Haredim Research, judaism, haredim, cahssidim, hashem

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THE FLOERSHEIMER INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES

Haredi and Secular Jews in Jerusalem in the Future:

Scenarios and Strategies

Shlomo Hasson

Jerusalem, December 1999



Translation: IBRT Ltd.

Editor: Yoram NavonPrincipal Editor: Shunamith Carin

Preparation for Print: Ruth Lerner

Printer: Ahva Cooperative Press

ISSN 0792-6251

Publication No. 4/11e

© 1999, The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies Ltd.

9A Diskin St., Jerusalem 96440 Israel

Tel. 972-2-5666243; Fax. 972-2-5666252

[email protected]

http://www.fips.org.il



About the Author

Prof. Shlomo Hasson is a senior researcher at and Deputy-Director of the

Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Head of the Institute for Urban and

Regional Studies and Lecturer in the Geography Department at the Hebrew

University of Jerusalem.

About the Research

One of the main issues on the political agenda of Jerusalem is future relations

between haredi and secular Jews and the question of the city’s future image. Will

a culture war ensue and result in the city’s social and economic deterioration, or

will a mode of cohabitation between both sides be found, preserving the pluralistic

character of the city. This study offers four scenarios for the city of Jerusalem.Each scenario describes a different relationship between the two groups and

examines its implications on society, the economy, politics and the municipal

structure. Each scenario is based on several principles: an overall concept which

relates to a wide range of perspectives, a logical structure of subsequent

occurrences, a blend of scientific thought which identifies and analyzes existing

trends and a rendering of these trends with a futuristic perspective.

The first scenario, a foreign capital, describes the intensifying struggle between

the two groups and the consequences of this process. The second scenario,

Brooklyn in Jerusalem, describes Jerusalem as an economically sound Haredi city.

The third scenario, a multicultural capital, presents a city in which a common way

of life has been reached. The fourth scenario, a declining capital, ends in the

tempering struggle between the two groups, as a result of the intensifying tension

between the Jews and Arabs in the city. The four scenarios are not designed to

predict the future but to stimulate thinking by proposing various possibilities for

the city. These possibilities enrich the thinking about the city by creating “future

memories.” They impel policymakers and residents of the city to contemplate

situations not generally considered due to the inclination to conceive the future in

terms of the past. Reality teaches us that history is brimming with unpredicted

developments and vicissitudes and that we are often caught unaware. Viewing the

future through scenarios expands the mental map by including the unexpected.

Even if the possibilities raised in the scenarios do not materialize, merelybroadening the mental map equips us with better means of confronting future

perplexities.

As the author of these scenarios I would be grateful for comments and proposals

for alternatives.



About the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies

In recent years the importance of policy-oriented research has been increasingly

acknowledged. Dr. Stephen H. Floersheimer initiated the establishment of a

research institute that would concentrate on studies of long-range policy issues.

The purpose of the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies is to research

fundamental processes likely to be major issues for policy-makers in years to

come, analyze the long-range trends and implications of such problems, and

propose to the policy-makers alternative options and strategies.

The members of the Board of Directors are Dr. Stephen H. Floersheimer

(chairman); I. Amihud Ben-Porath, advocate (vice-chairman); David Brodet,

former Director General of the Ministry of Finance; and Hirsh Goodman,

founding editor of the Jerusalem Report and vice-president of the Jerusalem Post .The director of the Floersheimer Institute is Amiram Gonen, professor of

geography at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The deputy-director is prof.

Shlomo Hasson of the department of geography at the Hebrew University of

Jerusalem.

Publications on Religion, Society, and State in Israel

1. The Cultural Struggle over Jerusalem, Shlomo Hasson, 1996 (Hebrew and

English).

2. The Politics of Accommodation: Settling Conflicts of State and Religion

in Israel, Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 1997 (Hebrew).3. The Cultural Tension Within Jerusalem’s Jewish Population, Shlomo

Hasson and Amiram Gonen, 1997 (Hebrew and English).

4. Religion and Democracy in Israel, Benyamin Neuberger, 1997 (Hebrew and

English).

5. Governing and Managing a Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) City, Yosseph

Shilhav, 1997 (Hebrew and English).

6. The Haredi Education System: Allocation, Regulation and Control, Varda

Shiffer, 1998 (Hebrew and English, 1999).

7. Ultra-Orthodoxy in Urban Governance in Israel, Yosseph Shilhav, 1998

(English).

8. Between Three Branches of Government: The Balance of Rights inMatters of Religion in Israel, Shimon Shetreet, 1999 (Hebrew, English

forthcoming).

9. Religion and Political Accommodation in Israel, Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 1999

(English).

10. Haredi and Secular Jews in Jerusalem in the Future: Scenarios and

Strategies, Shlomo Hasson, 1999 (Hebrew and English).



Table of Contents

Introduction 7

1 Reality in Jerusalem and the Policy Ideal 9

2 The Essence of the Scenarios for Jerusalem 15

General Background 15

Four Scenarios 19

3 Scenario 1 – A Foreign Capital 21

4 Scenario 2 – Brooklyn in Jerusalem 32

5 Scenario 3 – A Multicultural Capital 37

6 Scenario 4 – A Declining Capital 42

The appointed committee 45

Belfast in Jerusalem 46

7 From Scenarios to Strategies 49

Conclusions 58

References 60



7

Introduction

What will relations between secular and haredi Jews in Jerusalem be like in the

future? How will these relations shape the political and cultural character of the

city? Will the polarization between the two groups continue to increase, or could

things turn out differently? At present, discussion of these issues tends to suffer

from short-sightedness. It is informed for the most part by old habits of thought

and even tends to perpetuate those. But if history teaches us any lesson at all, it

is that dramatic changes invariably surprise policymakers and researchers.

Indeed, most of the radical historical changes in recent years were not foreseen.

Among these were the collapse of the USSR, the rapid growth of the Internet,

and the revival of the Balkan problem.

The purpose of this paper is to present several scenarios regarding the futurerelations between haredi and secular Jews in the city so as to anticipate varying

eventualities. In my opinion, these relations will have a greater impact on the

character of Jerusalem than any other social factor, including the relation

between Arabs and Jews. This assessment is supported by a survey in which 60

percent of secular residents said they were considering leaving the city, and that

their main reason for wishing to leave is the tension between haredi and secular

Jews (Hasson and Gonen, 1997). In contrast to empirical studies, which

thoroughly scrutinize existing facts, the present paper is forward looking. It

deals with the future relations between haredi and secular Jews in Jerusalem in

three respects: values, descriptive-futuristic, and practical.

Regarding values, the paper presents a policy ideal based on two

presuppositions, namely, sociocultural pluralism and local democracy.

Achieving sociocultural pluralism means having a city in which the various

social groups maintain their different ways of life and display mutual respect



8

and consideration. The ideal of local democracy requires that there be no

coercion of lifestyles, that representation be proportionate to the weight of the

different groups in policymaking processes, and that the rights of minorities be

protected.

On the descriptive futuristic level, the paper examines a series of scenarios to

identify the factors that either support or hinder the realization of the ideal of a

pluralistic and democratic city. The scenarios relate to a wide range of factors:

political, economic, social, cultural, and spatial. They include variables whose

development can be foreseen with high certitude, as well as variables whose

future is shrouded in uncertainty. They are intended not to predict the future butto develop policymakers’ rapid response ability and prepare them for changing

situations, i.e. to alter the mental conception of the policymakers. It is rather the

margin of uncertainty that affords fertile ground for creative thinking about

possible courses of development, in the relations between the different cultural

groups in the city.

In the practical vein, the paper proposes a variety of strategies conducive to

achieving the ideal of a pluralistic and democratic city. By observing what

happens to this ideal in the diverse scenarios, we can assess the chances and

risks for this ideal under various political, social, and spatial circumstances. We

can thus propose modes of action that will reduce the risks and increase the

likelihood of achieving this goal.

The first chapter briefly surveys the existing situation in Jerusalem regarding the

haredi-secular relations and introduces the ideal to be sought. The second

chapter explains the nature of the scenarios. The third through sixth chapters

present the various scenarios. Chapter seven advances a series of strategies for

attaining the goal: making Jerusalem a pluralistic city with a democratic local

government.



9

1 Reality in Jerusalem and the PolicyIdeal

This paper was written against the background of demographic, social, and

political changes that are likely to have far-reaching effects on the character of

Jerusalem. In recent years the cultural polarization between haredi and secular

Jews in the city has intensified. The reasons for the polarization are many and

diverse. Some stem from the general tension between the haredi and the secular

populations on issues such as yeshiva students’ exemption from the draft into

the army, the religious establishment’s exclusive jurisdiction in matters of

Jewish marriage and divorce, government funding of causes of the haredi sector

and non-recognition by the Orthodox of Conservative and Reform conversions.

Others stem from tensions that are unique to Jerusalem and revolve around the

character of the public domain.

In Jerusalem the right to freedom of expression in public is at the heart of a

protracted cultural-political debate. The secular want to realize their right to

freedom of expression, inter alia, by going to movies and the theater and driving

through the city streets on the Sabbath and festivals. They want to maintain their

way of life in residential areas and dress as they wish. The trouble is that

exercising their right to freedom of expression in the public domain has

frequently clashed with haredi conceptions of the desired character of the publicdomain. The haredim have taken action in the past to have movie theaters and

cafes closed on the Sabbath and festivals, pressured the authorities to close

roads, they have burnt bus stations that displayed advertisements that they

perceived as immodest, and assaulted women who, in their opinion, were in

immodest attire in haredi neighborhoods. The secular want to freely display and





11

significant proportion were haredim. This exodus led to the sprouting of suburbs

around Jerusalem, where some half of those leaving the city settled.

