Harvard Asimow Medrano Neg Berkeley1 Round6

7/21/2019 Harvard Asimow Medrano Neg Berkeley1 Round6

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time& t is no longer locali%ed, li(e an occupation& The heat is every$here&The de#nition o action underpinning the force-on-force of hard po$er isundamentally that o riction1 matter on matter, metal on metal, pro2ectileagainst shielding, metal in esh, esh splayed, splashed on hard suraces&Force o attac( against opposing orce o resistance. The overall aim of orce-against-orce is attrition !&llman and #ade *++, 88iii, 88viii$. ;t meets the enemy head-on

and $ears do$n his capabilities across an etensive series o rictionalengagements& ts aims and means are painully tangible& n the current#eld o conict, this (ind o punctual engagement has lost its centrality& thas been replaced by $aiting. :eing in the thic( o $ar has been $atereddo$n and dra$n out into an endless $aiting, both sides poised or action&The baseline state is no$ this al$ays-on o lo$-boil poising or action& Oneis al$ays in the thin o it& "hen a stri(e o orce-against-orce comes, itstands out against the bac(ground continuity o this thin condition, which Paul

<irilio presciently called the !nonbattle' years before it became the obsessive concern of leaders both

military and civilian !<irilio *+=>$. "hen it comes, the irruption o action is anebullition, a momentary boiling- over in this lo$-intensity broth o theal$ays-on conict o the nonbattle. ;n the nonbattle, the relation between action and waiting has

been inverted. "aiting no longer stretches bet$een actions& /ction brea(s into$aiting& *ot po$er is ho$ you act militarily in $aiting, $hen you are notyet tangibly acting& t is a $ay o preventing the $ait itsel rom being anattrition, or even a $ay o turning it to advantage& n the condition ononbattle, $hen you have nothing on $hich to act tangibly, there is stillone thing you can do1 act on that condition& /ct to change the conditionsin $hich you $ait& /ter all, it is rom these same conditions that anyaction to come $ill have emerged& 3y acting on the $ait-time conditions inthe intervals bet$een boilings-over, you may $ell be able to reduce the

potential of an eventual attac( , moderate its powers of attrition if it comes, or even better, induce it to taketangible shape when and where you are ready for it. That way you have a chance of disabling it before it reaches its

full magnitude, or even in the case where it bursts forth at full strength, you can be reasonably con7dent that you

will be able to respond to it $ith rapid and over$helming counterorce . Thusyou ta(e as your military #eld o operation the environmental conditionsin $hich both combatants and the noncombatant population live, or what

&llman and #ade call the !total situation' !*++, +$. The only $ay to act on the totalsituation is to act on the conditions o emergence o the battle, prior to itsoccurrence& These conditions concern threats that in the parlance of the doctrine of

preemption, which has come to de7ne the present era of con?ict as integrally as deterrence did the @old #ar, are!not yet ully ormed' !see chapter *$. "hat is not yet ully ormed is still inpotential& t may already be bre$ing li(e a recipe or disaster, orominously looming li(e an unclear, almost-present threat& t carries anirreducible degree o indeterminacy& That measure of indeterminacy ma(es itas intangible as it is ominous& t’s a tall order1 you must act !totally' on

the intangibles o the situation’s conditioning. The ultimate boundary blurred is betweenthe tangible and the intangible, the corporeal and the incorporeal. :ecause to act on the former you have to act on

the latter. There are t$o $ays to act totally and intangibly on a situation. The #rst is bytransposing your action rom the spatial ais o the battle, siege, or occupationto come, onto a time ais& 4ou operate in and on the interval in $hich$hat is not yet ully ormed is already imperceptibly bre$ing& 4ou can acton that almost-present in order to inuence the active orm o its net-a$aited emergence& 5reemption is proaction1 action on the conditions oaction, prior to its actually ta(ing shape& The second $ay to act totally and



intangibly on a situation is to act on perception. ;t is perception which prepares a body for action and

reaction. 3y modulating perception, you can already modulate subseuentaction-reaction& This in act ma(es perception a royal road to the almost-present. The two ways of acting intangibly with a view to the total situation are convergent. ;t was perception’spowers of proaction that motivated )ruilla and /onfeldt’s characterization of contemporary war asepistemological. :ut it is a mistake to take too cognitive an approach. The move into perception is accompanied inthe contemporary theater of war with a correlative move toward the “capabilities-centered approach much touted

by Aonald /umsfeld and his fellow neocons !/umsfeld 1221b$. ;n this approach, you move intoperception in order to operate not at the level at $hich actions aredeliberatively decided, but at the level at $hich the very capacity oraction is orming& Operating on the level at $hich decisions have beenmade ocuses on the properly cognitive aspect o (no$ledge1 itsinormational contents, their availability, reliability and manipulability,their actual usability& Operating on the level at $hich the capacity oraction is in the ma(ing is a very diferent proposition& t ocuses on a pre-decision process occurring in an interval o emergence antecedent to bothinormed (no$ing and deliberative action& This is a point beore (no$-ability and action-ability have diferentiated from one another. )t that point, a modulationof perception is directly and immediately a change in the parameters of what a body can do, both in terms of how it

can act and what it will know. This antecedent level o capacitation orpotentiali%ation is proto-epistemological—and already ontological, in thatit concerns changes in the body’s degree and mode of enablement in and toward its totalsituation or lie environment. /ny application o orce at this level is anontopo$er1 a po$er through $hich being becomes& /n ontopo$er is not a force

against life, as any force-against-force must inevitably be at its point of application. ;t is a positive orce&t is positively productive o the particular orm a lie $ill ta(e net& tconditions lie’s netness. ;t is a force of life. The 4orce to "wn Time &llman and #ade are

unambiguous about the fact that operating on this level is indeed an eercise o orce,even though its ob2ect is intangible& t is not a lesser orce, even though itis eerted in the thinness o nonbattle& t is, they say, !more than anapplication o orce'—a surplus o orce !&llman and #ade *++, 88vii$. t eceeds the

parameters o tangible applications of battle-orce and o the (no$n contents o lie upon $hich those applications bear and to which they add a hard permutation through theiraction o attrition& The productive orce o the nonbattle returns to thelevel o conditioning at $hich the parameters or attritional orce are set. There is always a follow-up action-reaction to an e8ercise of force-against- force. There is a second-ne8t enveloped

in the ne8t, and a third in that. "hat is conditioned is a or$ard series o potentialrepetitions. There is a power of potential continuation, a power of a continuum, wrapped up in each e8erciseof force-against-force. The power of the continuum is an e8cess over any ne8t, immanent in each one. 0onbattle

force takes this e8cess as its 7eld. This is $hat ma(es an eercise o ontopo$er asurplus o orce- or a surplus-value of force. The relation of nonbattle force to the force-against-force isanalogous to the relation discovered by Bar8 between money as a means of payment and money as capital. @apitalis the driving force of the series of payment e8changes3 money in the makingC money beyond money. )t eachpayment, a punctual return is made to capital. Pro7t is fed back into investment, replenishing the forward-driving

force of capital. Boney loops from its punctual e8ercise as means of payment into a feeding of the conditions of itsown continuing. This e8cess of forward-driving force over any given payment- engagement is surplus-value, asdistinguished from pro7t. (urplus-value is not the amount fed back. That is pro7t. (urplus-value is di5erent frompro7t. ;t is not uantitative. ;t is processual. ;t is the processual uality from which uantities of money aregenerated in forward- driving fashion. ;t is the ever-ne8tness of proliferating uantities of economic value. (urplus-value is realized punctually in the e8plicit act of e8change, in such a way as to cyclically e8ceed any such e8change.<alue beyond value, immeasurably on the make .6 “0ations make war the same way they make wealth !@ebrowski

and Darstka *++$.> Eike capital, nonbattle orce is at the same time or$ard-drivingand cyclic& /t each rictional engagement, it eeds bac( into itsel to$ardthe conditioning o $hat $ill come net& t is the ever-netness o actual



military value as reali%ed punctually in eplicit acts o $ar. 4orce- beyond-force,

intangibly on the make. The orce-beyond-orce is the processual uality o conictrom $hich tangible military outcomes are generated& &llman and #ade do nothesitate to link the force-beyond-force, as processual uality of war, to time. This is not, they say, a force to

overcome resistance. /ather, it is the force “to own time !&llman and #ade *++, 88vii, >9$. 6ecentmilitary thin(ing has revolved around the concept o rapid dominance . “

76apid’ means the ability to move uic(ly beore an adversary can react' !88v$. The force-to-own-time operates in an interval smaller than the smallest perceivable. “The target is

perception, always and at every band along the full spectrum !1$. 8ven in the thic( o things,$hen conict boils over and orce-against- orce is to be engaged, the force-to-own-time must still operate. ;t must sueeze into an interval smaller than the smallest perceivable between actions,so as to condition the enemy’s reaction. This is the “shock of shock and awe. The e8ercise of force-against-force isualitatively di5erent from the force-to-own-time, but if its e8ercise is separated from the force-to-own-time itrapidly loses its e5ectiveness. The force-to-own-time is infra-level force. ;t is infra-active because it occurs in asmaller-than- smallest interval between actions. ;t is infra-perceptual because this same interval is also smaller thanthe smallest perceivable. )nd it is infra-temporal because, being imperceptible, the interval of its e8ercise is ano5beat of time, a missed step in the cadence of actions and reactions, an elided present between one moment and

the ne8t. n the thin o things, at the nonbattle end o the spectrum, the orce-to-

own-time still operates to inra- condition action by !controlling the enemy’sperception' in the interests o !total situation control' !&llman and #ade *++, +,

