HANDBOOKOF

EMOTIONSSecond Edition

Edited by

Michael LewisJeannette M. Haviland-Jones

The Guilford PressNEW YORK LONDON

2 Oc: o

CHAPTER 26

The Cultural Psychology of theEmotions: Ancient and New

Richard A. ShwederJonathan Haidt

Great, deep, wide and unbounded, the ocean is nevertheless drunk by underwaterfires; in the same way, Sorrow is drunk by Anger. (Translation of an unidentifiedSanskrit stanza from India in the early Middle Ages; Gnoli, 1956, p. 35)

This chapter recapitulates and expands a de-scription of the cultural psychology of the emo-tions that appeared in the first edition of theHandbook. A cultural/symbolic/meaning-cen-tered approach to the study of the emotions isdefined and illustrated, using some sources thatare quite ancient (e.g., a 3rd century Sanskrittext, the "Rasidhyliya" of the Mityaiiistra andothers that are quite new The chapter then ex-amines the moral context of emotional func-tioning. It is suggested that the character andmeaning of particular emotions are systemati-cally related to the kind of ethic (autonomy,community; or divinity) prevalent in a culturalcommunity (Shweder, 1990b; Shweder, Much,Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Haidt, Koller, &Dias, 1993; Jensen, 1995).

In recent years there have been several majorreviews of contemporary research on similari-ties and differences in emotional meaningsacross cultural groups (Good & Kleinman,1984; Kleinman & Good, 1985; Kitayama &Markus, 1994; Lutz & White, 1986; Marsella,1980; Mesquite & Frijda, 1992; Russell, 1991;Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986;Shweder & LeVine, 1984; Shweder, 1991,

1993, 1994; White & Kirkpatrick, 1985). Therehave also been several books and essays defin-ing the character of a new interdisciplinaryfield for cross-cultural research on the emo-tions, which has come to be known as "culturalpsychology" (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1988,1990, 1996; D'Andrade, 1995; Goddard, 1997;Howard, 1985; LeVine, 1990; Lutz, 1985a;Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1992; Markus,Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996; Much, 1995;Peacock, 1984; Shweder, 1990, 1991, 1999a,1999b; Shweder et al., 1998; Shweder & Sulli-van, 1990, 1993; Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt,1990; Wierzbicka, 1993, 1997; Yang, 1997. Fora discussion of the historical antecedents ofcultural psychology, see Jahoda (1992). In an-thropology, the two most notable forums for re-search on the cultural psychology of the emo-tions are the journals Ethos: Journal of theSociety for Psychological Anthropology, andCulture, Medicine and Psychiatry.

The major goals of cultural psychology areto spell out the implicit meanings that giveshape to psychological processes, to examinethe distribution of those meanings across ethnicgroups and temporal—spatial regions of the

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world, and to identify the manner of their socialacquisition. Related goals are to reassess theprinciple of psychic unity or uniformity, and todevelop a credible theory of psychological di-ersity or pluralism. The emphasis in cultural

psychology is upon the way the human mindcan he transformed and made functional in anumber of diftèrent ways, which are not equallytistributed across ethnic and cultural communi-ties around the world. Hence the slogan popularamong cultural psychologists, "One mind, butmany mentalities: universalism without the uni-formity,- which is meant to express that plural-istic emphasis (see Shweder, 1991, 1996, 1998:Shweder et al.. 1998).

One hallmark of cultural psychology is aconception of "culture" that is symbolic andhehav ioral at the same time. Culture, so con-ceived, can be defined as ideas about what istrue, good, beautiful, and efficient that aremade manifest in the speech, laws and custom-ary practices of a self-regulating group (Good-now. Miller. Kessel, 1995; Shweder et al.,1998; Shweder, 1999a, 1999b). In research oncultural psychology, "culture" thus consists ofmeanings, conceptions, and interpretiveschemes that are activated, constructed orbrought "online" through participation in nor-mative social institutions and routine practices(including linguistic practices) (see e.g., D'An-drade. 1984: Geertz, 1973; LeVine, 1984;Miller, Potts, Fung. Hoogstra, & Mintz, 1990;Shweder, 1 091. I 999a.b). According to thisview, a culture is that subset of possible oravailable meanings which, by virtue of encul-turation (informal or formal, implicit or explic-it, unintended or intended). has become activein giving shape to the psychological processesof the individuals in a group.

A second hallmark of cultural psy chology isthe idea that interpretation, conceptualization,and other "acts of meaning" can take placerapidly. automatically, and un-self-consciously.Indeed it is assumed that "acts of meaning"(e.g., the judgment that the human body maybecome polluted or desanctified because it is atemple for the soul; or that illness is a means ofempowerment because it unburdens a person ofaccumulated spiritual debts; or that shyness,shame, modesty, and embarrassment are goodemotions because they are forms of civility)can take place so rapidly, automatically, and un-self-consciously that from the point of view ofan individual person they are indistinguishablefrom "raw" experience or "naked" conscious-

ness itself (see. e.g., Geertz, 1984. on "experi-ence-near" concepts; Kirsh 1991, on "thoughtin action"; and Nisbett & Wilson, 1977. on theunconscious -knowing more than we can tell";see also Fish. 19S0). According to this view,many rapid, automatic, and un-self-consciouspsychological processes are best understoodnot as "pure." "fundamental," or "intrinsic"processes, but rather as content-laden process-es, which are contingent on the implicit mean-ings, conceptual schemes, and interpretationsthat give them life (Markus, et al., 1996; Nis-bett & Cohen, 1995: Shweder, 1990a; Stigler,1984; Stigler, Chalip, & Miller, 1986: Stigler,Nusbaum & Chalip, 1988).

In the context of the study of the emotions,the intellectual agenda of cultural psychologycan be defined by tbur questions:

What is the generic shape of the meaningsystem that defines an experience as an emo-tional experience (e.g., anger. sadness, orshame) rather than as an experience of someother kind (e.g., muscle tension, fatigue, oremptiness? (see. e.g., Harr& 1986a, 1986b;Lakoff. 1987; Levy, 1984a, 1984b; Shweder,1994; Sniedslund 1991; Solomon, 1976, 1984;Stein & Levine, 1 987; Wierzbicka, 1986, 1992,1999).

What particular emotional meanings(e.g.. Pintupi watjilpa, Balinese Irk, Newar Iaj-ja, Ifaluk litgo„imerican "happiness") are con-structed or brought "online" in different ethnicgroups and in different temporal—spatial re-gions of the world)? (see, e.g., Abu-Lughod,1985, 1986; Appadurai, 1985: Briggs, 1970;Gerber, 1985: Geertz, 1959; Lutz. 1982, 1988;Miller & Sperry, 1987; Myers 1979a, 1979b;Parish, 1991; Rosaldo, 1980, 1983, 1984; Schi-effelin, 1976, 1983, 1985a. 19851); Stearns &Stearns, 1988: Swartz, 1988; Wierzbicka, 1986,1990. 1997, 1999; Wikan. 1984, 1989.)

To what extent is the experience of vari-ous states of the world (e.g., "loss," "goalblockage," "status degradation," "taboo viola-tion") "emotionalized" (e.g., as sadness, anger,fear, or guilt) rather than "somatized" (e.g., astiredness, chest pain, or appetite loss) in differ-

ent ethnic groups and in differenttemporal—spatial regions of the world? (see,e.g., Angel & Guarnaccia, 1989; Angel & Idler,1992; Angel & Thoits, 1987; Kleinman, 1986;Levy, 1984a, I984b; Shweder, 1988.)