Interestingly, in the suburbs people are segregated according to cultural group

and sociocultural status. Efrat is populated by the National Religious; Betar Illit

is populated by haredim; Mevasseret Ziyyon is the residence of affluent citizens;

Zur Hadassah attracted the middle class; and Ma’ale Adummim attracted the

middle and lower classes. It would seem that living in the suburbs enables

Jewish Jerusalemites to fulfill their dream — to live with people who are similar

and avoid others. In contrast to coexistence, the suburb represents the option of

living in isolation and free to maintain a congenial lifestyle. Does this constitute

evidence that urban pluralism, where different groups live in the same area,

treating each other with consideration, respect, patience, and tolerance — is

impracticable? Is the suburb, which is predicated on cultural and social

segregation, the inevitable alternative to urban pluralism? I think not. I believe

that we can and should have cultural pluralism in Jerusalem simultaneously with

a diversity of neighborhoods and cultures. Such pluralism cannot be achieved by

a legally enforced annexation of the suburbs. Such an imposed pluralism would

be highly artificial and might require a measure of violence in enforcing an

unwanted affiliation on the new suburbanites. Moreover, I think that in the long

run it will prove ineffectual. One of the main goals of this paper is rather toexplore how sociocultural pluralism in Jerusalem can be fostered by means of

dialogue and enhanced understanding between the groups.

Another process that has taken place in Jerusalem in recent years is the

withdrawal of the non-haredi Jewish population from political life. Thus, while

haredim constitute about one-fifth of all eligible voters (Hasson & Gonen,

1997), one-third of the city council are haredi representatives. Together with the

National Religious, the religious camp has elected 15 of the 31 city councilors.

The secular and traditional population is not represented proportionally today in

the city council. Although the secular and traditional have no one to blame for

this but themselves, the present political situation poses a constant threat to the

non-haredi population. These people bear the brunt of municipal taxation but are

not represented proportionally in decision-making processes. If this situation

continues, non-haredi exodus may well expand. It will continue even if this

population is convinced beyond doubt that more cafes and movie theaters have



12

been opened in recent years than ever before. The secular success in

determining the character of the public domain stands in sharp contrast to the

conspicuous rise of the haredim to leading positions of power in municipal

politics. Thus, in the long run, many people fear, whoever controls the political

system will also control the public domain.

In my opinion, both sides have an interest in alleviating the tension. Both haredi

and secular Jews can benefit from a political system that truly represents all

groups. Haredi control of the city council is liable to leave them in a city that is

increasingly being abandoned by its secular and affluent residents. The state of

exemption from municipal property tax in haredi neighborhoods is alreadyabout 40 percent. A mostly haredi city will have difficulty in meeting residents’

needs. It will be forced to appeal to the government, and there is no guarantee

that the response will always be favorable. Israeli governments, whether

controlled by the Left or the Right, are not famous for being interested in the

everyday trials and tribulations of Jerusalem. There is almost an inverse

relationship between declarations of political support for the unity of the city

and action in economic and developmental terms. Both sides therefore have an

interest in supporting the existence of a socially pluralistic city with a genuinely

democratic administration.

Obviously, I am not writing in a vacuum in terms of values and ideas. Therefore

it is important that I briefly explain my values and my conception regarding the

social and political nexus of Jerusalem. I am a Jerusalemite. I was born, grew

up, and received my education in the city, and to this day I continue to live there

with my family. My grandparents were religious Jews and my parents were

traditional. My attitude toward religion is warm, open, and sympathetic. The

sociopolitical atmosphere in Jerusalem during my childhood was more open and

relaxed than it is today. Movie theaters, cafes, and restaurants were closed on

the Sabbath, except for one or two for which customers had to buy vouchers inadvance. There was tension in the city between the haredim and the secular, and

there were Sabbath demonstrations and clashes. But the animosity was not as

intense as it is today. I am deeply concerned about the extremism manifested by

both camps and the rise to prominence of people on both sides who seek

confrontation. It is clear to me that many Jerusalemites want a more moderate,



13

diversified city based on the principle of religious freedom, but the voice of the

moderates is hardly ever heard because of the fervor of the conflict. I hope the

voicing of my conception will give expression to the quiet camp, but I do not

pretend to speak in its name.

In the recent elections I was involved, together with several colleagues

(including Yossi Tal-Gan and Yael Elon), in founding a party that ran for the city

council, advocating, among other things, compromise and dialogue between the

religious and the secular. The party, which was founded three months before the

elections and included religious, traditional, and secular members, won one seat

on the city council. During the election campaign, we read with greatenthusiasm the principles of the religious-secular covenant drafted by Prof. Avi

Ravitzky (member of Memad party) and MK Yossi Beilin (currently Minister of

Justice), and we sought ways to refine and adapt it to the special conditions of

Jerusalem. The covenant itself does not refer to the public arena and the public

domain, where cultural groups upholding different values and norms meet.

Therefore, additional thought is needed not only on the relation between religion

and state but, more importantly, on the relation between religion and society.

I am writing this paper at the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies. Although

I take sole responsibility for my remarks, I find it appropriate to be writing them

at the Floersheimer Institute, which has supported the approach of a pluralistic,

open society as its guideline.

I would like to see Jerusalem as a pluralistic capital whose city council includes

representatives of all the cultural groups in accordance with their demographic

share in the population. As we know, this is not the situation in the city at

present. Secular and traditional residents, who form a majority in the city, are

decidedly underrepresented. Moreover, the distribution of power in the

municipality does not correspond to the sociocultural composition of the city.Thus, the challenge is to develop strategies that will keep the non-haredim in the

city, encourage them to vote, and achieve adequate representation for the

different groups in local political life.



14

A pluralistic political nexus is the archetype of municipal politics that I would

like to see in Jerusalem. This is essentially the ideal or policy objective that

guides my thinking about the future character of the city. In an attempt to assess

the likelihood of achieving this ideal and the methods (i.e., strategies) to be

deployed for this purpose, I offer the following several scenarios regarding the

future of the city.



15

2 The Essence of the Scenarios for Jerusalem

General Background

The purpose of the scenarios is not to forecast the future but to rehearse various

possible futures (Schwartz 1996:192). The scenarios are intended to answer the

question of “what will happen if…?”. For example, how will relations between

haredi and secular Jews be affected if a violent intifada breaks out in Jerusalem?

What would happen if the haredim went out to work on a large scale and their

standard of living rose? Dealing with the question of “what if…?” enables

policymakers and planners to imagine different developments and be prepared

in time to give appropriate answers, i.e., to develop appropriate strategies. This

preparation can be an advantage to policymakers and planners because it

enables them to provide rapid and flexible responses to changing situations.

History teaches us that the future is almost impossible to predict, and the

scenarios presented here will also probably prove at least partly inadequate for

predicting the future. But working with the scenarios and developing an

approach that takes into account unexpected changes make it possible to

respond creatively and rapidly to the unexpected. This is the main contribution of

the scenarios. The scenarios, in other words, are pictures of the future intended to

increase flexibility and creativity in the mental processes undergone by

policymakers (Schriefer, 1997).

The development of the scenarios is a combination of scholarly research and

imagination. The scholarly research provides the facts. Through investigation

we can identify the largely predetermined factors, such as demographic growth

among different populations. We can also discover what forces activate the

system, for instance, economic competition between localities for public funds,



16

private resources, or professional personnel. We can also identify those

variables whose direction is undefined but whose evolvement may have a

considerable impact on the future of the city. For example, it is not clear how

much government investment there will be in Jerusalem. Presumably, a high

government investment or a low one would lead to different futures. These

assumptions, which are tantamount to different eventualities, can form the basis

for different scenarios. The scenario weaves together the data and trends with

the assumptions, and, by employing creative imagination, links the two to form

a coherent story with internal logic.

The scenarios are not exercises in science fiction. They are based on hard dataand on patterns, trends, and processes that have been identified by experts, and

they continue to creatively interpret the data into the future, while keeping an

open mind for surprises and unexpected changes. In creating the scenarios,

much attention is paid to those “pockets” of the future that are already contained

in the present. Observing the experiences of societies that have been in similar

situations can help identify these pockets. Naturally, the scenarios must draw on

a broad survey of data and trends from different fields, some of them very

closely related to the immediate topic and others far from it but with a great

potential for influence. Experts in different fields can contribute to thedevelopment of the scenarios. A team effort bringing together a wealth of

expertise and viewpoints is highly desirable.

The scenarios can be likened to a wind tunnel in which the ‘aircraft’ model of

pluralistic and democratic politics is tested. The author of the scenarios, like an

engineer who builds a wind tunnel, can modify the conditions in the tunnel. In

other words, he or she can create different scenarios and examine, in each case,

the difficulties and opportunities involved in achieving the policy ideal of a

pluralistic city with a democratic government. As with the wind tunnel, one can

introduce changes in the model or identify situations to be avoided in order forthe designed model to function (Heijden, 1997). In this manner, one can use the

scenario as a sort of experiment in order to refine the pluralistic-democratic

ideal or to develop strategies that make it feasible.



17

The proposed scenarios cover a range of 10 to 20 years. During this time, trends

and processes that are already visible are likely to mature. However,

unforeseeable changes during this time may entail far-reaching transformations

in the social and political configuration of the city. In other words, the scenarios

depend on certain factors that seem to be largely determined, but also on highly

uncertain factors.

Predetermined factors

These factors can be anticipated with a high degree of certainty. They include

the following:

a. The rate of natural increase among the haredim will remain high. Studies

show that modernization is not reducing their rate of natural increase. This

does not necessarily mean a rapid increase in the haredi population of the

city, however, because of their negative net migration.

b. The rate of natural increase among the Arabs will remain higher than that

among the Jewish population. This does not necessarily mean a rapid

increase in the Arab population, however. The rapid increase in the

percentage of Arabs in Jerusalem in recent years was caused by

immigration in response to the Israeli policy of denying residency to Arabs

who could not prove that they live in the city on a permanent basis. A

revocation of this policy would enable Arabs to live outside the city if they

wish.

c. The rate of natural increase of the secular and traditional population, which

is substantially lower than that of the haredim but higher than in the rest of

the country, will drop below its present level because of a rise in the

standard of living.

d. Out-migration by all groups in the Jewish population (secular, traditional,

religious, and haredi) will continue. This process accompanies the growth

of a Jewish metropolitan area around the city and stems from a wide variety



18

of causes involving employment, housing, social factors, and quality of

life.

