Hacking apple accessories to pown iDevices2013.hackitoergosum.org/presentations/Day3-04.Hacking apple accessories to pown... · – HACK.lu 2012 • Hacking iOS Application . 3

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Hacking apple accessories to pown iDevicesWake up Neo! Your phone got pown!

GOTO: H[a]CK

Mathieu RENARD - @GOTOHACKmathieu.renard[-at-]gotohack.org

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Who am I ?

# @GotoHack

– DAY: Pentester & Team Leader

– NIGHT: Security Researcher

# Area of expertise

– Mobility / BYOD

– Web application

– Embedded systems

– Hardware Hacking

# Publications

– GreHack 2012

• Practical iOS Application Hacking

– HACK.lu 2012

• Hacking iOS Application

3

MFI Devices Invasion

4

iDevices Attack surface

BootROM LLB iBoot KernelApps

Bootime Runtime

USB host / Apple Accessory

iDevices

DFU ModeIMG3X509

Fake DFUIMG3X509

Recovery modeIMG3X509

Hardware,Driver: WiFi,

Baseband

MobileSafariMobileMailAppStore

Deamons

Accessory Protocol(Serial)

iTunes services:Backup, AFC, …

(USBMux)



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iTunes Services

GOTO: H[a]CK

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USBmuxd and USBmux protocol

Client side communication

# USBmuxd

– Daemon is started at system launch (on user system).

– Creates a listening UNIX Domain Socket at /var/run/usbmuxd.

– Wait for iDevice connections via USB

– Allows multiplexing of TCP connection over one USB pipe

USBMuxd USBMux Client

Hello

Hello

Binary Data sent through UNIX Socket

device ID

TCP connect request

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Lockdownd

# Lockdownd binary

– Responsible for several tasks

• Pairing,

• Activation,

• Unlocking FairPlay certificates,

• Delegating communications to other services

• …

– Listening on port 62078

• Accessed through the usbmux protocol.

• Packets

– Data length : 32bits big endian word

– Data : XML plist

– Only available after pairing.

• First pairing require the device to be unlocked

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iTunes’ service communication overview

iDevices Host

lockdownd Can you start afc service ?

Pairing request

AFC Service

AFC Client

USBM

uxd

libmobiledevicePairing OK

Plist files sent over USB pipe

AFC service is running on port : XXXXX

AFC Commands

AFC Results

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Lockdown protocol & Pairing

Lo

ckd

ow

nd

(D

evic

e)

Lo

ckd

ow

n C

lien

t

XML Plist sent through USBmux

{Request=QueryType}

{Request=QueryType, Result=Success, Type=com.apple.mobile.lockdown}

{PairRecord={DevicePublicKey=xxxxx, DeviceCertificate=xxxx,HostCertificate=xxxx, HostID=xxxx,RootCertificate=xxxx, SystemBUID=xxxx}, Request=Pair}

{Request=GetValue, Label=xxxx}

{Request=GetValue, Label=xxxx, Value={ActivationPublicKey=xxxx, DevicePublicKey=xxxx,UniqueDeviceID=xxxx, DieID=xxx,…}}

{Request=Pair, EscrowBag=xxxx}

{PairRecord={DevicePublicKey=xxxxx, DeviceCertificate=xxxx, HostCertificate=xxxx, HostID=xxxx,RootCertificate=xxxx, SystemBUID=xxxx}, Request=ValidatePair}

{Request=ValidatePair}

{HostID=xxx, Request=StartSession}

{SessionID=xxx, Request=StartSession, EnableSessionSSL=True}

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libImobiledevice / pymobiledevice

# Libimobiledevice

– Cross-platform software library

– Developed by Nikias Bassen

– Handles the protocols to support iDevices.

– Based on the open source implementation of usbmuxd

# Pymobiledevice

– Lite python implementation

– Handles only most important protocols to support iDevices

– Based on the open source implementation of usbmuxd

# Allows other software to easily interact with the services hosted on the device.

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com.apple.mobilebackup &

com.apple.mobilebackup2

# Mobilebackup services

– Used by iTunes to backup the device

# iDevice backup

– Permit a user to restore personal data and settings

– Abusing this service may allow an attacker

• Retrieving personal and confidential data

– SMS

– Call Logs

– application data

– default preferences

– data stored in the keychain (WiFi password, VPN Certificate Passwords).

• Inject data to the device.

– Can be password protected

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com.apple.afc

# AFC (Apple File Connection)

– Service running on all iDevices

– Handled by /usr/libexec/afcd

– Used by iTunes to exchange files

– AFC clients can access certain files only

• Files located in the Media folder

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com.apple.mobile.house_arrest

# House_arrest

– allows accessing to AppStore applications folders and their content.

# Using an AFC client, a user/attacker can download the application resources and data (documents, photos…).

– Including “default preferences”

• File where credentials are sometimes stored.

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com.apple.mobile.installation_proxy

# Installation proxy

– Manages applications on a device

• List installed applications.

