United nations MeMber state: aUstralia—“lUcky coUntry” or terrorist target?

BY

Aidan Hall

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

United Nations Member State: Australia –

‘Lucky Country’ or Terrorist Target?

A Thesis

By

Aidan Hall

Post-Graduate Student Peace and Conflict Studies,

University of Sydney, Australia

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Presented in partial completion of the requirements of

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

Submitted: _____________________________________ Forwarded Recommending Approval: _____________________________________ Approval: _____________________________________

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List of Contents

1) Introduction ………………………………………………………………4 2) Critical Context – a comparison of the protagonists ……………………..6

i. The Status Quo and Defining Terrorism ……………………..6

ii. Indonesia and Terrorism: A quick summary ………………...13

iii. Australia and the United Nations …………………………….20

iv. ‘Lucky County’ or Terrorist Target? …………………………25

v. Counter Terrorist Strategies:

Linking Australian Business and Government ……………….32

3) Integrative Conclusion: …………………………………………………...37 4) End Notes …………………………………………………………………39 5) Bibliography ………………………………………………………………48

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UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATE: AUSTRALIA –

‘LUCKY COUNTRY’ OR TERRORIST TARGET?

INTRODUCTION

One of the most popular appellations used to describe Australia is the phrase ‘lucky

country.’ With its breathtaking natural beauty and glorious climate, Australia is home

to some 21 million people of mixed races including its indigenous people – the

Australian Aborigine.

Australia’s abundance of natural resources and burgeoning economy have for the last

few decades allowed the majority of Australians a fairly comfortable and affluent

lifestyle. Though in recent years, it has become more financially challenging, the

‘great Australian dream’ of buying one’s own home for some is still possible.

Professor Anthony Giddens, Sociologist and Head of the London School of

Economics, suggests that the risks which have concerned us in the past have been

natural or external; over which we have no control such as floods, plagues and

famines. However, many of the identified risks today have emerged out of our own

actions – such as AIDS epidemic, addictions, nuclear events, holy wars and terrorism.

Until recently, the concept of terrorism has seemed distant and unfamiliar to most

Australians. The aim of this research is to investigate if the ‘lucky country’ has in fact

run out of ‘luck’ figuratively speaking and is now facing potential terrorist threat in

the 21st century.

In order to come to some understanding of Australia’s vulnerability to terrorism, this

investigation will firstly discuss this rising phenomenon, as terrorism is not generally

dealt with comprehensively. An endeavour is made in explaining the importance of a

definition of terrorism the world can agree on, as without a proper definition, combat

against this type of criminal activity becomes almost impossible.

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Poverty and ignorance are food for extremism and provide support for radical groups

rooted in nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Since Osama bin Laden and his

regional deputy Abu Baker Bashir, declared Australia as an enemy of Islam, an

examination is made of South-East Asian regional instability and especially since the

Bali bombings where a large number of Australians were brutally massacred. The

archipelago of Indonesia is explored as the region is now regarded as a ‘hot spot’ of

global terrorist activity.

Secondly, this research looks at why Australia is specifically singled out and argues

that regardless of Canberra’s support of the US march to war, Australia remains

vulnerable to terrorist atrocities.

Due to the changing nature of contemporary terrorism, chemical, biological,

radiological (CBR) devices, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), maritime piracy

and Information Technology (IT) terrorism are all discussed as a means of possible, if

not probable, attack on homeland Australia.

Finally, counter terrorist strategies vis-a-vis international cooperation are explored in

context of Australia engaging in dialogue with other countries in the region to help

support one another in the aftermath of a cataclysmic incident. The economic costs of

terrorism are investigated and tied in with how the Australian government, together

with corporate business, can pool their ‘brain-power’ and workshop methodologies to

increase their ability to minimise threat and strategies to successful operations, post

shock.

These focal points and the United Nations (UN) operations are intimately connected

and therefore, are best discussed in context of their relationship to one another.

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UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATE: AUSTRALIA

‘LUCKY COUNTRY’ OR TERRORIST TARGET?

CRITICAL CONTEXT – A COMPARISON OF THE PROTAGONISTS

The Status Quo and Defining Terrorism

The Latin word ‘terrere’ means to frighten and was first used in a wider context

during the French Revolution in the Reign of Terror (September 1793- July 1794)

when France’s last Queen, the unloved Marie Antoinette along with some 17,000

people from all over France were beheaded.1

Since then terrorism has become one of the most challenging problems facing the

modern world. It has evolved into a specialised and sometimes sophisticated, large-

scale type of criminal conduct where innocent, defenceless and unrelated civilians are

victims along with the destruction of physical assets of a state’s infrastructure and

cultural sites. Whether it be anti-abortion terrorism, IT terrorism, Armageddonists to

ethnic-cleansing - from a legal point of view all forms of terrorist acts are criminal,

illegal and always a human rights violation.2

The events of September 11, 2001 have alarmed governments across the world to the

possibility of nuclear strikes should fanatical terrorists be successful in their attempts

to obtain illicit nuclear weapons and their components. Fortunately, there are many

obstacles terrorists face in acquiring individual components without being detected

and the technical expertise necessary to assemble nuclear weapons is difficult to

engage. Unfortunately, the conclusion of the Cold War, has seen an increase in

unemployed nuclear scientists who possess the necessary skills al-Qaeda have been

seeking since 1993.3

Detonation of a single nuclear warhead or a CBR device in a major population centre

like downtown Manhattan in the United States (US) or Europe carries the potential to

escalate into an exchange of nuclear strikes and regional war. Atomic detonation will

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cause large-scale loss of life, mass long-term casualties and considerable damage to

the ecosphere. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in his speech addressing the

General Assembly at New York City, “it is hard to imagine how the tragedy of 11th

September could have been worse. Yet, the truth is that a single attack involving a

nuclear or biological weapon could have killed millions.”4

One underlying event that developed contemporary terrorism was the Cold War. In

1961 then-Soviet premier Khruschev, announced that the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR) would support so-called ‘liberation movements’, it caused grave

concern to US government intelligentsia. The Cold War period saw alliances between

nations normally opposed to each other but allied against commonly perceived

enemies. The US opposing the Soviets on political grounds allied with Afghan and

other Muslim resistance forces to fight the Soviets and the Afghan Soviet puppet

regime. A massive expansion of forces to form a guerilla army was achieved by

Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, European and the Sino-US coalition which established

training camps in Pakistan.5

The operational task was to train Mujahideen units who opposed communism on

religious grounds. After 10 years of guerilla warfare the war ended in 1989. US and

Saudi Arabian funding had amounted to US$3 billion with logistics taken care of by

Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence. The large number of 14,000 volunteer recruits

from 22 Muslim countries who fought in this irregular army were motivated by the

US strategy in widespread stimulation of militant Islam against communist rule.6

After the Afghan-Soviet war transnational terrorists emerged, wishing to apply the

same measures against their own governments and the West. Some Mujahideen,

sometimes referred to as Afghanis were executed and jailed by their governments

upon return; others remained in Afghanistan still fighting with nowhere to go. A

sizeable number have been sighted in Bosnia, Chechnya, China, Kashmir, Nigeria,

Philippines, Sudan, Tajikistan and the United States. Western, Middle Eastern and

Asian Intelligence officials claim it is the influence of the Afghanis that is behind the

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increasing volume of violence by the most extreme fundamentalist movements

currently operating in the international arena.7

The Afghanis were fully trained militant guerrilla killers and terrorists with combat

experience. Literally, ‘rebels without a cause’ with no vocation and no interest in life

other than continuing to fight for Militant Islam, as they had been manipulated and

trained to do. Many will engage in any battle where Muslims oppose non-Muslims,

whether right or wrong. Many left Afghanistan to take up the ‘cause’ within the ranks

of other Islamic organisations, targeting the new enemy consisting of liberal Arab

governments and their allies in the West. Internal instability in Egypt, Algeria,

Tunisia, the Israeli Occupied Territories, Pakistan and the Philippines have been

linked to the operations of the Mujahideen. This certainly demonstrates the degree of

religious fanaticism instilled in them.8

Funding is the primary concern of terrorists. Unless they are sponsored by a

government, they tend to generate funds through criminal activities. The Afghanis

ceased to be ‘heroes’ and became ‘villains’ for political reasons and because they

began to run a lucrative narcotics trade, including stockpiles, to help fund training

camps and terrorist operations. 79% of the world’s illegal opium with a value of US$

56 million in 2001 is supplied from Afghanistan. This makes Afghanistan the largest

producer of opium in the world. Not all-militant training camps closed after the

Soviet-Afghan war, and religious schools and other facilities became training schools

for further recruits to guerrilla warfare. It is estimated that Mujahideen from 40

countries attended these training camps after the war was officially over.

Subsequently, Islamic students formed an army known as the Taleban and seized

much of Afghanistan.9

With the resurgence of Islam around the world, fundamentalists cast blame on

Westernisation, urbanisation and industrialisation for new moral and social decline.

