H. Delpar Aspects of Liberal Factionalism

8/6/2019 H. Delpar Aspects of Liberal Factionalism

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Aspects of Liberal Factionalism in Colombia, 1875-1885Author(s): Helen DelparSource: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 250-274Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2512475 .

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Aspects of Liberal Factionalism inColombia, 1875-1885*HELEN DELPAR

A LL STUDENTS OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY of Colombia nthe second half of the nineteenth century must grapplewith the dissension that occurred among leaders ofthe Liberal party of that country in the 1870s. As a result of theintra-party discord, the Liberals finally lost control of the federalgovernment, which they had dominated since i86i, and the regimeknown as the "Regeneration" came into existence in 1885-1886. Al-though the members of the two wings into which the party wasdivided are usually designated correctly as "Radicals" and "Inde-pendents," all too often the issues that set them apart are impreciselydescribed. The Radicals are usually depicted as overzealous reformers

who sought to convert Colombia into a utopian republic overnightand were, in particular, committed to policies of extreme anti-clerical-ism, federalism, and laissez-faire. The Independents, on the otherhand, are described as moderates who realized that the Radical pro-gram was inappropriate for a country like Colombia and served onlyto retard its political and economic progress. According to the standardaccount, the Radicals, their quixotic projects having failed, weredriven from power by the Independent Liberals under the leadershipof Rafael Nunez, who first occupied the presidency in 188o. Subse-quently Nuifiez formed a coalition of Independents and Conservativeswhich became the nucleus of a new National party that governed therepublic during the Regeneration under the centralist and authori-tarian constitution promulgated in i886.

While this depiction of nineteenth-century Colombian politics ispartially accurate, it fails to indicate shadows and nuances that signifi-cantly alter the final portrait. This essay represents an attempt toclarify the origins and nature of the differences among ColombianLiberals in the decade 1875-1885.* The author, Assistant Professor of History at Florida State University,Canal Zone, wrote this article while Assistant Professor of History at IndianaState University. Researchfor this article was made possible by grants from theDoherty Foundation and Indiana State University.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 251Colombia can be said to have possessed a two-party system by1863.1 Each party-Liberal and Conservative-had a readily identifi-able set of leaders, a fairly consistent and well-defined ideology, anda cluster of shared memories and traditions. Leadership of both partieswas largely in the hands of the upper classes, but members of non-elite groups, particularly those who were politically articulate andhad grievances or unsatisfied aspirations, such as the artisans ofBogota' and the Negroes of the Cauca Valley, were more likely to befound in the Liberal camp than the Conservative one.The ideological difference between the two parties lay primarilyin the Conservative belief in the infallibility and universality of the

moral precepts of Christ as transmitted by the Roman Catholic Churchand in the insistence of Conservatives that only their party couldspeak for Catholicism in Colombia. The Conservatives' interpretationof Catholicism led them to accept republican forms and institutions,but they placed greater emphasis than did the Liberals on order,authority, and the necessity of restricting the rights of the individualin order to protect society as a whole. There was comparatively littledisagreement on general economic policy between the two parties,2though Liberals tended to display greater interest in the problems ofdevelopment than did Conservatives.During the period under consideration, Liberals endorsed federal-ism as the most nearly perfect form of political organization, thoughfrequently disagreeing on the degree of autonomy which should beaccorded to the nine states in the Colombian Union.3 The Conserva-tives ordinarily favored more highly centralized government; however,they were willing at times to accept federalism if only because this1. Cf. the criteria for two-party systems set forth in Avery Leiserson, Parties

and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach (New York, 1958), p.167, and Leslie Lipson, The Democratic Civilization (New York, 1964), p. 315.After the disintegration of Gran Colombia in 1830, the area that became theRepublic of Colombia was known by various names: New Granada, to 1858;GranadineConfederation,to i86i; the United States of Colombia, to i886; andfinally, the Republic of Colombia. For the sake of clarity, the name of Colombiawill be used throughout this article. Unless otherwise indicated, the place ofpublication for all works cited hereafter is Bogota.2. Cf. Frank Safford, "Commerceand Enterprise in Central Colombia, 1821-1870" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1965), pp. 8-9;Luis Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protection en Colombia, 1810-1830 (Medellin,1955), pp. 246-247; David Bushnell, "Two Stages in Colombian Tariff Policy:

The Radical Era and the Return to Protection (1861-1885)," Inter-AmericanEconomic Affairs,IX:4 (Spring 1956), 19.3. The nine "sovereign" states were Antioquia, Bolivar, Boyaca', Cauca,Cundinamarca, Magdalena, Panama, Santander, and Tolima. For federalismbefore 1858, see Robert L. Gilmore, "Federalism in Colombia, 181o-1858" (un-published Ph.D. dissertation,University of California, Berkeley, 1949).


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252 HAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPARsystem might afford them the opportunity of winning control of oneor more states when Liberals dominated the federal government. Nordid the centralism favored by Conservatives include complete ex-tinction of sectional self-government. Colombia's racial and economicdiversity, together with the difficulty of communication, had bredstrong regional loyalties-as well as local political machines-that re-sisted domination or elimination by any centralizing national govern-ment. Thus the constitution of i886, which was basically a Conserva-tive document, restored centralism but allocated limited powers tosectional and municipal governments, and the boundaries of the states,henceforth to be known as departments, were left unchanged. In1888-1890 the administration made an attempt to break up the de-partments into smaller units on the grounds that such action was neededto extirpate completely the still powerful roots of federalism, but theproposal aroused such intense opposition, especially in Antioquia andCauca, that it had to be abandoned.4The polarization of Colombian politics began in the late 182os andwas intensified during the following decade, especially as a result ofa confused and unsuccessful Liberal revolution (1839-1842), in whichthe participants had but a single common aim-regional autonomy.5In 1849 the Liberal party won control of the executive branch of thegovernment when Jose Hilario Lopez defeated two Conservativecandidates to be elected president in a closely fought contest.6 ToLiberals, Lopez' four-year term was a watershed in the nation'shistory, for they felt that the reforms put into effect by his administra-tion marked a definitive break with colonial traditions and institutions

4. Centralism under the Constitution of i886 is discussed in William MarionGibson, The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham, N.C., 1948), pp. 306-310. Thecourse of the administration proposal to divide the departments can be tracedin the press, especially La Nacio'n, October 26 and November i6, i888, De-cember 17, 1889, April 15 and July 20, 1890; El Telegrama, November 6 andDecember 13, 1889; La Tarde (Medellin), June 4, July 5, and December 23,1889.5. There are no specialized studies of the early history of the Liberal party,but numerous memoirs and secondary works are of use for the period fromthe 182os to the 1840s. Among the former, see Joaquin Posada Gutierrez,Memories hist6rico-politicas, 4 vols. (d ed., 1929) and Jose Maria Samper, His-toria de un alma, 2 vols. (2d ed., 1946-1948); among the latter, see Jose ManuelRestrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, 2 vols. (1952-1963); Ruflno J. andAngel Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo y noticias de su epoca, 2 vols. (Paris,1892); Horacio Rodriguez Plata, Jose MariaObando, intimo (Archivo-epistolario-comentarios) (1958).6. For a recent account of this controversial election, see Joseph Leon Hel-guera, "The First Mosquera Administration in New Granada, 1845-1849" (un-published Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1958), pp. 240-267,290-301.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 253that had survived under the republic.7 Under Lopez' reform-mindedConservative predecessor, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, tariffs hadbeen lowered, and an end to the state tobacco monopoly had beendecreed. Starting in 1850, the Liberals, led by Secretary of FinanceManuel Murillo Toro, abolished slavery, authorized division of thecommunal lands (resguardos) of the Indians, enacted a program offiscal decentralization designed to increase provincial autonomy, andin other ways sought to remove barriers which were believed to behindering the social and economic development of the republic. Mean-while, the country was kept in an uproar not only by the socialisticdeclamations of Liberal youths inspired by the French Revolutionof 1848, but also by a crime wave in Bogota' and by numerous out-breaks of class conflict and violence in the Cauca Valley of westernColombia.8By 1852, older, more moderate members of the party, includingLopez himself, were expressing disapproval of the more extravagantproposals advanced by the followers of Murillo. These extremistLiberals came to be known as Go'lgotas, after an invocation of theMartyr of Golgotha by one of the Liberal firebrands. They in turncalled their adversaries Draconianos, partly because of the reluctanceof the latter to do away with capital punishment. During the brieftenure of Lopez' successor, Jose Maria Obando, conflict betweenGo'lgotas and Draconianos continued, culminating in the coup d'etatof April 17, 1854, when Obando refused dictatorial powers offered tohim by General Jose Maria Melo, who thereupon assumed them him-self.9 Although a coalition of Go'lgotas and Conservatives was suc-cessful in ousting Melo by the end of the year, the Liberals lostcontrol of the government for the remainder of the decade.

