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ConstitutionalLawICasesummariesandReviewer

Prof.HarryRoque,Jr.

2 PRELIMINARYCONCEPTSI.Introduction:TheConstitution,ConstitutionalismandConstitutionalLawA.PoliticalLawdefined

Thatbranchofpubliclawwhichdealswiththeorganizationandoperationofthegovernmentorgansofthestateanddefinestherelationsofthestatewiththeinhabitantsofitsterritory.1ScopeofPoliticalLaw:Theentirefieldofpoliticallawmaybesubdividedintotheffa) lawofpublicadministration‐dealswiththeorganizationandmanagementofthedifferentbranchesofthegovernment,

b) constitutionallaw–dealswiththeguarantiesoftheconstitutiontoindividualrightsandthelimitationsongovernmentalaction

c) administrativelaw–dealswiththeexerciseofexecutivepowerinthemakingofrulesandthedecisionofquestionsaffectingprivaterightsand

d) lawofpubliccorporations–dealswithgovernmentalagenciesforlocalgovernmentorforotherspecialpurposes.

B.ConstitutionalLawDefined

Inthesenseinw/ctheconceptisunderstoodinAmericanandPhilippineJurisprudence,constitutionallawisatermusedtodesignatethelawembodiedintheconstitutionandthelegalprinciplesgrowingoutoftheinterpretationandapplicationmadebycourtsoftheprovisionsoftheconstitutioninspecificcases.xxxConstitutionallawformsadistinctbranchofjurisprudencedealingw/thelegalprinciplesaffectingthenature,adoption,amendment,andoperationoftheconstitution.2(Sinco67.)

C.ConstitutionDefined

TañadaandFernando:"Itmaybemorespecificallydefinedasawritteninstrumentorganizingthegovernment,distributingitspowersandsafeguardingtherightsofthePeople."MalcolmandLaurel:"Itisthewritteninstrumentbywhichthefundamentalpowersofgovernmentareestablished,limitedanddefined,andbywhichthosepowersaredistributedamongtheseveraldepartmentsfortheirsafeandusefulexerciseforthebenefitofthebodypolitic."JudgeCooley:“Bodyofrulesandmaximsinaccordancewithwhichthepowersofsovereigntyarehabituallyexercised.”3

D.ClassificationofConstitutions

E.QualitiesandContentsofaConstitution

1. Qualitiesa. Clearness–“conducivetoacorrectandproper

1Sinco,PhilPoliticalLaw1,11thed.,19622Idat673Idat66

understandingofitsprovisions”4b. Brevity‐“itsgreatoutlinesshouldbemarked,its

importantobjectsdesignated,andtheminoringredientsw/ccomposethoseobjectsbededucedfromthenatureoftheobjectsthemselves.”5

c. Comprehensive–“coveralltheessentials….generaltermsareused”6

2. Contentsa. Preamble–statingthemotivesfortheformulationofthe

constitutionanditsbasicpurposes7b. Billofrights–“astatementoftherightsoftheindividual

whicharenormallyprotectedagainstimpairment,usurpation,orremovalbyanyformofgovernmentalaction”8

c. FrameworkoftheGovernmentd. ProvisionsforAmendment–bothprocedural(orderly

methodofbringingaboutthemostradicalconstitutionalreformsthatthepeopledesire)andsubstantive(offeranopportunityforthedeletionofobsoleteorill‐suitedportionsoftheConstitutionandforthefillingupofundesirablegapsw/crendertheconstitutionalsysteminadequate)9

II.HISTORYOFTHEPHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONA.VVMendoza’sFromMcKinley’sInstructionstotheNewConstitution Unlikeothercountries inSoutheastAsia, thenotionofacentralor

national government was unknown in the Philippines until theestablishmentofSpanishsovereignty.

Even after the establishment of sovereignty, the notion ofconstitutionalism did not gain ground until about 1869, whenlibertarian ideas fromEurope found theirway to the country as aresultoftheopeningoftheSuezCanal.

TheTreatyofParis,bywhich thePhilippine Islandswerecededtothe United States, is generally regarded as establishing thefoundationoftheconstitutionalsystemofthecountry.TheMalolosConstitutiondidnotlast,wasmoreofahistoricalinterestaccordingtotheauthor.

PhilippineConstitutionalDevelopmentTheEarlyAmericanGovernment PhilippinesasUnincorporatedTerritory‐‐TreatyofPariscededthe

Philippines to the US. The US constitution, however, was notextended by the terms of the treaty. Administration of the islandswasconductedbymeansofcharters(organicacts)derivedfromtheformallyexpressedwilloftheUSPresidentandCongress.

Principal Organic Acts ‐‐ President McKinley’s Instructions to theSecond Philippine Commission, Act of Congress of July 1, 1902(PhilippineBill),ActofCongressofAugust29,1916(JonesLaw).

o PresidentMcKinley’sInstructions

directed the Second Philippine commission to givepriority to the establishment of municipal andprovincial governments, giving Filipinos theopportunity to manage their local affairs to thefullestextentofwhichtheywerecapable,subjecttothe least degree of supervision and control …consistent with themaintenance of law, order andloyalty.

provided for the transfer of legislative authorityfrom theMilitaryGovernor to theCommission, butMilitary Governor was to remain the chief executiveheadofgovernment.

directed the commission to consider the customs,habits, and even prejudices of the natives in theenactment of laws, but there were certain greatprinciples andpractical rules of governmentwhich

4Idat705Idat71citingMcCulloughv.Maryland6Id7Idat728Id9Idat76

Type1Classidication

Written

Democratic Monarchial

Unwritten

Type2Classidication

Flexible Rigid

3 mustbeestablishedandmaintainedhowevermuchthey conflict with the customs and laws of theinhabitants.

Spooner Amendment transformed the government from amilitary to civil one, transferred the executive powers of themilitary governor to the President of the PhilippineCommission.

By an act of the Philippine Commission, a court system wasestablished consisting of a Supreme Court, Courts of FirstInstance,andJusticeofthePeaceCourts.

o PhilippineBill

BymeansoftheActofJuly1,1902(PhilippineBill),theUSCongressassumed theadministrationof theisland.Initially,nosubstantialchangesweremade.

On October 16, 1907, the structure of the lawmaking body was altered. The PhilippineCommission became the upper chamber, an allFilipinoassembly(thePhilippineAssembly)actedasthelowerhouse.

Enacted laws were to be reported to the USCongress, Philippine Supreme Court decisionssubjecttothejudicialreviewofUSSupremeCourt.

The Philippine Bill defined for the first time whoweredeemedcitizensofthePhilippineIslands.

ThelawcontainedaslightlyexpandedBillofRights.Some of the modern limitations on the legislativepowerowetheirexpressiontothePhilippineBill.

Italsocontainedprovisionsforthesaleandleaseofpubliclands,gavecitizensoftheUStherighttoourminerallands.

o PhilippineAutonomyAct

BythisacttheUnitedStatesformallyannounceditsintentiontowithdrawfromthe islands.TheActsetupanelectivePhilippineLegislaturecomposedofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives.

The supreme executive power was vested in theGovernor General whose officewasmade separateanddistinctfromthatofthelegislature.Theactgavethe Governor General the authority to appoint byand with the consent of the Senate executiveofficials. Concurrence of the lawmaking body wasnot required in suspending thewritorproclaimingmartial law. The Governor General was given theexclusivepowertograntpardonsandreprieves,thepowertovetolegislativeenactments.

Osmeña‐Roxas mission secured the passage of Hare‐Hawes

CuttingActwhichpromised independence for thePhilippinesafter10years.RejectedbythePhilippineLegislatureundertheleadershipofManuelQuezon.

Quezon led another mission and was able to secure theTydings‐Mcduffie Act which authorized the PhilippineLegislature to call an election of delegates to a constitutionalconventionasfirststeptoindependence.Theactprescribed3steps for the adoption of a constitution: (1) the calling of aconstitutional convention (2) the submission of theconstitution to the president of the US (3) submission of theconstitutiontothepeopleforratification.

The 1935 constitution was ratified, Commonwealthgovernmentwasinaugurated.

B.The1935Constitution­CommonwealthGovernment

Formo Executive power was vested in a President, legislative

powerinaunicameralNationalAssembly.o Separation of 3 Powers. But, as in the Philippine

Autonomy Act, the three departments were not evennearly equal. Strong President. The 1935 ConstitutionmadetheofficeofthePhilippinepresidentmorepowerfulthanthatoftheAmericanchiefexecutive.

o Whilesomeofthefeaturesofthe1935constitutionsuchas the Bill of Rights and provisions governing internalbusinessoftheNationalAssemblywereadoptedfromtheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates,itisanerrortoconclude

that the American constitutional system was therebytransplanted into the Philippines. The governmentalstructure provided in the Philippine Autonomy Act,rather than the set‐up in the US, was the model of the1935constitution.

BasisandNatureofGovernment

o The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty residesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.(ArticleII,Sec.1)

o Not completely sovereign. Conditions were imposed bytheTydings‐McduffieActwith respect to trade relationswithUS,financialoperationsandcurrency,andcontrolofforeignrelations.

o EnactedlawswerereportedtotheUSCongress,decisionsofPhilippineSupremeCourtsubjecttoreview.

SalientFeaturesoftheConstitution

o RightofSuffrage‐‐MaleCitizens,21yearsofageorover,abletoreadandwrite(lateronextendedtowomen).

o BillofRightscarriedoverfrompreviousOrganicActso Provisions on Social Justice, Conservation of Natural

Resources,Nationalizationofpublicutilities,MeritocracyintheCivilService.

TheGovernmentoftheRepublic In accordancewith the Tydings‐Mcduffie Act, the independence of

the Philippines was proclaimed. The Commonwealth GovernmentbecametheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.

The same government under the same constitution…but fullysovereign politically (?). Powers of government were distributed,albeitunequally,amongthePresident,Congress,andtheJudiciary.

ParityRightsAmendment–TheUSCongresspassedalawcalledthePhilippineTradeActof1946whichallowedtheentryofPhilippinearticles into theUS free of ordinary customs duties. In return, thePhilippinegovernmentamendedtheconstitutionandgrantedparityrights (right to the disposition, exploitation, development andutilizationofthecountry’sresources)toUScitizens.

RevisionoftheConstitution–Mountingdifficultiesandwidespreaddissatisfactionwith theworkingsof thesystem indealingwith theproblemsof thenation in the late1960s reinforceddemands forareexaminationof the constitution.A constitutional conventionwasconvenedthat,lateron,gavebirthtotheconstitutionof1973.

B.The1973Constitution The new constitution establishes a parliamentary form of

governmentbydrasticallychangingthedistributionofpowers.TheLegislative power was vested in a National Assembly, executivepowerwasvested in thePrimeMinisterwith theassistanceof thecabinet.

Unlike the Presidential system, the parliamentary system did notlook to the legislature to play the role of opposition. The rolewasgivenovertotheminorityparty.

While the separationof executive and legislativedepartmentswasobliterated, the line drawn between the judiciary and the politicalorgansismaintained.Thecourtsremainindependentofthepoliticalbranchesofgovernment.

Aquino v. Enrile, 1973 • In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA

183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC, 1985 • The constitutionality of BP 883, calling for special elections (snap

election with Marcos vs. Aquino as candidates), was contested since there is no actual vacancy in the office of the president

• “… Petitioners failed to demonstrate that BP 883 clearly contravenes any applicable constitutional provision. Besides, the issue posed by these petitions is essentially political in character… the Supreme Court has no authority to determine whether or not the act of the Legislature of Chief Executive is

4 against the Constitution”

• The main doctrine here is that the Supreme Court recognizes the separation of powers. There is what we call a political question wherein only the involved department may resolve to the exclusion of the other two. One division is not more powerful than the other and the decision of each is accorded great respect.

• II.THE1987CONSTITUTIONA.ProclamationNo.1,25February1986(Provisionalgovernment).­­ButProclamationNo.3whichannouncedtheProvisionalConstitution,seemedtosuggestthatitwasarevolutionarygovernment,sinceinoneofitswhereasesitannouncedthatthe"newgovernmentwasinstalled,throughadirectexerciseofthepoweroftheFilipinopeopleassistedbyunitsoftheNewArmedForces,"referringtotheEDSArevolution.

B.ProclamationNo.3,March25,1986(ProvisionalConstitution).­­TheProvisionalConstitutionorFreedomConstitutionwasadoptedon25March1986throughProclamationNo.3.Itabrogatedthelegislativeprovisionsofthe1973Constitution,modifiedtheprovisionsregardingtheexecutivedepartment,andtotallyreorganizedthegovernment.(Itsuseofthe1973Constitution,however,isnotbetoconstruedthatitwasacontinuationthereof.)ThenitprovidedforthecallingofaConstitutionalCommission,composedof30to50membersappointedbythePresidentwithin60days.

C.AdoptionandEffectivity1.ProvisionalConstitution

Art.V.ADOPTIONOFANEWCONSTITUTION“Section1.WithinsixtydaysfromthedateofthisProclamation,aCommissionshallbeappointedbythePresidenttodraftaNewConstitution.TheCommissionshallbecomposedofnotlessthanthirtynormorethanfiftynaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,ofrecognizedprobity,knownfortheirindependence,nationalismandpatriotism.TheyshallbechosenbythePresidentafterconsultationwithvarioussectorsofsociety.Section5.TheNewConstitutionshallbepresentedbytheCommissiontothePresidentwhoshallfixthedatefortheholdingofaplebiscite.Itshallbecomevalidandeffectiveuponratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinsuchplebiscitewhichshallbeheldwithinaperiodof60daysfollowingitssubmissiontothePresident.”

2.1987Constitution

“Art.XVIII,sec.27.ThisConstitutionshalltakeeffectimmediatelyuponitsratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteheldforthepurposeandshallsupersedetheallpreviousConstitutions.TheforegoingproposedConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippineswasapprovedbytheConstitutionalCommissionof1986onthetwelfthdayofOctober1986,andaccordinglysignedonthefifteenthdayofOctober1986atthePlenaryHall,NationalGovernmentCenter,QuezonCity,bytheCommissionerswhosesignaturesarehereunderaffixed.”

3.ProclamationNo.58(ProclaimingtheRatificationofthe1987Constitution),February11,1987 Lawyer’s League vs. Aquino • The legitimacy of the Aquino government was being contested • The Court ruled that the legitimacy of this government is a non-

justiciable matter. “It is only the people of the Philippines who may be the judge of its legitimacy. Since such government is accepted by the people, it is not merely a de facto government but also a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized its legitimacy”

• With all this in mind, the petitioners have no personality to sue and no cause of action

• The Court again reiterates the doctrine of separation of powers, deciding that such case is not for the courts to decide on.

In re: Saturnino Bermudez • The petitioner is asking for a declaratory relief and to explain the

‘ambiguity’ in the proposed 1986 Constitution as to who was being referred to as President and Vice-President in Art XVIII Sec 7.

• “The petition states no cause of action. Bermudez's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of 30 June 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Further, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.”

De Leon v. Esguerra, 1987 • Petitioners de Leon et al were elected as officials of Barangay

Dolores, Taytay Rizal on May 17, 1982 and their terms were to expire after 6 years under BP222 or the Barangay Election Act of 1982. Respondents Esguerra, the OIC Governor, designated Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain on Feb 8, 1987.

• The Provisional Constitution states that “All elective and appointive officials SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986. By reason of the foregoing provision, the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.”

• The 1987 Constitution took effect immediately upon its ratification in a plebiscite. Thus, when the plebiscite ratification was conducted in 1987, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Bp 222 wasn’t repealed by the 1987 Constitution thus the tenure of the Petitioners continues.

III.CONSTITUTIONALISMANDCONSTITUTIONALSUPREMACY:JUDICIALREVIEWUNDERTHE1987CONSTITUTIONA.SupremacyoftheConstitution

Marbury v. Madison Boumediene v. Bush David v. Macapagal-Arroyo Angara v. Electoral Commission • In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that "all

members- elect, with no election protest filed on or before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Electoral Commission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadline for the filing of election protest. Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertained by the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was controlling. The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the Electoral Commission juris-diction over election protests.

• “The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to

5 allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.”

• B.TheoryofJudicialReviewArt.VIII,Sec.1.“Thejudicialpowershallbevestedinonesupremecourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofcourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovernment.”

AngaravElectoralCommission

Ashwander vs. Tennessee Valley Authority Seven (7) rules of avoidance of constitutional questions (J. Brandeis). In the following cases, the court must refrain from passing on the issue of constitutionality or from exercising judicial review.

1. "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a

friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. "The Court will not 'anticipate question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."

4. "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. "The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. . Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

6. “The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.'

B.PrudentialConsiderationsC.RequisitesfortheExerciseofJudicialReview1. ACTUALCASESORCONTROVERSY

2. LOCUSSTANDI

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance • The petitioners, as taxpayers and legislators, brought a suit

questioning the constitutionality of the EVAT law on account of its passage. They contend that the passage of the law was not in accordance with the constitutional requirement in the origination of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debts, bills of local application, and private bills.

• Legislator’s standing – that the Senators’ • Daza v. Singson •

3. RAISEDATTHEEARLIESTOPPORTUNITY

4. LISMOTAOFTHECASED.HurdlestoJusticiability1. POLITICALQUESTIONS

Baker v. Carr • The case is about the reapportionment of districts as an

effect of the creation of new legislative districts under a new law.

• The ponente pointed out 6 cases of political questions: 1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of

the issue to a coordinate political department;" 2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable

standards for resolving it;" 3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"

4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;"

5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"

6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

Casibang v. Aquino • Tañada v. Cuenco • Sanidad v. COMELEC • Abueva v. Wood • IBP v. Zamora • Estrada v. Desierto • Marcos v. Manglapus • Daza v. Singson •

2. MOOTNESS

Gonzales v. Narvasa • Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary • Lacson v. Executive Secretary • Francisco v. HREP, supra •

PeoplevVeraJ.Laurellaiddownthedoctrinethatjudicialreviewcanonlybeexercisedinanactualcaseorcontroversy.Thismeans:1) apartywithapersonalandsubstantialinterest2) anappropriatecase3) aconstitutionalquestionraisedattheearliestpossibletime4) aconstitutionalquestionthatistheverylismotaofthecase,i.e.an

unavoidablequestion.1.ActualCaseorControversy

6 Thisisdefinedasaconflictoflegalrightsoranassertionofoppositelegalclaimssusceptibleofjudicialdetermination(Nachura)Thus,arequestforanadvisoryopinionisnotanactualcaseorcontroversy.But,anactionfordeclaratoryreliefisproperforjudicialdetermination(Perezvs.ProvincialBoard).

a.RipenessAconstitutionalquestionmaycometothecourteithertooearlyorprematurely,sothatitisstillabstract(advisoryopinion),ortoolate,sothatthecourt'sdecisionwouldnolongeraffecttheparties(mootness).Thecourtmustresolveconstitutionalissuesonlywhentheycometoitattherighttime(ripeness).Gonzalesvs.COMELECPetitionerschallengetheconstitutionalityofastatute[RA4880ortheRevisedElectionCode]whichcallstoahalttheundesirablepracticeofprolongedpoliticalcampaigns.Moreprecisely,thebasiclibertiesoffreespeechandfreepress,freedomofassemblyandfreedomofassociationareinvokedtonullifytheact.Thepetitionwasdismissed."AlthoughtheinstantpetitiondidnotseektorestrainrespondentCommissiononElectionsfromperforminganyspecificact,itcouldstillrightfullybetreatedasapetitionforprohibition.TheexceptionalcharacterofthesituationthatconfrontsthisCourt,theparamountpublicinterest,andtheundeniablenecessityforaruling,thenationalelectionsbeingbarelysixmonthsaway,reinforcethisstand.Itwouldappearundeniable,therefore,thatbeforethisCourtisanappropriateinvocationofthisCourt'sjurisdictiontopreventtheenforcementofanallegedunconstitutionalstatute.TheCourtisleftwithnochoice.Then,itmustactonthematter.

"ThelanguageofJusticeLaurelfitsthecase:'AllawaitthedecisionofthisCourtontheconstitutionalquestion.Considering,therefore,theimportancewhichtheinstantcasehasassumedandtopreventmultiplicityofsuits,strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthat[its]constitutionality...benowresolved.'[quotedfromPeoplevVera]Itmaylikewisebeaddedthattheexceptionalcharacterofthesituationthatconfrontsus,theparamountpublicinterest,andtheundeniablenecessityforaruling,thenationalelectionsbeingbarelysixmonthsaway,reinforceourstand."b.MootnessAcasebecomesmootwhentherearefacts,injuriesandheatedargumentsbutforsomereasonthelegalproblemhasbecomestale.Whenacaseismootandacademic,itceasestobeacaseandcontroversy.Anydecisionreachedbythecourtwouldnotbeconclusiveontheparties.Exceptionstomootness:1) Ifthequestioniscapableofrepetitionandevasiveofreview.2) Ifthereexitsamerepossibilityofcollaterallegalconsequencesif

thecourtdoesnotact.3) Voluntarycessationfromthewrongfulactbythedefendant,ifheis

freetoreturntohisoldways.2.StandingAproperpartyisonewhohassustained,orisinimminentdangerofsustaining,aninjuryasaresultoftheactcomplainedof.Standingisestablishedbytwonexuses:theparty'sstatusandthetypeoflegislativeactbeingquestioned,orhisstatusandtheprecisenatureoftheconstitutionalinfringement.Thetestofstandingiswhetherthepartyhasallegedsuchapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversyastoassuresuchconcreteadversenesswhichsharpensthepresentationofissuesuponwhichthecourtsolargelydependsforilluminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions(BakervCarr)Apersonhasstandingtochallengethegovernmentalactonlyifhehasapersonalandsubstantialinterestinthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustain,directinjuryasaresultofitsenforcement.(PeoplevVera)

Assenator,onehastherequisitestandingtobringasuitassailingtheissuanceorimplementationofalawasanusurpationoflegislativepower.Asataxpayer,onecouldimpugnthelegalityofthemisalignmentofpublicfunds(Oplevs.Torres)Whereaconstitutionalquestionisraised,asenatorhasbeenconsideredaspossessedoftherequisitepersonalitytobringasuit,e.g.,inMabanagvs.LopezVitoandTolentinov.CommissiononElections.]Aparty’sstandingincourtisaproceduraltechnicalitywhichmaybesetasidebytheCourtinviewoftheimportanceoftheissuesinvolved.Thus,wheretheissuesraisedbypetitionersareofparamountpublicinterest(Kilosbayan,Inc.vs.Morato)oroftranscendentalimportance(Tatadvs.SecretaryofDepartmentofEnergy),theCourtmay,inexerciseofitsdiscretion,brushasidetheproceduralbarrier.

Itiswellsettledthatthevalidityofastatutemaybecontestedonlybyonewhowillsustainadirectinjury,inconsequenceofitsenforcement.Yet,therearemanydecisionsnullifying,attheinstanceoftaxpayers,lawsprovidingforthedisbursementofpublicfunds,uponthetheorythatthe'expenditureofpublicfunds,byanofficeroftheStateforthepurposeofadministeringanunconstitutionalactconstitutesamisapplicationofsuchfunds,'whichmaybeenjoinedattherequestofataxpayer."(PascualvTheSecretaryofPublicWorks)3.QuestionRaisedattheEarliestOpportunity

Asageneralrule,thequestionmustberaisedinthepleadings.Thus,inUmalivs.Guingona.ThequestionoftheconstitutionalityofthePCAGCwasnoentertainedbecausetheissuewasraisedbythepetitioneronlyinhisMotionforReconsiderationbeforetheRTCofMakati.Itwastoolatetoraisetheissueforthefirsttimeinthatstageoftheproceedings.

4.LisMotaBecauseofthedoctrineofseparationofpowerswhichdemandsthatproperrespectbeaccordedtheotherbranchesofgovernment,courtsareloathetodecideonconstitutionalquestionsaslongasthereissomeotherbasisthatcanbeusedtoresolvethecase.

InArcetavs.JudgeMangrobang,theconstitutionalityofBP22(BouncingChecksLaw)waschallenged.TheSCdidnotfindtheconstitutionalquestiontobetheverylismotapresentedinthecontroversy.Everylawhasinitsfavorthepresumptionofconstitutionalityand,tojustifyitsnullification,theremustbeaclearandunequivocalbreachoftheConstitution,andnotonethatisdoubtful,speculativeorargumentative.

C.FunctionsofJudicialReview1.Checking‐invalidatingalaworanexecutiveactthatisfoundtobecontrarytotheConstitution.2.Legitimating(legitimizing)‐upholdingthevalidityofthelawwhichresultsfromameredismissalofacasechallengingthevalidityofthatlaw.WhentheCourtexercisesthisfunction,itusesthedoublenegativebydeclaringthatthelawis"notunconstitutional".Thisisnomeresemantics.TheCourtcannotdeclarethelawconstitutionalforitenjoysthepresumptionofconstitutionality,sothatadeclarationtothateffectbythecourtwouldnotmakeitmoreconstitutional.Ontheotherhand,anyonewhochallengesthevalidityofalawhastheburdenofprooftoshowitsinvalidity.Declaringthatthelawisnotunconstitutionalistantamounttosayingthatthechallengerhasnotmettheburdenrequired.*LegitimatingandCheckingAspectsofJudicialReview.DismissalofChallengetoaLaw'sValidityLegitimizesit.InOccenavCOMELEC(whichsoughtaninjunctiontoprohibittheCOMELECfromproceedingwiththeplebiscitefortheproposed1981amendments)andinMitravCOMELEC,(whichsoughtamandamusto

7 compeltheCOMELECtoholdaplebiscitetoratifythe1973Constitution)bothprayerswerebasedonthepremisethatthe1973Constitutionhadnotbeenratified,theSCheldthatthefailureoftheCourtinJavellanavExecutiveSecretarytomusterthevotesrequiredtodeclarethe1973Constitutionasbeinginvalidlyratified,whichresultedinthedismissalofthesuitquestioningthevalidityoftheratificationoftheConstitution,ineffectlegitimatedtheratification.InOccena,theCourtruledthat:

"TheSupremeCourtcancheckaswellaslegitimate.Inthelattercase,thereisanaffirmationthatwhatwasdonecannotbestigmatizedasconstitutionallydeficient.Themeredismissalofasuitofthischaractersuffices.ThatisthemeaningoftheconcludingstatementintheJavellanaresolution.Sincethen,theCourthasinvariablyappliedthepresentConstitution."

3.Symbolic‐toeducatethebenchandbarastothecontrollingprinciplesandconceptsonmattersofgreatpublicimportance.SalongavCruz­PanoThecaseagainstpetitionerforsubversionwhichwasfiledbythefiscalonthebasisofflimsytestimonygivenbyVictorLovelywasalreadydismissedwithoutprejudicebythefiscal(uponanticipationofadverseruling).Andyet,theSCnotingthatasthefiscalsaidthedismissalofthechargeswaswithoutprejudicetothefilingofnewonesforthesameactsbecausethepetitionerhasnotbeenarraignedanddoublejeopardydoesnotapply,thecaseisnotentirelymoot,decidedtoperformitsdutyto"formulateguidingandcontrollingconstitutionalprinciples,preceptsanddoctrinesorrules"fortheguidanceofthebarandbench.JaviervCOMELECThecasewasalreadymootednotonlybythedeathofEvelioJavier,butalsobytheabolitionofBatasan,theAntiqueseatwhichheandPaci‐ficadorwerecontestingfor.AndyettheSC,claimingtobe"notonlythehighestarbiteroflegalquestionsbutalsotheconscienceofthegovernment,"decidedthecaseanyway"fortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture.Thecitizencomestousinquestoflawbutwemustalsogivehimjustice.The2arenotalwaysthesame.Therearetimeswhenwecannotgrantthelatterbecausetheissuehasbeensettledandthedecisionisnolongerpossibleaccordingtothelaw.Buttherearealsotimeswhenalthoughthedisputehasdisappeared,asinthiscase,itneverthelesscriesouttoberesolved.Justicedemandsthatweactthen,notonlyforthevindicationoftheoutragedright,thoughgone,butalsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture."