• Install an application on the device.

• Upgrade an application on the device.

• Uninstall an application from the device.

• List archived applications.

• Archive an application on the device

– Creating a ZIP archive in the “ApplicationArchives” directory and uninstalling the application

• Removes a previously archived application from the device

– Used by the com.apple.mobile.house_arrest

• Enumerate and dump installed applications.

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com.apple.mobile.diagnostics_relay

# Diagnostics relay

– Allows requesting iOS diagnostic information.

– Handles the following actions:

• Puts the device into deep sleep mode and disconnects from host.

• Restart the device and optionally show a user notification.

• Shutdown of the device and optionally show a user notification.

– Used by evasi0n to update some caches by rebooting the device.

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com.apple.mobile.file_relay

# File_Relay

– Allow paired devices to launch the following commands

• AppleSupport,

• Network,

• WiFi,

• SystemConfiguration,

• VPN,

• UserDatabases,

• CrashReporter,

• Tmp,

• Caches

– All the files returned are stored in clear text in a CPIO archive

– Asking for UserDatabases allow retrieving

• SMS, Contacts, Calendar and Email from databases in clear text.

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Summary

# Pairing is initiated on the USB Host side

– Unlocking the device is mandatory

– This implementation may allow malicious dock station to

• Retrieve & Inject

– SMS

– Call Logs

– application data

– default preferences and data stored in the keychain (using backup)



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GOTO: H[a]CK

Reversing an

Apple MFI accessory

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Anatomy of an Accessory

# MFI Alarm clock

– Apple dock connector

– Features :

• Compatible with all iPods

• Wake up to iPod

• Full-function remote control

• Charges iPod whilst connected

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Opening the box…

Power supply & Audio Amplifier

iDevice interface

Mother board

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Mother board analysis

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R5F2126

In-System ProgrammingOn-chip data flash (1Kbytes) Internal ROM (32 Kbytes)

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iDevice interface

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Reversing the circuit

GN

D5V

Tx

Rx

AC D

ET

IP D

ET

IPO

D R

A G

ND

IPO

D L

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

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30

2V550K

2,6V

49.9K 43.2K

49.9K 75K

AudioRS232

Charging

J1 iDevice connector

J2

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What about the Lightning connector ?

# In October 2012 Apple released the Lightning

– Apple proprietary bus and power connector

– Replace its previous proprietary 30-pin dock connector.

– Using 8 pins instead of 30

– Significantly more compact than the 30-pin dock connector

– Can be inserted with either face up.

– Embeds an authentication chip inside the cable.

• Analyzing the Lightning connector will not be so easy.

# 30 pins adapters

– Allows to connect 30-pin accessories to devices featuring the Lightning connector.

– Successfully tested on the dock station used for our analysis

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Sniffing the communications

# Standard 8N1 serial protocol.

# Data are sent @ 19200 bauds.

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Request/Response Structure

Play

https://nuxx.net/wiki/Apple_Accessory_Protocol

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Summary

# Hacking the firmware of the µC ?

– Not relevant regarding our goal

• We need some space to store user data…

# Developing a custom dock ?

– Challenging but too much time consuming regarding this study.

– USB pins are not used

• Allows connecting another device that share the same power supply

# Hacking the dock and adding some hardware

– The raspberry PI is meeting all our requirements

– At least two USB ports

• 1 to communicate with the connected device

• 1 for a 3G / Wi-Fi adapter

– 1 Ethernet port for debugging

– GPIO (simulating user action on the dock)

– Accepting 5V power supply.



2929

GOTO: H[a]CK

Weaponizing an

Apple MFI accessory

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iPown Bill of materials

# 1 Raspberry pi

# 1 PodSocket

# 1 PodBreakout

# 1 USB Connector

# 1 mini USB Connector

# 1 WiFi USB Key

# 1 SDcard

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Hardware Hacking

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Reversing the circuit

GN

D5V

Tx

Rx

AC D

ET

IP D

ET

IPO

D R

A G

ND

IPO

D L

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

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30

2V550K

2,6V

49.9K 43.2K

49.9K 75K

AudioRS232

Charging


J2

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Enabling USB

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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550K

AudioRS232

USB


J2

GN

D5V

Tx

Rx

AC D

ET

IP D

ET

IPO

D R

A G

ND

IPO

D L

VCC

D+ D-

GN

D

J3 USB

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Hacked MFI accessory

This dock station is now powered by

http://www.raspberrypi.org/

Cheap ARM GNU Linux board

Hardware MiTM



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GOTO: H[a]CK

Demo

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iPown

Personal Data dumper…

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iPown

Personal Data dumper…

What if out alarm clock could silently jailbreak our device in our sleep when we are dreaming ?