Osama bin Ladin developed the al-Qaeda network and transnational terrorist attacks

began on US Embassies and other installations around the world in an attempt to

promote division between Christians and Muslims, with an overall strategy aimed at

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creating a separate Muslim world. On 22 February 1998 bin Laden announced the

creation of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders

and became preoccupied with the need to rid the Muslim world of those who do not

accept his extremist version of Islam. It is reported that bin Ladin, the most hunted

terrorist in history, funded US$20 million to rebels of the Militant Islamic

Movement.10

As can be seen, religion is much associated with terrorism today and if contemporary

Islamic terrorism is to be properly understood, it is necessary to point out that a true

Muslim adhering to Islam views terrorism as blasphemy as Islam forbids the killing of

women, children, unarmed or surrendered combatants, the destruction of buildings

and even the felling of a tree with single green leaf on it. In context of terrorism,

Islamic fundamentalism is actually a misnomer.11

The son of US evangelist Billy Graham, Franklin Graham said, “the god of Islam is

not the same god. It’s a very different god, and I believe it is a very evil and wicked

religion.” The danger with this simplistic view of Islam is the potential it carries to

permeate the popular imagination, forming the basis of policy decisions of Western

governments and the US. One example to be avoided was a comment by Saxby

Chambliss from the US House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Terrorism and

Homeland Security, when he told Georgia state law enforcement officials that they

should arrest every Muslim that crossed the state line.12

After September 11, representatives of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and

other various religions; recognising their faiths share several points in common,

especially that of common good for mankind and society’s wellbeing - joined Pope

John Paul II in the Italian town of Assisi. About 200 priests, imams, rabbis, patriarchs

journeyed to the birthplace of Saint Francis and with the Pope, prayed for peace in the

world. Assisi, known as an ancient pilgrimage centre, religious leaders from around

the world all vowed to do everything to eliminate the causes of terrorism.13

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The Pope explained that dialogue between the monotheistic religions needs to be

credible and marked by mutual respect, knowledge and acceptance. The spiritual

bond that united Christians and Muslims must be recognised and developed as a step

towards peace for future generations to enjoy.14

Regarded as the successor of Saint Peter, the Pope obviously does not share neither

Graham’s nor Chambliss’ sentiments as previously discussed. The present Pope has

made it clear his primary mission in life is to reconcile Judaism, Christianity and

Islam. In Damascus, the aging pontiff was the first Pope to enter a mosque and was

welcomed by Syria’s top Muslim cleric, Shiekh Ammad Kuftaro. In his visit to

Kazakstan, the Pope said ‘all’ people of the world are children of god and asked

Muslims to join Christians in building a civilisation of love and rejecting violence and

hatred.15

It is claimed Osama bin-Laden follows Wahhabism, a fundamentalist movement of

the Sunni form of Islam and has become an object of interest because of Wahhabism’s

influence to the major sect of government and society of oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The

Koran, holy book of the Islamic faith reveres Jesus (Ieshua) as a prophet from God

and (despite Wahhabi’s influence in Saudi Arabia) demands protection (Dhimmi) for

‘People of the Book’ that is, Christians and Jews. Terrorists distorting Islam and

killing innocent people are committing a blasphemy against Islam and are rejected by

devout Muslims.16

Therefore, Graham can not reconcile his assertion on Islam with widely accepted fact.

Al-Qaeda are no more representative of Islam, than the US’s Klu Klux Klan (KKK)

and Arcan’s Serbian militia were representative of Christianity.

Further to understanding Islam is the misuse of the word Jehad or Jihad – Arabic for

making an effort or struggle. There are in fact many Jehads. For instance, a Jihad on

one’s self in times of hardship such as studying. In short, it is considered as being a

self-motivating effort to do well, underpinned with prayer. Unfortunately, the term

Jihad is misunderstood or mis-used by sections of the media and exploited by power-

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hungry organisations, religious clerics and spiritual leaders based in the Middle East,

western Asia, Africa, India and Indonesia to imply a holy war.17

Mis-using a distorted banner of Islam, terrorist acts by Muslims have occurred in

Algeria, Angola, Egypt, France, Kashmir, Kenya, India, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,

Pakistan, Phillippines, South Africa, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, Tunisia, U.S and

Yugoslavia (former). Non-Muslim terrorist acts were committed in Angola,

Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Columbia, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador,

France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Greece, Lebanon, Mexico, Myanmar,

Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Panama, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland,

Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leonne, Spain, Sudan, Sumatra,

Turkey, Uganda, UK, US, Yugoslavia (former) and Venezuela.18

In Algeria alone over 100,000 victims of terrorism were Muslims, killed by religious

fanatics. From all over the world, Muslim police officers and soldiers are directly

engaged in fighting terrorism and some have paid dearly with their lives.19

There are many more Muslim police and security forces engaged in tracking down al-

Qaeda than non-Muslims. The KKK, IRA and Kach – the lists of terrorist

organisations / ‘freedom fighters’ are long and yet other religions are not condemned

because of the actions of a tiny number of its purported adherents.

The majority of terrorists cannot be attributed to any single religion, but a significant

number of cataclysmic terrorist acts may be attributed to small pockets of terrorists

distorting their own religion as a convenient way to cover and legitimise their criminal

actions in the popular mind of society.20

Even though international terrorism has received a renewed momentum, terrorist

crimes have been a concern to the international community since the 1920s when the

League of Nations – UN predecessor, addressed the problem. If terrorism in the past

was considered a serious irritation, today it has assumed more serious proportions.

Since the September 11 attacks, nations of the world are struggling to arrive at a

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common definition, which will help combat terrorism from a legislative angle and

bond the anti-terrorist coalition. Though terrorism is punishable under existing

national criminal law and anti-terrorist legislation – UN Security Council in resolution

1373 of 28 September 2001 was a mandatory first step in an international effort to

suppress terrorism in its unanimous definition.21

Defining terrorism remains complex, as one government may condemn a terrorist and

another government may defend by using the term ‘freedom-fighter.’ For instance,

before signing a new UN international treaty against terrorism, Mr Hasmy Agam, the

Malaysian representative said acts of ‘pure’ terrorism, involving attacks against

innocent civilian populations should be differentiated from legitimate struggles of

people fighting for self-determination.22

Defining international terrorism is at the forefront of the UN anti-terrorist efforts as

some governments, short of direct participation, support terrorism by transfer of

funding, sponsoring spiritual, ideological, diplomatic and political support. This is a

motivating factor in the recruitment, running and control of terrorists and their

operations. 23 May 2001, in accordance with article 22 (1) saw the UN International

Convention for the serious suppression of terrorism through the prosecution and

punishment of its executors. However, improved international security and a

reduction of tension between nations can not come to full fruition without first

defining terrorism. Until such a time that any definition will ever be generally agreed

upon, peace between states will remain volatile due to terrorist-inspired tension, for

example India and Pakistan.23

Terrorists often have more than one motive. It can be a mixture of political, religious,

egotistical and financial components blended together. Democratic societies have

become a favoured target to terrorists as chances of detection are less, penalties are

lighter in democracies than in dictatorships, and media coverage in democracies is

more rapid and widespread. The hypocrisy of terrorists is that they expect democratic

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principles to be fully applied when captured, they seek recognition from governments

they refuse to recognise and though they expect their human rights to be upheld they

refuse to acknowledge violation of their victim’s human rights.24

Indonesia and Terrorism: A quick summary

This paper will now move to briefly examine Indonesia, widely perceived as a hub of

terrorist activity disposed to violence in South-East Asia.

It is believed amongst those specialising in terrorism that economic hardship will be

the greatest underlying cause of terrorism in the 21st century. The distribution of the

world’s wealth, resources and opportunities for growth are not only unevenly

distributed but in the hands of the minority. Security in South-East Asia is

increasingly seen in terms of economic performance and political and social stability.

If the economic situation continues to worsen and developing nations are unable to

make repayments on advance, the result will be widespread hopelessness and

resentment. Mixed with government corruption, as in the case of Indonesia for many

decades, revolt, rebellion and regionalised terrorism will be inevitable.25

Consisting of 13,677 islands, Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world with a

population of over 240 million people of whom 87% follow Islam. Clearly, Indonesia

is the largest Muslim country in the world and a deeply troubled one at that. Unlike

Australia, relatively isolated, stable and prosperous, Indonesia is a developing country

without established democratic traditions. With a population expected to grow to 340

million by end of this century can only exacerbate pre-existing social problems such

as ethnic tension and high unemployment. This potential breakdown of law and order

and economic failure in Indonesia would have incalculable consequences for

Australia, as the Indonesian government could take on adventurous foreign policy to

divert attention from internal conflicts. Spillover of instability could also cause an

influx of large numbers of refugees from the archipelago into neighbouring

countries.26

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Issues around the wording of the 1945 Constitution and role of Islam for many

Muslims remained unresolved, and the 1950’s saw rebellions in an attempt to make

Indonesia an Islamic state. For over 30 years, Indonesia has continued to experience

rapid political, technological, economical and socio-cultural change.27

One of the most interesting aspects of the Islamic radical movement in Indonesia is

that it is mainly made up of young people under the age of 30. Since 1998, political

Islam became liberated from the New Order with Islamic issues becoming central to

political debate in Jakarta.28

The world for the young has become both an unfriendly and threatening place.

