Guthrie W K C History Greek Philosophy Volume 3 Part 1 Sophists

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T H E S O P H I S T S

B Y

W . K . C . G U T H R I E

F . B . A .

C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

C A M B R I D G E

L O N D O N · N E W Y O R K · M E L B O U R N E



Publis hed by the Syn dics of the Cambr idg e Univ ersi ty Press

Th e Pi t t Building, Trum ping ton Street, Cambridg e C B I I B P

B e n t l e y House , 20 0 Euston Road, London N W I 2DB

3 2 East 5 7 t h Street, New Y o r k , NY 1 0 0 2 2 , U S A

2 9 6 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, Australia

© Cam bri dge Unive rsity Press 1971

ISBN ο 5 2i 0 9 6 6 6 9

First published as Part 1 o f A History of

Greek Philosophy, Volume i l l (Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1969)

Reprinted 1 9 7 7

Printed in Great Britain at the

Universi ty Press, Cambrid ge



C O N T E N T S

List of Abbreviations page ix

Preface ι

I I N T R O D U C T I O N 3

II T O P I C S O F T H E D A Y 14

III W H A T I S A S O P H I S T ? 27

(1 ) The word 'sophist' 27

(2) The Sophists 35

(a) Professionalism 35

(b) Inter-city status 40

(c) Methods 41

(d) Interests and general outlook 44(e) Decline or adolescence? 49

( / ) Rhetoric and scepticism 50

(g) Fate of sophistic literature: Plato and

Aristotle 51

I V T H E ' N O M O S ' - ' P H Y S I S ' A N T I T H E S I S I N M O R A L S

A N D P O L I T I C S 55

( 1 ) Introductory 55

(2) The upholders of nomos 60

(a) Anthropological theories of progress 60

(b) Protagoras on the original state of man 63

(c) Other equations of nomos with the just

and right (Critias, examples from Hero

dotus and Euripides, Socrates, the Anon.

Iamblichi, pseudo-Lysias, the speech

against Aristogeiton) 68

A p p e n d i x : some passages descriptive of

human progress 79

ν



Contents

v i

(3) T h e realists page 84

(a) Thucydides 84

(b) Thrasymachus in the Republic 88

(c) Glaucon and Adimantus 97

(d) Nature and necessity 99

(4) T h e upholders o f physis 101

(a) Selfish 101

(i) C a l l i c l e s : physis as the right of the

stronger 101

(ii) Antiphon: physis as enlightened

self-interest 107

(iii) Other witnesses (Euripides,

Aristophanes, Plato) 113

(b) Humanitarian: written and unwritten law 117

A p p e n d i x : Pindar on nomos 131

V T H E S O C I A L C O M P A C T 135

V I E Q U A L I T Y 148

(1 ) Political equality 148

(2) Equality o f wealth 152

(3) Social equality 152

(4) Slavery 155

(5) Racial equality 160

V I I T H E R E L A T I V I T Y O F V A L U E S A N D I T S E F F E C T S O N

E T H I C A L T H E O R Y 164

V I I I R H E T O R I C A N D P H I L O S O P H Y (Seeming and bei ng , *-

b e l i e v i n g and knowing, persuading and proving) 176

( 1 ) General 176

(2) Protagoras 181

A p p e n d i x : Protagoras fr. 1 D K 188

(3) Gorgias 192

(4) Other v i e w s : scepticism extreme and moder

ate (Xeniades, Cratylus, Antiphon) 200



Contents

(5) Language and its objects page 204

(6) Grammar 219

Additional notes: (1) Prodicus and Thucy

dides, (2) Synonymic and philosophy 223

IX R A T I O N A L I S T T H E O R I E S O F R E L I G I O N :

A G N O S T I C I S M A N D A T H E I S M 226

( 1 ) Criticisms of traditional religion 226

(2) Agnosticism: Protagoras 234

(3) Atheism: Diagoras, Prodicus, Critias;Plato's two types of atheist 235

(4) Monotheism: Antisthenes 247

X C A N V I R T U E B E T A U G H T ? 250

X I T H E M E N 261

Introduction 261

( 1 ) Protagoras 262

(2) Gorgias 269

(3) Prodicus 274

(4) Hippias 280

(5) Antiphon 285Additional note: the identity of Antiphon 292

(6) Thrasymachus 294

(7) Critias 298

(8) Antisthenes 304

(9) Alcidamas 311

(10) Lycophron 313( 1 1 ) Anonymous writers 314

(a) The 'Anonymus Iamblichi' 314

(i) Th e' Do ub le Arguments' 316

v ii



Contents

Bibliography page 321

Index of passages quoted or referred to 331

General Index 330

Index of selected Greek words 345

vi i i



L I S T OF A B B R E V I A T I O N S

M o s t works cited in abbreviated form in the text w i l l be easily recogniz

able under the author's or editor's name in the bibliography. It may

h o w e v e r be helpful to list the following:

P E R I O D I C A L S

AJ Ρ American Journal of Philology.

BICS Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (London).CP Classical Philology.

CQ Classical Quarterly.

CR Classical Review.

GGA Gottingische Gelehrte Anêigen.

HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.

J HI Journal of the History of Ideas.

JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies.

PC PS Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society.

REG Revue des Iitudes Grecques.

Τ Α Ρ Α Transactions of the American Phifalogical Association.

O T H E R W O R K S

CGF Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, ed. Meineke.

D K Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.K R G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers.

L S J Liddell-Scott-Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed.

OCD Oxford Classical Dictionary.

OP Oxyrhynchus Papyri.

RE Realencyclopadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft,

ed. Wissowa, Kroll et al.

TGF Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, ed. Nauck.Z N Zeller-Nestle (see bibliography).

ix





P R E F A C E

The third volume of m y History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge

University Press, 1969) was divided into tw o parts, entitled respec

tively ' The Worl d of the Sophists' and 'Socrates'. By issuing the two

parts separately in paperback form, the Press hopes to make them more

easily and cheaply available to students. This book reproduces the first

part, with the minimum o f alterations necessary to allow it to appear as

a separate publication. Mentions o f ' vo l . 1' or ' vo l . 11' in the text refer

to the earlier volumes o f this work.

The original title for the first part was chosen to mark the fact that

it is impossible to understand the Sophists without taking into account

a wider circle o f writers and indeed the general contemporary climate

o f thought. Philosophy in the middle o f the fifth century B . C . was

c lose ly bound up with problems o f practical l i v i n g , with v i e w s on

morals and politics and the origin and purpose of organized societies,

and the biggest difficulty which it presented was that o f setting limits

to the subject. What an authority on the eighteenth century has said of

thephihsophes o f that epoch is equally true o f the Sophists, namely that

' w h i l e the Enlightenment was a family o f philosophes,it was something

more as w e l l : it was a cultural climate, a world in which the philosophes

acted, from which they noisily rebelled and quietly drew many of their

ideas, and on which they attempted to impose their programme'.1

One cannot isolate the Sophists from their contemporary world, from

writers like T h u c y d i d e s , Euripides, Aristophanes and the orators, whileat the same time any tendency to allow the volume to develop into a

history o f Greek literature had, for obvious reasons, to be resisted.

A recent writer has remarked on the powerful impact which has

a l w a y s been made by fresh and immediate contact with the great minds

of ancient Greece. More than once it has proved an inspiration to

St ruggles for political freedom, so much so that the authorities o f

C z a r i s t Russia, unable to suppress classical studies entirely, sought tocombat their revolutionary effect b y confining them to the harmless

channel o f the textual exegesis of a few selected authors instead o f

1

Peter Gay, Tht Enlightenment; an Interpretation, London , 1967 , p. xi i .

I



Preface

a l l o w i n g them the more dangerous outlet of education in ancient

pol i t ica l theory.1

Without departing from the limited aims of a his

torian, I may be allowed to hope that the link uniting Greek political

and social ideas to the reconciliation of freedom with order in the

modern world may never be broken.

B o o k s have most frequently been referred to in the text and notes by

short titles, and articles by periodical and date only. Full particulars of

b o o k s , and titles and page-references for articles, w i l l be found in the

bibliography. The fragments of the Sophists, and other texts relating

to them, are included in the Fragmente der Vorsokratiker of Diels and

K r a n z (abbreviated D K) . They are also to be found, with certain

additions, Italian translation and commentary, in the four fascicules of

Untersteiner's / Sofistt. This is referred to here as Sof., f o l l o w e d by

the number of the fascicule, whereas Sophs, stands for his book on the

Sophists in its English translation b y K. Freeman. Th e texts in an Ά '

section of DK (Tesamonid) have their number preceded by this letter,

and those in a ' B ' section, purporting to be actual quotations from the

philosopher in question, are designated 'fr.' (fragment). Treatises in

the Hippocratic Corpus have been referred to by book (when in more

than one book) and chapter, f o l l o w e d uniformly by the volume and

page in Littre's edition. Those who prefer to consult the Corpus

Medicorum Graecorum (originally edited by Heiberg, L e i p z i g , 1927) for

the particular treatises which it includes w i l l not, I hope, find the'

passages difficult to locate.

Translations, from both ancient and modern authors, are my own

unless otherwise stated.

D O W N I N G C O L L E G E , C A M B R I D G E W . K . C . G .

M A R C H I97I

1

H. G. Graham , ' T h e Classics in the Soviet Un io n' , Class. World, L I V ( 1 9 6 0 - 1 ) , 107.

2



I

I N T R O D U C T I O N

' T o describe is to select; to select is to evaluate; to evaluate is to criticize.'

Gouldner, Enter Plato, 168.

T h e Presocratic philosophers dealt to a large extent with questions

which might be said to have been settled long ago, and to possess

now an interest which is purely historical. We no longer debate

whether the earth is round or flat, and i f we want to discover the origin

and substance of the stars, we are hardly likely to be helped by the

speculations of Xenophanes or Anaxagoras. With the change that

came over philosophy in the fifth century, we are plunged into a

discussion of questions which are as relevant now as they were when

first raised by the Sophists. Whatever we may think of the Sophistic

movement, we must all agree that (as Alban Lesky puts it in his history

o f Greek literature) no intellectual movement can be compared with

it in the permanence of its results, and that the questions which the

Sophists posed have never been allowed to lapse in the history of

Western thought down to our own day.1

This is obvious from

many recent writings on the period, in which the conflict between the

Sophistic and Platonic points of v i e w is expounded, even by pro

fessional scholars, in tones not so much of dispassionate historical

investigation as of vehement partisanship. It is difficult to remain

impartial in discussing questions which are of such vital importance

to the preservation of civi l ized values in our own day.

1 L e s k y , 341 . Ma ny of course have made the same point. O ne ma y take at ran dom a Ge rma n

( W . Schmid, Gesch. 1 . 3 . 1 , 1 1 6 ) : ' T h e questions and controversies of that time have lost nothing

o f their actuality'; or an Italian (Gigante, Nom. Bas. 1 5 ) : 'The theoretical foundation of the

gene ral doc tr ine o f la w in the twen tie th centu ry recap itula tes the spe cul ati on o f fifth-century

G r e e k Sophis t i c ' I t s e f fec t on the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century is v i v i d l y portrayed

lit Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of the Enlightenment, especially ch. 6, where he justifies his statement (p. 285) that 'after more than two thousand years the eighteenth century establishes direct

contact with the think ing of a n t i q ui t y. . . T he tw o fundamental theses represented in Plato' s

Htpuilic by Socrates and Thr asy ma chu s opp ose each other again.' T h e y still stand oppos ed

today.

3



Introduction

In spite of the shift of interest from natural phenomena to human

affairs, there are nevertheless essential connexions between the Pre

socratic tradition and the new intellectual ferment generated by the

Sophists. The Presocratics may fairly be said to have been pre

occupied with the nature of reality and its relation to sensiblephenomena. This question of the relation between reality and appear

ance remains at the root of things, and in one form or another consti

tutes the fundamental difference between rival philosophies. On the

one hand we have a complex of ideas whose basis may be loosely

summed up in such terms as empiricism, positivism, phenomenalism,

individualism, relativism and humanism. Appearances are constantly

shifting, from one moment to the next and between one individual

and another, and they themselves constitute the only reality. In morals

this leads to a 'situational ethics', an emphasis on the immediately

practical and a distrust of general and permanent rules and principles.

Such rules or principles could remain valid only if instituted by some

divine power, and religious bel ie fs , along with many other hitherto

unquestioned traditions, are challenged on the grounds that they

cannot be verified by positive evidence. This outlook in its turn is

opposed by the attempt to restore, with philosophical justification, a -*

bel ief in absolute standards and permanent and unvarying truths

existing above, and unaffected by, sensible phenomena and individual

actions and events. We may call it (using similarly evocative but as

yet undefined terms) absolutism, idealism or transcendentalism. The first

v i e w is typified by the sayings of Protagoras, earliest and greatest of

the Sophists, that man is the measure of all things and the existence

o f gods an undemonstrable assumption. The second is rooted in the

teaching of Socrates, but culminates later in Plato's ideal theory,

according to which such concepts as justice and beauty, as w e l l as

identity and equality and many others, have an existence apart from

the human mind, as independent and unvarying standards to which

human perceptions and human actions can and must be referred.

With this goes naturally a v i e w of the world as the product of divine

intelligence.

It is remarkable how many arguments that might be thought to be

ethical or political, and so to deal with purely practical matters,

4



Morals and Metaphysics

depend in fact on much deeper philosophical issues. This is none

the less true because the men of action who put them into practice may

not always be aware of it; and often the connexion is in fact a ful ly

conscious one. Politics and morals, general theories of human nature,

metaphysics and epistemology cannot be separated. On the surfacew e may have political differences about the relative merits of

monarchy and republicanism, democracy and totalitarianism, and the

general question of where sovereignty should lie, whether in the

hands of one man, a select aristocracy or the whole people. We have

questions, demanding immediate action, of slavery and its abolition,

o f colonial rule, or race-relations. B e l o w this is a leve l of ideas which,

w h i l e still remaining on the human plane, are more abstract andtheoretical, raising fundamental questions of human nature. A re all

men naturally equal? Is the existence of rulers and subjects, masters

and servants, merely a matter o f practical convenience, or is it grounded

in ineradicable natural differences? In studying the various answers

that have been g i v e n to these questions, the historian w i l l often find

that their explanation lies at a third, still deeper l e ve l . They rest on

assumptions about the nature of reality and the workings of the

universe, determining man's position within it, on the issues of divine

government versus chance, a cosmos whose members are all organic

ally related as opposed to a collection of unrelated parts thrown

together at random.

A n example is furnished by the English civi l war of the seventeenth

century. On the surface it is a political struggle between two rival

fact ions , K i n g and Parliament, as to which should govern. Beneath

this was the question whether men are naturally, or divinely, divided

into higher and lower orders; and those who believed that they were

based this belief on the existence of a hierarchical dispensation pre

v a i l i n g throughout the whole of nature. At the head is God, the

supreme ruler, after him the angels, then man, who in turn is lord

o v e r the animals, beneath which come plants and lowest of all the

inanimate world. God himself has ordained that there should be

higher and lower orders of being, and intended that a similar pattern

should be f o l l o w ed in human society. Here, in divine ordinance, lay

the ultimate sanction for absolute monarchy. Christian principles,

5



Introduction

6

which most of us now believe to teach that all men are equal in God's

sight, were then invoked to prove precisely the opposite.1

What is invoked here is the analogy between microcosm and

macrocosm, the order of human society and the order o f nature,

involving the conception of the universe as a divinely constructed and

close-knit organism, which goes back to Plato and beyond. Equally

deeply rooted in Greek thought was the rival philosophy that found

its political expression in the idea of a social compact upheld by

L o c k e and others. The relations between a ruler and his subjects are

based on acceptance of this compact, which lays obligations on both

sides. It is no divine ordinance but a purely human agreement, and a

people has the right to depose a ruler who breaks it just as he may

punish his subjects if they disobey the laws in which it is embodied.

The idea of law as no more than an agreement, instituted by men and

alterable by consent, is , as we shall see, basic to the humanism of the

Greek Sophists, and is attacked by Plato, for whom justice and law

exist in their own right, and all that we can do is to try to reproduce

them, so far as possible, in our relations with one another. For a later

parallel one might cite Hugo Grotius, in whose work 'the Platonism

o f modern natural law is most perfectly expressed In enacting hisvarious positive laws the legislator f o l l o w s an absolutely universally

valid norm which is exemplary for his own as w e l l as for every other

w i l l . ' 2

The Sophists had held up nature as the antithesis o f law, wrongly,

said Plato, for nature itself, as the product of rational design, is the

supreme embodiment of law and order.

In epistemology the one philosophy, initiated by Parmenides and

elaborated by Plato, displays unbounded confidence in the powers ofhuman reason, which for Plato is based on the essential identity of

reason in man and God. Parmenides rejected the senses entirely, and

1

Fil mer tho ug ht it 'a fault scarce pardon able in a Chris tia n' to beli eve in a co mm un it y of

goods and equality of person s (Greenleaf, Order, Empiricism and Politics, 92). For Pusey the

mere recognition of rank and station was still 'a fact in God's providence' (Report of the R o y a l

Commiss ion on the Universities 1852, on the wearin g o f distinctive gow ns by nobl emen) .

C f . Miss M. A. Stodart reviewing Jane Eyre in the Quarterly Review, 84 (December 1 8 4 8 ) ,

1 7 3 — 4 : 'A l together the auto-biography of Jane Ey re is pre-emi nentl y an anti-Ch ristian co m

posit ion. Th er e is thr ou gh ou t it a mur mur in g against the comfo rts of the rich and against

the privat ions of the poor, w hi ch , as far as each individual is conc erned , is a mur mur ing against

G o d ' s appointment. '1

£. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 240.



Empiricism and Rationalism

Plato would allow them no loftier role than as a starting-point which

the mind must quickly leave behind. If heeded too much, they could

o n l y be a hindrance to the comprehension of reality. Knowledge

o n l y deserved the name if it was absolute and universal, and to attain

such knowledge it was necessary to transcend experience, penetratingthe ve i l of sense and rousing into consciousness truths that were

latent in the mind because that immortal essence had already been

vouchsa fe d a direct vision of them in its disembodied state.

The reappearance of this outlook in later history can be strikingly

illustrated by a passage from Dr W. H. Greenleaf's book Order,

Empiricism and Politics (276 f.) describing rationalism in seventeenth-

century England:

The rationalist philosophers of the time . . . shared many features of thought

with the empirical tradition but basically their views were contrary to

its tenets. While the empiricist acknowledged the importance of the rational

faculty and had great faith in its ability to understand the reality of things,

he nonetheless placed primary emphasis on the need to base the process of

reasoning on a solid foundation of experience. Reliable sense-data were

the first requirement of his inductive method. On the other hand, therationalist tended to stress the unique significance of reason alone and to

argue that the other faculties of memory and imagination, far from being

o f assistance in the comprehension of reality, presented obstacles to its

achievement. Information derived from the senses was, therefore, obscure,

unreliable and misleading, and it was only by transcending experience to

the higher level of reason that indubitable conclusions could be reached.

This reason was an innate faculty, an inner light, placed in every individual

by God, which guaranteed its compatibility with the reality of his creation.It was self-sufficient in the sense that its intuitions alone provided the clear

and precise understanding characteristic of and basic to true knowledge.

Like the empirical reason, it analysed and resolved things into basic

'natures'; however, these were not mere names (as they were to the

empiricist), but real, absolute ideas.

T h i s account is drawn from contemporary English sources, but its

derivation wi l l be obvious to any reader of Plato; and, although theauthor goes on to name Descartes, with his vision of a 'universal

mathematical science', as the prototype of such notions, the seven

teenth-century rationalists knew their Plato too, and no doubt looked

7



Introduction

8

on him as their first ancestor. The idea of mathematics as a model of

exact and rational science is certainly not absent from his works. It is

the Platonic philosophy which Macaulay rightly singled out as

dominant over men's minds up to the time when Francis Bacon

turned them in a new direction.The empirical outlook holds a much more modest v i e w of the

human faculties. Doubts of the adequacy of our equipment to attain

truth were first v o i c e d in a religious context in contrast to the clarity

o f divine vision,1

but in Ionians like Anaxagoras and Democritus we

see rather the modesty of the scientific spirit. For Democritus in his

more pessimistic moments, 'we know nothing, for truth is in the

depths', and 'either truth does not exist or it is hidden from us'. Buthe was not a complete sceptic.

2

The senses g i v e a false picture of

reality, and for the mind to probe beneath their 'bastard knowledge'

is not easy; but at least for him there was a reality behind appearances,

whether or not we could grasp it ful ly. Even this was abandoned by

some of the Sophists in favour of an out-and-out phenomenalism.

S u c h radical scepticism as that of Protagoras and Gorgias was hardly

helpful to the progress of scientific thought. It was a violent reactionfrom the extreme rationalism o f the Elea t ics , but it owed much to the atti

tude of contemporary Ionian scientists, whose religious agnosticism

or disbelief, denial of final causes, and humility before the magni

tude of cosmic problems in comparison with the feebleness of human

perceptions cleared the way for every variety of free thought. Here too

they have their counterparts in other periods, including our own.

A s to the upsurge of the scientific spirit at the Renaissance, no onecan read far in the literature of the time without observing its openly

a c k n o w l e d g e d connexion with the Greek philosophers. Stimulus to

empirical methods and the whole empirical way of thought came from

the revival of Greek learning as much as from contemporary advances

in knowledge. A founder of experimental science like Francis Bacon

knew w e l l that the two competing schools of thought in his own day

reflected a similar conflict of ideas in the ancient world. He wrote for

instance in De Augmentis Scientiarum:

1

E.g . by Alc maeo n, Xeno phan es and Heraclitus. See vo l. I, 344, 398.

2

Fr. 1 1 7 and A 1 1 2 . S e e v o l . 1 1 , 461 f.



Empiricism and Idealism

For this reason the natural philosophy of Democritus and others who have

removed God and mind from the fabric of the world, who have attributed

the construction of the universe to an infinity of attempts and experiments

on the part of nature (which they called by the single name of chance or

fate) and assigned the causes of particular things to necessity, without

admixture of final causes, seems to me (so far as one may conjecture from

the fragmentary remains of their philosophy) to be, so far as physical

causes are concerned, on a much firmer basis, and to have penetrated more

deeply into nature, than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; and this

solely for the one reason, that they wasted no thought on final causes,

whereas Plato and Aristotle forced them in at every turn.1

Kathleen Nott was hardly fair to Bacon in giving Lord Russell

the credit for pointing out that there are two main lines of development through European thought in so far as it stems from the Greeks,

the idealist and the empirical, one beginning with Plato and the other

with Democritus. Like most people since Bacon she is a partisan: ' On

the whole, the humane developments have sprung from the empirical

approach, while those which are anti-human can be linked with

various forms of philosophical idealism.'2

The empiricism and scepticism of the Sophists can best be understood in contrast to their most redoubtable opponent, the idealism

o f Plato ;3 but this immediately presents a problem for the study

o f Sophistic thought. With the Sophists we are in the same situa

tion as with the Presocratics, of reconstructing the ideas of men

whose own writings are for the most part no longer available, and our

richest source of information is Plato himself, their philosophical

opponent. At the same time the dramatic skill with which he presentstheir personalities and conversation, and the sheer charm of his literary

productions (seldom if ever equalled by any other philosopher),

1

De Augm. Sc. bk. 3, ch. 4. I hav e translated the Lati n, wh ic h w i l l be found in vol. I o f

the E l l i s and Spedding edition, 5 6 9 f. Th ei r ow n translation is in vol . iv , 36 3 f.

' 'German Influence on Modern French Thought ' , The Listener, 13 January 1 9 5 5 .

• T w o points should be noted here. (1) A t a later stag e it w i l l be necessary to determine

more precisely w h o the Sophist s we re , and wha t is the meani ng of the wo rd . A t present I am

a l l o w i n g m y s e l f to use it in a bro ad sense to stand for certain trends o f th ou gh t wh i ch the men

Culled Sophists certainly represented, even if not e x c l u s i v e l y . (2 ) It is usual to couple Socrateswith Pluto in this connexion, because it is through the mouth of Socrates that Plato delivers

most o f his attacks on the Sophist s in his dialog ues. T he position of Socrates, ho we ve r, is mor e

c o m p l e x , and for the present it w i l l be preferable to speak of Plato alone as at the opposite pole

from Sophistic thought.

9



Introduction

make an almost indelible impression on our minds. The present

century has seen a particularly violent controversy over the fairness

or otherwise of Plato's account and the relative merits of the two w a y s

o f looking at the world.

Until comparatively recently the prevailing v i e w , the v i e w in which

a scholar of my own generation was brought up, was that in his

quarrel with the Sophists Plato was right. He was what he claimed to

b e , the real philosopher or lover of wisdom, and the Sophists were

superficial, destructive, and at worst deliberate deceivers, purveyors

o f sophistry in the modern sense of that term. Since the 1930s,

h o w e v e r , we have seen a strong movement to reinstate the Sophists

and their kin as champions of progress and enlightenment, and a

revulsion from Plato as a bigoted reactionary and authoritarian who

b y blackening their reputation has ensured the suppression of their

writings. Sir Karl Popper has christened them 'the Great Generation', Λ

and it is they who are primarily referred to in the title of Professor

H a v e l o c k ' s book The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics. To him they

represent the spearhead of liberal and democratic thinking in Greece,

w h i c h was overwhelmed by the big battalions represented by Plato

and Aristotle. 1 In 1953 the American scholar R. B. Levinson could

say , sadly, that 't oday friendship for Plato is to be found chiefly

among those scholars (and their friends and disciples) whose vision

o f him antedated the rise of N a z i s m ' . It is true that a powerful impetus

to this movement was g i v e n by the rise of totalitarian governments

in Europe and the second world war, and it was indeed disturbing to

learn that the aim of the German Nazi party, as described in its official

programme, was the production of' guardians in the highest Platonicsense'. Another form o f attack was the psychoanalytical, which saw

Plato as a guilt-ridden homosexualist with an irresistible urge to

dominate.2

1

For an interesting critique o f Hav elo ck' s bo ok see L. Strauss, 'T h e Libera lism o f Classical

Pol i t i ca l Phi losophy ' , in J. of Metaph. 1959.1 would commend in particular his final paragraph,

in which he speaks of 'the danger that stems from the inspiration of scholarship b y wh at is

called a ph ilo so ph y' , and of the alleged tolerance w hi ch ' t u rns into violent hatred o f those w h o

have stated most clearly and most forcibly that there are unchangeable standards founded in

th e nature o f man a nd the nature of th ings ' .

3

T h e fullest and mo st influential att ack on Pla to and eu lo gy of the empiri cists is Sir Kar l

Popper ' s The Open Society and its Enemies ( 1 9 4 5 , 5t h ed . 1 9 6 6 ) . T h e attack in its modern form

began with W. Fite's The Platonic Legend ( 1 9 3 4 ) , and has grown into a considerable literature,

I O



Modern Defenders of the Sophists

H o w e v e r , as I have tried to show, such a dispute goes deeper than

contemporary events or fashionable theories, and in fact disagreement

o v e r Plato's presentation of the Sophists is older than some of the dis

putants on either side seem to remember. From the middle of the

nineteenth century the question was vigorously and ably debated.

Zel ler ' s History in its first edition (1844-52) was probably the last to

uphold unchallenged the v i e w that the teaching of even the best of the

Sophists was bound in the end to reduce everything to a matter of

individual preference and prejudice, and turn philosophy from the

search for truth into a means of satisfying the demands of selfishness

and vanity; and that the only way out was that of Socrates, who sought

to win back by reason a deeper, surer foundation for both knowledge

and morality (ZN, 1439). This v i e w had been particularly strongly

held in Germany, and was opposed by Grote in the powerful ch. lxvi i

o f his History of Greece. The German historians of philosophy, he

complained, 'dress up a fiend called "Die Sophistik", whom they

assert to have poisoned and demoralised by corrupt teaching the

Athenian moral character'. Grote was a utilitarian and a democrat,

at a period when, in describing the rise of Athenian democracy, he

w a s constrained to remark that ' democracy happens to be unpalatable

to most modern readers'.1

His vindication of the Sophists was hailed

as a 'historical discovery of the highest order' by Henry S i d g w i c k in

1872, who summarized the current opinion of the Sophists thus:

T h ey were a set of charlatans who appeared in Greece in the fifth century,

and earned an ample livelihood by imposing on public credulity: professing

to teach virtue, they really taught the art of fallacious discourse, and meanwhile propagated immoral practical doctrines. Gravitating to Athens as the

Prytaneion of Greece, they were there met and overthrown by Socrates,

from which the f o l l o w i n g is a selection: R. H. S. Grossman, Plato Today ( 1 9 3 7 , 2nd ed. 1 9 5 9 ) ;

A . Winspear and T. Silverberg, Who Was Socrates? ( 1 9 3 9 , written from a Marxist stan dpoint );

O , Neurat h and J. A . La uwe ry s, Plato's Republic and German Education, and the controversy

w h i c h f o l l o w e d it (inclu ding contributions from G . C. Field and C . Ε . M . Joad), in the Journal

af Education fo r 1 9 45 ; E. A. Ffavelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics ( 1 9 5 7 ) ; Plato,

Totalitarian or Democrat?, essays ed. by T. L. Thorson ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; Plato, Popper and Politics,

ed. Dumbrough ( 1 9 6 7 ) . The best and fullest justification of Plato against his attackers is L e v i n -«ο η 'κ In Defense of Plato, with a full bibliography up to its date of publication ( 1 9 5 3 ) . For the

p»ychoanalytical approach of H. Kelse n see Le vi ns on , pp. iooff .

1

Grote , History (nth ed. 1 8 8 8 ) , v u , 52 , and iv, 106. The first edition of this work was almost

e x a c t l y contemporary with Zeller's.

I I



Introduction

w h o exposed the hol lowness of their rhetoric, turned their quibbles inside-

out, and triumphantly defended sound ethical principles against their

pernicious sophistries.

Y e t he did not go all the way with Grote. T o Grote's statement

that few characters in history have been so hardly dealt with as these

so-called Sophists, he retorted: 'T h ey had in their lifetime more

success than they deserved, and many better men have been worse

handled by posterity.' Sidgwick 's main criticism was that in his anxiety

to do justice to the Sophists Grote had exaggerated the partisanship

o f Plato. For Grote, Plato

not only stole the name out of general circulation in order to fasten it s p e c i

a l ly upon his opponen ts the paid teachers, but also connected it with express

discreditable attributes, w h i c h formed no part o f its primitive and recognised

meaning, and were altogether distinct from, though grafted upon, the

v a g u e sentiment of dislike associated with it.

The reaction against commentators like Stallbaum, said S i d g w i c k ,

who ' treat their author as if he were a short-hand reporter of actual

dialogues', was necessary and right, but nevertheless ' on e always

feels that the satirical humour of Plato was balanced by the astonishing

versatility of his intellectual sympathy'.1

Jowett also published a

judicious criticism of Grote in the introduction to his translation of

Plato's Sophist ( 1 8 7 1 ) , in which he argued that the principal Sophists

may w e l l have been good and honourable men, but that their bad

reputation at Athens was something already current for a var iety of

reasons (they were foreigners, made large fortunes, excited youthful

minds and so on), and was by no means an invention of Plato.2

A

further appraisal came in a long and well-reasoned essay by Sir

Alexander Grant. His conclusions were that Grote had succeeded in

disposing of the former sweeping denunciations of the Sophists, but

that even so they were not all either morally blameless or philosophic

ally adequate, and that the ' subtle and discriminating pictures drawn

by Plato' did not deserve the censure they received at his hands.3

Reading these scholars of a past generation tempts one to linger

1

See S i d g w i c k ' s two articles in J. Phil. 1872 and 1873.2

Jowett , Dialogues of Plato (4th ed. 1 9 5 3 ) , i n , 325 η0

.3

Grant , The Ethics of Aristotle (4th ed . 1 8 8 5 ) , I , 1 0 4 - 5 5 .

12



Modern Defenders of the Sophists

and quote at length. That would be disproportionate, but at least it is

important to show that Plato's portrayal of the Sophists, so hotly

debated today, was w e l l and truly put on trial by the great Victorians,

many of whom were not only fine scholars but men of affairs with

experience in political, educational and other fields.1

Needless to say,

their conclusions, like those of their successors, were not unaffected

b y their personal political or philosophical beliefs. Karl Joel in 1921

(fiesch. 674 f.) noted how the positivists rallied in support of the

Sophists, especially in England from Grote and L e w e s onwards. In

Germany Theodor Gomperz (under Grote's influence), Laas and

Nietzsche in his positivist period did the same. More surprisingly at

first sight, Joel adds on the same side 'Hegelian intellectualism',

w h i c h hailed them as 'masters in reflective reasoning', and Out of its

philosophy of history understood all and pardoned a ll '. On the other

hand, it was inevitable that, history having taken the course it has,

Plato should now be suffering from the lavish praise that was bestowed

on him by some English commentators of the late nineteenth and early

twentieth century. Staunchly liberal as they might be in their personal

beliefs, they could yet, under the influence of what Havelock has

called 'the Oxford school of neo-idealism', see him in the image of a

V i c t o r i a n liberal like themselves. There is some substance in Have-

l o c k ' s claim {Lib. Temper, 19) that in one at least of these writers

'exposition reads as if it were fervent apology ', and 'the naturalists

and the materialists, the Sophists and the democrats, are treated only

as faint and futile voices protesting off-stage' . A reaction was in

evitable in the shocks and disillusion that overwhelmed Europe as

our century advanced. In the following pages I hope to set forth the

intellectual conflict of the fifth and fourth centuries B . C . as far as

possible in the light of contemporary evidence, and see it as arising out

o f its own crises and its own educational and social needs. We need

not fear that either its intrinsic interest or its continuing relevance

wil l thereby be diminished.

1

O f Gr ot e and Jowet t it is unnec essary to speak, and Gran t served for eig ht year s in educ a

tional posts in India. Hav elo ck' s description o f the Sophists' methods as essentially those of

democ ratic processes is anticipated b y Gro te , especia lly in v n , 39, n. 2 (on p. 40, col . 2).



