Harun Al-Rashid and the Mecca Protocol of 802

Harun al-Rashid and the Mecca Protocol of 802: A Plan for Division or Succession?Author(s): Tayeb El-HibriSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), pp. 461-480Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/164625Accessed: 05/11/2009 16:07

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 24 (1992), 461-480. Printed in the United States of America

Tayeb El-Hibri

HARUN AL-RASHID AND THE MECCA

PROTOCOL OF 802: A PLAN FOR

DIVISION OR SUCCESSION?

The succession crisis and civil war that followed the death of Caliph Harun al- Rashid in 809 is a gloomy chapter in the history of the Abbasid caliphate in its prime that captured the attention of later medieval Muslim scholars. Their main challenge lay in trying to find an appropriate rationale for justifying the conflict between the caliph's sons, al-Amin and al-Ma'mun, and the fate of the community under a caliphate seized by force for the first time in the Abbasid era. The destruc- tion wrought by the civil war on the capital, Baghdad, combined with the spread of factional strife to other provinces of the caliphate, presented an ethical and religious dilemma reminiscent to contemporaries of the early Islamic fitnas. Con- scious of this parallel, the chronicler al-Tabari, writing a century later, devotes considerably more space to the years of the civil war than he does to the reigns of al-Rashid and al-Ma'mun that bracketed it.

Modern historians of the Amin-Ma'mun civil war generally adopt the view de- rived from the medieval Islamic literary sources that portray the conflict as result- ing from al-Amin's breach of the succession arrangement that Harun al-Rashid had drafted in Mecca while he was on a pilgrimage in 802. In this Mecca Protocol, al- Rashid nominated his sons al-Amin and al-Ma'mun to succeed him in turn to the caliphate, and he divided the Abbasid state between the two so that, although the title of the caliphate was to pass first to al-Amin, his effective authority would be restricted because the regions east of the city of Rayy would become an autonomous domain centered in Khurasan to be ruled by al-Ma'mun. When al-Ma'mun succeeded al-Amin the division would presumably cease to exist.' Here, however, I will argue that Harun al-Rashid did not prescribe this territorial division. Rather he only firmly established a line of two successors to the caliphate, al-Amin followed by al-Ma'mun. It was only after al-Amin's defeat that later Ma'munid propaganda altered and expanded clauses in the protocol to include elaborate stipulations for the territorial independence of Khurasan. In thus detracting from al-Amin's caliphal authority, the spurious protocol provided al-Ma'mun with a legal argument for his hegemony over the east during the civil war and his eventual overthrow of the caliph.

Tayeb El-Hibri is a doctoral candidate at the Department of History, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027, U.S.A.

? 1992 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/92 $5.00 + .00

462 Tayeb El-Hibri

I shall further argue that the full plan for succession was concluded in 805 at Qarmasin, when al-Rashid finally included another of his sons, al-Mu'tamin, as a third successor to the caliphate and fully clarified relations among the brothers.2 A revised reading of the protocol suggests that, while al-Amin reigned as caliph, al- Ma'mun was to be stationed on the Khurasan frontier in a strictly military capac- ity, which was to be paralleled in the west by al-Mu'tamin's role of defending the Abbasid frontier in Asia Minor (composed of the provinces of al-Thughur, al- 'Awasim, and al-Jazira) against the Byzantines. The equivalence in the specific military functions of al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tamin thus reflected a similarity of subordination towards the central authority.

THE CIVIL WAR

The conflict between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun arose soon after Harun al-Rashid died while putting down the rebellion of Rafic ibn al-Layth in Samarqand in 809. Al-Rashid had set out on that campaign accompanied by a host of prominent Ab- basid figures, including his vizier al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi', his general Harthama ibn Acyan, and his son al-Ma'mun, who brought along the still little-known bureaucrat al-Fadl ibn Sahl, a protege of the Barmakids who had been converted to Islam by al-Ma'mun.3 In Khurasan, the ailing caliph set up his base in the town of Tus and dispatched al-Ma'mun to Merv to organize and direct Harthama's expedition against the rebel in distant Samarqand. Within a month al-Rashid died in Tus, having witnessed only the partial, if clearly growing, success of his campaign. The caliph's escort troops in Tus, now idle and cut off for months from their families in Baghdad, were quick to heed the call of al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi' to return to Baghdad. The return of the caliph's troops-secretly ordered by al-Amin according to some reports-soon became an event that would be viewed by the pro-Ma'munid faction as a treacherous withdrawal and a violation by al-Amin and al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi' of al-Ma'mun's purported autonomous jurisdiction. Whatever the circumstances, the army's return, according to the sources, set the stage for further inroads by al-Amin into al-Ma'mun's turf and provoked al-Ma'mun's defiance of the caliph.

Clues to the issues sparking the disagreement between the brothers are usually sought in a series of actions taken by al-Amin to assert his full sovereignty over the east that treated al-Ma'mun as merely the governor of Khurasan. Among them was al-Amin's demand that the tax revenues of certain towns in Khurasan be sent to Baghdad, the appointment of some postal agents to the east by the caliph, and the recall of certain military contingents from Khurasan to Baghdad.4 Al-Ma'mun reportedly saw these actions as an infringement of his independence, and although he refrained from renouncing the caliph's suzerainty immediately, he began styl- ing himself with the ambiguous, but politically presumptuous, title imam al-hudd (guide to righteousness).5 Around the same time, al-Amin tried to place his son al- Natiq bi-al-Haqq in the line of succession after al-Ma'mum and al-Mu'tamin, and then advanced him to the place held by al-Mu'tamin. When al-Ma'mun objected, the caliph promoted his son to succeed him in place of al-Ma'mun himself, and dropped al-Ma'mun's name from the khutba as second successor.6 By this time al- Ma'mun had changed the sikka in the east and minted coins that bore his new title

Harun al-Rashid and the Mecca Protocol of 802 463

and excluded the caliph's name, and soon afterwards he severed ties with the caliph. The stage was set for war.

In the escalating disagreement between the two brothers, two different geopolitical groups began to coalesce, one in the east and another in the west. As Gabrieli rightly pointed out, they did not represent an ethnic conflict between "Arabism" and "Iranism," but a dynastic one.7 Throughout the war, al-Ma'mun's support was ethnically and socially diverse, although it seems to have been spearheaded by the landed Persian gentry, whose grievances about mistreatment by Abbasid governors in Khurasan had long gone unheeded in Baghdad and had produced rebellions such as that of Rafi' ibn al-Layth in 808.8 In Baghdad, on the other hand, al-Amin continued to rely on the support of the abnda', the aristocratic descendants of the Perso-Arab generation of the Abbasid revolution that had settled in Iraq and formed the Praetorian guard of the caliphate.

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities around the city of Rayy in May 811, al- Amin's forces were defeated. They retreated from the east towards Baghdad, which al-Ma'mun's commanders, Harthama ibn Acyan and Tahir ibn al-Husayn, put under siege in August 812. After a year, during which much of the city was re- duced to ruins, the eastern armies finally overran it, and the caliph was soon afterwards captured and put to death at the command of Tahir ibn al-Husayn. The repercussions of this victory were soon felt across the caliphate. The efforts of earlier caliphs, starting with al-Mansur, to project an aura of invincible power com- pletely evaporated. Al-Amin's execution, the first regicide in the Abbasid house, shook the caliphate's legitimacy and created a power vacuum that invited a wave of secessionist attempts across the provinces. In time it also gave rise to an apolo- getic historiography that sought to legitimate al-Ma'mun's overthrow of an incum- bent caliph. This called for justifying the war by placing responsibility for its outbreak on al-Amin and his "betrayal" of the Mecca Protocol through his various "interventionist" demands on al-Ma'mun, ranging from token claims on the resources of Khurasan to succession changes violating the protocol.

