Elimination
The boundary conditions of eliminating or transferring risk include either moving the terminal or
moving the public receptors (Government Hill residents).
• Measure 7) - Move 150 Residences and commercial properties west of Loop Road.
Moving the public receptors west of Loop Road was included as a boundary condition of risk
mitigation for the nearby residences in Government Hill. POL facility risks would be
eliminated for those residences that were moved but not for other public receptors such as
public traffic from the port, and an effective 1,500 ft to 2,000 ft buffer area would be created.
• Measure 8) - Move Terminals. Moving the terminals can eliminate risk to the public
identified in this study, but the move also transfers environmental risks to another area and
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may transfer public risk depending on the new location for the terminal. The 11 hazard
scenarios with risks located in Column A of the Study Risk Profile (Table 4.5) are site safety
issues and would not be impacted directly from moving the terminals (however there may be
indirect impacts such as decreased third party traffic, etc).
6.4 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An order of magnitude analysis of costs and benefits for risk reduction was carried out to provide
a basis for a recommended risk mitigation plan. Risks associated with the POL facility operations
were estimated according to the study risk matrix presented in Table 4.5. These risks are
currently managed through a number of mitigation measures described in Section 5. Additional
measures spanning the boundary conditions for eliminating or transferring risk were described in
the previous sub-section. This spectrum of potential risk mitigation measures was analyzed to
estimate both the costs of implementation and the associated benefit in terms of reducing the
Study Risk Profile presented in Table 4.5.
Costs were estimated from operator and professional judgements, as well as easily available
references. More detailed analyses were outside the scope of the present study and may require
future refinement as part of the recommended risk mitigation plan. Risk reduction benefits were
qualitatively estimated based on historical performance and professional judgement. The Study
Risk Profile was developed for order of magnitude estimates to facilitate the use of such
qualitative analysis.
A large number of current and planned measures to prevent or mitigate the consequence severity
for hazard scenarios 1), 14), 4), 6) and 7) & 13) were identified previously in Table 5.2. These
measures were included in the cost benefit analysis to provide a baseline for estimating impacts
on the risk profile presented in Table 4.5 that was based on older historical industry performance.
Results from the cost benefit analysis are summarized in Table 6.2 according to risk mitigation
measures and the risk benefit for all the selected higher risk hazard scenarios. These risk
mitigation measures have been organized from those currently being implemented to the
boundary conditions for eliminating some risk as described above. We give credit for some
reduction in the Study Risk Profile by continuing with the measures currently being implemented
because the profile is based on conservative estimates, as discussed in Section 4.
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Table 6.2
Summary of Cost Benefit Analysis
Risk Mitigation Measure Hazard Scenarios Estimated Costs Risk Reduction Benefit (Table 5.2) [Reference] (Table 4.5) Current Reduction Estimate Estimate
1) Continue to implement current measures identified in Table 5.2 1) ~ $200,000/year [Operators estimate for prevention]
4A 3A
14) ~ $50,000/year 4A 4A 4) ~ $140,000/year
[Operators estimate for prevention]
1C <1C
6) ~ $40,000/year [Operators estimate for prevention]
1D <1D
7)&13) ~ $60,000/year [Operators estimate for prevention]
1D <1D
1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $200,000/year [Operations estimate for consequence mitigation]
Table 4.5 Reduced risk
2) Implement planned measures identified in Table 5.2 (or equivalent strategy) for specific facilities
1) ~ $70,000 4A 3A
14) ~ $20,000/year 4A 3A 3) Potential additional risk mitigation measures
3a) Formal monitoring of risks by operators on a regular (yearly) basis 1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $40,000/year Table 4.5 Prevent Risk creep greater than Table 4.5
3b) Have terminal managers sign yearly policy document that their operations abide by all required regulations and manage risk to industry standards
1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) Covered in other mitigation measures
Table 4.5 Prevent risk creep greater than Table 4.5
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Table 6.2 (continued)
3c) Formalize fire response table top exercise to plan, including involvement of fire department, document and submit to fire department (similar to SPCC plans submitted to ADEC)
1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $50,000/year Table 4.5 Maintain risk reduction
3d) Form a standing stakeholder advisory group to discuss public risk issues annually
1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $10,000/year Table 4.5 Maintain communication to prevent risk creep
3e) Major new developments (both for the terminals and for the port or other receptors) to address the impacts on public risk as represented through the study risk profile (Table 4.5)
1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) Depends on the development
Table 4.5 Prevent risk creep greater than Table 4.5
3f) Benchmark Comparison of Study Risk Profile with other terminals 1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $40,000 Table 4.5 Provide data to evaluate risk creep
4) Buffer Zone Alternatives
4a) Create minimum buffer (fatality exposure zone)) to remove homes within public exposure to fatality zone
4) 6), 7&13) ~ $2,000,000 [Based on moving 4 homes]
1C-D 1C
4b) Create buffer (injury exposure zone) between POL facilities and residences by moving selected tanks
4) 6), 7&13) ~ $40,000,000 [Based on moving 10 tanks]
1C-D 1B
4c) Create buffer (injury exposure zone) between POL facilities and residences by moving selected residences
4) 6), 7&13) ~ $5,000,000 [Based on moving 10
residences]
1C-D 1B
4d) Create buffer (injury exposure zone) by grading site to an impoundment basin.