Precisely how are emotionalized and so-matized meanings brought "online," socialized.

The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions 399

enculturated, or otherwise acquired? Morespecifically, what is the role of everyday dis-course and social interpretation in the activa-tion of emotionalized and somatized meanings?(See, e.g., Bruner, 1990; Garvey, 1992; Miller& Sperry, 1987; Miller et al. 1990; Miller,Mintz, Hoogstra, Fung, & Potts, 1992; Miller &Hoogstra, 1992; Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984;Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Shweder et al., 1998;Shweder & Much, 1987).

Any comprehensive review of answers tothese questions would have to address hundredsof years of theoretical arguments, empiricalsightings, and philosophical reflections in theliteratures of several different civilizations (seeDimock, 1974; Hurt, 1986b; Kakar, 1982;Kleinman, 1986; Rorty, 1980; Shixie, 1989;Solomon, 1976; Veith, 1978). In this chapterour aim is simply to formulate the first two ofthose questions in ways that seem promising,provocative, and productive for future interdis-ciplinary research.

We start the discussion, however, in the 3rdcentury A.D. in India with a relatively detailedexamination of a Sanskrit text (the "Raslid-hylya" of the Mityakistra that was written rela-tively close to the beginning of the historicalrecord of systematic human self-consciousnessabout the emotions. It is through an analysis ofthis venerable text—an ancient example of acultural psychology—that we address contem-porary concerns. The "Rasiidhyriya" is a usefulintellectual pole star on which to concentrate adiscussion of the cultural psychology of theemotions, for three reasons: (1) The text, al-though ancient, compares favorably with anycontemporary treatise on the symbolic charac-ter of emotional experience; (2) the text, al-though famous among Sanskritists and scholarsof South Asian civilization, is hardly known atall by emotion researchers in anthropology andpsychology; and (3) the text provides the op-portunity for an object lesson about the univer-sally appealing yet culturally revealing charac-ter of all accounts about what is "basic" to theemotional nature of human beings.

THE BASIC EMOTIONS OFTHE "RASADHAYA"

In Sanskrit the word for "existence" and theword for "mental state" (bhciva) are the same,and mental states are said to "bring into exis-

tence the essence of poetry" (Gnoli, 1956, p.63). So one should not be surprised to discoverthat between the 3rd and llth centuries A.D.,Hindu philosophers of poetics and drama, inter-ested in human emotions as objects of aestheticpleasure, posited the existence of eight or ninebasic emotions (sthayi-bliiiva)—four of whichthey viewed as primary—and developed a rela-tively detailed account of the symbolic struc-tures that give them shape and meaning.

There is no standard English translation of theSanskrit terms for the postulated basic emo-tions. Indeed, there is no agreement aboutwhether they should be translated as "emotions"or as "mental states" or as "feelings," or aboutwhether they should be translated as "basic" or"dominant" or "permanent" or "universal" or"natural" or "principal" emotions (or mentalstates or feelings). The eight basic (or dominant)emotions (or mental states or feelings) are vari-ously translated as follows: (1) sexual passion,love, or delight (nti); (2) amusement, laughter,humor, or mirth (hiisa); (3) sorrow (ioka); (4)anger (Iondha); (5) fear or terror (bhaya); (6)perseverance, energy, dynamic energy, or hero-ism (utsaha); (7) disgust or disillusion ( jugup-se); and (8) amusement, wonder, astonishment,or amazement (vismaya). Some early medievalcommentators mention an additional basic (ordominant) emotion (or mental state or feeling),(9) serenity or calm (sama). To simplify our ex-egesis, we refer to the eight (or nine) as "basicemotions," and we label them "sexual passion,""amusement," "sorrow," "anger," "fear," "perse-verance," "disgust," "wonder," and "serenity."Of the basic emotions, four are privileged as pri-mary basic emotions: sexual passion, anger, per-severance, and disgust (with serenity sometimessubstituted or linked to disgust as a primary ba-sic emotion).

The canonical Sanskrit text on the "emo-tions," attributed to Bharata, is the sixth chapter,the "Raddhrlya," of the Neityaiiistra, which isa book about drama. Ancient and medieval Hin-du thought specialized in "psychological" topicsconcerned with the nature of consciousness.Much of Sanskrit philosophy elevated the hu-man mind and body to the status of sacramentalobjects, and was disinclined to draw sharp oppo-sitions among the material, the sensate, the con-scious, the poetic, and the divine. In Sanskritdrama the primary aim of the aesthetic experi-ence was psychological as well; indeed, it wasthe symbolic representation of emotional statesper se that set the stage for aesthetic and revela-

40() SOCIAL/PERSONALITY ISSUES

tory experience (see Dimock, 1974). The fa-mous sixth chapter of the Ntitytts'astiri is aboutthe narrative structure (the causes, conse-quences, and concomitants) of eight basic emo-tional states and the most effective means i viafacial expression. voice, posture. setting, char-acter. action. and physiological response) oftheir representation in the theatre.

The .\,i(roh7stra was probably written sometime between the 3rd and 5th centuries A.D. Themost famous explication and commentary onthe text, itself a critique of earlier explicationsand commentaries and the source of our knowl-edge of the earlier commentaries, derives fromthe 10th and I 1 th century Kashmiri Brahmanphilosopher Abhinavagupta (partial translationsand contemporary commentaries can be foundin Masson & Patwardhan. 1970, and Gnoli,1956; see also Dimock, 1974, and Keith, 1924).

One major concern of the text and commen-taries is to define the nature and significance(both aesthetic and theological) of an elusivemetaemotion called rasa. Rasa means "totaste." "to savor," or to sample." but when theterm is used to refer to the grand metaemotionof Hindu aesthetic experience it is usuallytranslated as aesthetic "pleasure." "enjoyment,"or "rapture." It is a pleasure that lasts only aslong as the dramatic illusion that makes rasa areality. Because it is possible for members ofthe audience who witness a drama (the nisiki)to experience enjoyment or pleasure (rasa)even from the apprehension of negative emo-tional states (disgust, fear, anger, sorrow).which in other circumstances one might want toavoid or repress, Abhinavagupta and others rea-soned that 111.VU must be an autonomous meta-emotion, a viii generis tOrm of consciousness.

A second major concern of the text and com-inentaries is to differentiate eight (or nine) vari-eties, colors, or flavors of rasa, each related toone of the basic emotions. There is no standardEnglish translation of the Sanskrit terms for theeight (or nine) rasa. They are variously translat-ed as (I) the erotic or love (spigani, the msa ofsexual passion); (2) the comic (Iiiisya, the rasaof amusement); (3) the compassionate or pa-thetic (karuna, the rasa of sorrow); (4) the furi-ous or fury fraudra, the rasa of anger); (5) theheroic i vim, the rasa of perseverance); (6) theterrifying or terror (bhaviinaka. the rasa offear); (7) horror, the loathsome, the odious orthe disgusting (bibhatsa, the rasa of disgust);(8) the marvelous, the awesome, admiration, or

wonder (adblwra, the msa of wonder); and (9)the quietistic or calm (.4inta, the 111Stl of sereni-ty ). When viewed from the perspective of theirrelationship to the eight ( or nine) basic emo-tions of everyday life, the eight (or nine) flavorsof mesa (the pleasure of the terrifying, the de-light of horror, etc.) are sometimes translated asthe eight (or nine) "sentiments" or "moods" ofthe theater.

