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Hard Power, Hard ChoicesWritten by Frank P Cinturati Jr, Jacob Kennedy, Dariusz Lesniak-Cichocki, Asena May, Patrick Mondaca, Mara Tshibaka.

Edited by Mark Galeotti

Hard Power, Hard ChoicesA compilation of proposals from graduate students on the NYU SCPS Master of Science in Global Affairs program

Edited by Mark Galeotti

Written by Frank P Cinturati Jr, Dariusz Lesniak-Cichocki, Jacob Kennedy, Asena May, Patrick Mondaca, Mara Tshibaka.

Contents

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................! 2

An American Foreign Legion ............................................................................................................! 3

Restructuring ISAF Regional Commands and Subordinate Commands..........................................! 9

The Failure of the Empire of Bases ....................................................................................................! 16

An Evolution in Intervention ...........................................................................................................! 24

Force Specialization to Meet Modern Military Operational Needs..................................................! 33

Bright Peak: Promoting a Change in US Army Training to Match the Changing Threat ..............! 38

All contents are © copyright the original authors, 2012.

New York University SCPS Center for Global Affairs

15 Barclay Street, New York, NY 10007

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INTRODUCTIONAt the Center for Global Affairs, we challenge our students to grapple with the most intractable and yet also most important dilemmas facing international society. To our delight, they rise to that challenge, as this collection demonstrates, offering as it does just a sample of some of the best and most thought-provoking proposals from a single class. These were among the most relevant and impressive of the student papers submitted in the MSGA’s Hard Power: the uses and abuses of military force course in the fall of 2011. The students were asked to develop a concrete, conflict-related proposal, which could be anything from the narrowly technical to the broad and conceptual.

How, in the future, can the United States’ military capabilities -- still a crucial ingredient of its global authority, even if one we can hope is not over-used -- be deployed in a manner which will meaningfully advance not just national interests but wider agendas of stability, development, and human rights? The first question is one of maintaining credible forces, and Patrick Mondaca looks at the French model for lessons as to how to recruit and retrain appropriate intervention units. As of writing, the main combat deployment of US forces overseas is in Afghanistan and Jacob Kennedy considers how they may best be organized. The question of rational and cost-effective organization is a much wider one, though, and Dariusz Lesniak-Cichocki advocates a rationalization of the USA’s global “empire of bases.” Given that many or most future deployments will in some form or another relate to building, imposing or keeping the peace, it is appropriate that the final three papers all address the challenges this poses. Mara Tshibaka presents the case for a multi-vector approach to peacemaking, while Frank Cinturati and Asena May offer ways in which this can be operationalized within the US military through training, by unit specializations within the Marine Corps and the creation of a ‘peacebuilding West Point,’ respectively.

In keeping with these papers’ genesis as individual research papers, there are some slight variations in writing and reference styles. However, in our opinion they all share the combination of intellectual energy and informed commitment that we see as the goal of the MSGA program.

Mark Galeotti, Clinical Professor of Global Affairs and Academic Chair, CGA

About the Center for Global AffairsThe Center for Global Affairs at New York University's School of Continuing and Professional Studies educates and inspires students to become global citizens capable of identifying and implementing solutions to pressing global challenges. Its flagship program is the Master of Science in Global Affairs (MSGA) and it also offers a wide range of executive and continuing education options and public events.

http://www.scps.nyu.edu/areas-of-study/global-affairs/

http://web.scps.nyu.edu/global.affairs/msga/index.shtml

http://nyuglobalcitizen.wordpress.com/

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AN AMERICAN FOREIGN LEGIONBy Patrick Mondaca

The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll on America’s fighting forces and have brought to the forefront the significant implications of the protracted use of National Guardsmen and Reservists. Over the past decade, several thousands of National Guardsmen and Reservists have been mobilized for duty and rotated through multiple combat deployments with their active duty counterparts. These mobilizations and deployments have proven to be particularly difficult for these part-time citizen-soldiers who had not counted on such extended service. Upon release from active duty, many National Guard and Reserve units struggle to retain their soldiers, rendering those units non-combat ready until new recruits are available to replenish the ranks. Depleted of their manpower and equipment from these extended tours, these units then struggle to regain the combat readiness required for their original mission, the protection of the homeland (Perry, 2006).

In addition to the heavy reliance on Reservists and National Guardsmen, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought to light the significant implications of the protracted and extensive use of private military contractors, particularly those used for security related functions. The use of these private security contractors to perform security functions previously undertaken by military personnel, which has proven to be both expensive fiscally and at times politically, underscores the problems the United States is facing in terms of current and future combat

readiness. In Iraq for example, amongst the 180,000 military contractors reported there in 2007, some 30,000 of these were said to be classified as armed private security contractors (Serafino, 2007). Blackwater USA alone, at one point, held over $109 million in State Department security contracts in Iraq (al-Izzi, 2007). And as one researcher noted, the lines between military and civilian security personnel in Iraq became increasingly blurred, “State Department officials might rely upon Blackwater USA one day and a US Army escort the next.” (Lindemann, 2007).

The problem with this is twofold. While US military personnel are considered under the Geneva Convention to be combatants, civilians working with the military are generally considered non-combatants. Armed civilians participating in military missions alongside military personnel are thus legally problematic being that they are neither traditional civilian contractors nor military personnel. Also, the reliance on civilian security contractors by military commanders to perform military missions parallel to their soldiers can become a liability when those civilians fail. In Fallujah, Iraq in March 2004, while escorting a convoy, four Blackwater security contractors were ambushed, killed, and their mutilated corpses displayed from a bridge. A congressional committee later found that Blackwater had “ignored multiple warnings about the dangers of traveling through Fallujah, cut essential personnel from the mission, and failed to supply its

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“An American Foreign Legion makes the most sense if the United States wishes to remain the biggest, baddest dog in the junkyard.”

team with armored vehicles, machine guns, sufficient threat intelligence, or even maps of the area” (Waxman, 2007).

Consequently, America has a problem. The days of firebombing Dresden and Tokyo are over. America can no longer wipe out entire cities to avoid putting boots on the ground. It can equally not afford the domestic backlash of imposing compulsory military service upon its citizens. And as conventional wars decline and the United States finds itself involved in protracted irregular conflicts throughout the world, it will likely again require the large numbers of fighting men that we have seen in recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. But in order to sustain those large numbers of fighting men, America can no longer rely on the long-term activation of its reserve components or the extensive and problematic use of civilian security contractors. The answer to this problem is an American Foreign Legion based upon the model of the French Foreign Legion.

THE AFL

Founded by King Louis Philippe in 1831 to serve two key purposes, the French Foreign Legion’s first mission was “to protect France’s empire”. Its second function was to serve as a “solution to the influx into France of exiles from other countries…” (Koehler, 2005). Ironically, the United States finds itself in a similar position today as did King Louis Philippe then. Whether it likes to think so or not, America is a global empire with forces either engaged or positioned to engage in warfare throughout the world. It also has an influx of illegal immigrants and a backlog of applications from legal immigrants applying for citizenship. The US Census Bureau reported this year that America’s “immigrant population (legal and illegal) reached 40 million in 2010, the highest number in American history” (Camarota, 2011). Given the opportunity for gainful employment and legitimate citizenship, this immigrant population is a resource waiting to be tapped.

This being said, foreign born soldiers, following the September 11th attacks, are being recruited into the US military in greater numbers than in previous years. A 2002 Executive Order issued by then President George W. Bush expanded “existing legislation to offer a fast track to citizenship to foreigners who agree to fight for the US Armed Forces”, with some 8,000 foreign born soldiers enlisting annually since then (Meyer, 2007). In 2009, 7,100 foreign born US military personnel became naturalized citizens, “the largest number of military personnel naturalized as US citizens in any single year since the end of the Vietnam War” (Terrazas, 2010). Additionally, the New York Times reported in 2009, that a pilot program by the Pentagon would begin recruiting immigrants already residing in the United States for at least two years, “offering them the chance to become United States citizens in as little as six months” (Preston).

The American military has throughout history welcomed and integrated foreign born soldiers into its ranks. In every war it has fought since the American Revolution, foreign born soldiers have served honorably and fought with distinction under the American flag. Major General Lafayette, a French citizen who fought alongside and led American soldiers against the British in the American Revolution, is an American hero. So much so that he was granted honorary citizenship by an act of Congress in 2002, becoming the fifth of seven foreign born individuals conferred honorary citizenship in the entire history of the United States (Congress, 2002). An excerpt from the resolution granting his citizenship is particularly inspiring:

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“…General Lafayette…risked his life for the freedom of Americans…demonstrating bravery that forever endeared him to the American soldiers… Whereas [he] gave aid to the United States in her time of need and is forever a symbol of freedom: Now, therefore… the Marquis de Lafayette, is proclaimed posthumously to be an honorary citizen of the United States of America” (Congress, 2002).

One of the first “American” casualties of the Iraq war, US Marine Lance Cpl. Jose Gutierrez, was not quite a US citizen when he died fighting alongside and defending Americans in March 2003. In fact, the young Marine was not even in the country legally when he enlisted for service, having lied about his age to obtain a green card at a border crossing. With this green card, at that time, Jose Gutierrez would have been eligible to apply for citizenship after three years had he not been killed (Leung, 2009). Granted his citizenship posthumously and laid to rest with honors by his fellow Marines in his hometown in Guatemala, Lance Cpl. Jose Gutierrez is also an American hero.

But while Major General Lafayette and Lance Cpl. Gutierrez are American heroes and continue to serve as examples of soldiering that both American and foreign born soldiers continue to honor and be inspired by, foreign born soldiers likely do not wish to wait 200 years nor die in battle before they are granted their citizenship. And, as indicated by the previously cited reports, foreign born soldiers remain a vital part of the American military despite a decade of war. According to the Immigration Policy Center, “As of June 30, 2009, there were 114,601 foreign-born individuals serving in the armed forces, representing 7.91 percent of the 1.4 million military personnel on active duty” (Stock, 2010). Of these thousands of foreign born soldiers, why not offer them an opportunity to do more than just earn their citizenship? Why not offer them an opportunity to build a legion composed of foreign born American heroes like Lafayette and Gutierrez?

Moreover, an American Foreign Legion makes the most sense if the United States wishes to remain the biggest, baddest dog in the junkyard. American hard power projection throughout the world cannot be sustained with its current ground force structure. The fact of the matter is that America can no longer afford to fight long-term engagements such as the Global War on Terror with a volunteer fighting force of citizen soldiers and private security contractors. Unless it wishes to impose compulsory service, America must find a more affordable soldier. This more affordable soldier can be found in the American Foreign Legion.

STRUCTURE

As based on the model of the French Legionnaire, the American Foreign Legion soldier will be a single male, between 18 and 35 years of age, in excellent physical condition. He will be allowed no military dependents until completion of his required enlistment; thus incurring none of the costs of dependent housing, healthcare, education, transport, etc. that his regular Army counterparts do (FFL). The American Foreign Legion soldier will also come equipped with a wealth of language skills and cultural experience that the American military desperately needs and is struggling to procure and maintain. By vigorously recruiting from regions of the world that the United States is currently engaged in militarily or likely to be engaged, vital language skills and cultural experience will already be in hand (Schweitzer, 2003).

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As such, an American Foreign Legion might be comprised of 30,000 foreign born soldiers under the command of US Army officers and NCOs in its initial stages. Each soldier would be required to serve for a period of 24 months, after which they would be granted American citizenship. Following this, each American Foreign Legion soldier would be then required to complete a three year enlistment to be served in an overseas location. Upon completion of this five year term, the soldier may reenlist in the American Foreign Legion or the regular Army, or return to the United States as a private citizen, with all the rights, privileges, and benefits of any other American veteran.

In terms of capabilities, an American Foreign Legion would consist of two divisions of light and mechanized infantry equipped for rapid combat deployment, security and peacekeeping missions, long-range reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, path-finding and forward air support. While the training will be on par with that of the US Army Rangers—a fighting force capable of the multi-purpose missions of which the Legion will be tasked—the Legionnaire will wear the tab of the American Foreign Legion rather than the Ranger. The US Army Ranger and the American Legionnaire will be of equal fighting capabilities. If a Legionnaire wishes to join a regular Army Ranger Battalion upon completion of his term of service, then he will be authorized to wear his Foreign Legion insignia in place of that of the Ranger insignia. The two shall be seen as equals.