The protocol was originally drawn up, according to the sources, because Harun al-Rashid having nominated al-Amin at the age of five in 792 and later al-Ma'mun in 799, allegedly started suspecting al-Amin's loyalty to maintaining his brother as second successor and began losing trust in the "degenerate" al-Amin and his abil- ity to rule the entire caliphate. Although al-Amin was too young for these judg- ments, al-Rashid is said to have become sufficiently anxious to attempt to balance the power between his two sons, and he therefore embarked on a special pilgrimage in 802 to Mecca.9

A few months before the downfall of the Barmakids, the caliph set out from Raqqa on this pilgrimage accompanied by distinguished members of the Banu Hashim and a host of other prominent dignitaries, together with his two sons, Muhammad al- Amin and 'Abdallah al-Ma'mun-now sixteen years old. At Mecca, the caliph con- ferred privately with each of his two sons inside the Ka'ba. During these meetings, al-Rashid reportedly dictated to his sons the text describing his succession plans. When he emerged before an assembled multitude he announced the terms of the protocol, which al-Amin and al-Ma'mun had sworn to honor. This protocol pulled together the two previous nominations into one succession plan: al-Amin was to be the

464 Tayeb El-Hibri

first successor to the caliphate; al-Ma'mun would follow as second with full guaran- tee from al-Amin that he would not remove him from the line of succession. A significant additional clause divided the Abbasid state, giving al-MaDmun sovereignty and autonomy in the provinces lying east of Rayy-Hamadan, and restricting al-Amin's rule by making it unlawful for him to interfere in the eastern provinces.'0

The Mecca Protocol consisted of two documents, each representing the promise of one brother towards the other that he would abide by its succession and territorial terms. In the first document al-Amin declares in the opening paragraph, first, that he will succeed al-Rashid as caliph and accept al-Ma'mun's inviolable right to the second succession; and, second, that he will acknowledge al-Ma'mun's autonomous powers over the eastern provinces by declaring his brother's absolute political, military, fiscal, and administrative sovereignty over Khurasan.11 The remaining and larger portion of the document exhaustively details the promises and pledges that al-Amin makes to avoid infringing on al-MaDmun's sphere of influence. These include refraining from sending him commands or dispatching personnel for posts in the east, or requesting aid from him in monetary or military, or any other, form. Al-Amin further promises to render to al-Ma'mun whatever gifts or promises al-Rashid had given to him during his lifetime.'2 The document concludes with al-Amin taking an oath stipulating that should he violate al- MaDmun's independence in any way, or seek to deprive him of the second succession, or disobey other provisions of the protocol, then he should accept being deemed apostate and thus free the community of its oath of allegiance to him.'3 The caliphate would then rightly be transferred to al-Ma'mun.14

Al-MaDmun's letter is substantially shorter than al-Amin's, but is written in a haughty style very unlike al-Amin's confessional statement. It begins by declaring his right to the second succession. It then reiterates the elaborate promises that al- Amin has undertaken to al-Rashid to safeguard al-Ma'mun's right to succession and the independence of Khurasan under his rule.15 Curiously, unlike al-Amin's document, which mentions Khurasan as the domain of al-Ma'mun, the latter's document does not refer to the boundaries of al-Amin's territory. Al-MaDmun then goes on to elaborate how al-Amin should refrain from interfering militarily, fiscally, or administratively in the affairs of Khurasan and then describes briefly his own obligations towards al-Amin. One would expect the document to maintain the theme of mutual territorial exclusiveness expounded in al-Amin's document, but al-Ma'mun surprisingly instead makes a promise to advise, obey, and defend al-Amin and admits that, unless al-Rashid nominates a third successor, the prerogative of nominating a successor to al-Ma'mun belongs to al-Amin. The document again concludes with an oath; it is similar to that in al-Amin's document except that it does not state that a violation on his part will render him apostate and free the community from its allegiance to his prospective succession.'6

After al-Rashid obtained the oath of allegiance to the protocol from the public, the two documents were then said to have been rolled up, placed in cases, and stored inside the Ka'ba. There they lay until the disagreement between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun began, and al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi' allegedly ordered them brought to Baghdad and destroyed.'7 The question of succession was not raised again until 805.18 The caliph is remembered in that year for having led an expedition to the east


to preempt an attempted rebellion by his governor of Khurasan, CAli ibn 'Isa b. Ma- han. Al-Rashid's expedition stopped en route at Qarmasin, where he declared (in what I call the Qarmasin proclamation) the nomination of his other son al- Mu'tamin as a third successor to the caliphate, to be confirmed by the second successor al-Ma'mun upon his accession in due course. At the same time, al-Mu'tamin was also appointed viceroy of the frontier region composed of al-Thughur, al- 'Awasim, and al-Jazira in Asia Minor.19

PROBLEMS IN THE MECCA PROTOCOL

The Mecca Protocol is important because it is the only direct statement in the sources on the succession question that is purportedly worded in its entirety by al- Rashid. This makes it the central source for any examination of the legal aspects of the succession conflict. That is why it is necessary first to reconstruct the original points in the protocol as formulated by al-Rashid and then to determine the points that date to the pro-Ma'munid post-civil war period. This can be done by examining the document for stylistic and thematic consistency and then establish- ing linkages between the provisions of the protocol and the arguments between al- Amin and al-Ma'mun.

It is crucial at the outset to establish a distinction between two questions. The first is whether or not the protocol itself stipulated a consecutive succession. The second is whether the protocol further divided the state and introduced a power- sharing formula between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun for simultaneous rule in the Ab- basid state. On the first question, it can hardly be denied that al-Rashid nominated his two sons to succeed him, for this is not only consistently reported in the sources, but is also corroborated by numismatic evidence.20 The second question, however, is more difficult to answer since only the protocol itself directly refers to the division, and different versions of the protocol say different things about it.

The text of the Mecca Protocol is recorded in three of the earliest Islamic sources: Azraqi's Akhbar Makka, Yacqubi's Tarikh, and Tabari's Tdrikh.21 Azraqi and Yacqubi offer almost identical versions of the two documents that comprise the protocol. Tabari's Tarikh, however, agrees on the text of al-Ma'mun's document, but differs in both content and length in the case of al-Amin's document. On the whole, Tabari's version is manifestly less reliable than either Azraqi's or Yacqubi's, for it is full of inconsistencies in style and content. For example, in Yacqubi's version al-Amin's document is told from his perspective; in Tabari's version the text alternates between direct and indirect speech even within the same paragraph. It begins with al-Amin's promises to al-Rashid, but suddenly shifts to al-Rashid's third-person speech. To this stylistic confusion is added thematic inco- herence. In Tabari's version, he includes a reference to al-Rashid's nomination of a third successor, al-Mu'tamin, and specifically mentions Qarmasin three years before the caliph set foot in the east. Tabari here, applying a historiographical style of presenting all reports relevant to the succession story in one place, mixes the different episodes of 802 and 805.

As a result of the Qarmasin anachronism, Tabari's version of the protocol has a corollary inconsistency. He gives two versions of the geopolitical boundaries of

466 Tayeb El-Hibri

al-Ma'mun's territory. In the beginning of the first document, Tabari has al-Amin define al-Ma'mun's domain as follows: "The Commander of the Faithful has given him Khurasan and its marches and districts to rule over."22 Later in the same document, Tabari has al-Amin reiterate a pledge to respect al-Ma'mun's autonomy, and this time "the governorship given him by his father [extends] from the area of Rayy as far as Hamadan to the furthest frontiers and dependencies of Khurasan and all thereto pertaining."23 The second description appears more inclusive than the first, since the reference to Khurasan implies that it was a separate provincial zone from that in which Rayy and Hamadan were situated.

The Mecca Protocol has also often puzzled scholars by its open favoritism towards al-Ma'mun. Although it is assumed that the favoritism was al-Rashid's, it is still odd that all the thorny issues that constituted areas of disagreement between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities are so clearly and conveniently spelled out in the protocol in favor of al-Ma'mun's claims. This tendentiousness in the clauses of the protocol coincides every time with the contentions that punctuated the course of the civil war, such as the instruc- tion to al-Rashid's troops to return from Khurasan in 809, the attempt to procure the revenues and produce of towns in the east, the assertion of the caliph's right to appoint a post agent in the east, his request to al-Ma'mun to return to Baghdad, and finally al-Amin's attempt to add to, and later alter, the line of succession.