DemeteriavAlbaTheSCstruckdownSec.44ofPD1177,authorizingthePresidenttotransferfundsfromonedepartmenttoanother,onthegroundthatitoverextendedtheprivilegegrantedunderArt.VIII,sec.16(5)ofthe1973Constitution,evenifsuchprovisionwasalreadyabrogatedbytheFreedomConstitution.Then,citingtheJaviercaseontheneed"notonlyforthevindicationofanoutragedright,thoughgone,butalsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture,"itlecturedonhowthislawwouldopenthefloodgatesfortheenactmentofunfundedappropriations,uncontrolledexecutiveexpenditures,diffusionofaccountabilityforbudgetaryperformance,andentrenchmentoftheporkbarrelsystem,andonhowthiswouldcreatetemptationsformisappropriationandembezzlement.*AllcourtscanexercisejudicialreviewArt.VIII,Sec.5(2).TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx(2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:a) Allcasesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,

internationalorexecutiveagreement,law,presidentialdecree,proclamation,order,instruction,ordinance,orregulationisinquestion.

b) Allcasesinvolvingthelegalityofanytax,impost,assessment,ortoll,oranypenaltyimposedinrelationthereto.

c) Allcasesinwhichthejurisdictionofanylowercourtisinissue.d) Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusion

perpetuaorhigher.e) Allcasesinwhichonlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved.D.PoliticalQuestionAnissueisapoliticalquestionwhenitdoesnotdealwiththeinterpretationofalawanditsapplicationtoacase,butwiththeverywisdomofthelawitself.Whenajudgeattemptstoresolveapoliticalquestion,heisnotexercisingajudicialfunction,butisrathersupplantinghisconsciencetothatofthepoliticalbranchofthegovernment. Bakerv.Carr:guidelinesfordeterminingwhetheraquestionispoliticalornot.

‐“Prominentonthesurfaceofanycaseheldtoinvolveapoliticalquestionisfoundatextuallydemonstrableconstitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoapoliticaldepartment;oralackofjudiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingit;ortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationofakindclearlyfornon‐judicialdiscretion;ortheimpossibilityofacourt'sundertakingindependentresolutionwithoutexpressinglackoftherespectduecoordinatebranchesofgovernment;oranunusualneedforunquestioningadherencetoapoliticaldecisionalreadymade,orthepotentialityofembarrassmentfrommultifariouspronouncementsbyvariousdepartmentsononequestion.”Tañadavs.CuencoTheSCheldthattheterm"politicalquestion"connotes,aquestionofpolicy.Itreferstothosequestionswhich,undertheConstitution,aretobedecidedbythepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity,orinregardtowhichfulldiscretionaryauthorityhasbeendelegatedtotheLegislatureorexecutivebranchoftheGovernment(16C.J.S.,413).Itisconcernedwithissuesdependentuponthewisdom,notlegality,ofaparticularmeasure.TheSenateisnotclothedwith"fulldiscretionaryauthority"inthechoiceofmembersoftheSenateElectoralTribunal.Theexerciseofitspowerthereonissubjecttoconstitutionallimitations.Itisclearlywithinthelegitimateprovinceofthejudicialdepartmenttopassuponthevalidityoftheproceedingsinconnectiontherewith.Hence,thisCourthas,notonlyjurisdiction,but,alsotheduty,toconsideranddeterminetheprincipalissueraisedbythepartiesherein.

RomulovYniguezWhatseemslikealegalquestionwhenviewedinisolation(namely,whethertherulesoftheBatasanenablingittoshelfacomplaintforimpeachmentagainstthePresidentisconstitutional.)isreallyapoliticalquestionwhenviewedinabroadercontext(i.e.,thatthecasewasfiledagainsttheSpeakerofaco‐equalbranchtocompelhimbymandamustorecallthecomplaintfromthearchive,andthattheultimateresultofthecasewastoquestionthedecisionoftheBatasantoshelvethecase,amatter,thatissolelycommittedtothatdepartment.)Yet,despitethereallypoliticalnatureofthequestion,theSCpassedonthevalidityoftherulestoerasedoubtsthatmaystillbeentertained.AdvisoryOpinionAcasebecomesanadvisoryopinionwhenthereisnoactualcaseandcontroversythatdemandsconstitutionalconstructionforitsresolution.Thismaytaketheformofdeclaratoryrelief.Itisnotwiseforthecourttoengageinanadvisoryopinionbecause:a)Thisonlyleadstodialectics,toabstractlegalargumentsandsterileconclusions(LaurelquotingFrankfurter)b)Thejudicialfunctionisimpoverishedsinceitthrivesonfactsthatdrawoutthemeaningofthelaw.E.EffectofaDeclarationofUnconstitutionality

8 CivilCode,Art.7. Xxx Whenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththeconstitution,theformershallbevoidandthelattershallgovern. xxxTheeffectofadeclarationthatalawisunconstitutionalistomakethelaweithervoidorvoidable.a.VoidItisvoidifonitsface,itdoesnotenjoyanypresumptionofvalidity.Assuch,itproducesnoeffectwhatsoever,createsnorightoroffice,itimposesnoduty.Whateverpenaltywaspaidduringtheperiodofitsoperationmustberemitted.AnexampleisBP52inIgotvCOMELEC,providingthatanyonewhohasbeenchargedofrebellion,etc.isprimafaciepresumedtobedisqualifiedfromrunningforalocalpost.Onitsface,itblatantlygoesagainsttheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocence.b.VoidableAlawdeclaredunconstitutionalisonlyvoidableif,onitsface,itenjoysthepresumptionofvalidity.Inthiscase,itbecomesinoperativeonlyuponthejudicialdeclarationofitsinvalidity.Andevenso,theinvalidationproducesnoretroactiveeffect,sinceitwouldbeunjusttoholdthatthelawdidnotproduceanyeffectatallpriortoitsnullification.Fromthetimethelawwaspromulgatedtothetimeitwasdeclaredinvalid,peoplewouldhaveenteredintovarioustransactionsandrelations,expectingandinfactcompelledtopresumethatthelawisvalid.Thus,tonowholdthatthelawneverproducedanyeffectwouldpenalizethosewhoinfaithbelievedthelawspassedbytheirrepresentativestobeinaccordancewiththeirsolemndutyundertheConstitution.SerranodeAgbayanivPNBIn1939,AgbayanisecuredaloanfromPNB.In1944,theloanmaturedbutPNBcouldnotcollectbecauseofthewar.In1945,Pres.OsmenaissuedtheDebtMoratoriumLaw(EO#32),suspendingthepaymentofloansforfouryearsduetotheravagesofwar.In1948,RA342extendedtheDebtMoratoriumLawforanothereightyears(upto1956).In1953,however,theSCdeclaredRA342asunconstitutionalinthecaseofRuttervEsteban.In1959,PNBfiledasuitforpaymentoftheloan.Theissuewaswhetherornottheactionhasprescribed.Takingtheorthodoxview,theactionhasprescribed,sincethedeclarationofRA342asunconstitutionalretroactedto1945whenEO32wasfirstissued.Between1944whentheloanmaturedand1959,whenPNBcollectedtheloan,15yearshadelapsed. Takingtheunorthodoxview,astheSCdid,theactioncouldstillprosper.Theperiodfrom1945whenthelawwaspromulgated,to1953whenitwasdeclaredunconstitutionalshouldnotbecountedforthepurposeofprescriptionsincetheDebtMoratoriumLawwasoperativeduringthistime.Ineffect,only7yearshadelapsed(1944‐45,1953‐59).Itwouldbeunjusttopunishthecreditorwhocouldnotcollectpriorto1953becausetheDebtMoratoriumLawwaseffective,onlytobetoldlaterthathisrespectforanapparentlyvalidlawmadehimlosehisrighttocollect.Art.7oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthat,"WhenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththeConstitution,theformershallbevoidandthelattershallgovern."seemstobetheorthodoxview.THESTATEI.STATEDEFINED.Prof.Borlongay,quotingGarner,IntroductiontoPoliticalLaw,41:AStateisacommunityofpersons,moreorlessnumerous,permanentlyoccupyingafixedterritoryandpossessedofanindependentgovernmentorganizedforpoliticalendstowhichthegreatbodyofinhabitantsrenderhabitualobedience.

ELEMENTS:a. People‐‐‐inhabitantsoftheStateb. Territory‐‐‐fixedportionofthesurfaceoftheearthinhabitedby

thepeopleoftheStatec. Government‐‐‐agency/instrumentalitythroughwhichthewillof

theStateisformulated,expressed,andrealizedd. Sovereignty‐‐‐supremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentina

StatebywhichthatStateisgovernedCIRv.CamposRueda(1971):AStateisapoliticallyorganizedsovereigncommunity,independentofoutsidecontrol,boundbytiesofnationhood,legallysupremewithinitsterritory,andactingthroughgovernmentfunctioningunderaregimeoflaw.II.COMPONENTSOFTHEPHILSTATEA.TERRITORYARTICLEI,1987Constitution“ThenationalterritorycomprisesthePhilippinearchipelago,withalltheislandsandwatersembracedtherein,andallotherterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction,consistingofitsterrestrial,fluvial,andaerialdomains,includingitsterritorialsea,theseabed,thesubsoil,theinsularshelves,andothersubmarineareas.Thewatersaround,between,andconnectingtheislandsofthearchipelago,regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions,formpartoftheinternalwatersofthePhilippines.”Philippineterritoryconsistsof:• thePhilippinearchipelago;and• allterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshassovereigntyor

jurisdictionTheArchipelagicDoctrine:Bodiesofwaterwithinthebaseline,regardlessofbreadth,formpartofthearchipelagoandareconsideredasinternalwaters.B.PEOPLE–3meanings1.Inhabitants,asusedin:ARTICLEII,Section15,1987Constitution“TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherighttohealthofthepeopleandinstillhealthconsciousnessamongthem.”ARTICLEII,Section16,1987Constitution“TheStateshallprotectandadvancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthfulecologyinaccordwiththerhythmandharmonyofnature.”ARTICLEIII,Section2,1987Constitution“Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolablexxx”ARTICLEXIII,Section1,1987Consti“TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactmentofmeasuresthatprotectandenhancetherightofallthepeopletohumandignity,reducesocial,economic,andpoliticalinequalities,andremoveculturalinequitiesbyequitablydiffusingwealthandpoliticalpowerforthecommongood.”QuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard(1963):TherightofanindividualtobesecureinhispersonisguaranteedbytheConstitution.UnderourConstitution,thesameisdeclaredapopularrightofthepeopleandindisputablyappliestobothcitizensandforeignersinthiscountry.2.Electors,asusedin:ARTICLEVII,Section4,1987Constitution“ThePresidentandtheVice‐Presidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeoplexxx”ARTICLEXVI,Section2,1987Constitution“TheCongressmay,bylaw,adoptanewnameforthecountry,anationalanthem,oranationalseal,whichshallallbetrulyreflectiveandsymbolicoftheideals,history,andtraditionsofthepeople.Suchlawshalltake

9 effectonlyuponitsratificationbythepeopleinanationalreferendum.”ARTICLEXVIII,Section25,1987Consti“Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRPandUSAconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,whentheCongresssorequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.”3.Citizens,asusedin:PREAMBLE,1987Constitution“We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustandhumanesocietyandestablishagovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethecommongood,conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposteritytheblessingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love,equality,andpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.”ARTICLEII,Section1,1987Constitution“ThePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.”ARTICLEII,Section4,1987Constitution“TheprimedutyoftheGovernmentistoserveandprotectthepeople.TheGovernmentmaycalluponthepeopletodefendtheStateand,inthefulfillmentthereof,allcitizensmayberequired,underconditionsprovidedbylaw,torenderpersonalmilitary,orcivilservice.”ARTICLEIII,Section7,1987Constitution“Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallberecognized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andtodocuments,andpaperspertainingtoofficialacts,transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.”a.Whoarecitizens:ARTICLEIV,Section1,1987Constitution• citizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthis

Constitution;• thosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines;• thosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelect

Philippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority;and• thosenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.TherightofelectionpermittedunderARTICLEIV,Section1(3),1987Constitution,isavailableonlytothoseborntoFilipinomothersunderthe1935Constitution,who,hadthatcharternotbeenchanged,wouldhavebeenabletoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponattainingmajorityage.Obviously,electionisnotnecessaryinthecaseofachildborntoaFilipinomotherunderthepresentConstitution,assuchchildisconsideredaFilipinocitizenatbirth.Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives(1991)ARTICLEIV,Section1(3),1987ConstitutionappliesnotonlytothosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipafterFebruary2,1987,butalsotothosewho,havingbeenbornofFilipinomothers,electedcitizenshipbeforethatdate.ThisistocorrecttheanomaloussituationwhereonebornofaFilipinofatherandanalienmotherwasautomaticallygrantedthestatusofanatural‐borncitizen,whileonebornofaFilipinomotherandanalienfatherwouldstillhavetoelectPhilippinecitizenship.b.Whoarenatural­borncitizens:ARTICLEIV,Section2,1987Constitution• citizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformany

acttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship;and• thosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithARTICLE

IV,Section1(3)Thefollowingarenatural‐borncitizens:• citizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthe1987

Constitution• thosebornofFilipinomothers/fathers(after17January1973)• thosebornbefore17January1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelect

Philippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority• thosenaturalizedinaccordancewithlawc.Whomustbenatural­borncitizens:• President:ARTICLEVII,Section2• Vice‐President:ARTICLEVII,Section3• MembersofCongress:ARTICLEVI,Sections3and6• JusticesofSCandlowercollegiatecourts:ARTICLEVIII,Section7

(1)• Ombudsmanandhisdeputies:ARTICLEXI,Section8• MembersofConstitutionalCommissions

o CSC:ARTICLEIXB,Section1(1)o COMELEC:ARTICLEIXC,Section1(1)o COA:ARTICLEIXD,Section1(1)

• MembersoftheCentralMonetaryAuthority:ARTICLEXII,Section20

• MembersoftheCommissiononHumanRights:ARTICLEXIII,Section17(2)

AsperARTICLEXII,Section8,1987Constitution,anatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipmaystillbeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.d.GroundsforLossofCitizenship:

1) Naturalizationinaforeigncountry[CA63,Sec.1(1)]2) Expressrenunciationorexpatriation[CA63,Sec.1(2)]3) Takinganoathofallegiancetoanothercountryuponreachingthe

ageofmajority4) Acceptingacommissionandservinginthearmedforcesofanother

country,unlessthereisanoffensive/defensivepactwiththecountry,oritmaintainsarmedforcesinRPwithRP’sconsent

5) Denaturalization6) BeingfoundbyfinaljudgmenttobeadeserteroftheAFP7) MarriagebyaFilipinowomantoanalien,ifbythelawsofher

husband’scountry,hebecomesacitizenthereof• Expatriationisaconstitutionalright(GoGullianv.Government).

NoonecanbecompelledtoremainaFilipinoifhedoesnotwantto.EXCEPTION:AFilipinomaynotdivesthimselfofPhilippinecitizenshipinanymannerwhiletheRepublicofthePhilippinesisatwarwithanycountry.(Sec.1(3),Com.ActNo.63)e.Howmaycitizenshipbereacquired?1.Naturalization(CANo.63andCANo.473)• nowanabbreviatedprocess,withnoneedtowaitfor3years(1year

fordeclarationofintent,and2yearsforthejudgmenttobecomeexecutory)

• applicantmust:a.) be21yearsofageb.) bearesidentfor6monthsc.) havegoodmoralcharacterd.) havenodisqualification

• Republicvs.Guy:Naturalizationisneverfinalandmayberevokedifonecommitsactsofmoralturpitude.

2.Repatriation• womanwhobyhermarriagelosthercitizenship• thosedeclaredbyauthoritiestobedesertersoftheArmedForces• BengsonIIIvs.HRET:Repatriationresultsintherecoveryofthe

originalnationality.Therefore,ifheisanatural‐borncitizenbeforehelosthiscitizenship,hewillberestoredtohisformerstatusasanatural‐bornFilipino.

3.LegislativeAct• bothamodeofacquiringandreacquiringcitizenship

e.Dualallegiance• Dualallegiance(ARTICLEIV,Section5,1987Constitution)

contemplatesthecaseofalienswhoarenaturalizedasFilipinosbut

10 remainloyaltotheircountryoforigin,aswellasthecaseofpublicofficerswho,whileservingthegovernment,seekcitizenshipinanothercountry.

• UnderSec.40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode,thosewithdualcitizenshiparedisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition.(butseeMercadov.Manzano(1999),whichaccordingtoDanGat,madeSec40(d)inexistentbecauseonceacandidatefileshiscandidacy,heisdeemedtohaverenouncedhisforeigncitizenship)

Frivaldov.COMELEC(1989):Merefilingofcertificateofcandidacyisnotasufficientactofrepatriation.Repatriationrequiresanexpressandequivocalact.Labov.COMELEC(1992):Intheabsenceofanyofficialactionorapprovalbyproperauthorities,amereapplicationforrepatriationdoesnot,andcannot,amounttoanautomaticreacquisitionoftheapplicant’sPhilippinecitizenship.Aznarv.COMELEC(1990):LossofPhilippinecitizenshipCANNOTBEPRESUMED.Consideringthefactthatadmittedly,OsmeñawasbothaFilipinoandanAmerican,themerefactthathehasacertificatestatingthatheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotstillaFilipino,sincetherehasbeenNOEXPRESSrenunciationofhisPhilippinecitizenship.C.GOVERNMENT“Government”isthatinstitutionoraggregateofinstitutionsbywhichanindependentsocietymakesandcarriesoutthoserulesofactionwhicharenecessarytoenablementoliveinasocialstateorwhichareimposeduponthepeopleformingthatsocietybythosewhopossessthepowerorauthorityofprescribingthem.(USv.Door2Phil332)

“GovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines”isdefinedas“thecorporategovernmentalentitythroughwhichthefunctionsofgovernmentareexercisedthroughoutthePhilippines,including,saveasthecontraryappearsfromthecontext,thevariousarmsthroughwhichpoliticalauthorityismadeeffectiveinthePhilippines,whetherpertainingtotheautonomousregions,theprovincial,city,municipal,orbarangaysubdivisions,orotherformsoflocalgovernment.”(Sec.2(1),AdministrativeCodeof1987)1.Functionsa.Constituentfunctions‐constitutetheverybondsofsociety;compulsoryb.Ministrantfunctions‐undertakentoadvancethegeneralinterestsofsociety;optional(e.g.publicworks,publiccharity,andregulationoftradeandindustry)• HOWEVER,thedistinctionbetweenconstituentandministrant

functionsisnotrelevantinourjurisdiction.PVTAv.CIR[65SCRA416]reiteratedtherulinginACCFAv.FederationofLaborUnions[30SCRA649]thatthedistinctionhasbeenblurredbecauseoftherepudiationofthelaissez‐fairepolicyintheConstitution.

2.DoctrineofparenspatriaeParenspatriaeisthetaskofthegovernmenttoactasguardianoftherightsofthepeople.Thisprerogativeofparenspatriaeisinherentinthesupremepowerofeverystate,whetherthatpowerislodgedinaroyalpersonorinthelegislature…Cruz)3.Dejureanddefactogovernmentsa.Dejuregovernment‐hasrightfultitlebutnopowerorcontrol,eitherbecausethishasbeenwithdrawnfromit,orbecauseithasnotyetactuallyenteredintotheexercisethereof.b.Defactogovernment‐agovernmentoffact,thatis,itactuallyexercisespowerorcontrolbutwithoutlegaltitle.D.SOVEREIGNTY

SovereigntyisthesupremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentinaStatebywhichtheStateisgoverned1.Kinds

a) Legalsovereignty‐powertoissuefinalcommandsb) Politicalsovereignty‐powerbehindthelegalsovereign,orthe

sumtotaloftheinfluencesthatoperateuponitc) Internalsovereignty‐powertocontroldomesticaffairsd) Externalsovereignty(alsoknownasindependence)‐powerto

directrelationswithotherstates2.TheoryofAuto­LimitationItisthepropertyoftheState‐forceduetowhichaStatehasexclusivelegalcompetenceofself‐limitationandself‐restriction.3.“Dominium”v“imperium”“Dominium”‐capacityoftheStatetoownproperty.Itcoverssuchrightsastitletoland,exploitationanduseofit,anddispositionorsaleofthesame.TheRegaliandoctrinewherebyalllandsofthepublicdomainbelongtotheState,andanyoneclaimingtitlehastheburdentoshowownership,comeswithinthisconcept.Inthiscapacity,theStatedescendstothestatusofordinarypersonsandthusbecomesliableassuch.“Imperium”referstotheState’sauthoritytogovern.Itcoverssuchactivitiesaspassinglawsgoverningaterritory,maintainingpeaceandorderoverit,anddefendingitagainstforeigninvasion.WhentheStateactsinthiscapacity,itgenerallyenjoyssovereignimmunity.4.JurisdictionJurisdictionisthemanifestationofsovereignty.Thejurisdictionofthestateisunderstoodasbothitsauthorityandthesphereoftheexerciseofthatauthority.(Sinco)KINDS:

1.) Territorialjurisdiction‐authorityoftheStatetohaveallpersonsandthingswithinitsterritoriallimitstobecompletelysubjecttoitscontrolandprotection

2.) Personaljurisdiction‐authorityoftheStateoveritsnationals,theirpersons,property,andacts,whetherwithinoroutsideitsterritory.

3.) Extraterritorialjurisdiction‐authorityoftheStateoverpersons,things,oracts,outsideitsterritoriallimitsbyreasonoftheireffectstoitsterritory

4.SuitsAgainsttheStateandtheDoctrineofSovereignImmunity• BasedonARTICLEXVI,Section3,1987Constitution:TheStatemay

notbesuedwithoutitsconsent.• Positivisttheory:Therecanbenolegalrightasagainstthe

authoritythatmakesthelawsonwhichtherightdepends.[Kawananakoav.Polyblank205US349]alsocalledthedoctrineofRoyalPrerogativeofDishonesty

• Sociologicaltheory:IftheStateisamenabletosuits,allitstimewouldbespentdefendingitselffromsuitsandthiswouldpreventitfroperformingitotherfunctions.[Republicv.Villasor]

Q:Isthe“doctrineofsovereignimmunity”availabletoforeignStates?YES,itis,insofarastheyaresoughttobesuedinthecourtsofthelocalState.TheaddedbasisistheprincipleofsovereignequalityofStates,underwhichoneStatecannotassertjurisdictionoveranother.Todosowould“undulyvexthepeaceofnations.”(Cruz)Thisisconsistentwiththeinternationallawprincipleofparinparemnonhabetimperium.Q:WhenisasuitagainsttheState?AsuitisagainsttheStateregardlessofwhoisnamedthedefendant,ifitproducesadverseconsequencestothepublictreasuryintermsofdisbursementofpublicfundsandlossofgovernmentproperty.WhenasuitisagainsttheState,itcannotprosperunlesstheStatehasgivenits

11 consent.Inthefollowingcases,itwasheldthatthesuitisnotagainsttheState:a) whenthepurposeofthesuitistocompelanofficerchargedwiththe

dutyofmakingpaymentspursuanttoanappropriationmadebylawinfavoroftheplaintifftomakesuchpayment,sincethesuitisintendedtocompelperformanceofaministerialduty.(Begosov.PVA)

b) whenfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint,itisclearthatthe

respondentisapublicofficersuedinaprivatecapacity;c) whentheactionisnotinpersonamwiththegovernmentasthe

nameddefendant,butanactioninremthatdoesnotnamethegovernmentinparticular.

HowistheState’sconsenttobesuedgiven?Expressconsent‐maybeembodiedinagenerallaworaspeciallaw.Itiseffectedonlybythewillofthelegislaturethroughthemediumofadulyenactedstatute.Impliedconsent‐whentheStateentersintoabusinesscontractoritselfcommenceslitigation.ConsentisalsoimpliedlyassumedwhenitwouldbeinequitablefortheStatetoinvokeitsimmunityandininstanceswhentheStatetakesprivatepropertyforpublicuseorpurpose.• However,distinctionsmustbemadebetweensovereign(jure

imperii)andproprietaryacts(juregestioni)sincetheStatemayonlybeliableforproprietaryacts,aswhenitentersintocommercialcontracts.Asforthefilingofacomplaintbythegovernment,suabilitywillresultonlywherethegovernmentisclaimingaffirmativerelieffromthedefendant.

• Allmoneyclaimsagainstthegovernmentmustbefiledwiththe

CommissiononAudit,whichhas60dayswithinwhichtoact.Ifitfailstosoact,theclaimantmustcontinuetowait.Onceadecisionhasbeenmade,hehas30daystoappealbycertioraritotheSupremeCourt.

• TheGovernmentisonlyliablefortheactsofitsagents,officersand

employees,whentheyactasspecialagentswithinthemeaningof(ART.2180(6)CC).Aspecialagentisonewhoreceivesadefiniteandfixedorderorcommission,foreigntotheexerciseofthedutiesofhisofficeifheisaspecialofficial.ThespecialagentactsinrepresentationoftheStateandexecutesthetrustconfidedtohim.Thisconceptdoesnotapplytoanyexecutiveagentwhoisanemployeeoftheactiveadministrationandwhoonhisownresponsibilityperformsthefunctionswhichareinherentinandnaturallypertaintohisofficeandwhichareregulatedbylawandtheregulations(Merrittv.GovtofthePhilippineIslands)

• WhentheGovernmentcreatesacorporation,itinvariablyprovides

thiscorporationaseparateentityandwiththecapacitytosueandbesued.Ifthegovernmententityisgiventhecapacitytobesued,thesuitencompassesanykindofaction,includingonefromtort.

• Consenttobesuedincludesactionsbasedonquasi‐delicteven

thoughcommittedbyregular,andnotspecial,agents.Sotherule,itseems,isthatagovernmententitycanbesuedfortort,butifitis,itcaninvokethedefensethatitactedthroughitsregularemployee,andnotthroughaspecialagent.