>6$. n the absence o dramatic action spi(ing punctually rom the baselineo the nonbattle, the conditioning o the environment by the orce-to-own-time

appears continuous& 3ut this is only so because $e are not payingattention to paying attention& The ofbeat is still there& The baseline habito perception has not ceased contracting itsel in us& t still inhabits us&The pull o attention has not ceased to ta(e hold o us& t still directs us toa net perception, and through it to net action- reaction& The baseline o$ar has accordioned into the baseline o perception& /t the inra-level$here the t$o baselines converge, $ar at the macroscale o the battle,siege, and occupation alls into absolute processual proimity $ith $ar atthe microscale o everyday civilian lie& The Eife :are-)ctive The infra-interval is where

perception itself is in absolute processual pro8imity with the body. This raises the military 9and

political: sta(es inestimably& The automatism that attention possesses by virtue of its sharing anature with habit means that its operation reFoins the re?e8 workings of body matter. ;t is our bodies that contracthabits, which are acuired re?e8es. The operation of attention occurs at a point of indistinction between emergentperceptual e8perience and the autonomic mechanisms of the brain and nervous system. To a certain degree youcan bypass the shielding or immunizing e5ects of preoperative cultural conditioning as well as of personal histories,dispositions, and allegiances, by plugging into the nervous system and approaching attention from that autonomicangle. ;t is possible to 7nd tangible handles to leverage the intangible dimensions of the life of the body. ;t ispossible, within limits, to machine e8perience. The limits are due to the fact that the system of perception, like

capital, essentially involves feedback and is thus, like an economy, nonlinear. 3y de#nition, in anonlinear system you cannot guarantee a one-to-one correspondencebet$een a given punctual input and an outcome& 4ou do not cause anefect& 4ou efect a modulation& 4ou can create resonance and intererenceefects at the emergent level& The smaller-than-smallest interval o the

orce-to-own-time vibrates $ith inra-level agitation& The innervated body

poises, in vital commotion& t reacts1 habits are primed& t proacts1 itsreacting is already a tensing and a tending to the uture& The body isattending in the instant to the immediacy o lie’s unolding& 8verything hangsin the balance& 8cept, ar rom euilibrium, the balance is of& Gverything hangs

in the o5-balance of the instant. The nature and duration o the agitation ormatively#lling the instant inects $hat ollo$s& The ob2ect o ull-spectrum po$er ’sforce-to-own-time is not “bare life. ;t is not human life re-animalized, stripped of its human content, its vitality

reduced to the physical minimum, in absolute pro8imity with death. ;t is bare activity.= This ishuman lie in the instant’s ofbeat& n that instant, a lie is barely there,



recoiled, bodily consumed in its inra-relation to itsel& t is a lie $ithoutdeterminate content. ;n that imperceptible instant, what its content will be ne8t is in the making. /lie is ormatively barely there, tensely poised for what comes ne8t. ;n that measureless instant, a

life is intensely barely there, regathering in an immediacy of its capabilities. This is not vitalityreduced to the minimum; this is lie primed& This is also $ar& The lieprimed may indeed be in proimity to death . Het the body is already arcing toward a ne8t

vital e8ercise of its capacity to act. 0ot re-animalization3 re- animation3 a stoking for the ne8t step. This is a far cryfrom a life reduced to brute matter. ;t is the embodied event of a life regathering in recoil. This is life self- enfoldingin a5ective vitality. The obFect of full-spectrum power is the a5ective body regathering in its capacities across a

stepped interval of change. #hich is to say that ull-spectrum po$er does not actually have an obFect.

/ather than having an obFect, it 7nds a fulcrumIif a fulcrum can be said to leverage time. ;t leverages theuture, in the bare activity o action da$ning. (hock, in the ne8t instant, spills over intoaction. ;nfra- agitation ampli7es, issuing in a macro-move. The actual resulting action does not e8haust thecommotion of bare activity preceding it. That infra-activity coincides with a recapacitation of the body poising it for

any number of potential outcomes, only one of which eventuates. The unacted remainder ocapacitation constitutes a bac(ground modulation o the operationalparameters o the #eld o potential action& t is by virtue o thisreconditioning o the pragmatic #eld that the outcome is al$ays in somedegree nonlinear& The conditioning interval o shoc( does not simply issue

an ensuing action& t sets that net actual action against an unehaustedbac(ground o potential actions, many of which are in actuality mutually e8clusive. Theoutcome overall is a changed relation bet$een the action that has actuallyresulted and the ne$ly modulated eperiential #eld rom $hich itemerged. ;t is “ecological . The 7eld of potential action vibrates with the resonances and interferences ofpoisings unperformed, unsatis7ed in action. This ecological remainder of actionability accompanies the ensuing

action, retensing it even as it happens. (hock The ecological relation bet$een the actionand its dynamic bac(ground colors the action’s afective tonality& Thebare-active poising is embodied in a posture, $hich , like a posture in the everyday

sense, complicates the action $ith the vaguely elt accompaniment of what has

been left unacted and will in?ect further actions coming after. t is through posture that theagitation o shoc( and its poising commotion eeds or$ard through the

line o actual actions& 5osture holds the arc o the action-line or thepresent. ;t is the dynamic form of infra-agitation’s presently passing down the line3 a dynamic holding patternof in?ection’s on-?owC a carrying-on of continuously modulated action capacityC a carriage of pragmatic potential .+

<ess decisive than an action, more insistent than a state o rest, posture isnot eactly active or passive& .ore moving than passivity, less momentousthan activity, it registers the bare activity o an action, in inra-accompaniment to it& 5osture as carriage is the dynamic sign o bare activityuncoiling rom the inra- interval into action, and carrying the intensity othat passage across actions, under variation& Posture, as a sign, is indicative of acontinued ecological conditioning of the pragmatic 7eld. @arried with the conditioning is a continuing uncertainty. The resonating and interfering remainder of capacitation ?owing down the line is as apt to remodulate on the ?y as

to follow the arc. ) 7eld once in?ected may rein?ect. This poses a problem or the militaryeercise o orce- beyond-orce. )s a force-to-own-time, its avocation is to leverage

uturity by altering action’s conditions o emergence. The fact that the outcome ofshock it administers toward this end is comple8Ia dynamic relation between a punctual action and its continuouslymodulated background conditioningImeans that the future it in?ects retains a signi7cant degree of uncertainty.4orce-beyond-force must concern itself with managing uncertainty, not only that associated with pree8isting 7eldconditions into which it intervenes, but with its own future success. (trategies must be put in place to manage thearc of the action-line to prevent it from drifting too far a7eld or reaching a sudden turning point where it bifurcates

une8pectedly. ) kind of shock therapy becomes necessary. .ilitary strategy crucially assumesthe tas( o shoc( management as a central eature o its ontopo$erulperceptual conduct o proto-epistemological $arare&! The strategies are many. )ll

involve the use of force- against-force. The uture is accessed by addressing perception, perception is



accessed by a call to attention, and the call to attention is by nature an administration o shoc( Iespecially considering that what uali7es a call to attention as military is that ignoring it is not an option. ;t is

forced. +o$ever !sotly' administered, it does violence& t administers anafective 2olt& The ontopo$er o the orce- to-own-time is an added value, a surplus-value efect, o hard po$er’s violence& t is orce-against-orce $hich givesontopo$er purchase& 3attle and nonbattle go hand in ulcrum& Force-

against-orce is the !reali%ation' o sot po$er, Fust as the economic act of purchase isthe “realization of capital. Force-against-orce and orce- beyond-orce, battle andnonbattle, are processually $ed& They are reciprocal unctions& t is only atthe ar ends o the spectrum o orce that they seem to separate out& /tthe ar end o the spectrum, at the urthest etreme of the force-to-own-time, liessot po$er at its sotest1 the simple call to attention, administered by anemission o signs, $ithout eplicit violent action. The call to attention suspends. tinterrupts habitual or conventional entraining o actions, i only or animperceptible afective interval, in order to inect their direction& /t itssotest, sot po$er eerts a deecting orce o interruption& t reorientsaction potential& t suspends to divert, and diverts as a smaller- than-smallest step to$ard ecosystemic !total situation control&' The diversion

may involve traditional techniues designed to !deceive, disguise, ormisinorm' !&lhnan and #ade *++, 88i8$. n this orm, it is !ino-$ar' understood inthe traditional sense o propaganda $ar !a subset of “psyops$.

"ithdra$al doesn’t reduce presenceMassumi 14 (Brian, Prof of Communications @ U of Montreal, The Remains of the Day , On Violence Vol 1, 21!"214)The invasions o ra and /ghanistan may be $inding do$n& 3ut thepreemptive military posture o the )* has only spread . )nd nowhere has terroristthreat stopped looming. East month !'uly 12**$ was the bloodiest for months for &( military personnel in ;ra, andterrorist attacks in )fghanistan picked up spectacularly with the assassinations of the governor of Jandahar

province and the mayor of Jandahar city. 8ven ater the =$ithdra$al= o )* troops from ;ra, there $ill be a continuing )* presence inde#nitely into the uture , as "bamaKs

(ecretary of Aefense /obert Dates put it, in order to L7ll the gap in ;rai (ecurity 4orce operations.L This continuing presence $ill be in the orm o 7ve high-tech compounds out7tted for drone operations andhousing aircraft and armored vehicles for rapid- response forays. The withdrawal from )fghanistan will similarly

leave a permanent preemption-ready presence. That presence hasunprecedented reach& /ccording to best estimates, the )* preemptivepresence stretches across more than >?@ bases around the $orld& The lessocused it becomes on outright invasion, the more spread-out andtentacular it becomes& )* special operations orces are no$ active in noless than >? countries around the world and carry out an average of =2 missions a day. Thenumber o countries =serviced= is slated to rise to AB@. ) key to advisor to DeneralPetraeus, the commander of &( troops in ;ra, then )fghanistan, and now incoming @;) director, was recently

uoted marvelling at the reach of this Lalmost industrial scale killing machineL. 5reemption doesnCt goa$ay& t spreads its tentacles& Things change& 3oots on the ground mayrecede as drones advance, ollo$ing the rhythms o public opinion and theelectoral cycle o politiciansC engrossment in domestic afairs& 0ation-building might get bac(grounded in avor o targeted assassinationcampaigns& 3ut the operative logic o preemption only becomes more$idespread and insidious& The more it changes, the more it stays thesame, ever-epanding& To the point that it can be said to become thedominant operative logic o our times& 5reemption octopuses on&Ontopo$er rules&