In describing these issues as potential problems, the protocol appears to anticipate, or to have been written in light of, the civil war. In fact, in the protocol al- Amin's promises to refrain from intervening in al-Ma'mun's prerogatives are even more exhaustive, and his recognition of obligations is in stark contrast to al- Ma'mun's very general promises. The detail and the reiteration of the promises in al-Amin's letter show the caliph's position oddly restricted, and at times both documents of the protocol seem to deal exclusively with al-Ma'mun's sphere of authority. One clause defining the relationship between the successors even concludes by stating that in the case of disagreement between the brothers, al-Ma'mun's opinion should prevail.24 Al-Ma'mun's promises are also all contingent on al-Amin's hon- oring his promise: al-Amin phrases his in the form, "I voluntarily and without co- ercion agree to," those of al-MaDmun read conditionally: "If al-Amin honors all his oaths, I will reciprocate." Al-Amin is clearly not an equal party in the contract. He rather pathetically expresses his submission in a statement that heralds his future disadvantage in the civil war and anticipates al-Ma'mun's reign.

A variety of instances can be cited to support this impression of the protocol. Consider, for example, the apparent contradiction in describing the rights and re- sponsibilities of the two brothers: the protocol goes to great lengths in al-Amin's oath letter to safeguard the interests of al-MaDmun and Khurasan from any inter- vention by the caliph; al-Ma'mun's promises to obey al-Amin (unfidha kutubahu), to advise him, to fulfill his bayca, and to ward off his enemies (ujahida caduwwahu). Al-MaDmun states:

I, for my part, have undertaken to the Commander of the Faithful and laid upon myself the obligation that I will hear and obey Muhammad and not act rebelliously against him; that I will give him sincere advice and not deceive him; that I will fulfill the oath of allegiance to


him and acknowledge his authority, and not betray him or break my oath; and that I will put into effect his official instructions and commands, shall minister well to him and struggle against his enemies in all my territories so long as he performs what he has stipulated to the Commander of the Faithful regarding me25 and which he listed specifically in the document which he wrote out for the Commander of the Faithful and with which the Com- mander of the Faithful was satisfied, and does not pursue me in any way or fall short in those matters and does not break any of the undertakings to which the Commander of the Faithful made him agree regarding me.26

This passage seems to contradict the possibility of territorial division. For if the

spheres of authority of al-Amin and al-Ma'mun were to be mutually exclusive, and al-Amin for his part had promised categorically in his document not to request any resources from the east-since this request could constitute grounds for invalidating his entire rule-it is puzzling as to what sort of "official instructions and commands" al-Ma'mun was still to expect from Baghdad. In my view, this section of the

protocol may incorporate some remnant of al-Rashid's original protocol, in which he must have given al-Amin not just a nominal caliphal office, but also sovereignty over the western and eastern territories of the Abbasid state. In fact only in that context is it possible to accommodate the other more elaborate promises of al-Ma'mun. In the second document, al-Ma'mun promises to support al-Amin by stating:

If ever Muhammad the son of the Commander of the Faithful requires a military force and writes to me, ordering me to dispatch it to him or to any region or against any of his enemies who may have rebelled against him or sought to impair any part of his authority . . . then I undertake to carry out his commands and not oppose him or fall short in the per- formance of any matter about which he has written to me.27

It is apparent here that al-Ma'mun's pledge of fealty is characteristic of a gover- nor's ordinary compliance with the commands of the central government. On its own this passage is coherent enough until we read further in the same document and learn that al-Ma'mun has promised to render the stipulated military support and compliance to al-Amin only so long as the latter observes his "covenant" towards al-Ma'mun. The contradiction is here more specific. If al-Amin had com- mitted himself in his document to refrain from requesting monetary or military assistance from al-Ma'mun, then how could the latter expect, let alone fulfill, such a demand. This inconsistent reasoning within the same text may highlight the mixed origins of the statements of the protocol.28

Close reading of the text reveals the shadow of post-civil war rewriting. For example, according to the standard account of the civil war provided in the sources, it was al-Amin's nominating his five-year-old son al-Natiq bi-al-Haqq, first as successor to al-Mu'tamin, then as successor to al-Ma'mun in place of al-Mu'tamin, that was the central-if not the only-source of contention between the brothers.29 The protocol deserves a new reading to ascertain whether the action was legal and to separate it from the propaganda in which it is embedded. Al-Ma'mun's document reads:

If Muhammad desires to make any man (rajulan) among his sons his successor after me, that is his to do, so long as he performs for me what the Commander of the Faithful has prescribed for him and he has accepted to do. It is for me to execute and comply with his

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command, without diminishing, changing or altering it, and I may not give the precedence to one of my own sons or to any person near or far, except in the case that the Commander of the Faithful has designated one of his sons successor after me, and in that case both I and Muhammad are required to uphold him.30

Whether al-Rashid in 802 had voiced the possibility of a future nomination of a third successor cannot be shown from the sources, and it would have been nonsen- sical for him to have done so and at the same time grant al-Amin, in a binding covenant the right to nominate a successor to al-Ma'mun. When the excerpt from the protocol's stipulation for a third succession is juxtaposed with the description of the controversy in the sources, the protocol again appears to anticipate the later designation of al-Mu'tamin at Qarmasin as third successor, and more important, of the later dispute between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun over the validity of nominating al-Natiq bi-al-Haqq. The proof that this section is fabricated, is the fact that it bluntly refers to the kind of successor al-Amin is allowed to nominate: rajulan, an adult man. This word becomes significant when we read in the accounts of the civil war that among the causes for its outbreak was al-Amin's designation of a minor son. This caused the outcry that gave al-Ma'mun a legal excuse for challenging the caliph on other issues.

The following excerpts show a similarity in phrasing provided in several reports and illustrate the background against which the protocol was being crafted: (1) The anonymous chronicle, Kitab al-'Uyuin wa-al-Hadd'iq, describes the child heir as "wa-huwa tiflun radi' lam ya'zum" (when he was still a little child not yet ma- tured).3' (2) Al-Mas'udi's Muruij al-Dhahab reads "wa-Muiisa yawma'idhin la yan- tiqu bi-'amrin wa-la ya'qilu qabihan wa-la yakhlu ila man yakhdumahu fi laylihi wa-naharihi wa-yaqazatihi wa-manamihi wa-qu'idihi wa-qiyamihi." (and Musa [i.e., al-Natiq bi-al-Haqq] was at that time not yet able to speak or give commands, nor was he yet able to distinguish the bad or to do without someone who would serve him in his day and night, his time of sleep and awakening, and in his moving about).32 In al-Tanbih wa-al-Ishrdf, Mas'udi briefly describes the successor as "wa laqqabahu al-Natiq bi-al-Haqq wa-huwa yawma'idhin sabiyyun saghir." (and he gave him the title "the speaker of truth" when he was but a small child).33 (3) Tabari uses similar sentences in expressing surprise at the appointment: " . . . wa-ibnuhu Miusa yawma'idhin tiflun saghir" (when his son Musa at that time was but a small child).34 The concurrence of these excerpts decrying the nomination of a child for succession on account of his "immaturity" can be related with the text of the protocol to deduce an implicit pro-Ma'munid historical voice that is both didactic and rationalizing. The historiographic suggestion is, had al-Amin nominated an adult son instead of a child (since he was 16 in 802, al-Amin would probably not have been in a position to make such a nomination before 824-825), this entire conflict could have been averted, and his overthrow would have been uncalled for.35

The claim expressed in the protocol that al-Ma'mun was declared independent has no supporting outside evidence. For al-Ma'mun's authority to have been autonomous in Khurasan would theoretically have required that he possess prerogatives that would make his autonomy functional, among them control of local troops, the right to appoint local officials, and, above all, the collection of taxes. None of these powers can be shown to have been granted.


