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Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Company

Cornelissen, J. It is the decision of this court to review the matter of alleged trespass of

the Central Kentucky Natural Gas Company (subsequently referred to as “CKNGC”) against one

Mrs. Hammonds, a resident of this great Commonwealth. We must ask ourselves in this court

whether the underground business procedures of the CKNGC constitutes trespass against the

private property of Mrs. Hammonds. To do so, we, like the Kentucky Court of Appeals, must

consider precedential law pertaining to property rights and decide whether the lower court

committed an error of law in its decision.

Mrs. Hammonds lost her suit against CKNGC and was again defied some years later

when she appealed. Her case is considered one final time by the Supreme Court of Kentucky,

and it is my opinion that the persuasiveness of her complaint does not hold. We must affirm the

judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals and side with the appellee, CKNGC. The

justification for my opinion is as follows:

In deliberating over the strife between Mrs. Hammonds and CKNGC, we referred to a

handful of cases pertaining to the issues of trespass and property rights. In considering a

comparison made at the lower court that likens the natural gas deposits from the shared reservoir

of CKNGC and Mrs. Hammonds to wild animals, it is important to stress that, in my opinion, the

analogy is useful. Because this comparison justifies the nature of the laws that stand, let us

explore the multifaceted nature of the metaphor in all of its complexity so that any argument that

challenges the ruling of the lower court can be dispelled and the validity of the comparison (and

thus the decision of the lower court) can be verified. If the law is to insist that natural gas is

similar to a wild animal, then CKNGC purposefully placing such a material within the bounds of

her property without her permission must necessarily be like allowing a pack of dangerous wild

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beasts to roam free upon her property. Are not the laws of trespass designed to keep the

inhabitants safe from intruders? And further to that aim, much in the way that wild animals can

be dangerous, is gas not a known explosive, and also dangerous? Therefore, is not the

introduction of a new supply of unknown, unpredictable fumes every bit as intrusive as the

invasion of vicious brutes? The property of Mrs. Hammonds has, by this reasoning, become an

unwelcome hot zone for detonation and destruction.

The court wishes to observe, nonetheless, that the very ruling of the lower court removes

this burden of accountability from the appellee. Rendering uncaptured gas to the status of

common property (in the way that wild animals are like common property until captured and

killed) means that any danger brought on by the introduction of gas to that area is not the

responsibility of the appellee, as the appellee is not the sole owner of the resource. This matter is

disputed in Pierson v. Post, and the outcome there furthers our point here. The work of Post in

securing the fox he hunted did not, in the eyes of the court, render the fox his property and the

fox was thus legally available for Pierson to claim. Had the fox become the property of Post,

then it indeed would have been trespass for Pierson to intervene and claim the fox for himself.

Likewise, as the gas becomes public property once it is unleashed back into a natural confine, it

becomes shared. Thus CKNGC cannot be liable for its presence on parts of the property of Mrs.

Hammonds. Furthermore, while the court recognizes the possibility that the gas introduced to the

reservoir can become a dangerous agent, the reality is that gas was in the reservoir before

CKNGC introduced a new material. If Mrs. Hammonds was living atop a supply of gas for many

years before her dispute with CKNGC, then there is no guaranteeing that she will not continue to

live there safely for many years to come.

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Clearly, then, the finicky nature of a gas makes it impossible to render this case to being a

matter of trespass. It is, rather, consistent with other disputes over property rights in that items of

a wild nature are common property until specific types of interference change the nature of those

things. Death and capture of a wild animal mark it as property in cases such as Pierson v. Post

and also in Ghen v. Rich. In the lower ruling here, gas becomes property when it is taken from its

natural place in the ground and altered for some purpose (such as the production of fuel and

other energy). That this case reverses the usual pattern in that property is returned to a state of

communal ownership does not make this case markedly different. The same principles apply.

Again, in Pierson v. Post, just like in the matter here, the fact that the fox was of common

property and being procured from common property is what justified the right of Pierson and

Post to it and nullified any claims to trespass for Post. In Ghen v. Rich (a case about property

rights and the whaling industry), the court showed considerable concern even just in what is best

for the public. In that instance, the court showed concern for what is admiral in business-related

competition and sided with what the industry considers fair and respectable practices.

In the same vein, I suggest that the Supreme Court of Kentucky look to what is most

suitable for the common good in determining that there is no value in overturning the prior

ruling. These are dark and difficult times for all, and wherever there is a show of neighborly

good will and an inclination to collaborate for the sake of mutual successes in business the court

will choose to honor that spirit. The Central Kentucky Natural Gas Company has shown nothing

but a desire to share the profits made available from the gas resource beneath these properties

with Mrs. Hammonds, and it is by her own decision making that she has yet to enjoy the benefit

of those profits. As the economy of this great nation is recovering from a state of complete and

total disarray, the Supreme Court of Kentucky will uphold any legal precedents that make

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business a fair enterprise for all Americans. While the court of Ghen v. Rich was trying to

prevent unjust seizures of property that others labored for and that situation is not quite as clearly

applicable here (there is nothing unfair about CKNGC investing in the time and effort to procure

gas resources), the general sentiment that the court wishes to encourage is the same-that of

decency. The offer of CKNGC to set up a lease agreement with Mrs. Hammonds is a reflection

of good will.

At any rate, the lower court does not bar Mrs. Hammonds from becoming successful

financially because the earlier ruling does not recognize the actions of CKNGC to be of trespass.

On the contrary, the law makes quite clear that the lucrative resources available beneath her

home are available for her to claim just as much as the CKNGC, even if she is resentful that the

company placed the resources there to begin with. Thus, she is free to pursue livelihood even if it

is her wish to do so alone.

Judgment affirmed.