Uncertain factors

These factors are shrouded by uncertainty and may take different turns.

They include:

a. The extent of government intervention in economic investment, housing,

and political organization of the city. The government may intensify its

involvement in city life or it may continue to neglect Jerusalem, whiledeclaring its unreserved loyalty to it.

b. The percentage of Arabs in the city and their acceptance of the present

political system. In this regard, one may come up with several

eventualities, ranging from a continuation of the present political situation

to advancing toward a solution of the problem of Jerusalem or an

exacerbation of the conflict. The eventualities are dependent on

demographic processes within the Arab population, progress in the peace

process, and the nature and tendencies of government in Israel and among

the Palestinians.

c. The percentage of haredim in the city. The haredi population as a

proportion of the total population of the city is affected by several

processes that operate in opposite directions. Natural increase greater than

the city average is boosting the proportion of the haredi population, while

the growing number of out-migrants, especially young couples who cannot

afford residences in Jerusalem, is checking the impact of natural increase.

Two factors may reduce the negative net migration by haredim and thereby

increase their proportion in the city: a greater participation in the laborforce and government investments in housing for haredi families in

Jerusalem. Greater participation in the labor force would enhance the

well-being of the haredi population and enable community members who

so wish to remain in the city. On the other hand, a continuation of the

present trend in which a large percentage of the male population is not part





20

Two axes of uncertainty and four scenarios

Each compartment may contain additional scenarios as well owing to

differences in the behavior of the Arab population and in the standard of living

of the haredim. To avoid having too many scenarios (the number of uncertain

parameters can produce 16 scenarios), I have taken these possibilities into

account in some of the scenarios.



21

3 Scenario 1 - A Foreign Capital

High percentage of haredim in the city, low standard of living among

haredim, high government intervention, maintenance of the status quo

in Jewish-Arab relations

The demographic processes in Jerusalem in the late 20th and early 21st

centuries led to a steady increase in the haredi population and an increase of

their percentage in the total Jewish population. A salient manifestation of these

trends is the number of haredi pupils in Jerusalem schools. In 1993, haredim

formed 21.9 percent of all high-school pupils, 38.8 percent of the pupils in

elementary schools, and 55 percent of children in kindergartens (JerusalemEducation Administration survey, Jerusalem Municipality, 1995). By the year

2005, the proportion of haredim was up to 80 percent of kindergarten children,

66 percent of pupils in elementary schools, and 54 percent of high-school pupils.

The chief struggle of the haredim in the beginning of the 21st century was to

enable members of their community to obtain housing in Jerusalem and to

remain near the religious centers. They claimed that they had been discriminated

against for a long time in terms of allocations for housing and that it was only

right that the discrimination be corrected. The increase in their weight in the

population and their importance in local and national politics accorded their

demand a political impact that could not be ignored. Since the ruling parties on

the national and local levels had difficulty in forming coalitions and in ensuring

the election of the prime minister and mayor without haredi support, the secular

parties became more willing to make amends for the discrimination and allocate

land to haredim.



22

One site that was fought over for a long time was the Arazim Valley, on the

western outskirts of Jerusalem. In and near the Arazim Valley, the haredim

demanded permission to build thousands of dwelling units for their community.

For a while environmental organizations managed to repel these demands, but

when the haredim gained political power in the central government and came to

control the city council, the plan to build haredi neighborhoods in the area was

approved. Thus territorial continuity of haredi neighborhoods was achieved

from Me’a She’arim in the east to Ramat Shlomo and Ramot Alon in the west.

A continuous stretch of haredi neighborhoods now overlooked the entrances to

Jerusalem by Route 1 in the west and Route 4 in the north. The political and

planning authorities decided to allocate land also in the southern part of the city,

especially Giv’at Hamatos and Har Homa, to haredim and other religious Jews.

As a result, much of the new housing in northern and southern Jerusalem was

populated by haredim, thus, signalling pretty clearly to the secular residents that

the powers that be were not particularly keen on their remaining in Jerusalem.

In 2008, haredim became a majority in Jerusalem, amounting to slightly over

half of the population. Elsewhere in Israel too, an impressive proportional haredi

growth was recorded. Haredim were estimated as constituting 15 percent of the

total Israeli population. Large haredi neighborhoods developed in many cities,including Petah Tiqva, Netanya, and Ashdod. The growth of the haredi

population together with their high and regimented voting rate led to massive

haredi representation in the Knesset, so that even more than before the haredim

tipped the balance between the political right and left.

The growth of the haredi population was not accompanied by a change in their

lifestyle. Most haredi men continued to study in yeshivas (theological

seminaries) and kollelim (theological seminaries for married men), and only a

minority held jobs. The forecasts of several researchers notwithstanding, haredi

society did not collapse, chiefly because haredi Knesset members held keypositions in the government. Haredim headed the ministries of Construction and

Housing, Interior, Labor and Social Welfare, Education and Culture, and

Religious Affairs. A haredi Knesset member served as deputy Finance minister,

and another chaired the Finance Committee. Haredi ministers and Knesset



23

members wielded their power wherever possible, diverting public resources to

their preferred causes.

The close balance between the left and the right, which persisted, caused

frequent changes in government. Governments rose and fell, and in each

election the haredi parties grew in proportion to their increasing constituency.

Shas (an ultra-Orthodox Sephardic party) activity became especially

conspicuous. The Deri trial served as a turning point in the history of the

movement; the trial actually boosted Shas’s representation in the Knesset

markedly because of frustration and anger among the socioeconomic weaker

segments of the communities of eastern origin. The Shas school system rapidlyexpanded, and by the early 21st century it had produced a large number of

yeshiva students emulating the full-time Ashkenazi yeshiva students. Owing to

this state of affairs, the haredi parties were courted from right and left. They

gladly yielded to the courtship, and in order to ensure the requisite flow of funds

they “consented” to participate in every government coalition.

Following the increase in the weight of the haredi population, the political

system in Jerusalem changed. The political rise of the haredi community to

center stage and its new status as a major municipal political power during

Olmert’s terms of office proved, in the long run, to be a historic turning point in

local politics. In the interim stage, which began in 1993, the haredim and the

national-religious party took over the municipal positions of power. Even then,

it was clear that they were the ones who were determining municipal taxation

and deciding on spending and services, giving clear preference to haredi

interests. These processes turned out to be irreversible. The Haredi Education

Division and the Religious Culture Division created during Olmert’s first term

as mayor were not subsequently abolished, and the haredi hold on financing and

planning grew even stronger. The haredi presence in municipal politics

increased steadily over the years, and the percentage of haredim on the citycouncil rose from around a third in 1998 to more than half in 2008.

In 2008, a haredi politician was elected mayor. The haredim, who now held all

the positions of power in Jerusalem and many in the government, used all the

means at their disposal to serve their constituents and to strengthen their



24

position in the city. Haredim on the city council and in the government allocated

land within the city for haredi neighborhoods and for haredi educational and

cultural institutions and ensured that subsidized housing was built for haredim.

The haredi members of the local and district planning committees designated

areas within secular neighborhoods for haredi elementary schools, yeshivas, and

ritual baths. At first the allocations were disguised as areas for public use, but it

soon transpired that virtually all of them were intended for synagogues, ritual

baths, haredi elementary schools, and yeshivas. Haredim then moved into these

neighborhoods following their public institutions, initially in a thin trickle and

then in an ever growing stream.

Consequent to these processes, on the political level and on that of planning and

space, the secular residents felt more frustrated and more alienated from the

establishment. The non-haredim lost faith in the political system, while local

conflicts intensified. Social organizations acting for the secular public became

rife on the city scene, and they strove to curb the penetration of haredi

institutions and families into their neighborhood. The secular social movements

first became prominent in the struggles over Bar-Ilan Street and Ramot Alon.

Initially, efforts were made to achieve an understanding between the haredim

and the secular, through dialogue. Upon the election of an ultra-Orthodox mayorin 2008, committees were formed to discuss the relations between the cultural

groups in Jerusalem. In these discussions, an effort was made to formulate the

rights of the secular residents within a covenant that would safeguard the rights

of the minorities. But it quickly became evident that the haredim were

conducting the discussions spuriously while behind the scenes they were

working to further fortify their position and their control of the city.

Frustration with the attempt to build bridges and hold a dialogue drove many

moderate seculars who had sought coexistence and dialogue to militant secular

groups, which already since the 1980’s had nurtured an anti-haredi ideology. Asa result, there have been growing confrontation and conflict between seculars

and haredim. The absence of constitutional protection of the rights of the secular

minority intensified the conflicts between seculars and haredim in the city.

Campaigns against the penetration of haredim into secular neighborhoods

became more frequent. The secular population, especially in the southern parts



25

of the city - neighborhoods that had been secular strongholds until the beginning

of the 21st century - tried to organize opposition to the activities of the haredi

authorities. Scores of appeals against the planning decisions of the municipality

were filed, and experts and attorneys were hired for large sums of money to

support these appeals. But most of the objections were rejected by the local and

district committees, which were headed by people recommended for office by

haredi rabbis; moreover, most members of the boards, including the appeals

committees, were haredim or their associates.

Petitions to the High Court of Justice to protect the rights of secular

Jerusalemites did not help. The haredim thwarted the High Court rulings, whichsought to protect civil rights, by applying their parliamentary leverage and

changing the relevant laws. Legislation circumventing High Court rulings left

the secular residents of Jerusalem without recourse, thus leading to an escalation

of the conflict.

The establishment of yeshivas, ritual baths, and haredi elementary schools in

distinctly secular neighborhoods led to the sale of adjoining houses to haredim.

Gradually, the haredi core spread to neighborhoods that had previously been

manifestly traditional, national-religious or secular. As a result, many people

concluded that Jerusalem was no longer the place for them and they chose to

leave the city. In keeping with the trends identified back in the late 1990s, most

of the out-migrants were secular and traditional.