AFL AND AFRICOM

In terms of location and command, an American Foreign Legion would be based overseas in African nation states of which the United States has friendly relations and would fall under the operational command of AFRICOM currently headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. Djibouti is an obvious choice to base the First Division of the American Foreign Legion because of the already established US military presence there and its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula—which US officials have called a base for “the most active operational franchise of al-Qaeda beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan” (BBC, 2011).

Additionally, with the killing of Osama Bin Laden, US officials are concerned that “al Qaeda…is moving to expand operations through its affiliates in East Africa, and that a new charismatic militant leader could emerge there” (Barnes, 2011). In an effort to monitor and if necessary interdict these al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia and Yemen, the United States has begun building covert drone bases in strategic locations throughout the region. One of these bases is reportedly being established in Ethiopia while another is already operational on Seychelles (Reuters, 2011).While Seychelles, being an island, is less conducive to basing a division of mechanized infantry, Ethiopia—already headquarters to the African Union and an ally of the United States—would be ideal both militarily and politically for the Legion’s Second Division.

As reported in the New York Times in March 2011, AFRICOM, with no dedicated forces, has been criticized by some in Washington who feel that the command is “understaffed and poorly resourced for challenges that include countering fighters with an affiliate of al Qaeda in North Africa, Islamic extremists in Somalia, drug traffickers in West Africa and armed rebels in Congo” (Schmitt, 2011). With no assigned forces of its own and America’s closest available ground forces tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan, AFRICOM certainly does at this time seem to be quite “understaffed and poorly resourced”. However, with the American Foreign Legion’s initial proposed force of 30,000—its First Division based in Djibouti and the Second Division

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based in Ethiopia—AFRICOM will have both the robust forces in place to protect US interests in Africa and to combat the ever increasing threat of terror in the Arabian Peninsula.

There is no better time for the Pentagon to sell both Africa and America on an American Foreign Legion in Africa. In the past year, the world has watched as revolution and unrest has spread like a wildfire through North Africa and the Middle East. Regime after regime has been toppled or shaken to the core, while others continue to fight and kill their own citizens in desperate bids to stay in power. African leaders are not blind to these events nor are they blind to the growing influence of al-Qaeda on their continent. Other grave threats such as piracy, organized crime, tribal tensions, and non-terrorist affiliated militias and insurgent groups also pose a significant and unrelenting problem within many African states. Indeed, the only nation on earth currently in a position to levy a force capable of combatting these problems in Africa is the United States.

Those in America who would oppose such a long-term United States commitment in Africa know not what they do. Without security in Africa, development efforts will continue to fail. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates will continue to gain a foothold and while Americans themselves may not personally suffer, American interests in the region certainly will. Simply put, America needs Africa as much as Africa needs America. But in order to convince Africa how much it needs America, it cannot proffer to send 30,000 lily-white Idaho farm boys to Africa who have never seen an African, nor know nothing of ever skipping a meal, or spending their nights in anything close to a sun-baked hut. Rather, America must send the best of its melting pot to Africa. It must send to Africa not just fighting men of the highest caliber, but men also capable of understanding and appreciating international cultural differences and norms. Men who on their uniforms wear the flag of America, but who in their hearts carry the flags of many nations. Men who by the color of their skin and the scars on their faces reflect the history of many tribes. Men who by the words that flow from their mouths represent the dialects of many cities and villages throughout the world. Men who have been brought together as brothers—in the American Foreign Legion.

Bibliography

al-Izzi, S. a. (2007, May 27). U.S. Security Contractors Open Fire in Baghdad. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from The Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/26/AR2007052601394.html

Barnes, J. (2011, September 21). "U.S. Expands Drone Flights to Take Aim at East Africa". Retrieved November 28, 2011, from Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583012923076634.html

BBC. (2011, June 14). Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Retrieved November 28, 2011, from BBC News Middle East: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11483095

Camarota, S. A. (2011, October). A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration: 2000-2010. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from Center for Immigration Studies: http://cis.org/2000-2010-record-setting-decade-of-immigration

Congress, 1. (2002, August 6). Public Law 107–209 107th Congress: Joint Resolution Conferring honorary citizenship of the United States posthumously on Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roche Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de

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Lafayette. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from US Government Printing Office: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ209.107.pdf

FFL. (n.d.). French Foreign Legion - Recruiting. Retrieved November 29, 2011, from French Foreign Legion - Recruiting: http://www.legion-recrute.com/en/faq.php

Koehler, C. H. (2005). LEGIO PATRIA NOSTRA: THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION SINCE 1962. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC®): http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA436978

Leung, R. (2009, February 11). "The Death Of Lance Cpl. Gutierrez". Retrieved November 27, 2011, from 60 Minutes II : http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/23/60II/main550779.shtml

Lindemann, M. (2007). "Civilian Contractors under Military Law". Parameters, pp. 83-94.

Meyer, C. (2007, October 19). "US Army Lures Foreigners with Promise of Citizenship". Retrieved November 27, 2011, from Der Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,512384,00.html

Perry, W. J. (2006, January 25). The U.S. Military: Under Strain and Risk. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from US Senate Democrats: http://democrats.senate.gov/pdfs/NationalSecurityReport_01252006.pdf

Preston, J. (n.d.). "U.S. Military Will Offer Path to Citizenship". Retrieved November 27, 2011, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/us/15immig.html?pagewanted=all

Reuters. (2011, September 21). "US builds drone bases in Africa, Arab Peninsula-report". Retrieved November 28, 2011, from Reuters Africa: http://af.reuters.com/article/djiboutiNews/idAFS1E78J28J20110921

Schmitt, E. (2011, March 21). "U.S. Africa Command Seen Taking Key Role". Retrieved November 28, 2011, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22command.html

Schweitzer, P. (2003, February 22). Transforming U.S. military into an American Foreign Legion. Retrieved November 29, 2011, from seattlepi.com: http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Transforming-U-S-military-into-an-American-1107856.php

Serafino, J. K. (2007, July 11). Congressional Research Service Report "Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues". Retrieved November 27, 2011, from Washington Post : http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/contractor_crsreport_091807.pdf

Stock, M. D. (2010, September). "Fact Sheet: Immigrants and the Military". Retrieved November 27, 2011, from America's Voice Education Fund: http://amvoice.3cdn.net/385e1d33bde48f4d3e_znm6b9k3x.pdf

Terrazas, e. B. (2010, December). Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from Migration Policy Institute : http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=818#13

Waxman, H. (2007, February 7). United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Goverment Reform: Private Military Contractors in Iraq: an Examination of Blackwater’s Actions in Fallujah. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from C-SPAN: http://www.c-span.org/pdf/blackwater100207.pdf

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RESTRUCTURING ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDSby Jacob Kennedy

In late 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom, led by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United Islamic Front (Northern Alliance), succeeded in removing the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan. Shortly after the establishment of an interim administration headed by now president Hamid Karzai, the United Nations Security Council, recognizing the dangerously unstable environment inside and around the country of Afghanistan, passed Resolution 1386 in December 2001 creating ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force. ISAF, a NATO-led security mission comprised of 50 contributing nations, implemented a four-phased expansion across Afghanistan effectively assuming operational command and responsibility for the security of the entire country.

Over the past decade, the ousted Taliban has regrouped in various parts of the country, as well as in neighboring Pakistan, and has gradually intensified its fight against NATO forces and the developing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The insurgency in Afghanistan, led by the Taliban, has deepened with anti-government forces and other insurgent groups such as the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda affiliates contributing to the increase in terrorist attacks.1 The Taliban insurgency has proven to be an increasingly resilient and adaptive force despite the expansive ISAF coalition.2 While significant progress has been made regarding counter-narcotics efforts and building ANSF capacity, violent insurgent activity continues to pose a major threat to the ISAF mission, national security, and regional stability.3 This indicates the limited success of ISAF over the past years in defeating the Taliban insurgency and I argue that the potential effectiveness of ISAF is substantially restricted by its complex command structure that leads to a lack of unified objectives, differing mandates, and problems for coordination on the ground.

Furthermore, the six Regional Commands (RC) operating under the ISAF mission have headquarters led by the U.S., Germany, Italy, and Turkey. Subordinate commands operating

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1 Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, “2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Center for a New American Security, (2011), pp. 5-6.2 Barno, “2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan,” p. 5.3 U.S. Army Sgt. April Campbell, “Afghan forces becoming increasingly effective against drug producers,” (2011).

“The potential effectiveness of ISAF is substantially restricted by its complex command structure that leads to a lack of unified objectives, differing mandates, and problems for coordination on the ground.”

under each RC consists of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT), and Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLT). There are currently 13 different PRT Lead Nations for the total 28 PRTs working in the 34 provinces of Afghanistan.4 Of ISAF’s 50 contributing nations, less than half contribute to the hundreds of small-manned OMLTs5 and POMLTs6 functioning across the country. The following argument seeks to attest to the prohibitive complexity of these particular branches of the ISAF command structure and proposes that a restructuring of these components can lead to increased coalition cohesion further strengthening ISAF’s overall effectiveness in Afghanistan.

ISAF IN AFGHANISTAN

The primary mission of ISAF addresses three major issue areas: fighting back the insurgency, building the capacity and capabilities of ANSF, and improving governance and socio-economic development.7 Over the past seven years, ISAF and its Afghan counterparts have been working to address all of these major issues simultaneously and have largely been unsuccessful. Since the onset of the insurgency, suicide bomb attacks and Taliban-led violence have resulted in the deaths of large numbers of NATO and non-NATO troops in provinces spanning across all six RCs. Originally, violence in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan was much more intense compared to the northern and western parts due to the location of Taliban strongholds.8 As ISAF coalition forces succeeded in pushing the Taliban insurgency out of its main areas of operation, violence began to spread north as well as to southwestern parts of the country. The increasing waves of violent insurgent attacks being carried out across Afghanistan have caused major problems for the development of the other two major issue areas. Lt. Gen. Barno recognizes that ANSF has made significant improvements in their capacity and capabilities but

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4 NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations Placemat, (2011). Notes that numbers of troops should be taken as indicative as they change daily.5 NATO-ISAF Factsheet, “NATO’s OPERATIONAL MENTOR AND LIAISON TEAMS (OMLTs),” (2010). 6 NATO-ISAF Factsheet, “ NATO’s POLICE OPERATIONAL MENTOR AND LIAISON TEAMS (POMLTs),” (2010).7 NATO-ISAF Mission, http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html.8 Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” (2007), p. 59.

he goes on to state that “gains, often achieved at significant cost in blood and treasure by U.S. forces, must ultimately be sustained by Afghan national security forces.”9

The push to withdraw American troops and the push to transition increasingly more responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces are two competing forces. Progress in training ANSF has been frustrated by heightened insurgent activity. To make matters worse, Marine Corps Commandant James Conway announced that “intelligence intercepts suggest that Taliban fighters have been encouraged by the talk of the U.S. beginning to withdraw troops.”10 He went on to note that he, along with Gen. David Petraeus and other senior military officials, believes that it “will be a few years before conditions on the ground are such that turnover will be possible.”11 Whether or not decisions for complete U.S. military withdrawal by 2014 have served as “a morale boost to the Taliban” is not a certainty.12 However, it reinforces the importance and mounting pressure for effective change to occur regarding the transition process. Many within the Counterinsurgency Training Center Afghanistan believe that “a counterinsurgency mindset that encompasses prevention of civilian casualties, fosters public trust in the government and establishes conditions for economic growth is necessary to win the war.”13 The RCs and each respective subordinate command play a fundamental role in achieving this “mindset” among the Afghan population but developing collective objectives to successfully fulfill this role will require a more efficient lower level command structure.

SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

Beginning the structural reform at the subordinate command level is an important component to this restructuring process for a number of reasons. Firstly, PRTs play a critical role in carrying out the ISAF mission. As outlined by the ISAF PRT Handbook, PRTs “seek to improve the capacity of the GIRoA [government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] to govern itself…by helping to extend the reach of the as yet incomplete government presence especially in remote areas and hence deterring agents of instability.”14 Secondly, PRTs “operate as a fully integrated military-civilian organization.”15 Thirdly, OMLTs and POMLTs play an important role in the training, equipping, and mentoring process of the ANSF. Each of these teams consists of 11-28 personnel and “each OMLT [and POMLT] is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum period of six months.”16

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9 Barno, “2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan,” p. 4.10 Anne Flaherty, “Marine Corps Commandant James Conway Says Afghan Withdrawal Date 'Probably Giving Our Enemy Sustenance',” Huffingtonpost.com, (2010).11 Flaherty, “Marine Corps Commandant James Conway Says Afghan Withdrawal Date 'Probably Giving Our Enemy Sustenance',” (2010).12 Hamid Shalizi, “Afghans Say Withdrawal Timeline ‘Invigorates’ Taliban,” Reuters, (2010). 13 John House, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Requires New Thinking,” (2009).14 NATO, “ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook,” Edition 4, (2009), p. 4.15 ISAF PRT Handbook, p. 4.16 NATO-ISAF Factsheet, “NATO’s OPERATIONAL MENTOR AND LIAISON TEAMS (OMLTs),” (2010); NATO-ISAF Factsheet, “NATO’s POLICE OPERATIONAL MENTOR AND LIAISON TEAMS (POMLTs),” (2010)

Despite these significant characteristics, the enormous quantity of subordinate command units has fragmented their effectiveness. With multiple PRT lead nations implementing different agendas on the ground and focusing on dissimilar objectives, heightened insurgent activity has revealed the consequences of a loose unity of objectives. Insurgent attacks continue to strike compounds and busy military highways throughout the country; even the nation’s capital of Kabul has suffered deadly truck-bombs that, if securing highways were as central a mission-objective as outlined by the German-led RC-North, could be better and more collectively controlled. This is an example of the destabilizing problems arising from this fragmentation between regional commands and within subordinate commands that contributes to the ongoing violence. The PRT Handbook points out that despite “bringing all the PRTs under one theater commander [ISAF], even with a single command, achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs remains a challenge, if for no other reason than, as of March 2008, there are 14 nations leading PRTs.”17 While this speaks to the issue at hand, it was a mere recognition of a problem to which no solution was proposed.

The diverse make-up of the ISAF coalition permeates all levels of command becoming increasingly complex at the lower levels of the structure. The greater the quantity and variety of leading and contributing countries, the more problematic it becomes to design coordinated strategies among the many diverging national interests. These “problems arising from incongruity of purpose between the USA and its NATO allies” have become locked in by the operational gaps between subordinate command leadership at the lower levels.18 Coordinating objectives among the many subordinate commands has proven extremely difficult evident by the independence with which PRTs operate from other PRTs, as well as from the OMLTs and POMLTs. This is a result of the vast difference in country representation among command leadership. It is further supported by the fact that throughout the entire 283-page PRT Handbook there is no reference to coordination, communication, or cooperation strategies between PRTs and the OMLTs and POMLTs. Moreover, differences in command leadership are not just found in separate regions of the country but rather often exist within the same RC and, at times, the same province. For example, Norway leads the Meymaneh PRT in the Faryab province 517km west of the Hungary-led Pol-e Komri PRT in the Baghlan province. Both PRTs are located in the German-led RC-North.

Ultimately, the role of subordinate commands has been severely limited which has negatively affected ISAF’s ability to effectively secure the country. The complex command structure, combined with a superfluous amount of OMLTs and POMLTs, facilitates inefficient coordination, communication, and a lack of operational unity. As a result, restructuring the subordinate commands should involve eliminating OMLT and POMLT units and reintegrating their core functions into PRT operations. As impractical as this may sound, in reality, OMLTs and POMLTs differ very little from PRTs in their functions and purpose. The core functions of these units, providing liaison and deploying teams with specific Afghan units, will be assumed by PRTs. Under the PRT Guiding Principles, mentoring, teaching, training, supporting operational planning, and contributing to the development of ANSF are all activities currently

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17 ISAF PRT Handbook, p. 1. Updated numbers given by ISAF are 13 PRT Lead Nations for 28 PRTs.18 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan's Transition: ISAF's Stabilisation Role?” Third World Quarterly, (2006).

performed by PRTs.19 These are essentially the role of OMLTs and POMLTs and reinforces the point that their existence is an unnecessary source of the complex structure that leads to the coordination dilemma. Furthermore, the U.S. is the only nation that contributes a significant amount of OMLTs and POMLTs and given the fact that the U.S. is a leading or supporting nation for 11 of the 13 PRTs, integrating the units into PRT operations will be expedited.20

In addition, restructuring will inevitably increase the number of PRTs, as well as operational capacity. OMLTs and POMLTs, as mentioned above, are small units and the loss of these units will be minor compared to the gains. Financial support maintaining the teams can be utilized by PRTs and the troop numbers can be committed to creating additional PRTs in provinces that do not have one. This is especially important to deepen civilian-military relationships where PRTs are not currently operating and to ensure that “civilian-military planning must be balanced between civilians and military.”21 The logistics of incorporating OMLT and POMLT units into PRTs would be a relatively simple maneuver and the purpose for this integration is to help unify subordinate commands, decreasing the probability of differing objectives and increasing coordination capabilities. Restructuring will also implement a new PRT leadership structure. PRTs will be led by tri-national commands consistent with leading nations of the RC in which they are located. This change will facilitate operational coordination to “ensure a set of common objectives and increased convergence between the activities of all PRTs.”22

REGIONAL COMMANDS

On a larger scale, the regional commands of ISAF suffer from a lack of cohesion and differing elements between RC missions. For example, RC-North, headed by Germany, dedicates part of its mission to “securing highways,” “supporting Afghan Border Police,” and promoting “cultural development.” None of these elements are addressed in any other RC mission. Timo Noetzel, Senior Policy Advisor to the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, noted that “the domestic political debate [in Germany] has sent a signal to the allies that Germany is not prepared to support wholeheartedly the alliance’s fight against the insurgency.”23 Furthermore, Iceland, Portugal, Norway, and Canada are all NATO member-states that have contributed less than .5% to the total number of ISAF troops.24 This highlights substantially disparate levels of commitment when compared to the far greater troop contributions made by the U.S., the U.K., Italy, and France, whose contribution makes up roughly 82% of ISAF troops. In order to consolidate ISAF Joint Command’s control over RC operations, a new RC leadership structure will be established. Recalling the new PRT leadership structure, a tri-national command will

13

19 ISAF PRT Handbook, pp. 4-6.20 NATO-ISAF, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php. The U.S. accounts for 76 OMLTs and 279 POMLTs. The country with the second-largest contribution is Germany with 5 OMLTs and 10 POMLTs.21 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Afghanistan PRT Handbook: Observations, Insights, and Lessons,” (2011).22 ISAF PRT Handbook, p. 1.23 Timo Noetzel, “Ignoring the Insurgency,” (2007).24 NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations Placemat, (2011).

similarly lead each respective region. Purposefully, the three leading nations of each RC will determine the tri-national command of the PRTs operating within that region. This will further strengthen coalition cohesion.

The proposed RC leadership structure would be as follows: RC-North led by the U.K., Turkey, and Italy; RC-South led by the U.S., the U.K., and France; RC-East led by the U.S., the U.K., and Turkey; RC-West led by Italy, U.S., and Spain; and finally RC-Southwest led by Spain, France, and the U.S. To clarify the purpose of this structure it should be noted that Germany is removed from leadership responsibility of RC-North. Germany seeks a decreased military role in operations and since it already resources police training for the national police, committing German troop contributions to the increased PRTs is a mutually beneficial modification. Also, with the exception of France who did not previously have a lead role, leading countries were chosen based on current troop concentrations to expedite the leadership transition. Lastly, the restructuring of the RC leadership will involve development and dissemination of new, unified mission statements that will guide PRT operations in conjunction with ISAF’s original primary mission of fighting back the insurgency, building the capacity and capabilities of ANSF, and improving governance and socio-economic development.

CONCLUSION

As the 2014 withdrawal date nears, the ISAF coalition must seek effective structural and operational change. This includes creating and building on opportunities to enhance the civil-military component of the counterinsurgency. This proposal seeks to identify some of the underlying issues limiting the potential effectiveness of ISAF to not only control the insurgency but help effect lasting change for the Afghan authorities and population. As contributing nations, particularly the U.S., begin to draw down their troop numbers, actions need to be taken to emphasize the absolute importance that “Afghan security forces must be more rapidly and more widely placed into the lead.”25 Before this can take place, ISAF command units must find a way to swiftly remedy its own shortcomings. The impact of restructuring ISAF’s regional and subordinate commands could be a more unified, effective, cohesive security coalition. One that is able to complete its mission and successfully contribute to reconstructing a secure and stable environment that is sustainable by the government of Afghanistan, its own institutions, and the people.

Bibliography

Barno, Lt. Gen. David W. “2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Congressional Testimony. Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Center for a New American Security. 3 November 2011. Web. www.cnas.org. 12 November 2011. pp. 1-7.

Campbell, Sgt. April. “Afghan forces becoming increasingly effective against drug producers.” Isaf.nato.int. Web. 29 September 2011. http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/afghan-forces-becoming-increasingly-effective-against-drug-producers.html. 9 October 2011.

14

25 Lt. Gen. Barno, p. 4.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. “Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook: Observations, Insights, and Lessons.” No. 11-16. February 2011. Accessed from Web: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/call-11-16-afghan-prt.pdf. 3 November 2011. pp. i-215.

Flaherty, Anne. “Marine Corps Commandant James Conway Says Afghan Withdrawal Date 'Probably Giving Our Enemy Sustenance'.” Huffingtonpost.com. 24 August 2010. Web. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/24/james-conway-afghanistan-enemy-sustenance_n_693405.html. 22 November 2011.

House, John. “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Requires New Thinking.” American Forces Press Services. U.S. Department of State. 23 July 2009. Web. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55237. 10 October 2011.

ISAF. “Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook.” Edition 4. Unclassified. March 2009. Accessed from Web: http://publicintelligence.info/isaf-provincial-reconstruction-team-prt-handbook/. 3 November 2011. pp. iii-283.

Jones, Seth G. “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.” International Security. Vol. 32, No. 4. (2008). pp. 7-40. Published by: The MIT Press. JSTOR. 26 November 2011.

Noetzel, Timo. “Ignoring the Insurgency.” The World Today. Vol. 63, No. 11. (2007). pp. 7-8. Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs. JSTOR. 17 November 2011.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Headquarters Brussels. “Fact Sheet: NATO’s Operational and Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs).” Public Diplomacy Division. June 2010. Web. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets-june/June%202010-Fact%20Sheet%20OMLT.pdf. 15 November 2011.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Headquarters Brussels. “Fact Sheet: NATO’s Police Operational and Mentor Liaison Teams (POMLTs).” June 2010. Web. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets-june/JUne%202010-Fact%20Sheet%20POMLT.pdf. 15 November 2011.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan. Isaf.nato.int. Web. http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html. 18 November 2011.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. ISAF. Troop Numbers and Contributions. Isaf.nato.int. Web. http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php. 10 November 2011.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations Placemat. 18 October 2011. Web. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/18%20october%202011%20isaf%20placemat.pdf. 22 November 2011.

Rubin, Barnett R. “Saving Afghanistan.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 86, No. 1. (2007). pp. 57-74, 76-78. Published by: Council on Foreign Relations. JSTOR. 3 October 2011.

Saikal, Amin. “Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’s Stabilisation Role?” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 3. (2006). pp. 525-534. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. JSTOR. 28 November 2011.

Shalizi, Hamid. “Afghans Say Withdrawal Timeline ‘Invigorates’ Taliban.” Af.reuters.com. 25 August 2010. Web. http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE67O2SS20100825?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true. 20 November 2011.

15

THE FAILURE OF THE EMPIRE OF BASESby Dariusz Lesniak-Cichocki

As of this writing the United States’ national debt was $15,063,495,983,650.88.1 The nation has a series of problems, which have been perpetuated by a rueful and consistent mismanagement of its finances. There are numerous forms of power and power projection -- soft, hard, economic, military, cultural -- and yet while the United States was and is a leader in all of these fields, its global advantage is not slipping, it is gone.

Not only is the national debt egregiously high, but the debt to GDP ratio has also breached 100%. Federal Debt began the 20th century at less than 10% of GDP and jumped around through the years. As a result of World War I, it exceeded 30% of Debt to GDP, after the crash of 1929, it rose to 40%. Yet, During World War II, debt exploded to 120% of GDP and then began a decline that bottomed out at 32% in 1974.2 Currently, the ratio stands at 98% of Debt to GDP. The contemporary situation is not the first time that the United States has been in a strained fiscal situation, yet this is the first time that we border on calamity. The lack of fiscal discipline which has entrenched the belief that when it comes to power, more is better, is bankrupting America and preventing it from making intelligent decisions not only domestically but also abroad.