A third major concern of the text and com-mentaries is to give an account of the preciserelationship between the rasa and the basicemotions (stliiiyi-MCIva) to which they are saidto correspond. In general. when the actor onstage effectively portrays a particular hhiira,the appreciative audience experiences the cor-responding rasa. But is the relationship one ofidentity, such that the audience's experience ofthe rasa of fear is itself a real everyday experi-ence of fear? Or is the experience of the rasa offear a mere simulation, imitation, or pretense ofeveryday fear? Or is it perhaps an intensifica-tion or amplification of the basic emotion? Ul-timately, the idea is advanced that the experi-ence of the rasa of a basic emotion issomething entirely different from the experi-ence of the basic emotion itself.

Instead, the relationship of the eight (or nine)lava to the eight (or nine) basic emotions isakin to the relationship of an intentional state toits intentional object. To experience rasa is toexperience the pleasure or enjoy ment I an inten-tional state) that results from the dramaticallyinduced perception of the hidden or uncon-scious generic symbolic structures (the inten-tional objects) that lend shape and meaning tothe basic emotions in everyday life. To para-phrase Bharata. in drama the basic emotions arebrought to a state of rasa. This happens to theeery extent that their implicit symbolic codesare revealed and savored (or tasted) as objectsof pleasure and as a means of self-conscious-ness and transcendence.

According to this line of reasoning then,what "flavors" or "colors" the rasa and distin-guishes them from each other is that each has adifferent intentional object, one of the eight (ornine) "basic" emotions, which are thought to bepossessed by all human beings at birth. Never-theless there is still something common to allthe flavors of rasa. It is the pleasure, enjoy-ment. delight, or rapture that comes from beingartfully transported out of time, place. and theimmediacies of personal emotional experi-

The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions 401

ences—beyond "the thick pall of mental stuporwhich cloaks one's own consciousness" (Gnoli,1956, p. 53)—into the hidden depths of thesoul, where one perceives, tastes, and savors thetranscendental or impersonal narrative formsthat are immanent or implicit in the mostdeeply rooted modes of human experience.

Thus, viewed generically, all rasa possessthat quality of pleasure or enjoyment thatcomes from the tasting of a transcendent formthat had previously been hidden from the con-sciousness it had organized. It is this sui gener-is experience of delight, viewed as an intention-al state aimed at the basic emotions as itsintentional object, which explains how evendisgust, anger, fear, and sorrow can be objectsof pleasure when they present themselves asobjects of aesthetic encounter. Thus viewed,what is common to the rasa is a metaemotion,the feeling of delight that comes from the clearapprehension of the symbolic forms implicit inordinary emotional experience. This line of rea-soning is suggestive of a parallel type of analy-sis of "empathy." Empathy may be viewed as ametaemotion motivated by its own characteris-tic source of enjoyment or pleasure, whichmakes it possible to be responsive to anotherperson's negative emotional states such as sor-row or guilt. By this analysis, empathic sorrowor empathic guilt is not the same as the direct orsecondary experience of sorrow or guilt. In-stead, empathy is a dignifying experience pre-cisely because, as a witness to someone else'semotional experience, one is transported out ofoneself. It is as if empathy is also a metaemo-tion, but of a middle scale. It is less detachedthan the experience of ma, which comes fromwitnessing the generic symbolic structure thatlends shape and meaning to a basic emotion;yet it is more detached than the experience of abasic emotion itself, which is the unwitnessedand all too immediate experience of everydaypersonal life. (For an account of the psychologyof empathy, see Hoffman, 1990.)

Having summarized, however incompletely,a few key elements of the "Rauldhydya" andsubsequent commentaries, we would now liketo ask two questions about the text. (1) Whatcan the "Rassidhydya" tell us about the symbol-ic structure of emotional experience? (2) Whatdoes it reveal about itself as a cultured (henceparochial or local) account of what is "basic" tohuman emotional experience? We treat the sec-ond question first.

THE WONDER OF THE SANSKRITEMOTIONS: A CULTURALACCOUNT

Contemporary emotion researchers are likely tofind the account of the basic emotions in the"Rasidhydya" both familiar and strange. If wecompare the Sanskrit list of nine (eight plusone) basic emotions (sexual passion, amuse-ment, sorrow, anger, fear, perseverance, dis-gust, wonder, and sometimes serenity) withPaul Ekman's well-known contemporary list ofnine (six plus three) basic emotions (anger,fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust,plus interest, shame, and contempt), which hederives from the analysis of everyday facial ex-pressions (Ekman, 1980, 1984), the two listsare not closely coordinated, although they arenot totally disjoint either.

Richard Schechner (1988, pp. 267-289), inhis volume Performance Theory, presents a se-ries of photographs of facial expressions that heclaims are iconic representations of the ninerasa of the Niityaidstra. This, of course, is arather risky thing to do. The Mityakistru neverabstracts out facial expressions as the keymarkers of the basic emotions, but rather treatsthem as one element in an array of constituents;and there is every reason to believe that in Hin-du drama facial expressions unfold dynamical-ly in a sequence of movements, which are noteasily frozen into a single frame. Nevertheless,Schechner posits direct analogies between sixof his facial expressions for the rasa and the sixfacial expressions from Ekman's primaryscheme--equating, for example, Ekman's rep-resentation of the face of surprise with the facefor the rasa of wonder (adbhuta) and Ekman'srepresentation of the face of happiness with theface for the rasa of sexual passion (sr► gara).Schechner thinks he sees a universal pattern re-flected in the two schemes. He states, "Hu-mankind has countless gods, but I would bevery surprised if there were not some agree-ment concerning the basic emotions" (1988,p. 266).

In our view, several of Scheduler's equationsare dubious. For example, in Ekman's photo ofthe face of surprise, the mouth is wide open; itis not similar to the mouth of the rasa of won-der, which is closed and faintly suggestive of asmile. (The mouth is closed in all of the facialexpressions of the rasa. which may be relatedto a cultural evaluation concerning the vulgari-

402 SOCIAL! PERSONALITY ISSUES

ty of an open mouth.) And in Ekman's photo ofthe face of happiness, the eyes are directlyfrontal; they are not similar to the eyes of therasa of sexual passion, where the gaze is con-spicuously averted to one side, perhaps sugges-tive of secrecy or conspiracy. More importantly,because Schechner's equation of North Ameri-can "happiness" with Sanskrit "sexual passion"seems peculiar from the start. it should also benoted that Ekman's photo of the face of happi-ness, bears no resemblance whatsoever to theface of the rasa of amusement (hasya), whichis the rasa one might have intuitively expectedto be connected to the Western conception of"happiness."

