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Haiti’s Governance Challenges and the International Community

Andrew S. Thompson1

To non-Haitians, navigating traffic in Port-au-Prince, particularly during rush hour, can

be a harrowing experience, even for the most seasoned of drivers. The roads, to put it

mildly, are not easy to navigate. There are no lines separating one lane from another.

Regulatory signs directing the flow of traffic are notably absent. Gridlock is common.

The potholes – and there are many – are both deep and wide, while many of the cars and

trucks are barely road-worthy. And yet, the traffic does move forward, albeit seemingly

chaotically. At the end of the day, the “tap-taps” – the trucks that pick up pedestrians for

a small fee – do bring people home.

There are parallels between traffic conditions in Haiti and the present

international reconstruction effort. They are, to some degree, an appropriate metaphor for

the entire country. Haiti suffers from a host of deeply-rooted ailments, not the least of

which include weak state institutions, endemic poverty, systemic human rights violations,

a culture of impunity, high levels of criminal activity, and widespread environmental

degradation. The popular revolution of 1986 that ended twenty-nine years of Duvalierism

brought with it a tremendous sense of optimism and hope that Haiti would make the

successful transition from dictatorial to democratic rule. Sadly, the transition has, to date,

been less than smooth. In the two decades since the passing of the constitution of 1987 –

a document that entrenches democratic norms and prohibits the re-emergence of

authoritarian rule – the political system has remained largely dysfunctional, unable to

prevent either the concentration of power in the hands of the few or deter against the use

of violence as a means for solving conflict.2

1 This paper is a draft and is not to be cited without the permission of the author.

The most recent episode of political

instability occurred in February 2004 with the insurrection led by former military officer

2 For two excellent accounts of the roots of political turmoil in Haiti, see Robert Fatton, Jr., “The Fall of Aristide and Haiti’s Current Predicament,” and Suzy Castor, “La difficile sortie d’une longue transition,” both in Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State, Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.) (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press/Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2006), 15-24, and 111-27.

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Guy Philippe, an assault that led to then-Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s

departure from office, and prompted the United Nations to intervene in Haiti for the

second time in less than a decade.

The poorest and arguably most volatile country in the Americas, Haiti can

routinely be found towards the bottom of the list on virtually all indexes that attempt to

quantify and rank state fragility. Rightly or wrongly, the common perception is that Haiti

is the “basket case of the new world,” a country with so many strikes against it that it is

difficult to imagine a better future than either its past and present. While perhaps overly

pessimistic, this view is, sadly, not unfounded. By most measures – be they political,

social, economic, and environmental – Haiti scores amongst the worst in the world. The

difference between Haiti and most other fragile states, however, is that the tiny Caribbean

country that occupies the western half of the Island of Hispaniola has been the object of

considerable international attention, both through decades of massive amounts of foreign

aid and, more recently, two UN-led military interventions in the last two decades, neither

of which has resulted in more than a tenuous stability for Haitians. And yet, despite all of

its political, economic and social problems, life in Haiti does go on, albeit seemingly

chaotically. At the end of the day, Haiti remains a country rich in potential, a country

whose future does not necessarily have to be automatically pre-ordained to be as bleak as

its past.

This paper is about Haiti’s governance challenges and the responses of the

international community, specifically the UN, on the fifth anniversary of the anti-Aristide

insurrection of February 2004. On one level, it is a humble attempt to better understand

both the obstacles that are inhibiting the emergence of a more prosperous and cohesive

society, and the ways in which various actors, both domestic and international, are

attempting to overcome them. After all, Haiti has been and remains, by most measures,

the quintessential weak state, a prime example of the inherent difficulties associated with

peace-building initiatives aimed at fostering a democratic civic culture and a climate of

security for all. On another level, however, it is about the ascendency of new actors in the

Americas since the end of the Cold War. Traditionally, the main external actors in Haiti

have been the “Big Three” from the North – the United States, France and Canada –

countries that, for a whole host of reasons, have a vested national interest in a stable

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Haiti, and which, for better or worse, took the lead in the UN/OAS sanctioned efforts to

restore order and democratic rule to the country following the first military coup d’état

against Aristide that lasted from 1991 to 1994. Since 2004, a new grouping of states from

the South has risen to the forefront of the current UN mission. Referred to throughout the

hemisphere as the “ABC countries” – Argentina, Brazil and Chile – it is these actors who,

also for a whole host of reasons, have taken on much of the responsibility for ensuring

that Haiti’s governance challenges do not cause it to once again veer off the path towards

stability. Hence, a second aim of the paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts

roughly five years after the current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was

established in June 2004, to determine whether there is a distinctly “Latin American”

approach to peace-building. But more than this, it is attempt to make sense of the

changing geo-political dynamics within the Americas, particularly between the North and

South, as seen through the lens of the current international reconstruction effort in Haiti.

Haiti’s Governance Challenges

As Robert Fatton has argued on several occasions, the historical roots of Haiti’s

instability can be traced back to the period when Haiti was a French colony. In order to

ensure that the plantation economy would be profitable, the French established an

authoritarian system of rule. Following independence in 1804, the country’s elite

maintained this system. As a result, Haiti has had a history of deep class and racial

conflict (those in power tend to be mulatto or “blancs”), conflict that has been

perpetuated and buttressed by a dictatorial political system of “strong-man rule” in which

power lies in the hands of one individual, the president. Under this system, violence has

become the favoured means for “resolving and instigating problems.”3

Contemporary Haiti has had trouble shedding this system of rule. Beginning in

1957, François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his infamous Tonton Macoutes ruled Haiti with

tremendous cruelty. In 1971, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier took over following the

death of his father, and for a time conditions in Haiti improved. However, Baby Doc’s

3 Robert Fatton, Jr., “The Fall of Aristide and Haiti’s Current Predicament,” Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State, Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.) (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), pp. 15-17. See also, Robert Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

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presidency was marked by a series of confrontations between the military and civilian

authorities, as well as widespread economic stagnation. The combination of political

unrest and economic desperation fuelled anti-Duvalier sentiments across the country. In

January 1986, revolution erupted, forcing Duvalier to flee the country and seek asylum in

France.