Shaufv.CA(1990)InasmuchastheStateauthorizesonlylegalactsbyitsofficers,unauthorizedactsofgovernmentofficialsorofficersarenotactsoftheState,andanactionagainsttheofficialsorofficersbyonewhoserightshavebeeninvadedorviolatedbysuchacts,fortheprotectionofhisrights,isnotasuitagainsttheState.Thedoctrineofimmunityfromsuitwillnotapplyandmaynotbeinvokedwherethepublicofficialisbeingsuedinhisprivateandpersonalcapacityasanordinarycitizen,foractswithoutauthorityorinexcessofthepowersvestedinhim.Apublicofficialmaybeliableinhispersonal

capacityforwhateverdamagehemayhavecausedbyhisactdonewithmaliceandinbadfaith,orbeyondthescopeofhisauthorityorjurisdiction.Republicv.Sandoval(1993)TheprincipleofStateimmunityfromsuitdoesnotapplywhenthereliefdemandedrequiresnoaffirmativeofficialactiononthepartoftheStatenotheaffirmativedischargeofanyobligationwhichbelongstotheStateinitspoliticalcapacity,eventhoughtheofficersoragentswhoaremadedefendantsclaimtoholdoractonlybyvirtueofatitleoftheStateandasitsagentsandservants.STRUCTUREANDPOWERSOFTHENATIONALGOVERNMENTI.LEGISLATIVEDEPARTMENT1. NatureandClassificationLegislativePowerNature:• Theauthoritytomakelawsandtoalterorrepealthem.• VestedinCongress,excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebyprovisiononinitiativeandreferendum• Plenary(TheCongressmaylegislateonanysubjectmatterprovidedthatthelimitationsareobserved.)ClassificationofLegislativePower:1.Original‐possessedbythesovereignpeople2.Derivative‐delegatedbythesovereignpeopletolegislativebodiesand

issubordinatetotheoriginalpowerofthepeople3.Constituent‐powertoamendandrevisetheConstitution4.Ordinary‐powertopassordinarylaws2. Composition,QualificationsandTermofOfficea.Senate(Art.VIsecs.2‐4)CompositionoftheSenate:24senatorselectedatlargeQualificationsofSenators:1. Natural‐borncitizen2. Atleast35yearsoldonthedayoftheelection3. Abletoreadandwrite4. Aregisteredvoter5. ResidentofthePhilippinesforatleast2yearsimmediately

precedingthedayoftheelectionTermofOffice:6years,commencingatnoononthe30thdayofJunenextfollowingtheirelectionTermLimits:NoSenatorshallserveformorethan2consecutiveterms.However,theymayserveformorethan2termsprovidedthatthetermsarenotconsecutive.b.HouseofRepresentatives(Art.VIsecs.5‐8)CompositionoftheHouseofRepresentatives:Notmorethan250members,unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,consistingof:1. DistrictRepresentatives‐electedfromlegislativedistrictsapportionedamongtheprovinces,cities,andtheMetroManilaarea.2.Party‐ListRepresentatives‐constitute20%ofthetotalnumberofrepresentatives‐ For3consecutivetermsfrom2February1987,25seatsshallbeallottedtosectoralrepresentatives.Thesectoralrepresentativesaretobechosenbyappointmentorelection,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.Untilalawispassed,theyareappointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesbytherespectivesectors.(Art.XVIII,sec.7)RulesonApportionmentofLegislativeDistricts:1. Maintainproportionalrepresentationbasedonnumberofinhabitants.

a. Eachcitywithapopulationofatleast250,000,oreachprovince,shallhaveatleast1representative.Eachprovince,irrespectiveofthenumberofinhabitants,shallhaveatleast1

12 representative.

b. Eachlegislativedistrictshallcomprise,asfaraspracticable,contiguous,compact,andadjacentterritory.

2. Legislativedistrictsshallbere‐apportionedbyCongresswithin3yearsafterthereturnofeachcensus.QualificationsofRepresentatives:1. 1.Natural‐borncitizens2. 2.Atleast25yearsoldonthedayoftheelection3. 3.Abletoreadandwrite4. 4.Registeredvoterinthedistrictheseekstorepresent5. 5.Aresidentofthesaiddistrictforatleast1yearimmediately

precedingthedayoftheelectionTermofOffice:3years,commencingatnoononthe30thdayofJunenextfollowingtheirelection.TermLimits:NomemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallserveformorethan3consecutiveterms.Veteran’sFederationv.COMELEC(2000)FormulaforthenumberofadditionalseatstobeawardedtoalltheotherpartiesundertheParty‐listSystem:No.ofadd’lseatsforotherparties

=

No.ofvotesfortheconcernedpartyNo.ofvotesforfirstparty

x

Add’lseatsgarneredbyfirstparty

AngBagongBayaniv.COMELEC(2001)TheruleswithregardtotheParty‐listSystemarethat:

1) Thepartiesmustrepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresented.

2) Majorpoliticalpartiesmustcomplywiththisstatutorypolicy3) ReligioussectsareprohibitedbytheConstitution4) ThepartymustnotbedisqualifiedunderRA79415) Thepartmustnotbeanadjunctofanentityorprojectfunded

bythegovernment6) Thepartyanditsnomineesmustcomplywiththe

requirementsofthelaw7) Themembersmustcomefromthemarginalizedand

underrepresentedsectors8) Thenomineemustbeabletocontributetotheformulationand

enactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenation

Theirnomineesmustcomefromthesameparty.Dimaporov.Mitra(1991)InB.P.Blg.881membersofthelegislatureincludedintheenumerationofelectivepublicofficialsaretobeconsideredresignedfromofficefromthemomentofthefilingoftheircertificatesofcandidacyforanotheroffice,exceptforPresidentandVice‐President.ThetermofofficeprescribedbytheConstitutionmaynotbeextendedorshortenedbythelegislature(22R.C.L.),buttheperiodduringwhichanofficeractuallyholdstheoffice(tenure)maybeaffectedbycircumstanceswithinorbeyondthepowerofsaidofficer.Tenuremaybeshorterthanthetermoritmaynotexistatall.Thesesituationswillnotchangethedurationofthetermofoffice.Underthequestionedprovision,whenanelectiveofficialcoveredtherebyfilesacertificateofcandidacyforanotheroffice,heisdeemedtohavevoluntarilycutshorthistenure,nothisterm.Thetermremainsandhissuccessor,ifany,isallowedtoserveitsunexpiredportionc.SynchronizedtermsofofficeArt.XVIIIsecs1­2Section1.ThefirstelectionsofMembersoftheCongressunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay,1987.ThefirstlocalelectionsshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybesimultaneouswiththeelectionoftheMembersoftheCongress.ItshallincludetheelectionofallMembersofthecityor

municipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea.Section2.TheSenators,MembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,andthelocalofficialsfirstelectedunderthisConstitutionshallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.OftheSenatorselectedintheelectionsin1992,thefirsttwelveobtainingthehighestnumberofvotesshallserveforsixyearsandtheremainingtwelveforthreeyears. 3. Electiona.RegularElectionArtVIsec.8Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionoftheSenatorsandtheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay.b.SpecialElectionArtVIsec.9IncaseofvacancyintheSenateorintheHouseofRepresentatives,aspecialelectionmaybecalledtofillsuchvacancyinthemannerprescribedbylaw,buttheSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesthuselectedshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredterm.Lozadav.COMELECTheConstitutionmandatesthatthereshouldalwaysbeadequaterepresentationforeveryprovinceorlegislativedistrict.IfavacancyoccursinamannercontemplatedintheConstitution,thenCongresshastheauthorityifnotthedutytocallforspecialelections(subjectofcoursetothelimitationoftimeasspecifiedintheConstitution;seeArtVISect9ofConstitutionandRA6645).4. Salaries,PrivilegesandDisqualificationsa.SalariesArticleVI,Section10ThesalariesofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbedeterminedbylaw.NoincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefulltermofalltheMembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesapprovingsuchincrease.ArticleXVIII,Section17UntiltheCongressprovidesotherwise,thePresidentshallreceiveanannualsalaryofthreehundredthousandpesos;theVice‐President,thePresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,andtheChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,twohundredfortythousandpesoseach;theSenators,theMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,theAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourt,andtheChairmenoftheConstitutionalCommissions,twohundredfourthousandpesoseach;andtheMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.PHILCONSAv.MathayInthiscase,theSupremeCourtheldthatthephrase"allmembers"ofbothhouses,referstohousesasasingleunit,withoutdistinctionorseparationbetweenthem,thefundamentalconsiderationbeingthatthetermsofofficeofallmembersofthelegislaturethatenactedthemeasure(whetherSenatorsorRepresentatives)musthaveexpiredbeforetheincreaseincompensationcanbecomeoperative.Ligotv.MathayWhileitisCongress,thruasalarylaw,thatpossesstheauthoritytodeterminethesalaryofeachmember,theConstitutionprohibitsanyincreaseinsaidcompensationtotakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefulltermofallthemembersofthetwohousesapprovingsuchincrease.TheSupremeCourtheldthatalawincreasingthe"retirementgratuity"ofmembersofCongressfallswithintheprohibitionstatedabove.Inthiscase,thelaw(CommonwealthAct186,section12(c)asamendedbyRepublicAct4968)providedthatalthoughtheincreaseinsalarywasnotgoingtotakeeffectuntilthenextterm,suchincreasedsalarywouldbemadethebasisincomputingtheretirementpayoftheincumbentmembers.ThiswasdeemedbytheSupremeCourtasacircumventionof

13 theConstitutionalprovisionandthusvoid.b.FreedomfromarrestArticleVI,Section11ASenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesshall,inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethansixyearsimprisonment,beprivilegedfromarrestwhiletheCongressisinsession.NoMembershallbequestionednorbeheldliableinanyotherplaceforanyspeechordebateintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof.Martinezv.MorfeAlegislatorshallbeprivilegedfromarrestwhiletheCongressisinsession.Inthe1935Constitution,underwhichthiscasewasdecided,immunityfromarrestwasonlyfromcivilarrest.Thisverylimited(privilegeagainstcivilarrestsonly)immunityprovidedunderthe1935Constitution(oratleastaswasinterpretedbythecourtinthisparticularcase)wasexpandedunderthe1987Constitutionstatingthatamember"shall,inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethan6yearsimprisonment,beprivilegedfromarrestwhiletheCongressisinsession."c.SpeechandDebateClauseJimenezv.CabangbangInthiscase,aclarificationofthescopeandlimitationoftheparliamentaryimmunitywasmade.Therewasreiterationthat,first,Congressionalimmunityisaguaranteeofimmunityfromanswerabilitybeforeanoutsideforumbutnotfromanswerabilitytothedisciplinaryauthorityofcongressitself;second,tocomeundertheguaranteethespeechordebate"mustbeonemade"inCongressorinanycommitteethereof.""SaidexpressionreferstoutterancesmadebyCongressmenintheperformanceoftheirofficialfunctions,suchasspeechesdelivered,statementsmade,orvotescastinthehallsofCongress,whilethesameisinsession,aswellasbillsintroducedinCongress,whetherthesameisinsessionornot,andotheractsperformedbyCongressmen,eitherinCongressoroutsidethepremiseshousingitsoffices,intheofficialdischargeoftheirdutiesasmembersofCongressandofCongressionalCommitteesdulyauthorizedtoperformitsfunctionsassuch,atthetimeoftheperformanceoftheactsinquestion."Osmenav.PedantunEachHouseoftheCongresscandisciplineitsmembersfordisorderlyconductorbehavior.WhatconstitutesdisorderlybehaviorisentirelyuptoCongresstodefine.AlthoughamemberofCongressshallnotbeheldliableinanyotherplaceforanyspeechordebateintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof,suchimmunity,althoughabsoluteinitsprotectionofthememberofCongressagainstsuitsforlibel,doesnotshieldthememberagainstthedisciplinaryauthorityoftheCongress.TheCourtupheldthe15monthsuspension,butinretrospect,itwassuchaharshpunishment(readnoteonAlejandrinocase)thatmeasuresweretakenin1973andsubsequentlyinthe1987Constitutiontodeviseasystemofallowingsuspensionasapenaltybutlimiteditsperiodtosixtydays.(ArtVI,Sec16(3))d.Disqualifications1. Maynotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentinthegovernment

duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghisseat.2. Maynotbeappointedtoanyofficecreatedortheemoluments

thereofwereincreasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.3. Cannotpersonallyappearascounselbeforeanycourt,electoral

tribunal,quasi‐judicialandadministrativebodiesduringhistermofoffice.

4. Shallnotbefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orfranchiseorspecialprivilegegrantedbythegovernmentduringhistermofoffice.

5. Shallnotinterveneinanymatterbeforeanyofficeofthegovernmentwhenitisforhispecuniarybenefitorwherehemaybecalledupontoactonaccountofhisoffice.

e.DutytoDisclose

ArticleXI,Section17Apublicofficeroremployeeshall,uponassumptionofofficeandasoftenthereafterasmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnetworth.InthecaseofthePresident,theVice‐President,theMembersoftheCabinet,theCongress,theSupremeCourt,theConstitutionalCommissionsandotherconstitutionaloffices,andofficersofthearmedforceswithgeneralorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemannerprovidedbylaw.ArticleVI,Section12AllMembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshall,uponassumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.TheyshallnotifytheHouseconcernedofapotentialconflictofinterestthatmayarisefromthefilingofaproposedlegislationofwhichtheyareauthors.ArticleVI,Section20TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothepublicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAuditwhichshallpublishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember.5. InternalGovernmentofCongressa.ElectionofofficersOFFICERS:1. SenatePresident2.SpeakeroftheHouse3.SuchofficersasdeemedbyeachhousetobenecessaryElectionofofficers:Byamajorityvoteofallrespectivemembersb.QuorumMajorityofeachHouseshallconstituteaquorum.Asmallernumbermayadjournfromdaytodayandmaycompelthe

attendanceofabsentmembers.Incomputingaquorum,memberswhoareoutsidethecountry,thus

outsideofeachHouse’scoercivejurisdiction,arenotincluded.Avelinov.CuencoWhentheConstitutiondeclaresthatamajorityof"eachHouse"shallconstituteaquorum,"theHouse"doesnotmean"all"themembers.Evenamajorityofallthemembersconstitute"theHouse".Thereisadifferencebetweenamajorityof"allmembersoftheHouse"andamajorityof"theHouse",thelatterrequiringlessnumberthanthefirst.Therefore,anabsolutemajority(12)ofallmembersoftheSenatelessone(23)constitutesconstitutionalmajorityoftheSenateforthepurposeofthequorum.Insimpleterms,“majority”referstothenumberofmemberswithinthe“jurisdiction”oftheCongress(thoseitcanorderarrestedforthepurposeofquestioning).Inthiscase,oneSenatorwasoutofthePhilippineswhichisnotwithinthe“jurisdiction”oftheSenate,sothattheworkingmajoritywas23Senators.c.RulesofProceedingsEachHouseshalldetermineitsownproceduralrules.Onmattersaffectingonlyinternaloperationofthelegislature,the

legislature’sformulationandimplementationofitsrulesisbeyondthereachofthecourts.However,whenthelegislativeruleaffectsprivaterights,thecourtscannotbealtogetherexcluded.

CorollarytoCongress’powertomakerulesisthepowertoignorethemwhencircumstancessorequire.

d.DisciplineofMembersEachhousemaypunishitsmembersfordisorderlybehavior,andwiththeconcurrenceof2/3ofALLitsmembers:1.Suspension(shallnotexceed60days)2.Expulsion

14 Alejandrinov.QuezonThehistoryofthesixty‐daylimitationontheperiodofsuspensionofelectedofficialstracesbacktothiscase.TheSupremeCourtsaidthatitwasnotintherealmofpoweroftheLegislaturetosuspenditsmembersincesuspensiondeprivedtheconstituents(ofthesuspendedmember)therighttoberepresentedinCongress.Ineffect,thesuspensioncanbecomeanactofpunishmentoftheconstituents.e.JournalandCongressionalRecords(1)TheEnrolledBillTheoryAnenrolledbillistheofficialcopyofapprovedlegislationandbearsthecertificationsofthepresidingofficersofeachHouse.Thuswherethecertificationsarevalidandarenotwithdrawn,thecontentsoftheenrolledbillareconclusiveuponthecourts.Therespectduetoaco‐equaldepartmentrequiresthecourtstoacceptthecertificationofthepresidingofficerofthelegislativebody.Mabanagv.LopezVitoAdulyauthenticatedbillorresolutionimportsabsoluteverityandisbindingonthecourts.ThisCourthelditselfboundbyanauthenticatedresolution,despitethefactthatthevoteofthree‐fourthsofthemembersoftheCongress(asrequiredbytheConstitutiontoapproveproposalsforconstitutionalamendments)wasnotactuallyobtainedonaccountofthesuspensionofsomemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesandSenate.Cascov.GimenezThe“enrolledbill”istheofficialcopyofapprovedlegislationandbearsthecertificationofthepresidingofficerofthelegislativebody.Courtsmustacceptcertificationofthepresidingofficerasconclusiveassuranceofthebill’sauthenticity.Theenrolledbillprevailsoverthejournal.(2)ProbativevalueoftheJournalTheJournalisconclusiveuponthecourts.Butwhenthecontentsofthejournalconflictswiththatofanenrolledbill,theenrolledbillprevailsoverthecontentsofthejournal.USv.PonsCongressmayvalidlycontinueenactingbillsevenbeyondthereglementaryperiodofadjournment.WhenthejournalshowsthatCongressconductedasinediesessionwherethehandsoftheclockarestayedinordertoaffordCongresstheopportunitytocontinueitssession.AllbillsenactedduringthesinediesessionarevalidandconclusiveupontheCourts.TheJournalsareconclusiveevidenceofthecontentsthereofandCourtsareboundtotakejudicialnoticeofthem.(3)MattersrequiredtobeenteredintheJournalYeasandNaysonthirdandfinalreadingofabillVetomessageofthePresidentYeasandNaysontherepassingofabillvetoedbythePresidentYeasandNaysonanyquestionattherequestof1/5ofmemberspresent(4)JournalEntryRulev.EnrolledBillTheoryAstorgav.VillegasThebillwasnotdulyenactedandthereforedidnotbecomelawasindeedboththePresidentoftheSenateandtheChiefExecutivewithdrewtheirsignaturestherein.InthefaceofthemanifesterrorcommittedandsubsequentlyrectifiedbytheSenatePresidentandbytheChiefExecutive,forthisCourttoperpetuatethaterrorbydisregardingsuchrectificationandholdingthattheerroneousbillhasbecomelawwouldbetosacrificetruthtofictionandbringaboutmischievousconsequencesnotintendedbythelaw‐makingbody.

(5)CongressionalRecordf.Sessions(1)RegularSessionsConvenesonceeveryyearonthe4thMondayofJuly.Continuestobeinsessionuntil30daysbeforethestartofitsnextregular

session,exclusiveofSaturdays,Sundays,andlegalholidays.(2)SpecialSessionsCalledbythePresidentatanytimewhenCongressisnotinsession(3)AdjournmentsNeitherHousecanadjournformorethan3daysduringthetimeCongress

isinsessionwithouttheconsentoftheotherHouse.Neithercantheyadjourntoanyotherplacethanthatwherethetwo

housesaresitting,withouttheconsentoftheother.(4)JointSessions (a)Votingseparately‐ChoosingthePresident(Art.VII,sec.4)‐DeterminingthePresident’stemporarydisability(Id.,sec.11,par4) ‐ConfirmingthenominationofaVice‐President(Id.,sec.9)‐Declaringastateofwar(Art.VI,sec.23(1)‐AmendingtheConstitution(Art.XVII,sec.1(1) (b)VotingJointly‐Torevokeorextendmartiallaworsuspensionofprivilegeofhabeascorpus(Art.VII,sec.18)6. ElectoralTribunalsa.Composition1. 3SupremeCourtJusticestobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice(TheseniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunalshallbeitsChairman.)2.6MembersoftheSenateorHouse,asthecasemaybe,chosenonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandparty‐listorganizationsTheETshallbeconstitutedwithin30daysaftertheSenateandtheHouse

shallhavebeenorganizedwiththeelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.

Memberschosenenjoysecurityoftenureandcannotberemovedbymerechangeofpartyaffiliation.

Abbasv.SETThefiveLDPmemberswhoarealsomembersoftheSenateElectoralTribunalmaynotinhibitthemselvessinceitisclearthattheConstitutionintendedlegislativeandjudiciarymembershiptothetribunal.Asamatteroffact,the2:1ratiooflegislativetojudiciaryindicatesthatlegislativemembershipcannotbeignored.Toexcludethemselvesistoabandonadutythatnoothercourtcanperform.b.NatureofFunctionJurisdiction:bethesolejudgeofallCONTESTSrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectivemembers.EThasjurisdictiononlywhenthereisanelectioncontest.An‘electioncontest’isonewhereadefeatedcandidatechallengesthequalificationandclaimsforhimselftheseatofaproclaimedwinner.Angarav.ElectoralCommissionTheElectoralTribunalofeachHouseistheSOLEjudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthemembersofCongress.Intheabsenceofelectioncontest,theElectoralTribunalhasnojurisdiction.TheElectoralTribunalsareindependentconstitutionalbodiesandcannotberegulatedbyCongress.SupremeCourthasjurisdictionovertheElectoralCommissionandthesubjectmatterofthepresentcontroversyforthepurposeofdeterminingthecharacter,scopeandextentoftheconstitutionalgranttotheElectoral

15 Commissionas"thesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofthemembersoftheNationalAssembly."c.IndependenceoftheElectoralTribunalsSincetheET’sareindependentconstitutionalbodies,independentevenoftherespectiveHouse,neitherCongressnortheCourtsmayinterferewithproceduralmattersrelatingtothefunctionsoftheET’s.Bondocv.PinedaThetribunalwascreatedtofunctionasanonpartisancourtalthoughtwo‐thirdsofitsmembersarepoliticians.Itisanon‐politicalbodyinaseaofpoliticians."ThepurposeoftheconstitutionalconventioncreatingtheElectoralCommissionwastoprovideanindependentandimpartialtribunalforthedeterminationofconteststolegislativeoffice,devoidofpartisanconsideration,andtotransfertothattribunalallthepowerspreviouslyexercisedbythelegislatureinmatterspertainingtocontestedelectionsofitsmembers."ThepowergrantedtotheelectoralCommissiontojudgecontestsrelatingtotheelectionandqualificationofmembersoftheNationalAssemblyisintendedtobeascompleteandunimpairedasifithadremainedinthelegislature."Tobeabletoexerciseexclusivejurisdiction,theHouseElectoralTribunalmustbeindependent.ItsjurisdictiontohearanddecidecongressionalelectioncontestsisnottobesharedbyitwiththeLegislaturenorwiththeCourts."TheElectoralCommissionisabodyseparatefromandindependentofthelegislatureandthoughnotapowerinthetripartiteschemeofgovernment,itistoallintentsandpurposes,whenactingwithinthelimitsofitsauthority,anindependentorgan;whilecomposedofamajorityofmembersofthelegislatureitisabodyseparatefromandindependentofthelegislature."Validgrounds/Justcauseforterminationofmembershiptothetribunal.ExpirationofCongressionaltermofofficeDeathorpermanentdisabilityResignationformpoliticalpartywhichonerepresentsinthetribunalRemovalformofficeforothervalidreasonsd.PowersLazatinv.HRETSincethecandidatehasalreadybeenproclaimed,jurisdictionnowbelongstotheHRET,thusitsrulesmustbeapplied.TheHRETwillonlygainjurisdictionuponproclamationofthecandidate.Untilsuchproclamation,heisnotyetamemberoftheHouse;hence,theHRETwillnothavejurisdictionoverhim.JurisdictionoversuchremainswiththeCOMELEC.e.JudicialreviewofdecisionsofElectoralTribunalsJudicialreviewofdecisionsoftheET’smaybehadwiththeSConlyinsofarasthedecisionorresolutionwasrenderedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretiontantamounttodenialofdueprocess.Cov.HRETAsconstitutionalcreationsinvestedwithnecessarypower,theElectoralTribunals,althoughnotpowersinthetripartiteschemeofthegovernment,are,intheexerciseoftheirfunctionsindependentorgans—independentofCongressandtheSupremeCourt.ThepowergrantedtoHRETbytheConstitutionisintendedtobeascompleteandunimpairedasifithadremainedoriginallyinthelegislature(Angaravs.ElectoralCommission[1936]).6. CommissiononAppointmentsComposition:1. SenatePresidentasex‐officiochairman(shallnotvoteexceptin

caseofatie.)2.12Senators

3.12MembersoftheHouse

The12Senatorsand12Representativesareelectedonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandparty‐listorganizations.

TheCAshallbeconstitutedwithin30daysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeshallhavebeenorganizedwiththeelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.

TheCAshallactonallappointmentswithin30sessiondaysfromtheirsubmissiontoCongress.

TheCAshallrulebyamajorityvoteofallitsmembers.Meetings:CAmeetsonlywhileCongressisinsession.MeetingsareheldeitheratthecalloftheChairmanoramajorityofallits

members.• SincetheCAisalsoanindependentconstitutionalbody,itsrulesof

procedurearealsooutsidethescopeofcongressionalpowersaswellasthatofthejudiciary.

Jurisdiction:1. CAshallconfirmtheappointmentsbythePresidentwithrespecttothefollowingpositions:

a) HeadsoftheExecutiveDepartments(exceptifitistheVice‐Presidentwhoisappointedtothepost)

b) Ambassadors,otherpublicministersorconsulsc) OfficersoftheAFPfromtherankofColonelorNavalCaptaind) Otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhimbythe

Constitution(e.g.COMELECmembers)

2. CongresscannotbylawrequirethattheappointmentofapersontoanofficecreatedbysuchlawshallbesubjecttoconfirmationbytheCA.3.AppointmentsextendedbythePresidenttotheabove‐mentionedpositionswhileCongressisnotinsessionshallonlybeeffectiveuntildisapprovalbytheCAoruntilthenextadjournmentofCongress.Dazav.SingsonThecourtresolvesthatissueinfavoroftheauthorityoftheHouseofRepresentativestochangeitsrepresentationintheCommissiononAppointmentstoreflectatanytimethechangesthatmaytranspireinthepoliticalalignmentsofitsmembership.Itisunderstoodthatsuchchangesinmembershipmustbepermanentanddonotincludethetemporaryalliancesorfactionaldivisionsnotinvolvingseveranceofpoliticalloyaltiesorformaldisaffiliationandpermanentshiftsofallegiancefromonepoliticalpartytoanother.GuingonavGonzalesTheprovisionofSection18onproportionalrepresentationismandatoryincharacteranddoesnotleaveanydiscretiontothemajoritypartyintheSenatetodisobeyordisregardtheruleonproportionalrepresentation;otherwise,thepartywithamajorityrepresentationintheSenateorthehouseofRepresentativescanbysheerforceofnumbersimposeitswillonthehaplessminority.ByrequiringaproportionalrepresentationintheCommissiononAppointments,Section18ineffectworksasacheckonthemajoritypartyintheSenateandhelpstomaintainthebalanceofpower.Nopartycanclaimmorethanwhatitisentitledtoundersuchrule.ToallowittoelectmorethanitsproportionalshareofmembersistoconferuponsuchapartyagreatershareinthemembershipintheCommissiononAppointmentsandmorepowertoimposeitswillontheminority,whobythesametoken,suffersadiminutionofitsrightfulmembershipintheCommission."TheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethatthefullcomplementof12SenatorsbeelectedtothemembershipintheCommissiononAppointmentsbeforeitcandischargeitsfunctionsandthatitisnotmandatorytoelect12SenatorstotheCommission.TheoverridingdirectiveofArticleVI,Section18isthattheremustbeaproportionalrepresentationofthepoliticalpartiesinthemembershipoftheCommissiononAppointmentsandthatthespecificationof12memberstoconstituteitsmembershipismerelyanindicationofthemaximumcomplementallowableundertheConstitution.Theactoffilingupthemembershipthereofcannotdisregardthemandateofproportionalrepresentationofthepartiesevenifitresultsinfractionalmembershipinunusualsituationslikethecaseatbar.

16 8. PowersofCongressa.GeneralPlenaryPowersb.Limitationsonthelegislativepower1. Substantive‐curtailsthecontentsofalaw2.Procedural–curtailsthemannerofpassinglawsCorollaries:1. Congresscannotpassirrepealablelaws.2.Asageneralrule,Congresscannotdelegateitslegislativepower(Potestasdelegatanonpotestdelegare)

Exceptions:1.DelegationoftariffpowerstothePresident(ArtVIsec.28(2)).2.DelegationofemergencypowerstothePresident(ArtVIsec.

23(2)).3.Delegationtothepeopleatlarge.4.Delegationtolocalgovernments.5.Delegationtoadministrativebodies(rule‐makingpower).