We strongly doubt that most North Ameri-cans could spontaneously generate accurate de-scriptions for the majority of the nine facialicons of the rasa displayed in Schechner'sbook. (Curiously, one of the faces that U.S.graduate students seem to identify withoutmuch difficulty is the Sanskrit face of serenity,which as far as we know is not a basic emotionon any Western list. In informal experimentsconducted in classes at the University of Chica-go, they also converge in their responses tofaces of fear, disgust, and sorrow, but not to theothers.) Indeed, we believe one can plausiblyargue that happiness, surprise, and most of thebasic emotions on Ekman's list do not haveclose analogues among the basic emotions ofthe itasddhydya," and any sense of easy famil-iarity with the Sanskrit list is more apparentthan real.

As we read the "Rasädhyâya" and commen-taries, three of the nine basic emotions (anger,fear, and sorrow) are genuinely familiar, in thesense of possessing an equivalent shape andmeaning for medieval Hindus and contempo-rary North Americans. Of course, to acknowl-edge those three points of dense similarity isnot to suggest that those three emotional mean-ings must be cross-cultural universals.Wierzbicka (1992; see also 1990, 1997, 1999),an anthropological linguist and polyglot whospecializes in the study of semantic universalsand the language of the emotions, has broughtto a halt facile claims about translation equiva-lence, by arguing that "sadness" as understoodin European and North American conceptionsof the emotions is not an empirical universaland is neither lexicalized, important, nor salientin most of the languages of the world. Sheclaims that from the point of view of the studyof the linguistic semantics of emotion terms

around the world, there are no basic or univer-sal emotions.

Nevertheless, anger, fear, and sorrow areeasy to recognize in the "Rasädhy5ya." Sorrow,for example, is said to arise from misfortune,calamity, and destruction, and from "separationfrom those who are dear, [their) downfall, lossof wealth, death and imprisonment." "It shouldbe acted out by tears, laments, drying up of themouth, change of color, languor in the limbs,sighs, loss of memory, etc." ( Masson & Pat-wardhan, 1970, p. 52). Sorrow is said to be ac-companied by other mental states, includingworld-weariness, physical weariness, lifeless-ness, tears, confusion, dejection, and worry.

Anger and fear are also easy to recognize inthe text. Anger, for example, is said to arisefrom provocative actions, insult, lies. assault,harsh words, oppression, and envy. The actionsaccompanying it include beating, splittingopen, crushing, breaking, hitting, and drawingblood. "It should be acted out by red eyes. fur-rowing of the brows. biting one's lips andgrinding one's teeth, puffing the cheeks, wring-ing the hands, and similar gestures." It is ac-companied by other mental states, including anincrease in determination or energy, rashness,violence, sweat, trembling, pride. panic, resent-ment, and stuttering ( see Masson & Patward-han, 1970, pp. 52-53).

For three of the nine basic emotions de-scribed in the "Rasidhydya," it is easy to recog-nize the underlying script, to see the self in theother, and to arrive at a cross-cultural and trans-historical agreement about what is basic inemotional functioning (at least for them andus). Yet as one moves beyond sorrow, anger andfear to disgust, amusement, wonder, persever-ance, sexual passion, and serenity, the way inwhich consciousness is partitioned or hierarchi-cally structured into basic and nonbasic statesin the "Rasddhydya" seems less and less famil-iar, despite any initial appearances to the con-trary. This decline in familiarity is similar to the"gradient of recognition" that Haidt and Kelt-ner (1999) found when studying facial expres-sions in India and the United States: Some ex-pressions are very well recognized acrosscultures, some are less well recognized, andthere is no clear or bounded set of "universal"facial expressions.

Thus it becomes clear upon examination ofthe relevant Sanskrit texts and commentariesthat medieval Hindu "disgust" differs frommodern North American disgust. Medieval

The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions 403

Hindu disgust is partitioned into two subtypes:The first includes aspects of horror and disillu-sionment, as well as world-weariness associat-ed with the quest for detachment, transcen-dence, and salvation. The second includeshorror at the sight of blood. Medieval Hindudisgust is, as the anthropologist McKim Mar-riott has suggested to us, more like a domain ofthe loathsome, and it gathers together within itsterritory a broad range of human responses tothe ugly, the nasty, and the odious. Rozin,Haidt, and McCauley (Chapter 40, this volume)argue that contemporary North American dis-gust has a similarly broad and heterogeneousdomain of elicitors, but that moral and interper-sonal disgust are highly variable across cul-tures.

It also becomes clear upon examination thatmedieval Hindu "wonder" is not contemporaryNorth American "surprise," but rather a state ofmind closer to admiration than to startle orshock. For Hindu wonder has less to do with asudden violation of expectations and more todo with one's reactions to the opportunity towitness divine, heavenly, or exalted feats,events, or beings (including, e.g., the feats of ajuggler). It is even possible to do such witness-ing with one's mouth closed, as long as the eyesare wide open!

Similarly it becomes clear upon examinationthat medieval Hindu "amusement" (which in-cludes contemptuous, indignant, or derisivelaughter at the faults and inferior status of oth-ers) is not contemporary North American "hap-piness," which has celebratory implications.Indeed, happiness, shame, indignation, arro-gance, and some contempt-like emotions areexplicitly mentioned in the "Rasddhydya" forInclusion among 33 nonbasic ("accompany-ing") mental states. Thus it seems reasonable toassert that the basic emotion designated by me-dieval Hindu philosophers as "amusement" isnot adequately translated as "happiness" or as"contempt." (It should be noted that while thetext provides little basis for determining equiv-alence of meaning for the terms used to trans-late the 33 nonbasic mental states, there isgood reason to doubt that "shame" and "happi-ness" have the same implications and associa-tions, or play the same psychological role, inIndia as they do in contemporary North Amer-ica. (See Shweder, 1994, on the positive quali-ties of shame in India, where it is a virtue asso-ciated with civility, modesty, and an ability torein in one's destructive powers in support of

the social order rather than with the diminish-ment of the ego; see also Parish, 1991, and be-low.)

It also becomes clear upon examination ofthe text that medieval Hindu "perseverance" isnot contemporary North American "interest,"but is rather deeply connected to heroic deter-mination and a willingness to engage in acts re-quiring endurance and self-sacrifice. In thecontext of the early medieval Hindu scriptures,when the Hindu goddess Durga (or Kali) en-dured trials and tribulations yet persisted in aseemingly hopeless battle against uncountabledemons in an effort to save the world, her ef-forts are said to have displayed the heroic rasaof perseverance. Mere interest had very little todo with it; she would probably rather have beendoing something else (see below).

In sum, the two lists of nine basic humanemotions truly overlap at only three points. Allthe other apparent points of similarity (amuse-ment as happiness, their disgust as our disgust,wonder as surprise, perseverance as interest)turn out to be merely apparent; and for severalof the emotions (sexual passion, serenity,shame, contempt), there is not even an illusionof transcultural equivalence. In the end, most ofthe items cannot be easily mapped across thetwo lists.

There are other ways in which the "Rasäd-hydya" presents us with a somewhat unfamiliarportrait of the way consciousness is organized.One has to do with the way the text divides thebasic emotions into primary basic emotionsand secondary basic emotions. According tothe text and commentaries, the four primarybasic emotions are sexual passion, anger, per-severance, and disgust. The four secondarybasic emotions are amusement, sorrow, won-der, and fear. The ninth basic emotion, serenity,is sometimes viewed as a primary basic emo-tion and either substituted for disgust or associ-ated with disgust (through a causal sequencethat begins with horror and revulsion over at-tachments in the world and ends with theserenity of ego alienation, detachment, and sal-vation).