A comparison of the political narrative of the civil war and the diplomatic ex- change between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun from the period soon after the death of al-Rashid is worth making. Remarkably, none of the protocol's clauses pertaining to the division of the state or to the purported fiscal and political autonomy of Khurasan are raised in the quarrels between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun. That Khurasan continued to lie within the caliph's jurisdiction and that al-Ma'mun did not hold the legal power to make final decisions on issues of fiscal or military policy can be illustrated from the letters exchanged during the conflict period.

An unidentified report in Tabari gives the text of a letter that al-Ma'mun received from al-Amin on the eve of al-Rashid's death. In the letter al-Amin commands al-Ma'mun to

obtain the bay'a in your region from your generals, soldiers, nobles, and the public for your brother, and then for yourself and then for al-Qasim [al-Mu'tamin] ... and write to the de- fenders of your frontier (thughiur) and commanders of your troops about what has befallen you in calamity from the death of the Commander of the Faithful . .. and inform them that I shall look after them, reconcile them from dispersion, and extend to them my bounty.36

Here al-Amin expresses responsibility for funding and promises steady communi- cation with the contingents in Khurasan, which indicates a continuum in ties between Khurasan and the caliphate. One could argue that this statement of promises to the contingents of Khurasan in itself constitutes meddling in eastern affairs and can only help to incite conflict. However, if indeed this represented an illegal in- tervention in Khurasan, then it leaves open the question as to why it did not spark conflict, or at least a reaction from al-Ma'mun from the beginning. The record of the civil war rather shows that the conflict occurred much later and for reasons that were occasioned by a later dispute, namely, the attempt to change the second succession.

The legality of al-Amin's authority in the east can be examined through the administrative vocabulary used in the letters exchanged during the conflict, where the prerogative of confirmation or dismissal from a provincial post is given to the caliph. Al-Ma'mun's recognition that his position in Khurasan was subject to final administrative or other confirmation by the caliph can be discerned in the testi- mony of one letter that al-Ma'mun wrote to al-Amin at an early stage of the conflict that reads, "Thus if the Commander of the Faithful sees it fitting to confirm me in my post ('an yuqirrani 'ald 'amali), and relieve me from going to him, may he do so, God willing."37 The word used by al-Ma'mun to describe his position ('amall, my governorate) as well as what is needed to keep him in his post (yuqirrani, confirmation) clearly reflects a normal caliph-governor relationship, one where the governor derives his legitimacy solely from the appointment granted or denied by the caliph.38

How al-Ma'mun's position was changed in the course of the civil war to become that of the rightful and legal substitute for al-Amin is a complex issue that is closely tied with al-Ma'mun's formation of an entirely new structure of power and religious propaganda on the frontiers of Khurasan and Transoxiana. In the present context it is sufficient to say that al-Ma'mun was successful in seizing power because central control in the province was weakening and the regional political

470 Tayeb El-Hibri

confidence of Khurasan was growing. This reversal in the relation of power is probably best illustrated in a report provided by al-Jahshiyari that describes how al-Ma'mun and al-Fadl ibn Sahl reminisced over the events of the civil war after al-Amin's fall. In it, al-Ma'mun ponders the past, confiding to al-Fadl that there was one policy (ra'y) that could have reversed the outcome of the war if al-Amin had implemented it (as al-Ma'mun put it " ... lazafara bind . . ."). When al-Fadl

inquires what this policy was, al-Ma'mun responds:

If he had written to the people of Khurasan, Tabaristan, and Danbawand that he had granted them exemption from the khardj [the land tax] for a year, we would have had only one of two possible actions. Either we would have ignored this command, and then the intentions of the people of these regions (al-bulddn) would have been turned against us; or accepted it and put it into effect, which would have weakened our cause because we would not have been able to pay those with us, and our troops would have disbanded.39

This account reveals more than an ingenious plot by a caliph so often portrayed as dependent on the political acumen of al-Fadl ibn Sahl.40 It implies that the fiscal status of Khurasan was dependent on the central caliphate. Given this reality, al- Ma'mun here expresses the potential contingent obligation he would have been expected to render if the caliph had issued a fiscal rescript. Thus al-Amin, according to al-Ma'mun's scenario, did not have to extend caliphal largess and gifts to the people of these regions. It would have been sufficient for him to reduce the khardj level in order to sway the equation of power in favor of Baghdad.

Ideally, an analysis of the protocol would seek to distinguish the authentic sentences from the spurious ones. This goal is hardly attainable in light of the short chronological gap (the civil war period) between the time of the original text of al-Rashid and the later formulated clauses dating to the Ma'munid era, which in turn suggests similar, if not identical, literary styles. In historical terms, however, it seems more critical to establish the authentic purpose of the protocol, for this would in turn have bearing on the question of textual authenticity. In the process of challenging the long-standing reading of the protocol as a document dividing the empire and ascertaining thematically the authentic portions of the text, we can simultaneously construct an alternative and more coherent system for inter- preting the power relationship and hierarchy among al-Amin, al-Ma'mun, and al- Mu'tamin. The following evidence shows al-Ma'mun's function as being strictly the defense of the shadowy and shifting frontier (thaghr) in Khurasan and Trans- oxiana against rebellions from within the caliphate and incursions from without. This role can best be defined as comparable to the role that al-Mu'tamin took on against the Byzantines on the Asia Minor frontier. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that both al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tamin received these military and defensive appointments in the same year at Qarmasin.

That al-Rashid assigned a provincial military role to the nominated heirs can be demonstrated by the textual evidence of the letters exchanged between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun prior to and during the succession conflict. Al-Amin sent a num- ber of letters to al-Ma'mun containing demands that were seen as infringements on the latter's authority in the east. In the most aggressive of these letters al-Amin ordered al-Ma'mun to return to Baghdad, stating that he needed his counsel at


court. To the delegation that carried this letter, al-Ma'mun reportedly courteously declined the demand on the grounds that his presence was needed to secure the frontier:

The purpose that the Commander of the Faithful has called on me to give to him [return to Baghdad] is not a matter I put off out of hesitance, nor do I want to be hasty in my thence- coming, for I am on a frontier of the Muslims (fi thaghrin min thughur al-muslimin) where the enemy is ferocious and formidable, and I fear that if I neglect its security affairs, harm and unwanted damage would befall the soldiers and the people (raciyya); and yet if I stay, I will be saddened to miss out on aiding and advising the Commander of the Faithful. So let me ponder my circumstance.41

Al-Ma'mun's excuse not to comply with the caliph's demand clearly specifies the reason for refusal in the military role and protection he renders-as governor of the eastern frontier-to the inner territories of the caliphate. We are then told that after a conference with al-Fadl ibn Sahl, al-Ma'mun delivered a letter to al- Amin through the latter's delegation. In it he continued with the same evasion and

expanded his justification for refusal to return on defensive grounds. In this letter, however, al-Ma'mun justified his opposition to the caliph's summons by officially attributing his security role in Khurasan to al-Rashid's command:

I have received the letter of the Commander of the Faithful, and I am no more than an agent of his (Cdmil min cummalih) and an aid among his aids. I was commanded by al-Rashid, may God's Peace be upon him, to continue to reside in this frontier (al-thaghr), and to struggle against the enemies of the Commander of the Faithful in it; and I find my staying in it to be of protection for the Commander of the Faithful and of greater benefit to the Muslims than my sallying forth to the Commander of the Faithful, despite my great plea- sure in being close to him enjoying the bounty of God in his domain.42

Significantly, this passage does not reflect the confident and secure political position that is attributed to al-Ma'mun in the protocol. Rather it shows a confined mil-

itary role for al-Ma'mun, as well as a subjection to the caliph's official authority. It is puzzling why al-Ma'mun does not provide a shorter and more conclusive reply by referring specifically to the division clauses in the protocol, if the latter were authentic and indeed represented the centerpiece of legal reference for their relations.