Uncertainty of the future, a breakdown of traditional values, rapid technologisation,

mobile lifestyles, unemployment and AIDS just to name a few. Looking for solace

and inner sanctuary, a generation of young people in Indonesia has turned to Islam for

some understanding of the changing world they are living in. They want tools to

work with in matters of relationships, raising children, how to be good Indonesians,

relate to modern banking systems and to deal with new concepts of technology for

example, test tube babies, organ transplants and guidance in dealing with their

sexuality.29

Indonesian Muslims’ greatest objection was the then President Suharto’s unfriendly

attitude towards Islam and Muslims. The frequent arrest of Muslim leaders and the

prohibition of certain speeches and speakers continued to torment Muslims. The

Muslims, who are in the majority, perceived Suharto and his regime as favouring the

minority consisting primarily of affluent Chinese and Christians.30

With young Indonesians flocking to mosques, it was inevitable for political topics not

to become sermons of the day. Controversial topics such as land issues, wealth

inequalities and government corruption were often heatedly discussed and argued.

Free from government harassment, mosques became centres of religious, cultural and

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intellectual ideology-germinating centres, for political opposition and radical ideas

against Suharto’s regime. By the 1990’s, mosques could no longer accommodate the

high numbers of young people and students joining in the activities and intellectual

stimulation. Islam (meaning ‘submission’ implicitly to God), essentially a religion of

emancipation, became the solution to complex problems to those dispossessed, with a

political voice advocating change.31

Within the Indonesian community exist progressive minded, university educated and

intellectually inclined Muslims who support democracy and regressive Muslims

where government secular policies have challenged and violated their belief systems.

Front Pembela Islam is an organisation dominated by Jakarta-based youths

demanding the closure of places of gambling and prostitution. The youths, with links

to elements of the Indonesian army achieved notoriety by raiding bars, brothels and

nightclubs. Moral decline and spread of materialism which they consider corrupt and

under the aegis of the US, in global cultural and geopolitical supremacy. None of this

behaviour would have been tolerated prior to 1998, during the Soeharto era. Through

the al-jihad al-saghir (Arabic for Muslim holy war against unbelievers) regarded as

the lesser jihad, which advocates legitimate forms of strife with other human beings;

fundamentalists call for a revolutionary transformation of society and an

unconditional rejection of Western modernisation.32

Australia’s earlier contact with terrorist angst was on a relatively small scale. The

Hilton Bombing in Sydney (1978), the assassination of the Turkish Consulate General

(1980) and the Israeli consulate general’s office (1982). This significantly changed

on October 12, 2002 when Australia was traumatised as 202 people, 88 of them young

Australian holidaymakers were killed in Bali’s Sari nightclub. This brought the

greatest slaughter of Australians since World War II, and in the war on terrorism, Bali

became Australia’s Pearl Harbour. The terrorist blasts were blamed on Islamic

Fundamentalist group Jemaah Islamiah (JI), al-Qaeda’s regional wing.33

JI was founded in mid-1990’s, and was in part a manifestation of the reaction to

globalisation. JI’s popular fear of social change and growing westernisation saw the

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beginning operations of small secretive cell structures, using bombings, hijackings

and bank robberies. For some time Australian Intelligence organisations were

directing government attention to radical terrorist groups in the region. Though no

specific warning was received, the security – threat level for Australians in Indonesia

was rated high. In the words of Imam Samudra, mastermind of Bali horror “there will

be more killings after Bali!” These events have thrown the spotlight on Australia’s

counter-terrorist debate and associated social costs, later discussed in this paper.34

Terrorist experts say the epicentre of Islamic terrorism in the world has shifted from

the Middle East to South-East Asia. Known as the godfather of South-East Asian

terror, Abu Baker Bashir, leader of JI and suspected mastermind of the Bali bombings

wants to turn South-East Asia into an Islamic superstate. JI have told of plans to blow

up embassies, bombings of churches and shopping centres across the South-East Asia

region using ammonium nitrate and chemical fertiliser. Bashir says any action against

him will be considered an attack against all Muslims and commends bin Laden as a

great leader.35

Central Intelligence Agent (CIA) Vincent Cannistraro said Australia remains at risk of

further terrorist attack even though the financier of Bali bombings, a top al-Qaeda

leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was captured. Dr Rohan Gunaratna, UN Crime

Branch (ODC) consultant with the UN’s Terrorism Prevention Branch, said despite

Mohammed’s arrest while other JI operational leaders remained at large, such as JI’s

operational leader, Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, and the JI secretary, Zulkifli

Marzuki, there was grave risk of further devastation to South-East Asia and Australia.

Dr Gunaratna author of Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, said JI still has a

presence in Australia and Australia is part of JI’s area of operations. On 25 October

2002, JI was placed on the UN register of terrorist organisations.36

Aldo Borgu, military analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, comments

that the primary threat Australia faces is related to the growth of Islamic extremist

groups in our region, especially Indonesia. Rather than Australia being more

concerned with the global fight, Borgu believes a unique approach using Australia’s

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best strategic brains, linguists, military and intelligence resources and leaders, are

required to deal with the threat that Indonesia’s turbulent socio-political climate

poses. This includes working closely with Indonesia’s elite army unit, Kopassus –

despite its sullied reputation.37

Dr Alan Dupont, Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Australian

National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, that argues that Kopassus

is Indonesia’s pre-eminent counter-terrorist organisation, a highly trained and

disciplined unit in the Indonesian armed forces. Dupont argues that marginalising

Kopassus is not only unachievable in practice, but would be ultimately self-defeating

in Australian counter-terrorist plans.38

Borgu explains that, with or without al-Qaeda Australia faces high risk of a major

terrorist attack at home and against Australians abroad, than at any other time in the

nation’s history. Potential for further terrorist attacks in South-East Asia exists on

several fronts. The problem is not only the rise of radical Islam with growing

populations, but also thriving black markets for weapons and explosives. The region

has poorly controlled borders making possible illegal arms procurement and military

training in remote areas. Illegal arms come from China down through Laos and

Burma and low-paid military police that can be bought off to facilitate the trade.39

Professor Ross Babbage, the Australian National University’s graduate defence

studies convenor, proposed a summit of regional defence ministers for cooperation

should any one country in the region suffer from a devastating attack. Babbage’s

proposal is on intelligence sharing on terrorism and is now before the Association of

South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the period ahead one or more countries in the

region may suffer a major terrorist attack so catastrophic as to be beyond the

immediate capacities of the local authorities to manage alone. This collaboration

could greatly assist Australia. Historically, ASEAN governments have maintained a

principle of ‘non-interference’ in each other’s affairs, but the Bali blasts have

demonstrated the point terrorists can strike in any number of South-East Asian tourist

locations.40

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Professor Paul Dibb from the Australian National University said in Australia’s 10

year Defence Capability Plan, AUD$1 billion a year will be required to finance the

Australian Defence Force. To devise a set of credible and defence policies to combat

Australia’s growing sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the region following the

Bali attacks would require ramping up Australia’s defence policy and means

accepting that this is not a time for Australia to retreat into isolationism.41

Babbage’s summary of the attack by Aum Shinri-kyu cult in 1995, when 12 people

were killed and over 5,700 were injured in a Sarin nerve gas attack on a crowded

subway in the centre of Tokyo; suggests thousands would have died if the attackers

had used a more efficient dispersal method for the gas. At the time, authorities in

Tokyo experienced everything from ambulance communications breakdown,

contaminated patients taken to wrong hospitals and contaminating others. The types

of terrorist strikes that may be launched in the Asia-Pacific could be so cataclysmic as

to be beyond the immediate capacities of local authorities, and organised international

resources would become mandatory.42

Death and chaos would prevail if a chemical or biological attack were to occur on

Australian cities. Although it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate

potential CBR attack, the Australian government needs to address current resource

deficiencies and seriously invest in training and equipping health workers and

facilitators. Understandably, the government may not want to outlay large spending

for something that may not happen, juxtaposed with the Australian health system,

already struggling for funds to provide basic services and currently ill prepared for

anything more than a small number of patients.43

It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss various types of CBR and its

acquisition. Suffice to say the World Directory of Collections of Cultures currently

lists 453 repositories in 67 nations that supply biological agents. The US

Congressional Office of Technology explained how a light crop-dusting aircraft

carrying 100 kilograms of anthrax spores could deliver a fatal dose to approximately

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three million people. The complexity and range of such scenarios would raise a

significant number of unique and important issues for the Australian government.44

The 2002 Australian National Federal Budget included AUD$17.8 million over four

years for training Emergency Management Australia’s personnel. This includes the

procurement of detection devices for a CBR incident. A further AUD$11.4 million

was allocated to health agencies to acquire and stockpile appropriate medications and

vaccines.45

Australian and South-East Asian governments agree that fighting terrorism is a

collective responsibility and joint regional conferences are organised to look at how to

tackle the funding of terrorist cells from the Philippines to Indonesia and beyond. The

situation remains problematic. For instance, making matters worst are security

breaches in the Australian military where explosives, hand grenades and thousands of

rounds of ammunition suitable for light machine guns have been stolen from the

Australian Defence Force, sparking fears they could be used by terrorists.46

The above mentioned situation adds to the proliferation of weaponry in circulation;

munitions stocks left over from the old Cold War conflicts are further compounded by

the ‘leaky arsenals’ of the former states of the Soviet Union. Availability of weapons

has allowed terrorists to operate on a far more sophisticated and destructive level.