Subsequent to the secular flight from the city, the number of pupils in state and

state-religious kindergartens and elementary schools dropped significantly.

Therefore, many schools and preschools in non-haredi neighborhoods were

closed. Older secular residents remained in the city, as did mostly poor

traditional residents, who could not or did not want to leave Jerusalem.

The out-migrants were predominantly affluent, and unlike their predecessors,

their main reason for leaving was not the seeking of employment or affordable

housing, but the increase in the demographic and political weight of the haredim

and the decline in the quality of life in the city. Many of them headed for the

suburbs of Jerusalem and others moved to localities along the coastal plain.



26

The departure of the socioeconomically stronger residents of the city led to the

emergence of socio-spatial imbalances between the center (Jerusalem) and the

surrounding suburbs, manifesting itself in environmental development, and in

the quality of housing, schools, and services. The haredim, who were now a

majority in the city, tended to be poor and have large families, whereas the

secular population of the surrounding suburbs consisted of small, relatively

affluent families. The haredi areas were characterized by low income, high

housing density, low or mostly no taxation.

The gap between the city of Jerusalem and its suburbs was reminiscent of that

between the central city and suburbs in many North American metropolitanareas. But Jerusalem is not like America, and the gaps between it and the

suburbs were more intense because the economic aspect was compounded by a

cultural rift between the secular citizens and the haredim. Residents of the

suburbs of Jerusalem, unlike American suburbanites, could not travel on their

days off to shopping centers and cultural or recreational centers in the city, and

transportation on the Sabbath was restricted to just a few routes. The cultural

conflict impelled more people to leave the city. Their departure further reduced

the city’s tax base, and Jerusalem, which was growing more and more haredi,

found itself much like Bene Beraq (an ultra-Orthodox city): in a constantbudgetary crisis and growing dependence on the central government.

The departure of the secular population severely damaged the economic basis of

the city. Agencies and factories closed down, secular networks of business

connections deteriorated, and the local patriotism arising from the link between

economic activity and local life gradually declined. The out-migrants quickly

lost their sense of in any way belonging to the city and totally ceased to identify

with it. Eventually, many of them decided also to move their businesses out of

Jerusalem to places with which they could feel identified, where they could

operate without restrictions, and where there lived groups with similar values,culture, and world view. The business relations that had done much to attract

businesses and spur economic growth dwindled, the tax base shrank, and the

city deteriorated in terms of economic activity.



27

The mostly haredi Jerusalem municipality followed the model of Bene Beraq,

just before the city council was dissolved and replaced with an appointed

council. But in Jerusalem, unlike Bene Beraq, the council was not dissolved.

Representatives of the haredi parties, whose position in the government had

grown stronger, opposed the dissolution of the Jerusalem city council and foiled

the appointing of a replacement committee.

Many administrative and executive jobs were transferred from traditionalist and

secular workers to haredim. The assignment of jobs was determined behind the

scenes by rabbis and their associates. Impropriety became the norm. City

councilors pressured officials to allocate benefits to their family members. Onepolitician who held a high-ranking municipal position would regularly give

preference to his relatives in distributing benefits. Every Passover, he would

allocate sites in public parks where a relative of his ran an amusement park. All

this, in contravention of the accepted norms and causing great suffering to the

neighbors. The professional civil servants who had been trained at great effort in

Jerusalem found themselves in an impossible situation, and many top officials

resigned or were made to resign because of disagreement with the haredi

councilors.

More and more people obtained exemptions from municipal property tax, until

three-fifths of the haredim were exempt. Most of the burden fell on the secular

population, which resented having to finance the city “without having any

rights.” The result was the continued flight of the affluent, a worsening

economic crisis, a deterioration of infrastructure and maintenance, as well as

constant and large increases in municipal property tax rates. One secular city

councilor said in a council meeting on the property-tax issue that the haredim

were now slaughtering the goose that had laid golden eggs for them. Reports by

the city and state comptroller on the economic and administrative situation in

Jerusalem met with irate responses and were described as antisemitic criticism.The city comptroller was depicted as a haredi-hater, and one haredi councilor

even compared him to an Inquisitor’s dog who merely envies the haredim.

In an attempt to retrieve the secular and traditionalist residents who had left the

city (and its taxpayer pool) and to revive commerce, the municipality of



28

Jerusalem applied pressure on the government to annex to the city all the

localities between Jerusalem and the line connecting Beit Shemesh and Modi’in.

“Jerusalem” it was argued, “needs a lot of land to develop its economy, absorb

new residents, and cope with the growth of the Arab population.” The request

had the unqualified support of the haredi ministers in the government;

accordingly, a probing commission was formed to look into the matter. Feeling

threatened, the secular and traditionalist population of the Jerusalem suburbs

began to leave the area designated for annexation, thereby weakening the Jewish

presence not only in Jerusalem but also throughout the Jerusalem district.

The rise of the haredim to municipal positions of power turned a new page inJewish-Arab relations in the city. The ascendancy of a non-Zionist population

that does not serve in the army, is sharply critical of secular society, and aspires

that halakhah supersede the laws of the state brought about a rapprochement

between haredi Jews and Arabs. A haredi councilor who held a senior portfolio

explained:

On certain issues we collaborate more closely with religious Arabs

than with secular Jews. Regarding modesty, for example, I have no

problems with the Arabs; on the issue of abortions we have no

problems with the Arabs. We have things in common with the Arabs.

Therefore the new situation makes possible unprecedented

coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.

The processes taking place in Jerusalem were not thoroughly understood right

away. At first the media gave them a lot of coverage, mostly in gossip columns

about the new leaders of the city. The haredi mayor, interviewed by all the

media soon after his election, tried to calm the people, saying that the situation

in Jerusalem at present is better than ever. He stressed how attentive the haredi

councilors — and he personally — were to the needs of the residents, especiallythose in the poor and disadvantaged neighborhoods, and just how much

Jerusalem is a traditional Jewish city, connected to its roots and worthy of its

new government.



29

In the Tel Aviv area, the changes in Jerusalem were initially received with

apathy. In interviews with several Tel Aviv residents, the most common

response was: “What did you want? We’ve seen it coming for a long time.”

Another response was: “We haven’t been to Jerusalem for years anyway. That

city, with all its violence, repels us.” But eventually, the significance of a haredi

capital, encompassing the institutions of national renewal, became clear.

Jerusalem contains the major national sites that, since independence, have

become the focal points of the civil religion. They include Yad Vashem (the

Holocaust memorial museum), Mount Herzl (the site of a military cemetery and

the burial place of the leaders of the nation), the Knesset, government ministries,

and the Supreme Court. All these are secular state institutions that serve as foci

of identification for the secular population. They are emblems and symbols of

the destruction that befell the Jewish people in the Holocaust, of the struggle for

independence and security through “military service,” of the supremacy of the

rule of law and equality before the law, and of the establishment of a

liberal-democratic system of government. These symbols, it was argued, are

largely foreign to haredi culture, and the haredim tend to adopt a reserved,

distant attitude toward them. Gradually, secular Israelis realized that these

institutions epitomizing national renewal were now in foreign territory, a

territory whose inhabitants were mostly alienated from the values of Zionism,from liberal-democracy, and military service.

Over time, it also became apparent that the demographic, social, and political

changes in Jerusalem were having a major impact on Israel as a whole, because

they altered the image of Jerusalem in the Israeli national iconography and in

that of the entire Jewish people. Jerusalem lost power as a focus of identification

for the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora. This was manifested in various

ways. Efforts to raise funds for Jerusalem among Conservative and Reform

congregations in North America met with apathy. Many said, “Why give to a

city ruled by haredim who consider us a foreign sect?” Members of these

movements who used to flock to Jerusalem for studies and vacations began to

avoid the city. The ultra-Orthodox, who now saw haredi Jerusalem as the

fulfillment of an ancient promise, continued to visit.



30

Under these circumstances, more and more secular Israelis called for a

rethinking of the meaning and symbolic values of the capital. A painful

discussion ensued. Time and again, articles in the press and in professional

literature proposed moving the capital from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. One leading

literary critic wrote an article in favor of the return to the cradle of Zionist

renewal, which “is entirely immersed in Tel Aviv’s culture.” In his article,

which was covered prominently in the media, the literary critic argued:

Few haredim serve in the army, and only few of them have fallen

in Israeli wars. The memorial ceremonies, for the most part, are

not their ceremonies, and Independence Day events broadcast each year from Mount Herzl are not their events. The haredim do

not celebrate Independence Day, and the state flag is not flown

in their compounds. This past Independence Day in haredi

Jerusalem, very few flags were flown from houses, and the

national institutions stood out as festive exceptions. The

celebrations were held amidst a hostile-cum-apathetic

population.

The writer continued:

The attitude toward the liberal-democratic government

institutions is mixed with profound distrust and guided by

opportunist considerations. Whenever the values of liberal

democracy clash with the commands of halakhah, democracy is

shunted aside. In haredi Jerusalem, the state and national

institutions, which are the heart of national symbolism, have

become an enclave of negligible significance for the local

population. Consequently, it is necessary to redefine the attitude

toward the type of institution that can genuinely embody and

symbolize the national capital. Perhaps the national capital, in

terms of values and way of life, is no longer Jerusalem, which



31

has become a foreign capital, but rather Tel Aviv, the stronghold

of secular culture. Perhaps it is from Tel Aviv that the “Tikkun”

(repentance) of Jerusalem will spring.



32

4 Scenario 2 – Brooklyn in Jerusalem

High percentage of haredim in the city, high standard of living among

haredim, low government intervention, maintenance of the status quo in

Jewish-Arab relations

In the decade between 1998 and 2008, a haredi majority developed in Jerusalem

and in the city council. The Government did not change its attitude toward

Jerusalem substantially. The Prime Minister and other leading ministers

continued to make vociferous declarations in favor of Jerusalem and pledge

allegiance to the city. But these declarations were not accompanied by real

action. The Government failed to found new colleges in the city and provedtotally incapable of attracting financial services and developing high-tech

industry in the city and its environs.