After twenty-nine years of Duvalierism, the political situation in Haiti has been

slow to improve. The transition from dictatorship to democracy in the late 1980s was

marred by periods of tremendous violence and political instability, marked by five

different military and civilian governments in the first four years after Baby Doc’s

departure.4 The 1990s proved to be an equally difficult decade for Haiti. Jean-Bertrand

Aristide’s internationally recognized election victory on 16 December 1990 brought

renewed hope that Haiti had emerged from the chaos of the previous half-decade to

become the hemisphere’s newest democracy. But the hope was soon dashed. Many of the

country’s elites soon lost what little patience they had for either representative

government or Aristide’s economic reforms. On 1 October 1991, General Raoul Cédras

and his Front pour l’Avancement et le Progrès d’Haiti (Front for the Advancement of

Progress in Haiti, FRAPH) staged a military coup d’état against the newly-elected

President, forcing him into exile. Cédras and his supporters controlled Haiti for roughly

three years, during which time an overall climate of insecurity cast a long shadow over

the country as well as the wider Caribbean Sea region. The coup prompted both the

Organization of America States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN) to intervene, both

organizations believing that the situation had deteriorated to the point that it constituted a

threat to international peace and security. The international community was eventually

able to restore Aristide to office through a series of coercive measures that included a

combination of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and military force, but not after

much turmoil and hardship had been caused.5

4 Between 1986 and 1990, Haiti had five different Presidents: General Henri Namphy (7 February 1986 to 17 January 1988, 20 June to 18 September 1988), who took control of the country immediately after the revolution; Leslie Manigat (18 January to 20 June 1988), who was elected under disputed circumstances, and eventually displaced by Namphy after serving only six months in office; Lt-General Proper Avril (18 September 1988 to 11 March 1990), who staged a coup d’état against Namphy; and finally Judge Ertha Pascal Trouillot (10 March to 16 December 1990), who was appointed by Avril.

5 Security Council Resolution 875 authorized the body to “consider further necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions,” which included economic

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Governing in the post-coup period proved difficult, in large part because of a

toxic combination domestic political paralysis during the first Préval presidency from

1995 to 2000, and a tepid international commitment to peace-building as evidenced by a

gradual scaling-back of both international aid and resources to the joint UN/OAS

mission. The situation worsened following Aristide’s re-election in 2000. During his

second term he came to rely increasingly on heavy-handed tactics and the use of armed

militias (les chimères) in order to maintain his authority. By February 2004, he had

alienated many of his supporters and effectively lost control of the country. This provided

an opening for the insurgents to act. As had been the case in the past, violence became

the method of choice for bringing about change.

The Presidential election of 7 February 2007 was, by most measures, a success.

After having been delayed on four separate occasions due to slow voter registration and

infighting within the body responsible for organizing the elections, the Conseil Electoral

Provisoire (CEP), the voting proceeded fairly smoothly, as Haitians turned out en masse

to cast their ballots for the first time in six years. Although there were long line-ups, the

day remained relatively orderly and generally free of violence. Even the controversy

surrounding the roughly 100,000 spoiled ballots that were initially included in the final

vote count was resolved peacefully (they were later rejected, thereby giving René Préval

51% of the vote). The success of the election defied all the odds and expectations.

However, the challenges facing Haiti remain formidable, even daunting. Despite the

appointment of Michèle Pierre-Louis, a compromise candidate agreed upon by both the

Préval administration and the Haitian Parliament, as prime minister in 2008, there

remains no national vision or strategy for how best to deal with social problems such as

health care, education, and illiteracy; nor is there a common conception of citizenship in

sanctions. See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 875 (1993), 16 October 1993. UN Security Council Resolution 940 of 31 July 1994 authorized for the creation of a Multinational Force (MNF) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, its mandate “to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, …, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment…” See United Nations Security Council, S/RES/940, 31 July 1994, p. 2.

The sanctions had a devastating effect on the population, and arguably exacerbated the crisis. Another consequence of the coup was a massive exodus of boat people fleeing Haiti. By August, estimates suggested that the number of Haitians intercepted by the US Coast Guard since October 1991 had risen to 38, 000. See Amnesty International, “Haiti: Human Rights Held to Ransom,” AMR 36/41/92, August 1992, p. 26.

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Haiti. Beyond elections, the state and political system are still in desperate need of being

modernized. Furthermore, Haiti’s economy since the insurrection has remained perilously

fragile. In February 2007, The Economist described Haiti’s progress as “snail-like,” and

lamented that aid and job creation initiatives had yet to have a significant impact on

economic growth, development and poverty alleviation.6 The external events of the

spring and summer of 2008 – notably the rapid inflation of global food and fuel prices,

and the four Atlantic hurricanes that swept over the country during a period of three

weeks – have only compounded the severity of Haiti’s economic woes. On the security

front, the criminal justice system remains dysfunctional. Pre-trial, prolonged detentions

are the norm rather than the exception; despite the creation of the Consultative

Commission on Prolonged Pretrial Detention in 2007, prison conditions are well below

international standards relating to incarceration, and the Haitian National Police remain in

serious need of reform.7

Disarmament initiatives have also produced few results to date.

Consequently, few inroads have been made in combating the climate of impunity that

currently hangs over the country.

A Tale of Two Interventions

With two UN interventions in about a ten-year period, Haiti represents a very useful case

for illustrating new developments within the UN system, but also within the region of the

Americas. The February 2004 insurrection negated many of the gains that had been

achieved during the intervention of the 1990s, forcing the international community to

basically “start all over again.” Perhaps because of this, there has been a distinctive shift

in the focus of the second intervention, a recognition that things need to be done

differently. Whereas the intervention of the 1990s was principally concerned with

restoring democratic governance and stability, the second has thus far paid far greater

attention to addressing the systemic human rights and human security problems that are

at the root of Haiti’s fragility.