7. A discussion of Liberal ideology during the Lopez administrationappearsin Gilmore, "Federalism,"pp. 185-206.8. The institution used by young Liberals for the expression of their viewswas the Escuela Republicana, a political, literary, and oratoricalsociety foundedon September 25, 1850, anniversary of the unsuccessful attempt to assassinateBolivar in 1828. See Samper, Alma, I, 254-256, and Salvador Camacho Roldan,Memories (0193), pp. 195-196. For the disorders in Cauca, see [RamonMercado], Memorias sobre los acontecimientos del sur de la Nueva Granadadurante la administration del 7 marzo de 1849 ( 1853); [Avelino Escobar?],Resefia hist6rica de los principales acontecimientos de la ciudad de Cali, desdeel aiio de 1848 hasta el de 1855 inclusive (1856); Gustavo Arboleda, Histoiiacontempordnea de Colombia (Popaya'n, 1919), III, 151-157. Conditions inBogota are described in Venancio Ortiz, Historia de la revolucio'ndel 17 deabril de 1854 (i855).9. For the events leading up to the Melo coup, see the work cited above byOrtiz and Carlos Lozano y Lozano, "El golpe de cartel del 17 de abril de1854," Boletin de Historia y Antigiiedades, XXXI: 361-362 (Nov.-Dec. 1944),


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254 IAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPARIn 1856 the Liberals, having settled their former differences, wereable to present a single candidate, Manuel Murillo, in the presidentialelection of that year. The Conservative nominee was Mariano Ospina

Rodriguez, while ex-President Mosquera, who had been talking since1849 about the need for an electoral alliance of moderate progressiveslike himself, ran as the candidate of a National party composed mainlyof dissident Conservatives.10 Ospina won the election, but was facedin i86o by a revolution led by Mosquera, who now broke definitivelywith the Conservatives and won the support of most Liberal leaders.'The success of the revolution meant the restoration of Liberal rule,but many Liberals, especially the Golgotas, who were now knownas Radicals, doubted the ex-President's commitment to constitutional-ism and were critical of his intemperate anti-clericalism. On the otherhand, many surviving Draconianos were now devoted followers ofMosquera.The discord between Radicals and Mosqueristas emerged duringthe constitutional convention of 1863 in Rionegro (Antioquia) thatdrafted a federal constitution severely limiting the powers of the execu-tive and of the central government.12 The two factions of the partywere still at odds when Mosquera took office in 1866 to begin a two-year term as President. A series of conflicts between the Presidentand Congress, which was dominated by Radicals and Conservatives,led to Mosquera's closure of the legislature on April 29, 1867. Reactingto what they considered the imposition of a dictatorship, the Radicalseffortlessly deposed the President on May 23, winning by their actionthe plaudits of many Conservatives as well.131074-1102. On Melo, see also J. Leon Helguera, "El 'paquete chileno' delgeneral Melo," Archivos, 1:2 (July-Dec. 1967), 415-432.io. For Mosquera's aims in 1849, see J. Leon Helguera and Robert H. Davis(eds.), Archivo epistolar del General Mosquera:Correspondenciacon el GeneralRamdn Espina, 1835-1866 (1966), pp. 209-212, and Luis Augusto Cuervo (ed.),Epistolario del Doctor RtufinoCuervo (1922), III, 248-249. The election of1856 is discussed in Arboleda (Cali, 1933), IV, 426-430, 435-436.

ii. The revolution of 1860-1862 is described from different points of view inFelipe Perez, Anales de la revol'uci6n, egi'n sus propios documentos (1862) andAngel Cuervo, Co'mo se evapora tn ejercito (2d ed., 1953).12. For proceedings of the constitutional convention, see Anales de la Conven-cio'n (Rionegro), February 12, 1863, to June 30, 1863, as well as two accountsby delegates: Camacho Roldan, Memorias, pp. 271 ff., and Aquileo Parra,Memorias (1912), pp. 276 ff. A secondary account containing many documents

is Ramon Correa, La convention de Rionegro (1937).13. For the deposition of Mosquera, see Pablo E. Cardenas Acosta, "Larestauracionconstitutional de 1867," Boletin de Historia y Antigiiedades, XLIV:510-518 (Apr.-Dec. 1957), 165-205, 393-439, 573-618. Mosquera was broughtto trial for his misdeeds and sent into exile. The charges against him, as wellas his defense, are contained in Causa contra el Presidente de los Estados


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 255From 1867 to 1875 the federal government remained in the handsof Liberals formerly identified with Radicalism, and the party leader-ship was able to maintain a satisfactory level of cohesion. Neverthe-less, disaffection was by no means absent from Liberal ranks duringthis period and was to burst forth during the presidential election of1875, in many ways the most significant political contest to take placein nineteenth-century Colombia. In that election Rafael Nuifiez un-successfully challenged Aquileo Parra, choice of incumbent PresidentSantiago Perez, whom he had served as secretary of finance and de-velopment. At this time the followers of Nuiiez were not yet knownas Independents, ordinarily being called Nuiistas after their standard-

bearer. Parra's supporters were called Parristas, not Radicals, thoughtheir enemies usually referred to them as the "oligarchs." Although thislabel was pinned indiscriminately on all Parristas, it was directedchiefly at Manuel Murillo, Santiago Perez, and the men most closelyassociated with them, such as Parra, Perez' younger brother Felipe,Nicolas Esguerra, and Felipe Zapata.The use of the term "oligarchs"to designate the Parristas reflectedone of the principal charges hurled at them by the Nufiistas: thatthey wished to monopolize political power in Colombia. Ex-PresidentMosquera expressed the views of many Nuniistas when he wroteearly in 1875 that he found it "intolerable that a circle should wantto dominate the nation from Bogota, centralizing power and corrupt-ing the electoral system."14 As this statement suggests, it was theoligarchs' manipulation of the electoral process that provoked theangriest outcries from the Nuiiistas.Under the constitution of 1863, the President of the Union waselected by the votes of the nine states; that is, an election was heldin each state every two years, and the winner in each contest receivedthe vote of that state, a majority of five votes being needed for elec-tion. In practice, this meant that it was the disposition of the chiefexecutives of the states, who were also called presidents, and theirlocal agents that determined the outcome of national presidential elec-tions and that presidential aspirants and their backers had to assurethemselves of the support of at least five of the state governments.It was the contention of the Nuhistas in 1875 that the oligarchs hadUnidos de Colombia, Ciudadano Jeneral Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera i otrosaltos funcionariosfederales (1867). Mosquerareturnedto Colombia in 1871 andbecame president of Cauca that same year.14. Mosquera to Cesar Conto, January 13, 1875, Ms. #113, Biblioteca Luis-Angel Arango, Bogota'. This collection consists of 21 items, most of them letterswritten to Conto in 1876-1877. The Biblioteca Luis-Angel Arango will hence-forth be cited as BL-AA.