II

T O P I C S OF THE DAY

In volume π (ch. vi) I briefly sketched the climate of thought in the

fifth century, especially at Athens, and the effect in several different

fields o f the substitution of natural for divine causation. The present

chapter w i l l attempt an outline of the main causes and features of this

changing outlook, before we go on to consider the meaning of

Sophistic and investigate each separate topic in detail.

T o determine the causes of an intellectual revolution is always a

rash undertaking, and when a great many things are happening

together it is not always easy to distinguish cause from effect; but a

few things may be mentioned as more l ike ly to belong to the former

category. We are bound to dismiss, on chronological grounds, the

assumption that the ' P r e s o c ra t i c s a n d in particular the Ionians,

could all have been influential in moulding the thought of the Sophists.

I f there is any causal connexion between the ideas of Democritus and

those of Protagoras or Gorgias, it is more l ike ly to have been the other

w a y round. On the other hand the influence of the Eleatics on Prota

goras and Gorgias is undeniable, as is that of Heraclitus on Protagoras,

and Gorgias is said to have been a pupil and f o l l o w e r of Empedocles.1

One of the most powerful influences for humanism is to be found in

the theories of the natural origins of life and society which were a

feature o f Ionian thought from Anaximander onwards. Li fe , including

human l ife, was the product o f a kind o f fermentation set up by the

action of heat on damp or putrefying matter, and social and political

groups were formed by agreement as man's only effective form of

defence against non-human nature. The cosmogonies themselves

assisted in banishing divine agents from the world, not because they

were evolutionary rather than creative—the idea of divine creation

was never prominent in Greek religion—but because they made more

difficult the Greek habit of seeing divine or semi-divine beings every-

1

See vol. ii , 135.

Μ



Effects of the Scientific Tradition

where in nature. It was a blow to religion when even the stars and the

sun were asserted to be ignited clouds, or rocks torn from the earth

and put into orbit by the cosmic vortex. The Olympians, even if they

did not create the world, had at least controlled it, but the theories

o f the natural philosophers left no part for Zeus to play in the produc

tion of rain, thunder or lightning, nor for Poseidon in the terror of

earthquakes.1

In so far as the new spirit was a reaction from an interest in external

nature to a concentration on human affairs, the Presocratics contri

buted to it by what must have seemed in many eyes their failure. It is,

after all, the world of sensible experience and its impact on them with

which men have to come to terms if they are to carry on a satisfying

and happy l ife. This is for most of us the 'real world', yet in their

different ways philosophers as wide apart as Parmenides and Demo-

critus denied its reality and undermined the evidence of the senses.

T o the plain man's question: Ί can believe my ow n e y e s , can't I?',

their answer was a definite ' N o ' . Either motion and change were

illusion, and 'what is' an immovable plenum, or else the only real

things were atoms which were expressly denied to have any sensible

qualities at all. Moreover the speculative character o f their theories

made them highly vulnerable, and the ingenuity of a Gorgias was

quite capable of using arguments of the Eleatic type to prove the

direct contrary of the Eleatic conclusion: not 'what is, is', but what is

is not, and nothing exists (pp. 193 ff. be low) . Besides their remoteness,

the Presocratics were discredited by their mutual contradictions. Each

believed himself 4o be nearest to the truth, but were there any solid

grounds for trusting one rather than another? Gorgias attacked on

tilts front too. For him they were simply, like orators, masters of the

art of verbal persuasion.2

1

It should hardly be necessary to repeat the often-stated truth that the rationalism of any

•o-culled age of enlightenment is by no means universal. The rejection of divine agency is

confined to a section of the educated and intellectual. When in Plato's lifetime (373 B . C . ) the

Achaean city of Helike was overwhelmed by a combined earthquake and tidal w a v e , opinion

Wat still divided between 'th e pio usly inclined' (including Heraclides of Pon tus ), w ho ascribed

the disaster to the wra th o f Po sei don , and the rationalists wh o explained it sole ly b y natural

causes. See Strabo 8.7.2 and Diodorus 1 5 . 4 8 (Heracl. Pont. fr. 46 Wehrli) . Thucydides tel ls

how , dur ing the plague at Athe ns , ma ny sou ght aid from relig ious rites (2 .47.4), but he himself

obviously attributes it to purely natural causes.

' Co r n . '3 ( D K, I I , 292). See p. 51 bel ow.

'5



Topics of the Day

Often adduced as a cause of the new humanism is the widening of

horizons through increasing contacts with other peoples, in war,

travel and the foundation of colonies. These made it increasingly

o b v i o u s that customs and standards of behaviour which had earlier

been accepted as absolute and universal, and of divine institution,

were in fact local and relative.1

Habits that to the Greeks were w i c k e d

and disgusting, like marriage between brother and sister, might

among the Egyptians or elsewhere be regarded as normal and even

enjoined by religion. The history of Herodotus is typical of the mid

fifth century in the enthusiasm with which he collects and describes

the customs of Scythians, Persians, Lydians, Egyptians and others

and points out their divergence from Hellenic usage. If all men, he

says , were asked to name the best laws and customs, each wouldchoose his own; and he illustrates this by the story of Darius, who

summoned some Greeks and Indians to his court and first asked the

G r e e k s for what consideration they would consent to eat their dead

fathers. When they replied that they would not do it for anything,

he turned to the Indians (of a tribe who normally ate the bodies of

their parents) and asked them if anything could persuade them to

burn their fathers (as the Greeks did), whereupon they cried aloud atthe mere mention of such impiety.

2

Euripides too noted that incest is

practised among non-Greek peoples, 'and no law forbids it' (Andr.

1 7 3 - 6 ) , and shocked many by making a character say (again with

reference to incest) that no behaviour is shameful if it does not seem

so to those who practise it (fr. 19).3

1

It is rema rkab le ho w persiste ntly this ki nd of thi ng reappears as resp onsib le for a qu est io n

ing of the moral c ode . H. L. A . Hart {.Law, Liberty and Morality, 68) mentions as a cause of

division and hesitation over the issues of sexual morality 'in our own time' the free discussion

o f it ' i n the light o f the discoveries of anth ropo logy and p sy ch ol og y' . T h e exceptional freedom

o f discussion now tolerated must have other roots, for enough anthropology and psychology

to sho w up the relativity of moral codes was k no wn to Herodo tus , and again to sevente enth-

century Europe (cf. especially Greenleaf, Order, Empiricism and Politics, 198), let alone to

the Victorians.

1

Hdt. 3 . 3 8 ; not, incidentally, a very good argument for moral relativity, since it showed

bo th parties agreed on the fundament al mor al principle, that parents should be hon our ed in

death as in l i f e : the dispute was on ly about the means o f fulfilling it. Th uc yd id es (2 .97 .3 - 4)

notes a custom of the Odrysians in Thrace which is the direct opposite of one observed in

Persia.3

A s we shall see (p p. 1 1 9 f. be lo w) , Socrates did not agree that a law was any the less universal

and divin e becau se some peop le br ok e it : incest, for instance, bri ngs an una voi dab le penal ty,

fo r its effects are dysgenic.

Ι ό



Effect of Foreign Contacts

Such examples could be multiplied, but it should be remembered

that contact between Greeks and barbarians was no new thing. The

Ionian Greeks of the Anatolian coastal strip had been in close contact

with Orientals for centuries, and their intellectual progress owed

much to foreign sources. Trade and colonization took them to the

Black Sea and Mesopotamia, and the Milesian colony Naucratis was

founded in Egypt in the seventh century.1

Sojourns among Egyptians

and Chaldaeans are recorded of early philosophers and sages like

Solon, and are perfectly credible. The same may be said about the

effect of the codification of laws. The unquestioning acceptance of

law and custom, we are told, was no longer possible in a time of

legislative activity. Ά code of laws drawn up by a human lawgiver

whose name was k n o w n . . . could not be accepted in the old wa y

as part of the everlasting order of things.' So Burnet (T. to P. 106),

and the work of Protagoras in drawing up the laws for Thurii in

443 is sometimes quoted as a relevant example. But the names which

Burnet mentions are Zaleucus, Charondas and Solon, whose activity

can hardly be held responsible for the emergence of new theories

denying the religious sanction of law in the period following the

Persian Wars. The Greeks had seen laws in the making long before

that, yet they continued to attribute them to the instructions o f A p o l l o ,

advising the legislator through his oracle at Delphi.2

The causes of the

reasoned rejection of tradition which marked the middle of the fifth

century were exceedingly complex, and, even if the inflammable mix

ture can be analysed, it may remain difficult to see why the spark was

applied to it just when it was.3

Undoubtedly the successes of the Greeks against barbarians had

given them enormous self-confidence and pride in their achievements;

and, although popular opinion was still ready to lend an ear to stories

o f the personal intervention of gods or heroes at Marathon and else

where, the feeling that they had stood alone and overcome was strong,

especially among the Athenians. They had been the leaders of Greek

1

Sec vol . I , 2 9 f., where the mention of the eighth century must be corrected. R. M. C o o k

In JUS, 1 9 3 7 , 2 2 7 f f . , conclude s that Naucratis was founded about 6 1 5 - 6 1 0 .

' Fo r details see m y Greeks and their Gods, 1 84—9 .1

D i c l s in Hermes, 22, noted s ome signs that the 'enl ig ht en me nt ' o f the Soph ist s had its

forerunners as early as the sixth centu ry, particularl y am on g lo go gra ph ers l i k e Hecataeus of

Mllrtua. Sec on this DUmmlcr, Akad. 250.

17



Topics of the Day

18

resistance and borne the brunt of the Persian attack, and their con

sciousness of strength developed into an urge to dominate the rest and

turn their former allies into subjects. If asked by what right they did

this, they would reply as Thucydides shows them doing in the Melian

D i a l o g u e that it is a 'law of nature' that the stronger should do what

is in their power and the weak g iv e way (pp. 85 f. b e l o w ) .

T h i s consciousness of power was being fostered from another

direction by a new emphasis on the triumphs of human invention and

technique. It is too easily assumed that the Greeks as a whole believed

in an ideal of knowledge for its own sake, divorced from practical

aims, and despised the useful arts, and there is some justice in recent

claims that this generalization results from the academic habit o f r e l y i n g

too heavily on Plato and Aristot le as representative of the Greek mind.

In the fifth century the practical achievements of the human race were

admired as much as their understanding of the universe. The stages of

man's material progress were celebrated, for instance, b y a ll the three great

tragedians, as w e l l as by philosophers like Anaxagoras and Democritus

and the Sophist Protagoras. They might be associated with the name of

Prometheus, patron saint of technology, or an unknown god as in

Euripides's Supplices (201 f.), but, if so, his first gift to men is sagacity

or ingenuity, and the rest f o l l o w s from that. In the famous chorus of

So p ho c l es ' s Antigone (332 ff.) there is no mention of higher beings:

'man with his s k i l l s ' (π ε ρ ιφ ρ α δ ή ς ά ν ή ρ ) is the most dread and

wonderful thing in the world. The technical triumphs extolled by

these writers include speech and writing, hunting and fishing, agri

culture, the domestication of animals and their use in transport,

building, cookery, mining and metalwork, shipbuilding and navigation, spinning and w e a v i n g , pharmacy and medicine, calculation,

astronomy and the mantic arts. It is a list entirely in the spirit of

Macau l ay ' s catalogue of the fruits of Baconian science, in which his

express purpose was to show up by contrast the practical barrenness

o f Greek thought. A difference is that the Englishman, besides omitting

the art of prophecy, includes new weapons of war among the blessings

o f progress. Perhaps the Greek also showed his wisdom by adding at

the end of the list of technical achievements that they may be used

for evil ends as w e l l as good. So too Theseus in the Hippolytus (Eur.



Technology and Democracy

Hipp. 91 5 fF.) asks to what purpose it is that men teach ten thousand

arts and discover every ingenious device, when their science does

not tell them how to put sense into the head of a man who has not

g o t it.

Socia l and political changes played their part, especially the growtho f democracy at Athens. This was a gradual process, begun by Solon

( w h o first introduced the principle of appointing public officials by a

combination of election and lot) and continued by Cleisthenes after

the Peisistratid tyranny. It was already far advanced by the time of

the Persian Wars, and completed by the reforms of Pericles and

Ephialtes about 458. These opened the archonship to the lowest

classes and introduced pay for the archons, boule and people's courts,thereby making it not only legal but practically possible for the poorer

citizens to g i v e up their time to public affairs. At the same time they

introduced the lot in its pure form for appointment to many offices,

that is, without preliminary election of candidates; and of course any

citizen could speak and vote in the Assembly, which passed l a w s ,

declared war and concluded treaties. This situation naturally encouraged

thebelief that

one man's opinion was as good as another's, for, as

Socrates complained, although in matters considered technical no

one would be consulted unless he could g i v e proof of his training

and competence, where the art of government was concerned the

Athenians would listen to anyone—smith or shoemaker, rich or poor.

These anti-democratic sentiments were not lost on his critics {Socrates,

p. 91), but the faults of the system (very different from a modern

democracy) were glaring, not the least being fickleness. The treat

ment of Mytilene by the Athenian democracy illustrates its dangers,

and perhaps its virtues also. After putting down a revolt there in 428,

the Assembly under the influence of Cleon sent a trireme with orders

to kil l every man in the city and enslave the women and children.

N e x t day they repented of this atrocious cruelty, and after a second

debate reversed the decision by a tiny majority and despatched a

second trireme post-haste to cancel the order. By eating at their oars

and taking it in turns to sleep the rowers managed to arrive before it

w a s put into effect. In this case the weakness of the democracy in the

face of mob-oratory was just counterbalanced by its readiness to

19



Topics of the Day

20

reconsider and g i v e both sides a fair hearing.1

The little island of

M e l o s was less fortunate, and its inhabitants suffered the fate originally

intended for Mytilene. Their crime was to prefer neutrality to inclu

sion within the Athenian empire.

W h i l e the harsh realities of history, in a period of unscrupulousimperialism and war of Greek with Greek, were encouraging cor

responding theories o f the right o f the powerful to do as they pleased—

the kind o f theories that are commonly associated with the names o f some

o f the Sophists—the spread of democracy was creating the demand

w h i c h the Sophists claimed to supply in their capacity of professional

educators. The road to political success was open to anyone, provided he

had the wit and the training to outdo his competitors. In the absenceo f universities or co l leges of adult education the gap was filled, to

their profit, by men like Protagoras, who gloried in the title of

Sophist and proudly advertised his ability to teach a yo un g man 'the

proper care of his personal affairs, so that he may best manage his

o w n household, and also of the State's affairs, so as to become a real

power in the city, both as speaker and man o f action'. For this purpose

the prime necessity was to master the art of persuasive speaking, andit has even been argued (by Heinrich Gomperz) that the whole teach

ing of the Sophists is summed up in the art of rhetoric.2

That is a

considerable exaggeration; the arete which Protagoras claimed to

impart consisted of more than that. But one of them, Gorgias, did

indeed laugh at the professed teachers of c iv i c virtue. The art of

clever speaking, he said, was all that he taught and all that any am

bitious young man need learn. It was the master-art, for the man with

the gif t of persuasion had all the other experts in his power. (On this,

h o w e v e r , see pp. 27 1 f. below.)

I have spoken as if the political circumstances and public actions of

the Greek states g a v e rise to the irreligious and utilitarian moral

1

T h u c . 3.36ft". (The speeches on this occ asi on are referred t o on pp. 86f. be lo w. ) T h e

s i z e of modern states wo ul d forbid a comple te, as oppos ed to a representat ive, democ rac y, e ven

i f one were desired, and pro bab ly the onl y places whe re it can be observ ed tod ay are the Un i

versities of Oxf or d and Ca mbr id ge , whe re similar instances of vacillati on are not un kn ow n.2

At the other extreme Bignone (Studi, 32) contrasted the orators, ' li vi ng amid the harsh

realities of polities', with the Sophists, who led the 'sheltered and segregated l i v e s of paid

educators of the public'. I imagine that this is the first and last time that we can expect to see the

l i fe of tile Sophists described as ombratile e appartataX



The Sophists in their Setting

theories of the thinkers and teachers, but it is more l ike ly that practice

and theory acted and reacted mutually on one another. Doubtless the

Athenians did not need a Thrasymachus or a Call icles to teach them

how to deal with a recalcitrant island, but the speeches which Thucydi-

des puts into the mouths of the Athenian spokesmen, in what herepresents as a set debate with the Melian assembly, bear unmistakable

marks of Sophistic teaching. Pericles was a friend of Protagoras, and

when Gorgias appeared before the Athenians in 427 the novel flowers

o f oratory with which he pleaded the cause of his Sicilian fatherland

aroused their astonished admiration (p. 179, n. 3, b e l o w ) . If the

Sophists were a product of their age, they also assisted in their turn

in crystallizing its ideas. But at least their teaching fell on w e l l -prepared ground. In Plato's opinion it was not they who should be

blamed for infecting the young with pernicious thoughts, for they

were doing no more than mirror the lusts and passions of the existing

democracy:

Every one of these individual professional teachers, whom the people call

Sophists and regard as their rivals in the art of education, in fact teaches

nothing but the beliefs of the people expressed by themselves in theirMsemblies. This is what he claims as his wisdom.

1

Whether Plato was right we can only say, if at all, at a much later

Itage of our study.

Turning (so far as the two can be distinguished) from causes to

features of the change, the most fundamental is the antithesis between

fhysis and nomos which was developed at this time among natural

and humanistic philosophers alike. Once the v i e w had gained currency

that l a w s , customs and conventions were not part of the immutable

order of things, it was possible to adopt very different attitudes towards

them. On the one hand Protagoras could argue that accepted canons

o f good behaviour, including some restraint on selfish appetites and

consideration for others, although not an original and essential part

o f human nature, were necessary for the preservation of society, and

life in societies was necessary for actual survival. At the other extreme

1

/?<</>. 493 a. T h e whole passage 492 a - 4 9 3 d is illuminating.

21



Topics of the Day

22

is the rampant individualism of those, like Plato's Call ic les , who main

tained that ideas of law and justice were merely a device of the majority

o f weaklings to keep the strong man, who is nature's just man, from

his rightful place. Nomos and physis were enemies, and right was on

the side o f physis. The Sophist Antiphon drew an elaborate contrastbetween the works of nomos and those of physis, the former being

unnecessary and artificial curbs imposed on nature by human agree

ment, the latter necessary and of natural origin. In the idea that laws

are a matter of human agreement, 'covenants made by the citizens' as

Hippias called them (p. 138 below), instead of divinely sanctioned,

w e have the essence of the theory of the social compact or contract

w h i c h was developed especially in Europe o f the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries. In the eyes of Call icles it condemned them,

whereas Critias, through the mouth of Sisyphus in his play of that

name, represented the invention of law as an important step on the

road from men's originally 'disorderly and brutish' life to civilization.

A n unequivocal statement of the contractual theory of law is ascribed

b y Aristotle to Lycophron, a pupil o f Gorgias, and in its historical

form, as a theory of the origin of law, it is clearly stated by Glaucon

in the Republic as a current v i e w which he would like to see refuted.

Bes ides laws in the ordinary sense, contemporary opinion recog

nized the existence of 'unwritten l a w s ' , and the relation between the

t w o illustrates w e l l the transitional nature of this period of thought.

For some, the phrase denoted certain eternal moral principles, uni

v e r s a l l y valid and overruling the positive laws of men because their

origin was from the gods . This conception is best known from the

splendid lines of Sophocles in the Antigone (4506°.), where Antigone

defends the burial of her dead brother contrary to the edict of Creon

b y declaring: 'It was not Zeus or Justice who decreed these nomoi

among men, nor did I deem your proclamation so mighty that you , a

mortal, could overthrow the sure, unwritten laws of the gods.' Later

w e shall look at other references to these divine laws which have

existed for all time, and their superiority to the faulty and changeable

decrees of men. However, with the spread of democratic ideas the

phrase took on a new and more sinister meaning. The codification of

law came to be seen as a necessary protection for the people. Not only



Nature and Law: Religious Scepticism

Euripides (Suppl. 429 ft*.) saw it as a guarantee of equal rights and a

bulwark against tyranny, but also in practice the restored democracy

at the end of the Peloponnesian War expressly forbade a magistrate

to make use of unwritten law (p. 126 below).

Here is another discussion which finds its reflection in the secondgreat period of enlightenment, Europe of the seventeenth and eigh

teenth centuries A . D . On the one hand we have Rousseau writing:

T o these three kinds of law [political, civil, criminal] a fourth should be

added, and it is the most important of them all. It is to be found not graven

on pillars of marble or plates of bronze but in the heart of the citizens. It is

the true foundation on which the State is built, and grows daily in import

ance . . . I refer to manners, customs, and, above all, opinion.

Then for a different point of v i e w we can turn to/Locke:

The law of nature being unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the

minds of men, they who, through passion or interest, shall miscite or mis

apply it cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no

established judge; and so it serves not as it ought, to determine the rights

and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every

one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case;

and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength,

hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries or to punish

delinquents.1

The growth of atheism and agnosticism at this time was also_

connected with the idea of nomos. Beside the classic utterance of

Protagoras, that he could not say whether gods existed or not, one

may set the curious and thought-provoking words of Euripides's

Hecuba in her plea for mercy (Hec. 799if.): the gods, she says, have

power, and so has nomos, which is master of the gods because it is by

nomos that we believe in them and l i ve according to (standards', of right

and wrong. For Critias the gods were the invention of an ingenious

legislator to prevent men from breaking the laws when not under

nupervision. Prodicus may, like some nineteenth-century anthro

p o l o g i s t s , have seen the early stages of religion as two, first the

1

Kuusscau, Social Contract, 2 . 1 4 (trans. Ho p k i n s ) ; L o c k e , Second Treatise on Civil Govern-

mtni, 2 . 1 3 6 . (Bo th passages may convenie ntly be found in the Wor ld 's Classic s vo lu me Social

Contract, ed. Darker, 313 and 1 1 5 . )



Topics of the Day

24

deification of useful natural objects like the sun and rivers, corn and

the grape, and later of human discoverers or inventors of such essen

tials as bread and wine, shelter, and the useful arts in general. This has

been called an ancient example of the theory of the advance from

fetishism to anthropomorphism.

1

A n attractive aspect o f the nomos-physis antithesis is that it sponsored

the first steps towards cosmopolitanism and the idea of the unity of

mankind. Here nomos plays the part of die Mode in Schiller's hymn,

w h i c h divides those who are naturally brothers. That is how Hippias

sees it irxPlato's Protagoras, speaking of those wh o come from differ

ent Greek states. Antiphon went further (as Hippias may also have

done), and after censuring distinctions based on high or low birth

proceeded to declare that there is no difference in nature between

barbarians and Greeks. Wi th this disapproval of distinctions basecfon

birth and race, one would have expected him to include a condemna

tion of s l av e r y , and he may w e l l have done so; but there is no mention

o f it in the fragments. The only witness in the fifth century to the

existence of a belief that slavery is unnatural is Euripides, whose

characters utter such sentiments as ' Only the name brings shame to a

s l a v e : in all else slave is no worse than free, if he be a good man' . This

is not necessarily the dramatist's own opinion, for others in his plays

w i l l damn all slaves alike as a worthless and greedy lot. Not many

years after him, however, Alcidamas is quoted as having written that

G o d set all men free and nature has made no man a slave; and by

Aristotle's time there were certainly some who maintained that slavery

w a s unnatural. (The subject is treated in ch. v i (4) below.)

One of the most important lessons taught in the lectures and hand

books of the Sophists was the art of speaking with equal cogency on

both sides of a question. Protagoras started from the axiom that

^there are two arguments on^very subject'. We may recognize the

virtues of seeing both sides of a question, and the democratic quality

o f a willingness to g i v e them both a hearing, and yet be alive to the

dangers of such doctrine unless it is kept in ve ry scrupulous hands.

In fact it was being imparted, for high fees, to headstrong and ambi-

1

T h e evidence for ascribing the two-s tag e theory to Prodi cus is not absolutely concl usive .

It is discussed on pp. 238 ff. below.



The Power of the Word: Can ' Virtue* be Taught?

tious youth. In the eyes of Gorgias 'the word' was a despot who

co u l d do anything, but like a slave of the Tamp it would be at the ser

vice of those who took his courses. Reading the remains of Gorgias's

writings, one is not inclined to accuse Plato of unfairness when he

makes him disclaim any responsibility for the use to which his teachingmay be put by others. It was subversive stuff, both morally and

epis temologica l ly , for the conviction that men could be persuaded of

anything went naturally with the relativity of Protagoras's ' man the

measure' doctrine and the nihilism of Gorgias's treatise On Nature or

the Non-existent.

Fina l ly , one of the most hotly debated questions of the day, which

because it was taken up by Socrates continued to be discussed byPlato and even Aristotle, sprang directly from the Sophists' appearance

in the new role of paid educators. They claimed to teach arete, but

w as this something that could be instilled by teaching? Arete when

used without qualification denoted those qualities of human excellence

whi ch made a man a natural leader in his community, and hitherto it

had been believed to depend on certain natural or even divine gifts

whi ch were the mark of good birth and breeding. They were definitelya matter o f physis, cultivated, as a boy grew up, by the experience of

l iv ing with and following the example of his father and elder relations.

Thus they were handed on naturally and scarcely consciously, a pre

rogative of the class that was born to rule, and the thought that they

Could be implanted by an outsider, offering schematic instruction in

return for payment, was anathema to fathers of the old school. Hence

the urgency to a young man like Meno—high-born and wealthy yet a

pupil and admirer of Gorgias—of the question which he springs on

Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue that bears his name: 'Can

y o u tell me, Socrates, whether arete can be taught? Or is it a matter of

practice, or natural aptitude, or what?' rtEMtf

The above is a foretaste of some of the topics of burning interest in

the lifetime of Socrates which we shall be examining in detail in later

chapters: the status of laws and moral principles, the theory of man's

progri-ss from savagery to civilization replacing that of degeneration

from a past golden age, the idea of the social compact, subjective jj



Topics of the Day

26

theories of knowledge, atheism and agnosticism, hedonism and

utilitarianism, the unity of mankind, slavery and equality, the nature

o f arete, the importance of rhetoric and the study of language. But

first something about the class of men who are usually named as the

ch ief propagators of the new humanism and rationalism. What was aSophist, and what do we know of the individuals who posed these

questions that have exercised thoughtful minds ever since?



I l l

W H A T IS A SOPHIST?

( i) T H E W O R D ' S O P H I S T '1

The Greek words sophos, sophia, usually translated ' w i s e ' and

' w i s d o m ' , were in common use from the earliest times, and, standing

as they do for an intellectual or spiritual quality, naturally acquired

lome delicate shades of meaning which can only be crudely illustrated

here. At first they connoted primarily skill in a particular craft. A

ihipwright in Homer is 'skilled in all sophia', a charioteer, a steersman,

an augur, a sculptor are sophoi each in his occupation, A p o l l o is

tophos with the lyre, Thersites a contemptible character but sophos

with his tongue; there is a law in Hades (for comic purposes) that

w h o e v e r excels his fellow-craftsmen in ' one o f the great and clever

arts' shall have special privileges until someone else comes along who

is 'more sophos in his art ' .

2

This sense merges easily into that ofgenerally knowing or prudent, by way of a line like that of Theognis

( 1 1 9 ff.) that it is easy for a sophos to detect counterfeit coinage, but

much more difficult to unmask a man of spurious character. Here

tophos might still mean an expert (there are experts in testing coinage,

but alas none in testing humanity), though more probably it is

g o i n g over to the meaning o f knowledgeable in general. In a similar

doubtful position is Hesiod's description of Linus, the mythical

linger and musician, as 'versed in all kinds o f sophia' (fr. 153 Rzach).

In this way it was used of the seven Sophoi, Wise Men or S a g e s ,

whose wisdom consisted chiefly of practical statesmanship and

w a s enshrined in brief gnomic sayings, or o f anyone o f good sense

(Eur. I.A. 749).

1

In what f o l l o w s , in addition to primary sources I have made especial use of the following,

In whi ch α reader m ay be referred f or further information and v i e w s : Grote , History, v n , 32ft".;

Grant, Ethics, 1, io6ff. ; Z N , 1 3 3 5 , η . 1 ; Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, i l l , 326ft".; Kerferd in CR,1 9 5 0 , B - 1 0 ; Morrison in Durham U.J. 1949, 5 5 - 6 3 .

1

/ / . 1 5 . 4 1 2 ; Pind. Pyth. 5 . 1 1 5 ; A e s c h . Suppl. 770 and Sept. 382; Soph. O.T. 484; Eur. fr. 372

and /.'/ '. 1238 ; Soph. Ph. 439 f.; Aristoph. Frogs 7 6 1 ff.

27



What is a Sophist ?

28

A l o n g with generalization, a term of value like this, implying

positive approval, inevitably suffers division into a ' true' and a 'false'

meaning according to the user's point o f v i e w . The sophia o f charioteer,

shipwright or musician must have been to a large extent acquired by

learning, but Pindar no doubt pleased his royal patron when he wrotethat he who knows much by nature is wise (sophos), in contrast to

the chattering crows who have gained their knowledge by learning.

Not the man who knows many things is sophos, said A e s c h y l u s , but he

whose knowledge is useful. At the same time there creeps in an ironic

note, a hint that the sophos is too clever and may overreach himself.

T a x e d by the w i l y Odysseus (whom he has earlier described as a

sophos wrestler) with acting in a way that is not sophon, Neoptolemus

replies that what is right and just is better than what is sophon. So we

g e t the oxymoron of a chorus in Euripides: when men set themselves

up against the gods, their sophia is not sophon, they are clever but not

w is e . The verb sophiêsthai, to practise sophia, which Hesiod used of

acquiring skill in seamanship and Theognis of himself as a poet,

suffered a parallel development until it meant to trick or deceive, or

to be over-subtle.1

The word sophistes, 'sophist ', is a noun o f the agent derived from

the verb.2

As Diogenes Laertius remarked ( 1 . 1 2 ) long after it had

acquired an uncomplimentary sense, sophos and sophistes were once

synonymous. This appears especially in Herodotus, who applies the

name 'sophist' to Pythagoras, Solon and the founders o f the Dionysiac

cult, and says that all the sophists of Greece visited Croesus's Lydian

capital, including Solon. That the Seven Sages were called sophists

w e know from a fragment of Aristotle and from Isocrates, who says

that they were given this name ' which is now held in dishonour among

y o u ' . Isocrates dwells on the change which has come over the word,

w h i c h he equates with his conception of philosophy:

1

References for this paragraph: Pind. 01. 2 . 8 6 ; A e s c h . fr. 390; Soph. Ph. 1246 (andcf. the

use o f σ ό φ ισ μ α and σ ο φ ί 3 ε σ θ α ι at 14 and 7 7 ) ; Eur. Bacch. 3 9 5; for σ ο φ ί^ε σ β α ι He s. Op. 649;

Theognis 1 9 ; Eur. Bacch. 200. Wi th Th eog nis cf. Solon 1 . 52 , where σ ο φ ί α is used of poetry.

Wh e n Pericles finds the yo un g Alcibiad es's questions are getting aw kwa rd , he closes the dis

cussion w it h ' at y o ur ag e w e t oo τ ο ι α ϋ τ α έ σ ο φ ^ό μ ε θ α ' ( Xe n. Mem. 1 . 2 . 4 6 ) . B. Gladigow inHermes, 1967, has collected examples o f the invidiou s sense of σ ο φ ό ς in Euripides.

* Kerferd in CR, 1950, 8, gi ve s a classified list, wi th references, o f the earlier uses o f the

word.



The Meaning of Sophistes'

It offends me to see chicanery more highly regarded than philosophy, as

the accuser who puts philosophy in the dock. Who of the men of old time

would have expected this, among you of all people who pride yourself on

your wisdom (sophia)} It was not so in our forefathers' time. They admired

those who were called sophists and envied their associates.. . The best

evidence of this is that they chose Solon, the first Athenian citizen who

bore that title, to rule the state.1

Probably it was assumed that a sophistes would be a teacher.2

This

accords with the fact that the name was often applied to poets, for in

G r e e k eyes practical instruction and moral advice constituted the

main function o f the poet. Solon h i m s e l f w a s a poet, and J. S. Morrison

has suggested that it was in this capacity that he first attracted attentionand came to be entrusted with the preservation of political harmony.3

Before him Hesiod had written his Works and Days both as a manual

o f instruction for farmers and as a vehicle for ethical precept. Theognis

is full of ethical maxims, some of general import and some in support

o f the threatened supremacy of the upper class. Parmenides and

Empedocles were poets, and the great dramatists of the fifth century,

both tragic and comic, certainly regarded themselves as having aneducational mission. The contest which Aristophanes stages in Hades

between Aeschylus and Euripides is fought on moral rather than

•esthetic ground, and in the course of it Aeschylus expressly declares

that, although the story of Phaedra's guilty love as Euripides told it

might be true, a,poet should conceal such wickedness rather than

present it on the stage, because 'as schoolboys have teachers to show

them the way, so poets are teachers of men' . Euripides himself,

challenged to state the grounds on which a poet deserves admiration,

replies: 'For his wit and good advice, and because he makes men

better citizens.' So much is common ground between the disputants,

1

Hdt. 4 . 9 5 . 2 , 1 . 2 9 . i , cf. also 2 . 4 9 . 1 ; Aristotle fr. 5 Rose, Ross p. 7 9 ; Isocr. Antict. 235 ,

For Isocrates's use of the word see also Grant, Ethics 1, m - 1 3 .

' In Hdt. 1 . 2 9 . 1 , 2 . 4 9 . 1 and 4 . 9 5 . 2 , the translator in the Penguin series, Mr de Selincourt,

Nmdcra the word each time by 'teacher', which besides sounding very natural in its English

contexts is probably as accurate as an English equivalent can be.1 Morrison in Durham U.J. 1949, 59. His article contains much of the evidence that (as

Jaeger also maintained in PaiJeia 1, 293) the Sop his ts we re the heirs of the educ atio nal tradit ion

u f (lie poets. Not that this was their sole inheritance. Nestle was more correct when he called

llietti liclrn o f the Ionian ph ilo so phers as w e l l (VMûL, 252). So also in effect Morrison, loc.

til. jrt.