TestsforaValidDelegation(Pelaezvs.AuditorGeneral):1.TheCompletenessTest–Thelawmustbecompleteinallitstermsandconditionswhenitleavesthelegislaturesothattherewillbenothingleftforthedelegatetodowhenitreacheshimexceptenforceit.2.TheSufficientStandardTest–Thelawmustfixastandard,thelimitsofwhicharesufficientlydeterminateordeterminable,towhichthedelegatemustconformintheperformanceofhisfunctions.(2)ProceduralLimitationsArt.VISecs26­27Section26.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof.(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadingsonseparatedays,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedaysbeforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.Section27.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesameheshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesamewithhisobjectionstotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournalandproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,two‐thirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomealaw.Inallsuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesoftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehisvetoofanybilltotheHousewhereitoriginatedwithinthirtydaysafterthedateofreceiptthereof,otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.c.QuestionHourArt.VISec.22Theheadsofdepartmentsmay,upontheirowninitiative,withtheconsentofthePresident,orupontherequestofeitherHouse,astherulesofeachHouseshallprovide,appearbeforeandbeheardbysuchHouseonanymatterpertainingtotheirdepartments.WrittenquestionsshallbesubmittedtothePresidentoftheSenateortheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesatleastthreedaysbeforetheirscheduledappearance.Interpellationsshallnotbelimitedtowrittenquestions,butmaycover

mattersrelatedthereto.WhenthesecurityoftheStateorthepublicinterestsorequiresandthePresidentsostatesinwriting,theappearanceshallbeconductedinexecutivesession.d.LegislativeinvestigationsLimitations:1. Theinquirymustbeinaidoflegislation.2.Theinquirymustbeconductedinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.3.Therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.Corollaries:1. Thepowerofinvestigationnecessarilyincludesthepowertopunishacontumaciouswitnessforcontempt.2.However,legislature’spowertocommitawitnessforcontemptterminateswhenthelegislativebodyceasestoexistuponitsfinaladjournment.

a. HouseofRepresentatives–3yearsb. Senate–indefinite(Senate,withitsstaggeredterms,isa

continuingbody.)3. ThepowertopunishforcontemptisinherentinCongressandthispowerissuigeneris.Arnaultv.NazarenoTheinquiry,tobewithinthejurisdictionofthelegislativebodymakingit,mustbematerialornecessarytotheexerciseofapowerinitvestedbytheConstitution,suchastolegislateortoexpelamember.Inordertoascertainthecharacterornatureofaninquiry,resortmustbehadtothespeechorresolutionunderwhichsuchaninquiryisproposedtobemade.Onceaninquiryisadmittedorestablishedtobewithinthejurisdictionofalegislativebodytomake,theinvestigatingcommitteehasthepowertorequireawitnesstoansweranyquestionpertinenttothesubjectoftheinquiry,subjectofthecoursetohisconstitutionalprivilegeagainstself‐incrimination.Thepowerofinvestigationnecessarilyincludesthepowertopunishacontumaciouswitnessforcontempt.Arnaultv.BalagtasTheprinciplethatCongressoranyofitsbodieshasthepowertopunishrecalcitrantwitnessesisfoundeduponreasonandpolicy.Saidpowermustbeconsideredimpliedorincidentaltotheexerciseoflegislativepower,ornecessarytoeffectuatesaidpower.TheSenatebeingacontinuingbodyunliketheHousehasthepowertoordersuchwitnesstoremainindetention.Bengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee[T]heinvestigationmustbe"inaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure"andthat"therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected."ItfollowsthenthattherightsofpersonsundertheBillofRightsmustberespected,includingtherighttodueprocessandtherightnottobecompelledtotestifyagainstone'sself.ThepowertoconductformalinquiriesorinvestigationsisspecificallyprovidedforinSec.1oftheSenateRulesofProcedureGoverningInquiriesinAidofLegislation.Suchinquiriesmayrefertotheimplementationorre‐examinationofanylaworinconnectionwithanyproposedlegislationortheformulationoffuturelegislation.TheymayalsoextendtoanyandallmattersvestedbytheConstitutioninCongressand/orintheSenatealone.e.ActasaboardofcanvassersforPresidentialandVice­Presidentialelections· ArticleVII,Section4,par4· Rep.ActNo.7166,Section30f.CallspecialelectionforPresidentandVice­President· ArticleVII,Section10g.RevokeorextendsuspensionofprivilegeofHabeasCorpusordeclarationofmartiallaw· ArticleVII,Section18

17 h.ApprovePresidentialamnesties· ArticleVII,Section19i.ConfirmcertainappointmentsByCongress· ArticleVII,Section9ByCommissiononAppointmentsSarmientov.Mison(1987)Inthiscase,SCconstruedSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutiontomeanthatonlyappointmentstoofficesmentionedinthefirstsentenceofthesaidSection16,ArticleVIIrequireconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.TherulingwasreiteratedinMaryConcepcionBautistavs.Sen.JovitoSalonga,etal.(1989).Sincetheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentativesinparagraph2,Section5,Art.VImaybefilledbyappointmentbythePresidentbyexpressprovisionofSection7,Art.XVIIIoftheConstitution,itisindubitablethatsectoralrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesareamongthe"otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentinthisConstitution,"referredtointhefirstsentenceofSection16,Art.VIIwhoseappointmentsaresubjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.j.Concurintreaties· ArticleVII,Section21(throughsenate)k.Declarationofwaranddelegationofemergencypowers· ArticleVI,Section23l.BethejudgeofthePresident’sphysicalfitness· ArticleVII,Section11,par4m.Powerofimpeachmenti. whoaresubjecttoimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section2ii.groundsforimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section2iii.Procedureforimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section3(1)‐(6)iv.Consequenceofimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section3(7)v. Mustimpeachmentprecedefilingofcriminalcase?Yes,itwon’tprosperifnoconviction(Lecarozv.Sandiganbayan)n.PowerwithregardtoutilizationofnaturalresourcesArticleXII,Section2o.AmendmentoftheconstitutionArticleXVII,Sections1­2Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthree‐fourthsofallitsMembers;or(2)Aconstitutionalconvention.Section2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.NoamendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthisConstitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter.TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.9. LegislativeProcess

a.Requirementsastobills(1)Astotitlesofbills• Everybillshallembraceonly1subjectwhichshallbeexpressedin

thetitlethereof.• Thetitledoesnothavetobeacompletecatalogueofeverything

statedinthebill.Itissufficientifthetitleexpressesthegeneralsubjectofthebillandalltheprovisionsofthestatutearegermanetothatgeneralsubject.

• Abillwhichrepealslegislationregardingthesubjectmatterneednotstateinthetitlethatitisrepealingthelatter.Thus,arepealingclauseinthebillisconsideredgermanetothesubjectmatterofthebill.

(2)Requirementsastocertainlaws (a)AppropriationlawsLimitations:ForGeneralAppropriationsBills· CongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationsrecommendedbythePresidentfortheoperationoftheGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget.· Form,contentandmannerofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw.· Noprovisionorenactmentshallbeembracedinthegeneralappropriationsbillunlessitrelatesspecificallytosomeparticularappropriationtherein.· ProcedureinapprovingappropriationsFORTHECONGRESSshallstrictlyfollowtheprocedureforapprovingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies.· Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations.However,thefollowingmay,BYLAW,beauthorizedtoAUGMENTanyiteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations:1. President2. SenatePresident3. SpeakeroftheHouse4. ChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt5. HeadsoftheConstitutionalCommissions· DISCRETIONARYFUNDSappropriatedFORPARTICULAROFFICIALSshallbedisbursedonly:· Forpublicpurposes· Tobesupportedbyappropriatevouchers· Subjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedbylaw· Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated· IfCongressfailstopassthegeneralappropriationsbillbytheendofanyfiscalyear:· Thegeneralappropriationsbillforthepreviousyearisdeemedreenacted· ItshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillispassedbyCongress.ForSpecialAppropriationsBill· Shallspecifythepurposeforwhichitisintended· ShallbesupportedbyfundsactuallyavailableascertifiedbytheNationalTreasurerortoberaisedbycorrespondingrevenueproposalthereinLimitationonUseofPublicFunds—Art.VI,§29· NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheNationalTreasuryEXCEPTinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw.· However,thisruledoesnotprohibitcontinuingappropriations,e.g.fordebtservicing,forthereasonthatthisruledoesnotrequireyearlyorannualappropriation.Limitations:· AppropriationsmustbeforaPUBLICPURPOSE· Cannotappropriatepublicfundsorproperty,directlyorindirectly,infavorof1. Anysect,church,denomination,orsectarianinstitutionorsystemofreligionor2. Anypriest,preacher,minister,orotherreligiousteacherordignitaryassuch.EXCEPTifthepriest,etcisassignedto:

18 1. theArmedForces;or2. anypenalinstitution;or3. governmentorphanage;or4. leprosarium· However,thegovernmentisnotprohibitedfromappropriatingmoneyforavalidsecularpurpose,evenifitincidentallybenefitsareligion,e.g.appropriationsforanationalpoliceforceisvalidevenifthepolicealsoprotectsthesafetyofclergymen.· Also,thetemporaryuseofpublicpropertyforreligiouspurposesisvalid,aslongasthepropertyisavailableforallreligions.Demetriavs.AlbaTheprovisioninquestionundulyoverextendstheprivilegegrantedtothepresidentunderSec.16(5)oftheConstitutioninsofarasitempowersthePresidenttoindiscriminatelytransferfundswithoutregardastowhetherornotthefundstobetransferredareactuallysavingsintheitemfromwhichthesamearetobetaken,orwhetherornotthetransferisforthepurposeofaugmentingtheitemtowhichsaidtransferistobemade.FourphasesofGovernment’sbudgetingprocess.1. Budgetpreparation2. Legislativeauthorization3. Budgetexecution4. Budgetaccountability (b)TaxlawsRequirement:NolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofaMAJORITYofALLthemembersoftheCongress.ConstitutionalTaxExemptions:1.ThefollowingpropertiesareexemptfromREALPROPERTYtaxes:a. Charitableinstitutionsb. Churches,andparsonagesorconventsappurtenanttheretoc. Mosquesd. Non‐profitcemeteries;ande. Alllands,buildingsandimprovementsactually,directlyandexclusivelyusedforreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposes.2.AllrevenuesandassetsofNON‐STOCKNON‐PROFITEDUCATIONALinstitutionsareexemptfromtaxesanddutiesPROVIDEDthatsuchrevenuesandassetsareactually,directlyandexclusivelyusedforeducationalpurposes(Art.XIVsec.4(3)).3.Grants,endowments,donationsorcontributionsusedactually,directlyandexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax,subjecttoconditionsprescribedbylaw(Art.XIVsec.4(4)).Limitations:1. TheruleoftaxationshallbeUNIFORMandEQUITABLE.2. CongressshallevolveaPROGRESSIVEsystemoftaxation.3. Thepowertotaxmustbeexercisedforapublicpurposebecausethepowerexistsforthegeneralwelfare4. ThedueprocessandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitutionshouldbeobserved.SpecialFunds· Moneycollectedonataxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfundandpaidoutforsuchpurposeonly.· Oncethespecialpurposeisfulfilledorabandoned,anybalanceshallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernmentb.ProcedureforthepassageofbillsBillsthatMustOriginateEXCLUSIVELYfromtheHouseofRepresentatives(Sec.24,ArtVI):1. Appropriationbills(Abillappropriatingasumofmoneyfromthepublictreasury.)‐Abillcreatinganewoffice,andappropriatingfundsthereforisNOTanappropriationbill.2. Revenuebills(Abillspecificallydesignedtoraisemoneyorrevenuethroughimpositionorlevy.)3. Alawregulatinganindustry,thoughincidentallyimposingatax,doesnotmakethelawarevenuebill.4. Tariffbills

5. Billsauthorizingtheincreaseofpublicdebt6. Billsoflocalapplication7. PrivatebillsInTolentinovs.SecretaryofFinance,itwasheldthatRA7716(EVATLaw)didnotviolateSec.24,Art.VI(OriginationClause).Itisimportanttoemphasizethatitisthelaw,andnotthebill,whichisrequiredtooriginateexclusivelyfromtheHoR,becausethebillmayundergosuchextensivechangesintheSenatethattheresultmaybetherewritingofthewhole.Toinsistthatarevenuestatute,andnotjustthebill,mustbesubstantiallythesameastheHousebillwouldbetodenytheSenate’spowernotonlyto“concurwithamendments”butalsoto“proposeamendments”.Itwouldviolatetheco‐equalityoflegislativepoweroftheSenate.Readings:· Eachbillmustpass3readingsinbothHouses.· Eachreadingshallbeheldonseparatedaysandprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformshallbedistributedtoitsmembers3daysbeforeitspassage.Exception:IfabilliscertifiedasurgentbythePresidentastothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency,the3readingscanbeheldonthesamedayTheSCdeclaredinTolentinovs.SecretaryofFinancethataPresidentialcertificationdispensedwithonlythreethings:(1)printing,(2)distributionand(3)readingthebillonseparatedays.Itstillhastopassthroughthreereadings.Firstreading:Onlythetitleisread;thebillispassedtothepropercommitteeSecondreading:Entiretextisreadanddebatesareheld,andamendmentsintroduced.Thirdreading:Onlythetitleisread,noamendmentsareallowed.Voteshallbetakenimmediatelythereafterandtheyeasandnaysenteredinthejournal.c.ThePresident’sVetopowerArt.VI,§27· Everybill,inordertobecomealaw,mustbepresentedtoandsignedbythePresident.· IfthePresidentdoesnotapproveofthebill,heshallvetothesameandreturnitwithhisobjectionstotheHousefromwhichitoriginated.TheHouseshallentertheobjectionsinthejournalandproceedtoreconsiderit.· ThePresidentmustcommunicatehisdecisiontovetowithin30daysfromthedateofreceiptthereof.Ifhefailstodoso,thebillshallbecomealawasifhesignedit.· Tooverridetheveto,atleast2/3ofALLthemembersofeachHousemustagreetopassthebill.Insuchcase,thevetoisoverriddenandbecomesalawwithoutneedofpresidentialapproval.Itemveto· ThePresidentmayvetoparticularitemsinanappropriation,revenueortariffbill.· Thisvetowillnotaffectitemstowhichhedoesnotobject.· VetoofaRider · Ariderisaprovisionwhichdoesnotrelatetoaparticular

appropriationstatedinthebill. · SinceitisaninvalidprovisionunderSection25(2),the

Presidentmayvetoitasanitem.BolinaoElectronicsCorpvs.ValenciaAninvalidvetoisasifthePresidentdidnotactonthebillatall.Billbecomesalawbyexecutiveinaction.Aconditioninanappropriationbillmaybenotbevetoedwithoutvetoingtheitemtowhichitisattached.ThevetomadebythePresidentisinvalidsincetheExecutive’svetopowerdoesnotcarrywithitthepowertostrikeoutconditionsattachedtoanitem.Further,theconditionsvetoedweregermanetotheappropriationhenceshouldhavenotbeenvetoed.Ifthevetoisunconstitutional,itproducesnoeffectwhatsoever.Therestriction/conditionimposedbytheappropriationbillremains.

19 Gonzalesvs.Macaraig.DOCTRINEOFINAPPROPRIATEPROVISIONSAprovisionthatisconstitutionallyinappropriateforanappropriationbillmaybesingledoutforvetoevenifitisnotanappropriationorrevenueitem.Presidentmayveto“riders”.ThePresident’svetooftheprovisioninquestionisconstitutionalsincetheprovisiondoesnotrelatetoanyparticular/distinctiveappropriationinthebill.Rather,itappliestoallitemsdisapproved/reducedbyCongressinthebudgetproposalsubmittedbythePresident.Thedisapproved/reduceditemsarenowheretobefoundinthefaceofthebill.Todiscoverthem,resortshouldbemadetotheoriginalrecommendationsmadebythePresident.VetoedsectionsaremoreofanexpressionofCongressionalpolicyinrespecttheaugmentationfromthesavingsratherthananbudgetaryappropriation.Bengzonvs.DrilonPresidentAquinovetoedtheappropriationofthe(increased)pensionofretiredjusticessettingupasadefensethestandardizationofcompensationinthegovernment.TheactoftheExecutiveinvetoingtheparticularprovisionsisanexerciseofaconstitutionallyvestedpower.Butthevetopowerisnotabsolute.TheConstitutionreads:"ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,revenueortariffbillbutthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject."(Section27(2),ArticleVI,Constitution)TheExecutivemustvetoabillinitsentiretyornotatall.Heorshecannotactlikeaneditorcrossingoutspecificlines,provisions,orparagraphsinabillthatheorshedislikes.Intheexerciseofthevetopower,itisgenerallyallornothing.However,whenitcomestoappropriation,revenueortariffbills,theAdministrationneedsthemoneytorunthemachineryofgovernmentanditcannotvetotheentirebillevenifitmaycontainobjectionablefeatures.ThePresidentis,therefore,compelledtoapproveintolawtheentirebill,includingitsundesirableparts.ItisforthisreasonthattheConstitutionhaswiselyprovidedthe"itemvetopowers"toavoidinexpedientridersbeingattachedtoanindispensableappropriationorrevenuemeasure.TheConstitutionprovidesthatonlyaparticularitemoritemsmaybevetoed.Thepowertodisapproveanyitemoritemsinanappropriatebilldoesnotgranttheauthoritytovetoapartofanitemandtoapprovetheremainingportionofthesameitem.“Thetermsitemandprovisioninbudgetarylegislationsandpracticeareconcededlydifferent.Aniteminabillreferstotheparticulars,thedetails,thedistinctandseverableparts...ofthebill.Itisanindivisiblesumofmoneydedicatedtoastatedpurpose.An'item'ofanappropriationbillmeansanitemwhichinitselfisaspecificappropriationofmoney,notsomegeneralprovisionoflaw,whichhappenstobeputintoanappropriationbill.'"ThepresidentcannotvetounavoidableobligationssuchasthepaymentofPensionswhichhasalreadybeenvestedbythelaw.Thevetoisinvalidsinceitisviolatedtheseparationofpropertyandthejudiciary’sfiscalautonomy.d.EffectivityoflawsArticle2(CC)LawsshalltakeeffectafterfifteendaysfollowingthecompletionoftheirpublicationintheOfficialGazette,unlessitisotherwiseprovided.Thiscodeshalltakeeffectoneyearaftersuchpublication.“unlessotherwiseprovided”–thisphrasereferstothedateofeffectivity,andnotthepublication.Completepublicationisindispensable.· ExecutiveOrderNo.200(June18,1987)Tanadavs.TuveraDueprocessrequiresthatlawsofgeneralapplicationtohaveforceandeffectmustbepublished.

Tanadavs.Tuvera,ResolutionofMFRThepriorpublicationoflawsbeforetheybecomeeffectivecannotbedispensedwith.10. InitiativeandReferendumArt.VI,§32TheCongressshall,asearlyaspossible,provideforasystemofinitiativeandreferendum,andtheexceptionstherefrom,wherebythepeoplecandirectlyproposeandenactlawsorapproveorrejectanyactorlaworpartthereofpassedbytheCongressorlocallegislativebodyaftertheregistrationofapetitionthereforsignedbyatleasttenpercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvotersthereof.RA6735(Aug4,1989)II.EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENTA.ThePresident 1.Qualifications,election,termandoathArt.VII,Sec.2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.Thecandidatemustbequalifiedonthedayoftheelections.Bearinmindthatresidencyanddomicilemeanthesamethingunderelectionlaw,i.e.,theffmustbetakenintoconsideration:bodilypresence,animusmanendiandanimusrevertendi.Art.VII,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVice‐PresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayoftheelectionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyreelection.NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfouryearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime. NoVice‐Presidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVice‐PresidentshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay. ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice‐President,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirtydaysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceoftheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationoftheauthenticityanddueexecutionthereofinthemannerprovidedbylaw,canvass(i.e.,tallythecertificatesofcanvass)thevotes. Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoormoreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythevoteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately. TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates. TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,orVice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.RegularElectionandTerm

20 ThePresidentandVice‐President(whoshallbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident)shallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermof6years,whichshallbeginonthenoonofJune30nextfollowingthedayofelection.TheregularelectionforPresidentandVice‐Presidentshallbeheldonthe2ndMondayofMay.(Art.VII,Sec.4pars.1&3).SpecialElectionandTerm IfavacancyoccursintheofficesofPresidentandVice‐Presidentmorethan18monthsbeforethedateofthenextregularpresidentialelection,aspecialelectiontoelectthePresidentandVice‐PresidentshallbecalledbyCongress,pursuanttoVII,10.(SeediscussionunderOtherPowersofCongress,supraandSuccession,infra.)AconditionalresignationbytheincumbentPresidentisnotarealresignationthatcreatesavacancyforthepurposeofcallingaspecialelection.ButinthePhilippineBarAssociation,Inc.vCOMELEC,thefailureoftheSCtoissueaninjunctionontimeisalreadyadecisioninitselfinfavorofthevalidityofthelawcallingforSnapElectionsdespitetheabsenceofvacancy;only,itisadecisionthatisnotsupportedbyaratiodecidendi.Indeed,amidtermelectioninapresidentialsystemofgovernmentinresponsetopopularclamorforit,isalegalanomaly.TheConstitutionissilentastowhetherthepersonselectedinthespecialelectionshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredportionoftheterm,andwhetherthenewPresidentcanrunforre‐electionifhehasnotservedmorethan4years,whichdependsontheconstructionofthephrase"hassucceededasthePresident,"discussedinthenextsection.JusticeVVMendoza:Onlyunexpiredportion.Re­election ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyre‐election.Furthermore,nopersonwhohas"succeeded"asPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethan4years,shallbequalifiedforanyelectiontothesameoffice(thePresidency)atanytime.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.1)ThepersonwhosucceedsasPresidentandnotjustinanactingcapacity,couldeitherbe(i)theVice‐President,or(ii)onewhowaselectedPresidentinaspecialelection.Inbothcases,ifhehasservedformorethan4years,heisineligibleforre‐electionasPresident. TheVice‐Presidentontheotherhand,shallnotserveformorethan2successiveterms.Andforthispurpose,avoluntary(butnotinvoluntary)renunciationofofficeforanylengthoftime,shallnotbeconsideredaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermsforwhichhewaselected.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.2).Thisisapplicable,however,beginning1992,becauseoftheTransitoryProvisions.(ThisprohibitionissimilartothatapplicabletoSenators.)CanvassingofElectionReturns ItistheCongressthatactsasBoardofCanvassersofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice‐President.ElectoralTribunalfortheElectionofthePresidentandVice­PresidentTheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthatpurpose.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.) NotethatwhileelectioncontroversiesintheCongressareundertheexclusivejurisdictionoftheirrespectiveElectoralTribunals,thoseintheExecutiveareundertheSupremeCourtitself.OathofOfficeArt.VII,Sec.5.Beforetheyenterontheexecutionoftheiroffice,thePresident,theVice‐PresidentortheActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation: "Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmydutiesasPresident(orVice‐PresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveanddefenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyselftothe

serviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewillbeomitted.)2.PrivilegeandsalaryArt.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhichsuchincreasewasapproved.TheyshallnotreceiveduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromtheGovernmentoranyothersource.Art.XVIII.Sec17.UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,thePresidentshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP300,000;xxx. 3.ProhibitionsArt.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,Vice‐President,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputiesorassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure.Theyshallnot,duringsaidtenure,directlyorindirectlypracticeanyotherprofession,participateinanybusiness,orbefinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinanyfranchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictlyavoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice.ThespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.CivilLibertiesUnionvExecutiveSecretaryPetitionerchallengedExec.OrderNo.284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesandasst.secretariesandotherappointiveofficialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit,subjectofthelimitationsimposedtherein.IndeclaringtheEOunconstitutional,theSCheldthatbyostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthatCabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretariesmayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmorethan2positionsinthegovt.andGOCCs,EO284actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateofArt.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.ThestricterprohibitionappliedtothePres.andhisofficialfamilyunderSec.13,Art.VIIascomparedtotheprohibitionapplicabletoappointiveofficialsingeneralunderArt.IX,B,Sec.7,par.2areproofoftheintentofthe1987Consti.totreatthemasaclassbyitselfandtoimposeuponsaidclassstricterprohibitions.Thus,whileallotherappointiveofficialsinthecivilserviceareallowedtoholdotherofficeoremploymentinthegovtduringtheirtenurewhensuchisallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheirpositions,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedbytheConsti.itself.xxxHowever,theprohibitionagainstholdingdualormultipleofficesoremploymentunderArt.VII,Sec.13mustnotbeconstruedasapplyingtopostsoccupiedbytheExecutiveofficialsspecifiedthereinw/oadditioncompensationinanex‐officiocapacityasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofsaidofficial'soffice.Thereasonisthatthesepostsdonotcomprise"anyotheroffice"w/inthecontemplationoftheconstitutionalprohibitionbutareproperlyanimpositionofadditionaldutiesandfunctiononsaidofficials.CompareProhibitionsagainstotherofficialsArt.VI,Sec.13.