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256 HAHR MSAY I HELEN DELPARused their positions in the federal government to interfere shamelesslyin the affairs of the states in order to ensure the establishment orpreservation of regimes friendly to their interests, even to the extentof using the Colombian Guard, or national army, for this purpose.15Only two years before, when Julian Trujillo had run against SantiagoPerez for the presidency with considerable Conservative support, theincumbent, Manuel Murillo, had been accused of overthrowing thegovernment of Panamai and of acting to nullify a Trujillo victory inBoyaca in order to win these states for Perez. Now the Trujillistassupported Nu'fiez almost to a man.Besides his desire to end the hegemony of the oligarchs, ex-Presi-dent Mosquera had at least one other reason for working on behalf ofNuifiez: the advisability of electing a President who was a costeijo,or native of one of the Atlantic Coast states of Bolivar, Magdalena,and Panamat.16This feeling was shared by many Liberal politiciansfrom that region who resented the fact that costeios seemed to beexcluded from serious consideration for the presidency and whobelieved that the coastal states had been systematically neglected anddiscriminated against by the federal government.17 One of the earliestmanifestations of support for Nuifiez came from a Liberal conventionheld in Barranquilla (Bolivar) in January, 1875, for the purpose ofselecting a presidential candidate from the Coast; the delegates, all ofthem costefos, unanimously chose Nuifiez as their standard-bearer.18Rafael Nuifiez, who had also been mentioned as a presidentialpossibility in 1873, was in many ways ideally suited to become thecandidate of the costeios and of other dissatisfied Liberals.'9 Bornin Cartagena, the capital of Bolivar, in 1825, he had begun his politicalcareer in Panama, where he had married the sister-in-law of a promi-nent Liberal leader, and quickly had made his mark in Bogota. Al-though Nufiiez had been identified with the Golgota-Radicals as ayoung man, he also had served in the cabinet under Obando in 1853

15. For Nuiiista editorials expressing this point of view, see El Correo deColombia, January20, 1875; La Union Colombiana, March 24, 1875; El ElectorNational (Barranquilla), June 26, 1875.16. Mosquerato Cesar Conto, December 12, 1874, Ms. #113, BL-AA.17. No costeio had ever been elected to the presidency since independencewas achieved. For a sampling of costefio dissatisfaction,see La Palestra (Mom-pox, Bolivar), June 21, 1873, and El Escudo Nacional (Cartagena), May 18,1875. See also Parra,Memorias,pp. 6o6-6io.18. El Progreso (Panama), January 24, 1875.19. Numerous biographies of Nti'ez have been written, among them JoseRamon Vergara, Escrutinio hist6rico: Rafael NMifiez 1939); Joaquin Tamayo,N'ifiez (1939); Indalecio Lievano Aguirre, Rafael Ns'iez (3d ed., 1946); Gus-tavo Otero Munioz,Un hombre y una epoca: La vida azarosa de Rafael Ntiiez(1951).


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 257and under Mosquera in 1862. Since 1863 he had lived in the UnitedStates and Europe and was therefore free of any direct responsibilityfor the acts of recent administrations. At the same time his frequentcontributions to the Liberal press in Colombia had kept him in thepublic eye and had given further evidence of his impressive intellectualgifts.Nuifiez'opponent, Aquileo Parra, who also had been born in 1825,was a native of Santander.20 He described his family as being goodbut of modest financial status. Forced to drop out of school at anearly age, he had embarked upon a series of commercial and agri-cultural ventures that eventually made him a man of considerablemeans. He had simultaneously-though reluctantly, according to hisown account-begun to take part in state and national politics andhad been a delegate to the Rionegro convention. His close politicalties with Murillo and with Santiago Perez now led to his being brandedthe "official" or "palace" candidate.In endorsing Parra in 1875, the Diario de Cundinamarca, the lead-ing Bogota' spokesman for the Liberal administrations of the early1870's, laid special stress on the fact that Parra had overcome povertyand adversity to attain his present eminence.2' The writer of theeditorial-presumably Florentino Vezga, like Parra a native of San-tander-also observed that Parra had been born in a region wherethere never had been slaves, where all men treated each other asequals, and where no form of labor was considered dishonorable. Thisstatement, which was no doubt meant as a slur against Nunez' placeof birth, reflected the contemporary belief that in Santander, where thepopulation was largely white and mestizo and where there had beenfew slaves at the time of abolition, society was more egalitarian thanin most other parts of Colombia and that inhabitants of the regionwere characterized by an industriousness matched only by that of theantioqueios. In 1881 Nuniez was to recall "the hateful designationsof a personal character relative to the race and industrial habits" ofthe costeios that had been made during the 1875 campaign.22 Whetherthe oligarchs did in fact give themselves "airs of superiority," asNu'fiez charged, remains a matter for speculation, but costeios alreadysmarting from the neglect of the federal government would have beenquick to detect such an attitude if it did exist and become even more20. The best source of information on Parra's early life is his Memorias,which end in 1876.21. Diario de Cundinamarca, January25, 1875.22. La Luz, November 15, i88i, reprinted in Rafael Nulfiez, La reformapolitical en Colombia (1944), I, part i, 8i.


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258 HAR | MAY I HELEN DELPA13embittered. One of Nuifiez' biographers has suggested that SantiagoPerez did harbor a special antipathy for costeiios.23It also has been asserted that the oligarchs regarded Nuiiiiezhim-self with an irrational dislike that accounted for their unflagging op-position to his political ambitions in the 1870s and i88os.24 On thispoint there is no conclusive evidence. Parra relates in his memoirsthat neither he nor Murillo felt particularly hostile toward Nifiez.25And despite the acrimony of the presidential election, Nunez wasable to write to Parra in 1877, praising the latter's conduct in officeand stating that the two shared identical ideas and sentiments.26Whatever his feelings toward Parra may have been, Nuinfezevidentlythought little of Murillo, whom he described in 1876 as "corruptionincarnate."27Although the Nitiistas refrained from attacking Parra personallyin 1875, they mounted a strong offensive against the project withwhich he was most closely associated-the Northern Railroad, whichwas to have linked Bogota' with the lower Magdalena River by wayof Boyaca and Santander. Parra in fact had accepted the post ofsecretary of finance and development in Murillo's cabinet in 1872primarily to devote himself to the Northern Railroad, which Murillocalled "the greatest and most important enterprise for our country andabove all for the state of Santander."28Plans for the construction of this railroad took shape in 1872 shortlyafter Murillo's inauguration for his second presidential term, an oc-casion which he used to stress the importance of the telegraph, therailroad, and other means of communication in stimulating the eco-nomic and intellectual development of a people and in creating thesolidarity of interests and sympathies that he felt were needed to23. Vergara, Escrutinio historic, p. 176.24. Cf. Lievano Aguirre, Rafael Nnfiez, 113-114, and Tamayo, Nuniez,78-79. The event that is most frequently cited as evidence of the Radicals'personal hostility toward Nui'iez is their defeat of his appointment as Colombianminister to the United States when it was presented to the Senate for con-firmationin 1879. See Vergara, Escrutiniohistorico, p. 197, and Carlos Holguin,Cartas politicas publicadas en "El Correo Nacional" (1951), pp. 146-147.25. Parra, Memorias,pp. 685-686.26. Nuifiezto Parra, January 3, i877, in Correspondenciade Aquileo Parra,in the possession of Horacio Rodriguez Plata, Bogota (henceforth to be citedas CdeAP). See also Nunfiez o Parra, September 6, 1877, ibid.27. Nuifiez to Luis Carlos Rico, May 29, 1876, Ms. #99, BL-AA. Thiscollection consists of 52 items, mainly letters from Nuifiez to Rico. See alsoNui'iez to Miguel Camacho Roldain,October 3, 1866, and to Rico, December17, 1878, ibid.28. Murillo to Parra, December 13, 1871, and January 22, 1872, CdeAP.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 259perfect the federal system in Colombia.29 A few weeks later Murillounveiled to Congress the project that he had in mind-an inter-oceanic highway, consisting of both roads and railroad lines andfinanced at least in part by the federal government.30 Murillo thoughtthat two portions of this great highway could be undertaken at once:a railroad linking the Pacific port of Buenaventura with Cali and theCauca River, for which a preliminary contract had already beenapproved, and the Northern Railroad.The initial steps, both financial and organizational, for the con-struction of the Northern Railroad were taken during the Murillo andPerez administrations, and negotiations were begun to obtain a twenty-million peso loan in Europe. However, for a variety of reasons theproject aroused great opposition from many Liberals. Some whoapproved of the railroad in principle objected to the specific routechosen in 1873 on the advice of William Ridley, an engineer in theemploy of an English firm. Ridley had recommended that the linebe built to a point on the Carare River near its confluence with theMagdalena.31 Other critics of the railroad used a combination ofarguments: that the extent of federal participation in the enterpriseviolated the rights of the states and the canons of sound Liberal eco-nomic thought; that the construction of such a railroad was beyondthe financial capacity of the nation; and that the railroad, even if itcould be built, would benefit only three states (Cundinamarca,Boyaca, and Santander) while consuming virtually all of the revenueof the federal government.32All of these objections were aired repeatedly during the 1875 cam-paign, and one contributor to a newspaper in Palmira (Cauca) wentso far as to say that their attitude toward the Northern Railroadrepresented the only difference between the supporters of Parra andthose of Nufez.33 The position of Nifiez himself is somewhat unclear;in his memoirs Parra referred to him as a supporter of the railroad, but