6 “Haiti: Building a reluctant nation,” The Economist, vol. 382, no. 8515, 10 February 2007, p. 35. 7 See Resolution 1780 (2007), 15 October 2007. For a detailed survey of the problems and inequities of the Haitian criminal justice system that need to be overcome, see Organization of American States, “Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges ahead for Haiti and for the International Community,” OEA/Ser/L/V/II.123 doc.6 rev 1, 26 October 2005.

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Not surprisingly, there are some key differences between the intervention of the 1990s

and the current UN mission in Haiti, both in terms of its mandate and the actors involved

in its implementation. Whereas the former intervention was principally concerned with

restoring democratic governance and stability,8 the latter has made addressing the

systemic problems that are at the root of Haiti’s fragility and the protection of human

rights for all Haitians a much more explicit priority. Informed by the mainstreaming of

the concept of human security within the United Nations system during the late 1990s,

there has been an acknowledgement on the part of the Security Council that long-term

stability is contingent upon the elimination of collective threats, both physical and

economic, to the well-being of the Haitian population.9

8 During the crisis, the Security Council made only passing references to the New York Pact, an addendum to the 1993 Governors Island Agreement, which was a political truce to the conflict. The New York Pact called for, among other things, an end to arbitrary arrests and torture, the release of all political prisoners, respect for fundamental freedoms, and compensation to the victims of the coup. See UN Security Council Resolutions 940, 1063, 1086, 1123 and 1141.

The result has been an extremely

robust and ambitious agenda for engagement in Haiti. Indeed, the February 2004

insurrection negated what few gains had been achieved during the international

intervention of the 1990s, effectively forcing the international community to basically

“start all over again” in Haiti. Perhaps because of this, there has been a distinctive shift in

focus with the second intervention, a recognition that things need to be done differently.

Whereas the intervention of the 1990s was principally concerned with restoring

democratic governance and stability, the post-2004 intervention has made addressing the

9 Resolution 1542 of 30 April 2004 – the resolution that authorized the transition from the MIF to MINUSTAH – is particularly telling. In it, the Security Council denounced the rights violations that had occurred as a result of the insurrection, and, in the preamble of the resolution, placed the establishment of “a State based on the rule of law and an independent judiciary…among its highest priorities.” Building on this, in Section III of the resolution, which is dedicated entirely to human rights, the Council mandated MINUSTAH to support the promotion of human rights; “monitor and report on the human rights situation, in cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, including on the situation of returned refugees and displaced persons”; and assist with investigation of human rights violations (again in cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner) for the purposes of putting an “end to impunity.” Resolution 1542 also makes reference to the now standard “human security resolutions,” resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; resolutions 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003) and 1539 (2004) on children in armed conflicts; and resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. Resolution 1542 also authorized MINUSTAH to work with the Transitional Government in creating a nationwide Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) program, and it even lists sensitizing peacekeepers to the need to control the spread of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases as a priority. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1529, S/RES/1542 (2004), 30 April 2004.

Not surprisingly, subsequent resolutions have also emphasized similar human rights and human security priorities. See also See Security Council Resolutions 1576 (2004), 1601 (2005), 1608 (2005), 1658 (2006), 1702 (2006), 1743 (2007), 1780 (2007), and 1840 (2008).

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systemic problems that are at the root of Haiti’s fragility a much more explicit priority.

Indeed, this time round there has been an explicit acknowledgement on the part of the

Council that long-term stability can only be achieved if individual rights are protected

and collective threats to vulnerable populations eliminated. For example, Resolution 1529

of 29 February 2004 – the Security Council that authorized the creation of the MIF

Multinational Interim Force (MIF) – explicitly named the need to protect human rights,

develop a system of rule of law, and to ensure that violators of human rights are not

allowed to act with impunity as core aspects of the force’s mandate.10

More specifically, there are three distinct characteristics of the Security Council

resolutions of the 1990s. The first was the systematic reduction in military and police

personnel assigned to Haiti.

11 Security Council Resolution 940 of January 1995, which

formally established the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), authorized a force comprising of

6000 troops and almost 800 police officers. Resolution 1048 of 29 February 1996

reduced levels to 1200 troops and 300 police officers, while resolution 1063 of 28 June

1996 cut another 600 soldiers from the UN force. With resolution 1141 of 28 November

1997, which authorized the creation of the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti

(MIPONUH), the Security Council withdrew the last of the UN’s military presence in

Haiti, reducing the organization’s security presence to a measly 300 police officers.12 The

second aspect of the Security Council resolutions was a disproportionate focus on reform

of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and not nearly enough on reforms to the judicial

and penal systems; consequently, neither the Haitian courts nor prisoners were equipped

to handle the demands placed upon them, resulting in the overall breakdown of the

criminal justice system.13

10 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1529, S/RES/1529 (2004), 29 February 2004.

The third was that the resolutions were virtually silent on the

11 From 1995 to 2001, there were three follow-up missions to the initial UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH): the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) (June 1996 to July 1997); the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) (July 1997 to November 1997), a mission consisting almost exclusively of police officers; and the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) (November 1997 to March 2000). After MIPONUH’s and MICIVIH’s mandates expired, the UN implemented the short-lived International Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH), a program that ended in February 2001. 12 See UN Security Council Resolutions 940, 1063, 1086, 1123 and 1141. 13 This is a point that Robert Maguire has made in his critiques of the UN/OAS intervention of the 1990s. See Robert Maguire, “Assisting a Neighbour: Haiti’s Challenge to North American Policy-Makers,” Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State, Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.) (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press/Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2006), p. 32.