29



What is a Sophist?

30

and it is exactly what the professed Sophist Protagoras claimed

to do.1

So we find that at its earliest known occurrence, in an ode of

Pindar, the word sophistes clearly means poet. With poetry went

music, for the lyric poet was his own accompanist. Athenaeus quotes aline of Aeschylus about a sophistes playing the lyre to illustrate his

statement that 'all who practise the art of mousike used to be called

sophists', and the reference to the singer and musician Thamyris as

sophistes in Euripides's Rhesus is quoted as another example. Here

however the Muse is speaking of him with hatred and disgust, and the

word probably carries something of the unfavourable tone which it

acquired early in the fifth century.*It looks however as if in the fifth century the word was beginning

to be used of prose-writers in contrast to poets, as the didactic function

came to be more and more fulfilled through this medium. Some of

the Seven Sages , in their capacity as sophistai or teachers, uttered in

prose the kind of maxims which Theognis or Simonides uttered in

verse, and this may have sown the seeds of the distinction.3 Xenophon

(Mem. 4.2.1) says that Euthydemus collected 'many of the writtenworks of the most celebrated poets and sophists'. Among the latter

would be a man like Anaxagoras, whose book we know to have been

on general sale, and whom Aeschines of Sphettus may have bracketed

as a sophistes with Prodicus, one of the recognized 'Sophists '.4

A sophistes writes or teaches because he has a special skill or

knowledge to impart. His sophia is practical, whether in the fields of

conduct and politics or in the technical arts. If anyone could make

the products o f every separate craft, and in addition all the things

in the natural world, he would indeed be a wondrous sophistes, says

Glaucon in the Republic (596c!), and a similar phrase, 'a marvellous

1

Aristoph. Frogs 1 0 5 3 - 5 , 1 0 0 9 f.3

Pind. Isth. 5 . 2 8 ; A e s c h . fr. 3 1 4 ; Eur. Rhes. 924.3

Schmid, Gesch. gr. Lit. 1 . 3 . 1 , 14 .4

Th at Aesc hine s did this is gener ally take n as fact (e.g. b y Ze ller , Z N , 1335, n. 1) . T h i s

w o u l d be goo d cont empo rar y ev iden ce for the appellation, but the passage in question does

not guarantee more than that it was used of the two men by Athenaeus. It runs as f o l l o w s

( A t h . 5 .200b, A e s c h . fr. 34 Dit tmar) : 6 Se Κ α λ λ Ι α ς σ ύ τ ο ϋ ( i. e. Aeschines' s d ia lo gu e Ca//ias)

Τ Γ Ε ρ Ι ε χ Ε ί τ ή ν τ ο ϋ Κ α λ λ ί ο υ . . ,Π ρ ο δ Ι κ ο υ Koci Ά ν α ξ α γ ο ρ ο υ τ ω ν σ ο φ ι σ τ ώ ν δ ι α μ ώ κ η σ ιν . Anaxagoras

w a s also called sophistes by Diodorus ( 1 2 . 3 9 , D K , 59 A 17). For Anaxagoras's book sec vol. 11,

269.



The Meaning of'Sophistes'

(demos) sophistes', is uttered in the same tone of incredulity by Hippo-

lytus in Euripides (Hipp. 921) of a man who could make fools w i s e .

S o the noun occurs with an objective genit ive meaning a deviser or

contriver ( Ί became a sophistes of many calamities', Eur. Heracl. 993).

Hence the sense o f expert, pundit, for instance in mathematics. Socratesin the Meno (85 b), having by means of diagrams got Meno's slave to

recognize the diagonal of a square, tells him ' the name the sophistai

g i v e it is "diagonal"', and Xenophon (Mem. 1 . 1 . 1 1 , perhaps with

the Pythagoreans chiefly in mind) speaks of' what is called the kosmos

b y the sophistai'. In the same vein Socrates says of the wise Diotima,

with a touch of humour, that she answered his question ' l ike a real

sophistes'.1

Here the translation of Michael Joyce, though lengthy,

strikes the right note: ' with an air of authority that was almost pro

fessorial'. When Socrates in the Lysis (204 a) says of a certain Miccus

that he is 'no common man, but a very competent sophistes', the

compliment to his gifts as a teacher is genuine. An even more striking

use of the word in a complimentary sense is in Xenophon (Cyrop.

j . 1.14 and 38if.): the Armenian prince Tigranes tells Cyrus of a

teacher with whom he was associating, and whom Xenophon calls

sophistes. His father put the man to death, in the be l ie f that he was

corrupting Tigranes, but so noble was his character that before his

execution he sent for Tigranes and told him not to hold it against his

father, because he had acted out of ignorance. That such a term should

be applied to the natural philosophers is only to be expected, and

Ieocrates includes Alcmaeon, Empedocles, Ion of C h i o s , Parmenides

and Melissus along with Gorgias among 'the sophistai of past days'

(Antid. 268). In the other few instances recorded one seems to detecta hint of that disparaging note of which we shall have to speak next.

Diogenes of Apollonia called his predecessors sophistai in the course

o f writing against them (vol. 11, 363), and, when the Hippocratic

treatise On Ancient Medicine (ch. 20) speaks of ' certain doctors and

sophistai' who claim that one cannot be versed in medicine without

understanding the whole nature of man, it is strongly attacking their

position.' /'/mo, Symp. 108 c . Th e same phrase , τ έ λ ε ο ; σ ο φ ι σ τ ή ; , i s used jokingly of Hades in the

Criitylits, 4 0 3 1 · , with reference to his powers of persuasion.



What is a Sophist?

32

The Athenians, like other people, tended to be suspicious of intel

lectuals, pundits, professors and the like. Their qualities were summed

up in a word difficult to translate: demotes, with the adjective deinos.

D e r i v e d from a noun meaning 'fear', it stands for anything terrible or

dreadful, as for instance in Homer weapons, the glare of a foe, thewhirlpool Charybdis, thunder, lions. Of a goddess, it is coupled with

'reverend', and may have conveyed an idea more like 'the fear of

the Lord'. This sense o f ' a w f u l ' persists, often with a suggestion of the

strange, incomprehensible, uncanny; and so used the word contributes

to some o f the most moving, and untranslatable, lines of Greek tragedy.

Hephaestus cannot bring himself to chain Prometheus to the rock

because 'kinship is something deinon'. Clytemnestra hates and fears

her son, yet when she hears of his death cannot feel the expected

j o y and relief because 'to g i v e birth is deinon—the fact of mother

hood has a strange power. Degenerating, as words do, in popular

use, it became coupled with sophos to mean clever or skilful: the

Egyptians are deinoi (terrible fellows) for devising stratagems,

Prometheus is deinos at wriggling out of difficulties, a good driver is

deinos at his art. It also, and particularly, meant clever in speech or

argument.1

A n y o n e who had this quality was a natural object of suspicion to

his less clever fe l lows, as Antiphon the orator, says Thucydides (8.68. i ) ,

w a s to the Athenian public 'on account of his reputation for demotes',

and later Demosthenes alleges (De cor. 276) that Aeschines has called

him 'deinos, sorcerer, sophist and the like'. Here we have deinos

expressly coupled with sophistes as an insult to be resented, and, though

Demosthenes is a fourth-century figure, the idea of the sophistes as a

man who claims superior knowledge, and can have the claim ironically

f lung back at him, occurs as early as A e s c h y l u s . His Prometheus, the

bringer o f fire to men, wh o taught them all crafts and raised them

from savagery to civilization, is roughly addressed by Hermes as

' y o u , the sophist, who have sinned against the gods', and is mocked

1

A e s c h . P.V. 39; Soph. El. 7 7 0 ; A e s c h . fr. 373 and P.V. 59 . The expression S E I V O S λ έ γ ε ι ν

is frequent. T h e degen erati on resembles that of the English 'ter ribl y' or 'aw ful ly' . It is amusingly

illustrated in Plato, Prot. 34 1 a-b, where Socrates tells how the purist Prodicus rebukes him

fo r using deinos as a term of praise, calling Protagoras 'deinos and sophos', 'awfully clever ' .

Deinos, said Prodicus, properly applies to evils like disease, war, poverty.



' Demotes' and the Sophists

b y Kratos as a duller sophistes than Z e u s . 1

The two criticisms, that a

sophist is not so clever as he thinks he is, and that his cleverness is

used for wrong purposes, are hinted at again in a fragment of

Sophocles (97 N a u c k ) : Ά wel l -d i sposed mind, with righteous thoughts,

is a better inventor than any sophistes.'Sophocles was an exact contemporary of Protagoras, and in him

the word could have been coloured by the appearance on the scene

o f Sophists as a professional class.2

Aristophanes too was w e l l aware of

their existence when he satirized sophists in the Clouds, but still used

the word in a more general sense, in which it could include (for those

w h o disapproved of him) Socrates, although he took no fees and is

constantly represented by Plato as the Sophists' inveterate opponent.A t v. 331 the Clouds are said to be the foster-mothers of a crowd of

'sophists', who are itemized as soothsayers from Thurii, quack doctors,

lazy long-haired and beringed dandies, dithyrambic poets and bogus

astronomers—a pretty comprehensive list. At 360 Socrates and

Prodicus are mentioned together as ' meteorosophists' or experts in

celestial phenomena. At 1 1 1 1 Socrates promises that his teaching wi l l

turn young Pheidippides into a clever sophist, on which his unwilling

pupil comments Ά poor pale-faced devi l , you mean', and at 1309

the word as applied to Strepsiades by the chorus means nothing but

'trickster', in allusion to his cheating of his creditors.

The word 'sophist' then had a general sense as w e l l as the special

one of which we have yet to speak, and in neither sense was it neces

sarily a term of opprobrium. (Compare the judgment of Socrates on

the professional Miccus.) If we remember the educational vocation

of Greek poets, we may say that the word which comes nearest to it

in English is teacher or professor. From early in the fifth century it

could be pronounced with a depreciatory inflexion, as may the words

pundit or intellectual today. In the hands of the conservative Aristo

phanes it became definitely a term of abuse implying charlatanry and

deceit, though still by no means confined to the class of professional

Sophists. We cannot therefore agree with Grote in blaming Plato

1

Ι'. V. f)2. Promc-tlieus would not deny the title. He boasts o f his σ ο φ ίσ μ α τ α , and laments

lll.it l ie has tio σ ό φ ι σ μ α to get him out of his present plight. Th e word is for him sy no ny mo us

w l l l i μ η χ ά ν η μ α , τ ί χ ν η and π ό ρ ο ς . Hut a lready it can be thrown back at him wi th i rony.

* 1 uin re serv ing the capital initial for the members of this profession.

33

http://lll.it/

http://lll.it/

http://lll.it/



What is a Sophist ?

34

as solely responsible for casting discredit on the word (p. 12 above).

What existed already was more than a 'vague sentiment of disl ike',

nor is it true that ' what was new was the peculiar use of an old word

w h i c h Plato took out of its usual meaning, and fastened upon the

eminent paid teachers of the Sokratic age'.1

Apart from the evidenceo f Xenophon, it would have been quite impossible for Plato to have

referred, in the manner and the contexts in which he does so refer, to

the paid teachers as Sophists if that had not been their recognized title.

A v i e w like Grote's can only be upheld by the uncritical practice

( w h i c h w i l l not be f o l l o w e d here) of accepting as fact all references to

the Sophists in Plato which are either neutral or sympathetic ('Even

Plato is forced to ad m i t . . . ' ) and dismissing any less complimentaryremarks as due solely to illiberal prejudice. When Protagoras in

Plato's Protagoras a v o w s himself a Sophist and an educator in spite

o f the odium which attaches to the term, an odium which he explains

as due to the fact that they enter the great cities of Greece as foreigners

and attract their most promising young men away from their relations

and friends by claiming that their own teaching is better, there is no

reason to doubt the reality of the state of affairs which he describes.

His boast has an element of bravado: it needs courage to declare

onese l f a Sophist. Equally true to the character of the Athenians is the

remark of Socrates in the Euthyphro (3 c) that it does not matter if

they think somebody deinos provided he keeps it to himself, but if

he starts imparting his superior cleverness to others by teaching they

g e t angry, whether from jealousy or some other cause. Here Socrates

has his own plight in mind, but plainly the observation applies to the

professional Sophists too; indeed he shared their reputation, as the

Clouds makes plain. In the next century Aeschines the orator could

refer to him casually as 'Socrates the sophist\*

1

Grote , History, v i l , 35 and 37. N o r shall w e f o l l o w Popper (OS. 263, n. 52) in saying that

Plato is 'the man who by his attacks on the "Sophists" created the bad associations connected

with the word'. (My italics.) A fairer statement is Havelock's {Lib. Temper, i;8): ' T h e play

wri ght s of Ol d Co me d y played upo n the prejudice [against intellectualism], if they indeed

did not create it, and when Plato uses the word sophistes it has lost its dig nit y. He can not

forget, perhaps, the burlesques staged in his youth which he had either read or seen.'a

In Timarch. 1 7 3 . It was in the same speech that Aesch ines called Demo sth ene s a sophist.

T h o u g h the lapse of centuri es make s it o f doub tful relev ance to the present di scuss ion, it is

interesting that Lucian could refer to Christ as ' that crucified sophist' (Peregrinus 13).



Sophists as a Professional Class

(2) T H E S O P H I S T S

(a) Professionalism

In the lifetime of Socrates the word came to be used, though not

sole ly , of a particular class, namely professional educators who g a v einstruction to young men, and public displays of eloquence, for fees.

T h e y recognized their descent from the earlier tradition of education

b y the poets; indeed Protagoras, in the somewhat self-satisfied speech

w h i c h Plato puts into his mouth (Prot. 3i6d), accuses Orpheus and

Musaeus, Homer, Hesiod and Simonides of using their poetry as a

disguise, through fear of the odium attached to the name descriptive of

their real character, which was that of Sophists like himself.1

(Theanachronistic confusion is in keeping with the light-hearted tone

w h ic h Plato adopts in the dramatic parts of this dialogue, for needless to

say no professional stigma attached to the name in earlier d a y s , and in any

case, as we have seen, it was in fact applied to the poets.) In the Meno

(91 e-92a) Plato speaks of 'many others' besides Protagoras who have

practised the Sophists ' profession,' some before his time and others still

alive ' . O f professionals before Protagoras we have no record, and indeedSocrates in the Protagoras (349 a) addresses him as the first to take pay

ment for his teaching. Plato may have been thinking of a man like the

Athenian Mnesiphilus, who is mentioned by Herodotus (8 .57) as an ad

viser o f Themistocles and o f whom Plutarch writes in a passage o f some

interest for the development of the sophistic profession (Them. 2):

1

Tile same was said by Plutarch {Pericles 4) of Damon, a Sophist who was a pupil of

I'rodi cus and friend of Socrate s (Pl ato , Laches I97d). He was chiefly known as an authority

on music but, says Plutarch, though a leading Sophist and in fact the mentor of Pericles in

politics, he used his musical reputation to hide his δ ε ι ν ό τ η ; . This however did not avail him

ttnd he was ostracized. His association with Pericl es is confirmed b y Plato {Ale. I 1 1 8 c ) and

lnocrates {Anted. 235), and his ostracism (already in Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4) by the discovery

o f an ostracon bearing his name ( D K , 1, 382 n.). In the Republic (400b, 424c) Plato makes it

clear that his interest in musical modes was bound up with wider questions of their moral and

nocial effects. He goes so far as to say that in Damon's view 'the modes of music are never

dlnturbed wit hou t unsettli ng the most fundamental political and social co nv en ti on s' (trans.

Shorey). If more were known of him he might occupy an important place in the history of the

•nphistic movement, but in our comparative ignorance he can only appear as a footnote to it.

' l e x i s are in D K , 1, no. 37, and modern studies include W . D . Ande rson , ' T h e Importance of

tlir Damonian Theo ry in Plato's Th ou gh t' {Τ Α Ρ Α , 1 9 5 5 ; see also his book Ethos and Educa

tion in Greek Music and its rev iew by Bo rt hwi ck in CR, 1 9 5 8 ) ; ch. 6 of F. Lasserre, Pint, de

hi miiui/ue; J. S. Mor riso n in CO, 1958, 20 4-6; H. John, 'Das musikerziehende Wirken

l'yiliugorutt' und Damons' {Das Altertum, 1 9 Λ 2 ).



What is a Sophist ?

36

He was neither an orator nor one of those called philosophers of nature.

Rather he made a practice of what was called sophia but was in reality

political shrewdness (demotes) and practical sagacity, and so perpetuated

what one might call a school which had come down in succession from

Solon . His successors combined it with the art of forensic eloquence, and,

transferring their training from action to speech, were called Sophists.1

References to the Sophists as paid for their work are frequent in

Plato,2

and occur also in Xenophon, Isocrates and Aristotle. The

character of the Sophists may have changed, but they remained

professionals from Protagoras to the time of Isocrates at least. ' Those

w h o sell their wisdom for money to anyone who wants it are called

Sophists', says Socrates in Xenophon (Mem. 1 . 6 . 1 3 ) , and adds acomment more caustic than anything in Plato. In the Meno ( 9 1 c if .)

it is Anytus, a typical well-bred member of the governing class,

w h o violently abuses them, and Socrates who is their somewhat

ironic defender. Isocrates in his old age3 defended the profession,

w h i c h he equated with his own philosophical ideal, an ideal much

c loser to Protagoras than to Plato. The best and greatest reward of a

Sophist, he s a ys , is to see some of his pupils become wise and respectedcit izens. Admittedly there are some bad Sophists, but those who make

a right use of philosophy ought not to be blamed for the few black

sheep. In conformity with this he defends them from the charge of

profiteering. None of them, he s a ys , made a great fortune or l i ve d

other than modestly, not even Gorgias who earned more than any

other and was a bachelor with no family ties.4 Plato on the other

hand emphasizes their wealth, saying for instance that Protagoras

earned more from his sophia than Phidias and ten other sculptors put

together (Meno 91 d), and Gorgias and Prodicus more than the

practitioners of any other art (Hipp. Maj. 282 d). Aristotle describes

a Sophist as one who makes money out of an apparent but unreal

1

O n Mnesiphilus see further Morrison, Durham U.J. 1949, 59, and Kerferd, CR, 1950, 9f.2

E. L. Harris on in Phoenix, 1964, 191, n. 44 , has collected thir ty-o ne Platon ic references

to the Sophists' earnings. What is known about the practice of individuals w i l l be noted be lo w

in the sections devoted to them (pp. 262S.).3

He was 82 when he wrote the Antidosis; see § 9 . For the Protagorean standpoint of Isocrates

see Morrison's comparison of Platonic and Isocratean philosophia in CQ, 1958, 2 1 6 - 1 8 .4

Antid. 155 f . Dodds (Gorg. 7 ) , in his argument that Go rgi as wa s not a Sophist, tries to

explain away this passage, as w e l l as Plato, Hipp. Maj. 2 8 2 b 5 and Isocr. Antid. 268.



Sophists as a Professional Class

w i s d o m , and, setting aside the jibe, this and other passages are evidence

that paid Sophists still existed in his time.1

The professionalism of the Sophists is emphasized by the fact that

Protagoras had two classes of pupil: young men of good family who

wished to enter politics, and those, like a certain Antimoerus of Mende(not, that is , an Athenian), who was studying ' for professional pur

poses (ε π ί τ έ χ ν η ), to become a Sophist himself'.2

In the Protagoras

( 3 1 3 c ) Socrates describes a Sophist as 'a seller o f the goods b y which

a soul [or mind] is nourished', and suggests reasons w hy a young

man should hesitate before entrusting himself to such a one: like

retailers o f bodily foods, they praise their wares indiscriminately

without a dietitian's knowledge of their wholesomeness; unlike foods,

their products enter the mind directly, and cannot be kept in jars until

w e find out which to consume and how and in what quantities. By the

time Plato wrote the Sophist (where Socrates takes no part in the main

argument) they had simply become (along with other undesirable

characteristics) 'paid hunters of rich young men'. Mistrust of the Soph

ists was not confined to Plato. The outburst of A n y t u s must be true to

life, as it is also when young Hippocrates, son of a 'great and prosper

ous house', blushes for shame at the thought of becoming one himself

(Prot. 3 1 2 a ) . In the Gorgias (520a) Socrates's most violent opponent,

Call icles , dismisses them as 'worthless f e l l ows ' , and in the Phaedrus

( 2 j 7 d ) Phaedrus asserts that the most powerful and respected poli

ticians are afraid to write speeches and leave works of their own to

posterity, for fear of being called Sophists. Plato himself, though he

disagreed with the Sophists, was much gentler in his handling o f the best

o f them like Protagoras, Gorgias and Prodicus. A disparaging remark

about Sophists, in connexion with Prodicus, is put into the mouth

o f Laches, not Socrates (Laches 179 d). Xenophon, in a moral epilogue

to his treatise on hunting (ch. 13), castigates them as masters o f fraud.3

1

Soph. El. 1 6 5 a 2 i ; cf. i83b36f f . (where μ ισ β α ρ ν ο ύ ν τ ω ν recalls the μ ισ β α ρ ν ο ϋ ν τ ε ς Ι δ ι ώ τ α ι

of Pla to , Rep. 4 93a ) and EN 1 1 6 4 3 3 0 .

' Prot. 3 1 5a . F o r Sophistic as a τ έ χ ν η cf. e . g . τ η ν σ ο φ ι σ τ ικ ή ν τ έ χ ν η ν 3 i 6 d , and Protagoras

40 years tv τ ή τ έ χ ν η , Meno 9 1ε .1 If the Cynegetica is by Xenophon, which some have doubted. See L e s k y , Hist. Gr. Lit.

6 1 1 f. Others have maintained that the passage is influenced b y Plato's Sophist (Grant, Ethics 1,

1 1 1 ) and have pointed o u t that both were written after the brilliant first generation o f Sophists

were dead. So, one may presume, were the Protagoras and Meno, y et it is Protagoras, Gorgias,

llippias and Prodicus who are still lo r Plato th e representative Sophists.

37



What is a Sophist ?

3 8

The attitude of the Athenian public was ambivalent, reflecting the

transitional situation of Athenian social and intellectual life. The Soph

ists had no difficulty in finding pupils to pay their high fees, or audi

ences for their public lectures and displays. Yet some among the older

and more conservative1

strongly disapproved of them. This disapproval was linked, as Plato shows, to their professionalism. Wh y

should this be? We are accustomed to thinking of teaching as a per

fectly respectable way of earning a livelihood, and there was no pre

judice in Greece against earning a l i v ing as such. Socrates was the son

o f a stonemason and probably f o l low e d the same trade, but (unpopular

as he was in many quarters) this was never held against him. Poets

had been paid for their work, artists and doctors were expected tocharge fees both for the practice of their art and for teaching it to

others.2

The trouble seems to have lain first of all in the kind of

subjects the Sophists professed to teach, especially arete. Protagoras,

when asked what Hippocrates wi l l learn from him, replies (Prot.

3 1 8 ε ) : 'The proper care of his personal affairs, so that he may best

manage his own household, and also of the State's affairs, so as to

become a real power in the city both as speaker and as man of action.'

In short, says Socrates, the art of citizenship, and Protagoras em

phatically agrees. Though some of them taught many other things as

we l l , all included political advancement in their curriculum, and the

k e y to this, in democratic Athens, was the power of persuasive speech.3

1

Thi s does not necessarily mean aristocratic or oligarc hic as oppos ed to democratic. A ny t us

w a s a leading democrat. The division between democrat and anti-democrat cut across that

betwe en hig h-bo rn and plebeian. Pericles, wh o completed the democratic rev oluti on, was an

A l c m a e o n i d like Cleisthenes who started it. D r Ehre nber g has called him 'th e aristocratic

demo cra t' . C f. his remarks on p. 65 of his Soc. and Civ. in Gr. and Rome: 'The old aristocratic

education was out of touch with the realities of contemporary l i fe , bu t it was largely the same

leading class whi ch gove rne d the democr atic state.' Cf. also M. A . L e v i , Pol. Power in the

Anc. World, 65, 90.

1

See e.g. Isocr. Antid. 166; Ar . Rhet. I 4 0 5 b 2 4 (poets); Plato, Prot. 3 1 1 c , Meno 9 i d

(sculptors); Prot. 3 1 1 b and Hdt. 3 . 1 3 1 . 2 (doctors). Further references are in Nestle,

VMiuL, 259, n. 36. Zeno the philosopher is said by Plato to have exacted the impressive fee

o f 100 minas for a course (Ale. / 1 1 9 a), though, when late authorities say the same of Protagoras

(as indeed they do of Gor gi as , Di od . 1 2 . 5 3 . 2 ) , Zeller dismisses it as highly exaggerated

( Z N , 1 2 9 9 , n. 2) . Y e t Ze no does no t seem to have shared the name or the blame of the Sop hist s.3

Simil arly in the Clouds (v. 432) Socrate s, wh o is there caricatured as amo ng other thing sa professional Sophist (cf. 98 ά ρ γ ύ ρ ι ο ν f\v TIS S I S C O ) , assures Strepsiades that through his

instruction έ ν τ φ δ ή μ ω γ ν ώ μ α $ ο ύ δ ε Ι$ ν ι κ ή σ ε ι τ τ λ ε ίο ν α ί ή σ ύ . A t Gorg. 520ε Socrates suggests

a reason why teaching this kind of thing is gener ally frowned on.



Criticism of Sophists as Fee-takers

G o r g i a s indeed concentrated solely on rhetoric and refused to

be included among the teachers of arete, for he held that rhetoric was

the master-art to which all others must defer.1

Now 'to teach the art

o f politics and undertake to make men good citizens' (Prot. 3 1 9 a) was

just what at Athens was considered the especial province of theamateur and gentleman. A ny upper-class Athenian should understand

the proper conduct of affairs by a sort of instinct inherited from his

ancestors, and be prepared to pass it on to his sons. Even Protagoras

admitted this, while claiming that it still left room for his pedagogic

art as a supplement.2

In the Meno passage already referred to Socrates

innocently suggests to Anytus , a prominent democratic leader who

became his chief accuser, that the Sophists are the proper peopleto instil into a young man the sophia which wi l l fit him to manage

an estate, govern a city, and in general show the savoir-faire proper

to a gentleman. When Anytus reviles them as a menace to

socie ty , and Socrates asks to whom then, in his opinion, a young man

should turn for such training, he replies that there is no need to men

tion particular individuals, for ' any decent Athenian gentleman whom

he happens to meet wi l l make him a better man than the Sophists

w o u l d ' .

The grounds on which Socrates criticized their fee-taking were

rather different, and typical of the man. He held (we have this not from

Plato but Xenophon) that by accepting money they deprived them

selves of their freedom: they were bound to converse with any who

could pay their fees, whereas he was free to enjoy the society o f anyone

he chose (Mem. 1 . 2 . 6 , 1 . 6 . 5 ) . He went so far as to call it prostitution,

selling one's mind being no better than selling one's body. Wisdom

w as something that should be freely shared between friends and

1

Pp. 27 i f f . below, ά ρ ε τ ή ξ δ ι δ ά σ κ α λ ο ι was Plato' s regular way of referr ing to the Sophists

(Dodds, Gorgias, 366). For Gorgias see Meno 95 c, Gorg. 456c - e, especially ο ϋ γ ά ρ ε σ τ ί ν π ε ρ ί ό τ ο υ

ο ύ κ ά ν π ι θ α ν ώ τ ε ρ ο ν ε ΐτ τ ο ι ό ρ η τ ο ρ ι κ ό ς ή ά λ λ ο ; ό σ τ ι σ ο ΰ ν τ ω ν δ η μ ι ο υ ρ γ ώ ν ε ν τ τ λ ή θ ε ι. Gorgias

I'vt 'i i admits that his pupil s wil l learn from him the principles of rig ht and wr on g 'i f the y

don't happen to kn ow them alre ady' (460a), whi le at the same time m ainta ining that the

Iruclicr is not responsible for the use made of his teac hing. Fo r the correctnes s of inc lud ing

(•orgias among the Sophists see no w E. L. Ha rr is on in Phoenix, 1964 (against Raeder and

D o i l i U ) .' 1 do not understand how anyone can read the brilliant and sympathetic speech of Prota

goras in the Protagoras from 323 c to 328 c and still hold that Plato in his representations of the

licit of die Sophists was setting out to blacken their memory.

3 9



What is a Sophist?

40

l o v e d ones ( 1 . 6 . 1 3 ) . This was ho w philosophy had been regarded

hitherto, especially in the Pythagorean school, of which Plato

certainly, and Socrates probably, was an admirer. The complex

Socratic-Platonic concept of eros, a sublimated homosexual l ove , w i l l

also have been at work.

(& ) Inter-city status

The Sophists, then, were disliked for different reasons both by philo

sophers like Socrates and Plato and by leading citizens like Anytus.

The odium which they incurred in the eyes of the establishment was

not only due to the subjects they professed; their own status was

against them. Not only did they claim tog i v e

instruction in what at

Athens was thought to be for the right people a kind of second nature,

but they themselves were not Athenian leaders or even citizens. They

were foreigners, provincials whose genius had outgrown the confines

o f their own minor cities. Some of them first went abroad on official

missions, as Gorgias to Athens to plead the cause of Leontini against

S yra cu s e in 427.1

Both he and Prodicus of C e o s took the opportunity,

w h i l e presenting their cities' case before the Council, of advancing

their own interests by giv ing classes and demonstrations which

brought in considerable sums (Hipp. Maj. 282 b - c ) . Hippias, too,

boasted of the number of diplomatic missions on which his city em

p l o y e d him (ibid. 281a). Leontini, C e o s or Elis afforded inadequate

outlet for their talents. At Athens, the centre of Hellenic culture at

the height o f its fame and power, 'the very headquarters of Greek

w i s d o m ' as Plato's Hippias calls it (Prot. 337d), they could flourish;

but there they had no chance of becoming political figures themselves,

so they used their talents to teach others. It was no wonder that, as

Protagoras said, the position of such men could easily become pre

carious. Plato refers to it again more than once, in the Apology (1 9 ε )

and in the Timaeus where Socrates says (1 9 ε ) that the Sophists are

v e r y good speechmakers in general, but tha t ' their habit of wandering

from city to city and having no settled home of their o wn ' is a

disadvantage when it comes to matters of active statesmanship in

1

Plato, Hipp. Maj. 2 8 2 b , D i o d . 12 .53.1—2. Th uc yd id es also tells of the embas sy from

Leontini (3 .86 .3), but with out mentionin g Gorg ias .



Sophists as Foreigners: their Methods

war or negotiation. This has been cited as an example of Plato's

disparagement of the Sophists, but is only a statement of evident

fact . 1

(c) Methods

The Sophists g a v e their instruction either to small circles or seminars

or in public lectures or 'displays' (epideixeis).2

The former might be

conducted in the house of a patron like Call ias , the richest man in

A t h e n s , who was said to have spent more money on the Sophists than

anyone else (Plato, Apol. 20a). His home is the scene of the gathering

in Plato's Protagoras, and his hospitality to the Sophists and their

admirers seems to have turned it into a rather unhomelike place.

Protagoras paces the forecourt attended by a considerable crowd,including both Athenians and the foreigners whom he draws, like a

Pied Piper, from every city that he passes through. In the opposite

portico Hippias is holding forth to another circle, and Prodicus is

o c c u p y i n g a former store-room which Call ias has had to convert into a

bedroom owing to the large number staying in the house. He too has

his own circle of listeners round his bed. Callias's hall porter is under

standably sick of the sight of Sophists. When hosts were so complaisant, even public displays could take place in private houses. We

hear of Prodicus g i v i n g one at Callias's (Axioch. 366c),3 and when

Socrates and Chaerephon have missed a display by Gorgias, evidently

in some public place, Call ic les assures them that Gorgias is staying

with him and wi l l put on another performance at home for their

benefit. Sometimes the displays would be in a gymnasium or other

place of resort. C l e o n accuses the Athenian assembly of behaving

'more like the audience at Sophists' displays than a serious delibera

t ive body' (Thuc. 3.38.7). Hippias tells Socrates that in two days' time

he wi l l be g iv ing a recital 'in the School o f Pheidostratus', and Prodicus

did the same in the L y c e u m (Hipp. Maj. 286 b, Eryxias 397 c ) . Prices

1

The point about the alien status of the Sophists is made by Joel, Gesch. 646f., who remarks,

lidupting a wel l- kn own story of Plato' s, that if Themi stoc les had been a Seriphian he wo ul d have

becom e a Sophist! A t Rep. 493 a the Sophis ts are μ ι σ θ α ρ ν ο ϋ ν τ ε ς Ι δ ι ώ τ α ι , which is a lso a fair

description.

' Th e two method s are mentioned together in conne xion with Prodicu s at Hipp. Maj. 282 c :

π ι6ιΙ ξ ιις π ο ιο ύ μ ε ν ο ς κ α ΐ τ ο ις ν έ ο ις σ υ ν ώ ν .1

Kv rn if our auth orit y is of doub tful reliability for the actual fact, the author probably

knew that such occurrences did take place.

4>



What is a Sophist?

42

o f admission are mentioned more than once, as J , 2 and 4 drachmas

for a performance by Prodicus (Axioch. 366c). Socrates laments that

his knowledge of correct diction is inadequate because he had only

been able to afford the 1 dr. lecture of Prodicus and not the 50 dr. one.1

The display might take the form of inviting questions from the

audience. This is mentioned as a practice of Gorgias (Gorg. 447c,

Meno 70 c ) , and Hippias was bold enough to do the same before the

great pan-Hellenic concourse at Olympia (Hipp. Min. 363 c-d).

Al te rna t ive ly the Sophist g a v e a display of continuous eloquence on a

prepared theme and from a written text. Such were the Trojan dialogue

o f Hippias (Hipp. Maj. 286a, described by its author as 'splendidly

composed'), and the speeches of Gorgias at Olympia, Delphi andA t h e n s , the last a funeral oration for the dead in battle.