The debt to GDP ratio at the conclusion of WWII was the highest it has ever been, yet the situation differed greatly than that of the contemporary. In 1945, the United States had fought a devastating global conflict, empires were dissolved and a short peace was replaced by a burgeoning cold war which threatened to further devastate the world. Nations such as France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom left the trappings of their empires and entered an age of reform. Today, these nations once again have entered into austerity in order to scale back public spending, yet the United States continues to plow ahead, managing its own global empire of security. Yet, our empire, which is deemed a necessity by domestic policy circles, so as to ensure global security and stability, is doing everything but providing security. Although, the United States’ economy remains the largest in the world, its position is weakening; over the decade from 1999-2009, the U.S. global share of GDP declined from 23% to 20%, the nation’s credit rating has been downgraded, an economy with an over-reliance on imports, and the debt to GDP ratio, have all contributed to an alarming account deficit.3 The equation is simple, money is power; throughout history nations have depended on finances to create armies and fight wars. During the Roman era, the Roman Empire used its soldiers but had others finance their activities, in the fourteenth century the French leveraged finances from the Templars leading to the rise of the Templar knights. Today, the United States borrows finances haphazardly from nations across the globe. The current state of affairs cannot continue unabated, it is time that the

16

1 “US National Debt Clock,” Ed Hall 25 November 2011, accessed 29 November 2011 http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/.2 “US Federal Debt Since 1900” 29 November 2011 http://www.usgovernmentdebt.us/.3 Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment. America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (2011): 36.

United States scale back its global footprint, decreasing its global presence in order to secure its own long term interests.

THE PROBLEM: A SLICE OF THE LARGER PIE

The Department of Defense (DOD) manages a worldwide property portfolio which spans all 50 states, 7 US territories and 130 foreign nations. In addition, the DOD’s Washington Headquarters Service (WHS), manages leased facilities for the Pentagon and the DOD.4 The DOD uses a

classification process in order to streamline the management of its properties. This classification has three categories: buildings, structures, and linear structures. Within its rolodex of properties there are a total of 542,208 buildings and structures, 100,028 of which are located internationally.5 Although, the majority of the structures managed by the DOD - 431,418 - are located within the United States, these structures and the bases where they are housed are not the problem. Rather, it is the 707 overseas military installations which are.6 Between the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, WHS, and the DOD, the total value of these properties is $848 billion, $152 billion of which is located internationally.7 Furthermore, this translates into 504 million square feet and 855,000 acres which the US government is forced to manage and control outside of its borders. 8

The numerous international sites are broken down as follows: 20 large sites, 16 medium sites, 549 small sites and 26 sites classified as “other”.9 The official number of international bases comes to 611, yet once one factors in the classified and black sites, the number rises to 707. The majority of the bases are located in Germany (194), Japan (108) and South Korea (82).10 Although, some of the bases are holdovers from the Cold War, the Pentagon and DOD have been expanding this empire of bases since the onset of the Global War on Terror.11 Furthermore, the command structure of the bases is broken down throughout ten strategic command centers designed to function as a “Unified Command Plan” which establishes global missions as well as

17

4 “Washington Headquarters Service” WHS Online 15 December 2011 http://www.whs.mil/About/organization.cfm5 United States, Department of Defense Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010) 8.6 Chalmers Johnson, “America’s Empire of Bases” TomDispatch.com 15 January 2004, accessed 29 November 2011 http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm.7 United States, Department of Defense Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010) 9.8 Ibid 14-20.9 Ibid 25.10 Ibid 7.11 Chalmers Johnson, “America’s Empire of Bases” TomDispatch.com 15 January 2004, accessed 29 November 2011 http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm.

“Our empire, which is deemed a necessity by domestic policy circles, so as to ensure global security and stability, is doing everything but providing security.”

geographic areas of responsib i l i ty for American combatants scattered throughout the empire.12

Bases are the literal and symbolic anchors of US g l o b a l m i l i t a r y dominance. As exhibited by the increasing number of American bases abroad, the military apparatus would have us believe that the installations exist in order to increase and perpetuate domestic as well as global security, especially in a post 9/11 world where non-state actors have become the largest threat. Yet, the contemporary situation is unparalleled in history, not only from the devastating costs of global troop presence, but also from the omnipresence of militarism. The United States currently has 253,288 uniformed personal abroad and employs another 44,446 local foreigners at its facilities.13 This number of personal is larger than the total size of the military of each individual U.S. ally, including that of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and Israel.14 Although, the total amount of acreage, the value of the facilities and the logistical impact of America’s footprint is easily calculated, the full cost and impact of America’s military dominance is not.

At the end of World War II America found itself faced with a new threat, one emanating from the Soviet Union, whose doctrine was anathema to that of America’s capitalist model. During this period, the presence of global bases made for solid military and political doctrine in order to stem the tide of a looming communist threat. The superpower competition swelled budgets which led to unrestrained military spending.15 Yet, the world has changed. The threat of Communist invasion has vanished and the United States has become economically feeble and in

18

12 Unified Command Plan, U.S. Department of Defense 27 April 2011, accessed 29 November 2011 http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/.13 Chalmers Johnson, “America’s Empire of Bases” TomDispatch.com 15 January 2004, accessed 29 November 2011 http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm.14 “The UK’s Defence Dilemma” BBC News UK 19 October 2010, accessed 15 December 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-1156772915 Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment. America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (2011): 32.

turn potentially unstable. Furthermore, the presence of American military bases globally does not add to the security of the nation, rather it detracts from it.

In 2003, Defense secretary Rumsfeld stated “Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror” and although the nation may indeed be winning the conflict militarily, our global presence is not only financially crippling future Americans, it is also detracting from our current security situation.16 One of the potential causes of 9/11, was American military presence not only in the Middle East, but specifically in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, due to the damages of environmental degradation as well as increases in crime which stem from the presence of a military base, a rising number of local populations are opposing the presence of American soldiers.17 In addition, the military reports that there are 14,000 sexual assaults within its ranks annually, with 21% of American personal currently abroad this equates to 2,940 of these assaults occurring on international soil.18 These events alone will be expensive to manage, both politically and financially. Although the military establishment believes that increased defense is the purpose of these bases, environmental issues, violations of host nations’ laws and the cessation of the Cold War have led even staunch allies such as Japan to start to reconsider the presence of American soldiers.19

The problem is a complex one and the economics of the contemporary situation simply do not allow for a global presence of the nature and size we currently find ourselves in. Couple this concept with growing international hostility to an American presence and it forces one to question the efficiency of the current policy. Although the problem is indeed difficult to address, the solution need not be.

SOLUTIONS: FOLLOW ENGLAND, NOT RUSSIA INTO AUSTERITY

If we are to entertain the worst possible option: the United States’ economic situation will not improve drastically over the next 5 to 10 years. Then, it is only rational to begin to cut programs and budgets in order to scale back spending and prevent the further growth of the nation’s debt to GDP. Thus, what lies ahead are two options: Follow Russia or England. When the Soviet Union imploded, it found itself being forced to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe and disengage on a scale not previously seen. It is a common misconception that the United States defeated the Soviets, rather, the Soviet Union defeated itself through the inefficiency of its economic model. When the contemporary nation of Russia emerged from the ashes, it found itself unable to pay the wages of its soldiers or even maintain the upkeep of its nuclear ordinance.20

19

16 Chalmers Johnson, “America’s Empire of Bases” TomDispatch.com 15 January 2004, accessed 29 November 2011 http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm.17 Catherine Lutz, “Bases, Empire, and Global Response” Fellowship 73.1-3 (2007): 14-17.18 Chalmers Johnson, “America’s Empire of Bases” TomDispatch.com 15 January 2004, accessed 29 November 2011 http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm.19 Catherine Lutz, “Bases, Empire, and Global Response” Fellowship 73.1-3 (2007): 14-17.20 David Hoffman, “Russian Forces Disintegrating; Even Officers Seek Way Out of Military Nearing Collapse” The Washington Post (New York, 05 Oct 1996): A.01.

Conversely, the United Kingdom has set the model for what efficient downsizing can be. The United Kingdom escaped the trappings of empire at the conclusion of WWII largely by allowing the United States to pick up the reins. Yet, it maintained its presence as an effective global military power. Though, in an era where the global economy is in a recession and potentially a larger depression, England is now showing that it is a financially efficient military power. In October of this year, Prime Minister David Cameron announced plans to cut the military budget by 7.5% and the overall headcount by 10% over 5 years. In addition, the nation plans on retiring equipment, which would reduce English tank forces by 40%, artillery by 35% and reduce the overall total number of aircraft and naval vessels.21

According to the Government Accountability Office, costs associated with the military are on the rise, which is decreasing the return on investment for the U.S. For example, since the conclusion of the Cold War, the cost of supporting active-duty service members grew by 33%.22 Americans already shoulder the cost of global security; U.S. taxpayers pay an annual average of $2,065 each in taxes to cover national defense, whereas Britons pay $1,000, Germans $430, and Japanese $340.23 If the United States’ policy makers can look at the situation objectively, they should quickly realize that the model they want to emulate is that of England’s instead of Russia’s. There is no shame in reduction, but there would be in collapse. Thus, first and foremost, the United States must cease current expansion of any and all international bases. In the past, U.S. policy makers were able to simple purchase hegemony. Yet, it must be noted that there is no correlation between U.S. defense spending and U.S. military success abroad. Although money equates power, it does not guarantee success. To the contrary, as tactics and technology change, the advantages normally purchased by overwhelming technological superiority will be eroded.24 The proliferation of anti-ship and advanced surface air-to-air missiles, small arms trade, and nationalist insurgencies are all contributing to the alteration of warfare and making it less expensive for foes to challenge U.S. military dominance.25 Yet, while this cost is decreasing, the relative cost of holding territory is increasing, thus reducing the financial incentives of basing on the periphery.

Since WWII, American administrations have believed that a reduction in defense spending would potentially reduce American influence and hinder efforts at global cooperation. Furthermore, this has been coupled with the idea that attempts at reduction or retrenchment would embolden America’s adversaries. Yet, the policies which have strained American power in recent memory are exactly the one’s which have been activist and adventurist in their nature. For example, the invasion of Iraq alienated U.S. allies, while increasing Iranian regional power.

20

21 “Downsizing the U.K. Military; The U.K’s Forces Once Dominated Continents and Ruled the Waves, but Today British Military is Shrinking as the Government Cuts Defense spending to a Record Deficit” Wall Street Journal (New York, 16 May 2011).22 Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment. America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (2011): 35.23 Ibid 41.24 Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment. America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (2011): 41.25 Ibid 35-36.

Another example is NATO expansion, which has intensified Russian ambitions in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, while forward deployments and bases once served as barriers for land grabs, this is no longer the case.26 Thus, it would be prudent to attempt the opposite of what has become the status quo and implement an actual reduction in military expenditures. In line with this logic, over the course of the next 2 years, all bases which are leased should not be renewed. This 2 year period would allow ample time for troops and equipment to be moved back to facilities within the US. Despite the apocalyptic prophecies, similar reductions in the past have benefited the U.S. position. For example, repositioning of U.S. forces in South Korea as well as calls for increased Japanese participation in that nation’s defense have resulted in closer diplomatic relations as well as a more efficient integration of forces.27 The leased bases represent more recent acquisitions for the U.S. base rolodex and are located within areas of the globe where the local populations are not too keen on a U.S. presence. Thus, these facilities should be the first to close, allowing for a shift and movement of forces to areas where it will be more politically and financially acceptable to quarter them.