21 NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernment,oranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries,duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghisseat.Neithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedortheemolumentsthereofincreasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.Art.IX­A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdanyotherofficeoremployment.Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilegegrantedbytheGovernment,anyofitssubdivisions,agencies,orinstrumentalities,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Art.IX,B,Sec.7.Noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignationinanycapacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficialshallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Art.VIII,Sec.12.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylawshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunctions.Exceptionstoruleprohibitingexecutiveofficialsfromholdingadditionalpositions:a.President (1)ThePresidentcanassumeaCabinetpost,(becausethedepartmentsaremereextensionsofhispersonality,accordingtotheDoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,sonoobjectioncanbevalidlyraisedbasedonArt.VII,Sec.13.) (2)ThePresidentistheChairmanofNEDA.(Art.XII,Sec.9)b.Vice‐PresidentArt.VII,Sec.3.xxxTheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmationc.Cabinet (1)TheSecretaryofJusticeshallbeanex‐officiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncil.(Art.VIII,Sec.8[1]) 2)Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,appointiveofficialsshallnotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.(Art.IX,B,7,par.2)Art.VII,Sec.13talksof"unlessotherwiseprovidedbytheConstitution."InthecaseofCabinetmembers,thisreferstoArt.IX,B,7,par.2.Thus,theConstitutionallowsaCabinetmembertoholdanotherofficeprovidedeither(1)suchisnecessitatedbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition(e.g.SecretaryofTradeandIndustryasChairmanofNDC,SecretaryofAgrarianReformasChairmanoftheLandBank),or(ii)isallowedbylaw.ThevalidityofEO284allowingmembersoftheCabinetandtheirUnder‐Secretariestohold2additionalofficeswasdecidedinthecaseofCLUvsExec.Secretary. 4.Succession (1)Atthebeginningofterm

Art.VII,Sec.7.ThePresident‐electandtheVice‐Presidentelectshallassumeofficeatthebeginningoftheirterms. xxx ‐ThisprovisionreferstothePresidentandVice‐Presidentelectedintheregularelection,andsothetermreferredtobeginsonJune30nextfollowingtheelectiononthe2ndMondayof1992,andevery6yearsthereafter.VacancyinthePresidency Therearetwosetsofrulesonsuccession,dependingonwhetherthevacancytookplacebeforethebeginningofthetermonJune30,orduringthependencyofthetermsthatcommencesonJune30.(Thecut‐offpointisunsettled.Oneviewisthatthecut‐offisnoonofJune30,asexpressedinArt.VII,Sec.4,par.1.Theotherviewisthatthecut‐offismidnightofJune29whenJune30begins.) A.TemporaryorpermanentvacancyinthePresidencybeforetheterm 1.IfthePresident‐electcannotassumehispostatthebeginningofhistermbecausei)hehasnotqualifiedasyet(e.g.hehadanoperationandsohecouldnottakehisoathofofficeonJune30),ii)oraPresidenthasnotbeen"chosen"andqualifiedasyet(e.g.thereisatieandCongresshasnotyetbrokenthetie),thentheVice‐PresidentshallactasPresidentuntilthePresident‐electshallhavequalified,orshallhavebeen"chosen:andqualified,asthecasemaybe.(Art.VII,Sec.7,pars.2&3).Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxIfthePresident‐electfailstoqualify,theVice‐President‐electshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified. IfaPresidentshallnothavebeenchosen,theVice‐President‐electshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified. xxx 2.IfthePresident‐electi)dies,orii)becomespermanentlydisabled"atthebeginningofthetermofthePresident"(i.e.,beforetheterm),thentheVice‐PresidentelectshallbecomethePresident.(Id.,par.4)Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxIfatthebeginningofthetermofthePresident,thePresident‐electshallhavediedorshallhavebecomepermanentlydisabled,theVice‐President‐electshallbecomePresident.3.IfbothPresidentandVice‐President(i)havenotbeen"chosen"or(ii)havenotqualified,or(iii)die,or(iv)becomepermanentlydisabled,thenthePresidentoftheSenate,orincaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouse,shallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVice‐Presidentshallhavebeen"chosen"andqualified.(par.5)Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxWherenoPresidentandVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenchosenorshallhavequalified,orwherebothshallhavediedorbecomepermanentlydisabled,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified.(par.5thereof.) IncaseboththePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseareunabletoactasPresident,thenCongressshallbylaw,provideforthe"mannerofselecting"theonewhowillactasPresidentuntilaPresidentofVice‐Presidentshallhave(beeneither"chosen"or"elected"pursuanttothespecialelectionreferredtoinVII,10,andqualified. Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxTheCongressshall,bylaw,provideforthemannerinwhichonewho

22 istoactasPresidentshallbeselecteduntilaPresidentoraVice‐Presidentshallhavequalified,incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,orinabilityoftheofficialsmentionedinthenextprecedingparagraph.(par.6thereof.) Art.VII,Sec.10.TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthevacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresidentandaVice‐Presidenttobeheldnotearlierthanforty‐fivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeofsuchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbeexemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.TheconveningoftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed.Nospecialelectionshallbecalledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection. (2)DuringtermArt.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthePresident,theVice‐PresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVice‐President,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthenactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified. TheCongressshall,bylaw,providewhoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanentdisability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified,andbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualificationsastheActingPresident.B.PermanentVacancyinthePresidencyduringtheterm 1.IncaseofthePresident's(i)death(ii)permanentdisability,(iii)removalfromoffice(theonlywayisbyimpeachment),or(iv)resignation,theVice‐PresidentshallbecomePresidentfortheunexpiredportionoftheterm.(par.1) 2.IncaseofboththePresident'sandVice‐President'sdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice(byimpeachment),orresignation,thentheSenatePresidentor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouse,shallactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecialelectioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified.(par.1.) WhentheActingPresident(i.e.,theSenatePresident,orSpeakeroftheHouse)dies,becomespermanentlydisabled,orresigns(butisnotremoved,becausethereisnoneedtoimpeachhim,hisstaybeingtemporary),thentheCongressshallbylaw,provide"who"shallbeActingPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecialelectioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified.ThisActingPresidentshallbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualifications.(par.2)EstradavArroyoTheSCheldthatPresEstradaresigned,therebyleavingthepositionvacant.ThiswasbasedonstatementsheexecutedbeforeheleftMalacanangandthepublisheddiaryofE.AngarainthePhilippineDailyInquirer.Estradav.Desierto(2001)Thepresident’sresignationmustbewillfulandintentional,anditmustbestrictlyconstrued.WhenimpeachmentproceedingshavebecomemootduetotheresignationofthePres,propercriminalandcivilcasesmayalreadybefiledagainsthim.

Res’nontheMotionforRecon(2001)Thetotalitytestwasappliedtodeterminewhetherornotthepresidenthasindeedresigned.ManythingswereconsideredincludingtheAngaraDiary.Comparisonsanddistinctionsbetweenthetwovacancies: a)TheincumbentPresidentneverholds‐overthePresidencyinanycase. b)ThevacancymustoccurintheofficesofboththePresidentandVice‐PresidentinorderfortheSenatePresident,ortheSpeaker,or,intheirinability,theoneprovidedtosucceedaccordingtotheLawofSuccessionpassedbytheCongress,tosucceedasActingPresidentuntilthequalificationofthePresident. c)TheLawonSuccessionmustbepassedbytheCongressinbothcasesintheeventthatthePresident,Vice‐President,SenatePresidentandtheSpeakerareallunabletoactasPresident.Butinthecaseofavacancyoccurringbeforetheterm,thelawprovidesonlyforthe"mannerofselecting"theActingPresident,whileinthecaseofavacancyoccurringduringtheterm,itprovidesfor"theperson"whoshallactasPresident.Inbothcases,thestintoftheActingPresidentistemporary. d)Whenthevacancycomesbeforetheterm,theConstitutiontalksofthesuccessoractingasPresidentuntilaPresidenthasbeen"chosen"and"qualified";whenitcomesduring,ittalksof"elected"andqualified.Thereasonisthatbeforetheterm,thevacancyinthePresidencyneednotbefilledupbyelection,sinceitmaybefilledupbyavoteofCongressincaseofatie(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.5);butduringtheterm,theonlywaytofillupthevacancyisbyspecialelection. e)Aspecialelectioninbothcasesisheld,pursuanttoArt.VII,Sec.10,onlywhenbothofficesofPresidentandVice‐Presidentarevacant.However,ifthevacancyoccursbeforetheterm,thegroundsarelimitedto2(deathandpermanentdisabilityorboth),whileifthevacancyoccursduringtheterm,thegroundsare4(death,permanentdisability,removal,andresignation). f)Thevacancythatoccursbeforethetermofofficemaybetemporaryorpermanent;thevacancythatoccursduringthetermofofficecanonlybeapermanentone.Thus,adifferentsetofrulesapplies,tobediscussednextfollowing,incaseofthetemporaryinabilityofthePresidentduringthetermofoffice.Art.VII,Sec.10.TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthevacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresidentandaVice‐Presidenttobeheldnotearlierthanforty‐fivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeofsuchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbeexemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.TheconveningoftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed.Nospecialelectionshallbecalledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection. 3.IncaseoftemporarydisabilityArt.VII,Sec.11.WheneverthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice‐PresidentasActingPresident. WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowersanddutiesoftheofficeasActing

23 President.Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfivedaystothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshalldecidetheissue.Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinforty‐eighthours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall. IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession,withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwo‐thirdsvoteofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresidentshallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice. *TemporaryVacancyinthePresidencyduringthetermAvacancyinthePresidencyarisingfromhisdisabilitycanoccurinanyoftheffways: 1.AwrittendeclarationbythePresident 2.WrittendeclarationbytheCabinet 3.FindingbyCongressby2/3votethatthePresidentisdisabled. Inallthesecases,theVice‐PresidenttemporarilyactsasthePresident.VoluntarydeclarationofinabilitybyPresident a.WhenthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakerhiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice‐PresidentasActingPresident. b.TheVice‐PresidentshallsoactuntilthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakerawrittendeclarationthatheisnolongerunabletodischargehisoffice.ContestedinabilityofthePresident a.WhenmajorityofallthemembersoftheCabinettransmittotheSenatePresidentandSpeakertheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargehisoffice,thentheVice‐PresidentshallimmediatelyassumethePresidencyinanactingcapacity. b.ThePresidentcancontestthisbysendinghisownwrittendeclarationtotheSenatePresidentandSpeaker,thatnoinabilityexists.Uponsuchtransmittal,thePresidentshallautomaticallyassumehisoffice.c.ShouldthemajorityoftheCabinetinsistontheiroriginalstandbytransmittingasecondwrittendeclarationofthePresident'sinabilitywithin5daysfromresumptionofofficeofthePresident,thenCongressshallstepin. d.UponreceiptofthisseconddeclarationbytheCabinet,Congressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,within48hours,withoutneedofcall,inaccordancewithitsrules.(Ifitisalreadyinsession,itmustmeetrightaway,asglimpsedfromthefactthattheyonlyhave10daystodecide,whereasifitisnotinsession,itmustconvenein2daysanddecidebeforethe12thday.) e.CongressshalldeterminethePresident'sinabilitywithin10daysafterreceiptofthesecondwrittendeclarationbytheCabinetifitisinsession,orwithin12daysafteritisrequiredtoassemblebyitsrespectivepresidingofficerifitisnotinsession. f.IfthePresident,bya2/3voteofbothhousesvotingseparately,determinedtobe"unable"todischargehisoffice,thentheVice‐PresidentshallactasPresident.Iflessthan2/3findhimunable,thenthePresidentshallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.SeriousIllnessofthePresident

Art.VII,Sec.12.IncaseofseriousillnessofthePresident,thepublicshallbeinformedofthestateofhishealth.ThemembersoftheCabinetinchargeofnationalsecurityandforeignrelationsandtheChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,shallnotbedeniedaccesstothePresidentduringsuchillness. 5.RemovalArt.XI,Sec.2.ThePresident,theVice‐President,theMembersoftheSupremeCourt,theMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheOmbudsmanmayberemovedfromoffice,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.Art.XI,Sec.3.(1)TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateallcasesofimpeachment. (2)AverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentmaybefiledbyanyMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbeincludedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithinthreesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,shallsubmititsreporttotheHousewithinsixtysessiondaysfromsuchreferral,togetherwiththecorrespondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithintensessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)Avoteofatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirmafavorableresolutionwiththeArticlesofImpeachmentoftheCommittee,oroverrideitscontraryresolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenateshallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithinaperiodofoneyear.(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensittingforthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesisontrial,theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtshallpreside,butshallnotvote.Nopersonshallbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate. (7)JudgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw. Bernas:Theofficercanstillbetriedforacriminalcaseasidefromimpeachment“Initiation”isgovernedbytherulesoftheHouseofReps;“trial”isgovernedbytherulesoftheSenate.Whatissoughttobediscoveredisnotjusttheguiltorinnocenceinthecriminalsense,butapublicofficial’sworthinessorunworthinessofthesolemntrustconferreduponhimbythepeople.Thus,impeachmentispoliticalinnature. 6.PowersandFunctionsofthePresident (1)ExecutivePowerTheexecutivefunctionisessentiallythedutytoimplementthelawswithinthestandardsimposedbythelegislature.UndertheConstitution,thispowerisexercisedbythePresident.Thus,whentheCabinetandotherbranchesoftheExecutiveDepartmentimplementthelaw,theyareactingunderthecontrolofthePresident.

24 Art.VII,Sec.1.TheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresidentofthePhilippines.Sec.17.ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,andoffices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.InNationalElectrificationCommissionvs.CA,theCourtsaidthatasadministrativeheadofthegovernment,thePresidentisvestedwiththepowertoexecute,administerandcarryoutlawsintopracticaloperation.MarcosvsManglapusThisisapetitionformandamusaskingtheCourttoordertherespondentstoissuetraveldocumentstoMr.MarcosandhisimmediatefamilyandtoenjointheimplementationofthePresident'sdecisiontobartheirreturntothePhilippines.Theissueiswhetherornot,intheexerciseofexecutivepower,thePresidentmayprohibittheMarcosesfromreturningtothePhilippines.Althoughthe1987ConstitutionimposeslimitationsontheexerciseofspecificpowersofthePresident,itmaintainsintactwhatistraditionallyconsideredaswithinthescopeofexecutivepower.Corollarily,thepowersofthePresidentcannotbesaidtobelimitedonlytothespecificpowerenumeratedintheConstitution.Inotherwords,executivepowerismorethanthesumofspecificpowerssoenumerated. TheframersdidnotintendthatbyenumeratingthepowersofthePres,heshallexercisethosepowersandnoother.TheseunstatedresidualpowersareimpliedfromthegrantofexecutivepowerandwhicharenecessaryforthePrestocomplywithhisdutiesundertheConsti. (2)ControlofexecutivedepartmentsArt.VII,Sec.17.ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,andoffices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.Controlisthepowerofanofficertoalterormodifyornullifyortosetasidewhatasubordinatehasdoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstituteone'sownjudgmentinthatofasubordinate. Underthequalifiedpoliticalagencydoctrine(alsoalteregoprinciple),“allthedifferentexecutiveandadministrativeorganizationsaremereadjunctsoftheExecutiveDept,theheadsofthevariousexecutivedepts.AreassistantsandagentsoftheChiefExecutive,and,exceptincaseswhereintheChiefExecutiveisrequiredbytheConstiorbythelawtoactinpersonortheexigenciesofthesituationdemandthatheactpersonally,themultifariousexecutiveandadministrativefunctionsoftheChiefExecutiveareperformedbyandthroughtheexecutivedepts.,performedandpromulgatedintheregularcourseofbusiness,are,unlessdisapprovedorreprobatedbytheChiefExecutive,presumptivelyactsoftheChiefExecutive.”(FreeTelephoneWorkersUnionvs.MinisterofLaborandEmployment) (3)Generalsupervisionoflocalgovernmentsandautonomousre­gionsArt.X,Sec.4.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.xxxArt.X,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverautonomousregionstoensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted. Supervisionmeansthemereoverseeing,orthepowerorauthorityoftheofficertoseethatsubordinateofficersperformtheirduties,andifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthem,thentheformermaytakesuchactionorstepsasprescribedbylawtomakethemperformtheseduties.Butthisdoesnotincludethepowertooverruletheiracts,iftheseactsarewithintheirdiscretion.(4)PowerofappointmentCruz:Appointmentmaybedefinedastheselection,bytheauthorityvestedw/thepower,ofanindividualwhoistoexercisethefunctionsofa

givenoffice. Thepowerofappointmentis,accordingtotheSCinConcepcionvParedes,themosteminentlyexecutivepower,becauseitisthroughhisappointeesthatthePresidentcanexecutelaws. Distinguishappointmentfrom:

1. Designation–impositionofadditionalduties,usuallybylaw,onapersonalreadyinthepublicservice

2. Commission–writtenevidenceoftheappointmentThepowerofappointmentbythePresidentunderthe1987Constitutionhasbeensignificantlycurbed.Itcanbeclassifiedasfollows: 1.WiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentsSarmientovsMisonThereare4groupsofofficerswhomthePresmayappoint:

1. headsoftheexecdept,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptandotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhim;

2. allotherofficersofthegov’twhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedbylaw;

3. thosewhomthePresmaybeauthorizedtoappoint;4. officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentsCongressmayby

lawvestinthePresaloneHeadsofbureausweredeliberatelymovedfromtheprovisionofappointmentsrequiringconfirmationandwereincludedinthe4thgroupandhence,theirappointmentsnolongerneedconfirmation.BautistavsSalongaThepositionofChairmanoftheCHRisnotspecificallyenumeratedinthe1stsentenceofArtVII,Sec16.CHRshouldbeindependent,andtheofficers’tenureshouldnotbedependentonthePres.Hence,CommissionerBautistashouldberemovedonlyforcause.Quintos­DelesvsCommissiononAppointmentsTheseatsreservedforsectoralrepsmaybefiledbyappointmentbythePresunderArtXVIII,Sec7.ItisindubitablethatsectoralrepstotheHouseareamongthe“otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresinthisConsti”,referredtointhe1stsenrtenceofArtVII,Sec16.TheseappointmentsrequiretheconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointments.Notes:FromtherulingsinSarmientoIIIv.Mison,156S549),Bautistav.Salonga,172S160,andDelesv.ConstitutionalCommission,177S259,thesedoctrinesarededucible: 1.ConfirmationbytheCAisrequiredonlyforpresidentialappointeesasmentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII,including,thoseofficerswhoseappointmentsareexpresslyvestedbytheConstitutionitselfinthepresident(likesectoralrepresentativestoCongressandmembersoftheconstitutionalcommissionsofAudit,CivilServiceandElection). 2.ConfirmationisnotrequiredwhenthePresidentappointsothergovernmentofficerswhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaworthoseofficerswhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint(liketheChairmanandMembersoftheCom.onHumanRights).Also,asobservedinSarmientov.Mison,whenCongresscreatesinferiorofficesbutomitstoprovideforappointmentthereto,orprovidesinanunconstitutionalmannerforsuchappointments,theofficersareconsideredasamongthosewhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw. (a)HeadsoftheexecutivedepartmentsArt.VII,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmed

25 forcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution.HeshallalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissionsorboards. ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress. (b)Ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls(Id.) (c)OfficersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippineswiththerankofcolonelornavalcaptain(becausetheseareofficersofasizeablecommandenoughtostageacoup) (d)OtherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentintheConstitution:

(i)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheConstitutionalCommissions

Art.IX­B,Sec.1.(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCivilServiceCommission)shallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissionerforfiveyears,andanotherCommissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.InnocaseshallanyMemberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.Id.,C,Sec.1.(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononElections)shallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,threeMembersshallholdofficeforsevenyears,twoMembersforfiveyears,andthelastMembersforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.InnocaseshallanyMemberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.Id.,D,Sec.1(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononAudit)shallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissionerforfiveyears,andanotherCommissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.InnocaseshallanyMemberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity. (ii)RegularmembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncilComposedoftheIBPrepresentative,professoroflaw,retiredSCjustice,andrepresentativeoftheprivatesector.Notetheex‐officiomembers:ChiefJustice,SecretaryofJustice,andrepresentativeofCongress)Art.VII,Sec.8.(2)Theregularmembersofthe(JudicialandBar)CouncilshallappointedbythePresidentforatermoffouryearswiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments.OftheMembersfirstappointed,therepresentativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawforthreeyears,theretiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear. (iii)SectoralrepresentativesArt.XVIII,Sec.7.Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistofnomineesbytherespectivesectorstheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentationinparagraph(2)ofSection5ofArticleVIofthis

Constitution. (iv)RegionalConsultativeCommissionArt.X,Sec.18.TheCongressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregionwiththeassistanceandparticipationoftheregionalconsultativecommissioncomposedofrepresentativesappointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesfrommultisectoralbodies.Theorganicactshalldefinethebasicstructureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislativeassembly,bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganicactsshalllikewiseprovideforspecialcourtswithpersonal,family,andpropertylawjurisdictionconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws. Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotescastbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,andgeographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion. 2.UponrecommendationoftheJudicialandBarCouncil (a)MembersoftheSupremeCourtandallothercourtsArt.VIII,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation. Forthelowercourts,thePresidentshallissuetheappointmentswithinninetydaysfromthesubmissionofthelist. (b)Ombudsmanandhis5deputies(forLuzon,Visayas,Mindanao,generalandmilitary)Art.XI,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesforeveryvacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilledwithinthreemonthsaftertheyoccur. 3.AppointmentofVice­PresidentasMemberoftheCabinetArt.VII,Sec.3.XxxTheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation 4.AppointmentssolelybythePresidentArt.VII,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallxxxalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissionsorboards. ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress. 1.ThosevestedbytheConstitutiononthePresidentalone(e.g.appointmentofVice‐PresidenttotheCabinet)[Art.VII,Sec.3(2)] 2.Thosewhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedbylaw. 3.Thosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint. 4.ThoseotherofficerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentisvestedbylawinthePresident(alone). Thephraseologyismuddled. Themeaningof#4wastoucheduponinSarmientovMison.Inarguingthatevenbureauchiefsneededconfirmationeveniftheyareofinferiorrank,theargumentwasthephrase,"TheCongressmay,bylaw,vestin

26 theappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone"meantthatuntilalawispassedgivingsuchappointingpowertothePresidentalone,thensuchappointmenthastobeconfirmed.Onlyaftersuchlawispasseddoesthenecessityforconfirmationnolongerhold.TheSCdismissedthisviewhowever,sayingthattheinclusionoftheword"alone"wasanoversight.Thus,theConstitutionshouldread"TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresident." (5)LimitationsonappointingpowerofthePresident`Art.VII,Sec.13.XxxThespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.Id.,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofhisterm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointmentstoexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublicsafety. a.Thespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe4thcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnot,duringhis"tenure".beappointedas(i)membersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,(ii)memberoftheOfficeofOmbudsman,(iii)Secretaries,(iv)Undersecretaries,(v)Chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries. b.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelections(2ndMondayofMarch),anduptotheendofhis"term"(June30),aPresident(orActingPresident)shallnotmakeappointments. Exception:Temporaryappointments,toexecutivepositions,whencontinuedvacancieswill(1)prejudicepublicservice(e.gPostmaster)or(2)endangerpublicsafety(e.g.ChiefofStaff).ThisprovisionseemstohaveoverruledpreviouspronouncementsoftheSupremeCourtonthevalidityof"midnightappointments".(Adinterimappointmentscouldeitherbe"midnight",ifmadebythePresidentbeforehestepsdownfromofficeorrecess,ifmadebythePresidentwhenCongressisnotinsession.)AytonavCastillo,TheSCruledthatwhile"midnightappointments"(note:madebyoutgoingPresidentneartheendofhisterm)arenotillegal,theyshouldbemadeinthecapacityofa"caretaker"doublycarefulandprudentinmakingtheselection,soasnottodefeatthepoliciesoftheincomingadministration.Thefillingupofvacanciesinimportantposts,iffew,andsospacedastoaffordsomeassuranceofdeliberateactionandcarefulconsiderationoftheneedfortheappointmentandtheappointeesqualifications,maybeundoubtedlypermitted.Buttheissuanceof350appointmentsinonenight,andtheplannedinductionofalmostallofthemafewhoursbeforetheinaugurationofthenewPresidentmayberegardedasabuseofpresidentialprerogatives.QuisumbingvTajanglangitTheSCemphasizedthattheAytonarulingdoesnotdeclareallmidnightappointmentsasinvalid,andthattheadinterimappointmentofthepetitionerchiefofpolicehere,whosequalificationandregularitywerenotdisputed,exceptforthefactthatitwasmadeduringthelastfewdaysoftheoldadministration,isthusnotinvalid.DeRamav.CA(2001)Theprohibitionagainstmidnightappointmentsappliesonlytothe

presidentanddoesnotextendtolocalelectiveofficials.Moreover,thereisnolawthatprohibitslocalelectiveofficialsfrommakingappointmentsduringthelastdaysofhisorhertenure.InterimorrecessappointmentsArtVI,Sec.19.TheElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissiononAppointmentsshallbeconstitutedwithinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganizedwiththeelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonlywhiletheCongressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischargesuchpowersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit.Art.VII,Sec.16.xxxThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.Regularandrecess(ad‐interim)appointmentsAppointmentsrequiringconfirmationareoftwokinds,(i)regular,iftheCA,thatis,Congress,isinsession,or(ii)duringtherecessofCongress(becausetheCommissionshallmeetonlywhileCongressisinsession[Art.VI,Sec.19]). Regularappointment­onemadebythePresidentwhileCongressisinsession,takeseffectonlyafterconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments,andonceapproved,continuesuntiltheendofthetermoftheappointee. Ad­interimappointment‐onemadebythePresidentwhileCongressisnotinsession,takeseffectimmediately,butceasestobevalidifdisapprovedbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruponthenextadjournmentofCongress.(Art.VII,Sec.16,par.2)MatibagvsBenipayoAdinterimappointment–apermanentappointmentmadebythePresinthemeantimethatCongresisinrecess.ItispermanentasittakeseffectimmediatelyandcannolongerbewithdrawnbythePresoncetheappointeehasqualifiedintooffice.ThefactthatitissubjecttotheconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointmentsdoesnotalteritspermanentcharacter.Hence,saidappointmentiseffectiveuntil(1)disapprovedbytheCAor(2)thenextadjournmentofCongressActing/Temporaryappointment–canbewithdrawnorrevokedatthepleasureoftheappointingpower.Theappointeedoesnotenjoysecurityoftenure.ThisisthekindofappointmentthattheConstiprohibitsthePresfrommakingtotheindependentconstitutionalcommissions.PacetevsSecretaryThemerefilingofamotionforreconsiderationoftheconfirmationofanappointmentcannothavetheeffectofrecallingorsettingasidesaidappointment.TheConstiisclear–theremusteitherbearejectionbytheCommissiononAppointmentsornon‐actiononitspartfortheconfirmationtoberecalled.Also,thepowertoapproveordisapproveappointmentsisconferredontheCAasabodyandnotontheindividualmembers.TemporaryDesignations:AdminCodeof1987,BookIIISec.17ThePresidentmaydesignateanofficeralreadyinthegovt.serviceoranyothercompetentpersontoperformthefunctionsofanyofficeintheexecutivebranch,appointmenttowhichisvestedinhimbylaw,when: (a)Theofficerregularlyappointedtotheofficeisunabletoperformhisdutiesbyreasonofillness,absenceoranyothercause;or (b)Thereexistsavacancy; Innocaseshallatemporarydesignationexceedone(1)year.

27 (6)LimitationsontheappointingpoweroftheActingPresidentArt.VII,Sec.14.AppointmentsextendedbyanActingPresidentshallremaineffectiveunlessrevokedbytheelectedPresidentwithinninetydaysfromhisassumptionorreassumptionofoffice.*dealswithapptsmadebyanactingPresArt.VII,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofhisterm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointmentstoexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublicsafety.*dealswithapptsmadebyaPreswithin2monthsbeforethenextPresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofhisterm Art.VII,Sec.16.xxxThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.*dealswithregularpresidentialappointments.WithorwithoutconfirmationoftheCA,andwithrecessoradinterimappointments. (7)ExecutiveclemenciesArt.VII,Sec.19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,thePresidentmaygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment.HeshallalsohavethepowertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceofamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCongress.Art.IX,C,Sec.5.Nopardon,amnesty,paroleorsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelectionlaws,rules,andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationbytheCommission(onElections.) *ThePresidentmaygrant(i)reprieves,(ii)commutations,and(iii)pardons,and(iv)remitfinesandforfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment,except: (a)Incasesofimpeachment,and (b)AsotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitutionReprieve­atemporaryrelieffromorpostponementofexecutionofcriminalpenaltyorsentenceorastayofexecution.(Black)Itisthewithholdingofasentenceforanintervaloftime,apostponementofexecution,atemporarysuspensionofexecution.(Peoplevs.Vera) Commutation‐reductionofsentence.(Black)Itisaremissionofapartofthepunishment;asubstitutionofalesspenaltyfortheoneoriginallyimposed.(Peoplevs.Vera) Amnesty‐asovereignactofoblivionforpastacts,grantedbygovernmentgenerallytoaclassofpersonswhohavebeenguiltyusuallyofpoliticaloffensesandwhoaresubjecttotrialbuthavenotyetbeenconvicted,andoftenconditionedupontheirreturntoobedienceanddutywithinaprescribedtime.(Black;BrownvWalker,161US602).Probation‐adispositionunderwhichadefendantafterconvictionandsentenceisreleasedsubjecttoconditionsimposedbythecourtandtothesupervisionofaprobationofficer.[Sec.3(a),PD968.] Parole‐isthesuspensionofthesentenceofaconvictgrantedbyaParoleBoardafterservingtheminimumtermoftheindeterminatesentencepenalty,withoutgrantingapardon,prescribingthetermsuponwhichthesentenceshallbesuspended.