29. Diario Oficial, April 1, 1872.30. Ibid., April 30, 1872. Murillo justified federal sponsorship of such ahighway by citing Article 17, clause 6, of the Rionegro,constitution,which gaveto the federal government jurisdiction over existing and future inter-oceanicroutes.31. Parra, Memorias, pp. 627-648; El Ferrocarril del Norte (Duitama,Boyaca), 1872-1873, passim.32. For Liberal criticism of the railroad,see a series of articles by SalvadorCamacho Roldan in the Diario de Cundinamarca inl 1874, reprinted in hisEscritos varios (31892-1895), III, 31-go; El Telegrafo (Palmira, Cauca), 1875,passim; El Correo de Colombia, February 3, 1875; La Union Colombiana,March 24, 1875.33. El Tel6grafo, May 6, 1875.


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26o HAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPARin a letter to Parra on February 2, 1874, Nunez indicated that his sup-port was not unqualified since he warned that no "irrational"sacri-fices should be made to build the railroad and asserted the necessityof showing beforehand that the railroad could be made to pay its wayin the first few years of operation.34

The leading Parristas of 1875 tended to be Liberals who wereclosely identified with policies of recent administrations such as thatrepresented by the Northern Railroad.35 Of thirteen individuals whoserved in the cabinet between 1870 and 1874 and whose preferencein 1875 could be ascertained, only four supported Nunez while nine,including Parra himself, were Parristas. If the Parristas are studiedon the basis of regional origins, no clear-cut national pattern emerges,but it does become apparent that Parra had the support of the greatmajority of Liberal politicians from his home state of Santander, whichhad been and continued to be the bastion of Radicalism; on the otherhand, very few Parristas came from the coastal states or from Cauca,ex-President Mosquera's bailiwick.In 1875 Nui'iez had the backing not only of Mosquera himself,but also of his followers. While data on the preferences of all theleading Mosqueristas with respect to the 1875 contest is not available,there can be no doubt that the Liberals most closely associated withhim in the i86os-Julian Trujillo, Jose Maria Rojas Garrido, FroilanLargacha, Andres Ceron, to name but a few-were Nuijistas in 1875.The only prominent Liberal identified as a Mosquerista in the 186os whois known to have supported Parra in 1875 was Ramon Gomez, nick-named el Sapo, or "the Toad," who was boss of the most notoriouspolitical machine in nineteenth-century Colombia.36 Indeed, CarlosHolguin, chief architect of the Independent-Conservative alliance ofthe i88os, would write in 1893 that Mosquerismo had been the soul ofthe Independent movement.37It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the Nuiista ranksin 1875 were made up exclusively or even mainly of Mosqueristas.The challenge to the oligarchs in 1875 was serious precisely because

34. Parra, Memorias, pp. 685-686; N'fiez to Parra, February 2, 1874, CdeAP.35. The preferences of Liberal politicians in this or any presidential electionin which Liberals competed can best be determined by examination of thedozens of adhesiones, or endorsements of candidates, that appeared in the partypress.36. The Gomez machine dominated the state of Cundinamarca at differenttimes in the i86os and early 1870s. See La Opinio'n, July 6 and July 21, 1863,September 7, 1864, January 25, i865; El Liberal, June 3 and July 26, 1870;Jose Maria Quijano Otero, "Diario de Quijano Otero," Boletin de Historia yAntigiiedades, XIX (1932), 372-373.37. Holguin, Cartas political, p. ii8.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 261Nuifiez had the support of Liberals who had been closely associatedwith them in the past, such as Salvador Camacho Roldan and PabloArosemena, or who had acted as intermediaries in the old Radical-Mosquerista struggles, such as Santos Acosta and Eustorgio Salgar.Liberals were induced to support Nuifiez in 1875 for a variety ofmotives. The desire to dislodge the oligarchs no doubt accountedfor the support given by those who felt that they were being unjustlyexcluded from positions of influence in the federal government. Amongthese were individuals tainted by Mosquerismo as well as thecostefios who believed that their interests and those of their regionwere being slighted. To some extent these two groups overlappedsince Mosquera had a strong personal following in the Coastal statesthat can be traced at least as far back as the presidential election of1856, when he had carried the state of Panama and four of the sixprovinces that later made up the states of Magdalena and Bolivar.38Some Nuijistas may have genuinely hoped for an end to "palace"candidates and to the fraud and violence that had marred recent elec-tions. Others, such as Camacho Roldan, had strongly opposed theNorthern Railroad. Finally, according to Parra, a few Nuniistas weremotivated by personal grievances against him.39There is no evidence that the Nuniistas as a group were distressedby the extreme federalism of the Constitution of 1863 or that they wereconcerned with the problem of strengthening the federal governmentat the expense of the states. In fact, one of the chief Nufiista chargesagainst the oligarchs was that they had consistently violated thesovereignty of the states by unconstitutionally interfering in theirinternal affairs.This is not to imply that neither Nuiistas nor Parristas had reserva-tions about the constitution; it is simply to state that constitutionalreform to strengthen the federal government was not a subject of de-bate among Liberals in 1875. The desirability of increasing federalpowers had been asserted by Liberals of all factions almost from themoment the constitution was promulgated; that so little was donemay be attributed to the difficulty of reconciling the conflictingpolitical interests of the era and to the fact that amendment of theconstitution was virtually impossible since the approval of all ninestates as represented in the Senate was required.40

38. Arboleda, Historia contemporanea,IV, 435-436.39. Parra, Memorias,pp. 663-679.40. Only one amendment succeeded in passing these hurdles while the Rio-negro constitutionwas in effect. Approved in 1876, it provided that presidentialelections be held on the same date throughout the country (El Tradicionista,June 9 and July 4, 1876).