The steady outflow of affluent groups from the city further reduced the tax base,

and the municipality had difficulty in providing services beyond the bare

subsistence level. The situation of the haredim became worse in 1998–2003,

since the local public purse had trouble meeting their needs, while the coalition

Government of the left and center was unwilling to allocate funds to the

haredim. The haredi representatives in the government were unable to change

the situation.

Shas had lost support. At the beginning of the 21st century, Rabbi Yossef

(spiritual leader of Shas), who was now old, had no prospective successor, and

many Shas voters returned in the general election of 2003 to the Likud. Even the

haredi Ashkenazi parties could not increase their strength in the Knesset. In the



33

Governments led by the left, the haredi parties paid the price for identifying

completely with the right and remained in opposition, unable to obtain resources

for their constituents. Their hold on the balance of power was taken over by

Yisrael Ba’aliya (Russian immigrant’s political party), whose leaders

demonstrated great political flexibility in switching from one side of the

political map to the other.

As a result, haredi men came under increasing pressure to go out to work. The

calls were initially isolated and weak and came from the fringes. But gradually,

more and more haredim, including haredi women, called on haredi men to

combine Torah study with work. Many young couples left the city because theycould not afford to reside in Jerusalem, and the growth of the haredi population

in Jerusalem was slow. The economic difficulties - which were conspicuous,

especially with housing, schools, and services - intensified, and the non-haredi

population remained apathetic. The widespread response to a series of articles

on the plight of the haredim, published in one of the evening papers, was: “Let

them work.” In view of the worsening situation and the Government’s

reluctance to intervene and provide resources, haredi rabbis began to reconsider

their position on the issue. The change was gradual, but the subject was

eventually discussed by the Council of Torah Sages. In an exceptional decision,which a prodigious effort was made to keep secret, the Council of Torah Sages

determined that only the top students would remain in the yeshivas, while the

rest would combine studies with jobs to varying degrees based on their talents

and inclinations.

In 2003, the haredi school system began to change. Religious studies were

reinforced by science studies. Adolescents in the advanced yeshivas and those

who tended to go to the kollel were invited to take vocational courses that would

train them for jobs in the high-tech and information industries. At first few

people enrolled, and those who did found low-level, low-paying jobs. Graduallyhowever, as they gained knowledge and experience, haredi workers began to

take over top positions in the new industry. The tradition of extended study,

quick comprehension, razor-sharp logic, and the habit of questioning everything

led rapidly to a series of inventions and new developments by young haredim

who had become high-tech experts, especially in the field of software.



34

Following these inventions, Israel had its first home-grown haredi millionaires.

Haredi and non-haredi entrepreneurs began to discover the potential inherent in

the haredi labor market and opened additional courses, established

neighborhood work centers, and contracted with men and women working from

home. The percentage of haredi men in the Jerusalem labor force rose from 26

percent in 1995 to 45 percent in 2008, to 58 percent in 2013. As more haredim

entered the labor force, the standard of living of the haredi population rose

dramatically.

Between 2008 and 2013, there was a turnaround in the Jerusalem housing

market. The rise in the standard of living enabled haredi families to purchaseresidences in the city at market prices, and many of them stopped leaving

Jerusalem. In contrast to secular and traditionalist Jews, who felt little

connection to the city and did not identify with it, most haredim preferred to live

in the holy city, near their rabbis and their courts. As secular and traditional

residents sought to improve their quality of life by leaving for the suburbs,

especially the new ones around Jerusalem — Zur Hadassah, Mevasseret Ziyyon,

Beit Neqofa, Qiryat Anavim, and Har Adar, which had grown into large suburbs

— more and more apartments became available to the haredim in Jerusalem.

The result was a dramatic increase in the percentage of haredim in Jerusalem.Some of the change was due to natural increase, but the bulk of it was caused by

a halt to out-migration by haredim. Moreover, the economic change in

Jerusalem attracted many immigrants from affluent countries to the city; most of

them were haredim and others were non-haredi Orthodox.

The demographic change had an impact on the political system. In 2008 a haredi

candidate was elected mayor, and two-thirds of the city councilors were

haredim. The long-feared bitter cultural struggle between haredim and secular

Jews in Jerusalem did not come to pass. Work, on-the-job associations with

non-haredim, and modernization processes brought to the political arena haredirepresentatives with a modern, tolerant, and open approach. It became clear to

all sides that any attempt to enforce the way of life of one on the others would

encounter opposition and rebellion that would jeopardize the status of the city

and make its residents miserable. In the negotiations between the groups, it was

decided to set up forums to discuss coexistence in the city. The rules and



35

agreements were set forth in a municipal code that centered around three general

principles: respecting the right of each group to live according to its principles

so long as it does not infringe upon the rights of another group; deciding the

relations between groups through negotiation, and reaching agreements without

imposing majority rule in matters relating to ways of life.

Modernization, the rise in the standard of living, and contact with the world

outside the haredi ghetto all led to a turnaround in the attitude toward the central

state institutions, including military service. At first, groups of haredim

organized in the Civil Guard and Civil Defense corps. Later, some began to

volunteer for National Service, and small groups of haredi soldiers even beganto serve in the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) through haredi military yeshivas. The

example of the Ponevezh yeshiva (an elite yeshiva), which flew the state flag on

Independence Day, was followed by other yeshivas. More and more haredim

visited national sites in Jerusalem and Zionist settlement sites. The museums of

old settlements (moshavot) attracted a particularly high percentage of haredi

visitors; this was explained by the cultural proximity between the visitors and

the founders of the moshavot.

The social change was characterized by a more open and tolerant attitude among

the haredim toward other population groups in the city, combined with a

reduction in the hostility toward haredim on the part of the secular population.

Gradually, a “live and let live” approach evolved, in an attempt to lessen

conflict and reach understandings based on shared interests. The shared interest

of all the population groups was to create an affluent, strong city in which each

group would maintain its way of life without interference. One manifestation of

this approach was the creation of separate residential areas for each group. This

arrangement was not laid down in law, but was adopted as a guiding norm. In

each residential area, a large degree of autonomy was granted to the population

with respect to management of local life.

The community administrations played a major role in the system that

developed. They were delegated many powers in the fields of education, culture,

and social affairs. The rules governing transportation and the opening of cafes



36

and restaurants on the Sabbath and festivals were applied differentially in

various parts of the city, instead of universally binding the entire city.

Between 2008 and 2013, and even more so between 2013 and 2018, the city’s

tax base grew, particularly because of the increase in the welfare of the local

population. Secular and traditionalist groups that sought a special atmosphere

not as cosmopolitan as that of Tel Aviv but not coercive, as Jerusalem might

have been under other circumstances, found Jerusalem to be a fascinating and

interesting place. In various parts of town, seminars were offered on

philosophical, artistic, spiritual, religious, and mystical topics. Several

institutions that were founded subsequently to the partnership between theharedim and the secular began to offer tourists and students new exciting,

cross-cultural experiences that brought together different ways of life, cultures,

and philosophies. Tourists were invited to fascinating experiences during which

they visited various cultural institutions — secular and haredi, Jewish and Arab

— and took part in debates that, as many of the visitors claimed, "could not be

experienced anywhere else in Israel."

In 2013, Jerusalem was a predominantly haredi city, but the atmosphere was

moderate, peaceful, and open. Most secular Israelis preferred the cultural center

of Tel Aviv and its environs. But Jerusalem had begun to take on an image in

the cultural and local consciousness as a different, strange, and exciting place,

simultaneously attractive and forbidding. Young people who were tired of the

cosmopolitan culture transmitted by television and the Internet found a source of

cultural renewal in Jerusalem. The city contained unique local and international

avant-garde centers that created new fashions. In the old neighborhoods, artistic,

cultural, and intellectual centers re-emerged.



37

5 Scenario 3 – A Multicultural Capital

Low percentage of haredim in the city, low to medium well-being

among haredim, high government intervention, maintenance of the

status quo in Jewish-Arab relations

Following the EU declaration in 1999 stating that the European states adhere to

Resolution 181 regarding the establishment of a corpus separatum in Jerusalem

governed by a UN commissioner, the international status of Jerusalem began to

deteriorate rapidly. The United States expressed its support of the resolution.

The leaders of the Palestinian Authority announced their rejection of Israeli

sovereignty not only in the eastern part of the city but also in the western part.All of these factors, combined with the profound economic crisis in the city, led

the Government to increase its involvement in Jerusalem. Government

investigation yielded the finding that the economic crisis in the city was caused

in part by the rapid out-migration of affluent groups reluctant to resign to

becoming second class citizens, i.e., paying high taxes without representation in

local power centers. The goals set pursuant to the analysis were to halt the

exodus of affluent residents, to keep young couples in the city, and to attract

more young couples, while strengthening the economic status of Jerusalem.

Accordingly, the Government adopted a series of measures:

a. Attracting young couples to the city by building subsidized housing for

them.



38

b. Attracting students to the city by establishing new business and

engineering schools and by offering capital loans to students from outside

Jerusalem who study in the city. The loans became grants if the student

settled in the city for more than three years at the end of his or her studies.

c. Attracting businesses to the city, especially in the financial services and

high-tech industries, by providing infrastructure, training personnel, and

offering long-term tax exemptions and development loans.

d. Investing substantially in education, from preschool through school to

higher education.

e. Rehabilitating the center of town. Recognizing the importance of a

vibrant city center that serves as an economic and cultural center, the

Government decided to help rehabilitate the center of town. A new taxation

policy was instituted to make things easier for businesspeople in the center

of town and to attract new businesses; public transportation to the center of

town was improved; aid was given to developers to establish convention

centers, clubs, and hotels in the center of town; and numerous buildings

were renovated in an effort to attract residents. By these means, the center

of town began to recover and became a focus of urban life that attracts

diverse population groups.

f. Establishment of the Jerusalem Area Metropolitan Authority

(JAMA) was intended to improve the competitive potential of Jerusalem in

economic development. JAMA was empowered to plan the entire system of

economic activity, transportation, and infrastructure in the Jerusalem

metropolitan area.