Pardon‐permanentcancellationofsentence.(Black)Itisanactofgraceproceedingfromthepowerentrustedwiththeexecutionofthelaws,whichexemptstheindividualonwhomitisbestowed,fromthepunishmentthelawinflictsforthecrimehehascommitted.Itisaremissionofguilt,aforgivenessoftheoffense.(PeoplevVera) Pardonmaybeplenaryorpartial.Aplenarypardonextinguishesallthepenaltiesimposedupontheoffender,includingaccessorydisabilities,whereaspartialpardondoesnot. Pardonmaybeabsoluteorconditional.Wherethepardonisconditional,theoffenderhastherighttorejectthesamesincehemayfeelthattheconditionimposedismoreonerousthanthepenaltysoughttoberemitted.Butinthecaseofanabsolutepardon,thepardoneehasnooptionatallandmustacceptitwhetherhelikesitornot.Inthissense,anabsolutepardonissimilartocommutation,w/cisalsonotsubjecttoacceptancebytheoffender.EffectsofPardonCristobalvLabradorThereare2limitationsupontheexerciseoftheconstitutionalprerogativeofthePres.tograntpardon:(1)thatthepowerbeexercisedafterconviction;(2)thatsuchpowerdoesnotextendtocasesofimpeachment.xxxAnabsolutepardonnotonlyblotsoutthecrimecommittedbutitalsoremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfromconviction.Inthepresentcase,thedisabilityistheresultofconvictionw/ow/ctherewouldbenobasisforthedisqualificationfromvoting. Thepardonextendedisconditionalinthesensethat"hewillbeeligibleforappointmentonlytopositionsw/careclericalormanualinnatureinvolvingnomoneyorprop.resp.,"itisabsoluteinsofarasit"restorestheresp.tofullcivilandpoliticalrights."Pelobellov.PalatinoAbsolutepardonhastheeffectofremovingthedisqualificationfromvotingandbeingelectedincidenttocriminalconvictionunderSec94(a)oftheElectionCode.TheChiefExecutive,afterinquiryintotheenvironmentalfacts,shouldbeatlibertytoatonetherigidityofthelawtotheextentofrelievingcompletelythepartyorpartiesconcernedfromtheaccessoryandresultantdisabilitiesofcriminalconviction.MonsantovsFactoranPardonimpliesguiltanddoesnoterasethefactofthecommissionofthecrimeandtheconvictionthereof.Itdoesnotipsofactorestoreaconvictedfelontoapublicofficenecessarilyrelinquishedorforfeitedbyreasonoftheconvictionalthough *Notes:"Pardongrantedafterconvictionfreestheindividualfromallthepenaltiesandlegaldisabilitiesandrestoreshimtoallhiscivilrights.Butunlessexpresslygroundedontheperson'sinnocence(w/cisrare),itcannotbringbacklostreputationforhonesty,integrityandfairdealing.Thismustbeconstantlykeptinmindlestwelosetrackofthetruecharacterandpurposeoftheprivilege.xxx" Doespardoningpowerapplytoadministrativecases?LlamasvExecutiveSecretary TheConst.doesnotdistinguishbetweenwhichcasesexecutiveclemencymaybeexercisedbythePres.,withthesoleexclusionofimpeachmentcases. IfthePresidentcangrantreprieves,commutationsandpardons,andremitfinesandforfeituresincriminalcases,withmuchmorereasoncanshegrantexecutiveclemencyinadministrativecases,whichareclearlylessseriousthancriminaloffenses.However,thepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemencyinadministrativecasesrefersonlytoadministrativecasesintheExecutivebranchandnotintheJudicialorLegislativebranchesofthegovt. UnderthedoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,thedifferentExecutive

28 departmentsaremereadjunctsofthePresident.TheiractsarepresumptivelytheactsofthePresidentuntilcountermandedorreprobatedbyher.Inthiscase,thePresidentintheexerciseofherpowerofsupervisionandcontroloverallexecutivedepartments,maysubstituteherdecisionforthatofhersubordinate.ItisclearlywithinthepowerofthePresidentnotonlytogrant"executiveclemency"butalsotoreverseormodifyarulingissuedbyasubordinateagainstanerringpublicofficial,whereareconsiderationofthefactsallegedwouldsupportthesame.Itisinthissensethattheallegedexecutiveclemencywasgranted.Sec.53,Chapter7,SubtitleA,TitleI,BookV,AdministrativeCodeof1987RemovalofAdministrativePenaltiesorDisabilities.‐‐Inmeritoriouscasesanduponrecommendationofthe(CivilService)Commission,thePresidentmaycommuteorremoveadministrativepenaltiesordisabilitiesimposeduponofficersoremployeesindisciplinarycases,subjecttosuchtermsandconditionsashemayimposeintheinterestoftheservice Whomayavailofamnesty?TolentinovsCatoyPetitionerwasaHukbalahapwhowasfoundguiltyofillegalassembly.Afterthejudgmentwaspromulgated,thePresidentissuedProc.No.76grantingamnestytoleadersandmembersoftheHukbalahap.Petitionerwhowasalreadyservinghissentence,sentapetitiontothePresidentforhisreleaseundertheprovisionsoftheproclamation.Noactionwastakenonhispetition.Hethenwenttocourtandfiledanapplicationforawritofhabeascorpus.AmnestyProclamationNo.76applieseventoHukbalahapsalreadyundergoingsentenceuponthedateofitspromulgation.ThemajorityoftheCourtbelievethatbyitscontextandpervadingspirittheproclamationextendstoallmembersoftheHukbalahap.ItmakesnoexceptionwhenitannouncesthattheamnestyisproclaimedinfavoroftheleadersandmembersoftheassociationsknownastheHukbalahapandPambansangKaisahanngMagbubukid(PKM).Macaga­anvsPeople PetitionerswerechargedandconvictedofestafathroughfalsificationofpublicandcommercialdocumentsbytheSandiganbayan.TheyclaimedthattheyhadbeengrantedamnestybyPresidentMarcos.TheSandiganbayanclaimedthatthebenefitsofamnestywereneveravailabletopetitionersunderPD1182.TheSCagreedwiththeSandiganbayanthatinfactthepetitionerswereexpresslydisqualifiedfromamnesty.Theactsforwhichtheywereconvictedwereordinarycrimeswithoutanypoliticalcomplexionandconsistingonlyofdiversionofpublicfundstoprivateprofit.TheamnestyproclamationcoveredonlyactsinthefurtheranceofresistancetodulyconstitutedauthoritiesoftheRepublicandappliesonlytomembersoftheMNLF,orotheranti‐gov’tgroups. (8)Powersascommander­in­chiefArt.VII,Sec.18.ThePresidentshallbetheCommander‐in‐ChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinforty‐eighthoursfromtheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmitareportinpersonorinwritingtotheCongress.TheCongress,votingjointly,byavoteofatleastamajorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension,whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongressmay,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbytheCongress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit. TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwenty‐fourhoursfollowing

suchproclamationorsuspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall. TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. AstateofmartiallawdoesnotsuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution,norsupplantthefunctioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconfermentofjurisdictiononmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilianswherecivilcourtsareabletofunction,norautomaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit. Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersonsjudiciallychargedforrebellionoroffensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion.Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbejudiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased.Art.III,Sec.13.Allpersons,exceptthosechargedwithoffensespunishablebyreclusionperpetuawhentheevidenceofguildisstrong,shall,beforeconviction,bebailablebysufficientsureties,orbereleasedonrecognizanceasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusissuspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired.Art.VIII,Sec.1.xxxJudicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment. PowersasCommander‐in‐Chief:a.Hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.b.Hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,or c.HemayproclaimmartiallawovertheentirePhilippinesoranypartthereof.Subjectto:Art.VIII,Sec.1par.2.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovt.a.CallouttheAFPtopreventlawlessviolence‐Thisismerelyapolicemeasuremeanttoquelldisorder.Assuch,theConstitutiondoesnotregulateitsexerciseradicallyb.Suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus‐A"writofhabeascorpus"isanorderfromthecourtcommandingadetainingofficertoinformthecourt(i)ifhehasthepersonincustody,and(ii)whathisbasisindetainingthatperson. The"privilegeofthewrit"isthatportionofthewritrequiringthedetainingofficertoshowcausewhyheshouldnotbetested.Notethatitistheprivilegethatissuspended,notthewrititself.Requisites: 1)Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and2)Thepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspension. Effectsofthesuspensionoftheprivilege: 1)Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritappliesonlytopersons"judiciallycharged"forrebellionoroffensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5).Suchpersonssuspected

29 oftheabovecrimescanbearrestedanddetainedwithoutawarrantofarrest. "Judiciallycharged"asusedintheConstitutionisimprecise.Forifonewerealreadyjudiciallycharged,hisdetentionwouldbelegalandsohecouldnolongerpetitionforhabeascorpus.Habeascorpuspreciselycontemplatesasituationinwhichapersonisbeingdetainedwithoutbeingchargedincourt.Thus,theprovisionshouldread"onewhoissuspectedofcomplicityin"thetwocrimesabove. Asageneralrule,nopersoncouldbearrestedwithoutawarrantofarrest(validlyissueduponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudgeafterexaminationunderoathoraffirmationofthecomplainantandthewitnesses,(cf.Art.III,Sec.2),unless(i)thearrestwasmadeinconnectionwithacrimecommittedinthepresenceofthedetainingofficer,or(ii)theprivilegeofthewritwassuspended.Ifthepublicofficerarrestshimwithoutawarrant,theofficerbecomesliablefor"arbitrarydetention"underArt.124oftheRPC,andapetitionforhabeascorpuscanbefiledtoseekhisrelease. Thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotmakethearrestwithoutwarrantlegal.Butthemilitaryis,ineffect,enabledtomakethearrest,anywaysince,withthesuspensionoftheprivilege,thereisnoremedyavailableagainstsuchunlawfularrest(arbitrarydetention).Thearrestwithoutwarrantisjustifiedbytheemergencysituationandthedifficultyinapplyingforawarrantconsideringthetimeandthenumberofpersonstobearrested.Butthecrimeforwhichheisarrestedmustbeonerelatedtorebellionortheinvasion.Astoothercrimes,thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotapply. 2)Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbejudiciallychargedwithin3days,orotherwiseheshallbereleased.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.6). Inotherwords,thepublicofficercandetainapersonwithoutwarrantofarrest,buthecanonlydosofor72hours.Beforethelapseof72hours,aninformationmusthavebeenfiledinthepropercourtcharginghimoftheoffenseforwhichhewasarrested.UndertheRulesofCriminalProcedure,ifthedetaineewantsapreliminaryinvestigationtobefirstconductedbythefiscal,hemustsignawaiveroftheeffectsofArt.125.(delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons) Theeffectofthesuspensionoftheprivilege,therefore,isonlytoextendtheperiodsduringwhichhecanbedetainedwithoutawarrant.UnderArt.125,asamendedbyEO272,thepublicofficercanonlydetainhimfor12,18or36hoursdependingonthegravityoftheoffenseofwhichheischarged;withinthistime,hemustbejudiciallycharged,otherwise,hemustbereleased.Whentheprivilegeissuspended,theperiodisextendedto72hours.Whathappensifheisnotjudiciallychargednorreleasedafter72hours?ThepublicofficerbecomesliableunderArt.125for"delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons."Astothedetainee,itissubmittedthatheorsomeoneelseinhisbehalfcanfileapetitionforhabeascorpus.Forevenifthesuspensionhasalifetimeof60daysingeneral,astothatperson,thesuspensiononlyhasaneffectivityof72hours,sothatafterthistime,thesuspensionisliftedastohim. 3)Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusissuspended.(Art.III,Sec.13)Art.III,Sec.13.xxxTherighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofHCissuspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired.c.ProclaimMartialLaw Requisites: 1)Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and 2)PublicsafetyrequirestheproclamationofmartiallawalloverthePhilippinesoranypartthereof.Effectsoftheproclamationofmartiallaw:ThePresidentcan:

1)Legislate 2)Orderthearrestofpeoplewhoobstructthewareffort. Butthefollowingcannotbedone(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.4) a. SuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution. b. Supplantthefunctioningofthecivilcourtsandthelegislative

assemblies. TheprincipleisthatmartiallawisproclaimedonlybecausethecourtsandothercivilinstitutionslikeCongresshavebeenshutdown.Itshouldnothappenthatmartiallawisdeclaredinordertoshutdownthecivilinstitutions. c. Conferjurisdictionuponmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilians,

wherecivilcourtsareabletofunction.Thisisthe"opencourt"doctrinewhichholdsthatcivilianscannotbetriedbymilitarycourtsifthecivilcourtsareopenandfunctioning.Butifthecivilcourtsarenotfunctioning,thencivilianscanbetriedbythemilitarycourts.Martiallawsusuallycontemplatesacasewherethecourtsarealreadyclosedandthecivilinstitutionshavealreadycrumbled,thatisa"theaterofwar."Ifthecourtsarestillopen,thePresidentcanjustsuspendtheprivilegeandachievethesameeffect.d. Automaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.

Underthepresentrule,thePresidentcanstillsuspendtheprivilegeevenasheproclaimmartiallaw,buthemustsosuspendexpressly.TheRoleofCongress a.WhenthePresidentproclaimsmartiallaworsuspendstheprivilegeofthewrit,suchproclamationorsuspensionshallbeeffectiveforaperiodof60days,unlesssoonerrevokedbytheCongress.b.Uponsuchproclamationorsuspension,Congressshallconveneatonce.Ifitisnotinsession,itshallconveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacallwithin24hoursfollowingtheproclamationorsuspension. c.Within48hoursfromtheproclamationorthesuspension,thePresidentshallsubmitareport,inpersonorinwriting,totheCongress(meetinginjointsessionoftheactionhehastaken). d.TheCongressshallthenvotejointly,byanabsolutemajority.Ithastwooptions: (i)Torevokesuchproclamationorsuspension. Whenitsorevokes,thePresidentcannotsetaside(orveto)therevocationashenormallywoulddointhecaseofbills.IfCongressdoesnotdoanything,themeasurewillexpireanywayin60days.Sotherevocationmustbemadebeforethelapseof60daysfromthedatethemeasurewastaken. (ii)Toextenditbeyondthe60‐dayperiodofitsvalidity. CongresscanonlysoextendtheproclamationorsuspensionupontheinitiativeofthePresident.Theperiodneednotbe60days;itcouldbemore,asCongresswoulddetermine,basedonthepersistenceoftheemergency.IfCongressfailstoactbeforethemeasureexpires,itcannolongerextendituntilthePresidentagainredeclaresthemeasure,forhowdooneextendsomethingthathasalreadylapsed? NotethatCongresscannot"validate"theproclamationorsuspension,becauseitisalreadyvalid.Itisthusrestrictedtothe2measuresabove.IfCongressextendsthemeasure,butbeforetheperiodofextensionlapses,therequirementsfortheproclamationorsuspensionnolongerexist,Congresscanlifttheextension,sincethepowertoconferimpliesthepowertotakeback.IfCongressdoesnotrevieworlifttheorder,thiscanbereviewedbytheSupremeCourtpursuanttothenextsection.TheRoleoftheSupremeCourt TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfilledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisof(a)theproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,or

30 (b)theextensionthereof.Itmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithin30daysfromitsfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18par.3) ThisisbecausejudicialpowerincludesthedutytodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.2) ThejurisdictionoftheSCmaybeinvokedinapropercase.Apetitionforhabeascorpusisonesuchcase.Whenapersonisarrestedwithoutawarrantforcomplicityintherebellionorinvasion,heorsomeoneelseinhisbehalfhasthestandingtoquestionthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension.ButbeforetheSCcandecideonthelegalityofhisdetention,itmustfirstpassuponthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension. ThetesttobeusedbytheSupremeCourtinsoreviewingtheactofthePresidentinproclaimingorsuspending,ortheactofCongressinextending,isthetestofarbitrarinesswhichseekstodeterminethesufficiencyofthefactualbasisofthemeasure.ThequestionisnotwhetherthePresidentorCongressactedcorrectly,butwhetherheactedarbitrarilyinthattheactionhadnobasisinfact.Decidingonwhethertheactwasarbitraryamountstoadeterminationofwhetherornottherewasgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,whichisnowmadepartofjudicialpowerbyArt.VIII,Sec.1,par.2.Thiscurbsradicallytheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.LansangvGarcia,Theissuethereraisedwaswhetherinsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritin1971,Marcoshadabasisfordoingso.TheSC,inconsideringthefactthatthePresidentbasedhisdecisionon(a)theSenatereportontheconditioninCentralLuzonand(b)acloseddoorbriefingbythemilitaryshowingtheextentofsubversion,concludedthatthePresidentdidnotactarbitrarily.Onemaydisagreewithhisappreciationofthefacts,butonecannotsaythatitiswithoutbasis.2conditionsmustconcurforthevalidexerciseofauthoritytosuspendtheprivilege:(a)theremustbeanactualinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerand(b)publicsafetymustrequirethesuspensionoftheprivilege.ThisholdingoftheSCisnowfoundinArt.VII,Sec.18,par.3.]Thefunctionofthecourtistocheckandnotsupplanttheexecutiveortoascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofjurisdiction.Theproperstandardisnotcorrectnessbutarbitrariness. Thereare4ways,then,fortheproclamationorsuspensiontobelifted:1)LiftingbythePresidenthimself 2)RevocationbyCongress 3)NullificationbytheSupremeCourt 4)Operationoflawafter60daysMilitaryTrialofCiviliansVoidEvenUnderMartialLaw,IfCivilCourtsAreOpen.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5.).OlaguervsMilitaryCommissionNo.34TheAquinovs.MilitaryCommissionNo.2decisionwasreversed.(Inthatcase,theSCupheldthepowerofthePresidenttocreatemilitarytribunalsauthorizedtotrynotonlymilitarypersonnelbutciviliansevenifcivilcourtswereopen).AccordingtotheSC,civilianswhoareplacedontrialforciviloffensesundergenerallawareentitledtotrialbyjudicialprocess.Sincewearenotenemy‐occupiedterritorynorareweunderamilitarygovt.andevenonthepremisethatmartiallawcontinuesinforce,themilitarytribunalscannottryandexercisejurisdictionoverciviliansforciviloffensescommittedbythemwhichareproperlycognizablebythecivilcourtsthathaveremainedopenandhavebeenregularlyfunctioning.TheassertionofmilitaryauthorityovercivilianscannotrestonthePresident'spowerasCommanderinChieforonanytheoryofmartiallaw.Aslongascivilcourtsremainopenandareregularlyfunctioning,militarytribunalscannottryandexercisejurisdictionoverciviliansforoffensescommittedbythemandwhichareproperlycognizablebycivilcourts.Toholdotherwiseisaviolationoftherighttodueprocess.(9)EmergencypowersArt.VI,Sec.23.“xxx(2)Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongress,may,

bylaw,authorizethePresident,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.UnlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.” ThisgrantofemergencypowertothePresidentisdifferentfromtheCommander‐in‐Chiefclause.WhenthePresidentactsundertheCommander‐in‐Chiefclause,heactsunderaconstitutionalgrantofmilitarypower,whichmayincludethelaw‐makingpower.ButwhenthePresidentactsundertheemergencypower,heactsunderaCongressionaldelegationoflaw‐makingpower. Thescopeofthegrantissuch"powersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy."Underthe1935Constitution,thiswasconstruedthepowertoissuerulesandregulationstocarryoutthedeclaredpolicy.The1987Constitution,itissubmitted,doesnotchangethescope."Powernecessaryandproper"shouldmeanlegislativepower,becauseCongressisonlyallowedtodelegatelegislativepower,beingitsonlyinherentpower.ItsotherpowersareonlygrantedtoitbytheConstitution,andsoitcannotdelegatewhathasonlybeendelegatedtoit.Thispoweris(1)foralimitedperiod,and(2)subjecttosuchrestrictionsasCongressmayprovide.Thepowerceases(a)uponbeingwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,or,ifCongressfailstoadoptsuchresolution,(b)uponthenext(voluntary)adjournmentofCongress.ForthefactthatCongressisabletomeetinsessionuninterruptedlyandadjournofitsownwillprovesthattheemergencynolongerexistsistojustifythedelegation.Thisruleortheterminationofthegrantofemergencypowersisbasedondecidedcases,whichinturnbecameArt.VII,Sec.15ofthe1973Constitution.AranetavDinglasan,TheCongressgrantedthePresidentcertainemergencypowers.(CA671)Afterthewar,Congressheldaspecialsession.TheSCheldthattheemergencypowerlastedonlyuntilCongresshelditsregularsession.ThefactthatCongresscouldnowmeetmeantthattherewasnoemergencyanymorethatwouldjustifythedelegation.TheassertionthatnewlegislationisneededtorepealCA671isnotinharmonywiththeConsti.Ifanewlawwerenecessarytoterminateit,thenitwouldbeunlimitedandindefinite.Thiswouldcreateananomalysincewhatwasintendedtomeetatemporaryemergencybecomesapermanentlaw.RodriguezvGella,Thespecificpowertocontinueinforcelawsandappropriationswhichwouldlapseorotherwisebecomeinoperativeisalimitationonthegeneralpowertoexercisesuchotherpowersastheexecutivemaydeemnecessarytoenablethegov’ttofulfillitsresponsibilitiesandtomaintainandenforceitsauthority.Barlongay:Noticetheapparentinconsistencybet.theConstitutionandthecases.TheConsti.[Art.VI,Sec.23(2)]statesthattheemergencypowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongressunlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionofCongresswhereasthecasestellusthattheemergencypowersshallceaseuponresumptionofsession.Toreconcilethetwo,IbelievethatitwouldnotbeenoughforCongresstojustresumesessioninorderthattheemergencypowersshallcease.Ithastopassaresolutionwithdrawingsuchemergencypowers,otherwisesuchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongress. (10)ContractingandguaranteeingforeignloansArt.VII,Sec.20.ThePresidentmaycontractorguaranteeforeignloansonbehalfoftheRepublicofthePhilippineswiththepriorconcurrenceoftheMonetaryBoard,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.TheMonetaryBoardshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheendofeveryquarterofthecalendaryear,submittoCongressacompletereportofitsdecisionsonapplicationsforloanstobecontractedorguaranteedbythe

31 Government,orgovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporations,whichwouldhavetheeffectofincreasingtheforeigndebt,andcontainingothermattersprovidedbylaw.Art.XII,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationofthemonetaryauthority.InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbemadeavailabletothepublic.CfRepublicAct4860(AnActAuthorizingThePresidentOfThePhilippinesToObtainSuchForeignLoansAndCredits,OrToIncurSuchForeignIndebtedness,AsMayBeNecessaryToFinanceApprovedEconomicDevelopmentPurposesOrProjects,AndToGuarantee,InBehalfOfTheRepublicOfThePhilippines,ForeignLoansObtainedOrBondsIssuedByCorporationsOwnedOrControlledByTheGovernmentOfThePhilippinesForEconomicDevelopmentPurposesIncludingThoseIncurredForPurposesOfRe‐LendingToThePrivateSector,AppropriatingTheNecessaryFundsTherefore,AndForOtherPurposes.)Approved,September8,1966.DoesCongresshavetobeconsultedbythePresidentwhenhecontractsorguaranteesforeignloansthatincreasetheforeigndebtofthecountry? Thenegative,andstrongerview,isthatthePresidentdoesnotneedpriorapprovalbyCongressbecausetheConstitutionplacesthepowertocheckthePresident'spowerontheMonetaryBoardandnotonCongress.Congressmay,ofcourse,provideguidelinesforcontractingorguaranteeingforeignloans,andhavetheserulesenforcedthroughtheMonetaryBoard.ButthatCongresshaspriorapprovalisatotallydifferentissue. Atanyrate,thepresentpower,whichwasfirstintroducedinthe1973Constitution,wasbasedonRA4860ortheForeignLoanAct.WhatusedtobeastatutorygrantofpowerisnowaconstitutionalgrantwhichCongresscannottakeaway,butonlyregulate.(11)Powersoverforeignaffairs (a)Treaty­makingpowerArt.VII,Sec.21.Notreatyorinternationalagreementshallbevalidandeffectiveunlessconcurredinbyatleasttwo‐thirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate. *ByreasonofthePresident'suniquepositionasheadofstate,heisthelogicalchoiceasthenation'sspokesmaninforeignrelations.TheSenate,ontheotherhand,isgrantedtherighttoshareinthetreaty‐makingpowerofthePresidentbyconcurringwithhimwiththerighttoamend.TreatydistinguishedfromexecutiveagreementsExecutiveagreementsenteredintobythePresidentneednoconcurrence.Thereasonisthatalthoughexecutiveagreementsareakindofinternationalagreements,whentheConstitutionintendstoincludeexecutiveagreements,itsayssospecifically,asinArt.VIII,Sec.5,par.2,whenitspeaksofthepoweroftheSCtoreviewfinaljudgmentsoflowercourtsincasesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,isinquestion.CommissionerofCustomsvs.EasternSeaTrading InternationalagreementsinvolvingpoliticalissuesorchangesinnationalpolicyandthoseinvolvinginternationalagreementsofpermanentcharacterusuallytaketheformofTREATIES.Buttheinternationalagreementsinvolvingadjustmentsindetailcarryingoutwell‐establishednationalpoliciesandtraditionsandthoseinvolvingamoreorlesstemporarycharacterusuallytaketheformofEXECUTIVEAGREEMENTS. USAFFEVeteransAssn.vsTreasurerThecentralissueinthiscaseconcernsthevalidityoftheRomulo‐SnyderAgreement(1950)wherebythePhil.Govt.undertooktoreturntotheUSGovt.intenannualinstallments,atotalof$35MdollarsadvancedbytheUSto,butunexpendedby,theNationalDefenseForcesofthePhilippines.TheScheldthatthefundsinvolvedhavebeenconsistentlyregardedas

fundsadvancedandtobesubsequentlyaccountedfor.Sucharrangementthereforeincludestheobligationtoreturntheunexpendedamounts.Inthiscase,Pres.Quirinoapprovedthenegotiations.HehadpowertocontractloansunderRA213amendingRA16.AstothecontentionthattheagreementlacksratificationbytheSenate,itwasheldthattheyearlyappropriationsbyCongressoffundsascompliancewiththeagreementconstitutedratification.Buteveniftherewasnoratification,theagreementwouldstillbevalid.Theagreementisnota"treaty"asthetermisusedintheConstitution.TheagreementwasneversubmittedtotheSenateforconcurrence.Itmustbenotedthatatreatyisnottheonlyformthataninternationalagreementmayassume.ForthegrantoftreatymakingpowertotheExecutiveandtheSenatedoesnotexhaustthepowerofthegovt.overinternationalrelations.Consequently,executiveagreementsmaybeenteredintowithotherstatesandareeffectiveevenwithouttheconcurrenceoftheSenate.Fromthepointofviewofinternationallaw,thereisnodifferencebetweentreatiesandexecutiveagreementsintheirbindingeffectuponstatesconcernedaslongasthenegotiatingfunctionarieshaveremainedwithintheirpowers.Thedistinctionbetweenanexecutiveagreementandatreatyispurelyaconstitutionaloneandhasnointernationallegalsignificance. NatureofExecutiveAgreements:Thereare2classes:(1)agreementsmadepurelyasexecutiveactsaffectingexternalrelationsandindependentoforwithoutlegislativeauthorization,whichmaybetermedaspresidentialagreements,and(2)agreementsenteredintoinpursuanceofactsofCongress,orCongressional‐ExecutiveAgreements.TheRomulo‐SnyderAgreementmayfallunderanyofthesetwoclasses,forpreciselyonSept.18,1946,CongressspecificallyauthorizedthePresidenttoobtainsuchindebtednessw/theGovtoftheUS,itsagenciesorinstrumentalities.Evenassuming,arguendo,thattherewasnolegislativeauthorization,itisherebymaintainedthattheRomulo‐SnyderAgreementwaslegallyandvalidlyenteredintotoconformtothesecondcategory.This2ndcategoryusuallyincludesmoneyagreementsrelatingtothesettlementofpecuniaryclaimsofcitizens.BayanvsExecutiveSecretaryTheissueinthiscaseistheconstitutionalityoftheVFA.TheSCHheldthatoncetheSenateperformsthepowertoconcurwithtreatiesorexerciseitsprerogativewithintheboundariesprescribedbytheConstitution,theconcurrencecannotbeviewedasanabuseofpower,muchlessagraveabuseofdiscretion.ThePres,inratifyingtheVFAandsubmittingthesameforconcurrenceoftheSenate,actedwithintheconfinesandlimitsofthepowervestedinhimbytheConstitution.ThePresmerelyperformedaconstitutionaltaskandexercisedaprerogativethatchieflypertainstothefunctionsofhisoffice.(b)DeportationofundesirablealiensQuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard1.ThePresmaydeportonlyaccordingtogroundsenumeratedbylawsinceitwouldbeunreasonableandundemocratictoholdthatanalienbedeporteduponanunstatedorundefinedgrounddependingmerelyontheuseofanunlimiteddiscretionbythePres.2.2waysofdeportinganundesirablealien:(a)byorderofthePresafterdueinvestigationand(b)bytheCommissionerofImmigration3.ThePrescandelegatethepowerofinvestigationnottoorderthearrestofanalien.4.TheDeportationBoardmaynotorderthearrestofthealieninthiscase.Ifanimpliedgrantofpower,consideringthatnoexpressauthoritywasgrantedbylaw,wouldcurtailtherightofapersonthenadelegationoftheimpliedpowermustberejectedasinimicaltothelibertiesofthepeople.GoTekvDeportationBoard