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state of the human rights situation in Haiti,14 and none made mention of any problem that

could be considered as a threat to human security. Granted, during this time the joint

UN/OAS Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was actively engaged in human rights

monitoring and capacity-building programs (and did some very fine work under

extremely difficult conditions); however, its ability to operate was limited by budgetary

constraints. As for the Security Council, it was far more preoccupied with establishing

“stability,” “national reconciliation,” and the “consolidation of democracy,” than with

matters of justice or protecting vulnerable populations from threats to their well-being.15

Contrast these priorities with those of the resolutions that followed the February

2004 insurrection. First, the Security Council appears to have learned its lesson that it

cannot cut corners when it comes to providing security. Resolution 1542 of 30 April

2004, which established the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), authorized

an initial force consisting of 6700 troops and 1622 civilian police officers. Prior to the

presidential election of February 2006 these numbers were raised to 7500 and 1897,

respectively. Six months later, troop levels were lowered to 7200, but civil police levels

rose to 1951.

16 Granted, it is not clear that even these numbers are sufficient (there are

roughly 8 million people in Haiti); nor is it clear that the blue helmets and police officers

in Haiti meet the standards for peacekeeping and policing established in international

law.17

The second significant aspect of the resolutions is that there has been a much

greater awareness on the part of the Security Council that the entire justice system is in

need of reform. Indeed, several of the resolutions call for a coordinated approach to

Nonetheless, the fact that numbers of security personnel have remained relatively

stable since 2004 suggests that the Security Council is not willing to allow the situation in

Haiti to once again become unstable.

14 In these various resolutions, the Security Council made passing references to the New York Pact, which was an addendum to the 1993 Governors Island Agreement, which was a political truce to the conflict. The New York Pact called for, among other things, an end to arbitrary arrests and torture, the release of all political prisoners, respect for fundamental freedoms, and compensation to the victims of the coup. 15 See again, UN Security Council Resolutions 940, 1063, 1086, 1123 and 1141. Before conceding defeat, a representative for Cédras’ brokered an agreement whereby US and Haitian soldiers would to maintain order collectively, Cédras would be granted asylum in Panama. 16 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1542, 1608 and 1702. 17 These include documents such as the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials; UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions; and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

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reform that encompasses judicial and penal reform, and not just police reform.18

The third difference is that all of the post-February 2004 resolutions place a great

deal of emphasis on both human rights and issues that generally fall under a human

security framework, although they are not named as such. While the Security Council

still treats the situation in Haiti principally as a threat to international peace and security,

there is an explicit acknowledgement on the part of the Council that long-term stability

can only be achieved if individual rights are protected and collective threats to vulnerable

populations eliminated. On 29 February 2004, the UN Security Council passed

Resolution 1529, which called for the creation of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF);

consisting of troops from the US, Canada, France and Chile, its mandate was to restore

order for a period of three months until a UN force could be assembled to take over.

Resolution 1529 is significant in that it is explicit about the need to protect human rights,

develop a system of rule of law, and ensure that violators of human rights are not allowed

to act with impunity.

The

criminal justice system is, at present, highly dysfunctional: the judiciary lacks

independence from the executive; indefinite detentions are the norm rather than the

exception; and the corrupt and abusive elements of the HNP have yet to be vetted. The

danger is that if reforms in one sector fail to take hold, any gains in the other two could

very well be jeopardized. But the fact that the members of the Security Council have

recognized that these sectors cannot be reformed in isolation is an important first step in

the process of fixing what has for a long time been a broken system.

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18 See UN Security Council Resolution 1658, 1702 and 1743.

Specifically, the Security Council denounced the violations that

were taking place as a result of the insurrection, and, in the preamble of the resolution,

placed the establishment of “a State based on the rule of law and an independent

judiciary…among its highest priorities.” The explicit references to human rights do not

end there. Section III of resolution 1542, which is dedicated entirely to human rights,

authorized MINUSTAH to do the following: support the promotion of human rights;

“monitor and report on the human rights situation, in cooperation with the Office of the

High Commissioner for Human Rights, including on the situation of returned refugees

and displaced persons”; and assist with investigation of human rights violations, again in

19 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1529, S/RES/1529 (2004), 29 February 2004.

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cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner, in order “to put an end to

impunity.” In terms of human security, resolution 1542 also makes reference to past

resolutions that could be classified as “human security resolutions.” These include

resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; resolutions 1379 (2001), 1460

(2003) and 1539 (2004) on children in armed conflicts; and resolutions 1265 (1999) and

1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. Resolution 1542 also

authorized MINUSTAH to work with the Transitional government in creating a

nationwide Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) program, and it even

lists sensitizing peacekeepers to the need to control the spread of HIV/AIDS and other

communicable diseases as a priority.20 Since then, subsequent resolutions have also

emphasized similar human rights and human security priorities, and in some cases the

language used in them is even stronger.21

To what can this new, robust agenda be attributed? One reason is the

mainstreaming of a “human-centred” approach to confronting threats to international

peace and security at the UN. In the late 1990s, Canada used its membership on the

Security Council to sponsor a series of resolutions – 1265, 1296, and 1325 – that were

designed to expand the mandates of UN interventions beyond traditional peacekeeping

and force protection to include the physical protection of at risk populations. These

resolutions were first applied to the 1999 intervention in Sierra Leone, a historic

intervention in that it marked the first time that the central focus of the mission was to

protect vulnerable civilians from harm. Since then, as noted in the case of Haiti, these

resolutions have become fixtures of the Security Council’s responses to situations that it

believes constitute a threat to international peace and security. Add to this the growing

acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Although Haiti in February

2004 would not meet the strict test laid out in R2P (despite the destructiveness of the

insurrection, few would contend that the situation involved a “large scale loss of life”)

there is an emerging, albeit far from universal, norm around the idea that external actors

have an obligation to act in cases of mass human rights abuses that “shock” the collective

20 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1529, S/RES/1542 (2004), 30 April 2004. 21 See Security Council Resolutions 1576 (2004), 1601 (2005), 1608 (2005), 1658 (2006), 1702 (2006), and 1743 (2007).

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conscience of the international community.22

Perhaps most obvious reason, however, is that the intervention of the mid-1990s

is really a model of how not to intervene in a fragile state. In the effort to restore

democracy to Haiti, little attention was paid to the human rights and well-being of the

civilian population.

Related to this is a greater

acknowledgement that external actors have an equally important duty to take steps to

prevent the outbreak of violent conflict, as well as to invest in state building for the

purposes of preventing re-eruptions of violence.