4) 6), 7&13) ~ $2,000,000 [Based on reconstructing secondary containment]
1C-D 1B
5) Engineering Controls
5a) Installation of annular pontoon roofs with full seal to reduce probability of full surface fire on 4 tanks near residents
6) ~ $500,000 1D <1D
5b) Maintain products with smaller fire effects zones in tanks closest to residents
4), 6), 7) & 13), 8) ~ $2,000,000 [Based on transfer for product from 4 tanks]
1 C-D 1 B- C
5c) Installation of new industry measures that are not yet part of regulations 1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $400,000 [assumes $100,000 per operator annually]
Table 4.5 Reduced risk
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Table 6.2 (continued)
6) Quantitative Risk and Engineering Assessment
6a) Comparative Risk Analysis 1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $40,000 NA for Study Risk
Profile
NA for Study Risk
Profile 6b) Detailed cost-benefit analysis 1), 14), 4), 6), 7)&13) ~ $45,000 NA for
Study Risk Profile
NA for Study Risk
Profile 6c) Site specific seismic evaluation (with existing data) 7)&13) ~ $45,000 < 1D < 1D
7) Move 150 residences and commercial properties from Government Hill (west of Loop Road, excluding AT&T & Government Hill School)
4) 6), 7&13) ~ $50,000,000 [Current MOA property assessment & removal of existing property – remediation]
1C-D Eliminate risk for those residences
8) Move terminals to site removed from public residences 4) 6), 7&13) ~ $200,000,000 [Operators estimate for move and remediation]
1C-D Eliminate risk for all receptors in study area
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6.5 RISK MITIGATION PLAN
Results from the cost benefit analysis provide a basis for incorporating the more effective risk
mitigation measures in a plan for future management of the POL facilities. The premise for an
effective risk mitigation measure is that it reduces risk in a cost effective and practical manner.
As described previously, benefits in risk reduction may include reduction in the likelihood of
occurrence of an undesirable public health and safety event or a reduction in the severity of its
consequences or both. Different measures may be applied to affect any one or all of these three
approaches. However, the associated cost differentials among these different measures may be
substantial to affect similar risk reduction benefits. Effective measures therefore balance the
costs with benefits.
Each measure in Table 6.2 was assigned an estimated cost and reduction in risk in order to make
a qualitative comparison of cost-benefit and provide a basis for recommending further mitigation
efforts. Table 6.3 shows each risk mitigation measure ranked according to cost. We did not rank
Measures 1 or 2 because these are already budgeted by the operators and either currently
implemented or being planned for implementation. Some measures mitigate risk by helping to
prevent the hazard scenario from developing, (reduce frequency) while others serve to reduce the
consequences, and still others do both, which is also shown in Table 6.3.
The results in Table 6.3 also show the following distinct groupings of costs.