The rapid economic, social, and cultural development gave renewed hope to

several population groups in Jerusalem. Many people who had been on the

verge of despair and had even considered leaving the city changed their minds

and decided that Jerusalem had a future despite the difficulties. In a spontaneous

effort to preserve Jerusalem as a multicultural city, many groups formed and

began to work to motivate people to take part in public life. Secular, religious,



39

and haredi Jerusalemites formed discussion groups on the future of the city,

seeking a way to live together with mutual respect and consideration.

To ensure the rights of the different population groups in the city,

representatives of haredi and non-haredi groups decided to meet to draft a

covenant setting forth the relations between the groups. The covenant comprised

the following principles:

a. The right of each group to conduct its way of life freely so long as it does

not infringe upon the rights of another group.

b. Avoidance of sweeping rules that apply to all population groups in the city

and adoption of an approach of geographical differentiation and sensitivity.

According to this approach, a rule that is appropriate for an area populated

chiefly by one cultural group is not necessarily appropriate for an area

populated by a different cultural group. Based on this principle, the

covenant recommended designating specific areas for each cultural group

in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of friction as much as possible, and

to enable each group to live according to its own ways.

c. Adherence to the rule of law by all groups.

In order to enable each group to freely maintain its way of life, the groups

adopted the principle of separate residential areas, autonomous administration of

everyday life, and cooperation in running the city. To this end, the neighborhood

administrations and community institutions compatible with autonomous

administration were strengthened. In Jerusalem, the foundations had been laid

for autonomous administration back in Teddy Kollek’s (former mayor of

Jerusalem) term. The administrations reflected an executive initiative to ensure

that services are provided and to cope with the diverse composition of the

population by involving residents in running the city. Another manifestation of

the recognition of each group’s cultural autonomy was the division in the

provision of municipal services after Olmert became mayor. When Olmert

entered office, separate divisions were created for haredi education and haredi

culture; haredi departments were set up in the Sports and Social Affairs



40

Division; and a large residential neighborhood was built exclusively for

haredim.

In the late 1990s, the mayor lost his enthusiasm for the community

administrations and took various steps to weaken them, inter alia through severe

budget cuts. But following the intervention of the Israeli Government, it was

decided to strengthen the administrations and to regard them as the prime factor

in regulating relations between haredi and secular residents and then between

Arabs and Jews.

In keeping with the new approach, community administrations were establishedbetween 2003 and 2008 all over the city, and they were given more powers and

larger budgets. Broad groups began to apply pressure on the municipality and

the Government to switch to regional elections that would enable the different

parts of the city to send representatives to the city council. The Israeli

Government, which had a committee of experts look into the idea, decided to

adopt the concept of regional elections and apply it in Jerusalem as the first test

case. At the recommendation of a team of experts, the administrations were

organized in 2008, in separate clusters: secular, haredi, and subsequently Arab.

Each cluster was served by a submunicipality, and above the submunicipalities

was an umbrella municipality that dealt with topics requiring city-wide

coordination. The submunicipalities ensured each group political representation

and the ability to administer its own affairs and express its own culture. Thus

friction between groups in the city was mitigated and each population group

(secular, haredi, and Arab) was able to maintain its way of life without outside

interference. Elections for the umbrella municipality were regional, according to

the community administration districts.

Throughout the city, meetings were organized where it was explained

to the people how important it was to vote. In some districts, local partieswere formed that called on various population groups to support familiar

candidates. In the elections in 2008, people from different neighborhoods

in the city, representing different population groups, were elected to the

city council. Some were affiliated with countrywide parties, but many were

elected on new, local lists concerned mainly with local life.



41

Most of the haredi councilors represented the northern neighborhoods, where

most of the haredim lived. For the first time in many years, the non-haredi

population in the southern and western parts of town achieved substantial

representation in the city council, and these representatives served their

constituents just as the haredim did. The cultural diversity of the city reached the

city council in the elections of 2008, and the council reflected — for the first

time in a long period — the complex cultural composition of the population of

Jerusalem.



42

6 Scenario 4 – A Declining Capital

Low percentage of haredim in the city, low well-being among haredim,

low government intervention, and two models of Jewish-Arab relations:

maintaining of the status quo and confrontation.

From 1999 to 2003, non-haredim continued to leave the city. The negative net

migration, which in 1997 was about 7,000, increased steadily in subsequent

years, reaching 13,000 in 2003. Most of the out-migrants were young people

who could not afford the high housing costs in the city, as well as secular adults

who sought a different quality of life after their children grew up and left home.

Most of the out-migrants were secular, although there was also an increase inthe percentage of haredim among them, especially young couples who could not

afford apartments in Jerusalem. These processes virtually halted the growth of

the Jewish population of Jerusalem. In contrast, the Arab population continued

to grow at rates that had characterized it in the past. As a result, the

demographic ratio of Jews to Arabs in the city began to change. The proportion

of Arabs in the population rose from 30 percent in 1997 to 35 percent in 2003.

As a result of these processes, the city’s tax base diminished even further, as did

its ability to provide services on an appropriate level. Sporadic injections of

government funds were as effective as aspirin for a critically ill patient. Thedeterioration was evident everywhere: in the dismal state of the infrastructure; in

the poor maintenance of parks and open spaces; in the potholes and pits in the

roads that had not been repaired for a long time; in the low municipal

investment in pupils; in sparse community-center activity; and in cuts in

community administration budgets. Many recovery plans were proposed, but





44

Me’a She’arim and Malkhei Yisrael streets, was a commercial center that served

the needs of the haredi population. The area was rehabilitated and building

density had increased. The adjacent secular neighborhoods were the natural area

for haredi expansion, and there was constant pressure to designate additional

areas in the western part of the city for building to meet the needs of the

growing haredi population. As a result, the new secular neighborhoods in the

north remained an enclave in an increasingly haredi area. Ramot became mostly

haredi, and the major conflicts in the early 21st century raged in Ramat Eshkol,

Pisgat Ze’ev, and Neve Ya’aqov.

The Arazim Valley area, near Mevasseret Ziyyon, then became the area of natural expansion for the haredi population, and the haredim and their political

representatives applied heavy pressure to zone the area for haredi

neighborhoods. Eventually, most of the area was assigned to the haredim, and

the split of the city into two zones, northern and southern, became an

uncontested fact. The establishment of haredi neighborhoods in the center of the

Arazim Valley led to heavy pressure to close the western entrances to the city on

the Sabbath and festivals. The haredim pointed out that there were alternate

routes: in the south via Sataf and via the new road that would link Jerusalem

with Beit Shemesh. The case was to be tried in court.

In the municipal elections of 2003, despite a strenuous effort to persuade people

to vote, the population remained largely indifferent. The voting rate was 42

percent, only slightly higher than in the 1998 elections. As in the previous

elections, there was a high voting rate among haredim, a medium rate among the

secular, and a low rate among the residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods,

most of whom considered themselves traditional. Olmert was reelected with

haredi support, but the other secular candidate — a former army officer — had

strong support from secular and traditionalist residents.

The city council formed after the elections in 2003 included 16 religious and

haredi members (out of 31 council members), and control of the city passed to

the religious-haredi bloc. The members of this bloc continued to hold portfolios

and to head the major committees, and the mayor did their bidding. But the city

was in much worse shape economically than at the time of the previous



45

elections, and the tension between haredim and the secular intensified. Large

groups of secular residents organized and began to talk about a tax revolt. In a

flyer that they circulated, they said, inter alia: “It is inconceivable that we should

keep supporting the haredim while they continue to interfere in our lives.

Enough. We’ve had enough of you. Go to work.” The flyer was denounced by

haredi politicians as additional proof of how widespread antisemitism was

among the secular population. But in inner circles fear of a civil rebellion was

expressed. Hostile graffiti were written on the walls of homes and yeshivas in

Me’a She’arim and Batei Ungarin, and the city seemed to be on the brink of a

violent eruption. In view of these circumstances together with the steadily

increasing municipal deficit, the Minister of Interior decided to appoint an

accountant for the municipality. But so long as Mayor Ehud Olmert remained in

power, the Israeli Government dared not dissolve the city council.

At the start of his third term, Ehud Olmert resigned. This came as no surprise,

since it had long been clear that the mayor was tired of municipal life and

preferred to spend most of his time abroad on private and official trips. His

resignation at the beginning of his third term led to new elections, in which his

less-well-known deputy was elected by a tiny majority. In the new coalition,

clashes between haredim and seculars escalated, and there was no restraininghand to quell the tumult in council meetings. The financial irregularities,

deficits, and frictions in the municipality that had previously been shunted to

the margins came up for public discussion. Under the circumstances, drastic

measures seemed necessary to solve the problem of Jerusalem.

This scenario has two endings: the ending of the appointed committee and the

ending of Belfast in Jerusalem.

The appointed committee

The Government appointed a commission of inquiry that found severe flaws in

municipal leadership, problems and corruption in granting exemptions from

municipal property tax to groups associated with politicians, the appointment of

unqualified cronies, flaws in the approval procedures of plans by the Local

Planning and Building Committee, with preference for the politicians’ favorites.



46

The Government therefore decided to dissolve the city council and replace it

with an appointed council. The appointed committee served for about two years.

During this time, municipal administration was improved, but no salve was

found for the city’s budgetary and social problems.

Belfast in Jerusalem

The ever worsening conflict between haredi and non-haredi Jews in Jerusalem

came to an end on the evening of November 29, 2005, after a series of

explosions in the Jewish commercial centers in Manhat, the center of town, and

Geula. The explosions killed dozens of people and wounded hundreds, most of

them Jews and a smaller number of Arabs. The spokesman for the military arm

of Hamas announced in Damascus that the martyrs of Iz a-Din al-Qasam were

responsible for the explosions, which were a response to continuing Zionist

oppression in the holy city. The spokesman noted that the attack on the heart of

the Zionist enemy was intended to continue to weaken its presence in Jerusalem.