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262 HAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPARNor did the Nufistas of 1875 accuse their opponents of an unreal-istic adherence to laissez-faire principles. As the paragraphs on theNorthern Railroad may have suggested, by the early 1870s manyone-time G61gotas had modified their youthful commitment to laissez-faire. Murillo, for example, had shed his earlier conviction that eco-nomic development should come entirely from the efforts of theindividual and that the state should confine itself to giving securityto the citizenry; instead, he had come to the conclusion that the gov-ernment should be the prime mover of progressive enterprises ofconcern to the entire community.41 Aquileo Parra held somewhatsimilar views. The extent to which the government should intervene

in the economy, he believed, depended on the intellectual advance-ment and technical knowledge of the citizenry and, above all, on thedevelopment of their spirit of cooperation. For a country like Colom-bia, government support of education and of certain economic activi-ties was essential; in the United States or England, private enterprisewould fill the void left by the state.42To attack the oligarchs as a group for excessive devotion to laissez-faire, then, would not have been an effective strategy for the Nuijistassince such a charge could have been easily refuted by the statementsand actions of the oligarchs themselves. Nor did the Nufiistas indicatea desire to carry state interventionism beyond the point favored bythe oligarchs. If anything, articles in the Nufista press were morelikely to assail the oligarchs for violating traditional Liberal principles,both in the political and economic spheres. As one Nuffista editorialput it, "Liberal policy in recent years has been openly reactionary,going directly against the spirit and letter of our federal constitution."43During the campaign of 1875 the question of Church-State rela-tions played a comparatively minor role in the debate between sup-porters of the two Liberal candidates. This probably stemmed atleast in part from the fact that both Liberal factions included withintheir ranks individuals of divergent views on the subject. Nuifiez him-self made various statements which were interpreted as indicating adesire for greater harmony between Church and State and provoked

41. These views were expressed in a speech delivered in 1872 (DiarioOficial,April 19, 1872). For Murillo's ideas in the early 1850's, see his Memoriadel Secretariode Hacienda de la Nueva Granadaal Congreso Constitucionalde1850 (1850) and Informe del Secretario de Estado del Despacho de la NuevaGranada a las Cdmaras Lefislativas de 1852 (31852). See also El Tiempo,December 6, 1859.

42. [Aquileo Parra], Memoria del Secretario de Hacienda i Fomento dirijidaal Presidente de la Repuiblicapara el Congreso de 1873 (1873), p. 68.43. La Union Colombiana, March 24, 1875.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 263the criticism of anticlerical Parristas. Some of his supporters wereconvinced that the clergy constituted a subversive element withinColombia, but felt that excessive State control over the Church wascontrary to Liberal principle and in any case self-defeating; this wasthe position of Salvador Camacho Roldacn,who wrote in 1878 that"what we seek in this country is not the repression of the Catholicidea but the complete emancipation of human thought, and thisrequires freedom for Catholics and for non-Catholics, for those whobelieve and for those who do not."44 However, other Nuiistas believedthat stringent State control over the clergy was necessary to preventtheir conspiring against Liberal institutions. Among these was Mos-quera, who had been responsible for the most strongly anti-clericalmeasures enacted in nineteenth-century Colombia-the nationalizationof Church property, the suppression of religious communities, and theassertion of the executive's right of "tuition," or protection, over theChurch-and had continued to express alarm over what he called"neo-Catholic fanaticism," especially in Cauca.45Another prominent Nuffista, Camilo A. Echeverri, viewed Nuniezas a man who would respect the religious beliefs of the masses, butwould end the "adulterous union" of Church and State that character-ized the Perez administration, which he felt was a "subject" of theCatholic spiritual power.46 That such a statement could be madeseriously was a reflection of the fact that the Perez government, likethe other Radical-oligarch administrations of the i86os and earlyl870s, had been comparatively moderate in Church matters. Duringhis first term in the presidency (1864-1866) Murillo had been con-sistently conciliatory toward the Church and had revoked sentencesof banishment under which the Archbishop of Bogota and the Bishopof Antioquia had been expelled from their sees by Mosquera.47 Anti-clericalism had again flared after Mosquera took office in i866; withhis deposition by the Radicals the following year, a relaxation oftension had occurred.48 Prior to 1875 neither Parra nor SantiagoPerez had ever been associated with extreme anti-clericalism, and the

44. La Reforma, May 25, 1878, reprinted in Camacho Rolda'n,Escritos, II,73. 45. Mosquera used this expression in a letter to Conto, October 28, 1874,Ms. #;113, BL-AA. See also Mosquera to Conto, December 2, 1874, ibid., andan open letter from Mosquera to President Murillo on November 6, 1872, to-gether with Murillo's reply, in Diario de Cundinamarca,November 3o, 1872.46. El Correo de Colombia, February 3, i875.47. Jose Restrepo Posada, Arquidiocesis de Bogota':Datos biogrdficosde susprelados, Tomo II, 1823-1868 (1963), 467-471.48. Ibid., pp. 490-512.


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264 HAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPARlatter was, according to contemporary accounts, a practicing Catholic.49To be sure, hostility between the Liberal party and the Churchnever subsided entirely, even during periods of comparative tran-quility, and the Radicals, as Liberals, hoped to see a reduction inthe spiritual and temporal influence of the clergy over the Colombianpeople. In addition, all Liberals were likely to be particularly hostileto the clergy when they felt that the latter were allowing the Con-servatives to exploit religious issues for political purposes. Neverthe-less, it is incorrect to label the Radicals as being consistently anti-clerical in contrast to the more moderate Nuijistas. In 1875 the formerhad a better record of relative moderation on the Church-State ques-tion than did most of the Nuniistas.As the elections of 1875 took place, the Nuhistas became convincedthat their worst charges about the oligarchs were all too well-founded.50The former accused President Perez, probably with justification, oftoppling the governments of Panamai and Magdalena in order to winthose states for Parra and of using similarly underhanded tactics inCundinamarca. For their part the Parristas held that the Nuiiistaswere preparing to launch a revolution should their candidate be de-feated, and President Perez dismissed the secretary of war, RamonSanto Domingo Vila, and the commander of the Colombian Guard,Solon Wilches, both of whom were Nuiistas, when they refused tosign a statement pledging the Guard to neutrality in the election.Since neither Nuifiez nor Parra won the five state votes needed forelection, the contest had to be decided by Congress. After threeweeks of uncertainty and intrigue, the balloting took place on Feb-ruary 21, 1876, and resulted in a victory for Parra, who received forty-eight votes; Nuifiez received eighteen, as did Conservative BartolomeCalvo, who was the choice of the delegations from the Conservative-controlled states of Antioquia and Tolima.51 Parra tried to follow a

49. Cf. Revista de Colombia, March 22, 1873.50. The election of 1875, particularly its episodes of violence and fraud, isdescribed in numerous works, few of which are impartial. See, for example,Eduardo Rodriguez Pifieres, "La gran derrota de Rafael Nn'fiez: La revolutionde 1875," Revista de America (September 1947), 327-346; Gustavo OteroMufioz, Wilches y su epoca (Bucaramanga, 1936), 194-195; Anibal Galindo,Recuerdos hist6ricos: 184o a 1895 (1900), 194-198; Vergara, Escrutinio hist6rico,pp. 354ff.51i Calvo, like Nufiez, was a native of Cartagena. For relations between