The ultimate goal should not be the elimination of a US presence internationally. Rather, it must be a sensible reduction in order to meet contemporary economic realities whilst continuing to address the global security situation. Although various policy groups oppose the concept of retrenchment, under the misguided belief that it will foster international chaos, a prudent policy would not only benefit the already strained to the breaking point economy, but also redirect the antiquated Cold war mentality-driven foreign policy of the United States.28 A realignment of resources would increase strategic flexibility while also freeing up resources which would promote long term growth. In addition, according to the Pew Research Center, Americans would support this sort of reduction, as 70% of the Nation’s citizenry would prefer that the United States share global responsibility, which directly translates into a reduction in the burden of cost the U.S. bears.29

This could be accomplished by the reduction of 50% of international bases as well as the consolidation of structures within core nations such as Germany, Japan, and Korea. A reduction of 50,000 troops and the closure of the bases which house them would save as much as $12 billion per year.30 707 bases is an extreme, they circle the globe and although many have separate functions, the sheer number guarantees that some functions are being needlessly replicated. Thus, consolidation of existing structures will increase efficiency, decrease costs, and decrease international resentment due to a smaller U.S. footprint. Furthermore, a consolidation and reduction in overall numbers of troops quartered abroad would create incentive for U.S. allies to spend more on their own defense and play a more active role in that defense.31 In the

21

26 Ibid 37.27 Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment. America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (2011): 3828 Ibid 33.29 Ibid 39.30 Ibid 43.31 Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment. America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (2011): 42.

current strained economic environment the United States need not further erode its economic power. Thus, strategic realignment should be the call of the day, and commitments and resources should be shifted away from that of the periphery to that of the core of the nation’s interests. This sort of strategic shift would be supported by the population of the United States; 79% believe that the U.S. acts as a global policeman more often it should.32 A reduction in global basing would not only decrease costs, but also limit exposure, by reducing the number of forward deployed areas, the nation scales back its potential flashpoints by decreasing the number of potential accidental clashes with regional powers.33 Also, a reduction in the size of the nation’s global perimeter will also increase its security by allowing forces to become more effectively concentrated. Last, the United States and its allies have similar goals: stability and trade. Yet, the current U.S. position is unsustainable due to economic constraints. Thus, allowing allies to play a more active role in their own defense would allow the U.S. to concentrate on more important matters, such as repairing a faltering economy.

The reduction of the total number of facilities globally would allow for more efficiency to be produced by the armed services. Utilizing Germany – as in the past - as a hub, would be logistically prudent. Germany holds the largest U.S. troop concentration at present and is home to the largest number of international bases. Thus, consolidating these, allowing for a realignment to occur, would be more cost efficient and time effective, due to the presence of existing infrastructure. Furthermore, there is less hostility towards the American presence in Germany than elsewhere, as well as the benefit of relative proximity of NATO headquarters, which is located in Belgium.

CONCLUSION

US policy makers will find it difficult to decrease the nation’s global presence, a presence which has been hard won. Yet, they will find that if the economic situation does not change – all economic indicators show it will not, in the short term - that they will have no choice.34 The nation’s global empire of bases is founded on a defense strategy from an era which has passed. Furthermore, there is limited evidence indicating that the large global presence is accomplishing its intended task of increasing defense. Bases have been closed in the past, even by the anointed political saint, Ronald Reagan, who otherwise increased defense spending by 35%.35 Contemporary threats do not demand stationed logistical bases, rather they require rapid-response capabilities. Yet, rather than address the contemporary problem effectively, the United States has fallen into a familiar pattern of previous empires; it has started to over consume, overextend, and become overoptimistic about its own abilities. The country has proven numerous times in the past that it is resilient and resourceful, now if only policy makers could formulate a strategy not anchored by the trappings of empire and more aligned with contemporary threats, the nation could greatly improve its trajectory of recovery. Fredrick the

22

32 Ibid 40.33 Ibid.34 Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass, “American Profligacy and American Power” Foreign Affairs 89.6 (2011): 25-2835 “40. Ronald Reagan 1981-1989” Whitehouse.gov 2009, accessed 15 December 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/ronaldreagan

Great stated that by “attempting to defend everything, one defends nothing,” it is high time the United States paid heed to these words and began to reduce its global footprint in order to protect the future of its citizenry.

!

Bibliography

40. Ronald Reagan 1981-1989. Whitehouse.gov, 2009. Web. 15 Dec. 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/ronaldreagan

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Bacevich, Andrew J. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Chantrill, Christopher. US Federal Debt Since 1900. Christopher Chantrill, 2010. Web. 29 Nov. 2011. http://www.usgovernmentdebt.us/.

“Downsizing the U.K. Military; The U.K.’s Forces Once Dominated Continents and Ruled the Waves, but Today British Military is Shrinking as the Government Cuts Defense Spending in Response to a Record Deficit” Wall Street Journal 16 May 2011.

Hoffman, David. “Russian Forces Disintegrating; Even Officers Seek Way Out of Military Nearing Collapse” The Washington Post 05 Oct 1996: A.01.

Jaffe, Greg. “Pentagon Builds Up Influence in Gulf Bases, Troops – Qatar, Bahrain Quietly Invite U.S. Military Presence“ The Wall Street Journal 25 June 2002: A1.

Johnson, Chalmers. America’s Empire of Bases. TomDispatch.com, Jan. 2010. 29 Nov. 2011. http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm

Krepinevich Jr., Andrew F. “A New American Military Needed” The Wall Street Journal Asia 12 Sep. 2002: A7.

Lutz, Catherine. “Bases, Empire, and Global Response.” Fellowship 73.1-3 (2007)

Parent, Joseph M. and Paul K. MacDonald. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment.” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (2011)

“The UK’s Defence Dilemma” BBC News UK 19 Oct. 2010. accessed 15 Dec. 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11567729

Unified Command Plan. U.S. Department of Defense, 2011. 29 Nov 2011. http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/

United States. Department of Defense. Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline (A Summary of DoD’s Real Property Inventory), Sept. 2010. accessed 29 Nov. 2011. http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/bsr2011baseline.pdf

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Washington Headquarters Services. U.S. Department of Defense, 2011. accessed 15 Dec. 2011. http://www.whs.mil/About/organization.cfm

23

AN EVOLUTION IN INTERVENTION by Mara Tshibaka

Recent U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that while the military is well trained to conduct combat missions it is ill equipped for what ensues after the conflict ends.1 Yet the leadership burden in interventions often falls to the U.S. because worldwide, UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions endure for years, often producing little progress. As a result, many American politicians and civilians argue that the U.S. should become more isolationist in its policies. For example, modern politicians like Ron Paul and John Boehner are simply echoing principles set forth in George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address: “the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.”2 In fact, a recent Pew Research Center Poll found that nearly half of the Americans polled preferred to “mind [their] own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own."3 Advocates for isolationism also argue that the increased use of international law to punish state leaders and guerrilla commanders negates the need for active military intervention. 4 Moreover, some argue that international law invokes the jus cogens principle of sovereignty and consequently, the prohibition of intervention.

Lessons learned in the aftermath of World War I, however, as well as the advent of principles such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P), affirm that the U.S. cannot be a nation solely focused on the defense of its borders, and that the international community recognizes and advocates the need for intervention. 5 Moreover, the implementation of international law and even the authority of the Unites Nations Security Council (UNSC) is constrained by bureaucracy and lack of political will. U.N missions to what some consider post-conflict countries lack clear rules of engagement (ROE) to actively pursue rather than, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), simply monitor militia forces and their activities.

Although I understand that the size of such forces is important (the DRC boasts over 17,000 U.N. peacekeepers), their mandates must clearly delineate ROE and are paramount to such interventions. Military strategists like Thomas Barnett argue that interventions can occur more efficiently by separating the military combatants (the Leviathan) from peacekeeping

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1 Rosen, Nir. Aftermath: following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World. New York: Nation, 2010.2 Washington, George. Washington's Farewell Address. No. 106-21. Senate Document. Washington: G.P.O., 2000. 26.3 Nichols, Christopher M. "America's New Isolationism." The Huffington Post - Politics, 13 June 2011. 5 Jan. 2012.4 Goodman, Ryan. "Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War." Harvard Law School. The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 100:107. 14 Sept. 2004. 23 Nov. 2011. 7,8,30.5 Der Derian, James. "Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Boundary 2. Volume 30, Number 3, Fall 2003, 19-27.

and peacebuilding personnel (system administrators).6 This paper explores how the future of warfare lies not only in the strategies of waging war but also in the strategies of waging peace.7 It proposes a fundamental shift in the structural foundation of warfare and will argue that interventions must include a progression of three phases: an initial military campaign, peacekeeping, and then peacebuilding.

Efforts should focus on improving intervention strategies to maximize sustainable accomplishments and on effectively preparing security forces, particularly in light of the increased proliferation of guerrilla warfare. If the progression from military campaign to peacekeeping to peacebuilding is applied correctly, protracted crises will not only be avoidable, but even preventable.

WHY DO IT DIFFERENTLY?

U.S. and great power militaries have operated in largely the same way for generations, despite the evolution of the nature of warfare. The industrialization of war in the 20th century meant that those without access to technology increasingly utilized guerrilla and insurgency techniques. Mao Tse-tung’s work titled On Protracted War illustrated guerrilla warfare’s advantage over industrial warfare: guerrillas and insurgents are better prepared for protracted wars as the entire population can be engaged in the effort. Mao’s claim of a symbiotic relationship between the army and the people (where the guerrillas are fish swimming in the sea of citizens) can be found in protracted conflicts today.8 The eventual fall of the United Soviet Socialist Republic and the end of the Cold War engendered the proliferation of small arms. The Kalashnikov (AK-47 assault rifle) compensated for the imbalances that existed on the battlefield.9 Better technology and weaponry no longer equaled decisive victory. Instead, a small guerrilla army using geography, the people around them and unconventional strategies, could now frustrate the efforts of many conventional armies.

WHY PEACEMAKING?

In order to adapt to the changes in conventional warfare, Thomas Barnett and others suggest a move towards a “new army.” A large conventional army has little advantage when fighting unconventional armies that are using atypical tactics. By using surgical operations, however, fewer people can end a conflict in a contained and tractable manner. This requires a peacemaking force with the capabilities of a traditionally trained marine corps or what Thomas

25

6 Thomas Barnett Draws a New Map for Peace | Video on TED.com. Thomas Barnett. TED: Ideas worth Spreading. TED Talk, June 2007. 12 Nov. 2011.7 Ibid.8 Cowley, Robert, and Geoffrey Parker. The Reader's Companion to Military History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996. 193.9 Chivers, C. J. The Gun: the AK-47 and the Evolution of War. London: Allen Lane, 2010. 12.

“The future of warfare lies not only in the strategies of waging war but also in the strategies of waging peace.”

Barnett calls “the Leviathan.”10 This means the battalion of marines must include enough young soldiers capable of executing quick strikes in order to kill or capture insurgents. Reliable intelligence and communication are also paramount. Ideally their operations would destroy enemy command structures, weakening control over the local population.

In order to be successful, the strategic aims of a peacemaking force must restore security, maintain mission focus, and implement punitive actions, where necessary.11 In many cases this may include active regime change. The operational means must include an expedient chain of command as well as high technology support and tools.12 The importance of a unilateral command structure in these operations cannot be stressed enough, as this means decisions can be implemented quickly. This is preferable to the highly bureaucratic and largely ineffective U.N. multilateral operations. For example, Operation Desert Storm demonstrates that although joint operations can produce a decisive victory, its success also reflects the importance of a seamless and unilateral chain of command. This was reflected in General Norman Shwarzkopf’s overall command, which played a key role in securing the victory.13

WHY PEACEKEEPING?

An effective peacemaking force is not the only ingredient needed for maintaining sustainable peace. Too many countries that are considered ‘post-conflict’ are still in conflict. Active combat may have ceased in countries such as the DRC but mass violence is still regularly perpetrated against the population. Unless peace is created through an initial surgical military campaign, the peacekeeper’s mandate will not only be difficult, but most likely also untenable. One cannot keep the peace when peace has not first been established.

If there is to be a successful and sustainable peacemaking mission, peacekeeping forces must ensure long-term peace and development. According to General Rupert Smith, author of The Utility of Force, “peacekeeping… is toothless.”14 For Smith, this type of peacekeeping lies within the context of industrial warfare or war between states. He argues that industrial warfare tactics fail to recognize contemporary guerrilla warfare or war fought amongst the people. This coupled with the fact that U.N. peacekeepers rarely act offensively, creates an environment in which they do not instill respect or fear. Assembling a multinational U.N. force is not only time consuming but also produces an uneven quality of personnel. U.N. peacekeeping mandates, funding, staff, and organizational structures have limited capabilities and U.N. troops face challenges including uneven equipment and training.15 The U.N. is not a military organization nor does it employ a framework of rapid and comprehensive deployment. As a result, these

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10 Thomas Barnett Draws a New Map for Peace | Video on TED.com. Thomas Barnett. TED: Ideas worth Spreading. TED Talk, June 2007. 12 Nov. 2011.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Lambeth, S. Benjamin. The Transformation of American Air Power. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000. 148-152.14 Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force the Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin, 2006. 315.15 "Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. USHMM, USIP, AAD, Dec. 2008. 5 Jan. 2012. 85

troops’ presence merely sustains the culture of impunity that permeates post-conflict countries.

