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Irish Jesuit Province
Harmony in Labour Relations. III: Specific Programmes in the United StatesAuthor(s): Daniel LyonsSource: The Irish Monthly, Vol. 77, No. 911 (May, 1949), pp. 219-224Published by: Irish Jesuit ProvinceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20515987 .
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HARMONY IN LABOUR RELATIONS III.?SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES IN THE UNITED STATES
By DANIEL LYONS, SJ.
IN the present state of industrial society there is one glaring defect, and both management and labour are unhappy about it: the worker is not interested in his work. Since capital can do nothing without
labour, this situation constitutes the bottleneck of industry. The reasons why the labourer is not interested in his work are clear :
(1) his creative abilities are unused so that sufficient technical
interest is not aroused; (2) his abilities for managing and direct
ing have no opportunity to function, consequently that interest which comes from control over the processes of production is lacking; (3) there is no connection between the quality of his work and the
wage or salary he receives, so that as long as the worker does enough to keep his job he does not even have an economic motive for being interested in his work.
Because of such conditions, Pope Pius XI declared : "
In the present state of human society . . .We deem it ad
visable that the wage-contract should, when possible, be modified
somewhat by a contract of partnership, as is already being tried in various ways, to the no small gain both of the wage earners and
of the employers. In this way wage earners are made sharers in some sort in the ownership, or the management, or the profits."
It is evident that mere free competition cannot be the guiding prin
ciple of the economic world, for such a principle readily degenerates into a ruthless spirit of economic supremacy. The liberalism of the
last century, and Adam Smith's "
laissez-faire "
of the century before, have been tried before the bar of public opinion and been found want
ing. But some sort of social reconstruction is certainly on the agenda of the western world. Must it be Communism, which the Church has
forever condemned as inherently evil? Must it be that extreme form
of Socialism, which the Church has similarly condemned, and which
even the Communists admit is a mere stepping-stone to Communism?
The sovereign pontiffs have repeatedly insisted that this longed-for social reconstruction must be preceded by a profound renewal of the
Christian spirit. To have any effect* they declare, social reform must
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IRISH MONTHLY
be based on "
social justice and social charity." With this in mind, three systems which are being used to great advantage in the United
States will be considered: (1) the guaranteed annual wage; (2) mul
tiple management; (3) profit-sharing.
I. The Guaranteed Annual Wage
When Mr. Eric Johnston retired a few years ago as President of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, he said in his farewell speech : ?
" We businessmen say we regret to see slack times and seasonal
unemployment. We say we are for steadier jobs. Then what's
wrong with the annual wage? That's what it means, isn't it?
Steady jobs."
The United States Department of Labour recently reported that out
of ninety thousand businessmen who were questioned, the majority were in favour of some form of guaranteed income for their em
ployees. Unions have been advocating the guaranteed annual wage for several years, and the proposal has already been adopted in many
places. One of the most widely known annual wage plans is that in use since
1934 by the Hormel Company? in Austin, Minnesota. A meat packing firm, its business is highly seasonal. Livestock are born in certain
seasons, and the farmers bring them to the packers at certain times.
But to workers who get paid by the hour, the uncertainty of slack
seasons entails serious hardship. The Hormel Company first inaugurated the annual wage plan in
1933. The employees werei suspicious of it, called a strike against it.
and the plan was abolished. In the following year, however, the union
requested that the plan be restored. This is how it functions : from
sales prospects the company estimates the annual wage of the workers
for the ensuing year, agreeing to pay that amount in fifty-two equal instalments. During slack periods the workers may be employed for
only twenty-five hours a week, while in the busiest seasons they may work over fifty. If they work more than an average of forty hours
per week throughout the year they receive a bonus; if they average less
than forty hours weekly during the year they owe that many hours
of work to the company for the following year.
At Hormel, the emphasis is on production rather than clock hours
spent on the job. Speed allows extra bonuses and more leisure time.
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LABOUR RELATIONS
The C.L?. Union there has accepted responsibility for the quality of the work performed, and it takes punitive action, when necessary, to enforce discipline. The Hormel plan is similar to numerous other
adaptations of the guaranteed annual wage. In most cases> the indivi
dual workers are free to work either on an hourly pay rate or on the
fixed weekly rate for all seasons. Naturally, nearly all of them choose
the fixed rate at once, or their wives soon talk them into doing so. It
takes security to raise a family.
Economists who favour the annual wage insist that it must not
be considered as a guarantee against depression unemployment. For most firms to pay out wages during prolonged unemployment would be merely a short-cut to disaster. If this were to be the result
of annual wage programmes during the next business depression, the
whole movement would fall into disrepute for fifty years. Wise advo
cates of the plan insist that its purpose is to" provide steady income
where work is seasonal or otherwise unsteady. They maintain that the
unions themselves should favour limited responsibility on the part of
the company, to keep the plan from failing altogether.
II. Multiple Management
Workers are usually neither capable nor eager to participate in those
affairs which concern the financing of the company, its purchasing of
materials, or its finding a market. In the production line, however, they are both anxious and competent to participate. Working conditions,
safety, shop discipline, seniority, promotion, discharge, improvement of machinery, and progress in efficiency, all concern the workers.
Multiple management springs from a realization that a hundred
heads are better than one, and that workers who are allowed to take
part in the function of management are also more interested in their
job. In 1920, the United States Commissioner of Labour, Dr. Royal Meeker, made some strong statements along these lines. He said* in
part: ?