2

These declama

tions might be simply rhetorical exercises on mythical themes, designed

to show how, with skill and effrontery, the most unpromising case

c ou ld be defended. Of such we still possess two specimens in the

Helena and Palamedes of Gorgias. Besides Gorgias and Hippias,

Protagoras also claimed to excel in both genres, long and elaborate

speeches and the technique of question and answer (Prot. 329b, 335 a) .The appearance of the Sophists at the great festivals of Olympia

and elsewhere had a threefold significance. First, it is further evidence

that they considered themselves to be in the tradition of the poets

and rhapsodes. Xenophanes and Empedocles had, like other poets,

introduced their own work to the public by recitation either in person

or through a rhapsode. Poets and rhapsodes wore special clothes, in

particular a purple robe.3 Hippias and Gorgias did the same (DK,82 A 9), and Hippias made his own finery (Hipp. Min. 368 c ) . It has

to be remembered that we are still in an age when it was much more

usual to hear a literary work read than to read it to oneself, and

1

Many think that the 50 dr. must have been for a course, though the expression is

τ τ ε ν τ η κ ο υ τ ά δ ρ α χ μ ο ξ έ π ί δ ε ιξ ις (Crat. 3 8 4 b ) . Cf. Ar. Rhet. 1 4 1 5 b 1 5 . Judg ing by what we kno w

o f the Sophists' standards, 50 dr. would have been rather little for a wh ol e course . Eucriu-.

(p. 45 below) charged 5 minae, and Isocrates about the year 390 mentions 3-4 minae as the

price for which Sophists are prepared to impart their secrets.

1

See Philostr. V.S. 1 . 9 . 5 ( D K , 82 A 1) and G or gi as frr. 5 a - 9 .3

Empedocles at Olympia, D.L. 8.66; his poems recited there by a rhapsode, ibid, n j ;

Xenophanes α υ τ ό ς έ ρ ρ α ψ ώ δ ε ι τ ά έ α υ τ ο ΰ , idem 9 -1 8 . For the poets' garb see Morrison,

Durham U.J. 1949, 58, n. 21 .



Competitors at the Festivals

recitation at a pan-Hellenic festival, or in one of the cities,1

was a way

o f making a new work known. Formerly the subjects had been poems,

especially epic poems, and, although by the fifth century the public

reading of prose authors was also common,2

the elaborate epideictic

rhetoric of the Sophists, when performed at the Olympian or Pythiangames, aimed at something further. It was (and this is the second

point) agonistic, competing for prizes in set contests as did the poets,

musicians and athletes. Hippias speaks of 'entering the lists' (ά γ ω ν ί-

^ε σ θ α ι) at Olympia and being unbeaten (Hipp. Min. 364a). This

competitiveness came to be a general characteristic of the Sophists.

For Protagoras any discussion is a 'verbal battle', in which one must

be victor and the other vanquished (Prot. 335 a), in contrast to

Socrates's expressed ideal of the 'common search', one helping the

other that both may come nearer the truth. The contest, said Gorgias,

needs both boldness and wit, for the argument, like the herald at

O l y m p i a , summons whoever wi l l come, but crowns only those who

can succeed.3 Thucydides is contrasting himself with the Sophists

when he says that his own work is not intended as a ' competition-piece

for a single occasion' but a possession for all time. .A s often, Euripides

makes his characters speak in true contemporary sophistic style

when Creon's herald sings the praises of monarchy as opposed to

democracy and Theseus replies (Suppl. 4 2 7 f . ) : 'Since you yourself

have started this competition, listen to me; for it is you who have

proposed a battle of words.'4 Thirdly, the festivals were occasions for

' Isocrates comments on the fact that the first foun der s of the great festivals insti tuted athle tic

contests only, and praises Athens as a city where one can see 'contests not only of speed and

itrength but also of speech and wit and other accomplishments, for which prizes of great valuearc awarded' (Paneg. iff., 45). Isocrates made this speech at the age of 92, some half-dozen

years after the death of Pla to, bu t cf. Cl eo n' s criti cism of the Athen ians in Thu cy di de s

(3.38.4, ά γ ω ν ο θ ε τ ο Ο ν τ ε ; . . . θ ε α τ α ΐ τ ώ ν λ ό γ ω ν ) .

' Plutarch, Mai. Hdt. 862, speaks of Herodotus reading his work to the Athenians. Thuc.

1 . a i . 1 and 22.4 compares the effect of hearing the work of logographers and hearing his own.

(Nestle, VMiuL, 260 with n. 41.)3

Gorg ias fr. 8 D K . D K translate as if ό γ ά ρ τ ο ι λ ό γ ο ζ κ α θ ά τ τ ε ρ τ 4 κ ή ρ υ γ μ α were simply

τ ό γ ά ρ κ ή ρ υ γ μ α . Whether this is due to inadvertence, or they intended to impute the mention

o f the λ ό γ ο ς to Clement, I do not know (they g i v e no note on the passage), bu t the elaborat e

balance of the clauses shows that Clement is g i v i n g a verbati m extract from the r hetori cian,

and I sec no reason to supp ose that the simile is an importa tion of his ow n.4

W it h α γ ώ ν ι σ μ α and ά μ ίλ λ α ς in these lines cf. D . L . 9 .5 2 o f Pr ot ag or as κ α ι π ρ ώ τ ο ; . . . λ ό γ ω ν

α γ ώ ν α ς ίπ ο ι ή σ α τ ο , and Plato, Prot. 335 a, wher e Prot agor as s ays π ο λ λ ο ΐ ξ ή δ η ε Ι$ α γ ώ ν α λ ό γ ω ν

ά φ ικ ώ μ η ν ά ν Ο ρ ώ π ο ίξ .

4 3



What is a Sophist?

44

members of all the Greek city-states to meet together and forget

their differences, and the public appearance there of the Sophists was

s y m b o l i c of a pan-Hellenic outlook that went naturally with their

habit of staying in different cities in turn. Gorgias was as welcome in

Larissa as in Athens, and Hippias (even more remarkably) in Athensas in Sparta. The subject of Gorgias's Olympic oration was homonoia,

concord, and his advice, which he repeated in his Athenian funeral

oration, was that Greek states should turn their arms against the

barbarians, not against each other. We have already seen Hippias

upholding the brotherhood of all Greeks.1

(d) Interests and general outlook

It is an exaggeration to say, as has often been said,2

that the Sophists

had nothing in common save the fact that they were professional

teachers, no common ground in the subjects that they taught or the

mentality which these produced. One subject at least they all practised

and taught in common: rhetoric or the art of the logosJi In Athens in

the mid fifth century to be an effective speaker was the key to power.

'The word is a mighty despot' , as Gorgias said in one of his surviving

declamations (Hel. 8, D K , n, 290); and with the art of logos would go

all that was necessary for a successful political career. When young

Hippocrates is asked what he thinks a Sophist is, he replies: Ά master

o f the art of making clever speakers' (Prot. 3i2d). The speaker's

art they practised themselves, taught personally, and expounded in

written handbooks (technai) covering both rhetorical argument and

the correct use of language in general.* All save Gorgias would admit

1

Gorgias Α ι (Philostr. 1 . 9 . 5 ) , and fr. 5 b . Plato, Meno 7 0 b , Hipp. Maj. 283 b .2

E.g. T. Gomperz, Gr. Th. 1, 415 : 'I t is illegiti mate, if no t absu rd, to speak of a sophi stic

min d, sophistic morali ty, sophistic sceptici sm and so forth .' ( Ev en the bare fact of be in g p ro

fessional teachers can ha ve an effect: some at least wo ul d be prepared to maintain that there is

such a thi ng as a scho olma ster ly or donn ish mi nd. ) F or a similar poin t of vi ew see H. G om pe rz ,

Soph. u. Rh. 39.

3

See the evidence collected by E. L. Harrison, Phoenix, 1964, i9of£, nn. 41 and 42. Schmid's

contention (Gesch. gr. Lit. 1 . 3 . 1 , 5 6 f . ) that rhetoric was un kn ow n amo ng the early Sophists and

intr oduce d b y Go rg ia s in the last third of the century is not borne out by the evidence.4

For the written technai see Plato, Phaedr. 2 7 1 c ol ν Ο ν γ ρ ά φ ο ν τ ε ς . . . τ έ χ ν α ς λ ό γ ω ν and

cf. 266d.Isocrates,

In Soph. 19,speaks of 'th ose of an earlier gener atio n' wh o wro te τ α ς

κ α λ ο ύ μ ε ν ο ς τ έ χ ν α ς . Protagoras 's ό ρ θ ο έ π ε ι α i s ment ioned in the same context by Plato ( 2 6 7 1 . · ;

see p. 205, n. 2, below), and the list of his works in D.L. includes τ έ χ ν η ε ρ ι σ τ ι κ ώ ν . According,

to Plato {Soph. 2 3 2 d ) he published sets of arguments to enable a man to hold his own against



The Subjects Taught

to being teachers of arete (of which, as understood by them, the art of

persuasive speech was a prerequisite), and one may suspect that

G o r g i a s ' s disclaimer was a little disingenuous (pp. 271 f. b e l o w ) : his

teaching of rhetoric was aimed at securing for his pupils the same kind

o f success in life that Protagoras promised as a teacher oipolitike arete.

1

In accordance with their claim to be the educational successors of the

poets, the Sophists included in their art of logoi the exposition and

criticism of poetry. This is w e l l attested for Protagoras (pp. 205, 269,

b e l o w ) , and another Sophist, Euenus of Paros ('fee 5 minae' , Pi.

Apol. 20b), who was especially interested in knowing why Socrates

should have taken to writing poetry in prison (Phaedo 60d ) , also

lectured on poetry, as w e l l as writing it himself.

2

It is also recordedo f Hippias and Antisthenes (pp. 282, 309 b e l o w ) .

Apart from this one overriding interest, many of them had their

o w n specialities. Hippias prided himself on his polymathy and versa

tility. He not only taught mathematics, music and astronomy (which

Protagoras derided as useless for practical life)3 and had perfected his

o w n system of memory-training, but claimed mastery over many

handicrafts as w e l l . 4

It has been said of the Sophists that they were

as much the heirs of the Presocratic philosophers as of the poets.

W . Schmid has claimed for Protagoras a debt to Heraclitus, A n a x a

goras , the Milesian physicists and Xenophanes, and g ive s him the

credit for making the paradoxical conclusions of Heraclitus and

experts in divers arts and crafts. He also wrot e on gramma r. Fo r Gor gi as see Pl ato, Phaedr.

»6lb-c. He τ έ χ ν α ξ ρ η τ ο ρ ι κ ά ; π ρ ώ τ ο ; έ ξ ε ϋ ρ ε , Di od . 1 2 . 5 3 - 2 ( D K , A 4). D . L . 8.59 speaks

o f him as υ π ε ρ έ χ ο ν τ α tv ρ η τ ο ρ ι κ ή κ α ΐ τ έ χ ν η ν ά π ο λ ε λ ο ι π ό τ α , and Quintil . 3 .1 . 8 ( A 14) puts

him among the artium scriptores. Thrasymachus wrote a rhetorical τ έ χ ν η (Suda, A I ) which

• c c m s t o ha ve been k n ow n as the Μ ε γ ά λ η Τ έ χ ν η ( Β 3). For something of its content see Phaedr.

167 c with DK , Β 6. Prodi cus and Hippias are also mentioned in Pla to's revie w of the β ιβ λ ία

τ ά τ τ ε ρ ί λ ό γ ω ν τ έ χ ν η ; γ ε γ ρ α μ μ έ ν α {Phaedr. 266 d f f . ) , and Hippias's expertise in the minutiae of

•peech at Hipp. Min. 368 d. Prodi cus 's passion for distingui shing be twe en apparent synonyms

1· often referred to by Plato, e.g. Prot. 337c, Euthyd. 277ε (π ε ρ ί ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν ό ρ θ ό τ η τ ο ;), Laches

ν ρ Α (ο ν ό μ α τ α δ ια ιρ ε ί ν ) . M ore o n this below, pp. 222 f.

1

Cf . E. L. Harr ison in Phoenix, 1964, i88f. B l u c k has pointed out (on Meno 73d) that

arete" according to Gorgias is there said to be 'the capacity to govern men', which is precisely

what Gor gi as himself, in the Gorgias (452d), claims to impart through the art of persuasion.

S e c also p. 1 81 , n. 2, be lo w.

' Sec Phaedr. 267 a. Some fragments of his ekg ia cs have sur vived , and w i l l be found inD l r l i l , Anth. Lyr. i.7 8ff . Ar istotl e quotes him a number of times.

1

I'Or a more definite reason for Protagoras's quarrel with mathematics, based on his general

theories of knowledge and reality, see vol. 1 1 , 485^4

I'lato, I'roi. 3i8d-e , Η 'ψ ρ . Min. 368b-d; Philostr. VS. 1 . 1 1 . 1 (DK, 86 A 2) .

45



w η α ι is a oopnisi r

Parmcnides generally current in educated circles. (Sec Cesch. gr. Lit.

i . 3 . 1 , 1 6 and 38.) On the other hand it has been said that they had no

interest in natural philosophy at all. There can be no doubt that they

were familiar with the writings of the philosophers and that their

general outlook, with its rationalism, rejection of divine causation,

and tendency to scepticism, owed much to them. This is not incon

sistent with a fundamental difference of aim, and, making allowance

for this, there was also a meeting ground in their common interest in

anthropology, the evolution of man as a product of nature and the

development of human society and civilization. But there is little

positive evidence of a serious interest in cosmology or physical

questions generally, though this has sometimes been claimed for

Protagoras on the basis of a quotation in Eustathius from the comic

poet Eupolis ( D K A I I ) , who ridiculed him for 'pretending an

interest in the heavens but eating what came out of the ground '.

T h i s is slender, and probably comic slander like Aristophanes's jibe

against Socrates and Prodicus together as 'meteorosophists'.1

In

Plato's Protagoras ( 3 1 8 ε , a better source), Protagoras disclaims an

interest in all such unpractical studies. At the gathering in the house of

Call ias (ibid. 3 1 5 c ) , Hippias is shown answering questions about

'natural science and astronomy', and in the Hippias Major (285b)Socrates speaks to him of 'the stars and other cekstial ρ η ε η ο π ι ε Μ ,

in which you are such an expert'; but his pride was in the astonishing

breadth and variety of the topics on which he could discourse. His

acquaintance with each must have been extremely superficial, and

there is no suggestion that, except possibly in mathematics, he had

any original contribution to offer. Galen reports a work of Prodicus

(fr. 4) On the Nature of Man which repeats the title of a Hippocraticw o r k and shows an interest in physiology. Some fragments of Anti-

phon (betwε en 22 and 43 in D K ) seem to reveal an interest of Pre-

socratic type in questions of cosmology, astronomy, earth and sea.

C i c e r o speaks (De or. 3.32.126-8) of Prodicus, Thrasymachus and

Protagoras as having spoken and written etiam de natura rerum; but he

1

A s Schmid notes (Gesch. i . 3 .1,36, n. 3), after the trial of A n a x a g o r a s μ ε τ ε ω ρ ο λ ό γ ο ς became

a general term of abuse. One may compare also Plato, Apol. 26 d, and, for Ana xag or as as the

h i g h priest o f μ ε τ ε ω ρ ο λ ο γ ί α , Phaedr. 2 7 0 a.

46



Sophists and 1'resocratics: I'armemaes

puts this in the right perspective when he connects it with the Sophists'

claim to hold forth on any subject whatsoever and answer any question

that can be put to them. Among the 'practitioners of every art', with

whom Protagoras undertook to enable a pupil to argue on their own

ground, would no doubt be the cosmologists and astronomers. The

aim was to be a good talker and to make debating points, not to

acquire a scientific interest in a subject for its own sake.

One branch of Presocratic philosophy had a profound influence on

sophistic as on all other Greek thought: the extreme monism of

Parmenides and his fo l lowers . Its challenge to the evidence of the

senses, and rejection of the whole sensible world as unreal, inspired a

vio lent reaction in the empirical and practical minds of the Sophists,

w h o opposed it in the name of common sense. Protagoras, we are

told, took time off from teaching political arete to write a work on

Being which was directed against 'those who uphold the unity of

B e i n g ' , 1

and Gorgias in his On Non-Being showed his mastery of

Eleatic argument by turning it against its inventors. Yet the Sophists

could not, any more than other pretenders to serious thought, brush

aside the Eleatic dilemma, which forced a choice between being and

b e c o m i n g , stability and flux, reality and appearance. Since it was no

longer possible to have both, the Sophists abandoned the idea of a

permanent reality behind appearances, in favour of an extreme

phenomenalism, relativism and subjectivism.

The Sophists were certainly individualists, indeed rivals, competing

with each other for public favour. One cannot therefore speak of

them as a school. On the other hand to claim that philosophically

they had nothing in common is to go too far. They shared the general

philosophical outlook described in the introduction under the name

o f empiricism, and with this went a common scepticism about the

possibility of certain knowledge, on the grounds both of the inade

quacy and fallibility of our faculties and of the absence of a stable

1

Protag. fr. 2. Th e informant is Por phyr y, wh o mentions that 'by accident' he has come

across this book himself. Some have tried to identify it with other known works of Protagoras.

Bernays (Ges. Abh. I, 1 2 1 ) , f o l l o w e d by T. Gomperz, Nestle and others, said it was only another

n am e f or t he Κ α τ α β ά λ λ ο ν τ ε ς o r "Α λ ή θ ε ι α . F o r U nter st eine r, o n the o th er hand (Sophs. 1 1 ) ,

this is incorrect, and it belongs to the second part o f the Ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ί α ι , w hi le v o n F ri tz (RE, X L .Halbb. 9i9f.) thought it might be an independent work. The title does not occur in D . L . ' s

list of Protagoras's works, which is however defective.

47



What is a Sophist ?

48

reality to be known. All alike1

believed in the antithesis between nature

and convention. They might differ in their estimate of the relative

v a l u e of each, but none of them would hold that human l a w s , customs

and religious beliefs were unshakeable because rooted in an unchanging

natural order. These beliefs—or lack of beliefs—were shared by others

w h o were not professional Sophists but came under their influence:

T h u c y d i d e s the historian, Euripides the tragic poet, Critias the

aristocrat who also wrote dramas but was one of the most violent of

the Thirty Tyrants of 404 B . C . In this wider application it is perfectly

justifiable to speak of a sophistic mentality or a sophistic movement

in thought. The Sophists, with their formal instruction backed by

writing and public speaking, were prime movers in what has come tobe known as the Age of Enlightenment in Greece. Thi s term, borrowed

from the German, may be used without too much misgiving to stand

fo r a necessary transitional stage in the thought of any nation that

produces philosophers and philosophies of its own. Thus Zeller

wrote (ZN, 1 4 3 2 ) : ']ust as we Germans could hardly have had a Kant

without the Ag e of Enlightenment, so the Greeks would hardly have

had a Socrates and a Socratic philosophy without Sophistic.'

2

ThatSocrates and Plato could never have existed without the Sophists is

repeated by Jaeger {Paid. 1, 288), and this in itself would make them

repay study even if they were not (as some of them are) important

figures in their own right.

1

Th is is expressly attested for P rotagor as, Gor gia s, Hippias and An tip hon , and can be co n-

fidendy asserted of Pro dic us, w h o shared Pro tag oras 's v i e w o f the practical aims of his inst ruc

tion (Plato, Rep. 600 c- d) . It is traceable in later Sophists like Alc ida mas and L yc op hr on , and

it would be difficult to produce a clear counter-instance.2

Burnet (Th. to P. 109) complains of the influence which this 'superficial analogy' has had

o v e r German writers, and claims that if there is any parallel it occu rs muc h earlier, and X e n o -

phanes not Protagoras is its aposde. But Xenophanes was rather the first swallow that does

not make a sum mer ; the sophistic A g e of Enlighte nment means not onl y Protag oras but Pro dicu s,

G o r g i a s , Hippias, Anti pho n, Critias, Euripides and many others. Burne t's next remark, that

'it is not to religion but to science that Pro tag ora s and Go rg ias take up a nega tive attit ude', is

a strange one to make of the man who declared that he did not know whether there were gods

or not . As a general rule such war ni ng s again st facile anal ogie s are salutary, bu t the r ese m

blances betw een the Enli ghte nmen t and the age o f the Sophists are certainly ma ny and strik ing.

T h e relationship of the philosophes and their contemporaries to their predecessors in the ancient

world, bo th G re ek and Ro ma n, is discussed by Peter G a y in The Enlightenment ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,7 2 - 1 2 6 (chapter entitled 'The First Enlightenment').



The Sophistic Mentality

(e) Decline or adolescence?

T o a hostile contemporary like Aristophanes, sophistic ideas were a

symptom of decline. The great days of Greece were those of the

Persian Wars, when men were men. Courage and hardiness, simplicityo f life, high moral standards were all attributed to this immediately

preceding generation. Now, he lamented, all standards are being

abandoned and no one can distinguish right from wrong, or, if they

d o , they blatantly uphold the wrong and despise the right. The young

generation are luxury-loving, effeminate, immoral and cowardly.

L o o k at the drama: no longer do playwrights choose high and noble

themes as Aeschylus did. Instead we have Euripides with his plays of

adultery, incest and deceit, his flaunting of the mean and sordid, his

endless quibbling talk. All this, thought Aristophanes, came of f o l l o w

ing the new atheistical science and the new morality of the Sophists.

T h i s view—that Greece had already passed the peak of her greatness

and that the Sophists were a sign of the times and by their own teach

ing hastened her decline—has tended to reappear in modern histories.

O n the other hand Karl Joel in the 1920s (Gesch. 674^) was already

seeing, in the intellectual ferment of which they were the leaders, not

decline but the 'Rausch der Jugend'. Like the young they were

ambitious, contentious, breaking out in all directions. In the same

strain T. Gomperz (Gr. Th. 1.480) perceived in the rhetoric of Gorgias

' the streaming and unbridled vitality of an age in which the young

blood leaps with a wayward pulse, and the mind's activity is in excess of

the matter at its disposal'. Grant {Ethics 1, 76f.) worked out a division

o f morality into three eras: 'first, the era of popular or unconscious

morals; second, the transitional, sceptical or sophistic era; third, the con

scious or philosophic era'. (In the third era, of course, the three stages

wil l exist contemporaneously among people of different education and

intellectual powers.) He noted a parallel development in the individual :

The simplicity and trust of childhood is succeeded by the unsettled and

undirected force of youth, and the wisdom of matured life. First, we believe

because others do so; then, in order to obtain personal convictions, we pass

through a stage of doubt; then we believe the more deeply but in a

somewhat different way from what we did at the outset.

49



What is a Sophist ?

5 °

N o w if one thinks of the great things that lay ahead—the philosophies

o f Plato and Aristotle, to be followed by the Stoics, Epicureans and

other philosophers of the Hellenistic age—there can be no doubt that,

h o w e v e r it may be with Greek history in general, with the Sophists

G r e e k thought entered not on its decline but on its early manhood.1

(_/*) Rhetoric and scepticism

There was, we have seen, one art which all the Sophists taught,

namely rhetoric, and one epistemological standpoint which all shared,

namely a scepticism according to which knowledge could only be

relative to the perceiving subject. The two were more directly con

nected than one might think. Rhetoric does not play the part in our

l ives that it did in ancient Greece. Nowadays the words 'success'

or 'a successful man' suggest most immediately the world of business,

and only secondarily that of pol i t ics . In Greece the success that counted

w a s first political and secondly forensic, and its weapon was rhetoric,

the art of persuasion. Fol lowing the analogy, one might assign to

rhetoric the place now occupied by advertising. Certainly the art of

persuasion, often by dubious means, was no less powerful then, and,

as we have our business schools and schools of advertising, so the

G r e e k s had their teachers of politics and rhetoric: the Sophists.

Peitho, Persuasion, was for them a powerful goddess ; ' the charmer to

whom nothing is denied', Aeschylus called her (Suppl. 1039f.), and

Isocrates a century later reminded his Athenian audience that it was

their custom to offer her an annual sacrifice {Amid. 249). Gorgias in

his Encomium of Helen—a school exercise in rhetoric, sophistic in

e v e r y sense—names speech and persuasion as the two irresistible

fo rces . 'He who persuaded did wrong by compelling, but she who was

persuaded acted under the compulsion of the word and it is vain to

upbraid her.' Thus Helen is absolved from blame and depicted as a

helpless victim, deserving pity, not hatred or condemnation.3

It was part of rhetorical instruction to teach the pupil to argue with ·

1

The comparison of the stages of Greek thought to the stages of an individual life is also

made by Comford in Before and after Socrates, 38 ff. Fo r further comment on Grant's division

see p. 164 below.J

In Aes chy lus on the other hand it is Paris whose hand is forced by Persu asion, ' the in

sufferable chi ld of Doom' {/4g. 385 f.). Pind ar s peaks of the 'lash o f Per sua sio n' (Pyth. 4 . 1 1 9 ) .



Rhetoric and Scepticism

equal success on both sides of a question. A s Protagoras said, ' On

e v e r y topic there are two arguments contrary to each other'. He aimed

at training his pupils to praise and blame the same things, and in

particular to bolster up the weaker argument so that it appeared the

stronger.

1

Rhetorical teaching was not confined to form and style, butdealt also with the substance of what was said. How could it fail to

inculcate the belief that all truth was relative and no one knew anything

fo r certain? Truth was individual and temporary, not universal and

lasting, for the truth for any man was simply what he could be

persuaded of, and it was possible to persuade anyone that black was

white. There can be belief, but never knowledge.

T o prove his point that ' persuasion allied to words can mould men's

minds as it wishes', Gorgias adduced three considerations, which

illustrate the way in which the Sophists' teaching grew out of the life

and philosophy of their times {Hel. 13):

1. The theories of the natural scientists, each one thinking that he

has the secret of the universe, but in fact only pitting one opinion

against another and setting up the incredible and the invisible in the

eye of the imagination.

2. The inevitable contests and debates of practical life [as in the

la w courts or the A s s e m b l y ] , where a single speech can delight and

c o n v i n c e the crowd just because it is artistically and c l e v e r l y con

trived, not because it contains the truth.

3. The disputes of philosophers, which only go to show the

rapidity with which thought can demonstrate the mutability of

opinions and beliefs.

In such an atmosphere it is not surprising that an epistemology

should gain favour according to which ' what appears to me is for me,

and what appears to you is for you', and that no man can be in a

position to contradict another.2

(g) Fate of sophistic literature: Plato and Aristotle

F ina l ly , a word about the loss of the Sophists' writings. Havelock

has written of Greek liberalism, which roughly corresponds to what1

Sec D. L . 9.51 and Protagoras Λ 2 Ι and C 2 in D K.

' l o r such opinions in Protag oras see Plato, Theaet. 152a , Euthyd. 286c. The subject is

resumed in cli. v m bel ow.

5 1



What is a Sophist ?

52

is here called the sophistic outlook, that 'to chart its course with

precision is a difficult task, impossible but for the twin guide-posts

supplied by the ipsissima verba of these two men' (L.T. 255). The

t w o in question are Democritus and Antiphon, and since on the same

page he has to warn us that 'the chronology of Antiphon's life, nayhis very identity, is in doubt' ; since moreover the liberal temper is

represented for him not only by these two but by Archelaus, Prota

g o r a s , Prodicus, Hippias, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Lycophron and

others, this is a somewhat pessimistic v i e w . His suggestion that these

are the only two contributors to the school of thought in the classical

a g e who are documented by their own utterances is happily belied by

what he says elsewhere.1

Nevertheless it is true that the fifth-century

empiricists are represented for us in the main by meagre fragments,

or more or less hostile paraphrases, of the extensive writings which

they produced. Hitherto historians had assumed that this, though

unfortunate, was accidental: many other works of classical Greece

have perished, not surprisingly, in the passage of upwards of 2,400

ye a r s . But their modern champions see a more specific reason determin

ing the fate of the Sophists, namely the authority of Plato and Aristotle.

Plato's idealism carried the day, and, since he himself would have liked

to suppress the teaching of his opponents, his followers duly sup

pressed it; or at least, as contrary philosophies became entrenched,

nobody saw reason to preserve what were generally considered un

orthodox and objectionable v i e w s . So it has come about, to quote

H a v e l o c k (L.T. 18), that 'the history of Greek political theory, as

also of Greek politics, has been written in modern times exactly as

Plato and Aristotle would have wished it to be written'.

Here again, like S i d g w i c k with Grote, one may say that these

critics have a real point which others have neglected, but that they

probably overstate their case. What they allege may have been part-

cause, but other reasons, no less plausible, suggest themselves for the

lo ss . It has been pointed out that in general the Sophists were not

scholars writing philosophical and scientific treatises for the future.

1 On p. 1 57 he speaks in the same terms of ipsissima verba of Thrasym achus, Gorgias and

Protagoras. (For T. Gomp erz , Gr. Th. I, 490, ' the sole surv ivin g literary monument of the

movement known as sophistry' was the Hippocratic treatise On the Art [of medicine]!)



Aristotle and the Sophists

T h e y were rather teachers, lecturers and public speakers, whose aim

w a s to influence their own age rather than to be read by posterity.

M o r e o v e r , since much of their work was educational, of the handbook

t ype , it would naturally get incorporated in the handbooks of later

teachers, including Aristotle, which would be regarded as supersedingit. Aristotle, besides writing his own Art of Rhetoric, compiled a

summary of the earlier ' A r t s ' , from their originator Tisias onwards,

o f w h i c h C i c e r o wrote that he not only lucidly explained the precepts

o f each teacher but so exceeded the originals in brevity and attrac

tiveness of style that no one any longer consulted them, preferring

to read Aristotle as a much more convenient exponent of their

teaching.1

W h i l e on the subject of Aristotle it may be as w e l l to issue a caveat

against speaking of 'Plato and Aristotle' in one breath,2

as if their

opposition to sophistic empiricism were equal and identical. On the

subjects in which the Sophists were primarily interested, Aristotle's

standpoint was in many w a y s closer to theirs than to Plato's. True,

he shared Plato's teleological v i e w of the world, and on the question

o f realism versus nominalism he is usually supposed to have been a

Platonist. That is to say, though he g a v e up the transcendence of the

Platonic Forms, he continued to believe in the existence of permanent

substances or essences corresponding to universal terms—universalia

in rebus if not ante res. In general this may be true,3 but his position is

c o m p l e x , and it cannot be asserted without qualification when we

turn from his metaphysics to his treatment of human action both

individual and co l lec t ive , that is, his ethical, social and political theory.

For one thing, he drew an explicit distinction between the aims, and

in consequence the methods, of scientific investigation on the one

hand and inquiry into the problems of human behaviour and character

on the other. In the former, the most exacting standards of accuracy

must be demanded, but these would be inappropriate to the study of

1

Cic. De inv. 2.2 .6. See Jaeger, Paideia 1, 302 an d Unt erst einer , Sophists, 9. Untersteiner

does re cog niz e, as an additio nal re ason for the lo ss, the different turn taken by the prevailing

philosophies in succeeding generations.1

As Hav eloc k reg ula rly does, e.g. on pp. 12 , 17 , 18, 19 , 32, 34 (five times) in his Liberal

Temper.1

See how ever Miss Ansco nibe in Anscombe and Geach, Three Philosophers, 31 f.



What is a Sophist ?

54

human material, which is undertaken not for theoretical but for

practical ends. In the Ethics he puts the point many times, perhaps

most forcibly in the statement that to demand strict log ica l proof

from an orator is no more sensible than allowing a mathematician

to use the arts of persuasion.

1

In the ethical field the abandonment ofPlato's absolute, self-existent moral norms or patterns had far-reaching

effects, for it made possible a divorce of theory from practice, of

k n o w l e d g e from action, which for Plato had been unthinkable. A r i s

totle can write ( 1 1 0 3 b 2 7 ) : 'The object of our inquiry is not to know

what virtue is, but to become good men' , whereas on the Socratic-

Platonic v i e w ' to know what virtue is ' was an essential prerequisite

o f becoming good. He openly prefers Gorgias's method of enumerat

ing separate virtues to the Socratic demand for a general definition of

virtue, which he calls self-deception (Pol. 1260325),a n (

^m

the first

b o o k of the Ethics, which contains one of his most sustained and

effective attacks on the Platonic theory of Forms, we find a defence

o f the relativity and multiplicity of goods which might almost have

been written by Protagoras.2

1

1 0 9 4 D 2 5 . See also I098a26flf. (th e carpente r is not loo kin g for the same strai ghtnes s as

the g e o m e t e r ) , 1 1 0 4 3 3 , 1 1 0 2 3 2 3 .

J

The brevity of the above remarks may lay them open to a cha rge of over-s implifi cation.

In so far as Aris totl e believe d in the rela tiv ity of good ness , it wa s only in the first of the two

senses enume rated on p. 166 bel ow, and he wa s Socrati c enough to combin e it with a bel ief

in a sing le function of man as such, re sul ting from our common human nature and overriding

the different su bordi nate functions of ind ivi dua ls or classes. Th is and related point s are w e l l

brought out in Lloyd's article on Aristotle's biological analogies in Phronesis, 1968, in which

how eve r one is consc ious all the time of an influential figure stand ing in the bac kgr oun d though

never mentioned: Protagoras .



I V

THE ' N O M O S ' - ' P H Y S I S ' ANTITHESIS IN

M O R A L S AND POLI TIC S

( i ) I N T R O D U C T O R Y

The two terms nomos (pi. η ο τ η ο ϊ ) and physis are key-words—in the

fifth and fourth centuries one might rather say catch-words—of

G r e e k thought. In earlier writers they do not necessarily appear in

compatible or antithetical, but in the intellectual climate of the fifth

century they came to be commonly regarded as opposed and mutually

exc l u s i v e : what existed 'by nomos' was not 'byphysis' and vice versa.

It is with this use of the terms that we shall now be chiefly concerned.