This imperial metaphysics creates the conditions orunbounded violenceConstantinou 12 (Marios, Uni#ersit$ of C$%rus, Venus Imperatrix: The Moods of mpire, Paralla& 1'4, %1"5)"hat is under eamination is 8mpire as an afective disclosure& "hat (ind

o $orld do imperial moods discloseD :eing an a5ective intentionality without a subFect,8mpire discloses pro2ects, involvements and logics o ta(ing care obusiness $hich betray, as Bichel 4oucault has argued, a certain directionality obiopo$er $hose overall efect escapes anyone’s intention in particular&8mpire, then, is a state o mind, a undamental mood; a mode o attunement where the biopower of the imperial bourgeoisie of the *+th century which served as a strategy of its self-

constitution has by now evolved into a mood o global domination not only overcollaborative elites aspiring to partnership but also over peoples& The thrillingmood of postmodern biopower, namely, the mood of Mgetting ready to be trans7gured’ was captured for a moment

by %elene @i8ous3 Mwho knows who ; shall be, a moment from now, in the fertile night’ of GmpireN> 8mpire isthe essential moodiness o Elassical mperialism, its clamorous self-duplicity disclosedanew in relative autonomy, so to speak, from its original models. Eiving through a gestation process at the heart of@entral Guropean ;mperial metaphysics, %eidegger profoundly sensed both its disclosive and self-destructivemoods. )lthough the moral assessment and Furidical indictment of 0azism has more or less been orderly

completed, %eidegger’s critical engagement with the neo-/oman foundations of #estern imperialism remains, withrare e8ceptions, obscurely silenced. %owever there are still suOcient !and original$ grounds for uestioning these

intellectual and a5ective tropes of #estern imperialism. %eidegger anticipated that the inherentlybiopolitical moods o 8mpire would co-eist and co-evolve $ith imperialistterror; the eistential $ithdra$al o a $orld that up until then was ta(en orgranted as inert ra$ material, a mere standing reserve& %eidegger’s :eing and Time,along with his lectures on Parmenides, are in many respects masterful investigations of the neo-/oman tropes ofGmpire. %eidegger remains, in my view, a forgotten but suggestive resource for a critical re-e8amination of thecurrent dispositions of Gmpire as an indeterminable biopolitical terrain. %eidegger’s lesson, with regard to the

present engagement, is relevant to the dual nature o imperial paci#sm1 humanisticand at the same time immanently related to $ar pathologies& )ttuned to

%eidegger’s critiue, one could note that $hat is despicable is its ignoble, unconessedand unconessable violence $hich is philistine, co$ hearted, lily-livered,

$ea(-(need and, at the same time, beastly, erocious and relentless&Those $ho legitimi%e imperial peace commit the most contemptible ormo violence, perpetrating the most co$ardly assault& ;n %eidegger’s sense, theyare the ne$ arrivals o last men and $omen, evangeli%ing peace onimperial terms& ;f there is a critical legacy for thought after the ascist disaster that is it3 thedual nature o the 8mpire o the last man and the unending completion oan /merican ivf metaphysics& &pon re?ection, the moods o 8mpire disclose aundamental ambiguity, particularly its manipulative, double-eyedbiopolitical diplomacy& #e are living through times when any reference to Mimperialism’ sounds like theidle talk of a bygone era that memory cannot recall. #e cannot but test the principal a8ioms of the 0ew

;nternational "rder against its master moods which neither disclose perpetual peacenor perpetual $ar but an ambiguous demarcation bet$een the t$o,

moving in and out o these states s$itly and $ithout ore$arning, hencetriviali%ing both& ;n other words, there is still something raudulently 6omanabout 8mpire its commanding ga%e, moods and disciplines $hichconers upon any concept o politics an empty resonance& The Third 6eichmay be gone but the commanding logic o 6oman interpellation as animperial perspective is still our enduring condition& )ccording to %eidegger, in

Parmenides the de#ning eature o imperial actio proper alludes not to $ar butto the logic o fallereC of bringing do$n to all by deceptive circumvention, bygoing around& ;n other words, commanding as a logic o imperial actio entails a



constant surmounting, a deceptive outan(ing, a circumspicio $hose circular,periscopic, all encompassing revolving ga%e turns the enemy’s resistancearound&= /mbiguity remains the privileged mood and disciplinarypedagogy o our imperial postmodernity& This mood in the sense odisposition ought then to be read in an e8tended %eideggerian sense which includes modes odisposing order and methods o paci#cation that is, the biopolitical

sovereignty o an uncircumscribed imperium consisting o ormalcommands, inormal decrees and in2unctions& The all-knowingness of ambiguous everydaystructures of groundless hearsay or idle talk, spying or curiosity, furnishes the global biopower of Gmpire withaverage understandability, insatiably investigating and understanding everything, but learning nothing. Thiscommonsensical ambiguity of Mdiaphanous’ publicity is the unsurpassable ontological structure of Gmpire as itstands. ;ts forces of simulation reduce any possibility of counteraction to an already belated, collateral and

derivative status. (o much for the ambiguous openness of Gmpire, @ommonwealth and governance. "e are allattuned into itG #e rise and fall together %eidegger’s insights into the structure of imperial command can

be traced back to 0ietzsche’s a8iomatic style. 0ietzsche’s account of afect as a hallmar( ocommand schemati%es genealogically the intriguing sel-duplicity obiopo$er and its moodalities capable o de-po$ering resistance to it& Theprincipal preoccupation of this intervention is to rethink the concept of Gmpire in terms of de7nable a5ects and

e5ects3 that is, by recollecting its lu8urious yet bare will to biopower, the aimless striving o the

$ill to $ill& 8mpire in this 0ietzschean sense of decadence is both the commanding andobeying party governing and opposing through 0HOs, managing 6ightand <et and embodying contradictory drives and articulations o afect&

*urvival is, paradoically, anti-lie—the ris( politics o the A/Eis a lie-denying attempt to insulate lie rom u andbecoming& The desire to avoid all threats is a nihilistic impulse$hich reduces humanity to bare biological preservation,annulling lie itsel Babic *+4Q:abette G., Professor of Philosophy at 4ordham &niversity, 0ietzscheKs Philosophy of (cience 3 /e?ecting (cience "n the Dround of )rt and Eife, (&0H (eries, the Bargins

of Eiterature, (tate &niversity of 0ew Hork Press Pg. *+6-*+Q#ithout Price3 The #ill to Truth as the #ill to Eife )s we have seen, the democratic or !for 0ietzsche, decadent$

drive of scienti7c culture is e8pressed in the #ill to Truth. The "ill to Truth reigns in sciencebecause the decadent moral ideal o its culture proclaims not merely a $illto lie, but a $ill to lie at any price& The motif of sel-preservation, or survivalis, by its own de7nition, an insistent, desperate one& "hat is desired in the $ill tolie at any price is not at all lie or living, per se. #hat is $illed is much rathersimply the preservation o lie, perhaps as little as possible, perhaps so that onemay have it or as long as possible, perhaps as painlessly as possible. =+

"hat is essential is merely that one =have= and not that one =live= lie . Our$ords betray our values. Thus we tend to say, L<ie involves ris(= as i it $erepossible to eclude ris( $ith a little care& This possibility is impossible&

<ie is undamentally ris( . ;n what )na8imander e8presses as the supreme principle of the cosmos!which (chopenhauer understood so well$, the contradictory heart o the living thingsounds the promise o its evanescence&2 The longing or lie at any rate,at any price denies physiological #nitude& /nd lie is nothing butphysiological #nitude. The desire or immortality maniests the nihilism oa longing or lie at any price, sans aucun risue. 3ecause lie cannot be heldin stoc( nor ultimately preserved, the $ill to lie is undamentally opposedto the essence o lie. t has been argued that or those see(ing topreserve lie at all costs, it is not merely death that threatens& The



ependiture o lie !as it can be found in those who endanger life by celebrating its Foys or spending its

resources recklessly$ is to be countered as $ell& The $ill to 9preserve: lie isplainly aligned $ith morality. This opposition reveals two life-orientations. The #rstorientation that o saving or preserving lie is consumptive andacuisitive, epressing its o$n need and indigence, $hile the second theliteral spending o lie is an epression o inherent po$er& The artistCs

desire to create, to give, and to en2oy $hich also means to sufer lie,stands in contrast to the earul, acuisitive longing or lie. )nd here it should besaid that the LartistL in uestion is not the creative individual of paints and brushes nor a dancer nor even amusician nor any kind of cultural architect. The meaning of art must be understood in terms of the grand style, amatter more of character than mRtier )ll of life manifests desire or #ill to Power. That is, all life e8presses #ill to

Power, even in its most decadent e8pression. Het, a decadent epression o the "ill to 5o$eris radically diferent rom the strong pessimism o the "ill to 5o$er thatis, as 0ietzsche e8presses it in *, Lprompted by $ell-being, by overo$ing health,by the ullness o eistence&= The material acuisitiveness o a decadent"ill to 5o$er battles emptiness on the unidimensional plain o antasy inits drive to possess. 0ietzsche, describing the correspondence between the constant search and constant

boredom of modern culture, writes, Lit is a tragic spectacle to see ho$ the dance o itsthought rushes longingly to$ard ever-ne$ orms, to embrace them, andthen, shuddering, lets them go suddenly as Bephistopheles does the seductive Eamiae.L1 This is more than an account of modern culture between the agitations of the mode, but it describes the broad

compass of science in its endless proFect, the achievement of a Luni7ed vision of the world.L9 Iriving thisblithe commitment to truth =at any price,= $hat is then operative in thislie-preservative orientationthe need to preserve lie CCat any price=is apo$erul thrust to$ard $orld appropriation&6 This drive can be understood as 0ietzscheunderstands psychological and organic drives3 LThe course of logical ideas and inferences in our brain todaycorresponds to a process and a struggle among impulses that are, taken singly, very logical and unFust. #egenerally e8perience only the result of this struggle because this primeval mechanism now runs its course souickly and is so well concealed.L> #e have seen that this primordial mechanism is the basis of perceptual andconceptual !that is logical$ knowledge. The working of this mechanism corresponds to 0ietzscheKs e8pression of the#ill to Power. This mechanism can now be de7ned. Glucidating the direction of the moral structure of science, desirealone should be understood simply as will. Power !Bacht$ is correlative to desire3 it is its articulation. :ut the #ill toPower as a concept goes beyond desireC it is euivalent neither to an unconditioned or indeterminate #ille, nor to

any kind of conatus. Thus, for 0ietzsche, apart from a negative de7nition, the idea of power cannot be given aneudaimonistic e8pression, because the positive signi7cance of power is to be found only in the activity or

e8pression of power. The end of the active e8pression of power is power itsel& "here the end oepressed po$er, $here $hat is ris(ed, is no more than a bid or morepo$er, an original 9and reactive: lac( is con#rmed. The e8pression of power, then, has adouble sense corresponding to the degree and type of power !that is, active or reactive$. #e may e8plicate this

duality as the desire or po$er 9impotence$ and the desire of power !abundance$. The 7rst

reactive epression o the "ill to 5o$er is rom the side o a lac( o po$erand a need or po$er; this is neediness o desire1 articulated $ant& Thesecond 9active: epression o the "ill to 5o$er is rom a superabundanceo po$er and a need or creative epression; this is the plenitude odesire1 articulated armation&