32 1. TheDeportationBoardcanentertaindeportationbasedongroundsnotspecifiedinSec37oftheImmigrationLaw.TheBoardhasjurisdictiontoinvestigateGoTekevenifhehadnotbeenconvictedyet.2. ThePresident’spowertodeportaliensandtoinvestigatethemsubjecttodeportationareprovidedintheRevisedAdminCode.3.TheStatehasinherentpowertodeportundesirablealiens.ThispowerisexercisedbythePres.ThereisnolegalnorconstitutionalprovisiondefiningthepowertodeportaliensbecausetheintentionofthelawistogranttheChiefExecutivethefulldiscretiontodeterminewhetheranalien’sresidenceinthecountryissoundesirableastoaffectthesecurity,welfareorinterestofthestate.TheChiefExecutiveisthesoleandexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceoffactswhichwouldwarrantthedeportationofaliens.(12)Poweroverlegislation (a)MessagetoCongressArt.VII,Sec.23.ThePresidentshalladdresstheCongressattheopeningofitsregularsession.Hemayalsoappearbeforeitatanyothertime. *Every4thMondayofJuly,thePresidentdeliverstheStateoftheNationAddress,whichcontainshisproposalsforlegislation.Throughthisspeech,hecaninfluencethecourseoflegislationthatCongresscantakeduringtheregularsession. (b)PrepareandsubmitthebudgetArt.VII,Sec.22.ThePresidentshallsubmittoCongresswithinthirtydaysfromtheopeningofeveryregularsession,asthebasisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetofexpendituresandsourcesoffinancing,includingreceiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures. *Thebudgetistheplanindicatingthe(a)expendituresofthegovernment,(b)sourcesoffinancing,and(c)receiptsfromrevenue‐raisingmeasures.ThisbudgetistheupperlimitoftheappropriationsbilltobepassedbyCongress.Throughthebudget,therefore,thePresidentrevealstheprioritiesofthegovernment. (c)VetopowerArt.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesamewithhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournalandproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,two‐thirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesoftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehisvetoofanybilltotheHousewhereitoriginatedwithinthirtydaysafterthedateofreceiptthereof,otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject. Asageneralrule,allbillsmustbeapprovedbythePresidentbeforetheybecomelaw,exceptwhen(i)thevetoofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3vote,and(ii)thebillpassedisthespeciallawtoelectthePresidentandVice‐President.ThisgivesthePresidentanactualhandinlegislation.However,hiscourseofactionisonlytoapproveitorvetoitasawhole.(SeeLegislativePowerofCongress) (d)EmergencyPower

Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx(2)Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongress,may,bylaw,authorizethePresident,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.UnlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof. (e)FixingoftariffratesArt.VI,Sec.28.xxxTheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofixwithinspecifiedlimits,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageandwharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramoftheGovernment. Thereasonforthedelegationisthehighlytechnicalnatureofinternationalcommerce,andtheneedtoconstantlyandwithrelativeeaseadapttheratestoprevailingcommercialstandards. (13)ImmunityfromsuitCarillovs.Marcos ThePresidentassuchcannotbesued,enjoyingashedoesimmunityfromsuit,butthevalidityofhisactscanbetestedbyanactionagainsttheotherexecutiveofficialsorsuchindependentconstitutionalagenciesastheCommissiononElectionsandtheCommissiononAudit.InReBermudezThepetitionseeksclarificationastowhomtheConstireferstoastheincumbentPresandVicePres.Prescindingfromthepetitioner'slackofcapacitytosue,itiselementarythatthisCourtassumesnojurisdictionoverpetitionsfordeclaratoryrelief.Moreimportantly,thepetitionamountsineffecttoasuitagainsttheincumbentPres.AquinoanditisequallyelementarythatincumbentPresidentsareimmunefromsuitorfrombeingbroughttocourtduringtheperiodoftheirincumbencyandtenure.Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendtohisalteregos?A:No.SolivenvsMakasiar;BeltranvsMakasiarThisisthelibelcaseinvolvingBeltran'sallegationsthatPresidentAquinowashidingunderherbed.OneoftheissueswaswhetherthePresidentmayinitiatecriminalproceedingsagainstthepetitionersthroughthefilingofacomplaint‐affidavit.BeltrancontendedthatifcriminalproceedingsensuebyvirtueofthePresident'sfilingofhercomplaint‐affidavit,shemaysubsequentlyhavetobeawitnessfortheprosecution,bringingherundertheTC'sjurisdiction.Thiswouldbeanindirectwayofdefeatingherprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,sincebytestifyingonthewitnessstand,shewouldbeexposingherselftopossiblecontemptofcourtorperjury.TheSCheldthattheprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,pertainstothePresidentbyvirtueoftheofficeandmaybeinvokedonlybytheholderoftheoffice;notbyanyotherpersoninthePresident'sbehalf.Thus,anaccusedinacriminalcasewherethePresidentisacomplainantcannotraisethepresidentialprivilegeasadefensetopreventthecasefromproceedingagainsttheaccused.Moreover,thereisnothinginourlawsthatwouldpreventthePresidentfromwaivingtheprivilege.ThePresidentmayshedtheprotectionaffordedbytheprivilegeandsubmittothecourt'sjurisdiction.Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendevenbeyondhisterm?A:Yes.Solongastheactwasdoneduringhisterm. B.VICEPRESIDENT (1)Qualifications,election,termandoath

33 Art.VII,Sec.3.ThereshallbeaVice‐PresidentwhoshallhavethesamequalificationsandtermofofficeandbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident.HemayberemovedfromofficeinthesamemannerasthePresident.TheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation.Id.,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVice‐PresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayoftheelectionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyreelection.NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfouryearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime. NoVice‐Presidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected. Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVice‐PresidentshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay. ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice‐President,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirtydaysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceoftheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationoftheauthenticityanddueexecutionthereofinthemannerprovidedbylaw,canvass(i.e.,tallythecertificatesofcanvass)thevotes. Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoormoreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythevoteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately.TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates. TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,orVice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose. Id.,Sec.5.Beforetheyenterontheexecutionoftheiroffice,thePresident,theVice‐PresidentortheActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation: "Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmydutiesasPresident(orVice‐PresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveanddefenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyselftotheserviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewillbeomitted.) (2)PrivilegeandsalaryArt.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhichsuchincreasedwasapproved.TheyshallnotreceivedduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromtheGovernmentoranyothersource.Art.XVIII,Sec17.xxxtheVice‐President,xxxP240,000 (3)ProhibitionsArt.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,Vice‐President,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputiesorassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthis

Constitution,holdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure.Theyshallnot,duringsaidtenure,directlyorindirectlypracticeanyotherprofession,participateinanybusiness,orbefinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinanyfranchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictlyavoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice. ThespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.Art.VII,Sec.3.XxxTheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation. (4)SuccessionArt.VI,Sec.9.WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVice‐Presidentduringthetermforwhichhewaselected,thePresidentshallnominateaVice‐PresidentfromamongthemembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives,whoshallassumeofficeuponconfirmationbyamajorityvoteofallthemembersofbothhouses,votingseparately. *NotethatincasethevacancyoccursinboththeofficesofPresidentandVice‐President,thereisnoActingVice‐Presidentspokenof.ThereasonisthattheVice‐PresidentdoesnothaverealfunctionswhenthePresidentisaround. Whenavacancyoccursinbothoffices,theVice‐Presidentiselectedinaspecialelection.IfthevacancyoccursonlyintheVice‐Presidency,thesuccessorisnotelectedanymore,butmerelychosenfromtheCongress. (5)Removal Art.XI,Sec.2.ThePresident,theVice‐President,theMembersoftheSupremeCourt,theMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheOmbudsmanmayberemovedfromoffice,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.Id.,Sec.3.(1)TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateallcasesofimpeachment. (2)AverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentmaybefiledbyanyMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbeincludedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithinthreesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,shallsubmititsreporttotheHousewithinsixtysessiondaysfromsuchreferral,togetherwiththecorrespondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithintensessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)Avoteofatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirmafavorableresolutionwiththeArticlesofImpeachmentoftheCommittee,oroverrideitscontraryresolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenateshallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithinaperiodofoneyear.(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensittingforthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesisontrial,theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtshallpreside,butshallnotvote.Nopersonshallbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate. (7)Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthan

34 removalfromofficeanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw. (6)Functions (a)RightofsuccessionArt.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthePresident,theVice‐PresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVice‐President,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthenactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified. TheCongressshall,bylaw,providewhoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanentdisability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified,andbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualificationsastheActingPresident.Id.,Sec.11.WheneverthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice‐PresidentasActingPresident. WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowersanddutiesoftheofficeasActingPresident.Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfivedaystothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshalldecidetheissue.Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinforty‐eighthours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall. IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession,withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwo‐thirdsvoteofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresidentshallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice. (b)MembershipinCabinetArt.VII,Sec.3.xxxTheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation.III.JUDICIALDEPARTMENTA.ThesupremeCourtBarlongay:Ofthethreedepartmentsofgovernment,twodepartments(ExecutiveandLegislative)areconsideredasactive.Ontheotherhand,theJudiciaryisconsideredaspassive.Itispassiveinthesensethatithastowaitforacasetobefiledbeforeitcanact.Cruz:TomaintaintheindependenceoftheJudiciary,thefollowingsafeguardshavebeenembodiedintheConsti: (1)TheSCisaconstitutionalbody.Itcannotbeabolishednormayitsmembershiporthemannerofitsmeetingsbechangedbymerelegislation.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(1)] (2)Themembersofthejudiciaryarenotsubjectto

confirmationbytheCA. (3)ThemembersoftheSCmaynotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.(Art.IX,Sec.2.) (4)TheSCmaynotbedeprivedofitsminimumoriginalandappellatejurisdictionasprescribedinArt.X,Sec.5oftheConsti.(Art.VIII,Sec.2.) (5)TheappellatejurisdictionoftheSCmaynotbeincreasedbylaww/oitsadviceandconcurrence.(Art.VI,Sec.30.) (6)TheSCnowhasadministrativesupervisionoveralllowercourtsandtheirpersonnel.(Art.VIII,Sec.6.) (7)TheSChasexclusivepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts.(Art.VIII,Sec.11.) (8)ThemembersoftheSCandalllowercourtshavesecurityoftenure,w/ccannotbeunderminedbyalawreorganizingthejudiciary.(Id.) (9)Theyshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunctions.(Art.VIII,Sec.12.) (10)Thesalariesofjudgesmaynotbereducedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice.(Art.VIII,Sec.10.) (11)Thejudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.(Art.VIII,Sec.3.) (12)TheSCalonemayinitiaterulesofcourt.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5).] (13)OnlytheSCmayorderthetemporarydetailofjudges.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(3)] (14)TheSCcanappointallofficialsandemployeesofthejudiciary.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(6)]

(1)CompositionArt.VIII,Sec.4.

(1)TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedofaChiefJusticeandfourteenAssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Anyvacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof. (2)Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,orlaw,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality,application,oroperationofpresidentialdecrees,proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinances,andotherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (3)CasesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.TheSupremeCourtisaconstitutionalbody.AssuchitcannotbeabolishedbytheCongressforthepowertodestroyonlyresidesintheonewhohasthepowertocreate.Thelowercourtsontheotherhand,areestablishedbylaw,andsocouldbeabolishedbylaw,providedthesecurityoftenureisnotundermined.VargasvRillorazaTheSCheldthat:(1)CongressdoesnothavethepowertoaddtotheexistinggroundsfordisqualificationofajusticeoftheSC.Todisqualifyanyoftheseconstitutionalcomponentmemberofthecourt‐especiallyasinthiscase,amajorityofthem‐‐inatreasoncase,isnothingshortofdeprivingthecourtitselfofitsjurisdictionasestablishedbythefundamentallaw.Disqualificationofajudgeisadeprivationofhisjudicialpower.ItwouldseemevidentthatifCongresscoulddisqualifymembersofSCintakingpartinthehearinganddeterminationofcertain"collaboration"cases,itcouldextendthedisqualificationtoothercases.(2)Thedesignationprovided(aCFI‐judgetositasaSCjusticeinthePeople’sCourtiftheSCdoesnothavetherequiredquorum)isrepugnanttotheconstitutionalrequirementthatmembersbeappointedbythePres.w/theconsentoftheCA.(Thiswasunderthe1935Constitutionw/crequiredconfirmationfromtheCommissiononAppointments.)Itwill

35 resultinasituationwherein6memberssittingwillnotbeappointedandconfirmedinaccordancew/theConsti.(3)Howeverbriefortemporarymaybetheactionorparticipationofajudgedesignated,thereisnoescapingthefactthathewouldbeparticipatinginthedeliberationsandactsoftheSCandifallowedtodoso,hisvotewouldcountasmuchasanyregularjustice. OneSupremeCourtWhentheSCsitsindivisions,itdoesnotviolatetheconceptofa"oneSupremeCourt"because,accordingtheUSvLimsiongco,thedivisionsoftheSCdonotdiminishitsauthority,becausealthoughitsitsindivisions,itremainsandco‐functionsasonebody.This"oneSupremeCourt"doctrineisstrengthenedbytheprovisionthat"whentherequirednumber(inadivision)isnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)]StrictCompositionInVargasvRilloraza,theSCheldthatthetemporarydesignationofjudgesoftheCFIandtheCourtofAppealsintheSupremeCourttoconstituteaquorumduetodisqualificationofsomeofthejustices,isunconstitutional.ThereisbutoneSupremeCourtwhosemembershipappointmentsarepermanent.

(2)Appointment&qualificationsArt.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourtmustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourtorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines. xxx(3)Amemberofthejudiciarymustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probity,andindependenceSec.8.(5)Thecouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestothejudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.Sec.9.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation. xxx

(3)SalaryArt.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalaryshallnotbedecreased.Art.XVIII,Sec.17.UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,xxx;theChiefJusticeshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP240,000andtheAssociateJusticesshallreceiveP204,000each;xxx,theAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourt,xxx,P204,000each;xxx.Althoughthesalariesmaynotbedecreased,theymaybeincreasedbylaw,totakeeffectatonce.Reasons:(1)theConstitutiondoesnotprohibitit;(2)theJudiciaryplaysnopartinthepassageofthelawincreasingtheirsalaryunliketheCongressandtheExecutive,andsotherecanbenoconflictofinterest;and(3)thiswillpromotetheindependenceoftheJudiciary.

IstheimpositionofincometaxonthesalaryoftheJusticesandJudgesadiminutionoftheirsalaryasprohibitedbytheConstitution?NO.(Judiciarynotexemptfromincometax)NitafanvCIR

Underthe1987Constitution,thesalariesofmembersoftheJudiciaryarenotexemptfromtaxes.ItanchoreditsdecisiononthedeliberationoftheConstitutionalCommission,thatis,onthelegislativehistoryofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10.AdraftofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10whenoriginallypresentedtothebody,expresslyexemptedthesalaryofjudgesfromtaxation.Butwhenthisdraftwasdiscussedonsecondreading,thesentimentwasagainsttheexemption,thereasonbeingthatlikeanyothercitizen,judgesandjusticesmustpaytheirshareintheburdenofmaintainingthegovernment.SothisexpressexemptionwasdeletedfromArt.VIII,Sec.10andsoitwaswhenthedraftwasadoptedbythebody. (4)SecurityofTenureArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.Id.,Sec.2.xxx NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofitsMembers.ReorganizationDelaLlanavs.AlbaSec.144ofBP129replacedtheexistingcourtsystem,w/theexceptionoftheSCandtheSB,w/anewoneandprovidedthatuponthecompletionofthereorganizationbythePres.,thecourtsaffected"shallbedeemedautomaticallyabolishedandtheincumbentsthereofshallceasetoholdoffice."Petitioner,judgeofthecitycourtofOlongapo,and7membersoftheBarquestionedthevalidityoftheActinanactionforprohibition,onthegroundthatitcontravenedthesecurityoftenureofjudges.TheyimputedlackofgoodfaithintheenactmentoftheActandcharacterizeditasanunduedelegationoflegislativepower.TheSCheldthattheimputationoflackofgoodfaithdisregardsthefactthattheActwastheproductofcarefulstudyanddeliberationnotonlybytheBPbutalsobyaPresidentialstudycommittee(whereCJandjusticesweremembers).[T]heabolitionofanofficeisw/inthecompetenceofalegislativebodyifdoneingoodfaith.Thetestiswhethertheabolitionisingoodfaith.AsthatelementispresentintheenactmentofBP129,thelackofmeritofthepetitionbecomesapparent. However,whiletherecanbenoclaimtosecurityoftenurewheretheofficenolongerexists,intheireffectthereisnodifferencebet.removalandtheabolitionofoffice.Ineithercase,theeffectontheincumbentisoneofseparation.Accordingly,intheimplementationofthelawitwouldbeinkeepingw/thespiritoftheConstitutionthat,asfarasincumbentjusticesandjudgesareconcerned,theSCbeconsultedandthatitsviewbeaccordedfullestconsideration.Thisisnotrenderingadvisoryopinionbecausethereisnoquestionoflawinvolved.Neitheristhereintrusionintotheappointingprocessbec.onlyincumbentsareinvolved. (5).RemovalArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.

36 Art.XI,Sec.2.ThexxxMembersoftheSupremeCourtxxxmayberemovedfromoffice,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.MembersoftheSCcannotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.Thus,aSCjusticecannotbechargedinacriminalcaseoradisbarmentproceeding,becausetheultimateeffectofeitheristoremovehimfromoffice,andthuscircumventtheprovisiononimpeachmentandviolatinghissecurityoftenure(InRe:FirstIndorsementfromHon.RaulM.Gonzalez,A.M.No.88­4­5433). (6)FiscalAutonomyArt.VIII,Sec.3.TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.AppropriationsfortheJudiciarymaynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,afterapproval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased. (7)JurisdictionSupremeCourtA)Originaljurisdiction[Art.VIII,Sec.5(1)]

(1)Casesaffectingambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls. (2)Petitionsforcertiorari,prohibition,mandamus,quowarrantoandhabeascorpus. (3)SufficiencyoffactualbasisofproclamationofmartiallawandsuspensionofprivilegeofwritofHCNotethattheSCdoesnothavejurisdictionoverdeclaratoryreliefcases,whichmustbefiledwiththeRTC(InReBermudezsaidsotoo,andyetgaveduecoursetothepetition.)Thefirstcase(ambassadors,etc.)ismadeconcurrentwithRTCsbylaw(JudiciaryActof1948).Thesecondcase(specialcivilactions)isconcurrentwiththeCAandtheRTC,withrespecttoinferiorbodies.B)AppellateJurisdiction

TheSupremeCourtshallhavethepowertoreview,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmon(i)ordinaryappeal,or(ii)petitionforreviewoncertiorari,asthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentandordersoflowercourtsinthefollowingcases: (1)Casesquestioningtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofany(a)treaty,(b)internationalandexecutiveagreement,(c)laworstatute,(d)presidentialdecree,(e)proclamation,(f)order,(g)instruction,(h)ordinance,or(i)regulation. (2)Casesquestioningthelegalityofan(a)tax,(b)impost,(c)assessment,or(d)toll,or(e)anypenaltyimposedinrelationthereto. (3)Casesinwhichthejurisdictionoflowercourtsisinissue. (4)Criminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher. (5)Casesinw/conlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved. (6)OrdersoftheConstitutionalCommissions.JurisdictionovercriminalcaseswherepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx (2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin: (d)Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher.PeoplevDaniel;PeoplevRamos Botharerapecaseswherethetrialcourtimposedlesserpenalties

becauseofmisappreciationoftheaggravatingandqualifyingcircumstancesandonappealthepenaltywasincreased.ChiefJusticeCastro,forthemajority,explained:Art.X,Sec.5(2)(d)[nowArt.VIII,Sec.5(2)(d)]providesthattheSCshallhaveappellatejurisdictionover"finaljudgementsanddecreesofinferiorcourts"incriminalinw/cthe"penaltyimposedisdeathorlifeimprisonment."UnlesstheCArendersjudgmentandimposesthepenaltyofdeathorreclusionperpetua,therewouldbenojudgmentforSCtoreview.Indeed,Section34oftheJudiciaryActof1948andthepresentRule124,Sec.13providethat,whenevertheCAshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofdeathorlifeimprisonmentshouldbeimposed,"thesaidcourtshallrefrainfromenteringjudgmentthereon,andshallforthwithcertifythecasebroughtbeforeitonappeal,"whichthatitisnotprohibitedfromrenderingjudgment.Inotherwords,theCAisnotprohibitedfromrenderingjudgmentbutfrom"enteringjudgment."Thedistinctionbetweenthetwoiswellestablished.Thephrase"enteringjudgment"isnottobeequatedw/an"entryofjudgment"asthelatterisunderstoodinR36inrelationtoSec.8,R121andSec.16,R124,ROC."Entryofjudgment"presupposesafinaljudgment‐‐finalinthesensethatnoappealwastakenfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtorappellatecourtw/inthereglamentaryperiod.Ajudgmentinacriminalcasebecomesfinalafterthelapseoftheperiodforperfectinganappeal,orwhenthesentencehasbeenpartiallyortotallysatisfiedorserved,orthedef.hasexpresslywaivedinwritinghisrighttoappeal.Itisonlythenthatthereisajudgmentwhichistobeenteredorrecordedinthebookofentriesofjudgments.Rule124,Sec.13.xxxWhenevertheCourtofAppealsshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaorhighershouldbeimposedinacase,theCourtafterdiscussionoftheevidenceandthelawinvolved,shallrenderjudgmentimposingthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaorhigherasthecircumstanceswarrant,refrainfromenteringjudgmentandforthwithcertifythecaseandelevatetheentirerecordthereoftotheSupremeCourtforreview.Art.VII,Sec.18.xxxTheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.Art.VII,Sec.4.xxxTheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,Vice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsruleforthepurpose.Lopezvs.RoxasSection1,Art.VIIIoftheConstitutionvestsinthejudicialbranchofthegovernment,notmerelysomespecifiedorlimitedjudicialpower,buttheentiretyor"all"ofsaidpower,except,only,somuchastheConstitutionconfersuponsomeotheragency,suchasthepowerto"judgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualifications'ofmembersoftheSenateandthoseoftheHouseofRepresentatives,whichisvestedbytheConstitutionsolelyintheSenateElectoralTribunalandtheHouseElectoralTribunal,respectively.R.A1793,creatingthePET,hastheeffectofgivingadefeatedcandidatethelegalrighttocontestjudiciallytheelectionofthePresident‐electortheVP‐elect.ByprovidingthatthePET"shallbecomposedoftheChiefJusticeandtheother10MembersoftheSC",R.A.1793hasconferreduponsuchcourtanadditionalexclusiveoriginaljurisdiction.Ithasnotcreatedanewandseparatecourt.IthasmerelyconferredupontheSCthefunctionsofaPET.ThePETisnotinferiortotheSCsinceitisthesamecourt,althoughthefunctionspeculiartosaidTribunalaremorelimitedinscopethanthoseoftheSCintheexerciseofitsordinaryfunctions.Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemed

37 submittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeachCommissionmaybebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofthecopythereof. (8)CongressionalPoweroverJurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtArt.VIII,Sec.2.“TheCongressshallhavethepowerthedefine,prescribeandapportionthejurisdictionofvariouscourtsbutmaynotdeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsjurisdictionovercasesenumeratedinSection5hereof. Xxx” Whilethejurisdictionofcourtsisamatteroflegislativeapportionment,theConstitutionsetscertainlimitationsonthisprerogative:

1.ItcannotdecreasetheconstitutionallysetjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.(ItmaynotdeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsjurisdictionovercasesenumeratedinSection5hereof.)2.ItcannotincreasetheconstitutionallysetappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.(Art.VI,Sec.30).

Thus,inthecaseofFabianvs.Desierto,Sec.27,RA6770,whichauthorizesanappealtotheSupremeCourtfromdecisionsoftheOmbudsmaninadministrativedisciplinarycases,wasdeclaredunconstitutionalbecausetheprovisionwaspassedwithouttheadviceandconsentoftheSupremeCourt.

3.Itcannotpassalawreorganizingthejudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofitsmembers.(Art.VI,Sec.2,par.2)

4. ItcannotamendtheRulesofCourt.

InEchegarayvs.SecretaryofJustice,G.R.No.132601,theSupremeCourtdeclaredthatthe1987ConstitutiontookawaythepowerofCongresstorepeal,alter,orsupplementrulesconcerningpleading,practice,andprocedure.Infine,thepowertopromulgatesuchrulesisnolongersharedbythisCourtwithCongress,moresowiththeExecutive.However,Congresscan:

increasetheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSC(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower).

ItcanmakethejurisdictionoftheSCconcurrentwithlowercourts(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower).

Thus,undertheRulesofCourt,theoriginaljurisdictionoftheSCisconcurrentwiththeRTCandinthecaseofthespecialcivilactions,withtheCA. MantrusteSystems,Inc.vsCASection31ofProclamationNo.5‐A(Privatizationlaw)prohibitedcourtsandadministrativeagenciesfromissuinganyrestrainingorderorinjunctionagainsttheAssetPrivatizationTrustinconnectionwiththeacquisition,saleordispositionofassetstransferredtoit,noragainstanypurchaserofassetssoldbytheTrusttopreventsuchpurchaserfromtakingpossessionofanyassetspurchasedbyhim.SaidSectiondoesnotinfringeanyprovisionoftheConstitution.Itdoesnotimpairtheinherentpowerofthecourts"tosettleactualcontroversieswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceableandtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovt."ThePresident,intheexerciseofherlegislativepowerundertheFreedomConstitution,issuedsaidProclamationtopreventcourtsfrominterferinginthedischargeoftheExecutiveDepartmentofitstaskofcarryingouttheexpeditiousdispositionandprivatizationofcertaingovt.corporationsand/ortheassetsthereof,absentanygraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessorlackofjurisdictiononitspart.Thisproclamation,notbeinginconsistentwiththeConstitutionandnothavingbeenrepealedorrevokedbyCongress,hasremainedoperative.