A. Current and planned measures focused on prevention and mitigation (Measures 1 and 2)
$750,000
B. Measures aimed at improving allocation of resources for prevention and consequence mitigation (Measures 3, 5a, 5c, and 6)
$95,000 -$500,000 each
($1,650,000 total)
C. Measures to mitigate consequences in focused areas (Measures 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, and 5b)
$2,000,000 - $40,000,000 each
D. Measures to eliminate risk $55,000,000 - $340,000,000
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Table 6.3
Ranking of Mitigation Cost-Benefit
Mitigation Measure Estimated Cost Reduce Frequency
Reduce Consequence
Current and Planned Measures 1) Continue current measures in Table 5.2
for Prevention $ 490,000 Yes Yes
1) Continue current measures in Table 5.2 for Consequence Mitigation
$ 200,000 Yes Yes
2) Implement planned measures in Table 5.2 (where not already implemented)
$ 70,000 Yes Yes
Alternate Measures 6) Quantitative Risk and Engineering
Assessment $ 130,000 Yes Yes
3) Ongoing Risk Communication $ 170, 000 Yes Yes 5c) Engineering Controls - Install new
industry measures that are not yet part of regulations
$ 400,000 Yes Yes
5a) Engineering Controls – Install annular pontoon roofs with full seal in tanks near residences
$ 500,000 Yes Yes
4a) Buffer (injury exposure zone) – move 4 residences
$ 2,000,000 No Yes
5b) Engineering Controls – Keep products with lower thermal radiation effects in tanks closest to residences
$ 2,000,000 No Yes
4d) Buffer (injury exposure zone) – regrade sites to impoundment basin
$ 2,000,000 No Yes
4c ) Buffer (fatality/injury exposure zone) – move 10 residences
$ 4,500,000 No Yes
4b) Buffer (injury exposure zone) – move 10 tanks
$ 40,000,000 No Yes
7) Move residences west of Loop Road (1,500-2,000 ft buffer)
$ 55,000,000 No Yes
8) Move terminals (>2,000 ft buffer) $ 340,000,000 No Yes
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The recommended risk mitigation plan includes implementing the current or planned measures
(Measures 1 and 2), as well as the alternate measures aimed at improving allocation of resources
for prevention and consequence mitigation (Measures 3, 5a, 5c, and 6), as noted below.
• Continue to Implement Current Measures (Measure 1). These measures should be
continued, since they are already budgeted for and are being implemented.
• Implement Planned Measures (Measure 2). These measures presently being planned and
are budgeted for by the operators.
• Alternate Measures (Measures 3, 5a, 5c, and 6). The additional risk mitigation included in
this group represent approaches for managing risk according to the risk profile represented in
the study Risk Matrix. Decisions about future terminal operations and other developments in
the Port Area can now incorporate public risk as described in this report. Some of the
measures listed are currently being implemented on a corporate level by individual terminal
operators. However, formalizing these additional measures would have the advantage of
moving some of that process into the public arena, which will serve to better involve and
integrate the various emergency response agencies and improve public awareness of the risks
posed.
Implementation of the measures providing focused consequence mitigation (Measures 4a, 4b, 4c,
4d, and 5b) is not recommended at this time. These measures are an intermediate level of hazard
reduction between what is currently being done and eliminating the risk. They cover a wide
range of costs ($2,000,000 to $40,000,000 each) and in many instances are very focused in their
application. However, the need for implementing these measures may be modified based on the
results from some of the work in the recommended plan. Of course, there may be other social or
political reasons for selecting measures that are not recommended in this cost-benefit analysis.
The risk elimination measures (Measures 7 and 8) have high costs associated with them, as well
as some degree of uncertainty as to the feasibility of implementing them due to suitable space and
potential permitting difficulties. Although they can eliminate risk to current residents, the hazard
could simply be transferred to another stakeholder group, depending on the site selected.
Consequently, from a cost-benefit perspective, neither of the risk elimination measures is
recommended. In general, the risk elimination options would only be made as political decisions
August 2002 -70- 013-5504
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in which the broader society decides that some options are not desirable or worth actively
managing.
6.6 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
Implementation of the recommended risk mitigation measures will require the terminal operators
to continue implementing current and planned measures in addition to formalizing some activities
in a public forum. However, other measures will require additional expenditures, as well as a
commitment from the public, industry, and the government to maintain a transparent and active
dialog.
Significant aspects of implementing each of the recommended risk mitigation are presented in the
following sections. In some instances the implementation may result in recommendations to
implement additional studies to address specific issues.
6.6.1 Continue to Implement Current Measures
Implementing this recommendation requires the terminal operators to continue their present
efforts at managing risks and improving their individual operations. The most important aspect
of doing this will be to monitor the measures being undertaken for risk creep, which is the
tendency for risk at facilities to increase when the measures to control the risks are not being
actively managed. Risk creep is especially important with regards to impacts occurring outside of
the facilities themselves.
6.6.2 Implement Planned Measures
In order to implement the existing or planned measures listed in Table 5.2 will require terminal
operators to evaluate their own facilities in order to determine the most effective way to do so.
As noted previously, these measures can generally be implemented in a phased manner during
periodic facility upgrades and new construction, without impacting the present risk profile,
provided risk creep is considered.