“The holy city will soon be ours,” the spokesman continued. As evidence, he

presented figures on the drop in the Jewish population in the city, the weakening

of the social system because of the increasing cultural conflict between haredim

and seculars as well as the increase in the demographic strength of the Arabs in

Jerusalem. “Our objective,” the spokesman declared, “is to speed up the

departure of the Zionist enemy from the holy city, and with the help of Allah

and the gun we will succeed.”

Editorials published the next day in the Israeli press were full of statements such

as “We all share a common fate”; “They didn’t distinguish between religious

and secular”; and “A single fate for Geula and Manhat.” In his address to the

nation, the Prime Minister stressed that the bloodthirsty terrorists make no

distinctions between their victims. Following the explosions, attacks on Arabs

around the city increased. In spontaneous demonstrations throughout the city,

haredi and secular Jews called for revenge.

A week after the explosions in the Jewish shopping centers, a car bomb

exploded on Salah e-Din Street at a time when the street was swarming with

people. Dozens of Arabs were killed and hundreds were wounded. A person



47

who introduced himself as the spokesman for the Zealots of Eternal Jerusalem

revealed to the newspapers that his organization was responsible for the

explosion, and that henceforth any act of terrorism would be met with an

appropriate response. The situation in the city deteriorated following a series of

retaliatory acts. The ambassador of the Palestinian state in the United Nations,

with the support of the delegates from Arab countries, asked the Security

Council to call a special session on the problem of Jerusalem. The Palestinian

ambassador to the United States, interviewed on the major US television

networks, presented detailed figures on the demography of the city and the

rapidly growing percentage of Palestinians in Jerusalem. “Over one-third of the

people in the city are oppressed,” he said. “They are not represented in the city

council and are not citizens of the occupying state. They do not benefit from

development or from the influx of resources; they are discriminated against in

terms of services, but are required to pay taxes.”

In the Security Council, all the delegates condemned the continued Israeli

occupation of the city, in contravention of UN Resolution 181 concerning the

internationalization of Jerusalem. Russia proposed a resolution to force Israel to

comply with Resolution 181 on pain of sanctions like those imposed on Serbia.

Most members of the Council supported this motion. Britain abstained and theproposal was blocked by a US veto.

As a result, the Israeli Government decided to intervene directly in the affairs in

Jerusalem. As a first, harsh, and precedent-setting measure, it decided to

dissolve the city council and establish direct rule in Jerusalem. In addition, it

decided on a massive pouring of resources into the city to strengthen the Jewish

majority. As in Belfast before the Good Friday agreement, authority in crucial

matters such as planning, housing, health, and welfare was transferred to

Government-appointed committees of bureaucrats. The city was headed by a

“Minister in Charge of Jerusalem.” Appeals from left-wing factions protestingthe fatal blow the dissolution had dealt democracy in Jerusalem elicited a

vehement response from the Prime Minister: “In times of danger, no means are

too extreme. Sometimes the magnitude and the importance of the task — saving

Jerusalem — override democratic principles.”



48

As I write these lines, the city has not yet calmed down. Jews — both haredi and

secular—continue to move out of the city, and a solution to the problem of

Jerusalem seems more remote than ever. A critical article published recently by

a top journalist in the most popular Israeli newspaper surveys the mistakes made

by the Israeli Government in handling the problem of Jerusalem and suggested

that perhaps the Government was too late. The article ends as follows:

If the Beilin–Abu Mazen agreement had been adopted at the right

time, an agreement might have been reached with the Palestinians

solving the problem of Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem. The Rabin

assassination closed the window of opportunity. It is now clear that we have missed the boat, and demography will determine the future

of the city. It is highly doubtful whether, given the present

geopolitical and demographic situation, the Israeli Government will

be able to stop Jews from leaving the city. The only thing that can

still be done is an immediate separation between Jews and Arabs

before we lose everything.

The Prime Minister, who referred to the article briefly in his address to pupils of

the René Cassin School in Jerusalem, said that these are the vapid remarks of

irresponsible media people. He closed by saying “Jerusalem will remain united

forever under Israeli sovereignty.”



49

7 From Scenarios to Strategies

The scenarios are essentially stories that elucidate the policy ideal of a

pluralistic and democratic Jerusalem under varying conditions. In each scenario,

the policy ideal appears in a different light. Only in the scenario of the

diversified capital is the policy ideal — i.e., a pluralistic society and a

democratic government — realized in full. The scenario of Brooklyn in

Jerusalem achieves one objective, namely, that of a democratic government;

but the city does not become pluralistic. The scenarios of a foreign capital and

a declining capital (with both endings: the appointed committee and Belfast

in Jerusalem) make a pluralistic city with a democratic government seem

highly unlikely. On the basis of an examination of the policy ideal against the

various scenarios, one can devise strategies for achieving this ideal.

When reading the scenarios, we should ask ourselves how do they help realize

the policy ideal of a pluralistic city and democratic government? The answer is

that the scenarios clarify the opportunities and obstacles affecting the realization

of the ideal. Each scenario presents a specific hypothetical future situation in

which the likelihood of attaining a pluralistic city with a democratic government

is significantly different. Intervention is needed in order to achieve the desired

goal, and this intervention varies from one scenario to the next.

Another question is what can we learn from the scenarios about policy making.

The answer is that the scenarios enable policymakers to create “future

memories” that can guide them when they encounter real-life problems similar

to those presented in the scenarios. These future memories enhance the

perceptivity and flexibility of the imagination of policymakers. The mode of

thinking thus fostered allows for creativity, quickness and originality when

encountering the new situations that the future holds for us.





51

the decline of Jerusalem. A series of economic strategies should be developed to

create jobs in Jerusalem, keep the affluent population in the city, and attract a

strong population from elsewhere. In particular, business services, high-tech

industry, and tourism should be developed.

With respect to economic development, investments in developing the center of

town are extremely important. A vibrant, thriving center of town is a mark of a

city with vitality and rejuvenation. A dying center betokens a declining city.

Large shopping centers in the outskirts of the city or in the suburbs signify the

decline of the city. In addition to its economic importance, the center of town

has cultural importance. A city center with a vibrant cultural life gives the citycharacter and “color.” Thus, vigorous economic activity is needed to save the

dying center of town. Entrepreneurs should be attracted to the center by being

offered various incentives and tax exemptions. Jerusalem should adopt

strategies akin to those adopted by old cities around the world in order to revive

the center of town: building museums, galleries, apartments, and cafes; closing

some roads to traffic and turning them into pedestrian malls. Steps should also

be taken to enhance and develop public transportation, including a light-rail

system.

It should be recognized that the economy has entered a new age of global

competition. In this context, every effort should be made to strengthen

Jerusalem’s competitive ability to attract foreign investments. Making the center

of town stronger and more attractive is an important but insufficient step in this

direction. Action must also be taken to cultivate the human capital of Jerusalem

by investing in education, vocational training, and continued education for the

present work force. Among others, engineering and business schools should be

established to train professional personnel for the city.

We should accept the fact that not all of the economic development will occurwithin the confines of the city; therefore, as we saw in the scenario of the

diversified capital, the economy of the entire metropolitan area should be

developed. Planning and development should be coordinated by a

supra-municipal body: the Jerusalem Area Metropolitan Authority. The local



52

authorities in the area should jointly plan and carry out economic activity and

infrastructure, and decide on how to divide up revenues from taxes and fees.

Encouraging the haredi population to go out to work would contribute to the

development of Jerusalem, as was shown in the scenario of Brooklyn in

Jerusalem. But unless integration of the haredim in the work place is

accompanied by government intervention on behalf of all groups in the city, the

city will not be pluralistic. Haredim tend more than the secular to remain in the

city, and that will be yet easier for them if they find jobs and become more

affluent. The result will then be productivization accompanied by a rise in the

percentage of haredim in Jerusalem. Therefore government intervention isneeded that considers all groups in the social system and is guided by a

comprehensive perspective.

Housing: Land prices in the city should be lowered in order to cheapen

housing. Steps should be taken to provide housing for young couples who

cannot afford to buy or rent apartments in the city. Heterogeneous models of

urban life should also be fashioned to meet the needs of the different social

groups. These models should involve high-density construction, spacious

dwelling units, a high degree of privacy, and the ability to comfortably maintain

a large family lifestyle within the city. This will make possible high residential

quality, a high level of services, and better access to services than in the

suburbs. The provision of housing to various groups, including affluent ones,

will keep the strong population in the city, will prevent social polarization

between the city and the suburbs (as was seen in the scenario of the foreign

capital), and will even help strengthen the city’s tax base.

Greater housing density in the city should be encouraged by a revival of old

sections. This should be done by the private sector, encouraged by incentives of

improved land values (increased building percentages). Thus the population of the city could be increased without being dispersed over a large area. Dense

building would preserve the close link to the religious and national centers.

Specifically, it is important to refrain from creating a new city far from the old

centers; therefore there should be no broad-scale annexation of areas west of the

city. Such an annexation, if approved, would lead to the building of new, remote



53

neighborhoods that would essentially become a different city. The well to do

would move out to these neighborhoods and be replaced in the center of town

by the poor (see the scenario of the declining capital).

Large suburbs should not be built outside Jerusalem. As the scenarios of a

foreign capital and a declining capital indicate, an increase in the suburban

housing supply would cause large-scale migration by affluent secular residents

out of the city and would thwart the effort to foster a pluralistic city.

Culture — education toward tolerance and restoration of solidarity: A

crucial condition for the existence of a pluralistic society and a democraticsystem in Jerusalem is the fostering of acceptance of others in an attitude of

mutual respect, patience, and tolerance. Both sides, as the scenarios of Brooklyn

in Jerusalem and the diversified capital show, would benefit from such an

approach. Otherwise, the results will be unpleasant for both sides, as we can see

from the scenarios of a foreign capital and a declining capital.