Alarmingly, several hundred US-made Stinger missiles are believed to have found

their way to militant groups in South Asia. The Stinger (FM92-a) is a highly accurate

surface to air projectile used with devastating effect against both commercial and

military air traffic. Worse, the Soviet Union developed ‘suitcase’ nuclear bombs that

could be carried by a single person. Russian authorities took steps to protect these

devices from theft but unfortunately not all ‘suitcase’ bombs can be accounted for.

The detonation of these devices would wipe out hundreds of thousands of people and

if detonated in New York City, could leave the metropolitan area uninhabitable for

years.47

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Indonesia’s economic and political crises together with a new but weak democracy

and penetrable security systems, make fertile grounds for openly propagating al-

Qaeda’s agenda of holy Jihad with an enormous range of explosives available to

terrorists, from assault rifles, machine and submachine guns, rocket-propelled

grenades, shoulder-launched surface to air missiles, landmines and other demolition

explosive materials.48

In response to the problems highlighted already, as part of intelligence gathering the

Australian Federal Police (AFP) have a new Department called the Transnational

Crime Coordination Centre (TCCC) to deal with the new and uncertain security

environment. The Centre provides a 24-hour focal point of contact in national and

international law for prevention, identification and dismantling of all forms of

transnational crime. Areas of investigation includes terrorism, drug trafficking and

people smuggling.49

Peter Jennings, from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute relates how bin Laden

has specifically identified Australia as a terrorist target. Australia may be a big and

relatively isolated country but it is not immune from terrorists travelling through or

travelling to major cities. Malaysia, another Muslim majority nation with excellent

transport and communication facilities, was used as a logistics base by September 11

hijackers. Abu Sayyaf guerillas that control the Muslim areas of Southern Philippines

have been linked to al-Qaeda. US military is helping Philippines Army fight the

insurgents.50

Australia and the United Nations

In 1990 President George H. W. Bush (senior) stated that not since 1945 has the world

seen the real possibility of using the UN as it was designed: as a centre for

international security vis-a-vis through international and regional organisations.

However, the American attraction to the UN was short-lived. Member states,

especially the United States, failed to endow the institution with the necessary

authority and resources. Efforts to reform the UN and Security Council stalled, and

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with disappointing failures in Somalia and Rwanda, confidence in the UN seriously

plummeted. Nevertheless, the UN is the only global organisation remaining dedicated

to international peace and security.51

Australia emerged as the strongest supporter of the US in worldwide debate over Iraq,

telling the UN Security Council at an open meeting in February 2003 to disarm

Saddam Hussein and declare Iraq in ‘material breach’ of resolution 1441, which set

up the WMD inspections regime. The Australian Foreign Office dismissed the UN as

irrelevant when the Security Council failed to authorise invasion of Iraq and the

Howard government declared Australia could do without the UN. However, as

former Australian Diplomat Richard Woolcott explains, the UN was no longer

‘irrelevant’ when urged to share the financial burden and pressured to become a team

player in post-war Iraq. Australia’s long standing goodwill in the UN has been

obscured by inconsistent government policy.52

Though Australia is the 12th largest contributor to the UN and closely involved in all

areas of the UN activity, for the past 10 years it has a poor record of not supporting

international treaties against terrorism. This recently changed when Australia’s new

permanent representative to the UN, John Dauth asserted to the General Assembly,

Australia’s support for a new Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism.53

There are arguments for and against Australia signing up so unreservedly to the Bush

Administration’s march to war. “Either you are with us or with the terrorists” warned

the American President. Reminiscent of the early Cold War days, neutrality is

portrayed as immoral and not in synchronisation with the global struggle against

terrorism. Comparing it to the war against communism, some observers are calling

the war on terrorism the second cold war. This sentiment is open to serious

conjecture and outside the scope of this paper.54

Australian Prime Minister John Howard and his Liberal Government believe ridding

the world of Saddam Hussein would remove the risk of the Iraqi dictator arming

terrorists with WMD that could threaten Australia. Although considered a remote

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probability, security experts have not ruled out attacks on Australian soil using WMD.

Australians generally lacking confidence in their ability to defend themselves have

forged strong military ties with the US in hope of ensuring America’s military might

to protect Australia against any future regional threat. Australian General John Baker

said the war on terrorism could not be pursued primarily by military means. The war

against WMD in Iraq however, has to be pursued by military means.55

After September 11, many Australian eyes turned to the US for direction and not the

UN. As a response, the Howard government aligned itself with the US (the world’s

most powerful state) and Britain, and the bonds between these countries became much

closer. The result was a disengagement on differing levels from neighbouring nations

in Asia – ties which the Keating government promoted so assiduously. Richard

Woolcott, in his excellent and eloquently written book of diplomatic memoirs The

Hot Seat, clearly states that Australia’s support for questionable US actions and

shared democratic values do not necessarily guarantee the US will support Australia

when Australian interests are threatened. In short, interests, not friendships,

determine US foreign policy. The US will support Australia only if it is in its

interests to do so.56

The down side for Australia to joining America at war is that the immediate region

will continue to view Australia as America’s loyal deputy; Australia also risks

potential trade loss with the Middle East. Even moderate Arab leaders, like Amre

Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League, were bewildered by Australia so

vociferously supporting the invasion of Iraq – a largely Muslim state. The same

radicals who supported and carried out the Bali bombings will perceive Australia as

anti-Islamic. Anglican Primate, Dr Peter Carnley linked the Bali atrocity to

Australia’s high-profile support of President George Bush’s stance in relation to war

on Iraq, saying it was only a matter of time until Australians were sacrificed in some

form of retaliation. In November 2002, the BBC released a translation of a message

believed to be bin Laden saying, Australia was warned not to join the Afghanistan war

and not interfere with East Timor. The translation continues to explain how

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Australia ignored all warnings until it woke up to the sounds of the Bali bombs yet the

government falsely claimed Australians were not targeted.57

In charge of planning defence security for the Sydney Olympics was Brigadier Adrian

D’Hage who asserts it is in the policy area that the greatest change is needed.

Australians need to come to terms with how hated the US administrators and CIA are

in many parts of the world, where they have either directly or indirectly assisted in

alleged acts of terror against ordinary people. Listing these acts is outside the scope

of this paper.58

D’Hage stressed that without UN approval Australia should not have supported

another war in Iraq, and that Australians should press for a Palestinian state. The

imprisonment of Palestinians in their own country by US-backed Israelis who

themselves know what it is to suffer, is one of the keys to this ‘war’ on terror.59

Amin Saikal, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Arab and

Islamic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, follows on to say,

the suffering of the Iraqi people, democratisation of the Arab world, continued

repressive occupation of Palestinian lands, and the disputed territory of Kashmir are

all causes which have enabled someone like bin Laden to strike a chord in the Arab

and Muslim world. The solution to these issues require political mediation and not

military resolution.60

Furthermore, Stuart Rees Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the

University of Sydney said that for 200 years the identity of Australia has been about

men in uniforms sailing away and people building war memorials across the country.

Rees warned that if non-violent measures were not adopted to solve international

problems, the violence of the 20th century would also be repeated in the new

millennium.61

Borgu comments that if the attacks on Madrid’s train network killing 198 people

injuring 1400 were because of its support for the Iraqi war, then clearly Australia is in

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line. The speculative theory that Madrid train blast was timed for maximum effect to

throw out a government supportive of the US and replace it with one that was not,

should at least be considered since there are Australian elections in 2004. The

situation largely depends on where the next attack occurs. Hugh Smith, from the

Australian Defence Force Academy states until all the complex facts are known, the

risk to Australia remains unclear, unless the UK, Italy or Eastern European countries

are next then the warning signs for Australia will become all too clear.62

Remarkably, countries such as Turkey - a secular state but nonetheless a Muslim

majority - have been targets of al-Qaeda despite their opposition to the war on Iraq.