That al-Amin's rule differed substantively in nature, but not in geographic scope, from al-Ma'mun's can also be gleaned from Ibn al-Athir's description of al- Rashid's succession arrangement. Ibn al-Athir, who must have found problems with the text of the protocol since he saw fit to drop this important document en-

tirely from his chronicle, resorted to his own words to give a brief description of the episode of the Mecca Protocol. Describing the succession appointment of al-Amin, he says "al-Rashid walla al-Amin" but then, conveying a sense of simi-

larity between the frontier appointments of al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tamin in Tran- soxiana and Asia Minor respectively, he says: " . and joined (wa .damma) to al-Ma'mun from Hamadan to the extremity of the Mashriq, and he [al-Rashid] then nominated his son al-Qasim al-Mu'tamin for succession after al-Ma'mun and

gave him the title al-Mu'tamin, and joined to him al-Jazira, al-Thughur, and al-'Awasim."43

472 Tayeb El-Hibri

Therefore, while al-Amin is appointed to caliphal office, al-Ma'mun and al- Mu'tamin would share a similarity of appointment suggesting their parallel roles in their respective provinces. The similarity in the offices of al-Ma'mun and al- Mu'tamin had, in fact, been heralded by a piece of provincial reform that al- Rashid introduced in 786. In that year the caliph reportedly created the larger province of al-Thughur, and al-CAwasim, which had previously represented the northern parts of Syria and Jazira, respectively.44 Al-Rashid's motives for this provincial change must have rested in his own experience as leader of Abbasid expe- ditions against the Byzantines since the reign of al-Mahdi. Witnessing how the struggle between the two empires was increasingly drawing to a stalemate in Asia Minor, al-Rashid perhaps envisaged the provincial reorganization of the frontier as a measure that would reinvigorate the caliphate's initiative against the Byzantines by expanding and consolidating frontier resources to produce a new military con- figuration. This heightened commitment by the caliph to a new strategy on the frontier was underscored by the shift of the caliph's base of operations from Bagh- dad to Raqqa.45

Similarly on the frontier of Transoxiana, the need for a more reliable defense system had long been apparent. Khurasan had repeatedly presented the caliphate with ever more threatening revolts such as those of Ustadsis (768), al-MuqannaC (776), and Yusuf al-Barm (777).46 These and other revolts made it clear that not

only was Khurasan the epicenter for religious and rural unrest, but also that, given its wide and open frontier on the steppes, its position was conducive for neighbor- ing kingdoms and chiefdoms to lend their frequent and substantial support to local revolts. Al-Mansur had early on taken the strategic step of appointing his son al- Mahdi to the eastern provinces in 759.47 Thinking along similar strategic lines, al- Rashid appointed al-Ma'mun to the east with the hope that his son's Khurasani maternal kin ties would contain a regional drift towards political localism and en- hance the popularity of the Abbasid provincial administration.

The apparent equivalence in the historical description of the positions of al- Ma'mun and al-Mu'tamin, combined with the expanded provincial status of the Abbasid province in Asia Minor, leaves two possible interpretations of al-Rashid's succession plan. Either the caliph divided his realm, and thereby removed the authority of al-Amin from both Khurasan and the Thughur of Asia Minor, or he simply redefined the role of the governors of these provinces as primarily one of military defense, while maintaining their subjection to the caliph's authority. The first view has never figured as a possible interpretation since it has commonly been assumed, not without the bias introduced by the outcome of the civil war, that only al-Ma'mun had special political rights in relation to the caliph. The second view is more tenable in light of the previously mentioned evidence as well as of the occasion on which al-Rashid announced the military role of al-Ma'mun at Qarmasin. In the highly similar geopolitical environments of Khurasan and Asia Minor, al-Rashid delegated equivalent responsibility for military security to persons of equivalent stature.

The occasion on which al-Ma'mun received this military concession finally has to be closely examined. The announcement by al-Rashid at Qarmasin in 805 that all the troops, weapons, and defense equipment that were in his camp on that oc-


casion were to be entrusted to al-Ma'mun has misled some into regarding this bequest as a logical follow-up on the Mecca Protocol, a further expansion of al- Ma'mun's autonomous powers, and an indication of the rise of his status and the decline of al-Amin's.48 In reality, this military bequest has to be explained by the spontaneous and temporary causes that called for it.

Tabari reports that towards the beginning of the year 805 news arrived in Bagh- dad from Khurasan, which was suffering under the oppressive governorship of 'Ali ibn 'Isa ibn Mahan, that Ibn 'Isa was on the verge of open revolt. On numerous occasions before, notables from Khurasan had complained of the ruinous and abu- sive rule of the governor, but the caliph had repeatedly ignored these complaints, as well as the pleas of the Barmakids to dismiss the governor. The situation in that year, however, proved more serious. Whatever the source of the news about a potential rebellion by Ibn CIsa, it sufficiently shook the confidence of the caliph in his governor and produced a great scare in Baghdad.49 For a caliphate that had warded off several Khurasani rebellions previously, such rumors were cause for maximum alarm. Soon afterwards al-Rashid set out in person to the east with an army that camped midway at Qarmasin, perhaps awaiting further news of developments in the east. There he made the proclamation that all the troops and arms that were in his camp on that expedition were to be entrusted to al-Ma'mun,50 who, it seems, was being readied to lead the assembled armies on campaign to Khurasan and perhaps to take charge of the governorship himself.51 As the caliph's army advanced eastward, it pitched camp once more in Rayy. It was there that Ibn CIsa, rushing from Merv in a show of obedience, made his surprise appearance with a caravan of gifts intended to placate the caliph's anger and dispel his anxieties. Ibn CIsa then reaffirmed his oath of allegiance, and the caliph in turn confirmed him in the governorship of Khurasan.

Notwithstanding the great disappointment of the Khurasani notables, an end had finally been brought to the state of mobilization as the long awaited revolt proved nonexistent. What remained of the incident in the chronicles, however, were the official honors given to al-Ma'mun on that occasion. It was only during the conflict between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun that the latter's faction interpreted the Qar- masin proclamation in general terms as a permanent promotion of al-Ma'mun's status by al-Rashid. The downfall of al-Amin had made it anachronistically possible to interpret any positive gesture made to al-Ma'mun by al-Rashid between 802 and 809 as a sign of the caliph's favoring of al-Ma'mun, and even moving to remove al-Amin from the first succession.

THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA

It is not the purpose of this study to determine whether al-Ma'mun had envisaged a complete plan for his conflict with al-Amin from the moment of al-Rashid's death. The role that the vizier al-Fadl ibn Sahl took in organizing al-Ma'mun's provincial power, developing new religious propaganda, and mobilizing local support appears very critical throughout the civil war years. It is reported, for instance, that in the early days of the succession crisis, when al-Ma'mun found little support for his stand against al-Amin among the leaders who accompanied

474 Tayeb El-Hibri

al-Rashid to Khurasan, it was al-Fadl who encouraged al-Ma'mun to remain steadfast and develop in his court a circle of fuqaha' who would lend an aura of traditionalism.52 Politically, the propaganda centered on inflating whatever military tasks al-Ma'mun had originally been entrusted within Transoxiana.

The need for convincing grounds for al-Ma'mun's rise to power was mostly to be felt, however, at the end of the civil war with al-Amin's murder, an event for which al-Fadl ibn Sahl does not appear to have been directly responsible. He is said to have exclaimed to al-Ma'mun when the severed head of al-Amin was brought to court in Merv, "What has Tahir [ibn al-Husayn] done to us. Now he has unleashed on us the tongues and swords of the people. We commanded him [Ta- hir] to send him prisoner, and he sends his head!"53 The situation called for an im- mediate gesture by al-Ma'mun to show his disapproval, such as sending Tahir ibn al-Husayn into "honorary" exile in Raqqa in an attempt to appease the abnda and former supporters of al-Amin.54 The more onerous task, however, was to be the creation of historical legitimacy for al-Ma'mun by demonstrating that al-Amin had been responsible for the conflict. The invention of a "documented" tradition of political and territorial division woven into the succession clauses of the protocol was a major step in legitimating al-Ma'mun's claim for independence and simultaneously creating the historical space for al-Amin's "violations."