23 Moreover, the general consensus is that, looking back, the UN left

Haiti prematurely before any meaningful reforms could take hold.24 UN Secretary

General Kofi Annan acknowledged this in March 2004 when he wrote in the Wall Street

Journal that “the most important lesson [coming out of Haiti] is that there can be no

quick exit. Haiti will need our resources and our support for a long time. The current

crisis is at least as much the result of irresponsible behaviour by the Haitian political class

as of omissions or failures in previous international efforts.” He continued, “The stakes

are high – above all for Haitians, but also for us. Getting it right this time means doing

things differently. Above all, it means keeping international attention and resources

engaged for the long haul.”25

While this new approach is a welcome, and much improved development (and an

important example of the shifts in thinking relating to humanitarian interventions that

have taken place at the international level), a note of caution is perhaps in order. While a

strong case could be made that greater attention to human security is a crucial, and even

essential, ingredient of nation-building, it also raises the stakes for the international

community. Unlike in the 1990s, and immediate stabilization of the situation is no longer

the end goal but rather the first step in a longer process or re-building. One implication of

22 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: IDRC, December 2001), pp. vii, xii. 23 During the crisis, the Security Council made only passing references to the New York Pact, an addendum to the 1993 Governors Island Agreement, which was a political truce to the conflict. The New York Pact called for, among other things, an end to arbitrary arrests and torture, the release of all political prisoners, respect for fundamental freedoms, and compensation to the victims of the coup. See UN Security Council Resolutions 940, 1063, 1086, 1123 and 1141. 24 For a critique of the UN mission in Haiti during the 1990s, see Sebastian von Einsiedel and David M. Malone, “Haiti,” The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004). 25 Kofi Annan, “In Haiti for the Long Haul,” Wall Street Journal, 16 March 2004. See also, Amnesty International, “Haiti: Breaking the Cycle of Violence,” p. 15.

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this sort of engagement is that the elimination of “threats” cannot be satisfied in any

meaningful way in the short-term. To be “successful,” reconstruction efforts such as the

one taking place in Haiti will have to be both lengthy and costly, which raises a number

of moral and ethical dilemmas with which international actors will have to resolve, the

least of which is that any long-term engagement in a sovereign state could quite

conceivably lead to a whole host of dire and unintended consequences down the road.

To date, it is too early to say that the mission has been a success. Recognizing that

it had considerable challenges to overcome, the transitional Latortue government was a

disappointment. Indeed, the Latortue Government’s initial response to the conflict has not

been terribly encouraging. While in power it showed a preoccupation with arresting

members of Aristide’s Lavalas Party it suspects of committing “acts of political violence

or corruption,” and one of its first initiatives was to vet the government of all former

Lavalas civil servants. Three days into his term Latortue even went so far as to praise the

insurgents as “freedom fighters,” a statement that has raised serious questions about his

government’s impartiality. In contrast, it made little effort to bring the perpetrators of

grave human rights abuses to justice, many of whom had “played a prominent role” in the

insurgency.26 Unfortunately, this policy seems to have had the blessing of the United

States. In April 2004, a political officer at the U.S. Embassy told Amnesty International

that disarming “urban pro-Aristide gangs” was necessary since they were the ones that

posed a more “immediate danger” to Haiti.27

Despite the presence of international forces, a deep sense of insecurity and fear

hung over much of the Haitian population during the initial weeks following the crisis.

This feeling was not reserved just for Aristide supporters. Both witnesses and judges who

were involved in cases against former prisoners were afraid of retribution. Many

opponents of Aristide felt as though they were vulnerable to attacks from his chimères.

The staffs at various human rights organizations received regular death threats, as did

many journalists.

28

26 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Breaking the cycle of violence: A last chance for Haiti”, AMR 36/038/2004 (London: Amnesty International Publications, June 2004), p. 2.

And of course, insurgents and criminal gangs controlled many parts

27 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Breaking the cycle of violence: A last chance for Haiti”, p. 12. 28 One such organization is the Lawyer’s Committee for the Respect of Individual Freedoms (Comité des avocats pour le respect des libertés individuelles, CARLI).

14

of the country, acting as de facto authorities.29 In this climate in which rule of law was

missing in much of the country, women and street children remain particularly

vulnerable: the former are often the targets of “terror campaigns” that involve the use of

“rape, murder, arson and looting,” while the latter are susceptible to attacks by the

police.30

Much of the problem can be traced to the widespread access to small arms has

tremendous implications for the human rights climate in Haiti. Indeed, a number of non-

governmental organizations, including Amnesty International, have argued that the “main

and most pressing issue” facing the Haiti at the moment is the proliferation of small

arms.

31 The UN Security Council and the transitional Latortue government recognized

this as well, as access to guns fuelled violence between insurgents, criminal gangs and

pro-Aristide supporters.32 Moreover, perhaps the greatest failure of the international

missions in the mid- to late-1990s beginning with the MNF was the unwillingness and

inability to disarm these groups.33 According to the Small Arms Survey (SAS) Project

based in Geneva, there are approximately 170, 000 small arms currently in Haiti, many of

which are in the hands of non-state actors.34

29 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Breaking the cycle of violence: A last chance for Haiti”, pp. 20-3. See also, Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, p. 18.

Granted, the transitional government and

MINUSTAH deserve praise for beginning the process of demobilizing members of the

former military through the National Commission on Disarmament that it established in

February 2005. Unfortunately, its initial results have not been terribly encouraging.

30 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, p. 23, 25. 31 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, p. 2.

The International Crisis Group has also called on the international community to “carry out a forced disarmament campaign against any groups that do not participate in the negotiated disarmament process, including former military personnel, and, simultaneously, work closely with the National Disarmament Commission to ensure implementation of a comprehensive DDR strategy”. See International Crisis Group, “Spoiling Security in Haiti” Latin America/Caribbean Report N°13 31 May 2005; and International Crisis Group, “Can Haiti Hold Elections in 2005?” Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°8, 3 August 2005.