In commenting on this scheme, it is perhapsworth noting in passing that Sigmund Freudmight find much of value in a conception thattreats sexual passion and anger (and persever-ance and disgust) as the deepest aspects of hu-man experience. One wonders whether Freudwould have interpreted perseverance and dis-gust as analogues to the life and death instincts.

404 SOCIAL. PERSONALITY ISSUES

More notable. however, is the fact that the pri-mary basic emotions are primary primarily be-cause they are the "emotions" associated inclassical and folk Hindu thought with the fourworthy ends or goals of life. One of these goalsof life—pleasure (ii,Tni,d)—is linked to sexualpassion. A second goal—control, autonomy,and power (artha)—is linked to anger. A thirdgoal—social duty and moral virtue WhannaH-is linked to perseverance. The fourth and per-haps highest goal—salvation or the attainmentof divinity Imoksha)—is linked to disgUstand/or serenity. In other words, presupposed bythis famous formulation about the organizationof human emotions are a special theory ofmorality and human motivation, and a specificway of life. Thus it is hardly surprising that thisparticular medieval South Asian conception ofthe hierarchical structuring of consciousnessinto basics versus nonbasics and primary basicsversus secondary basics should seem somewhatstrange to emotion researchers in North Ameri-ca. and vice versa.

There is yet another way in which the"Rasadhydya" presents us with an unfamiliarportrait of the organization of consciousness.For the eight or nine items on the Sanskrit listare hound to seem like a disparate and anom-alous collection. at least from the point of viewof North American folk and academic concep-tions about how to partition consciousness intokinds of mental states I see D'Andrade 1987).Indeed, one might expect North American emo-tion researchers to recoil at the very suggestionthat the Sanskrit list is really a list of basic"emotions" at all. North American folk andacademic psychology do not really classifyserenity, wonder, sexual passion, amusement,or perseverance as definitive or clear examplesof "emotions" (see Shaver, Schwartz, Kitson, &O'Connor, 1987). Sexual passion would proba-bly be classified as a motive or, alternatively, asa nonemotional feeling. Serenity might be clas-sified as a nonemotional feeling or a state ofmind, although not a motive. Perseverancewould probably be classified as a quality of willor agency, or perhaps a formal property of mo-tivation. Amusement and wonder seem to benone of the above. Indeed after reading the textand commentaries and the various nonequiva-lent translations of and ruse (are theymental states, emotions, feelings, moods. senti-ments, or what?), one might begin to suspectthat in the "Rastidhyiiya" one is faced with asomewhat different conception of how to parti-

tion a person into parts and how to divide con-sciousness into kinds.

It is of course possible (indeed, likely ) that insome ways the "Rasallviiya" presupposes apartitioning of the person into parts that is notcoordinate w ith our own conception of the per-son, and that is why it is so hard to settle on anysingle translation equivalent for the Sanskrithhtiva and ruse. This is a familiar kind of trans-lation problem, and it is encountered even acrossEuropean languages and subcultures. Wierzbic-ka (1989), for example. has analyzed in detailthe many distortions of meaning that occurwhen the Russian word (ltd(' is translated intoEnglish. Dtdu is a lexical item signify ing a keyRussian cultural concept that has to do with thepartitioning of a person into parts. It is typicallytranslated into English as "soul," or alternativelyas "mind" or "heart" or "spirit." N: one of theselexical mappings is adequate, because none ofthese English words signifies the full and equiv-alent set of meanings associated with dtr.∎a. Forexample, Wierzbicka (1989. p. 52) notes that itis one of two parts of the person, that one cannotsee it: that because of this part, things can hap-pen in a person that cannot happen in anythingother than a person: that these things can begood or bad; that because of this part, a personcan feel things that nothing other than a personcan feel; that other people can't know what thesethings are if the person doesn't say it; that a per-son would want someone to know what thesethings are; and that because of this part, a personcan be a good person and feel something goodtoward other people.

Similar issues concerning variations in theorganization of consciousness arise in connec-tion with the research of Steven Parish (1991)on conceptions of the mental life among theSouth Asian Hindu Newars of Nepal (see alsoAppadurai, 1990; Brenneis, 1990). For theNewars, mental states such as memory, desire,feeling. thought. and emotion, which we wouldspatially differentiate between the head and theheart and perhaps the gut and the skin), are allthought to be located together in the heart; thisheart of the mental life is thought to be animat-ed by a god, who makes perception and experi-ence possible. Consequently, for the Newars"the efforts of individuals to monitor their in-ner life often draw on the sense of a divineagency," and it is believed that "a person seesbecause the god sees through his or her eyes"(Parish. 1991, p. 316). So it would be surpris-ing indeed if the set of meanings associated

The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions 405

with the Sanskrit terms rasa and bhciva couldbe easily mapped onto the set of meanings as-sociated with any single English term orphrase, such as "emotion:' "feeling," "mood,""sentiment," "mental state," or "conscious-ness." We look forward to the day when San-skritists do for the concept signified by theterm bhciva what Wierzbicka has done for theconcept signified by the Russian word dula

For the time being, however, we are not go-ing to try to solve the very deepest of questionsabout the partitioning of the person into partsand the division of consciousness into kinds.Instead, we are going to argue that it is helpfulenough to know what the text tells us. What the"Rasidhylya" tells us is that in drama thesthiiyi-bhciva (we'll keep calling them "basicemotions") are brought to a state of rasa. Moreimportantly, however, what the text tells us isthat the ma are nothing more than the union ofthree script-like or narrative components:

The determinants, causes, or elicitingconditions (vi-bhciva), which includes all thebackground information, settings, events, andaction tendencies that might make manifestsome state of the world and one's relationshipto it (e.g., forced separation from somethingone cherishes; finding oneself powerless in theface of danger).

The consequences (anu-bheiva), which in-cludes eight types of involuntary somatic re-sponses (sweating, fainting, weeping, etc.), andvarious action tendencies (abusing the body,brandishing weapons) and expressive modes(bodily movement, voice tone, facial expres-sion)—for example, wailing and tears.

3. The "accompanying" mental states (vyab-hicari-bhava), which are something like a 33-item symptom list of secondary side effects, in-cluding emotions, feelings, and cognitivestates; some of these effects are weariness, rem-iniscence, panic, envy, dreaming, confusion,sickness, shame, and even death.

In other words, in the "Rasildhyliya" onefinds a relatively elaborate account of the sym-bolic structures that give shape and meaning toa selected subset of mental experiences, whichbecause they have been privileged for symbolicelaboration have become transformed into "ba-sic" mental experiences for that culturally con-stituted world. That is, in the "Rasildhyllya" onefinds an ancient yet sophisticated text in thecultural psychology of the emotions.

THE SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE OFTHE EMOTIONS

The strategy adopted in the "RasAdhyiya" is todefine a basic emotion by the implicit symbolicstructure that gives shape and meaning to thatemotion (its rasa—the intentional object ofaesthetic pleasure in the theatre) and then to de-fine that symbolic structure by resolving it intoits determinants, consequences, and accompa-nying side effects. This strategy is directly par-allel to various contemporary approaches to thecultural psychology of the emotions.