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6.6.3 Implement Recommended Alternate Measures
The alternate measures being recommended include application of both engineering controls and
procedural changes in the way risk is considered in managing operation and development in the
POA area. Only one involves capital investment. Each item is discussed in the order it is listed
in Table 6.3.
• Measure 6) Quantitative Risk and Engineering Assessment. This measure represents a
suite of tasks that will serve to refine the risk profile developed for this study. They will
provide insights into individual risks, which are different and likely less than the risks
described in this report. They will also provide the additional information needed to quantify
the value of reducing a particular risk. This work can be accomplished in phases.
• Measure 3) Ongoing Risk Communication. As stated previously, this is an important part
of an overall risk mitigation strategy. Implementation will require the involvement of an
expanded group of stakeholders, as well as a commitment by all parties to continue to invest
time and resources resolving sometimes contentious issues.
• Measure 5c) Installation of New Industry Measures that are not yet part of
Regulations. This measure has the most uncertainty associated with it. In order for this to be
effective, the measures to be installed will have to be applied equally among all operators.
This would likely require modification of the local fire or building codes to require standards
higher than those presently in place.
• Measure 5a) Installation of Annular Pontoon Roofs. Use of annular pontoon roofs should
be investigated on some tanks. Implementing this measure would require capital investment,
but the need for the investment should be determined based on prior completion of the other
recommended measures. The burden for implementing it will not be equally applied to all
operators due to the proximity of the various facilities to the neighborhood; therefore,
provision for some public funding or cost sharing may be appropriate.
It is likely that a phased approach will be the best strategy for implementation of the alternate
mitigation measures described above. Those tasks aimed at better defining risks and costs are
logically the tasks that should be accomplished first.
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6.6.4 Limitations
The implementation strategy presented in this report is intended to address the hazards associated
with operation of the POL facilities in the POA area. The hazards specifically addressed are
those relating to fire, including exposure to thermal radiation, smoke, and explosion. While
addressing the fire hazards may serve to mitigate others, it is important to note that there are other
hazards that are not specifically addressed by this study. These other hazards include:
• Chronic human health risks. These risks may be from a number of exposure pathways
including exposure to fugitive emissions from the POL facilities, air emissions from other
sources in the Ship Creek area, exposure to second hand smoke from fires, fugitive dust (both
from contaminated sites adjacent to the community and area wide), and exposure to
contaminated soil and groundwater at nearby contaminated sites.
• Environmental risks that may impact fish, birds or other ecological receptors in Cook Inlet
and the Government Hill neighborhood.
• Economic risks associated with the hazard scenarios at either the POL facilities or other
industry in the Port Area.
• Impact on the risk profile from major developments being considered or planned.
• Mobile rail cars at the railroad.
• Expanded security measures or military operations.
This hazards study also does not address individual risk, which is typically expressed as the risk
of fatality to an individual located at a specified location as a result of exposure to a hazard
scenario. Typically, these risks are orders of magnitude less than those expressed herein.
Evaluation of those individual risks requires a level of effort that was beyond the scope of this
present study.
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8. REFERENCES
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), 1996, “Anchorage Volatile Organic
Compounds Ambient Air Monitoring Project”, Issued June 14, 1996.
ADEC, 2002a, discussions with Eileen Olson, March 27, 2002 and Jim Frechione, March 28,
2002.
ADEC, 2002b, Defense Fuel Support Point – Anchorage, Site Summary Update – January 2002,
posted on CSRP website.
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), 1992. Center for Chemical Process Safety.
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures.
America North/EMCON, Inc., September 1993, “Risk Assessment Feasibility Study for the Port
of Anchorage Area”, report prepared for Port of Anchorage – Petroleum Users Group,
Project 5127-001.00.
Anchorage Fire Department (AFD), May 28, 2002. E-mail from Bridget Bushue, Deputy Chief of
Fire Prevention.
AFD, June 17, 2002. E-mail from Bridget Bushue, Deputy Chief of Fire Prevention.
CAN/CSA-Q634-91 Risk Analysis Requirements and Guidelines, 1991, Quality Management, A
National Standard of Canada.
Denver Municipal Code Title II, Ch. 59, Article III, Div. 24.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 1989. US Department of Transportation. US
Environmental Protection Agency. Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures.
Geomatrix Consultants, May 2002, Facility Safety and Terrorism Risks, Presentation by Dan
Brooks & Tim Nieman at 5th Annual International Conference on Above Ground Storage
Tanks, Orlando, FL.