Ni'fiez and the Conservatives, see Otero Munoz, Nutfiez, 58-63. The ballotingof February 21, 1876, is described in Jose Maria Quijano Wallis, Memoriasautobiogrdficas, hist6rico-politicas y de charactersocial (Grottaferrata, Italy,1919), pp. 248-258. See also Diario de Cundinamarca, January 29, February 14,February i5, February 26, and March 16-21, 1876; El Tradicionista, February15, February i8, and February 22, 1876.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 265conciliatory course as President, but the election had engendered suchbitter feelings within the Liberal party that the Conservatives rosein revolt in 1876 in the expectation that the Nuijistas would refuseto support the government. Although Conservative hopes in thisrespect proved unfounded and most of the Nuiiistas actively aided thegovernment in its successful attempt to crush the revolution, the fissurewithin the Liberal party was not permanently healed since theNufiista grievances of 1875 remained unsatisfied. Indeed, the party'sdivision was deepened by several new sources of controversy whicharose in the wake of the Liberal victory over the Conservatives. Atthe same time the failure of the Conservative attempt to regain powerby force of arms convinced the leaders of that party that their bestchance for future success lay in an alliance with one of the two Liberalfactions.As a result of these circumstances, the years 1878-1885 saw asteady decline in Radical fortunes until in the latter year they rose inarmed revolt against the government of Nuifiez,then serving his secondterm in the presidency. Nulfiez thereupon turned to the Conserva-tives for military assistance in quelling the insurrection. It must beemphasized, however, that by 1885 the Liberal division had been large-ly healed and the Radical wing of the party included many one-timeNufiistas who had become disenchanted with the leadership of Nuifiez.The most inflammatory of the issues which emerged after theConservative defeat in 1877 was related to the ever-recurring religiousquestion, itself an important factor in bringing about the revolution.Since 1870 relations between Church and State had become increas-ingly strained in many parts of the country as a result of the federalgovernment's assumption of an expanded role in primary educationand the establishment of several normal schools headed by Protestantprofessors imported from Germany.52 Provision was made for religiousinstruction in the primary schools, and some prelates, notably Arch-bishop Vicente Arbelaez of Bogota, proved willing to accept thesecular schools provided they were not used for the dissemination ofanti-Catholic doctrine.53 In Cauca, however, there was virulent cler-

52. For the federal government'sefforts on behalf of primary education andthe Conservative-clerical reaction, see Jane Meyer Loy, "Modernization andEducational Reform in Colombia, 1863-1886" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,University of Wisconsin, 1969); Enrique Cortes, Escritos varios (Paris, 1896),II, 79-185; Ramon Zapata, Ddmaso Zapata o la reforma educacionista enColombia ( 1960).53. Archbishop Arbelaez to Jose Telesforo Paul, Bishop of Panama, June 17,1876, Ms. #97, BL-AA. This collection consists of 134 letters written from1875 to 1888 to Bishop Paul, who became Arbelaez' successor as Archbishop of


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266 HAHR I MAY HELEN DELPARical opposition to the Liberal educational program, and Bishop CarlosBermudez of Popayan forbade parents to send their children to publicelementary schools.54 Fanatic Liberals in that state, meanwhile,claimed that the furor was part of a Conservative conspiracy to regainpolitical power. On March 15, 1876, Cesar Conto, president of thestate, informed Parra that the Conservatives had joined the clergy inan attempt to make federal education laws unenforceable in Caucaand warned that if the federal government did not take action tomake itself obeyed, the entire nation would find itself in the handsof the Papal Curia.55In Cauca, where the Conservative revolution began in July, 1876,the conflict resembled a Catholic crusade as well as a struggle forpolitical ends. Indeed, the religious character of the revolt in Caucaand other sections of the country persuaded at least two prominentNuijistas to support the Parra government.56 After the conclusionof the war, Congress, which was by then composed exclusively ofLiberals (Nufiistas as well as Parristas), resolved to end clerical inter-ference in political matters once and for all by passing several severelyrestrictive pieces of legislation. Law 35 of 1877 was designed to pre-vent clerical opposition to laws of the federal and state governmentsand to acts of public authority.57 By Law 37 of the same year fourprelates accused of fomenting the revolution-the Bishops of Pasto,Popaya'n, Medellin, and Antioquia-were banished from Colombia forten years and were forbidden ever again to exercise their ecclesiasticalfunctions within the national borders.58 In addition, anti-clericalismwas revived on the state level, especially in Cauca, where PresidentConto had anticipated the federal government by ordering on Febru-ary 4, 1877, the expulsion of the Bishops of Pasto and Popayan fromthat state.59Bogota'. See also Jose RestrepoPosada, Arquidiocesisde Bogota: Datos biogrdficosde sits prelados, Tomo III, 1868-1891 (1966), 109-310, passim.54. For the conflict over the schools in Cauca, see Jose Maria QuijanoWallis,Memorias atitobiogrdficas,pp. 213-219, and Gonzalo Uribe V., Los arzobisposy obispos colombianosdesde el tiempo de la colonia hasta nuestros dias (1918),pp. 83-86. See also the reports (April 29 and May lo, 1876) of Damaso Zapata,sent by Parrato investigate the situation in Cauca, in CdeAP.55. Conto to Parra, March 15, 1876, CdeAP.56. The two Nuiiista3referred to were Solon Wilches of Santanderand PabloArosemenaof Panamai.For the former, see Otero Mufioz, Wilches, pp. 239-243,and for the latter, see Manuel Bricefio, La revolucio'n(1876-1877): Recuerdospara la historia (2d ed., 1947), p. 181. See also QuijanoOtero, "Diario,"p. 587.57. Diario Oficial, May 12, 1877.58. Ibid., May 15, 1877.59. Juan Pablo Restrepo,La Iglesia y el Estado en Colombia (London, 1885),


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 267Another source of controversy was the collection of forced loansfrom Conservatives during the recent revolution to raise funds to sup-port the government's military effort. The usual procedure was to

demand a fixed sum from a Conservative; if he was unable or un-willing to pay the required amount in cash-and in some cases, evenif he was-his property would be seized and frequently auctioned offat a fraction of its value to a deserving Liberal. Such practices were,of course, a standard by-product of civil war in nineteenth-centuryColombia, but contemporaries appeared to feel that the depredationsof 1876-1877, particularly where real estate was involved, exceededanything that had occurred in the past. Nuifiez later commented thatduring the revolution "the abuses committed with respect to realestate reached such alarming proportions that it could be perceivedthat the country was rapidly approaching the state of barbarism wherethis matter was concerned."60 The situation was especially bad inCauca, where forced loans continued to be collected even after thefederal government had ordered their suspension.6' Many personsalso were shocked by the looting of Cali on December 24, 1876, byLiberal troops who, according to one account, were restrained bytheir superiors only when they began to attack the property of Lib-erals.62Division within the party reappeared during the administration ofJulian Trujillo, a Nuiiista in 1875, who had added luster to his militaryreputation during the recent revolution. Although he had been electedas a unity candidate, dissension began almost immediately after hetook office on April 1, 1878. It was during his two-year term that hissupporters and those of Nufiiez, who served briefly as secretary offinance and development, became known as Independents while theirLiberal adversaries revived the Radical label for themselves, probablypp. 612ff.; Uribe V., Los Arzobispos, pp. 84-91; Conto to Parra, February 2o,1877, CdeAP.6o. La Luz, August i, 1882, reprintedin Ni'diez,La reformnaolitical,I, part 1,251.6i. Post-war conditions in Cauca are vividly described by Parra's corre-spondents. See, for example, letters to Parra from Julian Trujillo, April 21 andOctober 23, 1877; from Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, September 7 and ii,1877; from Modesto Garces, September ii and 19, 1877, CdeAP. For forcedloans in Cundinamarca,see Bricenlo,La revolucion, pp. 265-269, and MiguelSamiper, Escritos politico-economicos (1925-1927), II, 401-413; for Antioquia,see J. D. Monsalve, Biografta del Doctor Luis Maria Restrepo y datos sobre larevolucio'nde Antioquia (1876-1877) (1892), pp. 42-43.

62. Phanor James Eder, El Fundador Santiago M. Eder (Recuerdos de suvida y anotaciones para la historia economic del Valle del Cauca) (1959),pp. 283-299.