The meaning of physis emerges from a study of the Presocratics.1

It can safely be translated 'nature', though when it occurs in con

junction with nomos the word 'reality' wil l sometimes make the

contrast more immediately clear.3

Nomos for the men of classical

times is something that nomiietai, is believed in, practised or held

to be right; originally, something that nemetai, is apportioned, dis

tributed or dispensed.3 That is to say, it presupposes an acting sub

j ec t—bel iever , practitioner or apportioner—a mind from which the

nomos emanates. Naturally therefore different people had different

nomoi, but, so long as religion remained an effective force, the devising

mind could be the god's, and so there could be nomoi that were applicable to all mankind. 'Human laws (nomoi) are sustained by the one

divine law' said Heraclitus (fr. 114, vol. 1, 425), and for Hesiod

(Erga 276, echoed in the myth of Protagoras, Plato, Prot. 322 d)

Zeus has laid do wn' a law for all men' , that unlike the beasts they should

possess justice. This conception persisted in the Sophistic age. Even

the rationalist Thucydides can speak o f the self-seeking party politicians

of his day as partners in crime rather than observers of the divine

• See vol . 1, 82 f. and I I , 3 5 1 - 3 . 3

See vol. 1, 82 f., vol. 1 1 , 351-3 and 353, n. 1.

i See Pulilenz in l'liilul. 1948, ιτ ,-j — Kl. Schr. 11, 335, and the references in Ehrenberg,

A V t hisiilfe, 11 4, n. 1.

i 55 O S I"



The 'Nomos'—Physis' Antithesis

56

l a w . 1

It appears also in the 'unwritten l a w s ' of Sophocles's Antigone,

w h i c h are divine and everlasting and which no mortal can successfully

defy, as Creon learns too late (v. 1 1 1 3 ; on 'unwritten l a w s ' see pp.

n8ff. b e l o w ) . But when bel ief in gods is undermined, and they are

no longer 'current coin' (nomismd),2

this universal authority for

nomos no longer exists. Then the phrase 'unwritten law' takes on a

new and more sinister meaning, appropriate to the political realism

o f the age.

The earlier history of the terms nomos and physis is interesting, but

has been told more than once.3 We have now reached the point

where a new generation has divorced nomos from physis, as what is

artificially contrived from what is natural, and sometimes what is

false (though commonly believed) from what is true. The latter

sense of nomos we have met in philosophical contemporaries of the

Sophists: Empedocles denying birth and destruction but confessing

that he conforms to nomos by using the terms, and Democritus

declaring that sensible qualities exist only in nomos.'- However, in

the Sophists, historians and orators of the day (and in the tragedian

Euripides, another spokesman of the new thought) the antithesis was

more commonly invoked in the moral and political spheres. Here itsmore important uses are two : (i) usage or custom based on traditional

or conventional beliefs as to what is right or true, (ii) laws formally

drawn up and passed, which cod i fy ' right usage' and elevate it into an

1

Thuc. 3.82.6. And even Gorgias, who believed in suiting his rhetoric to the occasion

( κ α ι ρ ό ; ) , could speak of war-heroes as observing the θ ε ι ό τ α τ ο ν K C C I κ ο ι ν ό ν ν ό μ ο ν (fr. 6 ).2

Aristoph. Clouds 248, pla yin g on the two senses of the word. 'C oi na ge ' is the commonest,

but for the other see Aesch. Sept. 269, Eur. I.T. 1 4 7 1 , Pind. fr. 203 Bowr a (p. 132 be lo w).3

Th e fullest treatment is F. Hei nim ann 's Nomos und Physis of 1 94 ;, reprinted 1965. In a

notice of the reprint in L'Ant. Class, for 1 965 , E. des Places menti ons some wo rk s that have

appeare d on the subject in the int erva l. Pohlen z's articl e wi th the same tid e in Hermes, 1953 , is

avowedly a critique of Heinimann's work. His article Nomos in Philol., 1948, treats briefl y the

etymology and semantic development of the word. On nomos see also Ehrenberg, Rechtsidee,

n 4 f f .4

Emped. fr. 95 (vol . 11, 1 5 6 ) ; Democr. fr. 9 (vol . 11, 440). R emin isce nt of Emped ocle s is

Hippocr. De victu 1 . 4 ( vi , 476 L . ) ό ν ό μ ο ; y a p Tfj φ ύ σ ε ι π ε ρ ί τ ο ύ τ ω ν έ ν α ν τ ίο ξ , where τ ο ύ τ ω ν

refers to the identity of becoming and perishing with mingling and separation. Cf. also Mori,

sacr. 17 (v i, 392 L . ) : the seat of thought and feeling is the brain; the φ ρ έ ν ε ? (l i t . 'diaphragm',

but used in ord ina ry Gree k to mean mi nd or sense ) hav e a name whi ch is owe d to chance a nd

nomos and does not correspond to real i ty . In this sense the pair ν ό μ ω - έ τ έ η or ν ό μ ο ξ - έ ό ν(or α λ ή θ ε ι α , cf. Soph. fr. 83.3 N.) comes close in sense to the common expression λ ό γ ω μ έ ν . . .

ί ρ γ ω Si. In Hdt. 4.39. 1 λ ό γ ω could replace ν ό μ ω without detriment to sense or idiom. (Cf.

4 .8.2. )



Law and Custom

obligatory norm backed by the authority of the state. The first was

the earlier use, but was never lost sight of, so that for the Greeks law,

h o w e v e r much it might be formulated in writing and enforced by

authority, remained dependent on custom or habit. 'The law', wrote

Aristotle (Pol. 1269320), 'has no power to compel obedience besidethe force of custom.' T o some extent this remains true in any society.

A s H. L. A. Hart has written (Law, Liberty and Morality, 51) : 'It is

o f course clear (and one of the oldest insights of political theory)

that society could not exist without a morality which mirrored and

supplemented the law's proscription of conduct injurious to others.'

In primitive society there is little if any difference between the two,

for custom itself has binding force. Codification only becomes neces

sary at a fairly advanced stage of civilization. Hence, in origin, the

oscillation of the word between the two ideas. Since, however, they

are already separated for us, and no English word has the same cover

a ge , it wil l be best to retain the Greek. It w i l l serve to remind us that,

since the same word nomos expressed both ideas, 'the distinction

between what is legally enforceable and what is morally right was

much less clear-cut among the Greeks than it is with us'.1

It wil l be convenient to deal under separate headings with topics

w h i c h are normally regarded as distinct, but an examination of the

nomos-physis antithesis (the effects of which have been outlined in an

introductory way in the previous chapter) must come first, because it

wil l be found to enter into most of the questions of the day. Discus

sion o f re l igion turned on whether gods existed b y physis—in reality—

or only by nomos; of poli t ical organization, on whether states arose by

divine ordinance, by natural necessity or by nomos; of cosmopolitan

ism, on whether divisions within the human race are natural or only a

1

Dodds, Gorgias, 266. Heinimann (N. u. Ph. 78) quotes passages from Hdt. to show that

there was no sharp distinction in his time between the two senses, custom and law. The original

coincidence of custom and law (noted by Pohlenz in Hermes, 1 9 5 3 , 426) has an obvious bearing

on the question of 'unwritten l a w s ' . The derivativ e verb ν ο μ ΐ3ε ιν has a similar range, though the

sense of law-making is rarer and that of believing much the commonest. The two occur together

in Xen. Rep. Lac. 2 . 4 : Lycurgus έ ν ό μ ^ε ν έ ν Ι Ι μ α τ ί ω δ ι ' I T O U S π ρ ο σ ε 8ί2ε σ β α ι , vouijeov ο ύ τ ω ; . . .

ί μ ι ι ν ο ν Sv π α ρ ε σ κ ε υ ά σ θ α ι . It means ' to make a pract ice o f in Hdt . 4 . 5 9 . 2 : the Scythians

ν η ο ύ ; ο ύ ν ο μ ί^ο υ σ ι τ τ ο ι ε ϊ ν — it is not their nomos. In the same chapter it occurs in the sense

' believe in ' (g ods ) and ' believe that ' (Ge is the wife of Zeus). That in the indictment of Socrates

0«ou5 ο ύ ν ο μ ί μ ω ν indicates actual disbelief is shown below, p. 237, n. 2. The sense 'to set up,

institute' appears in Time. 2.38, and cf. Arist. Pol. 1 2 7 5 ° 7 ·

57 3-2



The 'Nomos'— Physis' Antithesis

58

matter of nomos; of equality, on whether the rule of one man over

another (slavery) or one nation over another (empire) is natural and

inevitable, or only by nomos; and so on. The plan involves a risk of

overlapping, which must be kept in check; but a little may even be

desirable, to show how the various questions were interlocked in

contemporary thought. This chapter wi l l explain the antithesis itself

in more detail, and the w a y s in which, once established, it led to very

different estimates of the relative value of physis and nomos in the

moral and political field.

The question who was responsible for the distinction in the first place

has often been discussed, but is probably unreal, and at least un

answerable on the evidence we have. Aristotle called it a widespread

topos recognized by 'all the men of old' as a means of trapping an

opponent into paradox (Soph. El. 1 7 3 3 7 ) . Heinimann cites a passage

in the Hippocratic De aere aqids locis as the earliest occurrence, but

the statement of it attributed to Archelaus ( A I and 2 DK) is probably

earlier, and in any case is the first known mention of it in an ethical

context.1

The slightly comic juxtaposition of physical and ethical in

the version of Diogenes Laertius (' He said that l i v ing creatures first

arose from slime, and that justice and baseness exist not naturally but

b y convention') is doubtless due to the naivety of the compiler, and

w e cannot tell in what words Archelaus expressed the thought; but it

may legitimately remind us of the historic connexion between e v o l u

tionary physical theories and theories of the conventional origin of

morality and law. Archelaus was a contemporary of Democritus.

1

Heinimann, N. u. Ph. I 3 f f . Th e testimony to the vi ews of Archel aus pretty certai nly

goes back to Theo phrastus' s special st udy of him mentioned b y D.L. (5 .42 ). Th e context in

the medical write r is anthropologi cal and ethi cally neut ral : he w i l l describe the differences

between different races whether these are due to ν ό μ ο ς or φ ύ σ ι ς . As to date, Archelaus must

have been older than Socra tes, and Hippocra tes was prob ably a few year s yo ung er , in spite of

t l i e rather loose statement of Aulus Gellius, N.A. 7.21 (RE v m , 1803, Jone s in Loeb Hippocr .

1 , x l i i i ) . Heinimann dates De aere, etc. to shor dy before the Peloponnesian Wa r, Pohlenz (wh o

thought it was by Hippocrates himself) after 428, and from the way the distinction is introduced

draught it must have been already familiar. He inclined to Archelaus as the originator. See his

article in Hermes, 195 3, and, for Arch ela us in gener al, vol. 1 1 , 339f., Heinimann m - 1 4 . He was

an Athen ian of the Periclean ag e, cont empo rar y w it h the first gener atio n of Sophis ts. Th e

combination of an interest in the origin of l ife with that of human society and l a w s recalls

Pro tag oras, but it is impossi ble to assign priori ty between them, bey ond say ing widi s ome

confidence that Prota goras w as the older man.



Physical Theories and Morality

59

W e are entering a world in which not only sweet and bitter, hot and

cold, exist merely in belief, or by convention, but also justice and

injustice, right and wrong.1

Doubts about the order and stability of

the physical world as a whole, and the dethronement of divinity in

favour of chance and natural necessity as causes, were seized upon by

upholders of the relativity of ethical conceptions and became part of

the basis of their case. To see that this was so, we need only look ahead

to the time when Plato took the field against them: to combat their

distasteful moral theories he felt compelled to construct a whole

cosmogony, in which the first place was given to intellect and con

scious design. It is, he says, the idea that the cosmos has come about

by chance that has made possible the denial of absolute standards of

right and wrong (pp. 1 1 5 f. below).

L a w , then, and moral standards enforced by public opinion, are

not god-given as was formerly believed. They are something imposed

by man on his f e l l o w s , or at best created by agreement to set a limit on

the freedom of each individual. In this way

the use of history and experience helped to e vo lve a rather different set of

standards, not of traditional moral goodness or badness but simply ofsuccess or failure, expediency or inexpediency. .. None of the rules was

absolutely rigid or invariable: they had always to be adapted to changing

conditions . . . The voyages of discovery . . . revealed numerous different

systems of morality To none of these customs, so infinite in matter

and diversity, could 'permanent authoritie' be attributed. The idea of a

universal moral law was, therefore, to this extent on the wane, and it

became pari passu more credible to regard moral rules as merely customary

and relative, as having grown up to meet the needs of particular people ingiven places and times. On this v ie w , 'interest' was what seemed to underlie

ethical standards, an attitude which readily lent itself to some sort of

hedonistic or utilitarian interpretation.

This passage, which so w e l l describes the changing climate of

thought in fifth-century Athens, was in fact written about seventeenth-

century England,2

and could be applied with almost equal propriety

' Th is juxt aposition of physical and moral as eq ua ll y subject ive is mad e in conne xion wi th

Protagoras by Plato, Thcaet. I 7 i c - I 7 2 a .

' Urcenlraf, Order, I'-mpiricUm and Politics, extracts from pp. 1 9 7 - 9 .




60

to the 'situational ethic' of today.1

As we proceed we shall find

plenty of reference to expediency or interest (τ ό σ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν ) as a

standard, especially in Thucydides. In the political sphere Unter-

steiner quotes a pleasing2

example from L y s i a s : 'The first thing to

keep in mind is that no man is by nature either an oligarch or a demo

crat, but each strives to set up the kind of constitution which would

be to his own advantage.'

With this denial of the absolute status of law and moral values, or

any place for them in the permanent nature of things, the stage is

set for a controversy between the two, but admission of the contrast

does not of itself decide the outcome. The place to be accorded to

la w and tradition was, in Greece at least, by no means determined by

the initial admission that they are artificial, and men who agreed on

that could nevertheless draw different practical conclusions from it.

For convenience, three main positions may be distinguished: support

o f nomos against physis, support of physis against nomos, and an

attitude o f hard-headed realism or fact-facing which without passing

judgment declares that the more powerful wi l l always take advantage

o f the weaker, and wi l l g i v e the name of law and justice to whatever

they lay down in their own interests. It wi l l retain the name for asl o n g as they keep their power.

(2) T H E U P H O L D E R S O F ' N O M O S '

(a) Anthropological theories of progress

' What is this pact but the means by which man, as a relatively weak and

defenceless creature, is able to maintain a biological status, which otherwise

he could never achieve?'

H. G. Baynes, 'Psy chol ogi cal Origins of Divine Kin gsh ip' , Folklore, 1936, 91 .

In the fifth century, as a natural corollary of physical theories of the

evolution of life from inanimate matter, some remarkably consistent

theories of human progress began to replace the mythical idea of

1

Cf. Time Magazine (22 April 1 9 6 6 ) : ' Th e traditional values are giv ing wa y to "sit uat ion

ethics"—meaning that noth ing is inhe rent ly right or wr on g, but mus t be jud ged in context on

the spur of the moment. '2

Pleasin g in its reminder of Private W i l l i s in Iolanthe, wit h who se faith in nature as the arbi ter

of part y-po liti cal alle gian ce the orator w as not in agree ment. Th e qu otatio n i s from I.ys ias ,

Apol. (or. 25), 8 (Untersteiner, Sof. iv, 74).



Fifth-century Anthropology

degeneration from a primeval perfection like that of Hesiod's Golden

R a c e . They can be traced in Democritus, and appear in the most

diverse authors, in Aeschylus as w e l l as Euripides, in the Hippocratic

C o r p u s , the Sophist Protagoras, and the aristocrat Critias; and some

what later in the tragic poet Moschion. Though Sophocles does not

picture the original savage state, his praise o f man's technical progress in

the Antigone presupposes the same order of events. Prometheus,

' Forethought' or ' The Forethinker', may be brought in as the teacher,

or left out; his presence seems to matter little. In A e s c h y l u s he is there,

but only as bestower of intelligence, who taught men to use their

o w n minds. In Euripides the benefactor is unknown ('whichever of

the gods it was who first gave us wits'), and in Sophocles it is man

himself who by his own achievements has become the marvel of the

w o r l d . Moschion, though later,1

reflects an indifference already

evident in the fifth century when he writes that the author of the

process was time itself, whether aided by Prometheus or necessity

or simply by the promptings of experience and nature.

A c c o r d i n g to these accounts, the first men lived like animals,

without clothes or houses, in caves and holes. They had no idea of

combining together, but scattered over the countryside feeding on

whatever offered itself. Even cannibalism was resorted to. They died

in great numbers, from cold, from diseases caused by the crudity of

their diet, and from the attacks of wild beasts. At length their hard

ships impressed on them the necessity of combining for survival,

and with the need for rational communication they gradually learned

to turn their inarticulate cries into speech. They also proceeded,

through a stage of storing wild produce for the winter, to cultivation

o f the soil and the growing of corn and vines. This marked the begin

ning of civilized life in communities, recognition of the rights of others

and the rudiments of law and order. Demeter giver of grain was also

Thesmophoros, Law-bringer. After all, as Rousseau pertinently

remarked, who would be so absurd as to take the trouble of cultivating

' Possibly third century B . C . See Diehl in RE, xx x i . Halbb. 345. Th e author of the Hippocratic De vet. medicina (cli. 1 4 ; I, 600 L. ) s a y s that although medicine is a purely human

a r t , developed by rational investigation, its inventors thought it wor th y of bein g attributed to

11 n°cl, as indeed i t commonly is ( ώ ; κ α ΐ ν ο μ ίζ ε τ α ι); Edelstein's Idea of Progress, 54, n. 7 1 , is

o p e n to correction on this point.

6l




62

a field, if the state of society was such that it might be stripped of its

crop by anyone who took a liking to it?1

This comes out particularly

in the claim of the Athenians to have been the originators both of

corn-growing and of laws and constitutional government.2

Side by

side with these advances we read of the domestication of animals and

the acquisition of technical ski l ls . Houses and cities were built, the use

o f fire made cookery possible and led to the extraction and working

o f metals, ships were launched and overseas trade developed, and

disease was held in check. Greek doctors saw the maintenance of

health as very largely a matter of correct diet, and for the fifth-century

author of On Ancient Medicine (ch. 3; 1, 576-8 L.) the healing art

began when cultivated foodstuffs, cooked meals and a balanced diet

replaced the 'animal-like' regime of primitive man, a process which

in his opinion covered a lengthy period of time, and was brought

about [not by Asclepius but] by 'necessi ty'.

These soberly rationalistic accounts of human development are in

strong contrast to the older religious conceptions of degeneration

from an age of perfection, the 'golden race' of Hesiod or the 'age of

L o v e ' in Empedocles, when the goodness of man was matched by the

kindly abundance of nature.^ The coincidences, of thought and alsoo f v o c a b u l a r y , between the various authors'* strongly suggest a common

source, which may possibly have been Xenophanes, the long-lived

poet and philosopher who probably survived until about 470 (vol . 1,

36 2 f . ) . At least the lines (fr. 18) in which he says that 'the gods did

not reveal all things to men from the beginning, but in course of time,

1

Origin of Inequality, Everyman ed. 188. Cf. the quotation from Grotius about Ceres

L e g i s l a t r i x on p. 217.

2 See especially the passages of Moschion, Diodorus ( 1 3 . 2 6 . 3 ) and Isocrates on 82, 83 , 8.)

belo w. Agri cul tur e does of course imp ly the c hange from a nomadic to a settled form ol

l i fe , though this is not expres sly mentioned in our sou rces. The conne xion wa s helped by the

associations of the word ή μ ε ρ ο ς , meaning (a) cultivated as opposed to w i l d crops, (b) gentle or

c i v i l i z e d as opposed to savage , a combinatio n whi ch no Engli sh word prov ides. Cf. es p.

Moschion fr. 6.23 Nauck κ α ρ π ό ; ή μ ε ρ ο υ τ ρ ο φ ή ; with 29 ή μ ε ρ ο ν β ί ο ν , and Diod. 1 3 . 2 6 . 3 : the

At he ni an s shared di ei r τ ρ ο φ ή ; ή μ ε ρ ο υ w it h other Greeks and brought them ε ις ή μ ε ρ ο ν κ α ι

δ ι κ α ί α ν σ ν μ ρ Μ ω σ ι ν .

On the relat ionship between θ ε σ μ ό ; and ν ό μ ο ς see Ehrenberg, Rechtsidcc, ch. 3, csp. p. 123.3

A more detailed description than can be giv en here, together wit h some interesting attempts

to combine the two, l i k e that of Dicaearchus in the fourth century, w i l l be found in my In r/η ·

Beginning, chs. 4 and 5.1

See the transla tions on pp. 7 9 f f . bel ow, wit h notes dr awi ng attention to sonic uf the

repeated key-words or -phrases.



'Nomos' and Human Progress

b y searching, they find out better' show him to have been a believer

in progress, not degeneration, and seem to foreshadow the detailed

expositions of the advancement of civilization which we find in the

younger writers.1

Whether or not he expanded his statement on these

lines, he certainly passed on the idea, which fitted w e l l with his tirades

against the religious outlook of Homer and Hesiod.2

Wherever it

came from, it gained wide currency in the secular atmosphere of the

fifth century.

The adherents of these historical theories were obviously on the

side of nomos, while at the same time rejecting any idea of it as innate

in human nature from the beginning or divinely ordained. Critias,

Isocrates and Moschion all name nomoi as the means of raising human

life above the l eve l of the beasts. The climax of the Antigone chorus

is the declaration that technical achievements in themselves are

neutral: they may bring man to evi l as we l l as to good. The essential

is that he observe nomoi and fo l low justice. Unlike the characters in

Critias and Moschion, Euripides's Theseus is pious: he attributes

man's progress from brutality to civilization to an unnamed god,

though from indications elsewhere one may doubt whether Euripideshimself did. In any case his moral is the same: avoid pride ( T O yocupov) ;

the ideal is the man of middle status who 'preserves the kosmos which

the state ordains' (yv. 244f.).

(b) Protagoras on the original state of man

Λ holder of the progress theory who can claim to be a philosopher in

his own right is Protagoras, the first and greatest of the Sophists. Inthe list of his works appears a title which may be translated ' On the

Orig ina l State of Man',3 and it wi l l be assumed here that when Plato ^

1

For a full (perhaps too fu l l ) commentary on these lines see Edelstein, Idea of Progress,

c l i . 1.

' One word which must have stood in the original, i f there was one, is θ η ρ ι ώ δ η ; (p. 80, n. 2,

b e l o w ) . Th is tells agai nst the expansi on occurri ng in the context of fr. 18, which is purely

l i c x a m c t r i c , but it could have come in one of his iambic or mixed poems. It should be added,

however, that the idea of progress as a human achievement ma y be traced back to the ea rly

sixth century. See O'Brien, Socr. Paradoxes, 5 9 f., on the stories of Phoroneus and Palamedes.1

-π ιρ \ τ ή ; έ ν ά ρ χ η κ α τ α σ τ ά σ ε ω ; , D.L. 9· 55· Th e title wou ld be unsuit ed to a cosmo gon y, even

If we did not know that Protagoras's main interest was in humanity. (Lesky also translates it as

referring to man, ltd/., 345.) The words of Democritus fr. 278 are sometimes com par ed: to

have children is Ικ -lievcd I t ) be a necessity for men ά π ο φ ύ σ ι ο ς κ α ι κ σ τ α σ τ ά α ι ό ; τ ίν ο ς ά ρ χ α Ι η ξ .



The 'Nemos'— Physis' Antithesis

64

puts into his mouth a speech on that topic he is substantially reproduc

ing Protagoras's own v i e w s , most probably as g i v e n in the work so

named.1

The passage in question is Prot. 32ocff. Protagoras has

made his claim to teach political arete" (pp. 381*. above), and Socrates

has expressed doubts whether it can be taught. He objects (a) that

on subjects which are taught and learned, like architecture or naval

design, the Athenians wi l l only accept the advice of experts, but on

general policy they allow anyone to g i v e advice, evidently because

they do not think of this as a technical subject calling for training;

(b) that good and wise statesmen prove unable to impart their political

gifts to others, even their own sons. Protagoras offers to g i v e his

v i e w s either as a reasoned argument or in the form o f a story or parable,

and, when his audience leave it to him, chooses the story as l ike ly to

g i v e more pleasure. This warns us plainly that the introduction of the

g o d s is not to be taken seriously, but can be stripped away as adorn

ment to the tale. Plato knew w e l l that Protagoras was a religious

More to the point is Mosc hion' s announcement (fr. 6.2) that he w i l l explain α ρ χ ή ν β ρ ο τ ε ί ο ν κ α ΐ

κ α τ ά σ τ α σ ι ν β ί ο υ , whic h seems to be an echo of Protago ras. Nestle plausi bly suggested (VMûL,

282) that the original was a public lecture ( έ τ ί δ ε ι ξ ι ; ) , whi ch would ha ve included even the

mythical form, l i k e Prodicus's 'Choice of Heracles' of which Xenophon s a y s (Mem. 2 . 1 . 2 1 )

π λ ε ί σ τ ο ι ; έ π ι δ ε ί κ ν υ τ α ι . Note that Plato's Socrates too speaks of Protagoras as τ ο σ α ϋ τ α ί π ι δ ε ι ξ ά -μ ε ν ο ; (Prot. 328 d ) . See also p. 319 below.

1

Th is is the opinion of a lar ge majo rit y of scholar s. For s umm ar y of opinions see Unter-

steiner, Sophs. 72 , n. 24, wh o agrees wit h it, and Havel ock, L.T. 407-9 , wh o does not ; al so

O'Brien, Socr. Paradoxes, 62L To those in favour may be added Heinimann, iV. u. PA. 115 ,

Schmid, Gesch.gr. Lit. 1 . 3 . 1 , 1 7 , n. 10, Vers enyi , Socr. Hum. 23, and Bignone, Studiiz, n. 2 ; to

those against, Capizzi, Protagora, 259. Cf. also von Fritz in RE, X L V . Halbb. 917.

Th e oppositi on o f Havelock is to some extent based on the rhetori cal question (L.T. 88):

' W h y . . . should a genius take the trouble to advertise in his own writings a system already

in circulation and put out by a representative of a school of thought which he distrusted?',

which in turn rests on his general belief that 'no philosopher in his senses w i l l take the trouble

to report wit h histor ical fidelity vi ew s whi ch intell ectua lly he cannot accept ' (p. 165) . Wh a t he

does is to make a 'c ri ti cal ex ami nat io n' of them. It is not explained ho w one can prop erly

criticize vi ews withou t ta king the trouble to report them accura te ly first. It is possible to t hink

better of philosophers than that. The books in the excellent Pelican series of historical studies

of individual philosophers of the past are written by active philosophers who would certainly

not sub scribe to all the vi ew s of their subjects. A rhetorical questi on can usu al ly be countered

by another , in this case M. Sal omo n's (Savigny-Stift. 19 11 , 13 6) : ' Wh at interest could

Pla to, wh o speaks wi th no little respect of Protagora s, have had in foisting on him vi ew s

which would have distorted and falsified our picture of him?'

Th e question h as been exh aust ive ly discussed , and there is little point in reopening it. Two

argume nts used agains t auth enti cit y ma y be dismissed at once : (i ) internal incons istenc ies, for,

a s examination of the content w i l l show, there are none of any ser iousne ss; (ii ) the contention

that it is a par ody or distortio n de signed to discredit the Sophis t, for an open-mi nded reading

of the myth and the logos which follows it leaves one onl y wi th feel ings of deep respect for their

author.

http://gesch.gr/

http://gesch.gr/



Protagoras on Human Progress

agnostic (cf. Tkeaet. 162 d), and had no wish to deceive. In fact the

myth is followed by a rational explanation of the main points, from

w h i c h divine agents are wholly absent.

Protagoras has a difficult position to defend, and he does it with

astonishing ski l l . If he admitted that virtue (to use the common English

translation of arete) is a natural endowment of the whole human race,

rather than something acquired by training, he would argue himself

out of his job, for training in virtue is what he has just claimed as his

metier. On the other hand he has undertaken to justify the principle

underlying Athenian democracy, that questions of public policy are

in no sense technical, so that the advice of 'smith or shoemaker' may

be as good as any other's, which seems to imply that the necessary

virtues are innate in every man rather than imparted by instruction.

Both positions are maintained in the myth and the explanation which

fol lows it.1

Techn ica l sagacity (έ ν τ ε χ ν ο ς σ ο φ ί α ) is innate in man from the

beginning, for in the myth it is bestowed by Prometheus at the

moment when the first men see the light. It is only another expression

fo r the practical intelligence (σ ύ ν ε σ ις in Euripides) which is the first

divine gift in Euripides and A e s c h y l u s . Original also was the instinct

fo r worship, because, as the myth puts it, men 'share in the divine'.

T h i s they would do both in the sense that reason was the gift of

Prometheus, a divine being, and because the possession of reason was

thought to be a mark of kinship with the gods. Protagoras himself

probably recognized worship as something peculiar, and perhaps

necessary, to man, without committing himself on the existence of

its object.2

U s i n g their native ingenuity, men soon provided themselves with

food , houses and clothing, and learned to speak; but they still lived

'scattered', without cities, because although they had the 'craftsman's

1

Wh at follows is based on the fullet account in my In the Beginning, 85 ff.

' Prot agoras d id not deny the existence of the god s, but refused to discuss the question on

the grounds that certainty was impossible (fr. 4 and Plato, Theaet. i 6 2 d - e ) . His friend Pericles

• a i d that our belief in gods rests on the honours that are paid to them as wel l as the benefits th ey

confer (Stesimbrotus ap. Plut. Per. 8). Protagoras probably thought this evidence hardly

ni i l l i c ien t . So Nestle, ed. of Prot. pp. 19 f. See further below, pp. 234 f. Simi lar lan gua ge occu rs

in Xcnophon, Menu 1 . 4 . 1 3 (man is the on ly race that worships gods) and 4 . 3 . 1 4 (the soul

of man τ ο ΰ θ ε ί ο υ μ ε τ έ χ ε ι ).

65




66

art'1

they lacked the 'polit ical art '. Consequently many were killed

b y w i l d beasts, against which the only defence for the physically

w e a k e r human species lay in combined action. Fearing, therefore, that

the whole race would be wiped out, Zeus (in the story) sent Hermes to

bring men two moral virtues, aidos and dike, 'to make political order

possible and create a bond of friendship and union' (322c). Dike is a

sense of right or justice, aidds a more complicated quality combining

roughly a sense of shame, modesty, and respect for others. It is not

far from 'conscience'. These gifts are not to be restricted to selected

individuals, as with the arts, where one can be a doctor, another a

musician and so on, and life be conducted on a principle of division

o f labour. All must share them, because ' there could never be cities

i f o n l y a few shared in these virtues as in the arts'. Even Zeu s , however,

cannot ensure that they are universal, for they were no part of the

original nature of man, so he adds the rider that, if anyone prove in

capable of acquiring them, he must be put to death as a cancerous

growth in the body politic.

Ze us ' s decree stands for what in the non-mythical anthropologies

(and in Protagoras's mind) was the work of time, bitter experience,

and necessity.* The story teaches two things about the 'political

virtues': (a) in the civi l ized world they are possessed to some degree

(ά μ ώ ς γ έ T T CO S , 323 c ) by everybody, but (b) they were not innate in

men from the beginning. In the explanation fo l l o wi n g the myth he

takes up both these points. The first one justifies the Athenians in

demanding expertise in the technical arts but not in the art of politics,

for which the prime requisites are justice and moderation. Everyone

in fact believes that these virtues are shared by all. A man entirely

' δ η μ ι ο υ ρ γ ι κ ή τ έ χ ν η , 3 22 b. C ompar ison wi th α ρ ε τ ή ; . . . δ η μ ι ο υ ρ γ ι κ ή ς at 322c! affords a

striking demonstration of the practical associations of areti and explains the (to an English

read er) rather il log ical w a y in whi ch the account seems to treat technical s k i l l s and moral

qualities as much the same sort of thing. The craftsman's art c a l l s for technical aretai and the

political man's for political aretai, which happen to be moral vi rt ue s. Cf. 3 22 b ή δ ί κ ο υ ν α λ λ ή λ ο υ ς

ά τ ε ο ϋ κ έ χ ο ν τ ε ς τ ή ν π ο λ ι τ ι κ ή ν τ έ χ ν η ν . On statesmanship a s τ έ χ ν η i n the fifth cen tu ry so me

intere sting materia l is collected in O'Brien, Socratic Paradoxes, 67 if.

2

Since wr it in g the abov e I find that this point, which even now escapes most scholars, was

made long ago by Kaerst in the Zeitschr.f. Pol. 1909, 51 3, n. 1: 'D er Umstan d, dass im My th os

des Protagoras erst durch Hermes die δ ί κ η und α Ι δ ώ ; an die Menschen vertei l t werden, soli

natiirlich nur die unbedi ngte N otwe ndi gkei t der Allgeme inheit der Rec hts - und Schamgefuhtr

fur das Bestehen des Staate s v eran scha ulic hen. '



Protagoras on the Development of Morality

without an artistic gift—say music—is a commonplace, but a man

entirely without moral qualities could not lead a human life, and

anyone who declared that this was his own case would be thought

mad (322a-c). If Socrates ever met such a one—who ex hypothesi

w o u l d be l iv ing in isolation, without education, courts of justice,

l aws orany other of the restraints of civi l ized life—he would regard

the most hardened criminals ofAthens as virtuous by comparison.

Se c ond ly , however, though the Athenians like everyone else believe

that all have some share of the political virtues, they do not think of

them as innate or automatic, but asacquired by teaching and effort

(323 c: these therefore correspond in reality to the decree of Zeus in

the myth). The education starts in infancy, with mother, nurse and

father, and is continued by schoolmasters, and in adult life by the state,

which provides in its laws a pattern ofhow to l ive . Moreover the

citizens prompt each other, for it is in our interests that our neighbours

should understand the rules of organized social life faja-b). In

this continuous process it is difficult to single out aclass of teachers of

virtue, but this is no more proof that itcannot be taught than the lack

o f instructors in our native tongue would prove the same about

speech.1

It is in this connexion that Protagoras produces his justly celebrated

theory of punishment, with its enlightened rejection of the motive of

vengeance or retribution. Thepassage is worth quoting in full

( 3 2 4 a - c ) :

In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that aman has

done wrong in the past, or punishes him onthat account, unless taking

blind vengeance like abeast. No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational

man for the sake of the crime that has been committed (after all one cannot

undo what ispast), but for the sake of the future, toprevent either the

same man or, by die spectacle of his punishment, someone else, from doing

wrong again. But to hold such a view amounts to holding that virtue can be

instilled by education; at all events the punishment is inflicted as a deterrent.