Keith Krause, the Director of the Small Arms Survey Project of the Strategic and International Security Studies Programme of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, has written that the central challenge today facing Haiti is arguably “insecurity stemming primarily (but not exclusively) from the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons”. See Keith Krause, “Small Arms, Big Killers”, Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century, Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff (eds.) (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2005), p. 105. 32 See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1608, S/RES/1608 (2005), 22 June 2005. 33 Amnesty International Press Release, “Haiti: Lessons must be learned from past mistakes”, AMR 36/012/2004, 1 March 2004. 34 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, p. 4.

15

Among the first 325 former military to opt in favour of reintegration into Haitian society,

only 7 weapons were recovered, all of which were old, their utility very much in doubt.35

The question – and it is a big one – is how? The answer is, of course, far from

straight forward or even obvious. The right to own a firearm is protected in the Haitian

constitution, as long as it is registered with the authorities. As Keith Krause of SAS has

argued quite rightly, “small arms are social artefacts”; they are “embedded in complex

social systems” that require “a nuanced understanding of the social and economic context

of weapons possession and use.”

36 Even so, disarmament is not impossible. In 2004, the

United Nations Development Programme was able to carry out a highly successful

project in Carrefour-Feuilles in which arms “were turned over on a voluntary basis in

exchange for access to micro-credit programs.”37

MINUSTAH has been operating in Haiti since June 2004. As with the MIF, its

presence in Haiti has been problematic, even divisive. Security Council Resolution 1542

requires that MINUSTAH work alongside the Haitian National Police on all issues

involving policing. MINUSTAH does not have either the authority or the resources to

engage in independent policing activities, although it does have power to “vet and certify

new and existing HNP personnel for service”.

Of course, much of the government’s

initial inability to engage in disarmament is a reflection of the lack of control that it and

MINUSTAH have in many parts of the country where insurgents, many of whom are

hostile to the Latortue government, have become de facto authorities.

38 Nonetheless, a number of questions have,

over the last five years, been raised about its neutrality. Since February 2004, the HNP

has committed a number of human rights abuses against Lavalas supporters, while

insurgents and other illegal groups have largely been left alone, perhaps because they

have threatened to overthrow the interim government.39

35 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, pp. 6-7.

Because MINUSTAH is seen to

be in league with the HNP, much of the population, particularly in the poor, urban areas

36 Krause, “Small Arms, Big Killers”, p. 106. 37 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, p. 6. 38 See Paragraph 8, United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1608, S/RES/1608 (2005), 22 June 2005. Paragraph 10 “Urges the Transitional Government to conduct thorough and transparent investigations into cases of human rights violations, particularly those allegedly involving HNP officers; requests that in order to support this effort MINUSTAH make the Joint Special Investigation Unit operational as soon as possible.” 39 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, pp. 8-10.

16

of the country, have lost all confidence in it. Although MINUSTAH officials have

attempted to forge links with civilians in these neighbourhoods, many Lavalas supporters

in Haiti and abroad have doubt whether it is an impartial force committed to bringing

order and stability to Haiti. The UN forces have, until recently, struggled to provide

security for the general populace. More specifically, MINUSTAH was slow to confront

the gang violence, particularly in the slums of Cité Soleil, and when it finally did in early

2007 precautions were not necessarily taken to minimize harm to civilians.40

There is considerable consensus within the international community that Haiti is

in need of an international police force that is prepared to assist domestic authorities in

policing the tiny island nation in a fair, equitable and just manner that is consistent with

international norms. This is by no a new problem. Haiti has had a long history of corrupt

and abusive police forces, despite strong international aid in this area. Indeed, the

international community’s attempts at police reform in the 1990s produced disappointing

results. By the end of the decade, slightly less than 1 in 5 police officers had been

dismissed because of charges of “corruption, drug offences and human rights abuses.”

Consequently, MINUSTAH forces have at times during their mission faced a serious

legitimacy deficit, despite the best efforts of many of its senior officials to engage

constructively with the public.

41

While most observers agree that the need for a functional and impartial police force Haiti

remains a pressing need, the HNP are badly under-resourced and under-staffed. Several

thousand officers are responsible for policing a population of about 10 million. Often,

they are required to handle situations involving political violence, and heavily-armed

criminal gangs. The force itself is also highly politicized. During Aristide’s second tenure

as President, the HNP were often used to silence and intimidate opponents of the Lavalas

Party. At present, it appears as though it has shifted loyalties. Indeed, there have been

number of reports that the HNP had used lethal force during the initial stages of the

insurgency, including firing on peaceful pro-Aristide demonstrations.42 Arbitrary arrests

are frequent, while extrajudicial executions remain common and are rarely investigated.43

40 la Concertation pour Haïti « Haiti: Le Canada peut et doit faire d’avantage, » 28 February 2007, p. 2.

41 Malone and von Einsiedel, “Haiti”, p. 476. 42 On 20 March plainclothes police arrested five youth in the neighbourhood of La Saline. The reason for their arrest was not clear. The next day, their “bullet ridden bodies, reportedly bearing signs of torture and

17

Rarely have perpetrators of human rights abuses, either past or present, been

brought to trial to face justice. The good news, however, is that this is an area in which

meaningful progress has occurred in the past, and can occur in the future. In November

2000, a Criminal Tribunal convicted 52 former members of the FAdH and FRAPH for

their roles in the 1994 Raboteau Massacre. Thirty-seven of the convictions were issued in

absentia. Each was sentenced to life in prison. Deeming the proceedings to be both fair

and transparent, observers from the UN International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti

(MICAH), including the UN Special Rapporteur and Independent Expert on Haiti, hailed

the trial as a “landmark for justice in Haiti.”44 Later that same month, the Supreme Court

affirmed the decision. But any increase in credibility to the justice system that came

about as a result of the trial was short-lived. On 3 May 2005, the Supreme Court of Haiti

quashed the sentences of the fifteen members of the FRAPH who had not been convicted

in absentia. The court ruled that the jury had not been competent to hear the case. Given

the current climate in Haiti, the decision may very well have been not only incredibly

expedient, but likely also motivated by political considerations. Even so, it was a “huge

step backwards” for justice.45

Impunity is not the only challenge facing the criminal justice system. The system,

and the ways in which it is administered, is “highly dysfunctional”.