The general failure of U.N. missions to encourage sustained negative peace (or the absence of direct violence) reflects the need to create a new breed of peacekeeper.16 Previous U.N forces have been given mandates to monitor rather than to enforce peace. This new peacekeeping force would entail a peacekeeping brigade that operates under one command structure, with clear ROE that are offensive as well as defensive in nature. The recruiting and training for these forces should be similar to Police Corps and Military Police training. In order to ensure high recruitment levels, commitment to successful peacekeeping should be rewarded with career advancement. In addition, preparation should include basic training, law and security enforcement, crime prevention, emergency response, military and local law education, jurisdiction and investigative training, as well as interviewing skills.17 It is essential that recruitment include officers and soldiers with high ideals and a strong moral compass.

Effectiveness requires a multiplicity of mandates and missions, including working to win the "hearts and minds" of the local communities. Peacekeepers must be trusted to protect. As such, these forces cannot include the same marine battalion that led the initial attacks. This allows the local communities to view these forces as less of an occupier and more of a welcome security enforcer. Otherwise their allegiance to the guerrillas may be unyielding and protracted conflict will be unavoidable. As Mao Tse-tung wrote, “The army must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Such an army will be invincible...”18

Other mandates should also include proper laws and actions clearly delineated in the rules of engagement, such as isolating the rebels, as well as closing borders to keep their supplies and weapons from replenishing. Peacekeepers must be empowered to engage in order to stop atrocities, and if enemy combatants attack them, they must be authorized to respond in kind. Mandates must also include the ability to attack militias that continue to terrorize the population.  In order to accomplish the above, peacekeeping soldiers must be seasoned veterans with the discipline to practice restraint.19 Operationally, the U.S. government must have the ability to deploy and maintain a force of this nature (and possibly size, depending on the conflict).  

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is essential to assimilating enemy combatants into society. Offering lower level enemy combatants amnesty in exchange for ending the violence helps accomplish this. The commanders of these groups should be captured and tried either by international organizations or local courts (with international expertise and funding if needed). Peacekeeping forces should increase the security established by the peacemaking forces, paving the way for the deployment of peacebuilding forces and development.

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16 Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. London: Sage Publications, 1998. 3.17 "Military Police | GoArmy.com." Go Army Homepage | GoArmy.com. Web. 21 Nov. 2011.18 Tse-tung, Mao. On Protracted War. Peking, 1963. 186.19 Thomas Barnett Draws a New Map for Peace | Video on TED.com. Thomas Barnett. TED: Ideas worth Spreading. TED Talk, June 2007. 12 Nov. 2011.

WHY PEACEBUILDING?

There is a growing understanding that mitigating conflict requires a long-term commitment to development and security. Many civil conflicts can be traced to lack of economic opportunities, government oppression, corrupt leadership, and an increasing number of marginalized youth—especially in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Asia where 80% of civil conflicts occurred in countries in which 60% or more of the population were age thirty or under.20 This youth bulge is not the only conflict trigger. It is clear, however, that countries which cannot afford economic opportunities for their growing number of youth are experiencing revolutionary changes. Guerrilla armies recruit these disenfranchised youth from local communities and win their favor by providing services and funding that the government is either unwilling or incapable of providing. Corrupt governments may also create their own militias to serve their particular political purposes.

This was clearly evident in the events preceding the recent elections in the DRC. Youth militias attacked any opposition to the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila. President Kabila’s party, the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), is known to recruit members for its militia by visiting poor neighborhoods and offering gifts and cash in exchange for intimidating and forcibly subduing any opposition.21 The need to combat such youth disenfranchisement

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20 Beehner, Lionel. "The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts." Council on Foreign Relations (2007). CFR.org. Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Apr. 2007. 15 Nov. 2011.21 Nsimba, Patou. "DRC: Youth Militia on the Rampage Ahead of Elections." Radio Netherlands Worldwide: Africa. Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 12 Oct. 2011. 5 Jan. 2012.

Major Conflicts since 1990Map by Hugo Ahlenius, Nordpil (2004): http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/crushed-by-war-and-world-conflicts

Used with permission

and manipulation confirms that peacebuilding is of paramount importance for political, economic, as well as social policies. Such policies and actions must promote and make opportunities available to all.

In order to better understand local needs and effectively deliver services, peacebuilders must have the ability to go out into the field and maintain an open dialogue. Aid organizations are helpful partners in this endeavor. In many cases aid agencies are already engaged in development work, but a well-trained, well-funded peacebuilding force has a greater capacity to coordinate long-term initiatives that create systemic economic opportunities. These types of initiatives are essential for what the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) calls peace dividends for successful development conditions.22 Peacebuilders must avoid the tendency of many aid organizations that focus only on outputs (what they produce with regards to their mission) rather than outcomes (the positive changes that actually occur because of their projects). Their mission should build, or improve, infrastructure and provide basic necessities.

Peacebuilders should be trained in the same manner as the Peace Corps and have many of the same requirements. Peace Corps volunteers are, over a period of three months, trained according to their specific country context, language and culture, as well as the particular functions they will be given. An important requirement for peacebuilders (borrowed from the Peace Corps framework) is the mandatory two-year commitment. Because Peacebuilding is a generational process, the minimum two-year service requirement is essential for peacebuilders to effectively build relationships with local communities. The process of winning "hearts and minds" will fall mainly to peacebuilding forces and requires their close collaboration with local governments and communities. Although the use of the Peace Corps is not a novel consideration, transitioning and expanding its capacity into a peacebuilding framework could be an important part of sustainable solutions for development in post-conflict countries.

Unlike Peace Corps volunteers, however, weapons training and boot camp should be a mandatory element of training for peacebuilders.23 Although peacebuilding forces will never acquire the discipline and training of their peacekeeping counterparts, it is still essential that peacebuilding forces be willing and able to act in emergency situations. This peacebuilding force would be trained and recruited in much the same way as the Peace Corps (with additional weapons and self-defense training); however this force would far exceed the current 9,000 volunteers of the Peace Corps and would be the final component to a successful international intervention by the U.S.

In addition to training, this peacebuilding corps would recruit from the same talent pool as the Peace Corps. This includes: teachers, engineers, doctors, youth and community developers, as well as environmental and agricultural specialists, etc.24 The peacebuilding corps creates an attractive alternative for many recent university and Masters graduates by offering them

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22 United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. The Peacebuilding Fund: Preventing a Relapse into Violent Conflict. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. PBF Brochure. UNDPF, 2011. 21 Nov. 2011. 13.23 "What About Safety? | Learn About Volunteering." PeaceCorps.gov. Peace Corps, 5 Oct. 2011. 22 Nov. 2011.24 "What Do Volunteers Do? | Learn About Volunteering." PeaceCorps.gov. Peace Corps, 3 Sept. 2009. 22 Nov. 2011.

international experience. Moreover, offering government subsidies to pay off student loans would afford these peacebuilding volunteers an opportunity to build their resumes while saving money.  Currently the Peace Corps does not have the capacity to incorporate the above-described type of force. For now, in order to ensure a coordinated and successful intervention, the current command structure available only to the military must be utilized. It should ultimately transition, however, from the military command to a civilian force that works in conjunction with the military.25

FUNDING AND POLITICAL WILL

Any option for funding the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding forces must first demonstrate success if it is to foster increased political support as well as budgetary allocation. The controversial Chinese model has been in effect as early as the 1950s. Chinese aid to this day is channeled into infrastructure construction and supplying material and expertise for projects. In exchange, China receives favorable extraction rights of the rich minerals deposits found in the many African countries it supports. As a result, this phenomenon has been called the ‘great Chinese take out.’

China’s principles of engagement with Africa are lofty but still attainable. They include equality and mutual benefit, mutual support and close coordination, as well as transference of expertise and skills to locals.26 In its Malthusian pursuit of resource extraction, however, China has failed to follow its principles of equality and increased self-reliance through local training. It also has neglected to use high quality materials when building infrastructure. As a result, railway, road and other projects, are not maintained and deteriorate quickly. Many Chinese mining companies have cultivated mistrust with their African employees as unfair employment

practices and unsafe mining conditions have led to protests. Some of these protests (as in the 2010 shooting of protesting mining workers in Zambia) have culminated in African employees being fired upon and injured for their defiance.27

The controversies surrounding China’s involvement in Africa are very real, but China does fill an investment void where many other countries will not. The United States’ adoption and fair application of what the Chinese principles should entail could create sustainable and mutually

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25 Thomas Barnett Draws a New Map for Peace | Video on TED.com. Thomas Barnett. TED: Ideas worth Spreading. TED Talk, June 2007. 12 Nov. 2011.26 "China's African Policy." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 12 Jan. 2006. 7 Jan. 2012.27 "Chinese Bosses Charged over Zambian Mine Shooting." BBC News Africa. BBC, 18 Oct. 2010. 7 Jan. 2012.

“Comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable operations create the necessary conditions for achieving negative peace (absence of direct violence and war) by first achieving positive peace (integration of society, creation of social systems and absence of structural violence).”

beneficial relationships. Creating fair trade agreements as well as safe mining conditions is one step toward this relationship. Another step would include the utilization of high quality and durable materials and building local capacity by teaching locals not only how to build, but also how to maintain these projects. In the end, the fundamental objective must be to create local intellectual capital in order to eventually nullify the need for peacebuilders. Resources within the conflict country could fund peacemaking and peacekeeping activities as well as peacebuilding during the initial development stages.

Establishing favorable and fair trade conditions could create an environment of mutual trust and friendly relations between countries for the long term. The U.S. was equitable in its execution of the Marshall Plan and should follow its own example in its intervention funding activities. The Marshall Plan proved to be a foreign policy success and if its basic framework were to be applied, it could yet again foster friendly relations. The U.S and Israel’s long lasting relationship could serve as a template for such relationship building endeavors. The U.S. played a key supporting role in Israel’s founding and mutual interests bind the two countries. It has played a major role as the guarantor of Israel’s existence and invested funds and expertise to build its capacity. It is through this ‘special relationship’ template that the U.S. can look to create such friendships with developing countries. Friendships that will eventually lead to mutually beneficial policy formulations and the political will to execute these policies because of the new nature of these relationships.

CONCLUSION

The end of industrial war has given way to the rise of guerrilla warfare engendering a new paradigm for conflict. It is my belief that the use of a new and innovative form of intervention—one that uses a peacemaking force to attack the causes and not just the symptoms of violence and conflict; an intervention that keeps the peace through active peacekeeping involvement; uses peacebuilders to build or rebuild a society in an effective manner; that generates sustainable solutions through the encouragement of local capacity; and cultivates a mutually beneficial and lasting friendship—will go further in achieving the end of protracted conflict and endemic human suffering worldwide. Ultimately comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable operations create the necessary conditions for achieving negative peace (absence of direct violence and war) by first achieving positive peace (integration of society, creation of social systems and absence of structural violence, as in the rape and impunity found in the DRC).28 Making intervention more sustainable and effective will require more than small changes to the current system. It requires a fundamental shift in the system as a whole and the transformation of the culture of intervention at its core.

Bibliography

Beehner, Lionel. "The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts." Council on Foreign Relations (2007). CFR.org. Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Apr. 2007. accessed 15 Nov. 2011.

"China's African Policy." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign

31

28 Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. London: Sage Publications, 1998. 3.

Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 12 Jan. 2006. accessed 7 Jan. 2012.

"Chinese Bosses Charged over Zambian Mine Shooting." BBC News Africa. BBC, 18 Oct. 2010. accessed 7 Jan. 2012.

Chivers, C. J. The Gun: the AK-47 and the Evolution of War. London: Allen Lane, 2010.

Cowley, Robert, and Geoffrey Parker. The Reader's Companion to Military History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996.

Der Derian, James. ”Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” Boundary 2. Volume 30, Number 3, Fall 2003

Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. London: Sage Publications, 1998.

Goodman, Ryan. "Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War." Harvard Law School. The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 100:107. 14 Sept. 2004. accessed 23 Nov. 2011.

Lambeth, S. Benjamin. The Transformation of American Air Power. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000.

"Military Police | GoArmy.com." Go Army Homepage | GoArmy.com. accessed 21 Nov. 2011.

Nichols, Christopher M. "America's New Isolationism." The Huffington Post - Politics, 13 June 2011. accessed 5 Jan. 2012.