I see no contradiction between Judaism and democracy or between Judaism and

tolerance. The contradiction is being contrived by extremist circles on both

sides, who are trying to gain social and political power by accentuating it.

Leaders, teachers, rabbis, and public figures on both sides can play a part in

promoting tolerance. They must realize the dangers inherent in fostering the

notion of a contradiction between Judaism and democracy and between Judaism

and tolerance and find a way to restore social solidarity.

The restoration of solidarity must be broached by both sides, with an

understanding and a desire to continue living together in the same city with

mutual respect and tolerance and an sensitivity to the other group’s desires. On

this basis, solutions should be found that allow for coexistence. This is the

supreme test for the elites on both sides, and the future of the city will be

determined largely by the effectiveness in resolving this issue. However, this

does not mean elimination of one group by the other or unilateral concessions. A

desire for dialogue should not be interpreted as an expression of weakness, and

we should act simultaneously to support the non-haredi population, which in

recent years has lost much of its self-confidence.



54

The solutions to the problems of restoring tolerance and strengthening solidarity

can come on various levels. On the political-cultural level we should strive

towards an acknowledgement by all groups of the distinct identity of each

group, its needs, its aspirations and ways of life, and its right to maintain its

ways of life and to pass them on to future generations, as manifested in the

scenario of a diversified capital. This means developing strategies that enable

each group to live and educate its children according to its values and world

view; such strategies include the right to autonomous administration of

neighborhoods and of cultural and educational institutions. The geocultural

implication of this approach is that no universal rules should be adopted for the

entire city. Distinct residential districts should be designated for each cultural

group so as to reduce the possibilities of friction as much as possible and to

enable each group to live according to its values and principles. On the

political-economic level, we should divide up resources proportionally, in

accordance with the relative portion of each group in the city, and avoid the

principle of the winner (of the elections) takes all. An important means of

dividing up resources proportionally is switching from general elections to

district-based elections and organization of local life on the basis of autonomous

administration and decentralization of powers.

Municipal politics — elections: In organizing the elections, we have to

consider ways of switching from at-large elections to district-based elections, as

in the ward system in the United States and Britain. Such elections would

require the amendment of legislation, the division of the city into polling

districts. A regional organization of the elections in Jerusalem is justified by the

fundamental differences in the voting rates of the different cultural groups. The

change should be applied only to Jerusalem, however, and not to the entire

country, because of the unique cultural structure of the city. Such elections

would make possible the formation of a city council whose composition

matches the composition of the population of the city to a greater degree.

Municipal politics — decentralization of powers and autonomy

administration: This strategy aims at reducing tensions and resolving conflicts

(as shown in the scenarios of the diversified capital and Brooklyn in Jerusalem)

by strengthening the autonomy of each of the major groups: haredim and secular



55

Jews. According to this strategy, administrations should be established for all

parts of the city, secular and haredi alike. Because the haredi administrative

districts are near each other and naturally deal with similar needs and problems,

an umbrella organization — essentially, a haredi submunicipality — should be

established for all the haredi administrations. Another umbrella organization of

secular and traditional administrations in Jerusalem should also be established.

Each submunicipality would deal with a wider variety of issues than the

administrations do and would gradually be given many powers, including the

right to collect certain taxes and to decide on spending in the district that it

serves (see the diversified capital scenario). The submunicipalities would have

broad powers in the fields of education, welfare, health, planning, and housing.

Larger issues related to transportation, infrastructure development, and

comprehensive planning would be handled by the municipality of Jerusalem.

Municipal autonomy may serve as a model for solutions that can be applied in

the eastern part of the city. Each group would manage its own educational,

cultural, and social affairs with a large degree of functional autonomy. This

would be a functional solution to the problem of Jerusalem, while preserving a

united city headed by a single umbrella municipality: the municipality of

Jerusalem. Perhaps this solution can help bring the Arabs of Jerusalem back intomunicipal political life. Once they have a way of electing their candidates for

local administrative bodies and to express their political and local needs, they

might be willing to take part in the elections for the Jerusalem municipality,

which would then serve all the residents of the city.

All the sociocultural evidence shows that the haredim and Arabs in Jerusalem

are comfortable functioning within an autonomous system that gives them their

own budgets and their own special plans and activities. Functional separation is

also indicated by the maintenance of their own ways of life in terms of religious

and community affairs. The question is to what extent the haredim will favorseparation if they have to fund the local municipal services and supplements to

state services from the taxes they collect from their own people. Assuming that

the haredim receive their share of government funding for education, culture,

and welfare services, there will still be services, especially routine and local

ones, that local residents will have to pay for out of their own pockets. In this



56

regard, provision should be made for lessening the inequality between the

different parts of the city.

The umbrella municipality of Jerusalem, in conjunction with the

submunicipalities, should do its best to allocate housing and public institutions

within the districts of each group — in the northern part of the city for haredim,

in the south for the secular, and in the east for the Arabs. It would thereby signal

an unofficial recognition of the emerging division between a secular south and a

haredi north and between both of these and the Arab east. Construction for the

different groups would take place partly in relatively small areas, where old

buildings would be demolished and new ones built, and partly in the areasadjacent to the territory of each group.

Political awareness: We should act to increase people’s awareness of the

importance of voting. In this respect we can learn from the successful activity of

Shas, and establish social movements with a similar format that operate in

disadvantaged neighborhoods. The Dor Shalom movement (a pro-peace youth

movement), too, has been successful in various places in Israel and may succeed

in Jerusalem. In addition, mechanisms similar to those developed by the

haredim should be used to bring voters to the polls on Election Day.

Social involvement: More intense social activity is needed. It will take a long

time for the proposed strategies to achieve their goal. In the meantime the

political composition of the city council, its decision-making processes, and the

disproportion between the interests represented in decision forums and the

distribution of the economic burden are liable to strengthen the trend of

out-migration among non-haredim, especially young people. Social activity

focusing on the image and character of the city is therefore needed urgently.

This activity will focus on boosting public participation in decision-making,

rectifying improprieties, increasing transparency, allocating resources fairly, andshaping the environment consistently with the agreed upon values of the

population as a whole. A closer connection is needed between participatory

democracy and representative democracy, as expressed by the elected council.

The main obstacle to social organization is financial. Other obstacles are the

lack of leadership and the lack of a tradition of social activity. Nevertheless,



57

there are promising beginnings, such as the Forum of Chair people of

Community Administrations, the Forum of Planners for the Future of Jerusalem,

an urban coalition of environmental organizations known as “A Sustainable

Jerusalem” Movement, and the Society for the Protection of Nature. It is

necessary to support the activities of nonprofit organizations, expand existing

coalitions, and intensify the discussion of the future of Jerusalem and the

activity for Jerusalem as a pluralistic city with a democratic system. The Jewish

world should mobilize for this task and support social activity in Jerusalem.



58

Conclusions

This essay aims to strengthen Jerusalem as a pluralistic and democratic city. To

attain this goal, I have developed several scenarios concerning the future

relations between secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem. Each scenarioexamined the trajectory of the stated goal under different demographic, social,

economic, political and spatial conditions. Relying on the outcomes of the

different scenarios, several strategies were suggested regarding how to

strengthen the democratic pluralistic camp in the city.

Evidently, I have taken a stand in the evolving cultural conflict that besets the

city. I am well aware of the fact that beside the pluralistic democratic camp to

which I belong there are some other groups in the city that may wish to pursue

different, perhaps even opposing, ideals. People belonging to these groups may

therefore criticize the scenarios and strategies outlined here on the grounds that

they will do very little to solve the problematic relations between the cultural

groups in the city.

I accept this criticism with certain reservations. Indeed to negotiate the future of

the city one must take a broader and more comprehensive view, that takes into

consideration the values and interests of various groups. Such an approach

requires some compromises and concessions, that may weaken the goal of a

pluralistic and democratic city. A compromise accepted by all parties that

infringes upon some basic civic rights, such as cinema-going on Sabbath, is aserious deviation from the ideal of pluralistic and democratic city. For this

reason, I think that it is extremely important at this initial phase to strengthen the

pluralistic democratic camp, by developing scenarios and strategies representing

its world view. Once this camp has a better idea with regard to its role in the city



59

and the ways to promote this role, one can move to the second phase of

negotiating the future of the city with other cultural groups.

In light of this, the question is not why this essay ignores the need for

negotiations and dialogue between various groups over the future of Jerusalem.

This need is fully recognized and will be endorsed at a later stage. The relevant

question at this point is how to achieve the goal of a pluralist and democratic

city, and what is the contribution of this essay towards this goal. The answer is

that only partly so. The scenarios and strategies suggested here reflect, for better

or worse, my subjective mental map. This map weaves together my own values,

norms, experience and knowledge. And it is therefore utterly biased. It may wellbe that I missed some important facts, skipped over certain predetermined

processes and uncertainties, and was insensitive to the plight of certain groups in

the city. The only way I can think of to rectify these misfortunes is to gather a

larger team of people who are committed to the ideal of a pluralistic democratic

city, yet represents different spheres of knowledge and expertise. Only at a later

stage I suggest to develop scenarios and strategies with other groups that may

have other policy ideals. The implication is that the development of scenarios

and strategies is an ongoing process. As this process proceeds, the challenge is

to harmonize between aspirations of different groups.



References

Hasson Shlomo and Amiram Gonen. 1997. The Cultural Tension within

Jerusalem’s Jewish Population. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for

Policy Studies.

Idon Associates. 1999. “Strategic Thinking with Scenarios”.

www.idongroup.com

Schriefer, Audrey. 1997. “The Future: Trends, Discontinuities and

Opportunities.” www.uio.no/`oleg/scenarioplanning.html.

Schwartz, Peter. 1996. The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future

in an Uncertain World. London and New York: Doubleday.

Shilhav Yosseph. 1999. “The ultra-Orthodox in the National Master Plan”, The

National Master Plan, Vol. 3. forthcoming.

van der Heijden, Kees. 1997. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation.

Chichester and New York: John Wiley.

Documents

Haredim Research, judaism, haredim, cahssidim, hashem