46 The independence

of the judiciary remains very much in doubt. Also, arbitrary arrests, prolonged

incarceration without the ability to challenge the legality of the detention, torture and ill-

treatment, an over-crowding of prisoners in unsanitary conditions, and a general

reluctance to bring past perpetrators of human rights abuses are, unfortunately, accepted

practices.47 Most of all, freedom of expression continues to be under constant threat.48

with their hands tied behind their back, were found the next day in different areas of the city. Three of them were found at a place known as the Piste d’aviation near the airport, where about 200 other bodies were reported to have been dumped in mid-late March 2004”. Amnesty International, “Haiti: Breaking the cycle of violence”, p. 27.

43 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Breaking the cycle of violence”, pp. 15, 17. 44 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Obliterating justice, overturning of sentences for Raboteau massacre by Supreme Court is a huge step backwards”, Public Statement, AMR 36/006/2005, 26 May 2005. 45 Amnesty International, “Haiti: Obliterating justice, overturning of sentences for Raboteau massacre by Supreme Court is a huge step backwards”. 46 Amnesty International, “Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, AMR 36/005/2005 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 28 July 2005), p. 21. 47 Former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune “surrendered himself to police on 27 June 2004 after he was accused by a local human rights organization of masterminding the reprisal killings of opposition activists

18

On the economic development front, there has been hope that the current Interim

Cooperation Framework (ICF), the proposal developed by the World Bank, the European

Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the United Nations outlining the

strategy for Haiti’s reconstruction, would rectify some of these problems.49

in the La Scierie neighbourhood of Saint-Marc on 11 February 2004. It took nearly a year before appearing before a judge and be formally charged”. Amnesty International, “Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, p. 22.

The aims of

the ICF are to promote “four core axes for medium-term Haitian development,” which

are “strengthening political governance and promoting national dialogue; strengthening

economic governance and contributing to institutional development; promoting economic

recovery; and improving access to basic services.” Unfortunately, it appears as though the

initial optimism was misplaced. As important as all of these aims are to Haiti’s future

prospects, there is also considerable room to be critical of the ICF. Yasmine Shamsie has

argued that the priorities for economic growth of the ICF are inherently flawed in that

they pay little attention to the needs of rural Haiti. Missing is any mention of funding for

agricultural development or credit for the poor; nor is there any consideration given to re-

introducing tariffs on food imports, in order to protect domestic production in Haiti.

Consequently, Shamsie concludes that the ICF does little to address concerns about

48 Amnesty International has recommended that the Latortue government inact the following recommendations: “all detentions should be recorded and monitored; detainees should be brought before a judge promptly; the Haitian Constitution establishes that detainees must be brought before a judge within 48 hours or released; detainees should be given access to lawyers and doctors of their choice as soon as they are detained; all detainees should be able to challenge the lawfulness of their detention; judges should take steps to ensure that detainees have not been tortured or ill-treated, and should institute criminal investigations where torture or ill-treatment are alleged to have taken place; institute a system of regular, independent, unannounced and unrestricted visits of inspection to all places of detention, including prisons under the auspices of the APENA (the National Penitentiary Administration), and police stations; such visits could be carried out by independent non-governmental organizations which should be authorized to have full access to all places of detention; accurate information about the arrest of any person and about his or her place of detention, including transfers and releases, should be made available promptly to relatives, lawyers and the courts; prisoners should be released in a way that allows reliable verification of their release and ensures their safety.” Amnesty International, “Haiti: Disarmament delayed, justice denied”, pp. 27-8. 49 The ICF was developed at meeting in Washington, D.C., that took place on 19-20 2005. See http://haiticci.undg.org/index.cfm?Module=ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=introduction&NewLanguageID=en. For the Canadian federal government’s contribution see, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/haiticonference/interimcoop-en.asp. See also United Nations Development Group, “Haiti - Lessons Learned ICF/CCI (Needs Assessment)”, 17 October 2005. http://www.undg.org/documents/5325-Haiti_-_Lessons_Learned_ICF_CCI__Needs_Assessment_.doc.

19

widespread food insecurity in Haiti.50 Moreover, Robert Muggah has suggested that the

current international aid strategy is “overambitious,” “erratic,” unevenly funded, and

perhaps more fundamentally problematic, has never been “‘owned’ in any meaningful

sense by Haitians and the process was hardly ‘inclusive’ beyond consultation in the

capital of Port-au-Prince and to a lesser extent in the regions.”51

The ABC Countries

The other big difference between the intervention of the mid-1990s and the current one is

new players that are currently operating in Haiti, specifically the ABC countries of

Argentina, Brazil and Chile. While governments in the north still make up the largest

funders of development in Haiti, the ABC countries have made tremendous contributions

to MINUSTAH’s, both in terms of political leadership the numbers of troops contributed

to the mission. Their presence and participation is, in many respects, a reflection of the

economic and political ascendency of Latin America since the end of the Cold War, and a

desire on the part of a number of states to take ownership of hemispheric security and

rival U.S. influence in the region. Moreover, there is some evidence of a “Latin

American” approach to peacekeeping, in which great value is placed on the centrality of

development and poverty alleviation to the security of the population. With their relative

geographic proximity to Haiti, a recent history of transitional rule, and first hand

experiences with conditions of poverty, they are, at least on one level, potentially well-

suited to carry out the human security objectives of the various Security Council

resolutions – poverty alleviation, security sector reform, disarmament, etc.