The alternative is to re2ect the metaphysics o presence—reuse to engage 8mpire on its o$n terms%anos ++ (-illiam V, Prof of .iterature @ Bin/amton U, !merica"sShadow: !n !natomy of mpire);t will be the purpose o the remaining chapters o this boo( to analy%e theinadeuacies o these =postmodern= discourses to the tas( o resisting thediscourse o the 5a /mericana and to profer prologomemally analternative on the basis o this critical analysis. %ere, it will suOce to suggest that these

oppositional discourses are, each in its o$n particular $ay, blinded by



their insights not only to precisely $hat, in the present historicalcon2uncture, is strongest in the discourse o the dominant liberalJcapitalistculture o the post-Eold "ar period1 its 2usti#cation o global po$er on thebasis o an ontological representation o temporal history 9being: thatends in the triumph o the cultural, social, political, and especiallyeconomic ormations that are constructed on its oundation& n ailing to

perceive $hat is strongest in the =triumphant= imperial discourse oliberalJcapitalist democracy, each o these oppositional discourses, in turn,is also blinded to $hat is $ea(est and most vulnerable in it& mean, torepeat, the ontological contradiction — $hat have been calling thespecter — at the enabling center o its =benign= global discourse1 theviolent genocidal $ill to po$er that $as the =end= o the 9onto:logicaleconomy that 2usti#ed /mericaCs intervention in Kietnam and itsindiscriminately murderous conduct o the $ar& )ll of which is to say, 7nally, that anadversarial discourse that $ould be adeuate to the tas( o resisting the0e$ "orld Order I that, in 0oam @homskyKs aptly ironic phrase, would be capable of LdeterringdemocracyL = I would do well not simply to reconstellate and rethink L<ietnamL in the conte8t of theannunciation of the end of history, but, in doing so, to take its directives precisely from the spectral contradictions!the radical di5erences$ precipitated by the Lful7llmentL of the imperial logic of the )merican anthropologos in the<ietnam #ar. ;n other words, the retrieval of the repressed history of the <ietnam #ar points to an adversarial

strategy that $ould reuse to engage its in#nitely more ormidable antagonistaccording to the terms prescribed by the latterCs imperial problematic,$ould not, that is, be ans$erable to the =truth= o its visibly invisiblemetanarrative& t calls or the adoption o a strategy that eploits itsadversaryCs essential $ea(ness1 the po$erul $ill to closure that hidesbehind its tolerance o diference, its alleged pluralism& t calls, that is, oran adversarial strategy that, li(e the strategy o the Kietnamese Other inthe ace o the utterly predictable narrativity o the /merican invadersCmetaphysically structured discourse and practice, ta(es the orm o anitinerant spectrality& mean a nomadic phantasmagoric absence, a mobilenonpresent presence, a haunting invisibility, that reverses the panoptic

ga%e o the dominant culture in transorming itsel as seen into absentsee-er& n short, the retrieval o the repressed history o the Kietnam "arcalls or a de-structive strategy that, li(e the Kietnamese Other vis-a-vis=/merica,= resists identi#cation and thus rustrates the $ill to closure othe triumphant culture and in so doing dis-integrates its discourse odecidability and arrival, $hich is to say, disempo$ers and delegitimi%es itsimperial po$er and legitimacy&



Lorea



A0E Iialogue *olves escalation )M6ecent deal proves neither side $ith escalate they $illnegotiate to reduce tensions&0im '!1 SAuyeon Jim, associate in the 0uclear Policy Program and )sia Programat the @arnegie Gndowment for ;nternational Peace, The ;nter-Jorean Aeal3 Aefusing/ecent Tensions, )ugust 9*, 12*>, @arnegie Gndowment for ;nternational Peace,http3QQcarnegieendowment.orgQ12*>Q2Q9*Qinter-korean-deal-defusing-recent-tensionsQifea#hat is the signi7cance of the dealN #hat does it mean for the future of cross-border relations, and will this agreement lead to an inter-Jorean summitN Thelatest deal is another indicator that the t$o governments can successullydeuse standofs and avoid conict through dialogue& t also reinorces thevie$ that $hile the 0orth’s Lim amily needs to sustain tension ordomestic legitimacy, it is not $illing to ris( inadvertent conict.



A0E )*-6OL alliance high*uo solves concerns over basing relocation is ma(ingprogress&co 315 S'ames E. (cho5, (enior )ssociate )sia Program at @arnegie,(trengthening &.(. )lliances in 0ortheast )sia, 'uly *>, 12*>, @arnegie Gndowmentfor ;ntentional Peace, @ongressional Testimony,http3QQcarnegieendowment.orgQ12*>Q2=Q*Qstrengthening-u.s.-alliances-in-northeast-asiaQidhr"verall, the &.(.-'apan and )&*&-6OL alliances are in good shape today, thanksin part to consistent bipartisan support from the &.(. government over the yearsand careful attention paid most recently by both the :ush and "bamaadministrations. Polls show broad support on each side of these two alliances, andpolitical change !back and forth$ in all three countries over the last two decades hasnot disrupted their relationships.* ;n fact, the alliances are arguably as strongas they have ever been.Uuick and robust &.(. support for 'apan in the aftermath of its 12** tsunami and nuclear crisis was the right thing to do not onlyfrom a humanitarian perspective, but also from a &.(. strategic standpoint and as a close friend. )lthough current 'apanese PrimeBinister (hinzo )be often remarks that his party’s return to power in late 12*1 helped “repair &.(.-'apan relations, the fact is that

alliance cooperation was solid during the last two years the Aemocratic Party of 'apan was in power, and this emerging “bipartisansupport for the relationship in 'apan should be celebrated. ;t is a long-term asset for the alliance.)crimonious trade battles are largely a thing of the past !though not e8tinct$, which has strengthened a sense of partnership. &.(.-

'apan cooperation initiatives in a variety of 7eldsI including energy, the environment, health, science and technology, anddevelopment aid !including the recently established &.(.- 'apan Aevelopment Aialogue1$I have been a staple of the post-@old #arperiod and deliver value to the allies and to the world. :ilateral defense cooperation continues to broaden and deepen in anevolutionary manner, amidst a deteriorating security environment.;n recent years the al lies have conducted more freuent and comple8 military e8ercises, updated bilateral planning, collaborated inhumanitarian assistance and disaster relief !%)QA/$ operations including Paci7c Partnership and "peration Aamayan in thePhilippines !among others$, established the G8tended Aeterrence Aialogue !GAA$ to consider alliance responses to nuclear threats,and announced new Duidelines for :ilateral Aefense @ooperation in 12*> to adapt to modern security threats.9 ;n addition, the &.(.and 'apanese governments agreed on a plan to reduce the &.(. Barine presence in "kinawa and relocate the 4utenma Barine @orps)ir (tation for a more politically sustainable posture, receiving permission from the local governor to initiate the proFect !althoughthis relocation faces delays due to local political opposition and a new opposition-backed governor$.

The )&*&-6OL alliance has $eathered numerous 0orth Lorean acts obelligerence and attempted intimidation in recent years, oten emergingstronger or the eperience& The allies approved in 12*9 a new coordinated planto respond to future 0orth Jorean provocations !enhancing deterrence$ and addednew bilateral working groups in the areas of cyber and space security policy.6)nother important bilateral initiativeI the G8tended Aeterrence Policy @ommitteeIbegan in 12*2 for the same reason as the &.(.-'apan GAA !i.e., to discuss allianceoptions with regard to the growing 0orth Jorean nuclear threat$, and it has been animportant tool for facilitating bilateral communication on the topic and reassuring(eoul of &.(. intentions and capabilities. The realignment o )&*& orces inLorea has aced delays and hurdles in implementationI much like thesituation in 'apanI but progress is being made and the allies signed a ne$agreement last year on sharing the costs or maintaining the )&*&presence through B@AN.>



A0E 0oLo $ar no escalation regime survivalLorean conict $ont escalate both sides have incentives tode-escalate& ackson '24 S<an 'ackson, a <isiting 4ellow at the @enter for a 0ew )merican(ecurity and a @ouncil on 4oreign /elations ;nternational )5airs 4ellow, Preparing forthe 0e8t Jorean #ar, The Aiplomat, )ugust 16, 12*>,http3QQthediplomat.comQ12*>Q2Qpreparing-for-the-ne8t-korean-warQGvery Jorea e8pert ;’ve ever met believes 0orth Lorea’s primary goal is regimesurvival. 4et most of these same eperts believe that Lim ong-un is capableo anything and there’s no telling $hat he might do. To put it politely, that’scognitive dissonance. $e (no$ 0orth Lorea see(s regime survival, then $e(no$ something about $hat it’s (een to avoid. 8ven Lim ong-un must(no$ there are certain actions that $ould end him and his regime—nuclear attac(s, the destruction o *eoul, or a mass invasion o *outhLorea. Jim 'ong-un isn’t a Billenarian or a 'ihadiC his goal isn’t suicide. (o unlesswe want to shrug our shoulders and say “anything could happen, $e should havesome modest con#dence that Lim $on’t pursue the etreme actions that0orth Lorean media routinely threaten. *outh o the I.P, the incentivesto avoid a nuclear conict are 2ust as strong. 4or starters, Q@ years o!restraint' $hen aced $ith 0orth Lorean violence suggests that, in the)nited *tates especially, there is a strong desire to avoid the ris(s oescalation and conict in general. Plus, no sitting presidentI/merican or*outh Lorean—$ants to go do$n in history as the #rst president to usherin the era o nuclear $ar#ghting. The cost in lives would be abhorrent, andthere’s a high risk that such a situation would rapidly erode the nuclearnonproliferation regime. 0orth Jorea @an’t ;nvade the (outh n une AR?@, 0orthLorea launched a large-scale invasion o a *outh Lorea with only a tokenability to resist and no meaningful &.(. military presence. This is the classicscenario that e8perts and military planners often imagine when they think ofanother Jorean #ar. 4et there’s no$ a heavily armed I.PIreplete with a largemine7eld, no lessIseparating the 0orth and (outh, and the *outh Loreanmilitary is better trained and euipped than any force 0orth Jorea couldmuster. 0orth Lorea’s air orce and navy services are vastly inerior to thetechnologically advanced (outh Jorean military. )nd the )&*& military presencein and commitment to *outh Lorea is ar more than symbolic. The point isthat no military leader $ould loo( at the military balance on the Lorean5eninsulaIespecially not a leader in the 0orth Lorean 5eople’s /rmy !JP)$Iand thin( that it ma(es sense or 0orth Lorea to invade *outh Lorea&The ormer might have cause or conict, but $aged asymmetrically, notas a head-on rontal assault& nvasion o the *outh is militarily impossible.