Suicide attacks on two synagogues; the British consulate and the HSBC bank brought

carnage to Istanbul. Over 60 people were killed, amongst them British Consul-

General Roger Short.63

Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty warns of future attack against

Australia as inevitable. New South Wales (NSW) Police Chief Ken Moroney said

Australia has been on medium alert against a terrorist strike since the events of

September 11, 2001. National security experts fear Australia’s interests overseas,

especially in the Middle East are at main risk and should now be rated as High.64

The Attorney-General’s Department is responsible for coordination of national

security arrangements in Australia. Once the Department is satisfied on reasonable

grounds that the Security Council of the UN has identified an organisation relating to

wholly or partly to terrorism and that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged

in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering terrorist action, the Australian Courts

can then determine that body as a ‘terrorist organisation.’ And as such, it is an

offence to direct the activities of the organisation, recruit personnel to the

organisation, receive training to/from organisation, receive/make available funds to

organisation, provide support and be a member of the organisation. Both JI and al-

Qaeda are two of 17 such organisations listed by the Attorney-General’s

Department.65

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Mr Howard reminds Australians they are on the al-Qaeda target list. The Prime

Minister continues to say guarding every person at every railway station is unrealistic

and virtually anywhere people gather without organised security such as bars,

restaurants, places of worship, sporting events could be terrorist targets of choice.66

This research now moves to explore economic consequences of terrorism and expand

on regional targets of choice.

Established world governments are recognising the tremendous costs catastrophic

terror attacks can incur. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate of the

economic costs of the World Trade Centre attack is that it reduced US gross domestic

product by US$ 75 billion in 2002. Insurance losses of up to US$58 billion. The

fragile Indonesian economy relying heavily on tourism had a 2.2% fall in tourist

arrivals in 2002, and a one-percent reduction in national gross domestic product. The

number of Australian tourists now visiting Bali is below normal. If tourist dollars,

which Bali so heavily relies on, do not start flowing in soon people will go hungry,

children will drop out of school and the socio-economics of the island will descend

into acute crisis.67

136,000 jobs were cut in the American airline industry with net losses amounting to

US$ 2.3 billion. The American aircraft manufacturing industry retrenched 15% of its

workforce. The Japanese government reported 10 billion yen in lost revenue through

withdrawn seats, cancelled flights and reduced cargo orders.68

‘Lucky Country’ or Terrorist Target?

The Australian security environment dramatically changed on September 11, 2001

and the Bali bombings in 2002 brought that threat sharply into Australians’ psyche. It

is impossible to predict exactly when and where terrorism will happen, so the

assumption according to Peter Jennings from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute,

must be that terror groups will launch in Australia if and when they can.69

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Dr Keith Suter, terrorist expert from the International Law Association, warns the

next wave of terrorist attacks would be against the shipping industry. Increasing

regional maritime crime allows transnational organised criminals huge financial

return. The range of illegal activity this type of crime covers runs from people

smuggling, narcotics and arms smuggling, illegal fishing, disposal of waste at sea, to

hijacking of ships. Al Qaeda and JI understand how piracy can play in their terror

campaigns. Freight ships may be detonated at ports. Bombs planted on freight ships

as they go into major ports could devastate infrastructure.

Targets for example, as the symbolic and highly prestigious Sydney Opera House and

Harbour Bridge, killing thousands of locals and tourists alike with nearby media able

to beam pictures of the carnage around the world.70

Approximate estimations are that only two percent of the world’s shipping containers

are physically inspected. Not surprising, considering there are 232 million container

movements a year. In 2003, the global shipping industry invested US$ 1.3 billion and

an annual US$ 730 million to improve security systems. One of the most vulnerable

areas of maritime attack close to Australia will be in the Straits of Malacca – one of

the world’s busiest shipping lanes linking the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and

Singapore. As corruption increases and economic infrastructure fails, piracy is likely

to expand in the waters of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, the Riau

Islands and off the southern coast of China. Piracy in the waters of South-East Asia is

set to get out of control. In short, Australia, particularly vulnerable because of its size

and the length of its uninhabited coastline, has a security crisis at its very doorstep.71

From prominent buildings including Parliament House in Canberra to large public

events such as sports finals at the Gabba in Brisbane to Flinders Street Station in

Melbourne all harbour lots of people and so are perfect targets. As Borgu explains,

there is nothing that is more or less at risk. The apocalyptic trend is terrorists like

killing as many people as possible.72

Borgu says Australian troops in Iraq would be the first target on al-Qaeda’s Australian

hit list, with embassies, high commissions and anywhere popular with Australian

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tourists coming a close second, for instance Anzac Day celebrations in Turkey.

Interesting to see that nothing happened at Gallipoli where many Australian travellers

gather every year to honour the dearly departed victims of World War One?

Gunaratna said the alleged existence of a Lashker-e-Toiba cell in Sydney shows an

authentic threat to Australia from Islamic extremists linked to possible major attack

on Lucas Heights nuclear reactor.73

With AUD $70 billion worth of US investment in Australia, it is highly likely

American, Jewish and Australian businesses could be targeted. Australian Security

Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) has increased surveillance of and protection for

Israeli and Jewish assets in Australia, as there is always a tendency for some of their

assets to be targeted. In the last three decades 80% of terrorist attacks in the US have

been directed at business. As the New York and Bali bombings have proven, on-

going business costs flowing from these attacks are profoundly damaging to domestic

and international markets.74

In 2001-02, over 32,000 Australian companies exported goods and services, with

another 55,000 companies importing materials. Australian business has been at the

forefront of globalisation and well integrated into the world economy. This is

reflected in just under one million Australians living and working in almost 150

countries. The positive side to this growth is that Australia for the last few decades

has enjoyed economic abundance, but it also means Australian business is either

directly or indirectly exposed to consequences of possible future terrorist activity.

Measures Australian businesses can take to minimise human and economic cost will

be discussed later in this paper.75

Australia also faces unanticipated challenges that result from new applications of IT.

Some risks include dis-information, hate/revenge personal or work-related crime,

commercial or military espionage, state and non-state based terrorism and information

warfare.76

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A recent planned terrorist attack in Australia used a New South Wales (NSW)

Government website to get maps, data and satellite images of potential targets such as

Sydney Centrepoint tower, Parramatta Central Business District (CBD) and transport

systems. Frenchman, Willie Brigitte admitted to French interrogators he and several

others were preparing a terrorist act of great size in Australia. Brigitte, along with

other terrorist suspect, Izhar ul-Haque prayed at the Haldon Street prayer hall at

Sydney’s suburban Lakemba, which is now under surveillance.77

During office hours from his place of employment Faheem Lodhi frequently accessed

the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources website called

iplan. Using a false name, Lodhi asked about buying urea nitrate, which was to be

used for bomb making to blast the electricity grid. Australia, to all intents and

purposes would be paralysed.78

NSW Premier Bob Carr confirmed security had already been increased at the

electricity grid and all critical infrastructures. This case has reignited dialogue

concerning terrorism and application of new laws to investigations.79

Security-conscious Singapore was host to the US Navy stationed at the island-state.

US soldiers could go on shore without fearing for their safety. About 17,000

Americans live and work in Singapore. It is now well established Islamic extremist

group JI had 15 members living on the island with links to al-Qaeda and extremist

groups in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.80

Caught with 3.9 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, commonly used in large vehicle bombs,

the operative JI members were looking to acquire another 16.7 tonnes. A frightening

amount, considering Timothy McVeigh used only 1.9 tonnes at Oklahoma City. Their

targets ranged from US Navy vessels, US Navy personnel using the MRT train

system, as well as US companies, US aircraft and facilities based at Paya Lebar

Airbase, US diplomatic missions, Israel, the UK and Australia diplomatic missions,

commercial buildings housing US firms and potential US business targets.81

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Australia’s foremost terrorist expert, Clive Williams is director of terrorism studies at

the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in

Canberra. He asks what does all this mean for Australia? Certainly, there is the risk

of danger to Australian diplomatic missions overseas including those previously

thought of as low-risk. Williams continues with further pertinent questions: from

Australia’s Islamic community who has been to Pakistan since 1991 for religious

training? How long did they go for and what did they do there? Do links exist

between individuals in Australia to extremists’ elements overseas and can this be

verified? 82

What is most disconcerting is the excellent security taught and practised by al-Qaeda

cells. The 15 devout JI members avoided mainstream Muslim community activities.