One material indication of the subsequent invention of the division plan dates from 813, the year of al-Amin's defeat, when dirhams carrying the inscription "al- Mashriq" on the reverse were struck in the eastern provinces and those with the inscription "al-Maghrib" were struck in the western provinces. It is very curious that such an indication of administrative or political division occurred at such a late date. If the protocol had in fact decreed a division of the Abbasid state, then one would expect it to have appeared on Abbasid coinage from the year 802 on- wards, much as the nomination of al-Amin in 792, al-Ma'mun in 799, and even the dual nominations of 802 are all commemorated on coins from those

years.55 If, on the other hand, this arbitrary division was intended only to go into effect on the caliphate's coinage after al-Rashid, then one would have expected at least one party to the succession, most likely al-Ma'mun, to have introduced it on the coinage in 809. But the Mashriq/Maghrib inscription appears on coins in 813, after the war was over and the caliphate was reunited, and even then it remained for only a few years (until 821), highlighting the special propaganda purpose that it served.56

THE SUCCESSION THEORY

If the Mecca Protocol was not a prescription by al-Rashid for a division of the Ab- basid state, then what was the original content of the protocol, and was there a

protocol in the first place? Harun al-Rashid undoubtedly made a pilgrimage journey to Mecca in 802.57 It seems that he also obtained written oaths from the heirs he had chosen to respect the order of succession. Far from being a plan for the division of the Abbasid state, the Mecca Protocol was merely a step towards ensur-

ing the line of succession. That is to say, the only remnants of historical truth from the contents of the original protocol are the opening clauses of the documents of


al-Amin and al-Ma'mun, which state al-Amin's right to the first succession and al- Ma'mun's inviolable right to the second.

Al-Rashid's purpose on the pilgrimage of 802 was simple. Having nominated al- Amin (in 792) and al-Ma'mun (in 799) during their minority, it was timely in 802 to confirm the succession with binding oaths on the princes in their majority. Evi- dence for the view that the original text of al-Rashid's protocol simply outlined and regulated the order of succession to the caliphate can be found in Tabari, who-in addition to giving the two-document version of the protocol provided in Azraqi and Yacqubi-gives the text of a third document, which summarizes the oaths of al-Amin and al-Ma'mun and is recorded as a statement by al-Rashid on the events of 802. In it the caliph addresses the provincial governors and describes to them the reasons that prompted him to undertake the pilgrimage in that year and what he resolved on doing on that occasion.58

Al-Rashid's document is written in a much more formal style than the embel- lished, highly personal, and descriptive letters of al-Amin and al-Ma'mun, thereby underlining an origin different from the other two. Treating the two successors in a more balanced manner, al-Rashid's document states directly that he had resolved on that pilgrimage to nominate al-Amin as his first successor, to be followed by al- Ma'mun. For this purpose, the document adds that he obtained the oath of allegiance (bayca) from both successors as well as from the community to honor this order of succession.

This description of the succession arrangement (wilayat al-'ahd) is the only substantive stipulation in the document. In the remaining two pages of text, al- Rashid's document recounts the virtues of the two heirs and the merits of the succession arrangement, but there is no reference-direct or indirect-to the special autonomy of al-Ma'mun or the political/territorial division of the Abbasid state. Why the caliph who had newly created a separation in the sovereignty and jurisdiction of al-Amin and al-Ma'mun did not inform the governors of such an important edict in this caliphal circular is not easily explained by the traditional interpretation. It can only serve to weaken the veracity of the division clauses and reinforce the possibility that the protocol was strictly a succession-nomination arrangement.

In sum, the caliph's purpose in the protocol of 802 was mainly to thwart potential attempts of the first successor to depose the second, which had been an en- demic problem in the history of the Abbasid succession. Earlier al-Mansur had set a precedent for reversing an established succession when he changed it from his cousin 'Isa ibn Musa to his own son al-Mahdi in 764. Al-Mahdi's later attempt to reverse the order of succession of his sons al-Hadi and al-Rashid was closer and more familiar to the memory of the reigning caliph.

Against this background of turbulent succession, and in the absence of a custom of primogeniture in Islamic political succession, al-Rashid's anxiety about the working of his succession plans was fully justified. His solution to reaffirm a more binding succession contract on the occasion of pilgrimage, where all the leading figures of the dynasty would be forced to give a religious oath of obedience, was a new experiment in systematizing an order of succession. However, in the absence of any follow-up mechanism for supervising the implementation of the details of

476 Tayeb El-Hibri

the protocol, a mechanism that would have only been necessary in the event of a territorial political division, the Mecca Protocol of 802 soon faded into the community's memory. In the process of fusing a religious space with a dynastic purpose al-Rashid gave a new symbolic meaning to the political document as well as to the caliphal right of protecting the Kacba. Al-Ma'mun was later to emulate, for a variety of purposes associated with his power propaganda,59 al-Rashid's precedent of putting an official edict on public display in the Kacba. The protocol, containing one kernel of historical fact from the reign of al-Rashid, was one document that was to be colored by the results of al-Ma'mun's reign and have other mean- ings attached to it.

NOTES

Author's note: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association on 16 November 1989, in Toronto, Canada. Before and after that date, it went through many stages of elaboration. I am grateful to Professor Richard Bulliet for contributing valuable criticisms on several earlier drafts of this paper. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation provided of certain excerpts from Arabic texts is mine.

'The Mecca Protocol has received little scrutiny in the literature on the succession crisis as com-

pared with the political history of the conflict. The point of departure remains F. Gabrieli's interpretation in his classic article on the subject, "La successione di Haruin al-Rashid e la guerra fra al-Amin e al-Ma'mun," Rivista degli Studi Orientali 11 (1926-28): 341-497. Gabrieli finds no reason to question the authenticity of the protocol and instead builds his narrative of the crisis based on a trusting reading of the sources. Later historians, among them 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duiri in his al-'Asr al-'Abbasl al-Awwal (Beirut, 1945); Dominique Sourdel in the Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1970); M. A. Shaban in Islamic History: A New Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1976); Hugh Kennedy in The Early Abbasid Caliphate (London: Croom Helm, 1981), have continued in the same direction, adopting the mainstream interpretation which says that al- Rashid-after nominating al-Amin in 792 for the succession and later adding al-Ma'mun in 799 for the second succession-started turning away from his earlier decision and sought to restrict the powers of al-Amin as future caliph. Thus, through the Mecca Protocol drafted in 802, al-Rashid attempted to modify the terms of succession in a way that would provide al-Ma'mun with greater autonomy and influence in the eastern provinces. The most recent view on the protocol is by R. A. Kimber in "Hariun al-Rashid's Meccan Settlement of A.H. 186/A.D. 802," University of St. Andrews, School of Abbasid Studies, Occasional Papers 1 (Edinburgh, 1986), 55-79. Kimber suggests that al-Rashid was even moving by the end of his reign to make al-Ma'mun his sole heir.

2Although the idea of a double succession had precedent, al-Rashid was the first to initiate the practice of a triple succession. The precedent of al-Rashid is significant as a point of legal and theoretical reference for later medieval Muslim jurists such as al-Mawardi who cited the event when arguing for the validity of a triple-succession nomination and the legality of this practice by pointing to the silence of opposition from contemporary theologians. It is notable that al-Mawardi does not speak of a territorial division of the state, but simply characterizes al-Rashid's succession plan as setting the line of succession among his sons. See al-Mawardi's al-Ahkam al-Sultdniyya (Cairo, 1983), 12.