This 0orth-(outh military imbalance is worsened by a JP) that lacks the logisticsand sustainment capacity reuired of an invasionC the JP) is numerically large, butregularly diverted from military tasks to perform agricultural and industrial laborfunctions to support a moribund economy. The JP) isn’t a force that’s capable of along duration military campaign.



0o chance o use- ear or regime survivalielmann 15 SD/GD T%;GEB)00, (G0;"/ 4GEE"#, )rms @ontrol )ssociation,&nderstanding the 0orth Jorean 0uclear Threat, Bay *1, 12*>,http3QQwww.armscontrol.orgQ7lesQT):V2>V12*>.pdf0orth Lorea has or soon $ill have small numbers o nuclear $arheads onmedium-range 0odong ballistic missiles capable of targeting cities in 'apan andthroughout (outh Jorea. %owever vulnerable, unreliable, or inaccurate thesemissiles may be, their potential as nuclear weapons delivery vehicles will not belightly dismissed by governments in (eoul, Tokyo, and #ashington. (ecurity oOcialsin these governments will take into consideration that any military confrontationswith 0orth Jorea could conceivably lead to nuclear devastation. ;f current trendlines continue, 0orth Jorea will probably be able to pose a genuine nuclear threat tothe &.(. mainland within a decade. 5yongyang’s primary motivation ordeveloping such a capability $ould be to deter aggression against 0orth

Lorea rather than to acilitate its o$n aggression against others. The

regime’s principal inhibition in the use o nuclear $eapons $ill be not the

e8tent and uality of missile defenses arrayed against it, but the sure (no$ledge

that nuclear use $ould lead to the end o the Lim dynasty and the 0orth

Lorean state&



A0E 0O /ccidental 0o(o "ar - Ehenoan/ccidental Lorea $ar is unli(ely no parties stand to bene#t Eheonan sin(ing proves&6arle$ 31! S/obert 4arley is an assistant professor at the Patterson (chool ofAiplomacy and ;nternational @ommerce, The Aiplomat, )pril >, 12*9,http3QQthediplomat.comQ12*9Q26Qnorth-korea-and-the-fallacy-of-accidental-warsQNallpagesWyes/ccidental $ars rarely happen. %istorians have demonstrated that most warsinitially deemed “accidental, !perhaps most notably the 4irst #orld #ar$, have inactuality resulted from deliberative state policy, even if the circumstances of thewar were unplanned. #hile war seems discordant, it actually reuires a great dealof cooperation and coordination. Fundamentally, t$o parties have to agree toconduct a $arC otherwise, you have either a punitive raid or an armed surrendernegotiation.@onseuently, the baseline or evaluating the chances or accidental $ar onthe Lorean 5eninsula should be 2udged as uite lo$. *outh Lorea, in alllikelihood, vie$s the prospect o decisive victory against 0orth Lorea as$orse than the status uo. The )nited *tates has no interest in #ghting a$ar against the AP/J at the moment. 4or e8ample, the sin(ing o theEheonan $as obviously an act o $ar, but neither the )nited *tates nor*outh Lorea $ere interested in #ghting a $ar on the terms ofered. #hilewe know less about the strategic calculus of 0orth Jorea, there is little reason tothin( that 0orth Lorea $as interested in $ar, either; it probed *outhLorean capabilities and resolve, but did not press the issue in $ays thatcould have orced *eoul’s hand& This said, there are conditions under which the chances for accidental wars increase. ;f the main parties do notcommunicate well !or at all$ with one another, they may misunderstand messages designed to convey commitmentor capability. @ultural di5erences can contribute to a lack of appreciation of how a potential foe thinks about thecosts and bene7ts of war. Aomestic con?ict invariably complicates foreign policy, as state leaders often actaccording to a logic that places the dictata of their governing coalitions above foreign policy concerns. 4inally,

leaders do not have full control over their military organizationsC a rogue artillery commander, 7ghter pilot, or subskipper can e5ectively initiate hostilities on their own. )ll of these conditions can lead to situations in which statescommit what they believe is limited force in service of what they believe are limited obFectives, but in actualitythreatens core interests of the enemy. The potential for accidental war is highest in conditions where technology and doctrine overwhelmingly favor uick,o5ensive action, and produce uick, decisive outcomes. #ars that could de-escalate following a border skirmishand a few artillery duels can escalate beyond control if both sides understand the timing of o5ensive action to becritical. )rguably, the conditions on the Jorean Peninsula currently match this description. )lthough there’s virtuallyno scenario in which 0orth Jorea could win a war, if allowed to mobilize and launch well prepared, coordinateo5ensive activities the AP/J could in?ict severe damage on the (outh Jorean military and (outh Jorean civilians.(imilarly, a pre-emptive &.(.-/"J assault on the 0orth Jorean military, or an attack launched in the very earlystages of a 0orth Jorean assault, could substantially undercut the power of 0orth Jorea’s 7rst punch.(uch an operation would include a wide array of attacks, launched from sea, air, and land platforms, targeting 0orthJorean air7elds, communication nodes, and logistic chokepoints. These attacks would attempt to eliminate 0orthJorean o5ensive capabilities, especially for direct attacks against the (outh !and presumably against 'apan$. Theability of the AP/J to provide any defense against a committed air o5ensive is in deep uestion, despite a large air

force and an e8tensive ()B network. 0orth Jorea is the war that the &.(. )ir 4orce !&()4$ !and to a lesser e8tent,the &.(. 0avy$ have been dreaming about 7ghting since the *+=2s, and they remain well prepared to 7ght it. Thelast maFor armored o5ensive to push forward under a condition of enemy air supremacy was the 0orth <ietnameseGaster "5ensive of *+=1, which ended in disasterC the 0orth Joreans would operate under considerably greaterhandicap. The 0orth Jorean nuclear program e8acerbates these diOculties. ;f the /"J and &nited (tates decided to launch apreemptive strike, AP/J nuclear sites would be among their 7rst targets. The ability of &.(. and (outh Joreanintelligence to successfully identify these targets !and to assess their destruction at high levels of con7dence$remains highly uestionable, but 0orth Jorea might nevertheless decide that it needs to use the weapons in somefashion in order to preserve the strategic and political balance. #hether the use of weapons would prevent regimedestruction is a di5erent uestion entirelyC the senior military and political leadership may assess the weapons asregime saviors, even if a nuclear detonation would ensure the resolve of (outh Jorea and the &.(. to end the AP/J.



Aaryl Press and Jeir Eeiber sensibly warn about the potential that attacks against the 0orth Jorean leadership cadremight have destabilizing e5ects. The &.(. may well refrain from launching attacks directly against the 0orth Joreanleadership in order to maintain some rump level of communications, and to give the leadership a potential survivalstrategy beyond nuclear escalation. Precedents for not directly attacking the leadership include Eibya in 12** and(erbia in *+++. %owever, given the close ties between the Jim regime and the senior military leadership, and theidenti7cation of the state itself with the Jim clan, there could be considerable temptation to strike. These dynamics operate on the 0orth Jorean side, as well. (enior 0orth Jorean military oOcers are professionalsCthey surely understand the power of the advanced )merican and (outh Jorean military establishments, and

appreciate that pre-emption could prove disastrous to 0orth Jorean military prospects. The appropriate response toconcern about catastrophic defeat at the hands of the &nited (tates and (outh Jorea would surely be to deescalatethe crisis, but AP/J domestic politics may, for the time, preclude that possibility.0evertheless, it is e8ceedingly diOcult to believe that serious military professionals within the AP/J believe in thepossibility of victory against the &nited (tates. Botivated bias surely matters to decision-making, but Fust as surelymust have some limits. Thus, if 0orth Jorea successfully convinces the &.(. and the /"J that war is inevitable, it is almost irresponsible forthe latter not to launch a pre-emptive attack that would disrupt 0orth Jorean preparations. #ere a war to takeplace without pre-emption, the political opposition in both countries would take the current leadership to task forfailing to take steps to destroy the AP/J’s military at its stepping o5 points. The political implications of this logicare obviously grim, and it should be clear that neither (eoul nor #ashington believes, at this point, that war isinevitable. )t the same time, convincing 0orth Jorea that war is inevitable could have similar disastrous e5ects. This is undoubtedly why the &nited (tates has responded in slow, measured fashion to 0orth Jorean provocations.

)gain, e$ $ars happen by accident; most ta(e place because policyma(ers$ant them, even i those policyma(ers operate $ith poor or incomplete

inormation about the prospects or success& Hiven the current balance ocapabilities on the Lorean 5eninsula, a ull $ar seems eceedinglyunli(ely, as none o the combatants stand to bene#t.





/T 3io$eaponsA& 0o acilities or bio$eapon creation or deployment0o terrorist-run labs, no access to materialsLeitenberg ‘9 !Bilton, (enior /esearch (cholar Z @enter for ;nternational and (ecurity(tudies Z Baryland &. since *++, *+, Eeitenberg 7rst )merican recruited to

work at the (tockholm ;nternational Peace /esearch ;nstitute, )Oliated with(wedish ;nstitute of ;nternational )5airs and the @enter for ;nternational (tudiesPeace Program Z @ornell &., his 7rst paper dealing biological weapons waspublished in *+=. )t (;P/;, he was a member of the team that produced the si8-volume study, The Problem of @hemical and :iological #arfare, published between*+=* and *+=9. (ince *++1, he has published thirty papers in the area of biologicalweapons, *2Q1=Q2+, “The Threat of :ioterrorism, /eal and ;magined,

As for assistance from state-run BW programs to terrorist organizations seeking to develop or to produce biological agents or

weapons, there is no evidence whatsoever of an such activit! "!#! intelligence agencies have alwas considered the

likelihood of such assistance to be e$tremel low, and the e$pect the same to remain the case in the future! %inall, the histor of

attempts b non-state actors to develop or use biological agents has been remarkabl limited! &f these, the most significant were al-

'aida(s effort in Afghanistan between )99* and +) to obtain a pathogenic culture of B! anthracis and to initiate work with the

organism, and the so-called Amerithra$ incidents in #eptember and &ctober +), when a purified, dr-powder preparation of B!

anthracis sent through the "!#! postal sstem killed five people! he barel initiated, rudimentar, and failed attempt b al-'aidais important because of the nature of the group. an international terrorist organization with a wide organizationalstructure, demonstrated initiative, and a record of successful, albeit conventional, attacks! he Amerithra$ attacks, on the other hand,

are significant for demonstrating the kind of attack a trained professional is capable of! But the identification of the perpetrator also

provided critical insight into both the likelihood of international terrorist organizations developing similar capabilities and how /uickl

such a threat could emerge! #ince the interruption of al-'aida(s BW pro0ect in 1ecember +), there are no indications that

the group has resumed those efforts! Accounts of al-'aida offshoot groups in the "nited 2ingdom, %rance, or 3ra/ producing ricin

are all spurious! here have also been no publicl identified indications that an other international terrorist group has

initiated the development of BW agents in the intervening ears! 3t is also significant that al-'aida(s efforts to develop BW

were provoked b the severel overheated discussion in the "nited #tates about the imminent dangers of bioterrorism! A

message from Aman al-4awahiri to his deput on April )5, )999, noted, ((6W7e onl became aware of them 6BW7 when the enem drew

our attention to them b repeatedl e$pressing concerns that the can be produced simpl with easil available materials!8 3n terms of

bioterrorism perpetrated b a terrorist organization, the Amerithra$ events are an outlier, as the almost certainl were carried out b a

"!#! scientist, full trained, with access to pathogenic strains and optimum working conditions! A terrorist group has never

carried out a mass-casualt bioterrorist event! et thanks to the stead stream of prognostications that essentiall e$plain toterrorists wh BW would be of great utili t to them, such an event ma well happen! "nfortunatel, remarks of the same sort will almost

certainl continue to be made b those interested in keeping the level of government funding for biodefense high!