3838

iPown 2.0Automating Jailbreak

GOTO: H[a]CK

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Public Jailbreaks

# jailbreakme.com

– Exploits by comex, Grant Paul (chpwn), Jay Freeman (saurik) & MuscleNerd

– Targeting MobileSafari

– Could be used against an unwitting victim

– Only working on old devices

# Others other recent jailbreaks (absinthe 1&2, evasi0n)

– Require USB tethering.

– Require User interaction

• iDevices refuse to communicate over USB if they are locked unless they have previously paired.

• Lower security impact

• only useful to the phone’s owner

# Are we really safe ?

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evasi0n…

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Evasi0n

Initialization & Stage 1

# Evasi0n Stage 1

– Pairing with the device

– Starting com.apple.mobile.file_relay service

– Retrieving the com.apple.mobile.installation.plist

• plist file

• caches the list of installed applications

– Activating the apple “DemoApp.app”

– Restoring Hijacked “DemoApp.app” in /var/mobile

• Using old mobilebackup simlink trick

– Updating the caches / Rebooting the device

• “DemoApp.app” will show up on SpringBoard after restart”

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Evasi0n

Stage 2: Overview

# Evasi0n Stage 2

– Chmod 777 /var/tmp/launchd

• Injecting symbolic link 1/2

– /var/db/timezone -> /var/tmp/launchd

• Crarshing lockdonwd 1/2

– Chmod 777 /var/db/timezone

– Chmod 777 /var/tmp/launchd/sock

• Injecting symbolic link 2/2

– /var/db/timezone -> /var/tmp/launchd/sock

• Crashing lockdonwd 2/2

– Chmod 777 /var/tmp/launchd/sock

– Waiting for user to launch the “DemoApp.app”

– Injecting the remount payload

– Uploading Cydia files

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Evasi0n

Stage 2: Remout payload

# Executing “DemoApp.app” => Executing the remount script

– Launchctl interfaces with launchd to load, unload daemons/agents

– launchd’s IPC mechanism operates through Unix domain sockets.

– LAUNCHD SOCKET

• Informs launchctl how to find the correct launchd socket

– Launchd runs as root and here launchctl runs as mobile

• The socket and the demaon launchctl have been chmoded 777

• Our mobile now able to communicate with the root user’s launchd

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Evasi0n

Stage 2: Remouting the file system in R/W

# launchd (runing as root) execute the remount script

– No mount point is specified in the script

– The kernel use the script name as mount point

• Generating errors messages on stderr

• The size of mount.stderr growing up

# Evasion detects the “DemoApp.app” was launched

– Checking the size of mount.stderr

# Evasion inject another set of files unsing backup

– Restoring timezone directory

– Replacing “DemoApp.app” binary by a symbolink link pointing to /

• The kernel use the script name as mount point

• The file system is successfully remounted in RW

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Evasi0n

Stage 3: Injecting final payload

# Evasi0n Stage 3

– Creating a directory at /var/evasi0n containing 4 files

• launchd.conf.

– List of subcommands to run via launchctl when launchd starts

Remouting the filesytem in RW

Loading amfi.dylib library

Executing the evasi0n binary

• amfi.dylib

– Loaded with DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARY

– Contains only lazy bindings and no TEXT section

No TEXT/text section means that there is nothing to sign

Overriding MISValidateSignature in order to always return 0

Allowing unsigned code execution

• Evasi0n Binary :

– Executed with root privilege in the early boot environment.

Launches the kernel exploit

• Udid

– Contains the UDID of the current device

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Reimplementing evasi0n

Modding evasi0n installer

# Hijacking Music iPhone Application instead of “DemoApp.app”

– Launched when connect the device is connected to a dock

– Handle Remote accessory protocol

– We can trigger the remount payload automatically

– The payload can be triggered by the alarm

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Simulating user action

µC

# Original Schematic

# iPown Schematic

µCin

in

out



48

GOTO: H[a]CK

Demo

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Wake up Neo! Your phone got pwd…

Scenario

Room 1 : Victim Room 2 : Attacker

50

Wake up Neo! Your phone got pwd…

Demo



5151

Conclusion

GOTO: H[a]CK

52

Conclusion

# Apple made the choice of user experience instead of security.

– It is possible to build up a malicious device in order to get both the data and the control of iDevices.

“When things get up close and personal,

the rule is always better safe than sorry"

Don’t connect your device to an untrusted dock station

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Credits

Jan0 @planetbeing @pod2g

@MuscleNerd @pimskeks @ih8sn0w @i0n1c @p0sixninja @saurik @Comex

Thanks to all members of the jailbreak community for sharing their work

and all of my friends who helped me to prepare this talk.

Don’t learn to hack but hack to learn !



5454

Thank you for ListeningQuestions ?mathieu.renard[-at-]gotohack.org - http://www.gotohack.org

GOTO: H[a]CK

Documents

Hacking apple accessories to pown iDevices2013.hackitoergosum.org/presentations/Day3-04.Hacking apple accessories to pown... · – HACK.lu 2012 • Hacking iOS Application . 3