Good security practices prevented their detection in Singapore, and the complex

September 11 hijack operation was carried through to completion without any

detection by US federal security and well-resourced intelligence agencies.83

21-year-old medical student, Izhar ul-Haque from University of NSW will be the first

person in Australia to be charged with the training offence under new counter-

terrorism laws. Ul-Haque is in solitary confinement in jail after interrupting his

medical studies by travelling to Pakistan and enrolling in a training camp run by

terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba. Ul-Haque’s activities were confirmed in his private

journals, revealed in court documents, recording the thoughts and ideals of a young

man in military boot camp training in long and short firearms and detonation of

explosives.84

2003 saw the biggest blackout in US history with up to 52 million people from Detroit

to New York and into Canada without electricity. President George W. Bush declared

a state of emergency. Any infringement to the integrity of Australia’s power grid

could see the nation in chaos with trains, planes, hospitals, communications, computer

systems, businesses, schools all affected. A major blackout would leave people stuck

in elevators, devastate millions of dollars worth of frozen or cooled produce, disable

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stock exchange trading, cities would be grid-locked as traffic lights failed and most

shops would be forced to cease operations.85

Former ASIO agent and chief of intelligence for the Sydney Olympics, Niel Fergus

said Australian security lagged behind places like London, where they have had to

endure over 30 years a series of significant terrorist attacks and graduated their

security architecture in response to those attacks. Though balance is required,

without becoming vigilantes, Australians need to become vigilant of suspicious

activities, unattended bags and get used to front liners responding to potential CBR

emergency training in space-age chem-bio suits on city streets. While the Federal

Government has been instrumental in setting up a new Incident Response Regiment to

handle CBR threats, this unit is based in Sydney. Should Melbourne or any other

major Australian city face a serious problem, it may be too late by the time these units

are transported.86

Babbage is concerned that Australia is prepared for the old style of terrorism, where

casualties were generally low and the perpetrators were often prepared to negotiate

over hostages. Babbage worries that Australian agencies still have not sufficiently

prepared for today’s new wave of terror, intent on mass murder in the heart of densely

populated areas.87

The Australian economic market in its present form is not capable of operating

without computerised information systems and communications link. Computers,

telecommunications, financial networks, defence communications all need electricity

to operate. A major failure to Australia’s electricity supply could result in regional

outrage.88

Optus’ satellites carry vital information relating to telephone systems, remote oil and

gas pipeline monitoring, ground to air traffic control communications, secure defence

signals, internet, radio and television services. International satellite control facilities

may very well be possible targets in a global campaign of information war.89

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The Australian banking system is linked to international systems in the UK, the US

and the Reserve Bank. All of which use a common transmission service facilitating

shared communication. Trillions of dollars in funds and securities are transferred

daily by electronic mechanisms and the entire system’s integrity will be in question if

it were accessed by a disgruntled employee, illegally or by accident. Yes, backup

facilities are available but nonetheless, how secure can such a system be?90

In the event of a major conflict any disruption to government payments to its armed

forces and their families would affect the morale of the forces and Australian society

as a whole. With government payments going through one computer, the financial

security of millions of Australians, national and economic stability is threatened. To

date, the majority of documented attacks on government and military sites were by

criminals with no political motives.91

Actions to counter money laundering and combat terrorism financing requires all

economies to work together and those that do not take counter measures could face

lack of investor confidence and boycotts by other banks. Financial institutions

directly or indirectly involved in terrorist financing risk reputation damage and

criminal charges.92

Cyber-terrorist attack would cause varying degrees of disruption to systems, and

without adequate recovery plans even small-scale disruption could severely affect

government, industry and society. Even though Australia faces no current threats, if

regional instability continues to further deteriorate, who knows how things might look

in the future? Criminals and organised crime syndicates already utilise weaknesses in

the National Information Infrastructure (NII), causing unnecessary growing costs to

Australian society. In times of major conflict and war terrorists and aggressive states

could seek to cripple the NII while permitting anonymity to the attacker.93

Nevertheless, a range of strategies can be adopted, some simple solutions others

requiring more coordination and they do not have to be prohibitively expensive.

Adopting protection back-ups for specific information units as well as the system that

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comprises NII will allow Australia to successfully engage in the economy and society

in current and future times.94

Counter Terrorist Strategies: Linking Australian Business and Government

This work will now discuss counter-terrorism and endeavour to illustrate strategic

steps Australian businesses can take to minimise human and economic cost in the

event of possible terrorist threat.

An important psychological aspect of September 11, was that it provided a potentially

terrible stimulus to the imagination and aspirations of ‘wannabe’ terrorists in Australia

and elsewhere. Events such as the Bali bombings will raise the sights of special

interest extremists and lone terrorists that practise leaderless warfare; to have a more

new and dangerous model to follow.95

Businesses have a significant economic interest in reducing the threat and/or impact

of terrorism. Long term benefits to combating terrorism includes maintaining trade

and investment levels and economic growth rates. With economies cooperating to

deal with this problem, costs will be minimised and benefits maximised. Thus,

strengthening regional and global security and future prosperity for one and all.96

There is much that business can do to counter terrorism and in the process help

government defeat terror groups. An important starting point is closer cooperation

between government and business, by each borrowing the other’s styles of operating:

governments needing to learn to be more flexible and business to develop stronger

skills in strategic analysis and war gaming.97

Intelligence information is usually tightly held within government agencies. Business

and community are kept away from operational concerns. Traditionally, business has

not seen national security as a core interest. Potential risk to business operations are

usually limited to a narrow set of concerns about employee safety, infrastructure

security and financial systems to name a few.98

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Contemporary terrorism challenges these standard approaches by not recognising

national or organisational boundaries. Therefore in today’s political climate business

needs to work out how it can assure safety to its people and plant security, while

continuing operations in a more difficult environment. Companies need to start

innovative thinking about security the way governments do. The problem for

government to solve is how to defeat non-state threat that constantly changes form

while seeking vulnerable targets. Similar to business, government needs to develop

greater organisational flexibility and faster reaction times.99

There are three good reasons why companies are advised to protect their operations

against terrorism. First, it underestimates the ripple effects within industry and

economic sectors. Second, there are practical things companies can do to protect

operations from terrorism. Third, companies that do nothing will lag behind those

with a competitive advantage who have not banked on remaining isolated with their

‘head in the sand,’ metaphorically speaking.100

Mr Howard believes the best defence against terrorism is high quality information.

This will involve business and government coming up with progressive

methodologies to faster and more comprehensive information sharing to manage

crises when they develop.101

Below are eight steps companies can use to harden their operations and maintain or

quickly resume business operations after an attack:

1. Broaden risk assessments – Australian companies with overseas presence develop

knowledge of local socio-political concerns and identify critical points where

these issues touch company concerns. Companies invest more effort to analyse

changing trends in regional security and terrorism and consciously bring these

assessments into a firm’s strategic planning. This planning needs to be drill tested

from time to time against worst case scenarios to gauge areas requiring further

improvement. Business to access up-to-date information supplied by Canberra on

terrorism.102

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2. Involve the board and top management – because the terrorist threat is largely new

to Australia top executive management need to take the lead in hardening their

operations in an age of increasing risk. Senior level managers need to be

confident they understand how their business activities could be damaged by

terrorist threat. Chief Executive Officers (CEO) need to review and put a high

priority on developing counter terrorist plan linking it to traditional risk

management.103

3. Review areas of organisational vulnerability – a company thousands of kilometres

away from ground zero may find its operations disrupted due to impact on

suppliers, transport routes, vital IT and financial systems. In a globalised business

environment companies must develop understanding of theirs – and their

supplier’s vulnerability to ripple effects of terrorist attack. Maintaining larger

stocks will cost more but it may be mandatory for business continuity after shock.

The military approach of using ‘red teams’ may prove helpful. In business

operations the red team finds faults which managers overlook because the latter

normally focus on making the system work rather than being encouraged to look

for problems.104

4. War game responses to terror attacks – besides the Defence Forces other

government bodies are using gaming techniques to help identify new threats and

effective responses. The best way to test this is to put a senior manager through

decision-making simulations and see how they will respond. Terrorist scenarios

are used to see how well staff would operate in reality. Strategic decision making

exercises should be treated as vital part of building resilience against terrorism.

Better to learn crisis management skills in simulation than in real life.105

5. Share knowledge with other businesses – major Western governments are

struggling to gather intelligence information to successfully defeat terrorism.

Australian businesses will face the same difficulty to identify all that which they

need to know to protect their operations. This is why information sharing is

recommended between businesses as one way of overcoming this dilemma.