"I insist that the management, even scientific management, has not a monopoly of all the brains in an establishment. . .
There is a tremendous latent creative force in the workers of
to-day which is not being utilized at all .. . The goodwill of the
workers is a much more potent force making for industrial effi
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IRISH MONTHLY
ciency than all the scientific management formulas and systems of production... Workers are not different f^om employers."
Since Dr. Meeker uttered these words, thousands of American firms
have found it practical to adopt multiple management programmes. A classical example is the plan which has been in use since 1931 in
the huge McCormick spice and tea plant, in Baltimore. For its basic
operation the plan has four boards of management: the board of
directors, the junior board, the sales board, and the factory board.
The board of directors is much the same as in any other company. The junior board is composed of office executives. The sales board is
chosen from sales agents. The factory board is selected from workmen
in the production line. Members of each board are chosen for intervals
of six months by the vote of their fellow employees, or by the vote of
fellow board members. In the latter case, one board member is
replaced each term. The purpose of the respective boards is to make
recommendations for improving operations in their part of the plant The senior board must approve the recommendations, but where
these are unanimous, they are approved in nearly every case.
One of the best known instances of labour sharing in management is found in the shops of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, where the
participation is carried on through the union officials. Within the last
ten years more than twenty-five thousand suggestions have been made
for improving shop operations. Of this number, twenty-one thousand were adopted. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and
the International Ladies* Garment Workers' Union have also been
outstanding in the multiple management field.
Enlightened employers have found that the benefits which flow
from allowing labour to share in management are incalculable: the workers become more interested in their work and are more content
with it; employees are more concerned about the progress of the com
pany; the cold, business relationship between capital and labour is
replaced by something like a human relationship.
III. Profit-sharing
Organized labour can still recall when profit-sharing was used to
weaken unions, as well as to serve as a delusive substitute for higher wages. But there are now thousands of laudable profit-sharing plans in existence to-day.
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LABOUR RELATIONS
When a United States Senate committee investigated the question of profit-sharing, in 1939, the committee reported: "The public interest in the matter is tremendous." Since that time both labour and
management have become increasingly interested in the subject. Mr.
Eric Johnston declared, before the members of the United States
Chamber of Commerce: ?
"We say we really want to see more diffusion of the good things of the world. Then what's wrong with profit-sharing? What's
wrong with giving our workers a real incentive to produce more
for their own profit?and for yours?" In 1945, shortly before giving the address from which the above
paragraph is taken, Mr. Johnston started a multiple management and
profit-sharing plan in the four west coast industries which he directs.
The plan is simple: twenty-five per cent, of the net profit, before taxes and dividends, is to be split among the employees. Paid annually in a lump sum, the dividend is made according to a unit system : one
unit for each twenty-five pounds of wages, one unit for each year of
service, five units for each term on the junior multiple management board, fifteen units for assistant department managers, and so forth.
Since the junior board has complete access to the company's books
and can frankly inquire into any phase of the company's business, the
plan is a workable one. It is a replica of the McCormick plan.
Shortly before World War II, the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored a study of 165 profit-sharing plans then in use in America. The one
reported most satisfactory was the plan which Mr. M. A. Joslyn started, in 1919, in the Joslyn Manufacturing and Supply Company.
Mr. Joslyn, a graduate of Notre Dame University, inaugurated a plan
whereby the employees contribute from two and a half to five per cent,
of their weekly pay cheques into a retirement fund. The company pays into the fund not less than ten per cent, of its annual net operating
earnings, but not more than four times the amount paid in by the
employees. Various precautions are taken to prevent abuses. For
example, the company does not gain by discharging anyone. The profit-sharing plan of the Nunn-Bush Shoe Company operates
as follows : the company pays from thirty-five to fifty per cent, of its
profits into the fund. Employees do not contribute. The portion credited to each participant is in direct ratio to his earnings, plus his
length of service. Employees may draw out of the fund only upon
reaching the optional retirement age (forty-five for women and fifty
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IRISH MONTHLY
for men). The money may be drawn through an annuity, or by pay ment in monthly or annual instalments.
Perhaps the most simple of all profit-sharing plans is that used in the Kaiser-Frazer plant, where twenty-five shillings are set aside to be
distributed to the employees for every automobile that rolls off the
assembly Une (one every fifty seconds). In all recommendable profit sharing programmes, abuses are prevented by the payment of union
wages simultaneously with the profit-sharing agreement. The question might well be asked: "Of course, labour favours
profit-sharing. But what does the employer get out of it?" No better source can be referred to than the report of the United States Senate
committee that investigated the matter. The committee found, as
hundreds of employers have found, that the result of honest profit
sharing is increased production, more loyalty, higher efficiency, less
strikes. From the committee report, which contains enough figures to
fill a telephone directory, it is learned that twenty per cent, of those
companies without profit-sharing have strikes, but only ten per cent,
of those that share their profits have strikes. Furthermore, those com
panies with ideal profit-sharing systems have no strikes at all.
Before profit-sharing will succeed, both sides must enter the plan
unselfishly, in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill. But employers are pleasantly surprised as they discover how much better their plants run when labour and management work together, instead of against each other. At present there are more than eight thousand profit
sharing and pension plans operating in the United States, with more
than one hundred million pounds being paid into them annually. All three of these systems, the guaranteed annual wage, multiple
management, and profit-sharing, are designed to bring out the best
that is in capitalism, and to cure the causes of class struggle, which
lead to Communism. All three are built on a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation, which is a Christian spirit.
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