Ioesn’t culminate in etinction0eller !8 !/ebecca X )nalyst at (tratfor, Post-Aoctoral 4ellow at &niversity of@olorado at :oulder, 12*9, L:ioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,Lhttp3QQwww.stratfor.comQweeklyQbioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential$;t is important to remember that the risk of biologica l attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak,epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scienti7c research and knowledge sharing. ;n most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than theactual threat. ;nfectious Aisease Propagation (ince the beginning of 4ebruary there have been occurrences of %>0* !bird ?u$ in @ambodia, %*0* !swine ?u$ in ;ndia and a new, or novel, c oronavirus !a member of the same virusfamily as ()/($ in the &nited Jingdom. ;n the past week, a man from 0epal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the &nited (tates, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, andthe @enters for Aisease @ontrol and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. ;n addition, the &nited (tates is e8periencing a w orse-than-normal ?u season, bringing moreattention to the in?uenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its e5ective reproduction number, or /-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate ordie out. #hen the disease 7rst occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as /2, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case cancause on average during its infectious period. )n /2 a bove * means the disease will likely spread !many in?uenza viruses have an /2 between 1 and 9, while measles had an /2 value of between *1 and *$, while a n /-value of lessthan * indicates a disease will likely die out. 4actors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads !through the airor bodily ?uids$ and how susceptible the population is. The initial /2, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below *, stopping the further spread of thedisease. :oth the coronavirus family and the in?uenza virus are /0) viruses, meaning they replicate using only /0) !which ca n be thought of as a single-stranded version of A0), the more commonly known double heli8 containinggenetic makeup$. The rapid /0) replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply e rrors in the replication process. (ome mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity ofinfection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two di5erent strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. ;n?uenza, because it infects multiple species, isthe hallmark e8ample of this kind of evolution. Butations can make the virus unfamiliar to the bodyKs immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because thepopulation is less euipped to battle the disease. The traFectory of a mutated virus !or any other infectious disease$ can reach three basic levels of magnitude. )n outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. )n epidemicindicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. <irologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic seuence of new infections. ;t isthis technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Biddle Gast was actually a novel coronavirus. )nd it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like%>0* could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Eessons Eearned There have been several in?uenza pandemics throughout history. The *+* (panish 4lu pandemic is often cited as a worst-casescenario, since it infected between 12 and 62 percent of the worldKs population, killing roughly 1 percent of those infected. ;n more recent history, smaller incidents, including an e pidemic of the ()/( virus in 1229 and w hat wastechnically de7ned as a pandemic of the swine ?u !%*0*$ in 122+, caused fear of another pandemic like the *+* occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although theeconomic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to e5ective disease management. The #orld %ealth"rganization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the &nited (tates and the Guropean &nion !although thepossibility e8ists that the vaccines may not be e5ective against a new virus$. ;n the event of a n outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. @ontainment strategies beyond vaccinesinclude uarantine of e8posed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus co uld easily spread, such as airports. 4urther measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. ;ndividualmeasures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in speci7c, high-risk situations. %owever, airborneviruses such as in?uenza are still the most diOcult to contain because of the method of transmission. Aiseases like noroviruses, %;< or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily ?uids or fecal matter.

The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. /esearch is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Jnowledge gained fromstudying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. 4or e8ample, the genomic seuence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in di5erentcountries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement uarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only *9 documented cases of the novel c oronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. /ecentcases in the &nited Jingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. 4urther sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. "ngoing research into viruses can also helpmake future vaccines more eOcient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. ) case in point is research on the %>0* virus. %>0* 7rst appeared in humans in *++=. "f the more than 22cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. %owever, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. %uman-to-human transmission of %>0* is very rare, with only a fewsuspected incidents in the known history of the disease. #hile there is an %>0* vaccine, it is possible that a new variation o f the vaccine would be needed we re the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable betweenhumans. <accines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. ;n Aecember 12**, two separate research labs, one in the &nited (tates andone in the 0etherlands, sought to publish their research on the %>0* virus. "ver the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutationsalso caused other changes, including a decrease in the virusKs lethality a nd robustness !the ability to survive outside the carrier$. Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk ofaccidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Gventually, publication of papers by both labs w as allowed. %owever, the



scienti7c community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on 'an. 16, 12*9. "n4eb. 1*, the 0ational ;nstitutes of %ealth in the &nited (tates issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with %>0*. "nce standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a c ase-by-case basis to allow research tocontinue. 4ear of a pandemic resulting from research on %>0* continues even after the moratorium was lifted. "pponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used a s abioweapon, since information in scienti7c publications would be considered readily available. The /isk-/eward Guation The risk of an accidental release of %>0* is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied.Proper safety standards are key, of course, and e8perts in the 7eld have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research bene7ts. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level threeout of four, which reuires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. #hile many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entryor even palm scanners. There are roughly 62 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wi shing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines reuiring strict national oversight and close communicationand collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biologicalweapon reuires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. (tratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have

rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the li(elihood o a successul attac( is very lo$& Diven that the

laboratory version of %>0* -- or any in?uenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modesthat a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be re7ned and then aerosolized and released into a

populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There aresevere constraints that ma(e success using either o these methods unli(ely.

The technology needed to re#ne and aerosoli%e a pathogen or a biologicalattac( is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Gven if they were able to develop a weapon, other

actors such as $ind patterns and humidity can render an attac(inefective. )sing a human carrier is a less e8pensive method, but it reuires that thebiological agent be a contagion. )dditionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start

an outbreak, the inected carrier must be mobile $hile contagious, something that

is doubtul $ith a serious disease like small po8. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. )s far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward euation to

consider. The threat o a terrorist attac( using biological $eapons is very lo$.)nd while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain of virus that could result inan epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more e5ectively. )ll of this hinges on the level of preparedness of

developed nations and their ability to rapidly e8change information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of thethreat.



/T 3io$eapons <in(Fear o pandemic apocalypse $hether bioterrorism or diseaseis not a response to increased threat but to a shit insub2ectivity in the post-genomic era to$ard ever-present

catastrophe the circulation o narrative creates practices thatma(e it more li(ely as rhetorical critics, $e should re2ectthemLeranen 7AA !Eisa, Aepartment of @ommunication , &niversity of @olorado Aenver,“@oncocting <iral )pocalypse3 @atastrophic /isk and the Production of:io!in$security #estern 'ournal of @ommunication, <olume =>, ;ssue >$The dominant critical read o the )&*&Cs post-RJAA biodeense bonan%a isthat it represents a dangerous etension o the "ar on Terror into atechnoscienti#c ront that strips unding rom crucial areas such asmalaria, tuberculosis, and +KJ/I* !Doldstein, 1229C Jlotz Y (ylvester, 122+$.(upporters counter that because it e8tends public health response capacity,biodefense could potentially counter a host of naturally occurring outbreaks and

lead to new medical advances !Palmuist, 122$. #hether or not either or both ofthese claims bears out upon empirical scrutiny, this paper locates thebiodeense buildup in a $idespread vision o bio9in:security collectivelyproduced through representations o catastrophic viral apocalypse that, inturn, licenses a prolieration o biological $eapons agents in the name obiodeense& ;ndeed, a collection o eperts rom security circles, thepharmaceutical industry, the scienti#c community, citi%en advocacygroups, international policy circles, and even +olly$ood haveIacross avariety of political, technical, and cultural frontsIpushed the guiding notion obiological vulnerability that may in act be promulgating bio9in:security inorder to 2ustiy and perpetuate its eistence& ;n short, $hile these elitedecision-ma(ers do not control the endless loop o +olly$ood imagery and

simulated conabulations that lodge the germ threat so #rmly in the/merican psyche, they do conront such visions o viral apocalypsethrough a series o technological #es that ma(e germ $or( routine, and$hich sustain biodeense $rit large&The rhetoric o biological threats as catastrophic ris( that emerged out of themidXlate *++2s and intensi7ed after the post-+Q** anthra8 mailings thus signi#es arecon#guration o anieties about emerging inectious disease to therealm o national security, encouraging a robust !biodeense&' /snecessary as protections from epidemic may be, this development nevertheless raises uestions about the interlacing o national security andpublic health& t also raises uestions about $hich health ris(s merit large-scale economic and cultural outlays& 4or instance, while acknowledged acts of

bioterrorism killed fewer than *2 people in the last *22 years, cell phoneXrelateddistractions are responsible for 1,22 annual deaths and 999,222 accidents withmoderate to severe inFuries !/ichtel, 122+$. /outine medical errors kill tens ofthousands of citizens each year, food-borne pathogens cause more than = millionillnesses each year in the &nited (tates with >,222 deaths !;nstitute of Bedicine,122+C Bead et al., *+++$, while cancer and heart disease kill more than a million!Doldstein, 1229$. 4et, concerns about bioterrorism and possible pandemic—more than the more mundane and regularly occurring (illers—prompt

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10570314.2011.614507#CIT0036


