One aspect of this symbolic (or, as somewould call it, "cognitive") approach is the viewthat kinds of emotions are not kinds of thingslike plants or animals. Instead they are (rasa-like) interpretive schemes of a particular script-like, story-like, or narrative kind that giveshape and meaning to the human experience ofthose conditions of the world that have a bear-ing on self-esteem (see Shweder, 1994). The el-ements that are proposed as slots in the storymay vary slightly from scholar to scholar, al-though most of the slots in use today can befound in the "Rasildhyiiya."

Mesquita and Frijda (1992; also seeEllsworth, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991;Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson, 1984; Lewis,1989; Lutz, 1985b; Russell, 1991; Stein &Levine, 1987), for example, parse each emo-tion script into a series of slots including "an-tecedent events," "event coding" (type of con-dition of the world), "appraisal" (judgedimplications for self-esteem and well-being),"physiological reaction patterns," "actionreadiness:' "emotional behavior," and "regula-tion." Shweder (1994) suggests a parsing ofemotion scripts into slots such as "self-involv-ing conditions of the world" (e.g., loss andgain, protection and threat), "somatic feelings"(e.g., muscle tension, pain, dizziness, nausea,fatigue, breathlessness), "affective feelings"(e.g., agitation, emptiness, expansiveness), "ex-pressive modes" (e.g., face, posture, voice),and "plans for self-management" (e.g., to flee,to retaliate, to celebrate, to invest). (See alsoShweder, 1991, where a slot is provided in theemotion narrative for variations in "social reg-ulation" or the normative appropriateness ofcertain emotions' being experienced or ex-pressed.)

The primary assumption of the symbolic ap-proach is the same as the approach of the"Rasidhyiya"—namely, that the "emotion"

•

406 SOCIAL/ PERSONALITY ISSUES

(e.g., sadness, fear, or love) is not something in-dependent of or separable from the conditionsthat justify it, from the somatic and affectiveevents that are ways of feeling or being touchedby it. from the actions it demands, or the like.The -emotion" is the whole story: a kind of so-matic event (fatigue, chest pain, goose flesh)and/or affective event (panic, emptiness, expan-siveness) experienced as a perception of someantecedent conditions (death of a friend, accep-tance of a book manuscript for publication, aproposition to go out to dinner) and their impli-cations for the self (e.g.. as loss, gain, threat,possibility), and experienced as well as a socialjudgment (e.g., of vice or virtue, sickness orhealth) and as a kind of plan for action to pre-serve one's self-esteem (attack, withdraw, con-fess, hide, explore). The "emotion" is the entirescript. It is the simultaneous experience of allthe components, or, perhaps more accurately.the unitary experience of the whole packagedeal.

A second aspect of the symbolic approach isthe view that for the sake of comparison andtranslation, any "emotion" is decomposableinto its narrative slots. From this point of view,to ask whether people are alike or different intheir emotional functioning (or whether emo-tion words in different languages are alike ordifferent in their significations I is really to askseveral more specific questions:

Are they alike or different in their somaticexperiences (e.g., muscle tension, headaches,etc.)? ( the somatic phenomenology question)

Are they alike or different in their af-fective experiences (e.g., emptiness, calm,pleasantness)? (the affective phenomenologyquestion)

Are they alike or different in the an-tecedent conditions of those somatic andaffective experiences (e.g., infertility, job loss,winning the lottery)? (the environmental deter-minants question)

Are they alike or different in the per-ceived implications of those antecedent condi-tions for self-esteem (e.g., irreversible loss,fame and recognition)? (the self-appraisal ques-tion)

Are they alike or different in the extent towhich showing or displaying that state of con-sciousness has been socially baptized as a viceor virtue or as a sign of sickness or health? (thesocial appraisal question)

Are they alike or different in the plans for

the self-management of self-esteem that get ac-tivated as part of the emotion script (e.g., cele-bration, attack, withdrawal from social con-tacts)? (the self-management question)

7. Are they alike or different in the iconicand symbolic vehicles used for giving expres-sion to the whole package deal (e.g., facial ex-pressions, voice, posture, and action)? (thecommunication question)

Given this type of decomposition of the defi-nition of an emotion to its constituent narrativeslots, the issue of translation equivalence be-comes a matter of pattern matching, as one triesto determine whether the variables in each ofthose slots are linked in similar ways acrosscultures.

BITE YOUR TONGUE: THE CASE OFHINDU LAJJA

For example, the contemporary Hindu concep-tion of lajja (or lajya) has recently been expli-cated for two communities in South Asia. theNewars of Bhaktapur in Nepal (Parish, 1991)and the Oriyas of Bhubaneswar in Orissa. India(Menon & Shweder, 1994, 1998; Shweder &Menon, in press)—and, as spelled out below,there is even more to be said about lajja thancan be found in those two accounts. Lajja is of-ten translated by bilingual informants and dic-tionaries as "shame," "embarrassment," "shy-ness," or "modesty"; yet, as should becomeobvious from the following bit of cultural exe-gesis, every one of these translations is prob-lematic or fatally flawed.

For starters lajja is something one deliberate-ly shows or puts on display the way we mightshow our "gratitude," "loyalty," or "respect." Itis a state of consciousness that has been bap-tized in South Asia as a supreme virtue, espe-cially for women, and it is routinely exhibitedin everyday life (e.g., every time a marriedwoman covers her face or ducks out of a roomto avoid direct affiliation with those membersof her family she is supposed to avoid). Parish(1991, p. 324) describes it as both an emotionand a moral state. It is by means of their lajjathat those who are civilized uphold the socialorder—by showing perseverance in the pursuitof their own social role obligations; by display-ing respect for the hierarchical arrangement ofsocial privileges and responsibilities; by actingshy, modest, or deferential and not encroaching

The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions 407

on the prerogatives of others; by covering one'sface, remaining silent, or lowering one's eyes inthe presence of superiors. Like gratitude, loyal-ty, or respect, lajja, which is a way of showingone's civility and commitment to the mainte-nance of social harmony, is judged in SouthAsia to be a very good thing.

While lajja may be experienced by both menand women, it is an emotion and a virtue asso-ciated with a certain feminine ideal. It is talkedabout as a lovely ornament worn by women.Lajja is the linguistic stem for the name of a lo-cal creeper plant (a "touch-me-not"), which isso coy that upon the slightest contact it closesits petals and withdraws into itself. To say of awoman that she is full of lajja is a very positiverecommendation. Here is one reason why.

Perhaps the most important collective repre-sentation of lajja in various regions of easternIndia is the tantric icon portraying the mothergoddess Kali, brandishing weapons and a 'de-capitated head in her 10 arms, eyes bulging andtongue out, with her foot stepping on the chestof her husband, the god Siva, who is lying onthe ground beneath her. Based on interviewswith 92 informants in Orissa, India, Menon andShweder (1994, 1998; Shweder & Menon, inpress) have been examining the meaning of thisicon and its significance for our understandingof lajja.