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268 HAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPARto suggest a parallel between contemporary conditions and the struggleagainst Mosquera in 1866-1867.Nutfiezgave the Independent movement a sonorous if convenientlyvague slogan in a speech delivered on the occasion of Trujillo's in-auguration when he warned that catastrophe threatened Colombiaunless a "fundamental administrative regeneration" were undertaken.63Shortly afterwards Trujillo gave the Independents a program in a seriesof messages to Congress. On April 27, 1878, he asked for changesin the ecclesiastical laws, including the extension of amnesty to theexiled bishops and the repeal of certain provisions of Law 35 of 1877.64Congress, where the Radicals had a majority, politely but firmlyturned down the President's request, declaring that it would be in-opportune to legislate on religious matters at that time.65 In 188o,however, the Independent-controlled Congress revoked the sentenceof exile against the bishops, and Law 35 was repealed two years later.In another message Trujillo expressed a desire for an end to thecollection of forced loans and requested authorization to returnauctioned real estate to the original owners with reasonable compensa-tion to purchasers and payment to the national treasury of the loanthe nonpayment of which had resulted in the auction.66 The follow-ing September Trujillo issued a decree permanently ending the col-lection of forced loans. A law providing for the return of propertythat had been auctioned as a loan or contribution during and after therevolution of 1876-1877 was passed in L882.66aA third part of the Independent program of 1878 dealt with thefederal government's role in promoting internal improvements. In amessage to Congress on April 25, Trujillo stressed the need for suchimprovements and expressed the hope that a "moderate"foreign loanmight be obtained to finance the construction of railroads.67 He madeit clear, however, that all states would share equally in the benefitsto be derived from such a loan and indicated that henceforth thefederal government would play a more limited role in the develop-ment of transportation. This new policy meant in effect the abandon-ment of the favorite project of Parra and the Radicals, the NorthernRailroad; in the future, emphasis would be placed on more modestbut perhaps more realistic enterprises designed to provide short,

63. Vergara, Escrutinio hist6rico, pp. 190-194.64. La Reforma, May 8, 1878.65. Ibid., May i8, 1878.66. Ibid.66a. Leyes de los Estados Unidos de Colombia expedidas en el afo de 1882(1882), pp. 70-72; Nui'iez,La reformapolitical, I, part 1, 249-253.67. Diario Oficial, April 29, 1878.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 269direct links between major towns and between the interior and theMagdalena.The Independent program was expanded in 188o when Nunfiezsucceeded Trujillo in the presidency, having been elected with thesupport of the Independents and a sizable portion of the Conservativeparty. In his inaugural address on April 8, Nunez called for estab-lishment of a protective tariff to stimulate domestic industry and forthe creation of a National Bank to serve as a spur to economic growth.68Duties on imports, which had been assessed on the basis of grossweight since i86i, had been rising during the 1870s, but there was nowconsiderable Radical opposition to the adoption of a frankly protec-tionist policy, primarily for two reasons: the belief that Colombia wasdestined to remain an exporter of agricultural products, at least in theforeseeable future, and the undesirability of granting preferential treat-ment to a few Bogota artisans at the expense of the consumer.69 TheRadicals directed even heavier fire at the proposed National Bank,which they declared would be monopolistic and would drive privatebanks out of business.70 Despite the objections of the Radicals, billscreating a protective tariff and a National Bank were passed by Con-gress in 188o.

It was the hope of Nunez that the National Bank would help liftthe Colombian economy from the depressed state into which it hadfallen in the late 1870s after a period of comparative prosperity earlierin the decade. To some extent a reflection of unfavorable conditions inother parts of the world, the Colombian depression, which can beblamed in part for the political agitation of the period, was largelythe result of the low prices which the nation's exchange-earning ex-ports, especially cinchona bark, were commanding in European mar-kets.71 Although the National Bank, which went into operation onJanuary i, i88i, as a completely official institution issuing notes re-

68. Diario de Cundinamarca,April 9, i88o.69. Bushnell, "Two Stages," pp. 17-18. See also La Defensa, May 27, i88o,and Samper, Escritos, I, 195-291.70. The Banco de Bogota, which began operations in 1871, was Colombia'sfirst successful bank of issue. In i88i there were 42 banks in existence, 12 ofthem in Cundinamarca and ii in Antioquia (Camacho Roldain,Escritos, II,338-339). A sample of Radical objections to the National Bank can be foundin La Defensa, April i6, 188o, and Diario de Cundinamarca, June 23, i88o.See also Samper, Escritos, III, 11-96.71. For economic conditions in Colombia at this time, see Ospina Vasquez,Industria y proteccio'n, 276; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise,"pp. 282-283,291-292; Camacho Roldan, Escritos, I, 665-674; Carlos Calderon, La cuestio'nmonetaria en Colombia (Madrid, 1905), pp. 46-55; Robert C. Beyer, "TheColombian Coffee Industry: Origins and Major Trends, 1740-1940" (unpublishedPh.D. dissertation,University of Minnesota, 1947), PP. 114-115, 117.


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270 HAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPABdeemable in silver, did not destroy the private banks as the Radicalshad predicted, it did not produce an economic upturn.72 Shortly afterNulfiez took office for the second time on August il, 1884, he reportedto Congress that the federal treasury was running a monthly deficit ofat least Loo,ooopesos and that the nation was in the midst of "the mostserious industrial and monetary crisis" it had ever known.73

Despite the vigor of their blasts at the Bank and the tariff, it islikely that the Radicals were moved at least as much by political con-siderations as by devotion to the Liberal doctrine of the 1850s, sincethey themselves had not hesitated to adulterate it in the past. TheLiberals retained a vague commitment to free trade during the restof the century, but this issue never occupied a prominent place intheir subsequent demands for reform, which dealt primarily withpolitical matters.74 To be sure, the National Bank did remain a majortarget for Liberal criticism, but this was mainly because after 1885the Bank's notes were no longer convertible and were declared bythe government to be the only legal tender in Colombia. Subse-quently, Liberals and many Conservatives regularly inveighed againstthe shady financial manipulations of the Bank and, after its liquidationin 1894, against the government's increasing emissions of paper money75In his inaugural address in 1884, Nulfiez called himself an "irre-vocable member of Colombian liberalism" and pledged to reconsti-tute the party's scattered forces.76 Despite the President's avowalof his devotion to liberalism, however, by 1884 he had lost the supportof most of the top-ranking Liberals who had backed him in the 1870s,and the Independent party had been reduced to a shadow of itsformer self.

Some of the defections can be ascribed to the thwarted politicalambitions of Independent leaders in various states. In addition,Liberal importers and businessmen connected with the Banco deBogota and other private banks could be expected to be critical ofthe legislation of i88o and hope for a reversal of policy with an end72. Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccidn, p. 278.73. Diario Oficial, August 30, 1884.74. For Liberal programs in the 189os, see El Relator, May i6, 1893, andConvention Nacional Eleccionaria del Partido Liberal, 1897 (1897), pp. 25-28.75. Colombianmonetary policy in the 189os is discussed in numerous works,among them Samper, Escritos, II, 97-235; Miguel Antonio Caro, Escritos sobrecuestiones econdmicas (1943), pp. 59-66; F[rancis] Loraine Petre, The Republicof Colombia (London, 1906), pp. 305ff.; L[uis] E[duardo] Nieto Caballero,Le Cours Force'et Son Histoire en Colombie (Paris, 19LL).76. Diario Oficial, August il, 1884.