Iiplomacy



A0E 6egionalism "on’t +appen8ven i not, 8nhanced regionalism $on’t happen too manysources o conict&.ee 311 SEee (hin-wha, Professor, Jorea &niversity, @4/, “The Gast )sia (ummit andthe AiOculty of Gstablishing a (ecurity /egime in 0ortheast )sia, 0ovember 12**,http3QQwww.cfr.orgQsouth-koreaQeast-asia-summit-diOculty-establishing-security-regime-northeast-asiaQp1>69

The &nited (tatesK membership in the Gast )sian (ummit !G)($ may mark a new step in &.(. involvement in Gast )sia. :ut 8ast/sian regionalism does not currently provide an ans$er or ho$ toinstitutionali%e security cooperation in 0ortheast /sia& ;n that region, the globalinterests o the our ma2or po$ers—the )nited *tates, Ehina, 6ussia, and

apan—intersect in complicated $ays with the divided Jorean peninsula. The fourth tri lateral summitbetween (outh Jorea, 'apan, and @hina was held in Tokyo last Bay, and since *++= the three countries have regularly met on thesidelines of the )ssociation of (outheast )sian 0ations !)(G)0$ summit. These meetings demonstrate the need for a region-speci7cpolitical dialogue and consultation, if not an independent institutional entity. The G)( and other )(G)0-led multilateral gatheringsare mainly centered on (outheast )sia and pay less attention to 0ortheast )sian concerns, such as the (i8 Party Talks on the 0orth

Jorean nuclear issue. %owever, it is unli(ely that *outh Lorea, apan, and Ehina $ill beup to the tas( o efectively addressing the challenges uniue to

0ortheast /sia.0ortheast /sian leaders at the tripartite meeting have ailed to prove thatsubregional multilateral initiatives are more efective in addressing theirneeds or enhanced cooperation in #nance, trade, and environmentalprotection, not to mention the absence of agreement on 0orth JoreaKs nuclear brinkmanship and its military provocations

against (outh Jorea. This lac( o progress can be eplained by several interrelated factors3 persistent nationalism and mutual mistrust caused by colonial history and$ar, territorial disputes, ideological conrontation throughout the Eold"ar period, &.(. engagement in the region based on a bilateral Lhub-and-spokeL system, and the lac( opolitical $ill in acilitating multilateral cooperation& 5olitical and securitymatters are still perceived as contentious rather than cooperative.

/lt cause FT/s9ent 31! S@hristopher B. Aent, Professor of Gast )siaKs ;nternational PoliticalGconomy at the &niversity of Eeeds, Paths ahead for Gast )sia and )siaXPaci7cregionalism, ;nternational )5airs +3 6 !12*9$ +9X+>;n sum, $hat has developed in 8ast /sia and the )siaXPaci7c so far is a dense region-$idepattern o heterogeneous bilateral FT/s. Bany observers make the mistake of euating this trend

with regionalism per se. ;n fact, a case can be made that FT/ bilateralism has ractured traderelations in both regions into a comple array o preerential traderelationships that actually $or( against the development o regionalismand regional community-building.1 Eompliance $ith the various trade andinvestment rules embodied in these bilateral agreements constitutes $hatis oten reerred to as the 7spaghetti’ or 7noodle bo$l’ problem or #rms.1=

:usinesses have long complained about the tangled mess of rules caused by bilateral trade deals, and governments from the regionhave sought to address it through proposed regional 4T)s that aim to harmonize sets of bilateral deals into uni7ed singularagreements.



/T Iisease0atural pandemics don’t cause etinctionan:ber/ Q**Q14 !)nders, 'ames Bartin /esearch 4ellow at &niversity of "8ford, “The 7ve biggest threats tohuman e8istence, http3QQwww.washingtonpost.comQposteverythingQwpQ12*6Q2Q**Qthe-7ve-biggest-threats-to-human-e8istenceQ$

0atural pandemics have killed more people than wars. %owever, natural pandemics are unli(elyto be eistential threats 3 There are usually people resistant to the

pathogen, and the ofspring o survivors $ould be more resistant. 8volution

also does not avor parasites that $ipe out their hosts, which is why syphilis$ent rom a virulent (iller to a chronic disease as it spread in 8urope .

5harma $on’t invest in solving their impactsam%le *Q19Q1! !;an, Duardian (cience @orrespondent, (ally Aavies is :ritainKs most senior medical adviser,“)ntibiotic-resistant diseases pose KapocalypticK threat, top e8pert says,http3QQwww.theguardian.comQsocietyQ12*9QFanQ19Qantibiotic-resistant-diseases-apocalyptic-threat$L;n the past, most people havenKt worried because weKve always had new antibiotics to turn to,L said )lan 'ohnson,

consultant clinical scientist at the %ealth Protection )gency. L#hat has changed is that the development

pipeline is running dry . "e donCt have ne$ antibiotics that $e can rely on in the immediate future or in the longer term.L

Ehanges in modern medicine have eacerbated the problem by ma(ingpatients more susceptible to inections& For eample, cancer treatments$ea(en the immune system, and the use of catheters increases the chances of bugs entering thebloodstream.L#e are becoming increasingly reliant on antibiotics in a whole range of areas of medicine. ;f we donKt have newantibiotics to deal with the problems of resistance we see, we are going to be in serious trouble,L 'ohnson added.

The supply o ne$ antibiotics has dried up or several reasons , but a ma2or

one is that drugs companies see greater pro#ts in medicines that treat

chronic conditions , such as heart disease, $hich patients must ta(e or

years or even decades. LThere is a bro(en mar(et model or ma(ing ne$

antibiotics,L Aavies told the BPs.

0o ris( o %oonotic pandemics can’t go airborne or spreadefectively, plus health inrastructure chec(s every disease inhistory proves our impactOrent *Q6Q15 !#endy "rent is the author of LPlague3 The Bysterious Past and Terrifying 4uture of the #orldKsBost Aangerous AiseaseL and LTicked3 The :attle "ver Eyme Aisease in the (outh.L, “;gnore predictions of lethalpandemics and pay attention to what really matters, http3QQwww.latimes.comQopinionQop-edQla-oe-orent-pandemic-hysteria-12*>2*26-story.html$

The scienti7c world has changed since 122>. 0ow, most scientists understand that there aresigni#cant physical and evolutionary barriers to a blood- and uid-bornevirus developing airborne transmission, as Darrett has acknowledged. Though Gbola virus hasbeen detected in human alveolar cells, as <incent /acaniello, virologist at @olumbia &niversity, e8plained to me,

that doesnKt mean it can replicate in the airways enough to allow transmission. “Baybe \ the virus can get in, butcanKt get out. Eike a roach motel, wrote /acaniello in an email.

+?0A, we understand now, never $ent airborne because it attached only to cellreceptors located deep in human lungs, and could not, thereore, becoughed or snee%ed out. */6*, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, caused local outbreaks after

multiple introductions via air travel but spread only sluggishly and mostly in hospitals.

3rea(ing its chains o transmission ended the outbrea( globally. There

probably $ill al$ays be signi#cant barriers preventing the easy



adaptation o an animal disease to the human species . 4urthermore, /acaniello

insists that there are no recorded instances o viruses that have adapted to

humans, changing the $ay they are spread .

(o $e need to stop listening to the doomsayers, and we need to do it now.

5redictions o lethal pandemics have I since the swine ?u 7asco of *+=, when President 4ord

vowed to vaccinate “every man, woman and child in the &nited (tates I al$ays been $rong . Fear-mongering $astes our time and our emotions and diverts resources rom$here they should be directed I in the case of Gbola, to the ongoing tragedy in #est )frica.)mericans have all but forgotten about Gbola now, because most people realize it isnKt coming to a school or ashopping mall near you. :ut (ierra Eeoneans and Eiberians go on dying.



/T "ater/lready lots o damsMuker;ee 814 !Badhusree, (cienti7c )merican @ontributor, “The ;mpending AamAisaster in the %imalayas http3QQwww.scienti7camerican.comQarticleQthe-impending-dam-disaster-in-the-himalayasQ$

Garlier this year earthuakes in 0epal leveled thousands of buildings, killed upwardof ,>22 people and inFured hundreds of thousands more. The magnitude =. and=.9 temblors also cracked or damaged several hydropower proFects, underscoringanother imminent danger3 dam bursts. .ore than Q@@ large dams have beenbuilt or are in some stage o construction or planning in the geologicallyactive +imalayan .ountains, but many are probably not designed to$ithstand the $orst earthua(es that could hit the region, according to anumber of seismologists and civil engineers. (hould any of the structures fail,reservoirs as large as lakes could empty onto downstream towns and cities. )collapse of Tehri Aam in the central %imalayas, which sits above a fault, would, forinstance, release a wall of water about 122 meters high, slamming through twotowns. ;n total, the ?ooding would a5ect si8 urban centers with a combined

population of two million.Bore powerful earthuakes are indeed likely to strike the %imalayas in comingdecades, seismology models show. The ;ndian subcontinent is pushing under the

Tibetan Plateau at roughly *. meters per century, but it regularly gets stuckC whenthe obstruction gives way, a section of the Tibetan plate lurches a few meterssouthward and releases the pent-up energy in an earthuake. The 0epalearthuakes also destabilized the region to the west, notes Eaurent :ollinger, aseismologist at the 4rench )lternative Gnergies and )tomic Gnergy @ommission.Aestabilization makes a great earthuake, which is de7ned as having a magnitudeof .2 or higher, more likely to occur sooner rather than later. "ther studies indicatethat the earthuakes released only a mere fraction of the stress of this fault line,which is e8pected to readFust with uakes of eual or higher magnitude. “#hether

theyKll break now, in an or wait another 122 years and then give way in an .=,one cannot say, says seismologist <inod J. Daur of the @(;/ 4ourth Paradigm;nstitute in :angalore.(uch seismically active regions are e8actly where hundreds o dams A? metersor higher are either under construction or being planned, most o them tosupply hydropo$er to ndia or Ehina& )ny dam being built during thisgovernment-funded boom, as well as those already completed, must be able towithstand the strong ground shaking of an e8treme earthuake, says Bartin #ielandof the ;nternational @ommission on Earge Aams, a group of engineers that makesrecommendations for structural standards. /lthough every nation has its o$nregulations, ndia and Ehina are secretive about their dam designs $hen itcomes to public scrutiny& ;ndependent engineers rarely are allowed to evaluatethe robustness of the structures, and when they are, the results can be unsettling.4or e8ample, Probe ;nternational, a @anadian environmental research organization,reports that designers for @hinaKs Three Dorges Aam used “the most optimisticinterpretation possible of seismic shaking. (imilarly Tehri Aam never underwentrealistic simulations, asserts Daur, who served on its oversight committee, alongwith civil engineer /. 0. ;yengar, formerly of the ;ndian ;nstitute of (cience in:angalore. Dovernment-aOliated scientists and engineers claim that Tehri Aam cansurvive an .> shock, but outside e8perts are not so sanguine. )ny of hundreds of



dams could be in danger of bursting when the ne8t big one hits. ;f that were tohappen during monsoon season, when the dams are full, the conseuences couldbe catastrophic.