Nsimba, Patou. "DRC: Youth Militia on the Rampage Ahead of Elections." Radio Netherlands Worldwide: Africa. Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 12 Oct. 2011. accessed 5 Jan. 2012.

"Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. USHMM, USIP, AAD, Dec. 2008. accessed 5 Jan. 2012.

Rosen, Nir. Aftermath: following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World. New York: Nation, 2010.

Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force the Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin, 2006.

Thomas Barnett Draws a New Map for Peace | Video on TED.com. Perf. Thomas Barnett. TED: Ideas worth Spreading. TED Talk, June 2007. accessed 12 Nov. 2011.

Tse-tung, Mao. On Protracted War. Peking, 1963.

United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. The Peacebuilding Fund: Preventing a Relapse into Violent Conflict. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. PBF Brochure. UNDPF, 2011. accessed 21 Nov. 2011.

Washington, George. Washington's Farewell Address. No. 106-21. Senate Document. Washington: G.P.O., 2000

"What About Safety? | Learn About Volunteering." PeaceCorps.gov. Peace Corps, 5 Oct. 2011. accessed 22 Nov. 2011.

"What Do Volunteers Do? | Learn About Volunteering." PeaceCorps.gov. Peace Corps, 3 Sept. 2009. accessed 22 Nov. 2011.

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FORCE SPECIALIZATION TO MEET MODERN MILITARY OPERATIONAL NEEDSby Frank P Cinturati, Jr

The new age of warfare demands specialization to adapt to the new utility of force. Today’s militaries are facing conflicts that involve terrorism, insurgency and peace operations. This means that current forces need to be trained and equipped to conduct such operations. These forces are not specifically specialized in each of these operations however; they do have other types of specialization. For example, some Marine Corps Infantry Regiments such as the 25th Marines are cold weather units, particularly trained for arctic weather operations. The same kind of specialization can be practiced for new types of operations. In one regiment of three battalions each battalion can specialize in a different conflict category. For example; in the 7th Marines, the 1st Battalion (1/7) can specialize in counter-guerrilla warfare, the 2nd (2/7) in anti-terrorism and the 3rd (3/7) in peace operations. In current Marine unit rotations, entire regiments are not deployed at once. Single battalions from different regiments are deployed to make Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) in theatre. For particular operations that may only require peace operational specialties the 3rd battalion can be deployed without completely depleting the regiment. However, if there is a conflict that requires all three specialties the entire regiment can operate as a whole.

In the Marine Corps every Marine is a rifleman first. After honing those skills in boot camp then at the School of Infantry (SOI), Marines whose primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) is not rifleman go onto additional training. In essence, many Marines have two roles: rifleman and their specialty. This principle can be applied to the previously mentioned specialization of units and personnel. This would require schools to be in place to train them. Such types of unit training already exist. At 29 Palms Marine Corps Base and other military installations real life counter-insurgency training already takes place. The same type of training can be conducted for anti-terrorism and peace operations.

The US military has faced unconventional warfare such as insurgency and guerrilla warfare throughout its history. This type of military operation is exactly what the US faces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These campaigns have given way to rethinking strategy, capability and force structure.1 It is imperative that we re-asses and revamp our training as well as structure of

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1 Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford University Press: New York. 2009. Pg xv.

“it is of the greatest necessity to have personnel who can, at one moment, hand out teddy bears and at the next moment, when there is a threat, ‘go kinetic’ using force as only the military knows how.”

forces to meet the needs of current threats.2 The military must adapt to new threats if the U.S. expects to be successful in current and future operations.

Unconventional warfare is out of the traditional and basic type of training that is received by Marines at boot camp or at SOI. Marines go to SOI after boot camp for training in combat skills. Combat skills are more focused on conventional tactics with little focus on unconventional fighting skills. Unconventional warfare requires more advanced training than that currently given to Marines. This need demands that Marines get specific formal training at such schools that provide this specialization. This non-traditional form of fighting emphasizes small unit leadership at the platoon and squad levels because that is the nature of fighting guerrillas.3 The old doctrine does not emphasize small unit leadership but instead traditional large-scale operations. In the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan it is being recognized that it is indeed the small unit leaders who are the ones in command of what is happening on the ground. If this is how we are fighting, then why are we not training like this more? This should be a part of training and doctrine.

According to H. John Poole:!

To move forward on ‘Distributive Operations’, [those in which squads operate alone] the U.S. infantry will need ‘bottom-up’ training method – one in which squad members collectively develop their own tactical techniques through field experimentation. Until Benning and Quantico recognize this, their squads (no matter how heavily armed) won’t be able to safely step outside their parent unit’s protective umbrella. Through bottom up training, squad leaders develop better initiative, tactical technique, and decision-making ability. The doctrinally driven, standardized approach to training will never operate to produce squads that can operate alone.4

The US certainly is obliged to start thinking of training for these threats, not historically but doctrinally new. It is of the utmost necessity that units be specialized in these particular fighting skills and continuously train for them. Once a Marine infantryman completes boot camp and his School of Infantry training he should go to advanced unconventional warfare training, if he is bound for such a regiment’s first battalion. This special school should also be attended by Marines transferred to such a unit. This training should be one month long, providing foundation training. There should also be additional training specifically for non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers in such units. Beyond this, though, the training in this field will be continuous. The unit will not only train in conventional warfare tactics as it always has but will include their new specialized training into their regular training schedule.

The training requirements for second battalion are similar to first battalion, but specializing in anti-terrorism. The attacks on the US on 9/11 made terrorism a security priority. It is of the utmost necessity that the military be able to meet this threat. This will be accomplished through specialization and continuous training of these anti-terror Marine battalions. The 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) formed shortly after 9/11 was to be the premier reaction force to

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2 Peters, Ralph. Never Quit the Fight. Stackpole Books: Mechanicsburg, PA. 2006. Pg. 14.3 Ellis, John. A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare. St. Martin’s Press: New York. 1976. Pg. 14.4 Poole, H. John. Dragon Days: Time for “Unconventional” Tactics. Posterity Press: Emerald Isle, NC. 2007. Pg.154.

meet anti-terror needs and included an Anti-Terrorism Battalion (AT Bn), 3rd Battalion 8th Marines (3/8).5 Since 3/8 was a regular infantry unit before being designated and specialized as an AT Bn, this concept of specialization has already been accomplished and thus is not a far-fetched idea. The same specialized designation and training can be applied to 2nd Bn 7th Mar (2/7).

A similarly specialized role has been assigned to the new Reserve 4th AT Bn. Its mission is to “rapidly deploy specially trained and sustainable forces to detect, deter, and defend against terrorism, as well as to conduct crisis response in the event of a terrorist attack.”6 Why throw away a good idea then bring it back to a limited implementation to one out of all the battalions in the Marine Corps? How often can you deploy this single battalion to meet the threat of terror? AT Bn designations should be assigned to more than one battalion to not only prevent unit fatigue but also to enhance the Marine Corps’ AT capabilities on the whole.

It was also the original vision of the MEB that the Marine Corps would spread this capability more widely.7 The AT Bn as an infantry battalion with additional training proved that this AT specialization is possible. The advanced skills of Urban Assault Climbing, Enhanced Marksmanship, security techniques, weapon skills, as well as reinforcing previous capabilities with a focus on anti-terrorism training, were all a part of the AT Bn’s training.8 These are all skills previously learned by the infantry unit 3/8. The argument that these specializations cannot be learned or maintained by infantry units is an absolutely invalid one.

3/25 will be the battalion that specializes in peace operations. This is an increasingly important area of expertise. As of October 2006 there were eighteen United Nations peacekeeping operations with 80,976 military and police personnel, and 15,000 civilians serving worldwide.9 Here is another example of a great necessity to meet the demands of current operations. If we are going to send troops to be involved in these operations we need to train them accordingly.

It is often that there is a need for a strong force to be deployed rapidly to bring security to the region so that humanitarian operations can successfully take place. You need the military to provide this security for civilian operations. This was true for Somalia, for example, where for humanitarian aid to be provided, the military had to establish and maintain a secure environment.10 Where the military failed to provide a secure environment, the humanitarian mission ceased to be successful. This is an example of the need for specialization. For such an

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5 Mihalka, Michael. NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force? The Quarterly Journal. Summer 2005. 67-79. P 69.6 “Anti-Terrorism Battalion [AT]”. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/atbn.htm>. Date Assessed 11/8/11.7 Capt. Ritzcovan, 1st. Lt. Jones. News Release “4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism)”. October 24, 2001. <http://www.lejeune.usmc.mil/news/102401release4thmeb1.html>. Date Assessed 11/8/11.8 Ibid.9 Bolton, John. Surrender is not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad. Threshold Editions: New York. 2007. Pg. 341.10 Meisler, Stanley. United Nations: The First Fifty Years. Atlantic Monthly Press: New York. 1995. Pg. 299.

operation it is of the greatest necessity to have personnel that can, at one moment, hand out teddy bears and at the next moment, when there is a threat, “go kinetic” using force as only the military knows how. Although contractors also know how to use force, they do not have the same legitimacy as do government forces. Intervention in the Rwanda Genocide would have been the quintessential mission for such battalions specializing in peace operations. Their intervention could have saved countless lives, maybe even a large portion of the 800,000 to 1.2 million that were lost. With the right authorization of the use of force, training and equipment intervention would have been absolutely possible.11 Of course the intervention of such a unit would have only taken place if the UN or the international community had the will to act. Force restructuring cannot do anything about authorization of the use of force in a given conflict. However, what can be changed and improved is training. Lt. General Romeo Dallaire, who was the Commander of UN Forces in Rwanda, saw the training of his forces as inadequate.12 Although this was not in reference to any US forces, it does show the need for training in these types of operations. Peace operations are different from those for which military force was originally intended and thus require special training.13

Some might suggest that troops would not want to be labeled as peace troops, but this is an invalid argument. 3/25 will still be a hard charging, Marine infantry force, the same battalion of shock troops that it ever was. This specialization in peace operations is an additional specialty providing them with the proper training from technical skills to the ability to operate without taking sides.14 Although they are willing to take on these missions they must be properly prepared to do so. Likewise, it has been suggested that “the U.S. military is logically headed toward a bifurcation into two different forces: one that specializes in high tech, big-violence war, and one that specializes in relatively low-tech security generation and routine crisis response”.15 However, it does not appear that policy makers are taking this course of action. Instead of this “bifurcation,” why not a two-for-one deal, where forces can double as both?

The type of training for all these specializations will be similar. The training will consist of class instructions as well as realistic scenario training exercises. The scenario training will similar to that already in use in the “Mojave Viper” exercise that takes place at 29 Palms, California. Mock towns will be built to provide realistic settings for scenarios with live role players to train the Marines in the skills needed for their specialties. This will be part of individuals’ initial training after SOI and regular unit training. Each specialization will have their different types training curriculums that pertain to the needs of their specialties.

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11 Kuperman, A.J. Rwanda in Retrospect. Foreign Affairs, 2000. Vol. 79, No. 1, Pg.118.12 Dallaire, Romeo. Brent Beardsley. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Carroll & Graf Publishers: New York. 2003. Pg. 41.13 Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War In the Modern World. Vintage Books: New York. 2005. Pg 367.14 Priest, Dana. The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military. W.W. Norton & Company: New York. 2003. Pg. 309.15 Barnett, Thomas P.M. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. G.P. Putnam’s Sons: New York. 2004. Pg.302.

The US military has faced and will face operations that are not the type of traditional operations that are envisaged in current doctrine. It is of the utmost importance that we prepare our forces to face these challenges or we will be unsuccessful in these operations. These specializations are necessary, possible and logical.

Bibliography

“Anti-Terrorism Battalion [AT]”. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/atbn.htm>.

Barnett, Thomas P.M. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. G.P. Putnam’s Sons: New York. 2004.

Bolton, John. Surrender is not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad. Threshold Editions: New York. 2007.

Chaliand, Gerard. Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. University of California Press Los Angeles, California. 1982.

Dallaire, Romeo. Brent Beardsley. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Carroll & Graf Publishers: New York. 2003.

Ellis, John. A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare. St. Martin’s Press: New York. 1976.

Kuperman, A.J. Rwanda in Retrospect. Foreign Affairs, 2000. Vol. 79, No. 1

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford University Press: New York. 2009.

Meisler, Stanley. United Nations: The First Fifty Years. The Atlantic Monthly Press: New York. 1995.

Mihalka, Michael. NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force? The Quarterly Journal. Summer 2005.

Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/default_e.asp>..

Peters, Ralph. Never Quit the Fight. Stackpole Books: Mechanicsburg, PA. 2006.

Poole, H. John. Dragon Days: Time for “Unconventional” Tactics. Posterity Press: Emerald Isle, NC. 2007.

Priest, Dana. The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military. W.W. Norton & Company: New York. 2003.

Ritzcovan Capt., 1st. Lt. Jones. News Release “4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism)”. October 24, 2001. <http://www.lejeune.usmc.mil/news/102401release4thmeb1.html>.

Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War In the Modern World. Vintage Books: New York. 2005.

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade Task Force Tarawa <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/2meb.htm>

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BRIGHT PEAK: PROMOTING A CHANGE IN US ARMY TRAINING TO MATCH THE CHANGING THREATby Asena May

During the Cold War, American political interests fueled an American military sized, structured and equipped to counter Soviet military capacity. Since the end of the Cold War; however, American national security interests have changed along with the developments in international geopolitics. There is a greater emphasis on involving the military in managing crises that do not involve full out war, but that involve operations other than warfare (OOTW) including peace and stability operations (PSO). The American political complex has heavily promoted this widening of military activities since the ear ly 1990s . Some administrations explicitly promote peace operations as evidenced by Clinton’s 1994 Directive 25 that argued, “that the United States should participate in a peace operation if that operation advanced US interests…”1 Others have done so implicitly, as evidenced by Bush’s loose and ever-evolving mandate for nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite opposing committing American troops to international peacekeeping operations after the debacles in Somalia (1992) and Haiti (1994), the Bush administration unilaterally committed troops to Iraq in a military capacity that quickly evolved into a peace operation. Although Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” on 1 May 2003 (just 42 days after declaring war), the US military was confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased and 10 years on, the US military is still active in nation building.2

Post-September 11th, new concerns regarding US national security raised several issues vis-à-vis American military capacity. In November 2005 the Department of Defense (DoD) issued the Directive on Military Support for Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (Directive 3000.05), which emphasized the idea that “stability operations are a core US military mission that the DoD shall be prepared to conduct and support…they shall be given priority

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1 Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (Directive 25), 1994. 2 Steve Bowman. CRS Report for Congress. Iraq: U.S. Military Operations. July 15, 2007.

“I propose the US military establish a separate, four-year, under-graduate, liberal arts institution (Bright Peak), modeled after West Point, that graduates commissioned officers into the US Army equipped with the specialized skills required to successfully conduct peace operations.”

comparable to combat operations…”3 A 2006 CRS Issue Brief for Congress recognized that Directive 3000.05 acknowledged the expectation that future operations would regularly include PSO along with regular warfare. In support of implementing Directive 3000.05, the HASC urged the DoD to adopt new training plans, revise the Army War College curriculum, and conduct any structural organization needed to ensure the operational fulfillment of the directive.4 Despite these statements a large contingency of the DoD continue to see peace operations as secondary to major combat operations in spite of the changing threat to US interests that stems from nonconventional sources.

Contemporary military structure and capacity do not meet the challenges involved in PSO. As recent as 2003 the Army continued to organize its forces around divisions of approximately 10,000 troops, as it had done since WWII. Today, while there is an increase in the number of “low-intensity, high-demand” units (PSO forces), they are still concentrated in the reserve component and trained as support personnel.5 Therefore, in light of the Directive’s concern the US military may not possess the numbers or skill necessary for increased peace operations, there should be structural reorganization. Thus, I propose the US military establish a separate, four-year, undergraduate, liberal arts institution (Bright Peak), modeled after West Point, that graduates commissioned officers into the US Army equipped with the specialized skills required to successfully conduct peace operations to secure and advance US interests around the world. This would move the PSO forces out of the reserve component and into the active duty component of the US Army by eventually creating two new brigades solely dedicated to PSO. These brigades would be controlled by a standing headquarters and add approximately 3000 soldiers to the active duty component. The cost of this would be offset by the reduction in reserve numbers, pay and training costs.

The DoD outlines the purpose of peace operations as “providing the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.”6 To successfully conduct these peace operations, soldiers must train for tasks that are not part of the standard wartime mission-essential task list (METL), and ultimately “leadership development may be the single most important factor in achieving success”.7 To date, there are only a select few training models that prepare units for such operations.

The US Army War College established the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in 1993 in order to improve military, civilian and inter-governmental capacities regarding peace and stability operations. The institute shapes military and civilian policy for

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3 Department of Defense. Directive 3000.05- Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Washington, DC. November 28, 2005)4 House Armed Services Committee. Report 109-452: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2007. May 5, 2006. 5 Nina Serafino. CRS Report for Congress. Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Proposals for Army Force Structure Changes. July 10, 2006. 6 See note at supra 3. 7 Department of the Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Washington, DC. December 30, 1994) 87.

PSO and develops and reviews military and civilian training programs; however, it accomplishes this goal through weekend-long conferences rather than through long-term training and capacity building. A second institute is the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Postgraduate School. The purpose of this center is to provide “educational opportunities for the full-spectrum of actors that become involved in peacebuilding, peace and stability operations, and relief and development activities”.8 CSRS only conducts seminars, usually 3-4 days in length. These institutes, while providing a medium through which policy can be developed and reviewed, they do not address the military’s need for organically trained officers specializing in PSO.

The only military institution that addresses training for PSO is the National Training Center (NTC) of the US Army. The rotations here range from 14-20 days and involve detailed training scenarios simulating counterinsurgency and PSO environments modeled specifically after Iraq. The teams are taught to employ nonkinetic resources such as civilian affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOPs) while conducting reconstruction projects, maintaining security, and negotiating with neighborhood leaders role-played by 250 Iraqi-Americas. However even this training is ad hoc, specific to Iraq, only 2 weeks in duration and cannot be a substitute for an institution that teaches the analytical skills required in any PSO.

Bright Peak, graduating 2nd lieutenant-grade Army officers specializing in PSO, would emphasize a curriculum that nurtures the characteristics of a leader: “skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience” along with academic and practice military training. Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskold said, “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it”. The benefits of establishing this institution squarely in the military context, as opposed to in the civilian sphere, greatly outweigh the potential negatives. Most importantly, before peace operations can begin to provide benefits to the population, basic security must be established. Those who conduct PSO must be able to quickly switch from playing the humanitarian assistant to playing the soldier and while “soldiers generally find it easy and morally acceptable to be humanitarian on occasion, the reverse (humanitarian workers taking part in military activities) is much less likely”.9 Furthermore, the military can enforce sanctions, establish and supervise protected zones, and forcibly separate belligerents, all the while distributing relief supplies, providing health services, resettling displaced populations, building infrastructure, and teaching the local population how to develop its own capacities for peace. The military has a level of versatility, initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization that is unrivalled by the civilian sector.10

Those who advocate for placing PSO in the civilian realm argue that fiscally, the civilian sector can do the same thing the military does for a fraction of the cost. However this could be remedied if allocation of fiscal resources dedicated to research and development for the next

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8 Nina Serafino. CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement. May 18, 2006. Also see: CSRS website at: http://www.csrs-nps.org/logistica/public/spd.cfm/spi/about_us 9 Tim Laurence, “Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping; An Uneasy Alliance?”, Whitehall Papers Series, 1999. 10 See note at supra 6, 19.

generation conventional grade tank were committed to PSO. Another argument revolves around the idea that militarization of humanitarian aid jeopardizes the neutrality of the operation and risks the military getting bogged down in political conflict. However it is only when clear end goals have not been established (e.g. Iraq) that military has been bogged down in PSO. Operations in Bosnia and Iraq in the late 1990’s were successful because of military PSO. Furthermore, some argue that the military machine does not understand that one wrong move by one soldier can negatively effect a PSO for good; however this only proves why 2 week training courses are not sufficient and why an undergraduate institution would benefit military PSO.

Bright Peak should be established to maximize the positive effects of the military’s role in PSO. This institution will be centered on the idea that American interests abroad are best served by those soldiers who understand that their responsibility is to protect in a humanitarian capacity as much as in a hard power capacity. Bright Peak cadets will be required to complete two tenets of the program, an academic component and a military component. To satisfy the academic requirements, cadets must select a major from one of the following available options:

Major PSO Skill DescriptionPsychology Leadership skills to perform Psychological Operations (PSYOPs)

promoting specific actions on the part of combatants and communities

Law Leadership skills for civil-affairs, especially establishing the notion of rule of law in a conflict-ridden society

Diplomacy Leadership skills for civil-affairs emphasizing mediation and negotation

Engineering Leadership skills to assess and implement infrastructural programs (economy and health)

Language/Region Specialty Leadership skills for civil-affairs emphasizing a knowledge of local language and customs

Economics/Development Leadership skills for sustainable economic developmentIntelligence/Security Leadership skills that involve surveillance, recon and intelligence

collection, planning and execution; strategic use of force and crisis management

These majors satisfy the needs of the US Army with regards to PSO skill-sets as highlighted by Directive 3000.05: “increases in the numbers of civil affairs officers, foreign area specialists, military police, engineers and psychological operations personnel” are needed in order for military capacity to match what is being asked of it under political policy.11 Majors corresponding to the individual’s military occupational specialty (MOS) reflect the skill sets needed for PSO above and beyond those required for conventional warfare. Through these targeted majors, cadets “develop a different mind set than that required for fighting wars”.12 In addition to learning how to always be prepared for combat ops, they attain skills that

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11 See note at supra 3, 10.12 See note at supra 6, 87.

emphasize protecting human rights, restoring law and order, conducting civil affairs, NGO cooperation and PSYOPs, establishing intercultural communication and media interrelationships, as well as intelligence collection and analysis. All contribute to not only ensuring negative peace, but also promoting positive peace to ensure American interests of stability, peace and democracy in situation areas.

Before a cadet begins specialized academic education in a major, each student must fulfill core requirements that include: Peacebuilding, Leadership, English, Foreign Language, American Politics, World History, Geography, International Relations, Military History and Constitutional/ Military Law. These core courses lay the foundation for the rest of the cadets’ academic training and must be completed within the first four semesters at Bright Peak. In conjunction with the academic rigors, each cadet must fulfill the military component of the program, which requires commitment each summer. The first two summers are spent on Bright Peak’s campus participating in simulations, seminars and basic boot camp. The 3rd and 4th summers should be spent at the NTC, training with COIN units, or interning in the civilian sector in order to actively utilize their specialty skills acquired through their major coursework. Thus Bright Peak will recruit top-level high school students who have a passion to make a difference in the world, but who also have a sense of adventure and patriotism. Ultimately, the purpose of the joint academic-military education program at Bright Peak is to establish the intellectual, psychological and physical foundation required of a well-rounded officer who can successfully develop and implement policy in the unique context of PSO.

Bibliography

Aall, Pamela, Daniel Miltenberger and Thomas Weiss. Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.

Cone, Robert. US Army Brigadier General. “NTC: The Changing National Training Center.” Military Review (May-June 2006) <Available at: http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/august_2006/8_06_3.html>

Congressional Budget Office. Making Peace While Staying Ready For War: US Military Participation in Peace Operations. December 1999. <Available at: http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=1809&type=0&sequence=2 >

CRS Issue Brief for Congress IB94040 (Nina Serafino). Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement. May 18, 2006.

CRS Issue Brief for Congress RL33557 (Nina Serafino). Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement. July 13, 2006. .

CRS Report for Congress RL31339 (Kenneth Katzman). Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post- Saddam Governance. January 7, 2004.

CRS Report for Congress RL31701 (Steve Bowman). Iraq: U.S. Military Operations. July 15, 2007.

CRS Report for Congress RS22473 (Nina Serafino). Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Proposals for Army Force Structure Changes. July 10, 2006.

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Department of Defense. Directive 3000.05- Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Washington, DC. November 28, 2005).

Development Assistance Committee. “Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation Report No. I”. Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict- Comparative Advantages and Costs. (Paris: OECD, 1998).

Draeger Lt. Colonel, David. Peace Operations- Means Versus Ways. US Army War College, 2004.

Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Washington, DC. December 30, 1994).

Seiple, Chris. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions. Peacekeeping Institute Center for Strategic Leadership. US Army War College, 1996.

Perito, Robert M. Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004.

Studer, Meinrad. “The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict.” IRRC volume 83 number 842 (June 2001).

US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Brief. The Army War College. Available at: http://pskoi.army.mil/documents/PKSOI_briefing_website.pdf

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