Protagoras's v ie w of arete, dike andnomos does certainly imply

I hat rawhuman nature contains the possibility of moral advance,' l i t l i u w l in Eur. Su/>/>/. 9 1 3 - 1 5 : ή

δ·

ε ύ α ι, δ

Ρ( α

δ ι δ α κ τ ο ί, Ε ί π ε ρ κ α ΐ β ρ έ φ ο ς δ ιδ ά σ κ ε τ α ι

λ ίγ α ν ά κ ο ύ ι ι ν 0' ώ ν μ ά Ο η σ ι ν ο ύ κ £ χ Ε ΐ .

6 7



Thei

Nomos '—Physis' Antithesis

68

though its realization is a matter of experience and education. As

Aristotle said later, ' we are equipped by nature to acquire the virtues,

but we achieve them only by practice (ε θ ο ς )' {EN, 1 1 0 3 3 2 4 ) .

Protagoras himself said (fr. 3, D K ) : ' Teaching needs both nature and

practice (ά σ κ η σ ις : i.e. in the pupil).' It is this antecedent capability,

v a r y i n g between individuals, which he invokes against Socrates's

other argument, that some good statesmen seem unable to impart

their virtue even to their own sons. If virtue were distributed on the

same principle as the other arts (326ε fT.), with one practitioner to

many laymen, the case might be different, though even there the sons

o f many artists, trained by their fathers, cannot hold a candle to them

(328 c ) . But as it is, everyone has some talent for virtue and everyone is

continually having it developed by various, sometimes unnoticed,

educative processes. In this situation, the advantages of contact with

an outstanding father cannot have so much effect as the natural capabili

ties of the son, which may be very inferior.

A s to his own claims as a Sophist, g i v e n that virtue can be taught,

and is continually being instilled in an infinite variety of w a y s simply

b y the experience of being brought up in a well-governed state, we

must, he modestly concludes, be content if we can find someone

rather better than the rest at advancing us along the road, and that is

all I claim to be.

( c ) Other equations of nomos' with the just and right

For Protagoras, then, self-restraint and a sense of justice are virtues

necessary to society, which in its turn is necessary for human survival;

and nomoi are the guidelines1

laid down by the state to teach its citizens

the limits within which they may move without outraging them.

Neither nomos nor the political virtues are 'by nature', but a 'return

to nature' is the last thing that is wanted. The state of nature was un

comfortable and savage, with every man against his neighbour, and

i f persisted in would have led to the destruction of the race. Critias

w as on the same side, if we may take the quotations from his plays as

1

At 326c) Protagoras compares them to the lines ruled in child ren's copy- book s whe n they

are being taught to write. E. G. Turner in BICS, 12 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 6η {., is probab ly right in refer ring

t i le words to parallel line s and not to a tracing of the letters themselves.



Upholders of Nomos'

6 9

reflecting his own v i e w s .1

This is plainly stated in the Sisyphus (fr. 25),

and the interesting lines from the Peirithous, which belittle law in

favour of character2

as a guarantee of right conduct, do so only on

account of its comparative weakness. ' The upright character no orator

can pervert, but the law he often turns upside-down and dishonours

with his talk.' In the Sisyphus too he pointed out that laws, relying on

compulsion, could prevent open but not secret misdemeanours

(fr. 2 5 . 9 - 1 1 ) , a weakness which is also remarked on by Democritus

(fr. 181). Democritus was another upholder of nomos, of which he

offered an even more exalted conception. Law exists for the benefit of

human life, and by obeying it we become aware of its excellence

(areti). One should establish 'the nomos in the soul', the law of self-

respect or shame which makes wrongdoing impossible even in secret.

(See further vol. 1 1 , 495 f.)

G r e e k recognition of the supremacy of law, as opposed to the w i l l

of a king or tyrant, was something of which Greeks were proud. This

is illustrated by the well-known story in Herodotus (7 .104) of the

reply made by Demaratus, the deposed king of Sparta, to Xerxes who

had given him asylum. Before invading Greece, Xerxes asked him if

the Greeks would fight, giving it as his own opinion that they would

not, because of their vastly inferior numbers and because they had no

overlord who could compel them to face such odds.

' They are free, yes,' replied Demaratus, 'but not entirely free; for they have

u master, and that master is Law, whom they fear even much more than

your subjects do you. Whatever this master commands they do, and his

command is always the same. He does not permit them to flee in battle,

against whatever odds, but compels them to stand firm, to conquer or die.'1

This is usually done without question, or even mention of the fact that the relevant

p u M u g c s are in the mouths of dramatis personae. Th e view of laws as man- made , to repl ace

'bru tish d iso rder ' wi th justice, is the prelude to an atheistical account o f the gods as anothe r

human invention, delivered by the impious Sis yphu s. On ly Wil amo wi tz remarks (Glaule

II, 116) that doubtless he received later in the pla y (wh ich is lost ) the traditional puni shment.

B u t wh en all is said, the mot ive w as probab ly that which Aetius attributes to the author (wh o

ha thinks is Euripides), name ly to be able to disclaim responsibi lity for vi ews whi ch are r e a l l y

hit own. (See Aet. 1.7.2, DK, 88 Β 25 : Euripides made Sis yphu s the champion of his views

fo r fcur of the Areopagus.)

* !•>. 2» τ ρ ό π ο ; δ έ χ ρ η σ -ros α σ φ α λ έ σ τ ε ρ ο * ν ό μ ο υ . T he same contrast b et we en ν ό μ ο ς and τ ρ ό π ο ;

occurs in the funeral omiio n of Pericles (T hu c. 2.39.4 μ ή μ ε τ ά ν ό μ ω ν τ ό π λ έ ο ν ή τ ρ ό π ω ν

d v S p i l a ; Ι Ο ίλ ο μ ιν κ ι ν ο υ ν ι ύ ί ΐ ν ) .



The ''Nomos'—Physis' Antithesis

70

A s a loyal Spartan, he claims only to speak for his own city, but

X e r x e s applies his answer to the Greeks, and the story is told with a

truly Hellenic pride.1

For an Athenian expression of pride in nomos

one can quote the words of Theseus in Euripides, Suppl. 429 if.,

beginning:

A city has no greater enemy than a tyrant, under whom in the first place

there are no common laws, but one man rules, having taken the law into

his own possession. There is no fairness in this. But under written laws

justice is meted out impartially to the feeble and the wealthy, the weaker

if slandered may speak on equal terms with the prosperous, and the lesser

man prevails against the greater if his cause is just.

Pericles utters a similar encomium of law in the Funeral Speech

(Thuc. 2.37).

Socrates was another who felt that the laws must in all circum

stances be upheld. In a conversation which Xenophon reports him as

having had with the Sophist Hippias, it is first agreed between them

that laws are covenants made by the citizens themselves concerning

what must be done and what not, and that they can at any time be

amended or rejected. They are not therefore 'by nature', yet Socratesargues strongly that the essence of justice consists in keeping them,

and that a state whose members obey the laws is both happiest and

strongest.2

Law-abidingness begets concord, without which a city cannot

prosper, while individually the law-abiding man is the most trusted,

respected and sought as a friend. Even more striking is the scene in

Plato's Crito where Socrates bases his refusal to evade execution onthe ground that it has been decreed by the laws of Athens. ' Do you

think a state can exist and not be overthrown, in which the law's

decisions are of no force, but are disregarded and nullified by private

individuals?' Here again his duty to the laws rests on nothing more

fundamental than agreement—there is no hint of divine ordinance or

1

A more lyri cal appreciation of the Demaratus episode can be found in Gigante, Norn. Bus.

1 1 5 — 1 7 . That Greeks fight better than Asiatics because they are not despotically ruled is also

argued in Hippocr. De aere etc. 16 ( 1 1 , 64L.), a wo rk p oss ibl y of the late fifth centu ry.2

Mem. 4.4 . i2 f f . Cf. 4.6.6, where Socrates argues that those who know and do what is

lawful in human affairs are just.



Socrates and the ' Anonymus lamblichi'

bond o f nature—but Socrates has had the benefit of the agreement

all his life, and to break it now would show base ingratitude.1

Another champion of nomos and eunomia, law and order, is the

so-ca l led 'Anonymus lamblichi', a writer apparently of the late fifth

or early fourth century.

2

His advice is aimed frankly at worldlysuccess , and may be summed up as 'virtue is the best policy ' and 'be

what you would seem'. He has taken a hint from Socrates, who, says

Xenophon {Mem. 1 . 7 . 1 ) , 'always said that the best way to acquire a

g o o d name was to become what you wished to be thought to be'.

Socrates however would hardly have included 'a ready tongue' among

worth-while ambitions, nor made fame the end and virtue only a means

to attain it.

The first necessity for success, says the writer, is to be born with

natural gifts, but he is no aristocratic advocate of birth and breeding,

for he immediately adds that this is a matter of chance. What is in a

man's own power is to show that he really desires the good, and to

devote the time and labour necessary to acquiring it, for in contrast to

'the art of speaking', which can be quickly mastered, arete demands

l ong time and effort. Like Protagoras he sees both nature and

practice as necessary, but he would evidently not have followed

Protagoras in using techne (art, acquired skill) and arete interchange

ably (see p. 66, n. 1), and his dismissal of the art of speaking as some

thing in which 'the pupil can in a short time rival the master' is an

almost Platonic hit at Sophists who made rhetoric the staple of their

curriculum. Arete on the other hand is a matter of long nurture, of

g r o w i n g up in avoidance of evil in speech and action and pursuing

and achieving good by protracted effort. Arete is here given the moral

content which Socrates and Plato gave it.3 It consists in using one's

other gifts—ready speech, cleverness, bodily strength—in the interests

of law and justice; if they are put to a contrary use, it would be better

' This magnificent passage is cited again in connexion with the social compact on pp. 140,

1 4 3 below.

* On these extracts and their author see pp. 3 i 4 f . below.3

Pace Nestle, who s a y s (VMûL, 425) : ' T h a t α ρ ε τ ή still has absolutely no moral sense is

c lea r from the very fact that all these capaci ties ma y be put to the service either of the r ight and

good or of the wrong and e v i l . ' His following sentence weakens this one considerably, and in

lint it is not α ρ ε τ ή but |/,libncss, cleverness and phys ical streng th which can be put to these

I ' D i i l f . n y C U D S (I ) K , 1 1 , . | u i . in). These capacities have been distinguished from ά ρ ι τ ή at the begin

ning ul the extract (iiid. 400.3 4).

7 1




72

not to have them. T o achieve perfect arete is to be useful to, or confer

benefit upon, the largest possible number of people,1

and this is best

done, not by such crude and in their outcome dubious methods as

indiscriminate charity, but by assisting the laws and justice, for it is

they which create and preserve the union of human lives in political

organizations. To achieve this calls for indifference to wealth, power

and life itself. The reward wi l l be an unfailing good name.2

T o think (he continues) of power-seeking as virtue and obedience

to the laws as cowardice is pernicious. (This attacks the kind of v i e w

represented by Plato's Cal l ic les , but it was all too common in the late

fifth century, and is equally exemplified by the assertion of T h u c y d i d e s ,

3.82.4, that in the general transmutation of values reckless aggression

w a s reckoned courage, and moderation a screen for cowardice.) The

reason for this is Protagorean: necessity forced men to combine for

su r v iva l , and communal life is impossible without submission to law.

Hence law and justice must be supreme: ' their strength is established

b y nature' (DK, 402.29f.). On the surface this seems to resolve the

nomos-physis antithesis by identifying the two on the basis of the

same facts which Protagoras had adduced: men's nature (physical

weakness) would have brought them to destruction without politicalorganization; therefore laws are an ordinance of 'nature' . But the

reconciliation could only be accepted by a superficial mind. Protagoras,

l ike other evolutionary theorists more conscious of the ages of suffer

ing and experience endured in the gradual and painful advance

towards civilization, could not see law itself as a provision of nature.

Nature gave men only the intelligence which enabled them, as a tardy

1 6 π λ ε ί σ τ ο ς ω φ έ λ ι μ ο ς ώ ν , DK, ι ι , 4 0 1 . 2 3 . Kaerst (Ztschr. f. Pol. 1 9 0 9 , 5 1 6 , n. 5) compares

the Benthamite principle of the greatest good of the greatest number.3

Th e equation of virtu e and goodness with τ ό ω φ έ λ ι μ ο ι " , the characterization of other ' g o o d s '

a s indifferent and capable of serving bad ends (DK, 1 1 , 4 0 1 . 1 6 - 2 3 >c

^ P'a

to> Meno 8 7ε ) , an d

the picture of the good man as self-controlled ( έ γ κ ρ α τ έ σ τ α τ ο ν ) , indifferent to wealth, power

and even life (on the grounds that no man can li ve for ev er ), mak e it difficult to resist the i m

pression that the author wa s an admir er of Socr ates and wri ti ng after his death. F or himself,

it is true, Socrates woul d have put ε υ δ ο ξ ί α amon g the indifferents, but he recognized it as a

general and legitimate huma n a im (Pla to, Symp. 208 c ) , and his death may have strengthened

the opinion that it would accrue anyway from a life of virtue. The sentence at DK, 1 1 , 4 0 2 . 1 2 ,

δ σ τ ι ς δ έ έ σ τ ι ν ά ν ή ρ α λ η θ ώ ς α γ α θ ό ς , ο ΰ τ ο ς ο ύ κ ά λ λ ο τ ρ ί ω κ ό σ μ ω τ τ ε ρ ικ ε ιμ έ ν <£ τ η ν δ ό ξ α ν θ η ρ α τ α ι

ά λ λ α τ η α ύ τ ο ϋ ά ρ ε τ η , has a Socratic r ing. I can hardly express s t rongly enough my disagreement

with what H. Gomperz s a y s on p. 84 of Soph. u. Rhet. about 'unertragliche Tautologie und

Selbstve rstand lichke it', etc. In general he seems to have developed an unreasonable prejudice

against this unfortunate author.



The ' Anonymus lamblichi'

73

alternative to destruction, to organize themselves in this way. There

is no disagreement of substance between the two accounts, and a

genuine reconciliation between nomos and physis could only be effected,

as Plato effected it, by seeing in nature not a series of accidents but the

product of a supreme designing mind.

1

Suppose, goes on the Anonymus, that a superman could exist.

Grant him 'a body and soul of steel', exemption from the ills of the

flesh, and a total lack of human feeling. Even such a one could not

continue to tyrannize with impunity, for all men would be his enemies,

and through their allegiance to law would overcome him by combined

force or skill . It is not, as many believe, the strength and violence of

the tyrant that bring him to power, but the fo l ly of the citizens themselves , for only a city that has already lost its respect for law and order

can fall into his clutches. The extract concludes with a eulogy of the

blessings of good government. Mutual trust (which Socrates also saw

as the fruit of obedience to law) encourages commerce and the free

circulation of money, the rich can enjoy their wealth in tranquillity

and the poor are helped by the more fortunate,2

men enjoy peace of

mind and freedom to f o l lo w their private pursuits, untroubled by

war or internal dissension and protected from tyranny. Law, says this

democratic sympathizer, 'benefits the whole people'.

M o s t scholars would probably agree with the verdict of W . C.

Greene (Moira, 25 i f . ) , that the ch ie f value of this composition lies in

s h o w i n g ' how far the stock ideas and arguments of the age penetrated

into rather ordinary minds'. Echoes have been detected not only of

Protagoras, Socrates and Democritus but also of Prodicus, Critias,

Antisthenes, Thucydides, and even those stout opponents of nomos

Hippias and Antiphon. Many of the supposed resemblances are

commonplaces (e.g. the idea that to hazard one's life for one's country

w i n s fame, repeated in Thuc. 2.43.2—but how often elsewhere?),

1

Th e recon ciliati on also see ms to be atte mpted in an inter esti ng and difficult pas sag e of the

Bacchae (pp. H3f. below).

' The idea of the rich helping the poor in a state of unity and trust recurs in Democri tus

fr. 1 5 5 (vol. 1 1 , 495), of which Cyril B a i l e y wrote {Gk. Atom, andE. 2 1 2 ) that, 'considering the

Kcncral state of class feeling in most of the Greek cities, this is perhaps the most remarkable of

nil Democritus 's say ing s' . On the other hand it looks as if such a protest against class hostility

wus becoming common, for it is repeated also in Archytas fr. 3 (vol . 1, 336) and Isocrates,

Anvp. 3 1 - 2 .



The ''Nomos'—''Physis' Antithesis

74

and one can say little more than that ideas are here reflected which

were widely current, though Protagoras and Socrates certainly seem

to have been among the models. At the same time the passage offers

some interesting points which are not matched in other sources: the

attempted reconciliation of nomos and physis, the idea of the 'man of

steel' and his fate,1

and the combination of democratic ideals with a

horror of mob-rule as the breeding-ground of tyranny.

The foregoing passages illustrate a respect for, and pride in, the

rule of law as something firmly entrenched in the Greek, and perhaps

especial ly the Athenian, mind, irrespective of whether laws were

regarded as a product of nature or strongly contrasted with it. If the

latter, they were hailed as a triumph of reason over nature, the symbol

o f man's ability to raise himself by his own efforts out o f a 'natural '

state of mutual conflict and destruction. L a w s were n o t ' by nature' to

Protagoras or Socrates, and Herodotus was fully aware of the variety

and inconsistencies between the nomoi of different societies. T w o

passages which make these points, and afford further evidence of

their wide currency, have been left to the last owing to certain doubts

about their authorship and date, which however do not (at least in

my opinion) seriously affect their value for our purpose.

(i) The second oration of L y s i a s , which purports to be a funeral

speech for Athenians who fell in the Corinthian war, is an inept pro

duction, written probably as a mere rhetorical exercise and unlikely

to be by L y s i a s .2

Certain coincidences with the Panegyricus of Isocra-

tes suggest that one imitated the other, but it is not so easy to say

w h i c h was the imitator.3 In § § 1 8 - 1 9 the writer, eulogizing the early

Athenians, says:

T h e y conducted the city's affairs in the spirit of free men, by law honouring

the good and punishing the wicked, for they thought it the action of beasts

1

But see H. Gomperz, Soph. u. Rhet. 86, n. 187. The re is a certain confusion (wh ich Gomperz

should have mentioned), at least as we have the passage in Iamblichus, between DK, 403.3

{not even a man of steel could overthrow the l a w s ) an d 4 0 4 . 2 7 Γ Γ . (to do it would need a man of

steel, no t of flesh).

' Dobson, Gk. Orators, 9 2 - 4 . Such judgments are admittedly subjective, and, although in

this case I agree, it should be mentioned that Grote thought it 'a ve ry fine comp osi tion ' andCope agreed with him. See Cope's ed. of Arist. Rhet. m , 120, n. 1.

3

B l a s s , thinking psendo-Lysias the imitator, put his speech after 387, but tile arg ume nt can

be used the other way. See Plobst in RE, xxvi. Halbb. 2 5 3 7 .



Upholders of'Nomos'

75

to prevail over one another by violence; human beings should make law

the touchstone of what is right and reasoned speech the means of persua

sion, subjecting themselves in action to these two powers, with law for

their king and reason their teacher.

( i i ) Among Demosthenes's speeches is included one against

A r i s t o g e i t o n (no. 25) which, though some in the past have defended

its authenticity, is generally thought to be spurious.1

Behind certain sec

tions of this speech Pohlenz (in Nachrichten... Gesellschaft, Gottingen,

1 9 2 4 , hereafter NGG) claimed to have discovered, as their source, a

single lost discourse, of unknown authorship, enjoining obedience to

the laws on theoretical grounds. This he dated to the end of the fifth

century, remarking in particular that there was no trace of Platonic

or Aristotelian doctrines. His conclusions won general acceptance,

and Ά η ο η . τ τ . ν ό μ ω ν ' was freely cited, until in 1956 M. Gigante argued

{Nom. Bas. 268-92) first that the passages in question cannot be

isolated from the rest of the speech (which is indiscriminately eclectic)

and assigned to a single model, and secondly that the speaker, both here

and elsewhere, betrays an acquaintance with Plato, Aristotle and even

Stoic i sm, and cannot be dated earlier than 300. His first thesis is con

vinc ing , and the 'Anon.' ought probably to be dismissed as a phantom,

but the second is much less securely based.* The f o l l o w i n g passage

from the speech is pertinent to the present theme:

( 1 5 ) The whole life of men, be their city great or small, is governed by

nature and by laws. Of these two, nature is disorderly [ά τ α κ τ ο ς like the

' Its authenticity was contested in antiquity. For the chief names on both sides see Gigante,

Nom. Bas. 269. On the neg at ive side may be added those of Unters teiner and Gi gan te himself.

' It is not obv ious, for instance, wh y inconsis tent definit ions of nomoi in § 1 6 should n ecess a r i l y imp ly late date, and Giga nte i s apt to re ly too mu ch on si ngle wo rd s or phrases , as wh en

,> men tion of σ ω φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η causes him to exclaim (p. 2 81 ): 'Socr ate— Plat one! ' Again , he s a y s that

ihc sections could not h ave been writ ten b y a Sophi st because the definition of la w as a σ υ ν θ ή κ η

is not held to condemn it as a plot of the weak to defend themselve s agai nst the str ong or the

strong to oppress the weak , and in fact the definition itself presupposes 't he w hol e of the Crito'

unci Lycophron! In the preceding pages we have seen sufficiently plainly both that the definition

of law as a compact was current in the fifth century and that not all the Sophi sts rejected it on

that account. It does not appear that Lyco phr on himself did, nor in an earlier generat ion did

Protagoras . Wh en Socrates is portra yed by both Xenophon and Plato as hold ing that law was

11 σ υ ν θ ή κ η the onl y sensible conclusion is that he did so, not that Plato inserted it gratuitously

nnH f a l s e l y in the Crito. In protesting that the distinction between voluntary and involuntaryfaults betr ays Stoic influence, G. does not even mention the strong pos sibi lity, noted b y Poh lenz,

I hut the correct text of l l ic speech does not contain it. His postponement of this point until four

pugcN later is har dly fair, nor a re his arg uments on p. 276 fu l l y relevant to the theory of a gloss

upheld b y Mass and Pohlenz.





The Origin of Law

A p o l l o . The Cretan who at the opening of Plato's Laws says that the

l a w s of Crete and Sparta were owed to Zeus and A p o l l o respectively

w a s not denying the work of Lycurgus.1

For the bel ief in the divine origin of laws (which he calls 'uralt'),

Pohlenz gi v es references in a footnote {NGG 28, Kl. Schr. 313, n. 2)

to five passages of the literature of the fifth and fourth centuries, but

without quoting, still less discussing, the texts. Let us take a look at

them, and see how far they indicate a general bel ief in the divine

origin of laws as such.

1. Sophocles, Ο Τ 863 fT. Here the chorus are speaking solely of

nomoi governing religious purity (ά γ ν ε ί α ν . . . ώ ν ν ό μ ο ι τ τ ρ ό κ ε ιν τ α ι),

o f w h i c h they very reasonably say that ' Olympus is their sole begetter,

not did any mortal human nature bring them to birth'. What have

these to do with the constitution of a ρ ο /is? They belong to the so-

called unwritten ordinances (ά γ ρ α φ α ν ό μ ι μ α ), of which Plato says

that they ought not really to be called nomoi?

2 . Euripides, Ion 442. Ion, the idealistic young servant of A p o l l o ,

is shocked to learn that his lord has betrayed a mortal woman. Virtue

should go with power. If a man sins, the gods punish him. ' How is it

right for you, who have written the nomoi for men, yourselves to be

gu i l ty of l aw lessness? ' This comes nearer to supporting the generaliza

tion about' a divine origin for nomoi', but, apart from the requirements

o f the dramatic situation, what is in question is a moral principle

rather than positive law. This too, in spite of the metaphorical language

about the gods 'writing' such l a w s , belongs rather to the 'unwritten

ordinances' which were indeed believed to come from heaven. It

recalls the conversation between Hippias and Socrates in which

positive law as a human compact is distinguished from the unwritten

l a ws which Hippias believes to be divinely sanctioned (pp. 1 1 8 if.

b e l o w ) .

3. Euripides, Hipp. 98. Hippolytus's servant asks him if he does not

think an affable, courteous nature preferable to a proud and haughty

one. When Hippolytus agrees, he continues: 'And do you hope to

1

l o r further discussion of this point, wit h references to Ty rt ae us fr. 3 Diehl, Hdt. 1. 65 ,

ΙΊ.1Ι0, Laws 624a and l'lut. Lye. 5 and 6, see my Gks. and their Gods, i84f.

' Laws 793a, to which Jcbb pertinently c a l l s attention in the note in his edition of the

Oedipus.

77



The1

Nomos'—Physis' Antithesis

find the same in the gods?' ' Y e s , ' replies Hippolytus, 'for we mortals

adopt the nomoi of the gods.' This is simply an instance of the wide

c o v e r a g e of the word nomos, for it clearly means ways or manners

rather than l a w s , and has no bearing on the origin of law.

4. Demosthenes 23 (against Aristocrates), 70, speaks of ' those w ho

from the beginning fixed these usages [the word is not even nomoi

but nomima], whoever they were, whether heroes or gods'. This is

v a g u e enough, but, apart from that, the reference is by no means

general. It occurs in a high-flown eulogy o f the court of the Areopagus,

in which the orator has begun by mentioning 'many mythical tradi

tions' about it (§65), for instance that the gods themselves once

settled their quarrels there, or acted as judges, as in the dispute between

Orestes and the Furies. Great emphasis is laid on the religious character

o f this ancient and revered institution, and the passage ends with the

distinction between 'written nomoi' and 'unwritten nomima ,

5. Isocrates, Panath. 169. In this section leaving the dead un-

buried is condemned as 'spurning the ancient custom (Ιθ ο ς ) and

ancestral nomos which all men observe as not laid down by men but

ordained by divine power'. This is the very sin which Sophocles's

Antigone described as transgressing 'the sure unwritten ordinances

(nomima) of the gods', and contrasted with the law that Creon as a

mere human ruler had laid down!

The lesson of these passages is not that 'laws are of divine origin'

but that there are certain divinely appointed ordinances (more often

designated by the vaguer term nomima thanas nomoi) covering religious

observance or moral principle, which are distinct from the great body

o f positive law in a city like Athens.1

Positive law itself, however, asthe traditions about Lycurgus and other lawgivers show, could be

regarded as the work of a man inspired by heaven and so of divine as

w e l l as human origin. This was an old belief, which admittedly was

under heavy fire in the age of enlightenment. We need not suppose

that when Pericles invited Protagoras to draw up a constitution for

his new colony of Thurii either of them genuinely believed that he

w o u l d be acting under divine guidance. Nevertheless the combinationo f ' g i f t of the gods' and 'decision of wise men' would by no means

1

They are fully discussed on pp. 1 1 7 fT. below.

78



The Origin of Law

79

appear inconsistent to a Greek as it does to us, and in the mouth of an

orator would seem only proper. A s for the third of Pohlenz's ' mutually

e x c l u s i v e ' stages, what inconsistency is there in stating the truth that,

although in a democracy like that of Athens a law could only come

into force by the consent of the whole demos, it must inevitably have

originated from the proposal of a single man? The author of the

speech against Aristogeiton may have his faults, but the concentrated

attack of scholars on this particular target is astonishing. T o a fifth-

century Athenian who still respected the traditions of his race, good

law was a gift of providence, conveyed through the decisions of wise

statesmen, and ratified by the consent of the whole city.

A P P E N D I X

Some passages descriptive of human progress

Aeschylus, Prometheus Vinctus 442-68, 478-506. (Aeschylus died in

456 B . C . and the Prometheus was probably his latest play. The speaker is

Prometheus.) But hear the sufferings of mortals, how aforetime they were

witless but I gave them sense and made them masters of their minds. At

first they had eyes but saw to no purpose, heard but took no heed. Like

dream-shapes they lived their long lives in utter confusion. They knew nohouses of brick to face die sun, nor working of timber, but lived like

crawling ants deep in the sunless recesses of caverns. They had no sure

sign of winter or flowery spring or fruitful summer, but acted all without

judgment until I showed them the risings and obscure settings of the stars.

I discovered for them also number, that supreme device, and writing which

is the universal memory and mother of culture. I first brought beasts under

the y o k e , that with bodies bowed to the collar they might relieve mortals

o f their greatest toil, and brought horses to the chariot, obedient to thereins, to be the glory of wealth and luxury. None but I invented the sea

borne, canvas-winged craft of sailors.. . If one fell ill, there was no healing

food, unguent or draught, but for want of medicines they pined away

until I taught them to mix soothing remedies to drive away all diseases.

I devised many systems of prophecy, I first judged which dreams were

true visions and made known to them the secrets of omens and chance-met

portents. I explained clearly the flight of crook-clawed birds, those on die

right and on the left, the habits of each and their mutual hates, loves andgatherings; the smoothness of entrails also, what colour of gall-bladder is

most pleasing to the gods, the subtle formation of the liver; and burning




8ο

the limbs wrapped in fat, and the long loins, I brought men to a difficult

art, and made plain the dim tokens of fire. So much for that. But as for

those buried aids to human life, copper and iron, silver and gold, who

could claim to have discovered them before myself? None, I well know,

unless in vain talk. In one short word you may know all at once: all arts

men owe to Prometheus.

Sophocles, Antigone 3 3 2 - 7 1 . (Produced about 440. The lines are from a

chorus.) There are many wonders,1

but nothing more wonderful than man.

This creature ventures over the grey sea when the stormy south wind

blows, crossing in the teeth of the roaring billows. Earth, eldest of the

gods, indestructible and inexhaustible, he harries as the ploughs year after

year go to and fro, turning up the soil with the progeny of horses. The

carefree race of birds he hunts and catches, and the hosts of wild beasts,

and the tribes of the salt sea in the coils of w ove n nets—this cunning creature

man. By his devices he tames the beasts of the fields and hills, he brings

the horse and the tireless mountain bull to bend their necks beneath the

yoke . He has learned speech and soaring thoughts and law-abiding ways

in cities, and refuge from the tempestuous arrows of inhospitable frosts in

the open air. Inventive always, never does he meet the future unprepared.

Death alone can he not flee, but for dire diseases he has contrived the

remedies. Skilful beyond expectation are the contrivances of his art, and

he advances—now to evil, and again to good when he carries out the laws

of the land and the just decrees of heaven to which he is sworn, proud of

his citizenship. But an outlaw is the man whose reckless spirit leads him

to consort with wickedness.

Euripides, Supplices 201—13. (Produced about 4 2 1 . The speaker is Theseus,

w ho represents Athenian humanity, democracy and rule of law against the

claims of tyranny in the person of Creon's herald.) I bless the god who

brought our life to order out of beastlike confusion,2

implanting in us first

of all intelligence,3

then giving us a tongue to be the messenger of speech,

that words might be distinguished, and crops to feed us and for the crops

rain from heaven, to raise the fruits of earth and give us drink; defences

too against winter's cold, to ward off the chill of the sky, and sea voyages

1

T he word is deina, on which see p. 32 above.2

θ η ρ ι ώ δ ο υ ς . Also in Critias fr. 25.2, Diod. i . S . 1, Hippocr. VM 3 (1, 576 L. ), Isocr. (Paneg.

28, Antid. 254, Bus. 25) and Ditt . Syll. 704 (vol. n , 324), have θ η ρ ι ω δ ώ ς , and Mosch. 6 .4 θ η ρ σ Ι ν

έ μ φ ε ρ ε Τ ς . In the Homeric Hymn to Hephaestus (20.4) men lived in caves ή ΰ τ ε θ ή ρ ε ς untilHephaestus and Athena taught them better. With π ε φ υ ρ μ έ ν ο υ cf. ί φ υ ρ ο ν ε ί κ η π ά ν τ α in the

Aeschylus passage (v. 450).

3 σ ύ ν ε σ ι ν . Prometheus in Aeschylus s a y s έ ν ν ο υ ς ε θ η κ α κ α Ι φ ρ ε ν ώ ν έ π η β ό λ ο υ ς {ν . 444)·






82

of the late fifth or fourth century. The name of the play and the speaker

are unknown.)

First I will go back and unfold in speech how human life began and was

established.1

There was once a time when the life of men resembled that of

beasts. They dwelt in mountain caves and dark ravines, for as yet there

was no roofed house nor broad city fortified with stone towers. Nor didthe curved ploughs cleave the black clod, nurse of the grain, nor the busy

iron tend the fruitful rows of bacchic vines, but earth was barren. In mutual

slaughter they dined on food of flesh. Law was of small account, and violence

shared the throne of Zeus.2

But when time,3

begetter and nurturer of all

things, wrought a change in mortal life—whether by the solicitude of

Prometheus, or from necessity, or by long experience, offering nature

itself as teacher—then was discovered holy Demeter's gift, the nourishment

of cultivated grain, and the sweet fount of Bacchus. The earth, once barren,

began to be ploughed by yoked oxen, towered cities arose, men built

sheltering homes and turned their lives from savage ways to civilized.

From this time they made it a law to bury the dead or give unburied bodies

their portion of dust, leaving no visible reminder of their former impious

feasts.

Critias, fr. 25.1-8 DK. (Critias was killed in 403. The extract is from the

play Sisyphus, and Sisyphus is the speaker.) There was a time when the lifeof men was disorderly and beastlike,4

the slave of brute force, when the

good had no reward and the bad no punishment. Then, as I believe, men

laid down laws to chastise, that justice might be ruler and make insolence

its slave, and whoever sinned was punished.

Sisyphus continues by expounding the theory of religion as the

invention of an early legislator to prevent secret wrongdoing by

instilling a fear of all-seeing gods. (See pp. 243 f. below.)