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Businesses should discuss what counter terrorist strategies have worked and failed,

share their assessments about potential threats to their companies and refine future

plans. The natural business plan is to protect commercial information but the

common riding interest to defeat terrorism is vital if corporations want to maintain

a stable environment to carry on with profitable operations.106

6. Involve the major business peak bodies – the business council of Australia, the

Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Committee for the Economic

Development of Australia, the Australian Industry Group and the Australian

Business Foundation all have a significant role to play in developing basic

guidance for business on planning against terrorism. They could facilitate the

pooling and sharing of business knowledge and act as a bridge between business

and government. Peak bodies have excellent training and expertise in planning,

structure and leadership. These finely tuned skills need to be focussed on the

impact of terrorism within the private sector.107

7. Build links with government and non-business groups – businesses will need to

build closer links with non-business groups and government to develop better

understanding of terrorist threat. Meaning business must take responsibility in

keeping informed about information only governments have. For instance travel

advice recommended by the Department of Foreign Affairs needs to be taken

seriously and so should advice from intelligence agencies on threat levels. A

military buzzword, ‘asymmetric’ threat – meaning defeating conventional

approaches by attacking from the inside. Businesses need to develop less

conventional ways of approaching and dealing with terrorist threat. Approaches

to strategic planning and perspectives can be broadened by networking with a

range of people and institutions with the best alternate thinking available.108

8. Communicate specialised knowledge to authorities – companies communicating

information to government relevant to defeating terrorism. Defeating terrorism is

painstakingly slow and requires vigilance in cross-referencing of small pieces of

data to build a bigger picture. The private sector can help contribute to the mosaic

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of information, ultimately leading to identifying terrorists and preventing their

actions. The joint counter terrorism teams of State and Federal Police being set up

around Australia will bring together the significant expertise, community linkages and

local contacts of State and international expertise of the AFP linked to TCCC to tackle

anything from hi-tech crime to money laundering.109

Brigadier Steve Ayling, security adviser for the Commonwealth Heads of

Government Meeting on Queensland’s Sunshine Coast said that despite 911 and a

spate of anthrax hoaxes which followed, corporate complacency was setting in before

the Bali blasts. Ayling emphasises, companies should have an integrated approach to

security from the Board down, review physical perimeter protection measures,

checking personnel, closely scrutinising who has access to and from their premises,

establishing capacity to seal off an area and arrange mass evacuations.110

From environmental planners, health, immigration, agriculture, energy, customs and

police agencies are all legitimate bureaucratic stakeholders in the fight against

transnational security threats. These and business bodies must be included in national

security decision-making process and have sufficient policy clout to make a

significant contribution. The Australian government cannot afford being structured

along the same functional lines of the last 50 years. Dealing with counter-terrorist

strategy requires a comprehensive and inclusive approach to security planning.111

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UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATE: AUSTRALIA –

‘LUCKY COUNTRY’ OR TERRORIST TARGET?

INTEGRATIVE CONCLUSION

Australia’s nearest main neighbour is Indonesia with an overwhelming Muslim

population. It goes without saying that Islam is not the cause of contemporary

terrorism facing the world today. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia was

discussed to provide a general understanding of instability in the archipelago.

The governments of Indonesia and the Philippines are not strong enough to prevent

minority groups of Islamic militants from cultivating links with international terrorist

networks. Addressing terrorism as a complex, multi-faceted, lethal phenomenon to

Australia where there is no simple military response means dialoguing and working

effectively with Indonesian authorities and ASEAN.

Major changes are not called for in the way Australians live when responding to

terrorism. This research studied macro and micro levels of counter terrorist strategy

government and Australian business can take to formulate responses to the threat at

domestic, regional and global levels.

Whether Australia is not a soft target for terrorists or can be tumultuously brought to

its knees remains to be seen. While no counter terrorist arrangement comes with a

guarantee it is hoped that the previously discussed plans and procedures will ensure

Australia remains relatively safe in the present and future. Unfortunately, any

terrorist attack within Australia would be judged a success story by al Qaeda and JI.

Australians strongly resent this risk or insecurity from terrorist attack. In the words of

contemporary British author on terrorism, Paul Wilkinson, “fighting terrorism is like

being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that

people remember is the one that gets past you.”

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This research comes to an unpleasant conclusion that we are living in uncertain and

dangerous times and risk to the ‘lucky country’ from terrorist attack has substantially

increased. This risk is likely to remain high in the foreseeable future, perhaps a

decade or more. Although, the risk an individual Australian faces from accidents or

misfortune in everyday life is probably higher, the question of terrorist attack on

Australian home soil is not necessarily a question of ‘if’ but ‘when.’

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UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATE: AUSTRALIA –

‘LUCKY COUNTRY’ OR TERRORIST TARGET?

END NOTES

1. Medhurst Ph.D, P. Global Terrorism, 2002 p 5

Gray, J. et al. Lonely Planet-France, fourth edition, 2001 p 23

2. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit pp 5-8, 102 Silke, A. (ed) Terrorists, Victims and Society:

Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences

2003, p xx

3. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit pp 9-10, 303 4. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 187

Dibb AM, P. Professor. Does Asia Matter to Australia’s Defence Policy? NIAP Lecture Series, The National Institute for Asia and the Pacific 2002, p 12

5. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 13, 299 6. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 300 7. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 302

Chalk, P. The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 53, no. 2, 1999, p 156

8. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 132 Chalk, P. ibid p 156

9. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 343 Dupont, A. East Asia Imperilled, (1) 2001, pp 206-207 Baylis, J. (ed) et al. The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations, 1999 p 386

10. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 18, 22, 302 Medhurst Ph.D, P. ibid p 132 www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=40&Itemid=2064 Chomsky, N. Terror and Just Response, July 2, 2002, p 9 Sheridan, G. Cities of the Hot Zone: A Southeast Asian Adventure 2003, p 67

11. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 21 12. Desker, B. Islam and Society in South-East Asia after 11 September

Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 56, no. 3, 2002, p 383

Page 40 of 56

13. www.help-for-you.com/news/Jan2002/Jan24/PRT24-228Article.html 14. www.lightforthelastdays.co.uk/does/israel_mideast/the_pope.html 15. www.blessedquietness.com/journal/housechu/popeshnr.htm

www.jordanembassyus.org/05072001004.htm 16. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 23

www.encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Wahhabi

17. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 23 18. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 23 19. Medhurst Ph.D.P. op.cit p 21 20. Medhurst Ph.D.P. op.cit p 24 21. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 25

Costa, A.M. Multilateral Treaty Framework: An Invitation to Universal

Participation – Focus 2003: Treaties Against Transnational Organized Crime

and Terrorism, 2003, p x

22. Medhurst, Ph.D, P. op.cit p 86 23. Medhurst, Ph.D, P. op.cit p 85, 204, 209

Costa, A.M. op.cit p 43 Silke, A. (ed) op.cit p xv

24. Medhurst, Ph.D, P. op.cit p 78, 100 25. Medhurst Ph.D, P. op.cit p 142

Ball, D. (ed) Maintaining the Strategic Edge:

The Defence of Australia in 2015, 1999, pp 96-97

26. The World Book Encyclopedia, 1997, p 196 Kremmer, C. Following Bushs’ agenda now leaves Australia vulnerable

to further attacks, The Sydney Morning Herald, Friday, October 18, 2002, p 15 Dupont, A. (2) Environmental and Security in Pacific Asia, Adelphi Paper 319 1998, p 23 McGillivray, M. (ed) et al. Australia and Asia, 1998, p 175 Woolcott, R. (1) The Hot Seat:

Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings

2003, p 123 Alagappa, M. Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, 1998, p 511

Page 41 of 56

27. Forrester, G. (ed) et al. The Fall of Soeharto, 1998, p 57

Hill, H. (ed) Introduction, Indonesia’s New Order, The Dynamics of

Socio-Economic Transformation, 1994, p xxv

28. Santosa, J.C. Abstract, Modernisation, Utopia and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, 1996, p 159 Huxley, T. Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security Adelphi Paper 349, 2002, p 64

29. Santosa, J.C. op.cit p 174 30. Santosa, J.C. op.cit p 361 31. Santosa, J.C. op.cit p 381 32. MacIntyre, A. Social Change, Islamic Debates, Indonesia, 1993, p 40

Medhurst, Ph.D, P. ibid p 343 Williams, C. (1) (ed) et al. Countering Terror: New Directions Post ‘911’ 2003, p 34 Desker, B. op.cit p 388 Chalk, P. op.cit p 155, 160

33. Borgu, A. Fear Back on Map, The Daily Telegraph, Saturday March 13, 2004, p 25 Stephens, T. The Mourning After, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Special Edition, October 19-20, 2002, p 1 Kremmer, C. ibid p 15 Caldicott, D. et al Are we ready for this? The Diplomat, vol. 2. No. 1 April-May, 2003, p 11 Whitehead, R. (ed) Networks of evil, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Special Edition, October 19-20, 2002, p 9

34. Wesley, M. et al Bali: The Australian Story, The Diplomat. vol. 2. No. 3

August-September, 2003, p 30 Williams, C. (1) (ed) et al. op.cit p 17 Anggraeni, D. Who Did this to Our Bali? 2002, p xiv Gyngell, A. et al Making Australian Foreign Policy, 2003, p 168

35. Kremmer, C. (1) Recruiting holy army of hate, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Special Edition, October 19-20, 2002, p 9

36. Williams, C. (1) (ed) et al. ibid p 34 Baker, M. Squeezing the mastermind for secrets of terrorism:

Australia at risk while two leaders at large, The Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday, March 4, 2003, p 10