The gist of the story, as it is narrated by localexperts, is that once upon a time the male godsgave a boon to a minor demon, Mahisasura, tothe effect that he could only be killed at thehands of a naked female. They thereby turnedMahisasura into a major demon who was ableunimpeded to terrorize all the male gods. In or-der to destroy the demon, the male gods pooledall their energy and powers and created the god-dess Durga, and armed her with their ownweapons. On their behalf they sent Durga intobattle against Mahisasura, but they neglected totell her about the boon. She fought bravely butcould not kill the demon; he was too strong andclever. In desperation Durga appealed for guid-ance from an auspicious goddess, who let her inon the secret. As one informant narrated thestory:

So Durga did as she was advised to [she stripped],and within seconds after Mahisasura saw her[naked], his strength waned and he died under hersword. After killing him a terrible rage enteredDurga's mind, and she asked herself, "What kindsof gods are these that give to demons such boons,

and apart from that what kind of gods are thesethat they do not have the honesty to tell me thetruth before sending me into battle?"

Durga felt humiliated by her nakedness andby the deceit. She decided that such a worldwith such gods did not deserve to survive; shetherefore took on the form of Kali and went ona mad rampage, devouring every living creaturethat came in her way. The gods then called onSiva, Kali's husband, to do something to savethe world from destruction at the hands of themother goddess. Siva lay in her path as shecame tramping along, enraged. Absorbed in herwild dance of destruction, Kali accidentallystepped on Siva and placed her foot on her hus-band's chest, an unspeakable act of disrespect.When she looked down and saw what she haddone, she came back to her senses—in particu-lar to her sense of lajja, which she expressed bybiting her tongue between her teeth. She reinedin her anger and became calm and still. To thisday in Orissa, India, "Bite your tongue" is anidiomatic expression for lajja, and the biting ofthe tongue is the facial expression used bywomen as an iconic apology when they realize,or are confronted with the fact, that they havefailed to uphold social norms.

One moral of the story is that men are inca-pable of running the world by themselves, eventhough they are socially dominant. They rely onwomen to make the world go round. Yet in a pa-triarchal society, men humiliate women by theway they exploit female power, strength, andperseverance. This leads to anger and rage inwomen, which is highly destructive of every-thing of value and must be brought under con-trol, for the sake of the social order. Lajja is asalient ideal in South Asia because it preservessocial harmony by helping women to swallowtheir rage.

If we decompose lajja into its constituentnarrative slots, it becomes apparent just howhazardous it can be to assume that one can ren-der the emotional meanings of others withterms from our received English lexicon formental states. (See Geertz, 1984, p. 130, on thedifficulties of translating the Balinese term lek.Balinese lek seems much like Hindu lajja.Geertz notes that lek has been variably translat-ed and mistranslated and that "'shame' is themost common attempt." He tries to render it as"stage fright.") Hindu lajja does not map wellonto words like "shame," "embarrassment,""shyness," "modesty," or "stage fright." An

40S SOCIAL,' PERSONALITY ISSUES

analysis of the constituents of hyla helps us seewhy.

From the perspective of social appraisal andself-appraisal, for example. to be full of kijiti isto be in possession of the virtue of behaving ina civilized manner and in such a way that thesocial order and its norms are upheld. It is not aneurosis. and it does not connote a reduction inthe strength of the ego. Indeed, lajja promotesself-esteem. Of course, to he perceived or la-beled as someone without Igija—as someonewho encroaches on the station of others. or failsto live up to the requirements of his or her ownstation—is unpleasant and arousing. Parishnotes that to feel Witt is sometimes associatedwith blushing, sweating, and altered pulse(1991, p. 324), but we suspect that such a so-matic phenomenology is a feature of the anxi-ety provoked by the social perception of the ab-sence of hijja and is not definitive of lajjaitself. For to experience Icyja is to experiencethat sense of virtuous, courteous, well-mannered restraint that led Kali to rein in herrage.

The environmental determinants of lujja as asense of one's own virtue and civility are as var-ied as the set of actions that are dutiful and re-sponsible, given one's station in life in a worldin which all people are highly self-consciousabout their social designation (see Geertz,1984, for a brilliant attempt to capture the dra-matic qualities of such a world). They includeevents that we would find familiar (not beingseen naked by the wrong person in the wrongcontext) as well as many events that mightseem alien or strange (never talking directly toone's husband's elder brother or to one's father-in-law; never being in the same room with bothone's husband and another male to whom hemust defer).

From the perspective of self-management,South Asian ityja may appear at first glance tobe similar to North American shame or embar-rassment. It activates a habit or routine thatsometimes results in hiding, covering up. andwithdrawing from the scene. Yet what is reallybeing activated by tuna is a general habit of re-spect for social hierarchy and a consciousnessof one's social and public responsibilities,which in the context of South Asian norms maycall for avoidance, silence, withdrawal, or otherdeferential, protective, or nonaggressive ges-tures and actions.

Finally, consider the semantic structure of"shame" and lajja in the minds of informants.

When middle-class Euro-American college stu-dents are presented with the triad of terms"shame–happiness–anger" and asked. "Whichis most different from the other two?." they aremost likely to respond that either "happiness"or "shame" is most different from the othertwo, perhaps on the grounds that "shame" and"anger" go together because they are both un-pleasant feelings, or that "happiness" and"anger" go together because they are both ego-expanding emotions. Neither response is typi-cal of responses in the South Asian communitywhere Tenon and Shweder (1994) haveworked, where lajja (shame?) and .viika (happi-ness'!) are thought to go together in the triadtest, and ra'a (anger'?), perceived as destructiveof society. is the odd emotion out. Here some-thing seems to be amiss in the translationprocess. Something may well have been amissin most past attempts to equate emotions acrosslanguages and across local cultural worlds (seeWierzbicka, 1992).

THE SOCIAL AND MORALCONTEXT OF EMOTIONALEXPERIENCE

The case of Icyja illustrates the dependence ofemotional experience on its social and moralcontext. To understand /ajja, one must under-stand the moral goods that Oriyas strive toachieve. This strategy of viewing emotionsagainst the background of their associatedmoral goods can be extended to other emotionsusing a framework that has proved useful in re-cent cultural-psychological work. Shweder etal. (1997; see also Shweder, 1990b; Haidt etal., 1993; Jensen, 1995) suggest that moralgoods do not vary randomly from culture toculture, but rather tend to cluster into three setsof related goods or three ethics, known as theethics of autonomy. the ethics of community,and the ethics of divinity. Cultures rely uponthe three ethics to varying degrees. The relativeweights of the three ethics within a culture ap-pear to affect the experience and expression ofemotion, as well as the way emotions are con-ceptualized by both local folk and local ex-perts.

In cultures that emphasize an ethics of au-tonomy, the central object of value is the indi-vidual. Within that type of cultural world. themost salient moral goods are those that pro-mote the autonomy. freedom, and well-being of

The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions 409

the individual, with the result that nothing canbe condemned that does not demonstrablyharm others, restrict their freedom, or impingeon their rights. Haidt et al. (1993), for example,found that U.S. college students (a populationsteeped in the ethics of autonomy) respondedto stories about violations of food and sexualtaboos (e.g., eating one's already dead pet dog)with disgust. Nevertheless, these students feltcompelled by the logic of their ethical stance toseparate their feelings of disgust from theirmoral judgments. As a result they held firmlyto the view that their personal emotional reac-tions did not imply that the actions werewrong. They spoke exclusively in the languageof the ethics of autonomy, pointing out that no-body was hurt, and that the people involvedhad a right to do as they pleased in a privatesetting. Disgust plays an ambiguous role insuch an autonomy-based cultural world (seeRozin et al., Chapter 40, this volume). In sucha cultural world, the moral domain is construct-ed so that it is limited to issues of harm, rights,and justice (Turiel, 1983), and the emotionsthat are experienced as moral emotions (e.g.,anger, sympathy, and guilt) are those that re-spond to a rather narrow class of ethical goods(e.g., justice, freedom, and the avoidance ofharm). In such a cultural world, the focus of or-dinary folk and social scientists alike is uponindividuals' striving to maximize their personalutility (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1980;Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, Chapter 28, this vol-ume). Happiness, sadness, pride, and shameare viewed as responses to individual gains andlosses, successes and failures. Other moralgoods (such as loyalty, duty, and respect forstatus) that might be linked to the emotions areeither lost or undertheorized.