3Yazid ibn Muhammad, al-Azdi, Tdrikh al-Mawsil, ed. 'All Habiba (Cairo, 1967), 308. 4Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Tdrikh al-Rusul wa-al-Muluik, 3 ser., ed. M. J. de Goeje

(Leiden, 1879-1901) 784. 'Ibid., 3:796. 61bid., 795. M. J. de Geoje and P. de Jong, eds., Kitdb al-'Uyuin wa-al-Hadd'iqfi Akhbdr al-Haqd'iq,

(Leiden, 1869), 323. Previous studies on the conflict have insistently attempted to establish the specific sequence of escalation and causal linkages in the conflict between the brothers. This I find to be a futile endeavor given the biased nature of the accounts in favor of al-Ma'mun. At best, one can arrive at a partial construction of the events, which only reinforces the skewed picture of legal responsibility for


the war. One example of a synthetic study of the conflict is S. Samadi, "The Struggle Between the Two Brothers al-Amin and al-Ma'muin," Islamic Culture 32 (1958): 99-120.

7F. Gabrieli, "al-Amin," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Leiden, 1960), 438. 8Hugh Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 132-87; Elton

Daniel, The Political and Social History of Khurasan under Abbasid Rule 747-820 (Bibliotheca Islam- ica, 1979), 172; Roy Mottahedeh, "The CAbbaisid Caliphate in Iran," in Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, ed. R. N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 72.

9'Abd Allah ibn Muslim, Ibn Qutayba, al-Imama wa-al-Siyasa (Cairo, 1904), 172; Ahmad ibn Dawud al-Dinawari, al-Akhbar al-Tiwdl, ed. V. Guirgass (Leiden, 1888), 385; 'Ali ibn Husayn al- Mas'cdi, Muriiuj al-Dhahab, ed. C. Pellat (Beirut, 1973), 4:213-14.

10Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:656. IlAhmad ibn Abi Ya'qub, al-Ya'qubi, Tdrikh, vol. 2, 416; Muhammad b. CAbd Allah al-Azraqi,

Akhbar Makka, ed. F. Wustenfeld (Leipzig, 1858), 161; Tabari, Tirikh, 3:656. 12Al-Amin promises in his document the following:

I have contracted with God's servant Harun, with full approval and with good will on my part, to com-

ply with all that he has conveyed to my brother CAbd Allah in the matter of the succession, the caliphate, and all the affairs of the Muslims after me, surrendering that to him, and what he has appointed for him in the viceregency of Khurasan and all its dependencies, and the estates assigned him by the Com- mander of the Faithful, or given him from his own lands or exchanged with him in estates and assignments; all that he has given him in his own right by way of wealth, ornaments, jewels, furnishings, garments, residences or animals, whether small or great; all these shall be for CAbd Allah, the son of Harun, Commander of the Faithful, conveyed to him without restriction, and I have recognized this item by item. In the event of the Commander of the Faithful's death, and the passing of the caliphate to Muhammad his son, Muhammad must carry out all that Harun, Commander of the Faithful, has provided for in the governing of Khurasan and its marches by 'Abd Allah. It is not for Muhammad, son of the Commander of the Faithful, to turn any officer or soldier or any other man assigned to 'Abd Allah by the Commander of the Faithful away from him, nor to turn 'Abd Allah, son of the Commander of the Faithful, away from any part of the governorship given him by his father, nor to summon him therefrom to himself, nor to separate any one of his followers and officers from him or any of his officials and functionaries, any merchant or any accountant or any collector, and not to cause any harm to befall him in any matter small or great, nor to come between him and the discharge of his functions there with his own opinion or disposition, nor to occasion to anyone of those assigned to 'Abd Allah by his father from the people of his family, his followers, his judges, his officials and secretaries, his officers, retain- ers, mawlas, and army, anything that might cause harm to them or constraint, whether to their persons, their families, or their dependents, nor to anyone coming from them on an errand, nor yet to shed their blood or touch their possessions, their estates, their houses, their allotments, their goods, their slaves, their animals, or anything of theirs small or great, or any of the people by his order, advice, or caprice, or by his permission or instigation thereto to any one of the children of Adam, nor to give orders about their affairs; he or any of his judges or officials, except by the permission of 'Abd Allah son of the Com- mander of the Faithful, and his opinion and the opinion of 'Abd Allah's qadis.

Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:655-58; John A. Williams, trans., al-Tabari: The Early 'Abbdsi Empire, vol. 2 (Cam- bridge, Eng., 1989), 232-33.

13Ya'qubi, Tarikh, 2:418; Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 164; Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:658. 4Mas'idi, Muruiij al-Dhahab, 4:270; Tabari, Tarikh, 3:658.

15Al-Ma'mun declares in the following excerpt from his document:

The Commander of the Faithful has appointed me in the succession of the caliphate and all the affairs of the Muslims under his sovereignty after my brother Muhammad and given me in his own lifetime the government of the frontiers of Khurasan and its districts and dependencies, and stipulated that Mu- hammad his son shall comply with his provisions for the caliphate and the governing of the affairs of God's servants and territories after himself, and the government of Khurasan with all its dependencies. He shall not oppose me in any of the things allotted to me by the Commander of the Faithful or assigned to me by way of estates, covenants, and properties or exchanged with me, nor in what the Com- mander of the Faithful has given me in the monies, jewels, regalia, furnishings, animals, or slaves, or

478 Tayeb El-Hibri

other possessions. He shall not confront me or any of my functionaries or secretaries for the purpose of an accounting, or ever at any time pursue me or one of them for that, or impose upon me or them or my followers or appointees whomever, any constraint in life or blood or hair or man or wealth whatever, in

any matter small or great. He has complied with this and declared it and written a document for it in which he solemnly confirms it as obligatory upon himself. The Commander of the Faithful has attested his satisfaction and his acceptance in it, and recognized his sincerity of purpose.

Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:660-61; Williams, trans., al-Tabari 2:235. '6Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 167; Ya'qubi, Tdrikh, 2:420; Tabari, Tarikh, 3:661. 17De Geoje and de Jong, eds., Kitdb al-'Uyiin wa-al-Hadd'iq, 331; al-Azdi, Tdrikh al-Mawsil, 302;

Ya'cqbi, Tdirikh, 2:421. 18It is significant that on his pilgrimage in 804, al-Rashid did not renew the oath of allegiance to the

Mecca Protocol by the people. 19Ya'qubi, Tdrikh, 2:425; Kitdb al-'Uyiin wa-al-Haddaiq, 303-4; al-Azdi, Tdrikh al-Mawsil, 302;

al-MasC'di, Muruj al-Dhahab, 4:215. 20There are a variety of dirhams from al-Rashid's reign documenting the succession nominations of

the two heirs. For the year 792, when al-Rashid made his first nomination of al-Amin for the succession, the inscriptions on the reverse of dirhams read: "mimma amara bihi al-amir al-Amin Muhammad ibn amir al-mu'minin wall 'ahd al-muslimin." Later in 799 when al-Rashid nominated al-Ma'mun for the second succession, this was also commemorated by inscribing on dirhams the statement: "mimma amara bihi al-amir al-Ma'mun 'Abd Allah ibn amir al-Mu'minin wall wall 'ahd al-muslimin." See Widad Qazzaz, "Al-Dirham al-'Abbasi fi Zaman al-Khalifa al-Rashid," Sumer 21 (1965): 181.

2'The protocol text is provided in a later recension in Qalqashandi's Kitdb Subh al-A'shd fi Sinaat al-Inshda', vol. 14 (Cairo, 1917), 85-89 who states that he relied on the version of Azraqi. A summary of the text of the protocol is also provided in al-Irbili's Khuliisat al-Dhahab al-Masbuik Mukhtasar min Siyar al-Muluik (Baghdad, n.d.), 140.

22Williams, trans., al-Tabari, 2:232. 23Ibid., 233. 24Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 162; Ya'qubi, Tdrikh, 2:416. 25The Arabic text of this passage is:

fa-sharattu li-Abd Allah Haruin amir al-mu'minin wa-ja'altu lahu c'ala nafsi an asma' li-Muhammad ibn amir al-mu minin wa-uti'ahu wa-la ac'sih wa-ansahahu wa-la aghushshahu wa-awfi bi-baycatihi wa- wilayatihi wa-la aghdira wa-la ankitha wa-unfidha kutubahu wa-umuirahu wa-uhsina mu'azaratahu wa- mukanafatahu wa-ujahida caduwwahu fi nahiyati ma wafa 11 bi-ma sharata 1i wa-li-Abd Allah Hariun amir al-mu minin . . .

Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:661. The excerpt is also part of the text in Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 167; and Ya'qubi, Tdrikh, 2:420.

26Tabari, Tarikh, 3:661. This translation is a composite one from the translations of al-Tabari's Tdrikh by C. E. Bosworth, The History of al-Tabari (The 'Abbdsid Caliphate in Equilibrium), vol. 30 (Albany, 1988), 193, and Williams, al-Tabari, 235.

27Bosworth, trans., History of al-Tabari, 30:193. This text from Tabari, Tarikh, 3:661, is also agreed upon by Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 167; and Ya'qiibi, Tdrikh, 2:420.

28Unless we interpret the "covenant" as solely the promise of al-Amin not to depose al-Ma'mun or alter the line of succession, there would be no logical connection between the two different actions.

29De Geoje and de Jong, eds., Kitdb al-'Uyun wa-al-Hadd'iq, 292; Muhammad ibn Ahmad, al- Dhahabi, Duwal al-Isldm, vol. 1 (Hyderabad, 1945), 88.

30Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 167; Ya'qiubi, Tdrikh, 2:420; Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:662; Williams, trans., al- Tabari, 236.

3'De Geoje and de Jong, eds., Kitdb al-'Uyun wa-al-Hadd'iq, 331. 32Al-Mas'idi, Muruij al-Dhahab, 4:271. 33Al-Mas'idi, al-Tanbih wa-al-Ishrdf, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1894), 347. 34Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:796. 35The nomination of a child prince for the succession in fact had not been as novel as the sources

imply. Al-Rashid had earlier nominated al-Amin for the succession in 792, when the latter was only


five years of age. This precedent, however, is not described in the sources as a sign of the reckless judg- ment on the caliph's part. Ironically the criticism made against al-Rashid was that he did not nominate al-Ma'mun, though he was only older by five or six months. See al-MasCiidi, Muriuj al-Dhahab, 4:261.

36Tabari, Tarikh, 3:767-68. 37'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-Athir, al-Kiimilfi al-Tarikh, 6:233. 38A further echo of the implicit caliph-governor relationship and al-Ma'mun's request for confir-

mation can be inferred from reports connected with al-Amin's discussion of possible ways for dealing with al-Ma'mun's mutiny. There are two distinct actions which al-Amin considers. The first involves the "dismissal" (sarf) of al-Ma'mun, while the second uses the word "deposition" (khal'). The differ- ence in the two actions is significant, for here we have a textual reflection of the chronological escalation in the crisis as well as the implicit reflection in the dismissal order of the subordinate position of the governorship of Khurasan.

39Muhammad ibn CAbdus al-Jahshiyari, al-Wuzara' wa-al-Kuttab, ed. Mustafa al-Saqqa (Cairo, 1938), 311.

40D. Sourdel, "al-Fadl b. Sahl," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Leiden, 1965), 731. 4tTabari, Tdrikh, 3:814. 42Ibid., 816. An almost identically phrased response by al-Ma'mun, emphasizing the military at-

tributes, is provided in Dinawari's al-Akhbiir, 390-91. 43Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al Tarikh, 6:173. 44Tabari, Tarikh, 3:604. 45F. Omar, "Haruin al-Rashid," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Leiden, 1971), 234. 46Elton Daniel, Khurasan under Abbasid Rule, 125-47. The danger of provincial revolts was cou-

pled with the alarming retreat of caliphal influence in Central Asia; for example, Chinese records report the defeat of an Abbasid army under Tibetan command in 801; see D. M. Dunlop, "Arab Relations with Tibet in the 8th and early 9th centuries A.D.," Islam Tetkikleri Enstitusu Dergisi 5 (1973): 309.

47Yacqubi, Tdrikh, 2:445-46. 48This rationale represents the basis for a recent examination of the protocol by R. Kimber, who

views al-Rashid as moving towards the end of his reign to make al-Ma'mun his sole heir. This view reads the temporary assignments of al-Ma'mun as permanent privileges and a sign of irreversible favor by al-Rashid. It must be said that al-Rashid's entrusting of new duties (seen as privileges) to al- Ma'mun and al-Mu'tamin after the Mecca Protocol is only logical, for it implies that the caliph was training both for future caliphal office. This does not, however, imply an infringement on the future caliphal prerogatives of al-Amin, since the latter's rank as successor belonged to a different category from al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tamin's. Al-Amin does not figure in the grants given at Qarmasin because he-as heir apparent-was left in charge of Baghdad during the caliph's absence on campaign. Fur- thermore, Kimber's suggestion that the occasion on which al-Rashid later made al-Ma'mun his deputy at Raqqa in 806 (when he left on his campaign against the Byzantines) can be read as another sign of the caliph's raising his son closer to the caliphal succession is untenable since al-Rashid later in 808 appointed his other son al-Mu'tamin as deputy to the same post. One can hardly read the caliph's appointment of al-Mu'tamin as a sign of promotion for succession in place of al-Amin. See R. Kimber, "The Meccan Settlement of A.D. 802," 63-65.

49Tabari, Tdrikh, 3:773; al-Jahshiyari, al-Wuzard' wa-al-Kuttdb, 278. 50Tabari, Tirikh, 3:765. 51 This likely progression of events had earlier been realized in the caliphate of al-Mansur, who put

his son and nominated successor al-Mahdi in charge of the expedition that set out to Rayy in 760 to recall the unruly governor of Khurasan 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Azdi. When the latter refused to comply, al- Mahdi advanced eastward and set up his base at Nishapur, while he dispatched Khazim ibn Khuzayma as the general in charge of the military operation against the rebel in Merv.

52Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Tabataba, al-Fakhri (Beirut, 1966), 212; Tabari, Tarikh, 3:774.

53Al-Jahshiyari, al-Wuzard' wa-al-Kuttab, 304; Ahmad ibn A'tham al-Kufi, al-Futuh, vol. 4 (Beirut, 1986), 446. A more dramatic, but less convincing, sentiment is expressed by al-MaDmun who reportedly laments: "I cannot but say what the Commander of the Faithful 'Ali [ibn Abi Talib] said when he received the news of 'Uthman's murder 'By God I did not murder or order or sanction [the murder]. May God bring agony to Tahir's heart"' (Mas'idi, Muruij al-Dhahab, 4:298). Regardless of

480 Tayeb El-Hibri

whether this statement is truly al-Ma'mun's or a fabrication, it is particularly revealing in that it creates the analogy between al-Amin's and 'Uthman's murder.

54Tabari, Tarikh, 3:975. 55Conversely, a division that does not authorize the prerogative of sikka for two different territorial-

political entities as in this case is not one that is substantial enough to detract from the caliphate's sovereignty.

56Tayeb El-Hibri, "Coinage Reform under the CAbbasid Caliph al-Ma'miin" (paper presented at the American Numismatic Society Seminar, New York, August 1989, forthcoming).

57A lighter view of the caliph's motive for undertaking the journey in that year, according to one re-

port in Mas'udi, says that al-Rashid sought personally to verify the alleged existence of twin children from the marriage of his sister 'Abbasa to Ja'far al-Barmaki. This popular tale is given as a background factor for the sack of the Barmakids upon the caliph's return to Baghdad a few months later (Mas'cdi, Muriuj al-Dhahab, 4:249).

58Tabari, Tdarikh, 3:663. 59Azraqi gives the text of another document that was placed in the Kacba at the order of al-Ma'mun

in 814. The document was placed along with the crown of the king of Kabul, which the latter sent as a

sign of his submission to al-Ma'mun and/or conversion to Islam. The caliph, who was still residing in Khurasan at the time, sent the crown to Mecca to be placed inside the Kacba in order to exhibit to the Muslim community the conquests of Islam on the frontier; see Azraqi, Akhbar Makka, 157-61.

Documents

Harun Al-Rashid and the Mecca Protocol of 802