Page 42 of 56

37. Borgu, A. (1) A war on the innocent, The Daily Telegraph,

Saturday, March 13, 2004, p 24 Kremmer, C. (1) ibid p 9 Dupont, A. (3) Supping with the devil, The Diplomat, vol. 2. No. 2 June-July, 2002, pp 34-35

38. Dupont, A. (3) ibid pp 34-35 39. Borgu, A. (1) ibid p 24

Williams, L. Principle may be early casualty in this campaign, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Special Edition October 19-20, 2002 p 9 Stephens, T. ibid p1

40. Wilkinson, M. et al (1) Why didn’t they tell us what they knew? The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Special Edition, October 19-20, 2002, p 5 Williams, L. ibid p 9

41. Dibb AM, P. Professor, op.cit p 15 42. Snow, D. Deadly complacency, The Sydney Morning Herald,

Weekend Special Edition, October 19-21, 2002, p5

43. Caldicott, D. et al. op.cit pp 10-12 Babbage, R. Rethinking Australia’s Defence, 1980, p 70

44. Caldicott, D. ibid p 12 45. Caldicott, D. ibid p 12 46. Williams, L. ibid p 9

Stephens, T. ibid p 1 Wilkinson, M. (1) ibid p 5 Maiden, S. Terrorist Fears Over Stolen Weapons, The Australian, April 10, 2004, p 3

47. Chalk, P. op.cit p 161 Visco, I. (ed) How to prepare for the risk of mega-terrorism, OECD Economic Outlook 71, June 1, 2002, p 120

48. Chalk, P. ibid p 161 49. www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/ww…/Protecting+National+Security?OpenDocumen

Protecting Australia, Thursday 15, April, 2004, p 2 www.afp.gov.au/page.asp?ref=/International/Lawenforce…/CounterTerrorism.xm Australian Federal Police Counter Terrorism Measures, April 23, 2004, p 1 Whitehead, R. (ed) ibid p 9

Page 43 of 56

50. Jennings, P. Terrorism and Australian Business, Strategic Insights, ASPI February, 2004, p 1 Wilkinson, M. (2) Terrorist threats go much deeper, Australia warned, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Edition, May 1-2, 2004, p 13

51. Alagappa, M. (1) (ed) Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, 2003, pp 10-11, 14

52. Woolcott, R. (2) Truth and Accountability in Public Policy: Implications for Australia’s Foreign Policy, Occasional Paper, December 2003, pp 23-24

53. Overington, C. Saddam is out of time, Australia tells UN The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday, February 20, 2003, p 10 Riley, M. Canberra backs special UN treaty, The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday, October 4, 2001 p 9 www.australiaun.org/Students/Index.htm Permanent Mission of Australia to the UN

Monday, May 6, 2002, pp 1-2

54. Alagappa, M. (1) ibid p 10 55. Babbage, R. (2) A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia beyond the 1990s,

1990, p 223 Dibb, A.M. P. Professor. op.cit p 13 Alagappa, M. (1) op.cit p 18 Visco, I. (ed) ibid p 120 McLellan, D. Terrorist attack inevitable, one day The Canberra Times, Saturday March 20, 2004, p B4

56. Zifcak, S. It’s UN-Australian, The Diplomat, vol. 2, no. 1, April-May 2003, p 29 Woolcott, R. (1) op.cit pp 247-248 Alagappa, M. ibid p 11.

57. Williams, C. (1) (ed) et al op.cit p 14 Edwards, N. ibid p 11 Woolcott, R. (2) op.cit p 21 McPhedran, I. et al Are we vulnerable to terrorist attack? The Advertiser, Tuesday, March 16, 2004, p 19 Revell, A. (ed) The Australian Response to terror, The Sydney Morning Herald, Monday, October 21, 2002, p 12

58. D’Hage, A balanced way to protect the homeland, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Special Edition, October 19-20, 2002, p 10

59. D’Hage, ibid p 10

Page 44 of 56

60. Saikal, A. Afghanistan, terrorism, and American and Australian responses,

Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 1, 2002, p 30 Stephens, T. A long line of battles, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Edition, March 15-16, 2003, p 38

61. Riley, M. Unanswered question time, The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Edition, March 15-16, 2003, p 38

62. Borgu, A. Fear back on map, ibid p 25 Riley, M. ibid p 38 McPhedran, I. et al ibid p 19

63. Borgu, A. Fear back on map, ibid p 25 64. McPhedran, I. et al Are we vulnerable to a terrorist attack? ibid p 19

Borgu, A. Beyond Bali, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2002, p11

65. www.nationalsecurity.gov.a…/Listing+of+terrorist+Organisations?OpenDocumen Listing of Terrorist Organisations, May 3, 2004, pp 1-2 www.nation…/National+Security+Public+Information+Campaign?OpenDocumen National Security Public Information Campaign, March 15, 2004, p 2

66. McPhedran, I. et al Are we vulnerable to a terrorist attack? ibid p 19

67. Hale, B. et al Gone to ground, Weekend Edition, The Sydney Morning Herald, October 6-7, 2001, p 54

68. Jennings, P. op.cit p 2 www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/2002/speech1913.htm Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP Address to the Parliament: Bombings in Bali, October 14, 2002, p 2 Cici, N. How Bali is Recovering, The Diplomat, August-September 2003, p 34

69. McLellan, D. ibid p B4 Jennings, P. ibid p 1

70. McPhedran, I. et al ibid p 19 McLellan, D. ibid p B4 Dunn, M. Piracy and terrorism, The Diplomat, April-May 2004, p 14

71. Jennings, P. op.cit pp 2-3 Kelly, P. Australia and America, The Diplomat, June-July 2003, p 29

72. McPhedran, I. et al ibid p 19

Page 45 of 56

73. Hawthorne, M. Al Qaeda targets Australia, Illawarra Mercury,

Saturday, April 24, 2004, p34 Brown, M. et al Australia goes on high security alert,

The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday, September 13, 2001, p17

74. Jennings, P. ibid p 2

Grattan, M. Distressed Howard promises support as security on US

Installations in Australia tightened, The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday, September 12, 2001, p 3

75. Jennings, P. ibid p 3 76. www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1997-98rp18.htm

Dr. Cobb, A. Thinking about the Unthinkable: Australian vulnerabilities to

High-Tech Risks, Parliament of Australia: Parliamentary Library, 29 June, 1998, pp 2-3

77. Hawthorne, M. ibid p 34

Conway, D. Electricity grid is safe: suppliers, The Examiner, Saturday, April 24, 2004, p 8 Hawthorne, M. Terrorism on home soil likely, The Courier, Ballarat Monday, 26 April, 2004, p 8 Connolly, E. et al Terror sites ‘Suspect used government websit’

Sydney targets on screen, The Sydney Morning Herald, Anzac Weekend, April 24-25, 2004, p 1

78. Conway, D. ibid p 8 79. Connolley, E. et al ibid p 1 80. www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/02Pf/aus

Williams, C. (2) Singapore breach brings terror closer to home

The Australian, January 15, 2002, p 1

81. Williams, C. (2) ibid p 1 82. Williams, C. (2) op.cit p 2 83. Williams, C. (2) ibid p 2 84. Thompson, M. et al Diary of a terrorist-or a kid’s trip back home

The Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Edition, April 17-18, 2004, p 1

85. Conway, D. ibid p 8 86. Wilkinson, M. (1) ibid p 5

Page 46 of 56

87. Snow, D. ibid p 5 88. Cobb, A. Dr. op.cit p 10 89. Cobb, A. Dr. op.cit p 13

90. Cobb, A. Dr. op.cit p 15 91. Cobb, A. Dr. op.cit p 14

Silke, A. (ed) op.cit p 78 92. Raby, G. Dr. The Costs of Terrorism

and the Benefits of Cooperating to Combat Terrorism,

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Economic Analytical Unit, February 2003, p 8

93. Cobb, A. Dr. op.cit p 20, 29 94. Cobb, A. Dr. ibid p 29 95. Silke, A. op.cit p 259

White, H. A new world of terror? The Asia-Australia Papers No. 4 November 2001, p11

96. Visco, I. (ed) op.cit p 3

97. Jennings, P. ibid p 1 98. Jennings, P. ibid p 2 99. Jennings, P. ibid p 2 100. Jennings, P. ibid p 3 101. Jennings, P. op.cit p 7

McPhedran, I. et al ibid p 19

102. Jennings, P. op.cit p 4 103. Jennings, P. ibid p 4 104. Jennings, P. op.cit p 5 105. Jennings, P. op.cit p 6 106. Jennings, P. ibid p 6 107. Jennings, P. ibid p 6

Page 47 of 56

108. Jennings, P. op.cit pp 6-7 109. Jennings, P. ibid p 7 110. Wilkinson, M. (1) ibid p 5

111. Dupont, A. (1) op.cit p 240

Page 48 of 56

UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATE: AUSTRALIA-

‘LUCKY COUNTRY’ OR TERRORIST TARGET?

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