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Hazard Assessment Handbook, Commandant Instruction Manual M 16465.13.
Industrial Performance Standards for a New Century (1993).
International Fire Code 2000 (IFC).
Myers, Philip E., 1996, “Report on API Large Diameter Tank Fire Study” for API Large
Diameter Tank Fire Resource Team, August 30, 1996.
Margolis, Howard. 1996. Improving Risk Communication. National Academy Press,
Washington, DC, Chapter 5.
National Academy of Sciences, 1973, The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964, Engineering, p 536.
NFPA Code 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 2000 Edition.
Oregon State Fire Code 7901.1.3.
Sandman, Peter. 1993. Responding to Community Outrage: Strategies for Effective Risk
Communication. American Industrial Hygiene Association.
http://www.psandman.com/book.htm
Siting of HUD-Assisted Projects Near Hazardous Facilities: Acceptable Separation Distances
from Explosive and Flammable Hazards (1987).
Slovic, Paul. 1992. “Perceptions of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm”. In S.
Krimsky and D. Golding, Social Theories of Risk. Praeger Press, Westport, CT.
Taylor L. and Morris S.S, 1996, “Final Report on the Operations and Findings of the Anchorage
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) Monitoring Project”.
Uniform Fire Code 2000 Edition (UFC).
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Varnes, David, J., 1969, Stability of the West Slope of Government Hill Port Area of Anchorage,
Alaska, USGS Geologic Survey Bulletin 1258-D, Washington, D.C., pp. D11-D12.
Wesson, R. L., A. D. Frankel, C.S. Mueller and S.C. Harmsen, 1999, “Probabilistic Seismic
Hazard Maps of Alaska”, Open Fire Report 99-36, U.S. Geological Survey
Western Regional Climate Center, http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-bin/clilcd.pl?ak26451.
Meteorological data for Anchorage Airport 1961-1990
Golder Associates
FIGURES
TITLE
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PROJECT No. FILE No.
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013-5504.001 VIVINMAP.CDR
N.T.S. 0
FIGURE 1.1
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
PROJECT LOCATION MAP
MRM 01/02
CAV 03/02
BG 08/02
MRM 08/02
PORT OF ANCHORAGE AREAPORT OF ANCHORAGE AREA
T U R
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013-5504.001 AIRPHOTO2.CDR
~1"=900' 0
FIGURE 1.2
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
HAZARD STUDY AREAAND POL OPERATORS
MRM 01/02
CAV 02/02
BG 08/02
08/02MRM
APPROXIMATE SCALE, FEET
0 900 1800
REFERENCE:Aerial photography provided by AEROMAP U.S.of Anchorage, dated 9/20/2001
Port of Anchorage (POA)Port of Anchorage (POA)
ElmendorfAir Force BaseElmendorfAir Force Base
POAVY (Spaghetti Farm)POAVY (Spaghetti Farm)
Ship CreekShip Creek
Alaska RailroadAlaska Railroad
Government Hill CommunityGovernment Hill Community
Former Defense Fuels SiteFormer Defense Fuels Site
Bluff RoadBluff Road
Squirrel CageSquirrel Cage
Ocean
Do
ck
Rd
.O
cean
Do
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Rd
.