/lt cause, <aos $ill destroy the .e(ong Ielta any$ays they

see damming as an eistential necessityParames<aran *14 !Prashanth, Aiplomat #riter, “Eaos Aam /isks AamagingBekong /iver, ;gniting Tensions #ith <ietnam http3QQthediplomat.comQ12*6Q*1Qlaos-dam-risks-damaging-mekong-river-igniting-tensions-with-vietnamQ$/ t$o-day meeting in <aos regarding the construction o a BQ@-mega$attdam on the <o$er .e(ong 6iver has predictably done little to close thegap bet$een the <ao government, $hich is intent on proceeding $ith thepro2ect, and other parties that remain concerned over its environmental andgeopolitical impacts, <oice of )merica reported Tuesday.

The proposed Aon (ahong hydropower proFect is critical part of the Eaogovernment’s hopes to transform the country into “the battery of (outheast )sia,with revenues generated from e8porting power to neighboring countries. :ut the

other three neighboring countries in the lower Bekong X Thailand, @ambodia and<ietnam X have Foined with rights groups in formally calling for a halt in constructionto allow for further impact studies. They argue that the proposed proFect woulddramatically alter the ?ow of the Bekong /iver and disrupt the migration of 7sh tothe detriment of downstream communities in neighboring countries.“The likely impacts from the Aon (ahong dam\pose an unacceptable risk to foodsecurity, lives and livelihoods and the health of millions of people, the (ave theBekong @oalition wrote in the <ietnamese publication Thanh 0ien 0ews on 4ridayahead of the meeting.@ambodia, Eaos, Thailand and <ietnam are all bound by a *++> Bekong treaty tohold inter-governmental consultations before constructing new dams, and therecent meeting was part of this process. %owever, Eaos continues to insist that it

only needs to notify its neighbors about its desire to build the dam, and it hasalready begun constructing it.Beanwhile, governments and groups from neighboring Thailand, <ietnam and@ambodia have said that the trans-boundary impacts of the dams mean that thewisdom of the proFect itself needs to be debated 7rst, or else the consultationprocess itself would be of limited utility.“@onstruction has begun and decisions have already been made, prior to any“consultation taking place. The process will simply serve as a ritual or a rubberstamp for the dam, (omkiat Jhuenchiangsa, coordinator of the Thailand-based@hiang Jong @onservation Droup and the Bekong-Eanna 0etwork on @ultural and0atural /esources @onservation said in an op-ed to The :angkok Post on Aecember**.

The e5ects of the Aon (ahong dam on neighboring countries could be signi7cant. The dam will block the only channel available for dry-season 7sh migration, leadingto the demise of important 7sheries and the potential e8tinction of criticallyendangered ;rrawaddy dolphins, which are also a big source of eco-tourism.Aisrupted 7sh migration patterns would be particularly devastating for @ambodia,since more than =2 percent of protein consumed there comes from 7sh. The damwould also a5ect the roughly 12 million residents of <ietnam’s Bekong Aelta, whichaccounts for more than a uarter of the country’s DAP. )n e8pected drop in alluviumwould render soil unsuitable for cultivation, while drought and salination will be



more severe, potentially disrupting the livelihoods of millions and leading to anemployment and migration crisis for the <ietnamese government.“The dam will come like a hit to the back of the head. ;t will be a fatal blow, Ar.Auong <an 0i from @an Tho &niversity said.

The conseuences could e8tend into the geopolitical arena as well. @arlyle Thayer, apolitical scientist with the )ustralian-based &niversity of 0ew (outh #ales !and

Aiplomat regular$, told <oice of )merica that if the dam a5ects the livelihood offarmers in the Bekong Aelta as predicted, it could then generate bottom-uppressure and a5ect bilateral relations between Eaos and <ietnam.“;t’s going to test S@ommunist party to party relations between Eaos and <ietnamuite severely. )nd also a bad time for Eaos because <ietnam has got one moreyear to the party congress and there’s a plenum to do with pretty stridentnationalism in <ietnam, Thayer said.

Het <ao ocials have insisted on going or$ard $ith the dam& They saythat the .e(ong 6iver Eommission cannot stop the country rom pursuingits right to hydropo$er, and that the <ao government and the dam’sdevelopers are $or(ing to address some o the environmental concernsraised& %owever, critics remain unconvinced that the mitigation measures

proposed will be suOcient.!SThe <ao government $ill not be deterred rom its commitment todevelop clean, rene$able hydropo$er, a source o national pride or the<ao people and a sustainable source o electricity or the region, <iraphonh<iravong, the country’s vice minister of energy and mines, wrote in an especiallystrident op-ed in Thailand’s 0ation newspaper in late "ctober.

0o ris( o escalation 0o country in the region cares enoughto bloc( the dams they 2ust complain and use $ater control inlieu o #ghtingeik *15 !(alman /a7, Pakistani academic and a regular contributor to )sia

(entinel, “The /ace for Aams in the Dreat %imalayahttp3QQwww.asiasentinel.comQsocietyQrace-dams-great-himalayaQ1Q$The race or dams in the +imalayas afects all o the river systems o$ingout o the Tibetan glacier X the Danges, the Bekong, the :rahmaputra, the;rrawaddy, the Hangtze and many more. The race could turn the region into a virtualdesert if it continues unabated, environmentalists say. Auring the past threedecades, tens of millions of people have been displaced in ;ndia and @hina due tothe construction of big dams such as the (ardar (arovar Aam on the 0armada /iverin ;ndia and the Three Dorges on the Hangtze.

:ut geopolitics overshado$s human misery and destruction o ecology&

<ittle attention is being paid to human and environmental actors& 0o

state has actually put or$ard any comprehensive plan or rehabilitationo those $ho $ould be directly afected& )lthough some states such as ;ndia

have assured their citizens that large scale dislocations would not occur and thatmany of the proFects are merely run-o5-the-river electricity generation units,whenever people have been displaced due to the construction of hydro-electricproFects, dams and other such things, relocation fails due to one basic reason3 theyare unable to adFust to the new locality they are shifted to.



0ot only ndia but other *outheast /sian states have also repeatedlyvoiced their concerns over Ehina’s massive dam pro2ects& @onstruction in@hina has been vociferously blamed for reduced water ?ow into and sudden?ooding of the Bekong /iver, which ?ows into (outheast )sia and is a source of lifefor millions of people. )s such, massive dam construction in the Tibetan region inthe great %imalayas is also regarded as having serious rami7cations for the lower

riparian states.;n response to such widespread concerns, the @hinese 4oreign Binistryspokeswoman %ua @hunying told reporters in late 12*6 that “the hydropowerstations @hina builds will not a5ect the ?ood prevention and ecological system ofdownstream areas.%owever, Ehina is certainly not the only state involved in harnessing the

$aters o the +imalayas& )s a matter of fact, a number o regional states,

especially ndia, are also planning and or constructing hundreds o dams&

0ot only is this a part o the strategy to meet national needs and to cater

for the ever growing population’s needs, but it is also geostrategic necessity&

Eontrol over the o$ o $ater directly translates into a strategic asset

and can potentially be used as a $eapon in the $a(e o $ar or as a threat

to deter any possible aggression from an adversary state.

0o $ater conict3rahic 7@N S@atherine, writer for 0ew (ceintist X peer reviewed Fournal, )pril **, “;s this the beginning of waterwarsN, http3QQwww.newscientist.comQarticleQdn*9>>-is-this-the-beginning-of-water-wars.html

/s 3arcelona runs out o $ater, *pain has been orced to considerimporting $ater rom France by boat& t is the latest eample o thegro$ing struggle or $ater around the $orld - the =$ater $ars=& :arcelona and

the surrounding region are su5ering the worst drought in decades. There are several possiblesolutions, including diverting a river, and desalinating $ater& :ut the city looks

like it will ship water from the 4rench port of Barseilles. The water services authority in Barseille say that nocontracts have been signed, and would not say how much the water would cost, although it is unlikely to cost any

more than it costs the inhabitants of Barseilles. )nd the amounts o $ater than have beendiscussed are small - B?,@@@ cubic metres, less than $hatCs needed togro$ an acre o $heat, and not enough to keep 92 (paniards going for a year, based on their averageconsumption. :ut the proposal is interesting because it turns a local drought into an international situation.

Elimatologists predict that certain regions, the .editerranean basinamong them, $ill increasingly sufer rom $ater shortages as globaltemperatures are pushed up by greenhouse gas emissions& Eombined $ithreports that $ater scarcity can escalate conicts, the orecasts haveraised ears that climate change could bring about $ater $ars& =5eople$ill not go to $ar over $ater,L says Bark ]eitoun, from the Eondon (chool of GconomicsK @entre for

Gnvironmental Policy and Dovernance in the &J. L3ut thatCs not to say $ater shortages $illnot contributing to eisting tensions&L This is already happening. ]eitoun advises the

Palestinian authorities in their water negotiations with ;srael. The latter controls +2^ of the two territoriesK sharedwater resources. LThe fact that the Palestinians are deprived of their water doesnKt help the situation,L ]eitoun says.Eike (pain, the Palestinian authorities are considering their options, and like (pain one of them is to import water -in this case from Turkey, a country which is already involved in its own water disputes with (yria and ;ra. The Tigrisand Guphrates rivers start in Turkey and supply (yria and ;ra. The Turkish government is building dams on thoserivers, reducing the ?ow downstream and stoking long-standing tensions with its neighbours. L;ra desperatelyneeds that water,L says ]eitoun.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13655-is-this-the-beginning-of-water-wars.html


http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn12086-med-to-get-five-times-as-many-dangerously-hot-days.html


http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11089-the-impacts-of-rising-global-temperatures.html

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19426064.500-rainfall-records-could-warn-of-war.html

http://lse.ac.uk/collections/alcoa/whosWho/programmeFellows.htm




http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11089-the-impacts-of-rising-global-temperatures.html

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19426064.500-rainfall-records-could-warn-of-war.html

http://lse.ac.uk/collections/alcoa/whosWho/programmeFellows.htm

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