Administrativepowers (9)SupervisionoflowercourtsArt.VIII,Sec.6.TheSupremeCourtshallhaveadministrativesupervisionoverallcourtsandthepersonnelthereof.NoblejasvTeehankee,TheSCheldthatalthoughtheCommissionerofLandRegistrationisgiventherankofjudgeoftheCFI,heisstillanadministrativeofficial,henceoutsidethejurisdictionoftheSCandcannotbeinvestigatedbyitasifhewerealowercourtjudge.Otherwise,theSCwouldbeperforminganon‐judicialwork. (10)TemporarilyassignjudgestootherstationsinthepublicinterestArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to) xxx (3)Assigntemporarilyjudgesoflowercourtstootherstationsaspublicinterestmayrequire.Suchtemporaryassignmentshallnotexceedsixmonthswithouttheconsentofthejudgeconcerned. (11)Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrialtoavoidmiscarriageofjustice[Art.VIII,Sec.5(4)] (12)DisciplineoflowercourtjudgesArt.VIII,Sec.11.xxx TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissal,byavoteofamajorityofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (13)AppointmentofofficialsandemployeesofentirejudiciaryArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to) xxx (6)AppointallofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewiththeCivilServiceLaw. (14)RulemakingArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx (5)Promulgaterulesconcerningtheprotectionandenforcementofconstitutionalrights,pleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts,theadmissiontothepracticeoflaw,theIntegratedBar,andlegalassistancetotheunderprivileged.Suchrulesshallprovideasimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedureforthespeedydispositionofcases,shallbeuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,andshallnotdiminish,increase,ormodifysubstantiverights.Rightsofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapprovedbytheSupremeCourt. InRe:requestforaCreationofaSpecialDivison,A.M.No.02­1­09­SC,itwasheldthatitiswithinthecompetenceoftheSupremeCourttocreateaSpecialDivisionintheSandiganbayanwhichwillhearanddecidetheplundercaseagainstformerPresidentJosephEstrada.PowerofCongresstorepealRulesofCourt‐ArticleXVIII,Sec.10.AllcourtsexistingatthetimeoftheratificationofthisConstitutionshallcontinuetoexercisetheirjurisdiction,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw.TheprovisionsoftheexistingRulesofCourt,judiciaryacts,andprocedurallawsnotinconsistentwiththisConstitutionshallremainoperativeunlessamendedorrepealedbytheSupremeCourtorthe

38 Congress.Co‐Judicialpowers AsidefromthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtmentionedabovethefollowingareitsotherpowersrelatedto,thoughnotexactlyconstituting,itsjudicialfunction: 1.Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrial,inordertoavoidamiscarriageofjustice.Art.VIII,Sec.5(4)] 2.Rulemaking‐Promulgaterulesconcerning(a)theprotectionandenforcementofconstitutionalrights,(b)pleading,practiceandprocedureinallcourts,(c)theadministrationtothepracticeoflaw,(d)theIntegratedBar,and(e)legalassistancetotheunderprivileged.Limitstorule‐makingpower:Suchrulesshall

(i) providesimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedure,forthespeedydispositionofcases

(ii)beuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,and(iii)notdiminish,increaseormodifysubstantiverights.

Rulesofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapprovedbytheSC.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5)]Itisonthebasisofthispower,thattheRulesofCourt,theBar,IBP,LegalAidOfficewereadopted.PracticeofProfessionsArt.XII,Sec.14.xxxThepracticeofallprofessionsinthePhilippinesshallbelimitedtoFilipinocitizens,saveincasesprescribedbylaw.MartialLawArt.VII,Sec.18.TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofMartialLaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysformitsfiling.(par.3thereof.) (15)Noquasi­judicialandadministrativeworkofjudgesGenerally:Nonon‐judicialworkforjudges;Noquasi‐judicialandadministrativeworkforjudges. Asageneralrule,membersofthejudiciaryshallonlyhavejudicialfunctions,inlinewiththeseparationofpowersprincipleoftheConstitution.Thus:Art.VIII,Sec.12.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylawshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunction.MeralcovPasayTransportationCoTheissueconcernsthelegalrightofthemembersoftheSC,sittingasaboardofarbitrators,thedecisionofamajorityofwhomshallbefinal,toactinthatcapacity.ItwasheldthattheSCanditsmembersshouldnotandcannotberequiredtoexerciseanypowerortoperformanytrustortoassumeanydutynotpertainingtoorconnectedw/theadministeringofjudicialfunctions.GarciavMacaraigTheSCsaidthatitdidnotlookwithfavoratthepracticeoflongstandingofjudgesbeingdetailedwiththeDepartmentofJusticetoassisttheSecretary,evenifitwereonlyinconnectionwithhisworkofexercisingadministrativeauthorityovercourts.Thebasisofthisruleistheseparationofpowers.Inthiscase,respondentMacaraigwasappointedtooneofthenewly‐createdCFIbranchesw/stationatCalambaLaguna.Atthetimeofhisappointment,respondentwasthechiefofTechnicalStaffoftheDOJandconcurrentlymemberoftheBoardofPardonsandParole.

xxxInRe:RodolfoManzanoEONo.856createdtheProvincial/CityCommitteesonJusticetoinsurethespeedydispositionofcasesofdetainees.Amongthefunctionsofsaidcommitteearetoreceivecomplaintsagainstanyapprehendingofficer,jailwarden,fiscalorjudgewhomaybefoundtohavecommittedabusesinthedischargeofhisdutiesandreferthesametoproperauthorityforproperaction,torecommendrevisionofanylaworregulationwhichisbelievedprejudicialtotheproperadministrationofcriminaljustice.JudgeManzano,ExecutiveJudgeOfIlocosNortewasappointedasmemberofsaidCommittee.TheSCheldthatsuchcommitteeperformsadministrativefunctions.Administrativefunctionsarethosewhichinvolvetheregulationandcontrolovertheconductandaffairsofindividualsfortheirownwelfareandthepromulgationofrulesandregulationstobettercarryoutthepolicyofthelegislatureorsuchasaredevolvedupontheadministrativeagencybytheorganiclawofitsexistence.UndertheConstitution,themembersofthecourtsshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunctions.ConsideringthatmembershipofJudgeManzanoinsuchcommittee,willviolatetheConstitution,theSupremeCourtisconstrainedtodenyhisrequestthathebeallowedtoservetherein.Hecanonlyrenderassistancetosuchcommitteeandonlywhensuchassistancemaybereasonablyincidentaltothefulfillmentofhisjudicialduties.Exceptions:Constitutionallyappointednon‐judicialfunctionsoftheSupremeCourt a.ActasPresidentialElectoralTribunalWhileCongressactsastheNationalBoardofCanvassersforthePresidentialelection,theSupremeCourtactsastheElectoralTribunalforsuchelectionasprovidedinArt.Art.VII,Sec.4,lastpar.ThismeansthatbeforetheproclamationbytheCongressofthewinner,Congressisthejudgeofanyelectoralissue,buttheproclamation,whenthereisanelectoralcontestalready,thentheSCbecomesthesolejudge.b.ChiefJusticeaspresidingofficerinimpeachmenttrialofthePresident.[Art.XI,Sec.3(6)]c.ChiefJusticeasChairmanoftheJudicialandBarCouncil. (16)ReportonthejudiciaryArt.VIII,Sec.16.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheopeningofeachregularsessionoftheCongress,submittothePresidentandtheCongressanannualreportontheoperationsandactivitiesoftheJudiciary. (17)MannerofsittingandvotesrequiredInthe1987Constitution,notonlywasthediscretion(tositenbancorin2divisions)retained,butalsothedivisionswereincreased.Theremaybe5,3or2divisionsmadeupof3,5or7members,respectively.Atpresent,theSCsitseitherenbancorin3divisions.Art.VIII,Sec.4.(1)TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedofaChiefJusticeandfourteenAssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Anyvacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.(2)Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,orlaw,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality,application,oroperationofpresidentialdecrees,proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinances,andotherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (3)Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwith

39 theconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.ThefollowingcasesshallbeheardbytheSCenbanc: 1.Casesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,inter‐nationalorexecutiveagreementorlaw.[Id.,Sec.4(2)] 2.Casesinvolvingthe(a)constitutionality,(b)application,or(c)operationofpresidentialdecrees,proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinancesandotherregulations.[Id.,Sec.4(2)] 3.AllothercaseswhichundertheRulesofCourtarerequiredtobeheardbytheSCenbanc.[Id.,Sec.4(2)] 4.Casesormattersheardbyadivisionwheretherequirednumberofvotestodecideorresolve(themajorityofthosewhotookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocaselessthan3members)isnotmet.[Id.,Sec.4(3)] 5.Tomodifyorreverseadoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivision.[Id.,Sec.4(3)] 6.Administrativedisciplinarycasesinvolvingjudgesoflowercourts.(Id.,Sec.11.) 7.Actionsinstitutedbycitizentotestthevalidityofaproclamationofmartiallaworsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit.(Art.VII,Sec.18.) 8.ThecourtsittingasPresidentialElectoralTribunal.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.)Rule56Sec.11.ProcedureifopinionisequallydividedWherethecourtenbancisequallydividedinopinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbere‐heard,andifonrehearingnodecisionisreached,theactionshallbedismissediforiginallycommencedinthecourt;inappealedcases,thejudgmentororderappealedfromshallstandaffirmed;andonallincidentalmatters,thepetitionormotionshallbedenied.Rule125,Sec.3.DecisionifopinionisequallydividedWhenthecourtenbancisequallydividedinopinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbere‐heard,andifonrehearingnodecisionisreached,thejudgmentofconvictionofthelowercourtshallbereversedandtheaccusedacquitted

(18)RequirementastodecisionsDeliberationsArt.VIII,Sec.13.“TheconclusionsoftheSupremeCourtinanycasesubmittedtoitfordecisionenbancorindivisionshallbereachedinconsultationbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberforthewritingoftheopinionoftheCourt.AcertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeshallbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseandservedupontheparties.AnyMemberwhotooknopart,ordissented,orabstainedfromadecisionorresolutionmuststatethereasontherefor.Thesamerequirementsshallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.”Thereasonfortherequirementthatthedecisionmustbereached"inconsulta"(i.e.,afterdeliberationsbythegroup)istoemphasizethattheSCisonebody,albeitcollegiate,sothatthedecisionofthecaseisbythecourtitselfandnottheponente.Thewriteroftheopinionismerelythespokesmanofthebody.ConsingVCATheabsenceofcertificationbytheCourtofAppealsdoesnotrenderthatdecisioninvalid.Thecertificationrequirementimposedbythe1987constitutionwasmeanttoensuretheimplementationoftheconstitutionalrequirementthatdecisionsoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourts,suchastheCA,CTAandSandiganbayan,arereachedafterconsultationwiththemembersofthecourtsittingenbancorinadivisionbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberthereoffordecisionwriting.

Theabsencewouldnotnecessarilymeanthatthecasesubmittedfordecisionhadnotbeenreachedinconsultationbeforebeingassignedtoonememberforthewritingoftheopinionofthecourtsincetheregularperformanceofofficialdutyispresumed.Thelackofcertificationservesasanevidenceoffailuretoobservethecertificationrequirementbutitwouldnothavetheeffectofinvalidatingthedecision.Art.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefusedduecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.VotingVotesrequiredto"renderadecisionorresolution"A)Enbanc‐Concurrenceofamajorityofthememberswho(i)actuallytookpartinthedeliberations(i.e.,theconsultation)ontheissuesinthecase,and(ii)votedthereon.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(2)andSec.11.] B)Indivisions‐Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolved(a)withtheconcurrenceofamajorityofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,and(b)innocasewithouttheconcurrenceofatleast3ofsuchmembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc.Nodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaidbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)]a.Inadivisionof7members,themajorityifallarepresentis4.Ifonly6arepresent,4.Ifonly5or4,3.Ifonly3,noquorum. b.Inadivisionof5members,3votesareneededregardlessofwhether5,4,or3arepresent.c.Indivisionof3members,3votesareneeded.d.Inanyofthesecases,whenthevotescannotbemustered,thecasemustberaisedtothecourtenbanc.Effectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajority:Ifthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseisagainreheard.Ifuponrehearing,nomajorityisstillhad,thefollowingaretheeffects: a.)Ifacaseisonappeal,thejudgmentappealedfromisdeemedaffirmedexcept: (i)Criminalcaseswherethejudgmentisthatofconviction:theconvictionisreversed,andtheaccusedisacquitted. (ii)Caseswherethelowercourtdeclaredalaw,etc.unconstitutional:thejudgmentisreversed,andthevalidityofthelawisdeemedsustained,pursuanttothepresumptionofconstitutionalityunderSec.9oftheJudiciaryActof1948.(Ifthelowercourtdeclaredthelawasnotunconstitutional,thisjudgmentisdeemedaffirmedpursuanttothegeneralruleabove.) (Thus,if12arepresent,5votedthelawunconstitutional,4votedforitsvalidity,and3abstained,thereisnodecisionandsothelawremainsvalid.) b.)Ifthecaseisanoriginalpetition,thenthecaseisdeemeddismissed.Writingofthedecision Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.(Art.VIII,Sec.14.) InthecaseoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourt,thisruleisaddressedtotheonetowhomthewritingoftheopinionwasassignedafterconsultation,thatis,theponente.Inthecasebyothercourts,thisruleisaddressedtothejudge.

40 Decisionsonthemerit. Therulerequiringstatementoftherelevantfacts,theissues,theruling,andthereasonedopinioninsupportoftheruling,appliesonlytodecisionsonthemeritbyacourtofrecord,basedonthefollowingrulingsoftheSC:ValladolidvInciongitwasheldthattheOrderoftheDeputyMinisterofLabordidnotcontainastatementoffactsandconclusionsoflawisnotcoveredbytheconstitutionalrequirementbecauseitisnotadecisionofacourtofrecord,theMinistryofLaborbeinganadministrativeagencywithquasi‐judicialfunctions,withrulesofproceduremandatedtobenon‐litigious,summaryandnon‐technical.Section14,Chapter3,BookVII,AdministrativeCodeof1987.Decision.‐‐Everydecisionrenderedbytheagencyinacontestedcaseshallbeinwritingandshallstateclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.xxxBacolodMurciaMillingCo.vHenares,TheSCruledthatordersofacourtonanincidentalmatter(inthiscase,theorderimposingthepaymentofattorney'sfees)neednotstatethelegalbasisoftheruling.MinuteResolutionCruz: Injustifyingtheso‐calledminuteresolution,theSCsaidinBorromeov.CA, "TheSCdisposesofthebulkofitscasesbyminuteresolutionsanddecreesthemasfinalandexecutory,aswhereacaseispatentlyw/omerit,wheretheissuesraisedarefactualinnature,wherethedecisionappealedfromissupportedbysubstantialevidenceandisinaccordw/thefactsofthecaseandtheapplicablelaws,whereitisclearfromtherecordsthatthepetitionswerefiledmerelytoforestalltheearlyexecutionofjudgmentandfornon‐compliancew/therules.Theresolutiondenyingduecourseordismissingapetitionalwaysgivesthelegalbasis.xxxx TheCourtisnotdutyboundtorendersigneddecisionsallthetime.Ithasamplediscretiontoformulatedecisionsand/orminuteresolutions,providedalegalbasisisgiven,dependingonitsevaluationofacase."AndneitherdoestheruleapplytoadministrativecasesdecidedbytheSCitself,asitheldinPrudentialBankv.Castro,thus:"NoconstitutionalprovisionisdisregardedintheSC'sMinuteResolutiondenyingamotionforreconsideration'forlackofmerit,theissuesraisedthereinhavingbeenpreviouslydulyconsideredandpassedupon.Inanadministrativecase,theconstitutionalmandatethat'no***motionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallbe***deniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasisthereforisinapplicable.Andevenifitwere,saidresolutionstatedthelegalbasisforthedenial,and,therefore,adheredfaithfullytotheconstitutionalrequirement.'Lackofmerit,'asagroundfordenialislegalbasis.Petitionsforreviewandmotionsforreconsideration Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefusedduecourseordenied,withoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.14,par.2.)

Thisruleappliestoadismissalofamotionforreconsiderationofa"decisiononthemerits",saidtheSCinMendozavCFI,).Itdoesnotapply,asinthiscase,toadismissalofamotionforreconsiderationofapreviousdismissalofapetitionforhabeascorpus.(Thedismissalofthepetitionforhabeascorpusisnotadecisiononthemerits,butissimilartoadismissalofapetitionforreview,whichisadecisionnottogiveduecoursetothepetition.) Thepastpracticeusedtobethatwhentheappellatecourtdeniedapetitionforreview,ordeniedaMFR,itsimplydidsoinaMinuteResolution,statingthatthecasewasdismissedforlackofbasis.This

aggrievedmanyalawyer,speciallythosewhowouldspenddayspreparingpagesofbriefs,onlytofindoutthatalltheireffortwasansweredbyaone‐liner"Dismissedforlackofbasis".

Thispromptedtheframersofthe1987ConstitutiontoforcetheCourttoatleastwritedownthelegalbasisforthedenial.Thismeansthatwhileafullydetaileddecisionisnotrequired,neitherisaskimpyone‐linerisallowed.Thelegalreasonforthedismissalmustbewritten.DissentersandAbstainers Inthecaseofadecisiononthemerits,ifamember(a)tooknopart,or(b)dissented,or(c)abstainedfromadecisionorresolution,hemuststatehisreasontherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.13.)Eventhosewhotooknopartinthedeliberationsbutwerepresent,andthosewhoabstainedarerequiredtowritetheirreasonsforthesearereallyformsofcastingtheirvote.Thosewhoinhibitedthemselvesare,ofcourse,notrequiredtovote,sincetheydidnotreallyparticipate. Procedurally,thepurposeistoenablethepartytofindoutthereasonfortheactiontaken.ForcourtslowerthantheSC,andeventheSCitself,thisisimportantforappealormotionforreconsiderationpurposes,asthebasisfortheassignmentoferror. (19)MandatoryperiodfordecidingcasesArt.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedorresolvedwithintwenty‐fourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and,unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsforallotherlowercourts.(2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.(3)Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.(4)Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudicetosuchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseormattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.Art.VII,Sec.18. xxx TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. xxx(par.3thereof.)Art.XVIII,Sec.12.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinoneyearaftertheratificationofthisConstitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodies.Id.,Sec.13.Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable.Id.,Sec.14.Theprovisionsofparagraphs(3)and(4),Section15ofArticleVIIIofthisConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.A)CasesfiledafterFebruary2,1987

41 AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedwithintwenty‐fourmonthscountedfromthedateofsubmission."[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)] Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolu‐tionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(2)]MandatoryperiodintheSupremeCourt:24months[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)]Except:Apropercasequestioningthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworsuspensionoftheprivilegewhichmustbedecided30daysfromfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.1.)Butwhathappensifthejudgeorcourtfailstomeetthedeadlineanyway?TheConstitutionprovides: Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeorthepresidingJudgeshallforthwithbeissued,andacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(3)] Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudicetosuchresponsibility(administrativedisciplinaryactionagainstthejudgeorjustices)shalldecideorresolvethecaseormattersubmittedtheretofordeterminationwithoutfurtherdelay.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(4)] Inotherwords,failuretodecidethecase[forreasonsotherthantheinabilitytoreachthenecessarymajority]hasnoconsequenceonthecase.Thus,acertificationisrequiredthattheperiodhaslapsedwithoutanydecisionbeingmade,statingthereasonforsuchinaction.Thenthecourtmustdecidewithoutanyfurtherdelay.Theconsequencesareonthejudge:(a)hecouldnotdrawouthissalary,sincehewouldnotbeabletocertifythathehasresolvedallcasessubmittedtohimin90daysand(b)heissubjecttoadministrativesanctions.B)CasesfiledbeforeFebruary2,1987butexpireafterthisdate TheprovisionsofArt.VIII,Sec,15(3)‐(4)shallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.(Art.XVIII,Sec.14) Inotherwords,itisasifthesecaseswerefiledafterFebruary2,1987.C)CasesthatexpiredbeforeFebruary2,1987

Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbytheSCassoonaspracticable.(Art.XVIII,Sec.13.)

TheSupremeCourtshall,within1yearfromFebruary2,1987adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSCorlowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodies.(Art.XVIII,Sec.12.)B.LOWERCOURTS (1)QualificationsandappointmentArt.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourtmustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourtorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.(2)theCongressshallprescribethequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybeappointedjudgethereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippineBar.Id.,Sec.8.

(5)The(JudicialandBar)CouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatlistthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.

Forthelowercourts,thePresidentshallissuetheappointmentwithinninetydaysfromthesubmissionofthelist.Composition Thecompositionoflowercourtsshallbeprovidedbylaw.ThelawsaretheJudiciaryActof1948andBP129.QualificationsLowerCollegiateCourt(CourtofAppeals)(1)Nopersonshallbeappointedmemberofanylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanatural‐borncitizen.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(1)]andamemberofPhilippineBar.(2)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)](3)Amemberofthejudiciarymustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probity,andindependence.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)]LowerCourts(1)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybeappointedjudgethereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippinebar.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)](2)Hemustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probityandindependence.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)] (2)SalaryArt.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupremecourtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalaryshallnotbedecreased. (3)CongressionalpowertoreorganizeandsecurityoftenureArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.Id.,Sec.2.xxx NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofitsMembers.ThepowerofCongresstoreorganizelowercourtshasbeenupheldbytheSCpriorto1987.OcampovSecretaryofJustice,TheSCbyfailingtomusterthe2/3voterequiredthentodeclarealawunconstitutionalineffectsustainedthevalidityofthelawpassedbyCongressabolishingtheofficesof"judges‐at‐large"and"cadastraljudges"andtheconsequentremovalofjudgesoccupyingtheseposts.Notingthatthepurposeofthelawwastopromotetheindependenceofthejudiciary(byavoidingforum‐shopping),itheldthatanabolitionofanofficemadeingoodfaithdoesnotviolatesecurityoftenure.Securityoftenurepresupposesthecontinuedexistenceoftheofficefromwhichonewasremovednotremovalfromanofficethathasbeenabolishedingoodfaith

42 andnotmerelypartisanpoliticalreasons. (4)RemovalArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.Cruz:"Judgesoflowercourt,"ashereused,includesjusticesoftheSandiganbayan.Thisrulecastsmuchdoubtonthelegalityofthepresidentialdecreemakingthemremovableonlybythelegislaturethroughtheprocessofimpeachment. (5)JurisdictionArt.VIII,Sec.1.JudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.J.M.Tuason&Co.vCA;YnotvIAC,Thereisineffecta"constitutionalconfermentoforiginaljurisdictiononthelowercourtsinthosefivecasesforwhichtheSupremeCourtisgrantedappellatejurisdictionin5(2)."UndertheprovisiongrantingtheSCjurisdiction"toreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelaworRulesofCourtmayprovide,judgmentsoflowercourts,"lowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance. (6)RequirementsastopreparationofdecisionsArt.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefusedduecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.Mannerofsitting TheCourtofAppealssitsindivisionswhenithearscases;theonlytimeitconvenesasonebodyistotakeupmattersofadministration. Thetrialandinferiorcourts,ofcourse,donothavethisproblemsincethereisonlyonejudge.Deliberations Thesamerequirements(forconsulta)shallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.(Art.VIII,Sec.13).Forobviousreasons,thisrequirementdoesnotapplytothetrialandinferiorcourts.Voting Forcollegiatecourts,liketheCourtofAppeals,thelawprovidesthatitsitsonlyindivisionswhendecidingcases.Fortrialandinferiorcourts,noproblemarisessinceonlyonejudgeisinvolved.EffectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajorityCourtofAppeals.‐‐Thesamerulesapply,exceptthatthedecisioncannowbeappealedtotheSC.InferiorCourts.‐‐Failuretodecidehasnoconsequenceonthedecisionofthecourt.TheCourtisnotoustedofitsjurisdiction,butthejudgesuffers

administrativeconsequences. (7)Mandatoryperiodfordeciding Art.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedorresolvedwithintwenty‐fourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and,unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsforallotherlowercourts.(2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.(3)Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.(4)Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudicetosuchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseormattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.Art.XVIII,Sec.12.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinoneyearaftertheratificationofthisConstitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodies.Id.,Sec.13.Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable.Id.,Sec.14.Theprovisionsofparagraphs(3)and(4),Section15ofArticleVIIIofthisConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.MandatoryPeriodLowercollegiatecourts:12months,unlessreducedbytheSCOtherlowercourts:3months,unlessreducedbytheSCTheConstitutionnowexplicitlyprovidesinSec.15(1)thattheperiodsaremandatory,asidefromusingtheword"must"(not"shall"asin1973)inSec.15(1).ThecaseofMarcelinovCruz,whichheldthattheperiodsinthe1973Constitutionwereonlydirectory,isthusnow,overruled.Cruz:Itshouldbenotedthat,althoughdecisionwithinthemaximumperiodisnowmandatory,failuretoarriveatthesamewillnotdivestthecourtofjurisdiction,withoutprejudicetoanyresponsibilitythatmayattachtothejudge.Thecourtmuststillresolvethecasew/ofurtherdelay,unliketheoldrulewhenthedecisionappealedwasdeemedautomaticallyaffirmedandthepetitionwasdeemedautomaticallydismissedasaresultoftheinactionofthecourt.C.JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCILArt.VIII,Sec.8.(1)AJudicialandBarCouncilisherebycreatedunderthesupervisionoftheSupremeCourtcomposedoftheChiefJusticeasexofficioChairman,theSecretaryofJustice,andarepresentativeoftheCongressasexofficioMembers,arepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar,aprofessoroflaw,aretiredMemberoftheSupremeCourt,andarepresentativeoftheprivatesector.(2)TheregularmembersoftheCouncilshallbeappointedbythePresidentforatermoffouryearswiththeconsentoftheCommissionon

43 Appointments.OftheMembersfirstappointed,therepresentativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawforthreeyears,theretiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear.(3)TheClerkoftheSupremeCourtshallbetheSecretaryexofficiooftheCouncilandshallkeeparecordofitsproceedings.(4)TheregularMembersoftheCouncilshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedbytheSupremeCourt.TheSupremeCourtshallprovideinitsannualbudgettheappropriationsfortheCouncil.(5)TheCouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.Ex‐officiomembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)] (1)ChiefJusticeasex‐officioChairman (2)SecretaryofJustice (3)RepresentativeofCongressRegularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)] (4)RepoftheIntegratedBar (5)ProfessorofLaw (6)RetiredmemberoftheSC (7)RepresentativeofprivatesectorSecretaryex‐officio[Art.VIII,Sec.8(3)] ClerkoftheSC,whoshallkeeparecordofitsproceedingsAppointment,Tenure,SalaryEx‐officiomembers‐ForobviousreasonsthisdoesnotapplysincethepositionintheCouncilisgoodonlywhilethepersonistheoccupantoftheoffice. Regularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(2)]‐TheregularmembersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments. Thetermoftheregularmembersis4years.Butthetermofthoseinitiallyappointedshallbestaggeredinthefollowingwaysoastocreatecontinuityinthecouncil: IBPrepresentative‐4years Lawprofessor‐3years Retiredjustice‐2years Privatesector‐1year RegularmembersshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedbytheSC.TheSCshallprovideinitsannualbudgettheappropriationsfortheCouncil.[Art.VIII,Sec.8(4)]Functions: 1.RecommendappointeestotheJudiciary[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)] 2.RecommendappointeestotheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandhis5deputies.(Art.XI,Sec.9) 3.SuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSCmayassign[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)]Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.Forthelowercourts,thePresidentshallissuetheappointmentswithinninetydaysfromthesubmissionofthelist.D.AutomaticreleaseofappropriationforthejudiciaryArt.VIII,Sec.3.TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.AppropriationsfortheJudiciarymaynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,afterapproval,

shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.