Nevertheless, in many parts of the world themoral domain has been constructed in such away that it is broader than, or at least differentfrom, an ethics of autonomy. In cultures thatemphasize an ethics of community, ontologicalpriority is given to collective entities (the fam-ily, guild, clan, community, corporation, or na-tion), and the central moral goods are thosethat protect these entities against challengesfrom without and decay from within (e.g.,goods such as loyalty, duty, honor, respectful-ness, chastity, modesty, and self-control). Insuch a world, individual choices (what to wear,whom to marry, how to address others) take ona moral significance and an ethical importance(Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987), and the

successful pursuit of individual goals may evenbe a cause for embarrassment or shame. Haidtet al. (1993), for example, found that outside ofcollege samples, people of lower socioeconom-ic status generally thought it was morallywrong to eat one's already dead pet dog or toclean one's toilet with the national flag. Evenwhen these actions were judged to be harmless,they were still seen as objectively disgusting ordisrespectful and hence as morally wrong. In acultural world based on an ethics of communi-ty, emotions may exist that are not fully felt bythose whose morality is based on an ethics ofautonomy. Laija is a clear example, since it isnot the type of emotion that will be experi-enced in a world that sees hierarchy and the ex-clusive prerogatives of others as unjust or as aform of oppression, rather than as a powerfuland legitimate object of admiration and/or re-spect (Menon & Shweder, 1998). To select an-other example, song, the righteous indignationof the Ifaluk (Lutz, 1988), may require a senseof close, valued, and inescapable community.Whereas North American "anger" is triggeredby a violation of rights and leads to a desirefor revenge, Ifaluk song appears to be triggeredby violations of relationships, and it leads toa socially shared emotion that brings the viola-tor back into voluntary conformity (Lutz,1988).

Similarly, emotions related to honor andheroism may require a strong attachment anddedication to a collectivity or group, for whomthe hero lays down his or her life. TheMityaitistra's otherwise puzzling inclusion ofperseverance or heroism as a basic emotion,equal to anger and fear, seems more intelligibleagainst the backdrop of the ethics of communi-ty. A James Bond-type hero may display perse-verance as he battles to save the "free world,"yet we do not think he inspires the same rasa ina North American audience that an Indian audi-ence savors when a Hindi film hero battles toavenge the death of his father. Many older clas-sic North American films raised themes of fam-ily honor, but such themes have become lesscommon in recent decades, as the ethics of au-tonomy has pushed back the ethics of commu-nity. Unlike Hindi films, modern North Ameri-can films rarely embed the hero in the thicktraditions and obligations of family history. It isa rare movie indeed when we meet the hero'sparents.

The third ethic, the ethic of divinity, mayhave a similar differential activation and en-

410 SOCIAL; PERSONALITY ISSUES

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abling effect on the emotional life. In the ethicof divinity. people (and sometimes animals) areseen as containing a bit of God for a god) with-in them, and the central moral goods are thosethat protect and dignify the person's inherentdivinity. The body is experienced as a temple,so matters that seem to be personal choices

ithin the ethics of autonomy (e.g., food andsexual choices, personal hygiene) becomemoral and spiritual issues associated with suchgoods as sanctity, purity, and pollution.

Within the terms of a cultural world focusedon an ethics of divinity, even love and hate maylose their simple positive versus negative hedo-nic valences. A modern spiritual guide( Yatiswarananda, 1979. p. 187) says that hatredand attachment are both fetters that "degradethe human being. preventing him from rising tohis true stature. Both must be renounced." Hin-du scriptures are full of stories such as that ofPingala, a greedy courtesan who sought inces-santly for wealth. One day she was deeply dis-appointed that nobody came to give her gifts."Her countenance sank and she was very muchdown in spirits. Then as a result of this brood-ing an utter disgust came over her that madeher happy" (Yatiswarananda, 1979, p. 160, re-ferring to Bhagavatam I 1.8.27). While secular-ized Westerners can easily recognize these feel-ings of greed, attachment. and self-disgust, thestory points to feelings about attachment andrenunciation that may not he readily availableto those who lack an ethic of divinity. Secular-ized Western folk may feel pride upon givingup an attachment to cigarettes, or even to mon-ey; however, if this renunciation is set within ascript of personal accomplishment and healthconcerns, it is a different emotion (accordingto the present account) than if it is a compo-nent of a script about the purification and ad-vancement of the soul toward reunion withGod.

Of course, the very idea of an emotion con-nected with renunciation seems paradoxical,since spiritual progress in many Eastern reli-gions is measured by the degree to which onemoves beyond the experience of emotions.Only once this paradox is grasped does themysterious ninth emotion of the Niinia.s:(.7stramake sense. Serenity or calmness is an impor-tant part of Hindu emotional life and emotionaldiscourse precisely because of the centrality ofan ethics of divinity in everyday Hindu life. Notsurprisingly, it is on no Western lists of basicemotions.

CONCLUSION: THE CULTURALPSYCHOLOGY OF THEEMOTIONS ANEW

As we enter a new era of collaborative researchamong anthropologists, psychologists, andphysiologists, concerned with similarities anddifferences in emotional functioning on aworldwide scale, a major goal for the culturalpsychology of the emotions will be to decom-pose the emotions (and the languages of theemotions) into constituent narrative slots. It isto be hoped that by means of the decompositionof the symbolic structure of the emotions, itwill be possible to render the meaning of otherpeople's mental states without assimilatingthem in misleading ways to an a priori set oflexical items available in the language of the re-searcher (e.g., rendering Hindu lajja as English"shame").

It is one of the great marvels of life thatacross languages, cultures, and history, it ispossible, with sufficient knowledge, effort. andinsight, to truly understand the meanings ofother people's emotions and mental states. Yetone must also marvel at one of the great ironiesof life—namely. that the process of understand-ing the consciousness of others can deceptivelyappear to be tar easier than it really is, therebymaking it even more difficult to achieve a gen-uine understanding of "otherness." Thus, in theend, this discussion of the cultural psychologyof the emotions and meditation on the venera-ble "Rasildhyliya" of the Ndr •aiiistizi are reallypleas for a decomposition of emotional statesinto their constituent narrative slots (environ-mental determinants. somatic phenomenology;affective phenomenology, self-appraisal, socialappraisal. self-management strategy, and com-munication codes). Unless we take that step, wewill continue to be prone to the bias that theemotional life of human beings is "basically"the same around the world. The truth may wellbe that when it comes to "basic" emotions we(medieval Hindus and contemporary NorthAmericans, Pintupis and Russians, Inuit andBalinese, etc.) are not only basically alike insome ways, but are basically different fromeach other as well.

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