' α ρ χ ή ν β ρ ο τ ε ίο υ κ «1 κ α τ ά σ τ α σ ι ν β ί ο υ . C f. the title o f Protagoras' s w or k Π . τ η ; Iv ά ρ χ η

κ α τ α σ τ ά σ ε ω ς . Mos chio n b eg in s hi s s to ry w i th the wo rds ή ν y a p Τ Γ Ο Τ ' α ι ώ ν and Protagoras his

s to ry in P la to w ith ή ν y a p π ο τ ε χ ρ ό ν ο ς ( 32 0c ).3

Th e reading Δ ι! is not absolutely certain (Ll oyd-Jon es in JHS, 1956 , 57, n. 24), th ou gh in

my opinion extremely probable. The difference between the primitive and c i v i l i z e d eras is

emphas ized by the unspo ken contra st here wi th the traditional b e l i e f that it is La w or Justice

w h i c h sits enthroned wit h Ze us : Hes. Op. 259; Pind. Ol. 8.21 Δ ιό ς ϊ ε ν ί ο υ π ά ρ ε δ ρ ο ς Θ έ μ ι ς ;

[Dem.] In Aristog. I I (citing Orphic literature) Δ ί κ η ν . . . π α ρ ά τ ο ν τ ο ϋ Δ ιό ς θ ρ ό ν ο ν κ α δ η μ έ ν η ν ;

Ο χ γ . Ρ α ρ . 2256 fr. 9 ( Α ) , ν . ί ο (Lloyd-Jones, he. cit. 59^·)·

3

Cf. Philemon (Meineke, CGF iv, 54; Philemon was born c. 361 and li ved to be a cen ten-

a r

'a n

):

ό σ α ι τ έ χ ν α ι y8yovaai, τ α ύ τ α ς , ώ Λ ά χ η ς ,

π ά σ α ς ίδ ίδ α ξ ε ν ό χ ρ ό ν ο ς , ο ύ χ δ δ ιδ ά σ κ α λ ο ς .4

Th e same pair of Gre ek wor ds as in Di od . 1 . 8 . 1 ; ά τ α κ τ ο ς of φ ύ σ ις in [Dc m. ] In Aristog. 15

(p. 75 above).



Passages on Human Progress

83

On Ancient Medicine 3 (i, 574-8 L . ) . (This treatise probably belongs to the

late fifth or early fourth century. See G. E. R. L lo yd in Phronesis, 1963.

His conclusion is on p. 125.) Sheer necessity caused men to seek and dis

cover the art of medicine . . . I believe that in the beginning men used the

same sort of nourishment [sc. as the beasts]. Our present way of life, I think,

has been evolved by discoveries and inventions over a long period of time.Many and terrible were the sufferings of men from their strong and brutish

diet when they lived on raw and uncompounded foods o f strong qualities . . .

and it is reasonable to suppose that the majority were of too weak a consti

tution and died, while the stronger put up a longer resistance . . . So from

wheat, after steeping, winnowing, grinding and sifting, kneading, and

baking, they produced bread, and from barley, cake. Experimenting with

many other foods in this way, they boiled, baked and mixed, combining

die strong and uncompounded with weaker components, adapting every-iliing to the constitution and power of man.

Isocrates, Panegyricus 28 ff. Isocrates (436-338) here puts the theories

o f progress to a patriotic use: the Greek world owes its civilization to

A t h e n s , for Demeter, in gratitude for the kindness she received there

when searching for her daughter, granted to the city her two gifts of

the cultivation of corn and celebration of the mysteries, with theirhope of a future life. The first ensured that we should not l ive 'like the

beasts', and he goes on (§32):

If we leave all this aside and look at things from the beginning, we shall

find that the first men to appear on the earth did not lead straight away the

kind of life that we now enjoy, but reached it gradually by their own joint

efforts . . . (38) This was the beginning of our city's benefactions, to find

fo r those in want the kind of sustenance which'men must have if they aregoing to live a well-ordered life in other respects. For she believed that

life that was mere subsistence was not worth living, and took thought for

llie rest, so that none of the benefits which men now enjoy, and which we

ow e to each other and not to the gods, is unconnected with our city, and

of most of them she is the direct cause. (39) She took over the Greeks living

In scattered groups, without laws, some groaning under tyranny, others

perishing for lack of leadership, and rid them of these evils, taking some

under her protection and acting as an example to others; for she was thefirst to lay down laws and establish a constitution... (40) As for arts and

techniques, both those useful for life's necessities and those devised for

enjoyment, some were invented and others tested by our city, which then




84

handed them over to the rest of mankind to u s e . . . (42) Moreover not

every land is self-sufficient. Some are poor, others produce more than the

inhabitants need, and it is a problem for them, in the one case to dispose

o f their surplus and in the other to find imports. In this difficulty too

Athens came to their aid by establishing the Peiraeus as the emporium of

Greece, so abundantly provided that everything can be obtained here which

in any other single place it would be difficult to buy.

With the above passage of Isocrates compare

(a) Diod. 13.26.3 (speech of Nicolaus the Syracusan recommending

mercy to the Athenian captives o f 41 3 B.C.) . The Athenians it was who first

introduced the Greeks to cultivated food, which they had received from

the gods for themselves and offered for the common use. They are the

inventors of laws, through which our common life was transformed from a

savage and wicked existence into a civilized and just society.

(h) to indicate the persistence of this idea, Ditt. Syll. 704 (vol. 11,

p . 324), an inscription of the second century B . C . containing a proposal

o f the Delphic Amphictyony to honour the Athenian technitai

(theatrical artists). It states that the Athenian people brought men from

a ' beastl ike' state to civilization, admitted them to the mysteries, and

g a v e them the boon of agriculture, laws and civilization.

(3) T H E R E A L I S T S

(a) Thucydides

T o understand the temper of the age in which the Sophists lived, one

cannot do better than start with the philosophic historian Thucydides.

He is writing of the great inter-state war which was the background

o f Greek life for the last thirty years of the fifth century, and divided

not only city from city but factions within each one. In his own

words (3.82):

War, destroying the ease of everyday life, is a violent schoolmaster, and

assimilates most men's tempers to the conditions around them. . . The

customary values of words were changed as men claimed the right to

use them as they pleased to justify their actions: an unreasoning daring was

called courage and loyalty to party, a prudent delay specious cowardice;

moderation and self-control came to be reckoned but the cloak of timidity,



Thucydides

to have an understanding of the whole to be everywhere unwilling to a c t . . .

Applause, in a word, went to one who got in first with some evil act, and

to him who cheered on another to attempt some crime that he was not

thinking of.1

T h u c y d i d e s has primarily in mind the effects of internal strife, but

his narrative, especially in the speeches, shows these traits to have

been equally marked in the dealings of one Greek state with another.

It is remarkable how seldom even his orators, aiming at persuasion,

see any point in appealing to considerations of right, justice or other

normally accepted moral standards: it is taken for granted that only

an appeal to self-interest is l ike ly to succeed. Thucydides had an

impressive insight into the minds of his fe l l ow- Gre e ks , and may be

trusted when he claims that he has heard some of the speeches himself

and had first-hand reports of others, and that he has reproduced the

kind of thing that they were bound to say on each occasion, while

keeping as close as possible to the gist of what they actually said

(i .22. i).2

His reports supply the necessary background to an outburst

like that of Thrasymachus in the Republic, and throw light on the

current interpretation of such conceptions as human nature, law,

justice, advantage or interest, necessity, and their mutual relations.

S o m e illustrations from his work w i l l therefore be very relevant to

our theme.

The most famous example of amoral 'realism' is the discussion

w h i c h he represents as being held between Athenian envoys and the

•mall island of Melos , which the Athenians wished to force into their

confederacy ( 5 . 8 5 - 1 1 1 ) . The Athenians begin by saying that they

will neither use moral arguments nor expect them from the Melians,

because both sides know that by human standards justice depends on

•quality of power: the strong do what they can and the weak submit.

V e r y w e l l , say the Melians (ch. 90). T o confine ourselves, as you wish,

to considerations of interest (τ ό ξ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν ) rather than justice, we

1

Tra ns, based on Gomme, Comm. on Thuc. 2. 384, with slight alterations.

' Th is sentence takes a pre tty fierce bull by the hor ns. O n the thor ny ques tio n o f the

historicity o f Thu cyd id es' s speeches, scholars seem a little inclined to hav e it both w a y s .I'.hrenbcrg says (S. and P. 42) that he agrees wit h most scholars 'i n taki ng not on ly the " f o r m"

hut to some extent also the "s pi ri t" as Thu cyd ide an . . . but there remains the certaint y that

truthful reproduc tion ( τ ά α λ η θ ώ ς λ ε χ θ έ ν τ α ) l i e s at the bottom of the speeches'. Can both halves

id tills statement be tr uer

85



The ''Nomos'—''Physis9

Antithesis

86

claim that it is useful (χ ρ ή σ ιμ ο ν ) as a general principle that those in

danger should meet with fairness and justice (τ ά ε ικ ό τ α κ α ι δ ίκ α ια )

—a principle that you yourselves may need to invoke some time . . .

(98) Since you forbid us to talk o fjustice, and bid us g iv e in to your

interest (ξ υ μ φ ό ρ ω ), we wi l l tell you what is good (χ ρ ή σ ι μ ο ν ) for us,

and, if it agrees with your interests, try to persuade you.

Later however (ch. 104) the Melians do venture to introduce moral

considerations, claiming that in spite of their weakness they may hope

for divine favour because they stand for right against injustice (ό σ ιο ι

Trpos ο ύ δ ικ α ίο υ ς ). The Athenians retort that this is unrealistic:

Our belief about the gods, and certain knowledge about men, is that uni

versally, by natural necessity (ύ π ό φ ύ σ ε ω ς α ν α γ κ α ία ς ), he who is superior

rules. We did not make this law (ν ό μ ο ν ) . . . We merely use it and shall

leave it to exist for ever. You would do the same in our position... Nor

will the Spartans help you. More than any others they equate pleasant with

good and interest with justice.1

Similar ly in addressing the Spartans themselves ( 1 . 7 6 . 2 ) , the

Athenian representatives declare:

It has been established from all time that the weak should be subject to the

strong. You Spartans, while really calculating your own interests, make

use of the argument of justice, which never yet deterred anyone from

seeking aggrandizement if he had the opportunity of obtaining it by

superior strength. Those are deserving of praise who, while their human

nature leads them to accept power, nevertheless display more justice than

they are compelled to in their superior situation.

C l o s e l y parallel to this are the words of Hermocrates the Sicilian

warning his countrymen against the Athenians (4.60.1):

Under the legal name of alliance they speciously turn their naturalhostility

to their own advantage . . . ( 6 1 . 5 ) It is whol ly excusable that they should

plot thus for their own aggrandizement. It is not those who seek to dominate

that I blame, but those who too readily give in to them. It is universal

human nature to dominate the unresisting, but equally to guard against

attack.

Pericles told the Athenians frankly that they held their empire ' likea tyranny' (2.63.2): it might have been wrong to acquire it, but it

1

Ch. 105 : τ ά μ έ ν η δ έ α κ α λ ά vouljouai, τ ά δ έ ξ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν τ α δ ί κ α ι α .



Thucydides

w o u l d now be dangerous to let it go. C l e o n , in advocating condign

punishment for the rebellious city of Mytilene, repeats this more

emphatically.1

In his speech, which is more notable for audacity than

log ic , he does not shun the concept o f justice but blandly accuses the

Mytilenaeans of subordinating it to power (ισ χ ύ ς , 3.39 .3). Byproposing to ki l l all their adult males and enslave the women and

children, he claims to reconcile justice with interest (δ ίκ α ια with

ξ ύ μ φ ο ρ α , 40.4), since the Mytilenaeans have deserved their fate; but,

even if it is wrong, he immediately continues, Athenian interest

demands that they carry out the deed in defiance of decency (π α ρ ά τ ό

ίΐκ ό ς ) unless they are w i l l ing to abandon their empire and turn

philanthropists. He repeats that it is human nature to despise conciliators and admire the iron hand (39.5). The three things most fatal to

an empire are pity, l o v e of discussion, and humanity (fair-mindedness,

d e c e n c y : ε π ιε ίκ ε ια , 40.2).

Diodotus, who opposed the atrocity, makes no more appeal to the

finer feelings than C l e o n . That would evidently not have served his

case. He distinguishes justice and interest, and advocates consulting

on ly the latter: this is not a law-court but a political assembly, and the•ole point is how the Mytilenaeans may be best made use of (44.4).

T o take vengeance might be strictlyjust, but would not be in Athenian

interests. C l e o n misjudged when he thought the two coincided in the

present case ( 4 7 . 5 ) . It is the nature of e v e r y o n e , state or individual, to

do wrong, and no law can prevent it. Poverty induces recklessness,

wealth leads to pride and lust for more (45.4). It would be simple-

minded to deny that human nature, once set upon a certain course,will be deterred from it by force o f law or any other threat ( 4 5 . 7 ) .

The Mytilenaeans themselves, in appealing to Sparta for help,

l e e m to know that appeals to justice or pity wi l l not get them far.

T h e y begin ( 3 . 9 . 1 ) by saying that they we l l know what is the rule in

' 3 . 3 7 . 2 . T h e same expressio n is taken off b y Aris top hanes , whe n his chorus o f kni ght s

uongrurulaie Demos {Knights m i ) because

κ α λ ή ν γ ' !χ ε ι ς

α ρ χ ή ν , δ τ ε π ά ν τ ε ς ά ν

θ ρ ω π ο ι δ ε δ ία σ ί σ * ώ σ -

π ε ρ ά ν δ ρ α τ ύ ρ α ν ν ο ν .

Th e Irony of a democracy which behaved like a τ ύ ρ α ν ν ο ς was not something which Aristophanes

w o u l d miss.

4 « 7 OS V



The ^Nomas'—'Physis' Antithesis

88

Gr e e c e when a subject state revolts in a war: the other side accept it in

so far as it is useful to them, but think the worse of it for deserting its

allies. They go on to say (unusually for speakers in Thucydides) that

they wi l l next speak of justice and honesty ( ί ο . i ) , but in fact they say

little about them, and are soon remarking (ι ι . 2) that the only trust

worthy basis for an alliance is an equality of mutual fear.

Other instances of the relation between justice and interest occur in

the speech of the Corinthians at Athens ( 1 . 4 2 . 1 : ' D o not suppose

that though what we say is just, your interest points in another direc

tion, should it come to war') and of the Plataeans to the Spartans after

surrendering (3.56.3). If, they say, you are going to estimate what is

just by the standard of your immediate advantage (χ ρ ή σ ι μ ο ν ), you

wi l l show yourselves no true judges of right (τ ό ο ρ θ ό ν ) but rather

servants of expediency (τ ό ξ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν ).

(b) Thrasymachus in the ''Republic'1

The theme of the Republic is the nature of justice or what is right.

A f te r some preliminary discussion of current definitions ('giving every

man his due', 'benefiting friends and harming f o es ' ) , Thrasymachus

bursts out that they are talking nonsense and, pressed to state his ownopinion, asserts that 'Justice is nothing but the interest o f the stronger'.

Expanding this, he says that, whether a state is ruled by a tyrant, an

aristocracy or a democracy, the ruling powers make laws with a v i e w

to their own benefit. By making these l aw s , they declare that to be

right for their subjects which is beneficial to themselves, and punish

w h o e v e r departs from them as a law-breaker and wrongdoer. Justice

in all states is the same, namely what benefits the established government. Since the government holds the power, justice everywhere is

what benefits the stronger.

In answer to questions from Socrates, Thrasymachus adds that,

although he has said it is just for subjects to obey the laws laid down

b y their rulers, this does not imply that they should obey even if

those in power happen, mistakenly, to ordain what is not in their

interests. L i k e any other expert or craftsman, he claims, a ruler is not,

1

Rep. 1 .3 36 b ft". Th e questi on whet her the acco unt in the Republic represents the views and

character of the historical Thr asy mac hus is not raised here. For that see pp. 296 ff. below.



Thrasymackus

89 4 - 2

strictly speaking, a ruler when he acts ignorantly or mistakenly, but

only when he exercises his skill correctly. It is only then that he w i l l

command what is best for himself, and that the ruled should obey.

Socrates takes advantage of the fact that Thrasymachus has intro

duced the analogy between government and crafts like medicine, and,

borrowing his phrase 'strictly speaking', claims that a craft as such

does not seek its own advantage but that of the subject on which it is

exercised (έ κ ε ίν ω ο υ τ έ χ ν η ε σ τ ί ν , 3 42 D

) 5 which Socrates identifies

as the body in the case of medicine, the horse in the case of horse-

training and so forth. He concludes that the art of government, strictly

conceived, legislates not for the advantage of those who practise it

but for that of its subjects.1

Y o u might as w e l l say, retorts Thrasymachus, that shepherds study

only the well-being of their flocks, whereas, if they keep them healthy

and fatten them up, it is for the ultimate benefit not of the sheep but of

their masters or themselves.2

Similarly justice means serving another

man's good: for the obedient subject it is a ί/wadvantage. Injustice is the

opposite: it rules over the genuinely3 simple and just, who act for its

benefit because it is the stronger. The just man always comes offworse than the unjust, both in private transactions and in his relations

with the state (tax-paying, selfless service, incorruptibility). The

advantage of injustice is best seen in its extreme and most successful

form. When a tyrant has seized power he robs, plunders, and tramples

on all that is sacred, but instead of being punished like the small-scale

transgressor, he is congratulated and called happy by the people he

has enslaved. Thus injustice is shown to be stronger, freer and more1

Joseph (A. and M. Phil. 24 and 22) notes that Socra tes is rig ht to clai m that the pur pos e

o f »n art as such is no t to benefit its practit ioner , ev en if he earns his l i v i n g by it, but wrong in

i l l uming that the purpose o f all arts is to benefit othe rs on wh o m it is pract ised. A hun ter

exercises his art on game, but not for its benefit, a dancer on his own body, which he may strain

or Injure to reach perfection.

' Cross and W o o z l e y (Comm. on Rep. 4 8 f.) say that, since Socrates's claim abou t go ve rn

ment it deduced from a genera lizatio n based on an imperfect induction , Th ra sy ma ch us attacks it

legitimately by pro duci ng a counter-instance. Bu t it was Thra sym ach us w h o introduced the

not ion o f an art in the strict (tha t is, ideal) sense, to mak e his poi nt that no ruler errs w he n

acting as su ch ; and Socr ates is therefore entitled to retort that the w o r k of a shephe rd, quashepherd, is concerned s o l e l y with the welfare of his flock. Cf . especially 3 4 5 b—c. For a contrary

V i e w see also Kerferd, D.U.J. 1 9 4 7 , 22.

1

ώ ? ά λ η β ώ ς , 3 4 3 c . Cornford strangely translates 'who are called just', and Lee omits the

phrase.



The ''Nomos'—'Physis' Antithesis

90

powerful than justice and the original thesis is proved, that justice is

what benefits the stronger.

A s k e d whether this means that he considers injustice a virtue1

and justice a v i c e , he replies that he would rather call injustice good

policy (or prudence, ε υ β ο υ λ ία ) and justice 'a noble simplicity'.2

Later he calls the just man 'a well-bred simpleton' and the unjust

'sensible and good'. This is a tougher proposition, says Socrates. He

could understand Thrasymachus maintaining that injustice paid in

spite of being discreditable, but evidently he w i l l call it honourable

and good and everything else that is usually associated with justice.

I f s o , they cannot argue on any generally accepted grounds. Moreover,

Thrasymachus now appears to be speaking his own mind and believing

in the truth of what he says. Instead of simply agreeing to this,

Thrasymachus replies ,' What does it matter to you whether I believe

it or not? Just refute the doctrine '—words which acquire significance

in the light of his later behaviour.

Socrates proceeds to do this by several arguments,3 and to determine

Thrasymachus's position it is important to notice the nature of his

responses to them. After the first proof that the just man is good and wise

and the unjust stupid and bad, we have the following exchange (35od):

Th. I don't agree with what you say, and I could reply to it; but if I did,

y ou would accuse me of claptrap. So either let me say what I wish, or if you

prefer, question me, and I'll say 'all right' and nod and shake my head

like someone listening to old wives ' tales.

S. But not against your real opinion.

Th. Y e s , to pleaseyou, sincey o u won't let me speak. What else do y ou want ?4

1

α ρ ε τ ή , usually so translated, but not necessarily hav ing the moral implications usually

attached to 'v ir tu e' . It means the characteristic excellence whi ch enables any creature, organ

or instrument to perfo rm its specific functi on. (See p. 252 be lo w. ) A t 35 3a -b Socra tes speaks

o f the α ρ ε τ ή o f e y e s and ears: even a knife has it if it is w e l l designed and sharp. Immediately

alter this, Thrasymachus agrees with Socrates that he would ca l l the unjust tyrant 'sensible

and good' , using the adjective ( α γ α θ ό ς ) which corresponds to α ρ ε τ ή . N o moral judgment need

be invo lved , thou gh Socrates takes it into the moral sphere b y adding wor ds like κ α λ ό ν and

α ί σ χ ρ ό ν , and Thrasymachus incautiously agrees.

2

Cf. Th uc . 3. 82 .4 o n the wa y wor ds change d their meanin g (p. 84 a b o v e ) . 83.1 provides

a striking parallel to the present p as sa ge : τ ό ε ΰ η θ ε ς , ο ύ τ ό ν ε ν ν α ϊο ν π λ ε ί σ τ ο ν μ ε τ έ χ ε ι, κ α τ α γ ε λ α σ θ έ ν

ή φ α ν ίσ θ η .3

Th e first of whi ch appeared to Joseph ' absol utel y co nv in ci ng ' {A. and M. Phil. 31) and

to Cross and W o o z l e y 'almost embarrassingly bad' {Rep. 52).1

Lee, by turning Socrates 's words μ η δ α μ ώ ς κ τ λ . into positive form ( ' please answer as you

really think'), makes Thrasymachus's reply mean that he w i l l act as Socrates wishes, instead of



Thrasymachus

9 «

S. Nothing. If that's what you are going to do, do it. I'll get on with my

questions.

It follows that neither the immediately preceding argument nor any

thing later can be said to have Thrasymachus's agreement,1

except

3 5 1 c 1-3, where he distinguishes between ' I f you are right' and ' I f

I am right', and Socrates thanks him for it; and the conclusion 'if I am

right' is that a strong state owes its power to injustice. Contrast the

following expressions of Thrasymachus: ' Let it be so,2

since I don't

want to contradict you' (351 d ) ; ' Y o u may enjoy your argument with

out fear: I shan't oppose you for I don't want to offend the company'

(352b); 'So it appears according to your argument' (353 ε ); and his

final words: ' W e l l , this can be your holiday treat.' Socrates, it is clear,

1M pursuing his own train of thought irrespective of whether Thrasy

machus is following him, and Thrasymachus is not committed to

any of it.

In discussing the view here attributed to Thrasymachus the most

recent practice has been to consider all possible alternatives as they

appear to a philosopher today, and by exhaustive examination of the

dialogue endeavour to decide which of them is being maintained

by Thrasymachus.3 Such clarification can be most valuable, yet may

err by neglecting (as it is never wise to do with Plato) the dramatic

iltuation and emotional tension between the speakers, and the fact

that the driving-force behind Thrasymachus is passionate feeling

rather than philosophical inquiry. None of this emerges from a

lummary of the argument, but it is emphasized by Plato at every

Μ lie iwld he would act. Cor nf ord 's 'An yt hi ng to please y o u ' is a little amb igu ous but was

probab ly intended to mean the same. Jow ett and S ho re y ho we ve r translate in the sense g i v e n

a b o v e , which is surely the obvious one. Thrasymachus w i l l not speak his own mind, since he

•annot do so by Socrates 's method of quest ion and answer. Socrates 's ο υ δ έ ν μ ά Δ ί α amounts

Ι α 'Ha ve it your own wa y ' .

' Fo r this reason I cannot ag ree wi th Cr os s and W o o z l e y (Rep. 58) that 'Thrasymachus's

mistake was to hav e agreed wi th Socr ates that justice is the excelle nce o f the so ul ', for he

Immediately withdraws his agreement (35od).

' Ι Σ Τ Ω . Similarly ί σ τ ω at 354a means 'H av e it you r ow n w a y ' rather than Ί grant that ' ( L e e ) .

• Thus Kerferd (D.U.J. 1947, 19) sees them as ( 1) Ethical Nih ilis m, (2) L e g a l i s m , (3) Natural

Ι Ι Ι μ Ι ιι, ( 4 ) P s y c h o l o g i c a l egoism. T o Cross and W o o z l e y (Rep. 29) they present themselves as

( 1 ) Naturalistic Definition, (2) Nihilist V i e w , (3) Incidental Com me nt , and (4) Essential A n a l y s i s ,

hel ere ncr s for the most important earlier discussion s may be found in Ker fer d's article, exce pt

lhal hr makes no mention of Max Sal omo n' s acute analysis in Ztschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung,

l y n .



The 'Nomos'—'Physis' Antithesis

92

turn. Under the stress of powerful emotion, Thrasymachus throws

his challenge into deliberately, bitterly paradoxical form: 'Justice?

It's nothing but the interest of the stronger!' This need not mean

literally what it says, any more than a man does if, appalled at the

success of wickedness and the wretchedness of many good men, he

exc la ims 'There is no justice, justice is non-existent'. What he in fact

means is that there is such a thing as justice and he knows very w e l l

what it is, but in this life he has looked for it in vain. The shock of

the paradox lies in the fact that to every Greek the words justice and

just (dikaion) conveyed an impression of positive moral wort h:

indeed they embraced such a wide field that the conception of dikaion

might almost be said to be co-extensive with that of moral worth.

Since dikaion is a word so strongly charged with moral approval,

it was difficult for any Greek to say openly that he meant by it simply

the interest of the stronger party. The critics of strong-arm tactics in

T h u c y d i d e s usually contrast the two in some such accusation as ' Y o u

fo l low your own interests while pretending to fo l low justice'. Yet,

besides the accusation of putting power before justice (3.39.3), we

actually hear, in a speech of Brasidas, o f ' the justification that lies in

superior power' (ι σ χ ύ ο ς δ ι κ α ι ώ σ ε ι , 4.86.6). In the Melian dialoguethe Athenians accuse the Spartans of identifying justice with their own

interest, but themselves come close to Thrasymachus when they

claim (ch. 105) : 'Wh at we deem just (δ ικ α ιο Ο μ ε ν ) is consistent with

religious bel ief and human purpose: human and divine alike hold to a

l aw , based on natural necessity, that the stronger subdues others.'

Here we have the reversal of values, of which Thucydides speaks in

b o o k3, in all its nakedness, though more often, as he says, the odious

deed was cloaked under a fine phrase. Thrasymachus's purpose, as

I see it,1

is to unmask the hypocrisy and show how the meaning of

justice is being perverted. Men and cities act as if it were just for the

w e a k to be oppressed and the strong to have their way by no other

1

It is necessary to be personal, since this is no w a minor ity vi ew and others have much to

be said for them. Those who have in the past taken a vi ew similar to that put forward here

include, amo ng others, Gr ote , Barker, Joseph, Burnet and Tay lo r. Mor e recently Kerferd has

maintained that Thr asy mac hus is preac hing a doctrine of natural right, and Cro ss and Woo/ .l cy

that he hol ds it to be the mora l dut y of the wea ke r to serve the str onger but then cynically

recom mends us not to behave in the wa y in wh ic h we ou gh t to behav e.



Thrasymachus

93

right than their power to do so, while for the most part denying that

this is true and accusing their opponents of acting as if it were.

This is the background against which the interplay of actual and

ideal, 'is' and Ought', in Thrasymachus's assertions must be seen.

It accounts for a certain confusion which strikes a reader at once,though scholars have claimed to resolve it by subtle analysis. Thrasy

machus begins by making, in scorn and anger, a factual statement:

Ί maintain that justice is nothing but the interest of the stronger ',

later narrowed to 'the interest of the established government'. This

could be called either a reversal of current morality—the word

'justice' still conveying approval, but standing for something that

hitherto no one would admit to approving—or a draining away ofmoral content from the word itself: what goes by the name of justice

nowadays has nothing to do with right or wrong; it is simply used to

Hand for the interest of whoever, at a particular moment, holds the

reins of power. All governments make laws in their own interest, and

call that justice. Those are the facts: praise or blame does not enter

into it. One can fill in the rest from Thucydides: it is a matter o f human

nature, of necessity, so that, as Hermocrates said (p. 86 above), the

•trong are not to be blamed for seeking to rule, nor on the other hand

It there anything morally praiseworthy in their action. To keep others

under is simply profitable, and for a ruling power to indulge pity and

humanity is dangerous. This is what Pericles and Cleon, and many

others, were preaching in Thrasymachus's lifetime.

Justice, then, is the interest of the stronger, and the just subject w i l l ,

to his own disadvantage, serve the ruler and obey his l a w s . Later,

however, Thrasymachus says that to judge the advantages of injustice

one should look at it in its most extreme form, that of the tyrant who

has seized power by a combination of force and treachery. Wrong

doers on a small scale are punished and disgraced, but this man is

fawned on and called happy and blessed. Yet 'he robs and plunders,

not on a small scale but wholesale, respecting neither sacred nor pro

fane, public nor private property'. His is 'the complete, the supreme

example of injustice'1

and this, concludes Thrasymachus, proves my

point that injustice is 'stronger, freer and more lordly than justice,

1

344a τ ή υ τ ι λ ι ω τ ά τ η ν ά δ ι κ ί α ν , 344c τ ή ν δ λ η ν ά δ ι κ ί α ν ή δ ι κ η κ ό τ α .



The 'Nomos'—Physis* Antithesis

94

and the interest of the stronger is justice, whereas injustice is the

profit and interest of oneself.

A l l this illustrates the historical fact to which Thucydides is witness,

that in the troubled circumstances of the late fifth century established

moral canons were ignored and men altered the accepted meanings of

moral terms to conform to their actions. Such alteration suits the

rough-and-tumble of politics and war (e.g. the label of cowardice or

weakness fastened on a man who opposes an act of unjustified aggres

s ion) , but can hardly stand up to philosophical examination.1

The

moral associations of the word dikaion—right or justice—are too

strong for its equation with 'the interest of the stronger' to be con

sistently maintained in the face of questioning. It has been argued2

that Thrasymachus is looking at the matter only from the point ofv i e w of the ruled, that for him justice consists in the subject seeking

the interest of the ruler or, as he puts it, 'another man's good' (343c);

and that this rescues him from inconsistency and is indeed the key to

understanding his thesis, which is a form of the doctrine of natural

right. B ut what consistency, it may be asked, is there in contending

that (a) justice is the interest of the ruling power (which Thrasy

machus states simply and without qualification), but (b) it is not just

for the ruler to seek his own interest, i.e. justice ? 3

A l m o s t every commentator has noted the contrast in the discussion

between the ideal and the actual, fact and value, 'is' and Ought', but

there has been disagreement about the places in which one or the other

standard is introduced. In one of the most acute treatments of the

question, M. Salomon noted that the difference between the descriptive

and the normative was still in nuce. We find it obvious, but to maintain

the distinction may not have been so easy for either Plato or the

* Th ou gh I do not agree altogether wit h Bignone 's estimate of Thra symac hus, there is force

in his remark (Studi, 38) about him and C a l l i c l e s : 'But behind these two names one is more

conscious of the politics than of the philo sophy of the t ime. '

* B y Kerf erd in his article in D.U.J.3

Bo th sides o f the thesis are clearly stated by Adi man tu s at 367 c, whe re he speaks of 'a gr ee

ing with Thrasymachus that justice is another man's go od , bei ng the advant age of the stro nger,

and injustice is the advantage and profit of oneself, but the disadvantage of the weaker'. Thus

justice consists in obedience to laws which the ruling power (Thrasymachus's chosen example

o f 'the stronger') has laid down in his own interest, i.e. unjusdy. A more consistent v i e w is

that referred to by Plato in Laws 10 (890a), of those (wh oev er they may be ; not Thr asy mach us

a pp ar ent ly) w h o say ε ίν α ι τ ό δ ικ α ι ά τ α τ ο ν ό τ ι τ ι ς ά ν υ ικ φ piaj optvos.



Thrasymachus

95

historical Thrasymachus. Salomon himself saw Thrasymachus as

engaged in purely descriptive sociology1

down to the place (344 a)

where he comes to a change in the ruling power and characterizes the

man who has successfully overturned the former laws as ' the greatest

criminal'. 'Here Thrasymachus not only explains, he judges': an

attentive reader cannot overlook the scorn and bitterness with which

lie speaks. As he sees life, the greatest possible reversal of values is

going on before his e y e s . The most unjust man becomes the justest;

i.e. people w i l l call him just when once he is in power.2

With this interpretation o f the latter part of Thrasymachus's remarks

w e may agree, but in maintaining that up to then he has simply been

g i v i n g 'sociological information', Salomon ignores the fact that

Thrasymachus himself introduced the concept of the ruler 'in the

strict sense', who is infallible, that is, an ideal, not an actual ruler.

It was this which gave Socrates the opening for his argument that no

practitioner as such, whether of the art of government or anything

else, exercises his art in his own interests. In claiming that Socrates

cannot refute Thrasymachus by speaking of what happens when a

man rules rightly (κ α λ ώ ς , 347a), since Thrasymachus was asking not

how a man legislates when governing rightly but how in fact people do

govern in this world, Salomon invited contradiction, for no govern

ment is in fact infallible. Nevertheless the infallible or ideal ruler is still

for Thrasymachus the one who legislates unerringly in his own interests,

and he did not intend his admission to lead to the moral conclusion in

which the ingenuity of Socrates lands him. His rejection of thealternative offered him by Clitophon (that what he meant by the

Interest of the stronger was what the stronger thinks to be his in-

1

' S t a c , d i e . . . lediglich soziologische Erkenntnisse geben w o l l e n ' (Savigny-Stifi. 1 9 1 1 ,

1 4 ) ) . A clarification o f ideas is unde rtaken, bu t no nor m set up such as, e .g . : ' A c t jus tly , act

according to the law.'