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 271of Independent rule.77 But the most important factor in the disen-chantment of many erstwhile Nuijistas was probably their fear thatthe Independents would allow the federal government to fall into thehands of the Conservatives. By 1879 the leading Conservative partychiefs, particularly Carlos Holguin and Antonio B. Cuervo, had con-cluded that revolution had to be discarded as a method of regainingpolitical power and that the most feasible route to this end would bethrough cooperation with the Independents.78 Although this policyencountered resistance from individual Conservatives who mistrustedNuiiez, the party gave him significant support in the presidentialelection of 1879 and officially endorsed his candidacy in 1883.79 TheIndependents, of course, had to balance their animosity toward theRadicals against the hazards of cooperation with the Conservatives.In 1876 Nu'fiez himself had indicated that he was undecided as tothe proper course. "Should we lean toward the oligarchs out of fearof the Conservatives?",he asked one of his supporters. "Or should weunite as much as possible with the latter even though we may laterbe dominated by the theocratic element?"80 To most Independents,if not to Nuifiez, the latter alternative was unacceptable.The disintegration of the Independent movement was signalledas early as July 20, 188o, when two former chief executives, SantosAcosta and Eustorgio Salgar, both of whom had been Nuijistas in1875, joined Radical ex-Presidents Santiago Perez and Aquileo Parrain a committee formed to direct the activities of Liberals willing torecognize their authority.81 An even more impressive set of defectionstook place the following year when the Radicals were able to capturethe presidential candidate selected by Nuifiez and the Independents,Francisco Javier Zalduia, and proclaim him as their own choice.82This attempt at "Liberal union" had the support of such prominentIndependents as Julia'nTrujillo and Salvador Camacho Roldan, though

77. Cf. Lievano Aguirre, Rafael Nufiez, p. 163, and Samper, Escritos, III,94-95.78. For an expression of Holguin and Cuervo's thoughts on this matter, seetheir joint address to the Conservative convention of 1879, Ms. #30, BL-AA.This folder and Ms. #31 consist of documents pertaining to Cuervo's life from1854 to 3888.79. El Deber, May 2, September 36, and October 19, 1879; [Carlos MartinezSilva], "Revista politica," El Repertorio Colombiano, 11: 12 (June 1879), 474;El Ccmservador,April 24, 1883.8o. Nuifiez to Juan de Dios Restrepo, July 8, 1876, Ms. #99, BL-AA.8i. La Defensa, July 29, i88o.82. Quijano Wallis, Memorias autobiogrdficas,pp. 412-416; La Unio'n, May13, 188i; [Carlos Martinez Silval, "Revista politica," El RepertorioColombiano,VI:34 (April i88i), 312-315; "Cartasdel Doctor N'uliez," Boletin de Historia yAntigiiedades, XXXIV:387-389 (Jan.-Mar. 1947), 26-27.


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272 HAHB I MAY I HELEN DELPABnot that of Nu'iiez himself. In a manifesto to Independents on April30, i88i, Trujillo and Camacho Rolda'n warned of the dangers in-herent in Conservative support for one of the Liberal factions andpointed out that the original reasons for the party's split had dis-appeared: both of the presidential aspirants of 1875 had served aschief executive; respect for religious beliefs was now the order of theday; and public funds were being spent on internal improvementsof the second rank that would pave the way for the great enterprisethat would one day link the states of the interior, this last statementbeing a reference to the new railroad policy then in effect.83By the time Nuniez began his second term, therefore, the ranksof the Independents had been greatly thinned, with many of theleading members of the movement having rejoined the Radicals. Whenthe revolution of 1885 broke out, Nufiiez, who had long been in favorof constitutional reform, took advantage of the opportunity to burythe Rionegro constitution. He called instead for the writing of adrastically different charter, which, as promulgated in i886, greatlyexpanded the powers of the chief executive, ended federalism, andgave preferential treatment to the Catholic Church.84 Although nineof the eighteen men who attended the constitutional convention wereIndependents, only a few had been nationally known Liberals, andthe chief author of the new constitution, Miguel Antonio Caro, wasof Conservative background. Consequently, it is inaccurate to statethat the Constitution of i886 and the regime which it establishedwere the creations of both Independent Liberals and Conservatives.In an effort to destroy the old partisan labels, supporters of theRegeneration formed a new political organization, the National party,composed of Independents and Conservatives, but it soon became evi-

83. La Union, May 13, 1881.84. For a statement by Nunfiezoutlining his views on constitutional reform,see La Nacion, November 13, 1885. On the drafting of the constitution, seeJose Maria Samper, Derecho pftblico interno de Colombia (1886), I, 329ff., andMiguel Antonio Caro, Estudios constitucionales (1951). Nuniez was elected toa six-year presidential term in 1886 by the Council of Delegates which draftedthe new constitution. He was re-elected in 1892, but died in 1894, being suc-ceeded by Vice President Miguel Antonio Caro. It should be pointed out thatfrom 1886 to 1894 Ni'iiez wielded executive power himself only for about ayear in 1887-1888. He spent most of this eight-year period in retirement inCartagenawhile presidentialalternatesor vice presidents acted as chief executive.The extent to which Nunfiezwas able or willing to exert influence on politiciansin Bogota' cannot be determined with certainty as yet. According to one ofhis biographers, during the last four years of his life "the titular President al-lowed those entrusted with the governmentfull liberty to dispose of the nation'sfate according to their will, limiting himself to, giving advice when he wasconsulted" (Otero Mufioz, Nuinhez, pp. 384-385).


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ASPECTS OF LIBERAL FACTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA 273dent that the Independents would be overshadowed by their newassociates. Several Independents who had played important rolesin the events of 1885-1886 were discarded in the next few years, amongthem Vice President Eliseo Payain, who was stripped of his title in1887 for dallying with his former Liberal comrades.85 By mid-1888the preponderance of the Conservative party had been assured: Con-servatives held five of the seven ministries and headed six of the nine-departments.86 At the end of that year Nuniez tried to assure LuisCarlos Rico, an Independent from Boyaca, that Carlos Holguin, thenserving as chief executive in Nlufiez' absence, would save the Inde-pendents from "complete eclipse," but Rico hoped that Nufiiez him-self would infuse the Independents with "new life" through his cor-respondence.87 Eventually the Independents became part of theNationalist or National wing of the Conservative party.In the meantime, former Independents continued to return to theLiberal party. In 1891 a newly formed Liberal Center, composed ofParra, Camacho Roldan, and Luis A. Robles, in a set of directives tobe circulated confidentially in the departments, recommended thatthe party press avoid the revival of old quarrels that might discourageformer adversaries who wanted to rejoin the party. "We especiallyurge," the statement continued, that our press omit the terms Radicaland Independent. We ought to recognize only Liberals."88 Thesewords indicate not only that the re-entry of Independents into Liberalranks was continuing, but also that they may have occasionally re-ceived a less than cordial welcome from those who blamed them forthe party's present plight. However, if it was in the Liberal interestto minimize past divisions, the Conservatives stood to gain as muchby attempting to perpetuate the Radical-Independent split. Amongthe Liberals these terms soon became extinct, but the pro-administra-tion press continued to refer to its non-Conservative opponents asRadicals well into the decade of the 189os.Impermanent though it was, the Liberal split of the 1870s hadled to a Conservative restoration and to the destruction of the insti-tutions set up at Rionegro. But other factors, which cannot be dis-cussed here, also contributed to the Liberal debacle, among them thelack of effective Radical leadership; state and local issues that in-

85. Otero Mui'oz, Nuifiiez, p. 305 $f.86. Ibid., p. 321.87. Nunfiez o Rico, November 22, 1888, and Rico to Nufiiez,January 7, i888(sic; the year was actually 1889), Ms. #99, BL-AA.88. Circular from the Liberal Center, May 2, 18giL, n the Copiador Parra,which contains copies of the Center's correspondence, 1891-1892, and is in thepossession of the Academia Colombiana de Historia, Bogota'.


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274 HAHR I MAY I HELEN DELPARfluenced the course of national affairs; and the changing views andinclinations of Rafael Nufiiez. All of these, together with the eventssketched on the preceding pages, must be considered by the historianwho seeks an understanding of the decade 1878-1885 in Colombianhistory.

Documents

H. Delpar Aspects of Liberal Factionalism