STUDY AREASTUDY AREA
Tesoro #1Tesoro #1
ChevronChevron
AFSCAFSC
WilliamsWilliams
Tesoro #2Tesoro #2
POA MarineTerminal
POA MarineTerminal
CS
treet
Bri
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Loop Road
Loop Road
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013-5504.001 POL_FAC.CDR
1:15360 0
FIGURE 2.2
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
LEGEND
TANK FARM (T), TRUCK RACKS (TR),
RAIL RACKS (RR), MARINE TERMINAL (MT)
COMMERCIAL (C)
RESIDENTIAL OR PUBLIC USE (R)
REFERENCE:2000 AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY TAKEN BYAERO MAP U.S. INC., JUNE 2, 2000
POL FACILTIES ANDSURROUNDING LAND USE
MRM 03/02
CAV 03/02
BG 08/02
MRM 08/02
SEALAND
TOTE
AT&T
SCHO
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SCHO
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FORMERDEFENSE
FUELS SITE
FORMERDEFENSE
FUELS SITE
ALASKA RAILROADALASKA RAILROAD
INSUL-FOAMINSUL-FOAM
NORTHSTARNORTHSTAR
FISHERY ANDTOURISTS
FISHERY ANDTOURISTS
PORT OFANCHORAGE
PORT OFANCHORAGE
SEALAND
TOTE
AT&T
SCHO
OL
SCHO
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FORMERDEFENSE
FUELS SITE
FORMERDEFENSE
FUELS SITE AT&T
ALASKA RAILROADALASKA RAILROAD
INSUL-FOAMINSUL-FOAM
NORTHSTARNORTHSTAR
SEALAND
TOTE
FODEF
FUELS
FORMERDEFENSE
FUELS SITE
PORT OFNCHORAGEPORT OF
ANCHORAGE
INSUL-FOAMINSUL-FOAM
FISHERY ANDTOURISTS
FISHERY ANDTOURISTS
RTHNORTHSTAR
SCHO
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SCHO
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SCHO
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SCHO
OL
SCHO
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SCHO
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T
TT
TR
TR
RR
TTR
RRRR T
T
ELMENDORF AIRFORCE BASE
ELMENDORF AIRFORCE BASE
R
C
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EAFB FLIGHT OPSEAFB FLIGHT OPS
MT
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C
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STUDY AREASTUDY AREA
STUDY AREA
1"=1280'
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013-5504.001 HAZSCHEMATIC.CDR
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FIGURE 4.1
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
HAZARD SCENARIO SCHEMATIC
MRM 01/02
CAV 03/02
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ACCIDENTCAUSAL
FACTORS
ACCIDENTCONSEQUENCE
FACTORS
HAZARDOUSACCIDENT
HAZARD
ACCIDENT
BASE
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CONSEQUENCE
HAZARD
ZONES
HAZARD
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One Hazard Scenario
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FIGURE 4.2
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
GENERIC POL RELEASE CONSEQUENCE EVENT TREE
BG 08/02
MRM 08/02
POL Release(Size)
Form Vapor Cloud(Downwind)
Form Pool(May be contained)
Flammable ?
DelayedIgnition ?
Ignition ?
Exposed Public ?
Thermal Radiation(Hazard Distance)
Flash Fire(Flammable Cloud)
Thermal Radiation(Hazard Distance)
Pool Fire(Pool Size)
Public Risk
Explosion
Overpressure(Hazard Distance)
Public Risk
Exposed Public
Public Risk
Exposed Public ?
No
No
No
NoNo
Yes Yes
No Public Risk
Vapor Liquid
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
MRM 01/02
CAV 02/02
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013-5504.001 FIRE_MODEL_ZONES.CDR
1" 400'» 0
FIGURE 4.3
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
EXAMPLE FIREMODELING RESULTS
REFERENCE:2000 AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY TAKEN BY AERO MAP U.S. INC., JUNE 2, 2000
MRM 03/02
CAV 03/02
BG 08/02
MRM 08/02
NOTES:1. Results shown are examples based on modeling criteria that will change with scenario. See text (Sec. 4.3.1) for discussion.2. Zones do not consider topographic and other site features that may reduce distance of impact.3. Modeling results (Appendix E) based on 10,000 bbl Gasoline (Williams) or Diesel/Naptha (Chevron).
APPROXIMATE SCALE, FEET
0 200 400
475'475'
475'
475'
301'301'
301'
301'
140'
140'
140'
140'
130'130'
130'
130'
67'67'
67'
67'
187'187'
67'67'
130'130'
312'312'BURNING POOL FIRE
CONTAINED BY TOPOGRAPY
BURNING POOL FIRECONTAINED BY
TOPOGRAPY
BURNING POOL FIRE IN IMPOUNDING
BASIN
BURNING POOL FIRE IN IMPOUNDING
BASIN
INJURY
EXPOSUREINJURY
EXPOSURE
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013-5504.001 RISK.CDR
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FIGURE 5.1
POA HAZARD STUDYMUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE
RISK MITIGATION SCENARIO
MRM 05/02
CAV 05/02
BG 08/02
MRM 08/02
ACCIDENTCAUSAL
FACTORS
ACCIDENTCONSEQUENCE
FACTORS
HAZARDOUSACCIDENT
HAZARD
ACCIDENT
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CONSEQUENCE
HAZARD
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HAZARD
EFFECTS
RECEPTOR PROTECTION : Buffer Zone, Shelter, Evacuation
IMAPCT LIMITATION : Release Detection and Isolation, Fire Protection, Emergency Response
SAFEGUARDS : Safety Equipment, Management Systems, Operating Procedures
FAILURE PREVENTION : Design, Operating/Maintenance/Inspection Procedures, Training, Equipment Specifications, Risk Analysis