But their reasons for participating in MINUSTAH are not entirely benevolent. For

the ABC countries, the mission serves a number of national interests. Brazil has been

quite candid about its aspirations at the United Nations, specifically with respect to its

desire for a Permanent seat on the Security Council; the Lula government has adopted a

functionalist approach towards the mission in Haiti, its thinking being that its leadership

will help to bolster its case that it has become the dominant actor in the hemisphere, a

50 See Yasmine Shamsie, “The Economic Dimension of Peacebuilding in Haiti: Drawing on the Past to Reflect on the Present,” Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State, Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.) (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), pp. 37-48. 51 Muggah, “The Perils of Changing Donor Priorities,” pp. 172-73.

20

status that it believes should be formalized in the highest decision-making body of the

UN. To some extent, Brazil’s had was also forced by Chile after Santiago volunteered

troops first to the MIF and then to MINUSTAH. Although Chile wishes to be a

constructive international player, UN Missions such as the one in Haiti are provide

excellent training for troops who would otherwise have limited opportunities to get field

experience. Finally, Argentina has viewed the mission in Haiti as an opportunity to

rejuvenate the “ABC” concept, and thus advance its relations with the two other countries

making up the trio; Argentina also has reserves of charcoal that it could sell to Haiti as

part of a reforestation program. Add to the mix that Venezuela and Cuba are both major

contributors of development assistance to Haiti, and the tiny Caribbean Island nation has

become a hotspot of regional politics.

Still, greater Latin American leadership can also advance North American

relations as well. NATO members currently have their hands full with the war in

Afghanistan, which it has committed itself to until at least 2011. It is a mission that has

strained NATO, with the British, U.S. and Canadian forces taking on the bulk of the

heavy combat duties in the Kandahar region. At present, Canada and the U.S. have

neither the desire nor military capacity to be engaged in Haiti in a peacekeeping role, at

least not in any meaningful way. The fact that the Latin Americans have shouldered the

bulk of the load has been a great relief to Washington and Ottawa. As in the past, Haiti is

a pawn for a greater diplomatic game.

But are they suited for the task? On one level, the answer might seem yes. These

countries are all relatively new to the peacekeeping business, and very new to Haiti. They

do not speak Creole, nor are their experiences necessarily transferable. While they are

perhaps better able to empathize with Haitians, they are not necessarily any better-

equipped to either understand the roots of Haiti’s governance challenges or help Haitians

overcome them. Finally, like their northern counterparts, they are not immune from

“Haiti” fatigue; if there is little evidence of substantive reform, than their respective

populations could very well begin to question the benefits and costs of the mission. The

Latin Americans would do well to learn from the mistakes of the northern governments.

Conclusion

21

On a number of levels the current international reconstruction effort represents a break

from the 1990s, the two notable differences being the mainstreaming of human security

as an approach to state building, and Latin American leadership. Both are potentially very

positive developments. A note of caution, however, is in order. While greater attention to

human security is a crucial (and arguably even essential) ingredient of state building, it

adds new layers of complexity to the international effort in Haiti, as stabilizing the

situation is no longer the end goal but rather the first step in a longer process or

rebuilding. The challenge for donor countries is that neither the protection of human

rights nor the elimination of threats to human security can be satisfied or addressed in any

meaningful way in the short term. To be “successful” the current experiment in state-

building in Haiti will have to be both lengthy and costly, but above all it will require a

high degree of cooperation between North American and Latin American partners.

Haitians attitudes toward MINUSTAH have, to date, been mixed. On the one

hand, there is a general acknowledgement that chaos could once again erupt if the UN

pulled-out of the country. On the other, there is a deep resentment and even a sense of

humiliation amongst many Haitians, who have been forced to accept that, at least for the

immediate future, they are not in complete control of their own destiny, a reality that is

deeply frustrating for a people who first won their independence by defeating driving

Napoleon’s forces off the island. For them, the concern is not that MINUSTAH exit

Haiti; rather, that when it does leave the conditions are such that it does not have to return

in the future.

Still, there remains a widely-held within the international community that Haiti’s

problems are intractable. It is, sadly, a sentiment that is not completely unwarranted.

Previous attempts at nation-building, particularly those of the 1990s, produced few

lasting results, so much so that Haiti has often been described as a “graveyard of aid

projects.” For their part, donor nations have, in the past, developed acute cases of “Haiti

fatigue,” and have withheld much needed development aid, in part (although by no means

exclusively) because of a lack of hard evidence that their investments had “born any

fruit,” so to speak. In doing so, a vicious cycle was created: the absence of progress

prompted a reduction in aid, which in turn hampered progress, and contributed to the

22

disintegration of the country’s social fabric. Believing that the situation was hopeless

became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

There is a distinct possibility that the current international reconstruction efforts

could suffer a similar fate. To date, “progress” has been slow and arduous, despite the

substantial resources – both financial and military – that have been invested in Haiti since

the insurrection. Indeed, 2008 will be remembered as a terribly difficult year for Haitians,

one that was marked by tremendous political volatility and setbacks to economic growth,

prompted first by the food inflation riots and then by severe tropical storms of the spring

and summer, respectively. Given the severity of the ailments afflicting Haiti, no one

anticipated that the reconstruction effort would be easy. Many in the international

community – including former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan – advocated a long-

term presence, possibly even a decade in length.52

And while most observers agree that the costs of not strengthening Haiti will be

high (again, both financially and militarily), the international community has been down

this road before. It is by no means inconceivable that international support for

reconstruction will once again waver, leaving Haiti susceptible to future rounds of

debilitating violence. True security dictates that donors adopt a holistic approach to

engagement in Haiti that aims to address the root causes of fragility. And yet, there is

presently a substantial divide between the aims laid out by the United Nations Security

Council and the international community and realities on the ground. There is a danger

that history will repeat itself, that if substantive signs of progress are not visible soon,

donors may be tempted to withdraw before genuine reform is allowed to take hold. This

would be tragic. Nevertheless, it remains a distinct possibility. After all, it is much easier

manoeuvre around potholes than it is to repair them.

Even so, there is some evidence of

improvements to security, political and economic situations during the first two years of

the current Préval government, and in the ways in which international aid is being

administered.

52 Kofi Annan, “In Haiti for the Long Haul,” Wall Street Journal, 16 March 2004.