' In this last sentence Sal omo n go es be yo nd the text. In fairness to Ker fer d's expos itio n it

must be said that Th ra sy mac hu s now her e calls the man or party in po we r 'j us t' , or says that

l ie Is so called by others. (They ca l l him 'h ap py ' and 'ble st'. ) Wh at he says is that justice ' is '

their Interest, and the just man is the subject wh o in his simple-heartedness is con ten t to s ub -

nrillnnlc himself and serve that interest. Y e t wh at Sa lom on says wo ul d seem to be onl y a l e g i t i

mate Inference from Thrasymachus's words, and helps to show up the inconsistency in Thrasy-

uidi hint's emot iona lly charge d asse rtions: justice is the interest of the stro nge r (eq uated w it h the

established government), but for the stronger to seek his own interest is unjust. Glaucon in

li U reinforcement of Thrasy machus' s argu ment does say (36 1a) that the perfectl y unjust man

wi l l »re 10 il ill.11 hi- acquires the best reputa tion for justice.



96

terest, whether rightly or wrongly) put him at the mercy of Socrates's

dialectic.1

On the interpretation here put forward Thrasymachus, exasperated

by what he regards as the unreality and childishness of the discussion

so far, bursts out with an angrily paradoxical statement of what he

believes to be the facts of real l i f e : ' There's your vaunted justice for

y o u ! ' He is not prepared to see this somewhat rhetorical statementundergo a Socratic examination, to which he responds with insults

(such as the suggestion that Socrates needs a nurse), outbursts of bad

temper, and an unsuccessful attempt to escape (344 d). In so far as he

represents a doctrine, it is that called by Kerferd ethical nihilism. As

Joseph wrote:

He holds, like Hobbes, that every man acts only with a view to his own

private interest—if he makes laws, as thinking them in his own interest;

if he obeys them, as thinking it is in his own interest rather to obey than to

pay the penalty of disobedience, though the act itself required of him brings

benefit not to him but to the ruler

to which may be added Taylor's remark that

unlike Hobbes, Thrasymachus feels no need to justify the absolutism of the

'sovereign' by appeal to the 'social contract' by which he has been invested

with his sovereign powers; since he does not regard 'r ight ' as having any

meaning, he has not to show that the sovereign has any right to obedience;

1

So Joseph, A. and M. Phil. 18:' Thr asy mac hus ' defence introduces a contrast betwe en the

actual and the ideal which is ultimately fatal to his position.' Cross and W o o z l e y also say (p. 46)

that he 'might have done better to have accepted the suggestion' of Clitophon, though Kerferd

denies this on the hypothesis (not very different from theirs) that Thrasymachus is preaching a

doc tri ne o f the natura l right o f the s tro nger.

Salomon should also have forestalled an objection that norma tive langu age is introdu ced at

339 c and 341 a, wher e Thr as yma ch us agrees that what the ruler decrees is not only 'just' (i.e.

according to Socrates that that man is called just wh o obeys the law) but also τ τ ο ιη τ έ ο ν -rots

α ρ χ ό μ ε ν ο ι ;. T h i s , it might be argued, shows that in Thrasymachus's own v i e w the subject

ought to obey. In reply it might be said: (a) At this stage of thought, and in the absence of

resourc es of vo cab ul ar y for mak in g philo sophi cal distinctions such as are available to twen tie th-

century philosophers, some confusion between descriptive and prescriptive language was

unavoidable and the complete divorce from the wor d δ ίκ α ι ο ν o f any suggestion of obligation

impossible; (b) that the compu lsi on implied by verbal adjectives of this for m was b y no means

e x c l u s i v e l y moral: it could refer to force of circumstances or to what must be done to achieve a

speci f ied aim (what Aristotle was later to c a l l hypo theti cal necess ity : exampl es of this use appear

at 361 c ) .

E . L. Harri son, i n his interesti ng article in Phoenix, 1967, expresses the o pini on that this is

one of the points at whi ch Plato 'mani pula tes' Th rasy mach us, that is, makes the Sophist speak

out of character for the sake of his own artistic design in the Republic.



97

It I» N u d i c i o n t to observe that his power to enfo rce obe die nce is guara ntee d

b y t h e . s i m p l e fact that lie is the sovere ign .

The theory is also, as Grote perceived, essentially different from that of

C'ullicles in the Gorgias, who preaches the right of the stronger to seek

unlimited power and enjoyment for themselves as 'nature's law',

which the strong and powerful not only do fo l low but ought to f o l l o w .1

Final ly , this interpretation of the Platonic Thrasymachus accordswith one of the few pieces of independent testimony about the man

himself. A scholiast to the Phaedrus says that he 'wrote in one of his

o w n speeches something to this effect : The gods do not see what goes

on among men. If they did, they would not neglect the greatest of

human goods, namely justice, yet we see men making no use of it'

(Hermias = Thrasymachus fr. 8 D K) .Z

Here speaks the disillusioned

moralist, who in Plato's dialogue, by his ill-judged, ill-temperedând paradoxical expression of what is essentially the same v i e w lays

himsel f open to the rigours of the Socratic elenchus. In the general

neglect o f justice, the man who tries to practise it can only be described

as a 'noble simpleton' (348c).

(c) Glaucon and Adimantus

After the foregoing episode Glaucon (at the beginning of book 2)complains that Thrasymachus has been too easily put off. He himself

wants to hear Socrates prove his contention, that justice is good both

in itself and for its consequences. He wants an explanation of 'what

justice and injustice are, and what effect each has in and by itself, by its

presence in the soul', irrespective of rewards or other extraneous con

sequences. He wants to hear justice praised for its own sake, but in

order to elicit this he must first face Socrates with the case against it in1

Joseph, A. and M. Phil. 1 7 ; T a y l o r , Plato, 268; Grote, History, ch. 67,1888 ed. v o l . v n , p. 72.

Similar to Grote's is the more recent statement of J. P. Maguire, Yale Class. Stud. 1947, p. 1 64 :

' Unlike Callicles, neither Thrasymachus nor Glauco admits the existence o f a natural right at

all. ' For Popper both Thrasymachus and Callicles are 'ethical nihilists' {Open Soc. 1 , 1 1 6 ) .1

Similarly Adimantus, a little later in the Republic (365 d), represents the young as saying,

' W h y should we bother about the gods, since they either don ' t exist or don ' t take any notice of

human affai rs?' I t is difficult to detec t in this statement of Thrasymachus the O bv io us

exaggeration' and 'manifest hyperbole ' which made H. Gomperz th ink it impossible to take it

seriously, so that it must be assigned to a T r a t y v i o v or agonistic speech (S. u. Rh. 50).

3

Thrasymachus's fiery temper is also independently attested, Arist. Rhet. 1400 b 1 9 . For

our know le dg e of the historical Thra sym ach us see further pp. 2946°. below.

http://jiauam/




its full strength, putting before him all that 'people say' about its

origin and nature.

They say that to do wrong is in itself desirable, but to suffer it is not,

and the harm of suffering injury outweighs the advantage of doing it.

Experience has proved the difficulty of seizing the fruits o f wrongdoingand escaping the harm, so, as a compromise, men made laws and

agreements binding themselves to do neither. What these prescribed

they called lawful and just. This is the origin and nature of justice,

and it is valued not as good in i t se l f but through lack o f the power to do

wrong with impunity.1

A man capable of practising injustice with

consistent success would be mad to allow himself to be bound by such

pacts. Imagine a man endowed with the fabled ring of G y g e s , which

by conferring invisibility on the wearer at his pleasure enabled him to

escape the consequences of his acts. It would completely obliterate the

distinction between the good and the wicked, for no one could resist

the temptation to steal, commit adultery, and indulge in every sort of

profitable or pleasurable wickedness. Goodness, or justice, is never

practised from choice, but only from necessity, under the fear of

suffering injury oneself.

Thus what matters is not in fact to be, but to appear, just. T o

compare the lives of the just and unjust man, we must look at them in

their pure form, each perfect in his way. The one who has perfected

his wickedness w i l l obviously not be caught—that would brand him as

a botcher—but w i l l go through life with an untarnished reputation for

integrity. Conversely the perfectly just man must not have the credit

for his virtue: that would bring him honour and riches, and one could

never be sure that he was not virtuous for the sake of these perquisitesrather than of virtue itself. His virtue must be tested by suffering

throughout life an undeserved reputation for wickedness. It is not hard

to predict the fate of the two men. The perfectly just w i l l be taught by

prison, torture and execution that he has chosen the wrong path, while

the perfectly unjust w i l l be blessed with wealth, friends and prosperity

o f every kind, and even enjoy the favour of the gods through being

able to offer them the most lavish sacrifices.

1

For a comparison with Hobbes see Bignone, Stud!, 41 f., espec iall y the quo ta ti on fro m

De cive 1 .2 : 'Statu endum igitur est orig inem magnaru m et diuturnarum societatum non a

mutua hominum benevolentia sed a mutuo metu exstitisse.'

98



Nature and Necessity

Here Adimantus joins in to add that Glaucon's case is only streng

thened by the arguments of those who counsel justice, since they

commend it not for its own sake but only for the reputation and

rewards that it brings—honour from men and blessings from heaven

in this world and the next—and deprecate injustice as leading to punish

ment and misery, including posthumous torments in Hades. Everyone

pays lip-service to justice as a fine thing, but they add that it is hard and

laborious, whereas self-indulgence and injustice are easy to practise

and only apparently and by convention (nomos) disgraceful. Even the

g o d s g ive a miserable life to many just men, and can be swayed by

lacrifices, rites and incantations into condoning, and even assisting,

t h e injuries inflicted by the wicked.

These v i e w s are offered as those of the ordinary run of mankind.

W c should not therefore expect to find any heroic Calliclean advocacy

of the powerful and unscrupulous superman, nor do we. Instead we

have a rather sordid mixture of greed, envy, pettiness and fear. Every

one would take an unjust advantage of his fe l lows if he could, but,

l l iough to l ive justly is an evil , it is a necessary one. True, the only

important thing is to appear just, but, since the ring of G y g e s is only afairy-tale, this involves keeping on the whole within the bounds of

la w and conventional morality. The 'perfectly unjust man' is an un

attainable ideal.

(d) Nature and necessity

Self-interest, says Glaucon (359c), is what every nature (physis)

naturally pursues as a good, though law or convention (nomos) con-

itrairis it to diverge into respect for equality. This is the kind of realism0 Γ fact-facing which we meet in Thucydides, in the often-repeated

itatcment that it is human nature to do wrong and dominate others

wherever possible,1

and in the Sophist Gorgias (He/. 6, DK, 1 1 , 290) :

Mt is not in nature for the strong to be thwarted by the weaker, but

for the weaker to be ruled and led by the stronger, for the strong to

lead and the weak to f o l low . ' The factual or amoral character of the

current attitude to human behaviour is emphasized when, as often, we1

Κ .μ ;. 4. f>i. 5 π έ φ υ κ ε γ α ρ τ ό ά ν θ ρ ώ π ε ι ο ν δ ι α π α ν τ ό ς α ρ χ ε ι ν ; 3· 45 ·3 ιτ ε φ ύ κ α σ ί τ ε ά π α ν τ ε ς . . .

Λ ΐ ι ι ι ρ ' ΐ ά ν ι ι ν (ι- | ' . ιΐιο Π : Ι Ι ·Π :Ι Ι Ι :Ι : in §7 <° Λ α ν θ ρ ω π ε ί α φ ύ σ ι ς ) ; 3 · 3 9 · 5 π έ φ υ κ ε . . . ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ς τ ό μ έ ν

e»(Mit«Uow ύ ι η ρ φ ρ ο ν ι ΐ ν τ ό be μ ή v m t l K o v Θ α υ μ ά 3ε ιν ; 1 . 7 Ο . 3 , χ ρ η σ ά μ ε ν ο ι τ ή α ν θ ρ ω π ε ί α φ ύ σ ε ι ώ σ τ ε

I il |>ujv α ρ χ ι ι ν .

9 9




IOO

find nature coupled with the idea of necessity. In the Melian dialogue

(Thuc. 5.105.2) the Athenians claim that the rule of the stronger

occurs 'b y natural necessity' (ύ τ τ ό φ ύ σ ε ω ς ά ν ο τ /κ α ία ς ), and this and

similar phrases are a reminder of the influence on ethics of the natural

science of the day. Necessity (ananke) as a cosmological force runs

right through Presocratic thought, in the Western tradition (Parmen-

ides , Empedocles, the Pythagoreans) with almost mystical or theo

log ica l overtones, but in Ionian rationalism, which reached its

culmination in Leucippus and Democritus, appearing as a mindless

natural force equated with the chance collisions of the atoms and the

cosmic vortices which they form.1

T w o passages in the Clouds of

Aristophanes parody the jargon of the scientists and illustrate the way

in which it was transferred to human life as a justification for im

morality. Ananke fills the clouds with moisture and governs the

motions by which they collide and cause thunder; and the author of

this necessity is no longer a personal Zeus but 'the celestial whirl'

{Clouds 376ff . ) . Later in the play ( 1 0 7 5 ) the Unjust Argument speaks

o f 'the necessities of nature' with reference to adultery, and calls

shamelessness and self-indulgence 'exercising one's nature'. Demo

critus himsel f made the transfer to human life in a less provocative waywhen he said (fr. 278) that the begetting of children is looked upon as

one of the necessities arising from nature.2

T h i s association of necessity with nature is used as an argument by

the opponents of nomos, which they represent as an attempt to thwart

natural forces that is rightly doomed to failure. Thus in Antiphon we

read, in a passage setting forth the advantages of breaking the law if

one can escape detection, that the dictates of law are artificially imposed by human agreement, whereas those of nature are necessary

just because they have grown up naturally; and in emphasizing our

common humanity against the artificiality of racial distinctions he

speaks of breathing and eating as activities which are 'naturally

necessary to all men'.3 In a fragment of Euripides 'the necessary'

* See vol . π , 415.

* References in the Hippocrat ic writers to the φ ύ σ ι; ά ν θ ρ ώ -irou no doubt also helped in the

transfer of the wo rd from the constitut ion of the universe to the nature of man, th ou gh they

used it in a physiological rather than an ethical sense. For more on this topic see vol. 11, 3 5 1 - 3 .3

Antiphon, fr. 44 A , co l. 1, 23fT. ( D K 11, 346f.) and 44 B , col. 2, 15f t ' . (it. p. 353). These

are dealt wi th fully on pp. 107 ff. be lo w.



Might is Right

l imp ly replaces physis as the contrary of nomos.1

The conclusion to be

drawn is that since the laws of nature are inexorable, and apply to

humanity no less than to the world at large, men w i l l inevitably

fol low them unless prevented by the intervention of nomos. For some,

like Thucydides and (if I am right) Thrasymachus, this was simply afact which had to be accepted. Others drew the positive and practical

conclusion that to contravene 'nature's l a w s ' must inevitably be harm

ful, and they ought to be actively followed whenever possible.2

(4) T H E U P H O L D E R S O F ' P H Y S I S '

Those who attacked nomos as an unjustified curb on the operations o f

physis did so from two quite different points of v i e w , which may be

called the selfish or individualistic and the humanitarian.

(a) Selfish

Side by side with those who saw in history proof of the fact that it

Was human nature for both states and individuals to behave selfishly

and tyrannically, if g i v e n the chance, were those to whom this seemed

not only inevitable but right and proper. For them the tyrant was not

on ly an inescapable fact but an ideal.

(I) Callicles: 'physis' as the right of the stronger. The outstanding ex

position of this ethic is that presented by Plato in his Gorgias under the

nime of Call ic les , and summarized in the Laws in the words (890 a ) :

These views are held by men who in the eyes of the young appear wise,

both prose-writers and poets, who say that the height of justice is a conquest won by force.3

Hence young men fall into irreligion, as if there were

' Fr. 433 Nauck, Ε γ ω γ ε φ η μ ί κ α ΐ ν ό μ ο ν ye μ ή σ έ β ε ιν

{ ν τ ο ί σ ι S E I V O I S τ ώ ν α ν α γ κ α ί ω ν τ τ λ έ ο ν .

T h e quotation is from the earlier Hippolytus, and whoever speaks the words (see on this

Helnlmunn, N. u. Ph. 126, n. 5), the y no do ub t refer to Phaedra 's gu il ty passion, so that τ ά

i v e r y w i t a correspond to the φ ύ σ ε ω ς ά ν ά γ κ α ι o f Clouds 1075.

' Cf. Heinimann, N. u. Ph. 1 2 5 f. (t ho ug h I canno t agr ee whe n he says (126 , n. 4) that the

Use of α ν ά γ κ η as a cosmogonical force by Leucippus and Democritus is irrelevant to its employ

ment by the Sophists). It should be noted that 'necessary' can be applied quite differently to

hoxiiu Itself, the compulsion imposed by law and convention. This, says Glaucon in the Republic,

Is submit ted to by most men as necessary, but not accepted as good (from the point o f vi ew of the

Individual's self-interest). The compulsion of nature is absolute, that o f nomos contingent.

' These, then, are men of a different stamp from Thr as ymachu s, for w h o m ty ranny was

f| ΐ ι λ ι ω τ ά τ η α δ ικ ία and the tyrant τ η ν δ λ η ν ά δ ικ ία ν ή δ ικ η κ ώ $ (p. 94>η

· 3> ab ov e) .

Ι Ο Ι



The Nomos'—Physis' Antithesis

I02

no gods such as the law enjoins us to believe in. Hence, too, outbreaks of

civil discord as men are attracted to the 'right life according to nature',

which plainly expressed means a life of domination over one's fellows

and refusal to serve others as law and custom (nomos) demand.

Cal l ic les is a somewhat mysterious figure, for apart from hisappearance as a character in Plato's dialogue he has left no trace in

recorded history. Yet he is described with an amount of authentic

detail which makes it difficult to believe that he is fictitious. Probably

he existed, and was known to have held v i e w s of the kind which Plato

ascribes to him, though, in his anxiety to present in all its brutality

the case that he wishes to demolish, Plato may w e l l have taken elements

from different sources and built up in the person of Cal l ic les a some

what stylized presentation of the doctrine 'might is right' in its most

extreme form.1

He is a wealthy and aristocratic young man, just entering

on public life ( 5 1 5 a), and, though acting as host to G o r g i a s , no Sophist

himself. He dismisses those ' who profess to educate men in arete'z

as a worthless lot, and would certainly blush as hotly as young

Hippocrates in the Protagoras at the thought of joining their profession.

His aristocratic and oligarchic connexions are indicated by his liaison

with Demos,3 the son of Plato's stepfather Pyrilampes, and friendship

with Andron, who was one of the Four Hundred set up in the

oligarchic revolution o f 4 1 1 , 4 and his pride in his descent is mentioned

at 5i2d.

1

B y 'authentic detail' I mean that he is assigne d to a real deme and gi ve n historical characters

as his friends and acquaintances. Three v i e w s are possible and have been held: (i) he is purely

fictitious, (2) the nam e is a mask for a we ll -k no wn character like Critia s or A l c i b i a d e s , (3) he is

a historical figure. The last is the most probable. See Dodds, Gorgias, ιζ ί., and for various

opinions also Untersteiner, Sophists, 344, n. 40. Dodds conjectures that a man 'so ambitiousand so dangerously frank* may w e l l have lost his l i fe in the troubled years at the end of the

fifth century, before he had time to make his mark on history.

* 520a. G or gi as himself, th ou gh certainl y to be classed as a Soph ist (p. 39, n. 1, ab ov e) ,

laughed, it was said, at those who made this profession (Meno 95 c). C a l l i c l e s may have been

think ing especially o f Prot agor as, wh o emphatically did so, and who se moderation and respect

f o r nomos would not have commended themselves to him.3

Most Greek names have a transparent meanin g, and they can be ver y puzzling . So me seem

too appropriate to be true, e.g. Thras y-m ach us of a hot-te mpered character (cf. Ar . Rhet.

1400b 1 9 ) , Aristo- teles of a teleological philoso pher, De mo- sth ene s of the most famous orator

o f his day, Dio-peithes of an atheist-hunter. Why, on the other hand, should a man of ancient

and nob le family call his son D em os ?4

Possibly also b y his championship o f φ ύ σ ις itself. Dod ds remarks (Gorgias, p. 13) that

'praise of φ ύ σ ις is usually associated with an aristocratic bias, from Pindar omvaida ', but the

situation was perhaps rather more com plex. See ch. χ belo w.



Callicles

Call icles takes up the argument with Socrates after the discom

fiture o f Gorgias's young and impetuous pupil Polus, who had tried

to maintain the same thesis as Thrasymachus, that 'many achieve

happiness through injustice' (47od). Like Thrasymachus also Polus

chose tyrants (Archelaus of Macedon, the Great K i n g of Persia) as hisexamples : they are without doubt evil-doers (ά δ ικ ο ι, 4 7 1 a ) , but if

I he wicked can escape punishment they are prosperous and happy. By

call ing them wicked, as Call icles points out, he has played into

Socrates's hands, for he has enough conventional morality left in him

to agree that, whereas wickedness is a good thing for the wicked man,

It is nevertheless dishonourable and blameworthy. Nonsense, says

Callicles. Polus was wrong to grant Socrates his contention that tocommit injustice was more blameworthy than to suffer it. That is the

conventional v i e w , but to put it forward as the true one is vulgar and

mean. Nature and convention are generally in opposition, so that, if a

mail is prevented by shame from saying what he thinks, he is compelled

to contradict himself. Those who establish the conventions and make

the l a w s 1

are 'the weaker, that is, the majority'. It is they who say

that self-advancement is disgraceful and unjust, and equate injusticewith the wish to have more than others. Nature says it is just for the

better to have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the

less powerful.2

W e may note here the formal contradiction of Thrasymachus, who

laid that those who make the laws are the stronger party, whether

tyrant, oligarchy or democracy (Rep. 338c). Adimantus came nearer

to Call icles when he argued that it is the weak who uphold justice (inthe conventional sense of course) and censure injustice, not through

convic t ion but because of their own impotence, and that the disgrace

attached to injustice is only a matter o f nomos. But both of these would

earn Callicles's censure, as Polus did, for using justice and injustice

1

ol TOOS vouous τ ι θ έ μ ε ν ο ι . It must be remembered that C a l l i c l e s is using the word nomos for

bulb conventi onal beha viour and p osit ive law. See pp. 56 f. ab ove.

* (At 488b-d, C a l l i c l e s s a y s he is using β ε λ τ ί ω ν , κ ρ ε ί τ τ ω ν and Ι σ χ υ ρ ό τ ε ρ ο ;—bett er, super io r

mill wronger—as synonymous.) This sentence and the next (483 c—d) show c l e a r l y the influence11I < iu l l i i l c s ' s association with Gor gias (if indeed at this point he is more t han a mout hpiece

l l l i i u i g l i which Plato is repro ducing the uns crup ulous rhetoric of Gor gias himse lf) . Cf. Gorg.

thi f t nirpuK* γ ά ρ oO τ ό κ ρ ι ί σ σ ο ν υ π ό τ ο ΰ ή σ σ ο ν ο ς κ ω λ Ο ε σ θ α ι α λ λ ά τ ό ή σ σ ο ν Ο π ό τ ο ΰ κ ρ ε ίσ σ ο ν ο ς

Α |ιχ ιυ Ο α ι κ υ ΐ α γ * σ ϋ α ι ,

\Ο Τ ,



The 'Nomos'1

—Physis' Antithesis

Ι Ο 4

in their conventional senses.1

Many things, he continues, point to the

fact that the criterion of justice is for the stronger to get the better

o f the weaker, for example the behaviour of animals and of men

co l lec t ive ly as states and races. Darius and Xerxes in invading other

people's territory were acting according to the nature of justice—

according to law too , if you mean the law of nature, though not

according to the laws we men lay down. In this first appearance of the

phrase 'l aw of nature ', it is used as a deliberate paradox, and of course

in neither of its later senses, neither the lex naturae which has had a

long history in ethical and legal theory from the Stoics and Cicero

down to modern times nor the scientists' laws of nature which are

'simply observed uniformities'.2

But it epitomized an attitude current

already in the late fifth century, and the Athenians in Thucydides's

Melian dialogue came close to it even verbally, when they put forward

the principle that he should rule who can as a matter of 'natural

necessity' and at the same time an eternal law.3 The bestial criterion

o f natural behaviour (taking the animals as models) was also known

in the fifth century. Herodotus in quoting an instance expressly

excludes the Greeks (2.64), but it is parodied more than once in

Aristophanes {Clouds 14271!*., Birds 7 5 3 f f . ) . 4

Our unnatural laws, Cal l ic les goes on, mould our best men from

their youth up, teaching them that equality is fine and just, but, if a

character naturally strong enough were to arise, like a young lion he

would shake off these fetters, break his cage and turn master instead

o f slave. Then nature's justice would shine forth in all its glory.

Socrates tries to make him retreat at least to the position of the Platonic

Thrasymachus by pointing out that in a democracy, since 'the ma ny'make and enforce the l a w s , they are the stronger and better element

(Ca l l i c les having equated these two epithets himself), and therefore

on Callicles's argument what they decree is naturally right; but it is

1

Thrasymachus, we may remember, would not admit that he deemed injustice not only

profitable but also hono urab le and virt uous (p. 90 abo ve ). T h e ver y different v i e w s of someone

w h o wa s prepared t o apply the wo rd 'j us t' to what the wo rl d consi ders unjust ma y be so me

additional evidence that his avoidance of committal was deliberate.2

See Do dd s' s note on Gorgias 48363.3

Th uc . 5.10 5. 2, p. 86 abov e.4

Her e also the natural philosop hers may hav e made a contrib ution. Co mpa re D emo cri tus 's

theory that men learned certain arts by imitation of the beasts (vol. 1 1 , 474) .



Callicles and Socrates

the many who insist that justice means equal rights for all and to

Inflict injury is more dishonourable than to suffer it, therefore all this

must be right according to nature and not only to nomos.

Call icles replies in a burst of anger that Socrates is talking nonsense

and tripping him up over words. When he said that the stronger werethe better he meant better—naturally better men (492 a ) , not a non

descript and slavish rabble. Invited by Socrates to amend his statement

o f who should be master and get their own way he says he means

the better and wiser, that is, those who display courage, and good

practical sense in regard to the affairs of the state ( 4 9 1 c ) . Such men

should rule, and it is just that the rulers should be better off than the

rest. The idea that they should 'rule themselves', that is, display self-

control, is ridiculous. Natural goodness and justice decree that the

mun who would l ive rightly must not check his desires but let them

g r o w as great as possible, and by his courage1

and practical sense be

capable of gratifying them to the full. The common run of men

condemn this indulgence only out of shame at their own incapacity for

It. For a man with power over others nothing could be worse or more

disgraceful than self-control and respect for the l aws , arguments and

reproaches of others. The truth is this: luxury, wantonness and freedom

from restraint, if backed by strength, constitute excellence {arete) and

happiness; all the rest is fine talk, human agreements contrary to nature,

Worthless nonsense. W e need not for the present concern ourselves

with the rest of the discussion, in which Socrates first gets Cal l ic les

to agree that his doctrine is the extreme hedonism which actually

Identifies pleasure and the good, then drives him from his position by

•l lock tactics until he makes a shameless volte-face and says he has

Hot been in earnest: of course he believes that some pleasures are good

ind others bad.

1 lere then at last is the championship o f physis against nomos in its

extreme form, fervently and eloquently preached. There is such a

thing as natural justice, and it consists simply in this, that the strong

1

In 1 lie sense given to α ν δ ρ ε ία here Plato is again intro duci ng an idea that was already

Wi lr nt in the fifth centu ry. C f. Ti me . 3 . 8 2 . 4 τ ό λ μ α μ έ ν yap α λ ό γ ι σ τ ο ; α ν δ ρ ε ία φ ι λ έ τ α ι ρ ο ;

Ι ν ο μ Ι υ ϋ η , . . τ ό δ έ σ ώ φ ρ ο ν τ ο ΰ ά ν α ν δ ρ ο υ π ρ ό σ χ η μ α , a nd the wo rds o f Eteocles in Euripides,

t%wrt. 5»>yf. ώ ν α ν δ ρ ία yap τ ό π λ έ ο ν δ σ τ ι ; ά π ο λ έ σ α ; τ ο ΰ λ α σ σ ο ν έ λ α β ε . It is referred to again by

l*l**lo ut JU/>. j oo d σ ω φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η ν δ έ ά ν α ν δ ρ ία ν κ α λ ο ύ ν τ ε ;.

i o5




man should l i ve to the utmost of his powers and g ive free play to his

desires. Might is right, and nature intends him to get all he wants.

E xi s t i n g human nomoi are utterly unnatural, because they represent

the attempt of the weak and worthless many to thwart the purpose of

nature that the strong man should prevail. The truly just man is not

the democrat, nor the constitutional monarch, but the ruthless tyrant.

T h i s is the morality against which Plato resolutely and undeviatingly

set his face, from the time when as an eager young fo l lower of Socrates

he learned from him that 'no man voluntarily does wrong' (in the

ordinary sense) to the end of his life when he opposed it once again

in the Laws and, since its roots were in the natural science of the time,

turned cosmogonist himself in the Timaeus to undermine its deepestfoundations. It is necessary to emphasize this because there is a

curious theory that Plato felt a secret sympathy for Cal l ic les , who

stood for something deeply implanted in his own nature, which

perhaps only his acquaintance with Socrates had repressed. Cal l ic les

is 'a portrait of Plato's rejected sel f . 'Although he is fundamentally

opposed to the v i e w s of Cal l ic les , he states them with the ease and

sympathy of a man who has suppressed them in himself, or has yet

to suppress them', or as G. Rensi put it, 'the conflict Socrates-

Cal l ic les in the Gorgias is not a conflict between two individuals but

one which occurs within a single mind'.1

Dodds agrees with this to

the extent that, because Plato felt ' a certain sympathy' for men of the

Cal l ic lean stamp, his portrait of Call ic les 'not only has warmth and

vi ta l i ty but is tinged with a kind o f regretful affection'.2

One may more

easily associate onese l f with the mild protest of Levinson (Defense of P.

4 7 2 ) that 'it is not sound to identify Plato with those of his characters

1

T h e quotations are from H. Ke lse n as cited by Lev ins on, Defense of P. 47 1, and Highct

and Rensi quoted by Untersteiner, Sophists, 344, n. 40.1

Dodds , Gorgias, 1 3 f. T h e subj ecti ve character o f such jud gme nts m ay be sh own by co m

par ing the impressions made by the same passage on two critics, Do dd s and Jaeger. A t 486 a l>

Dodds sees C a l l i c l e s expre ssin g a sincere conce rn for Socrate s's safety, whereas to Jaeger the

same wo rd s are 'a scarcely conce aled threat of state sanctions against him' (Paideia 11, 140).

Dodds takes at its face value Socrates's praise of C a l l i c l e s at 48 6d -4 87 b as ' the true touchstone' ,

honest and frank, and a man of cul tu re : to Jaeger all this is 'bit ter ir ony '. In contrast to the

' a f f e c t i o n ' in the portrait (wh ic h is indeed difficult to detect), Jaeger spea ks of 't he brutally

menacing tone of C a l l i c l e s ' , whi ch ' s ho ws the seriousness of the situation here, and the irrcc on

c i l a b l e spiritual enm it y bet wee n the protagon ist s o f each si de' (Jhid. 141I. II. Neum ann again

sees Socrates's 'unfeigned affection for his you ng friend' in such expressions as ώ φ ί λ η κ ε φ α λ ή

in 5 1 3 c 2 (Τ Α Ρ Α , 1965, 286, n. 9).

I 0 6



Callicles and Plato

whom he abhors'. It is instructive to compare the tone of the con

versation here with that in the Protagoras, where Socrates is talking

to a man for whom, though he disagrees with him on fundamentals,

lie has a real respect. When Protagoras occasionally, and justifiably,

gets irritated, Socrates relaxes his pressure, and friends of both are at

hand to put things right between them with soothing words. The

criticism is good-humoured, the atmosphere one of friendliness and

tolerance, and the dialogue ends with mutual expressions of esteem.

Here on the other hand is unmistakable bitterness and ill-temper.

Drivel l ing nonsense, mob-oratory, quibbling, small-mindedness,

violence, and the cheap scoring of debating points are some of the

accusations which Cal l ic les hurls at Socrates, and Socrates returns as(j;ood as he gets. P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y considered, all this is no doubt

compatible with the existence of a repressed Call icles in Plato himself,

hut seen in the context of his whole philosophy it appears highly im

probable. Dodds sees even greater significance in 'the powerful and

disturbing eloquence that Plato has bestowed on Ca l l i c l e s ' , but it

ahould be no news to us that Plato was a superb dramatic artist.

T h i s eloquence, adds Dodds, convinced the young Nietzsche, whileSocrates's reasoning left him cold. That is not surprising, but scarcely

relevant. The apostle of the Herrenmoral, the Wille iur Macht and

Umwertung aller Werte did not need much convincing, for he was

blood-brother to Cal l ic les , whereas Socrates became for him, to

quote Dodds again, 'a fountain-head of false mora li ty '.1

(II) Antiphon: 'physis' as enlightened self-interest. W e are not at themoment concerned with the question whether the f o l l o w i n g v i e w s ,

which occur in some papyrus fragments of Antiphon's On Truth, are

hi*own, or whether he is simply setting forth for examinat ion ' different

' D odds , Gorgias, 388. What Nietzsche called the Sophist-culture was for him ' t h i s priceless

BWvenient in the midst of the moral - and ideal-swindle of the Socratic sch oo ls '. ' T h e Sop his ts' ,

h» M i d , 'we re Gr ee ks : whe n Socrates and Plato to ok the side of virtue and justice, they were

JIW« or ( do not k no w what.' N o wond er it wa s Callicl es wh o appealed to him . The se passages

•tit cjiioted on p. 1 4 6 of A . H. J. Knigh t's bo ok , Some aspects of the life and work of Nietzsche,

*«>/ particularly of his connexion with Greek literature and thought, which might perhaps have

ItMii mentioned by Do dd s when , at the begi nnin g of his informative ap pendix on Socrate s,

('•IIU'I™ and Nietzsche (Gorgias, 5 8 7 - 9 1 ) , he says that the link b etween Nie tzsche and Callicles

)>·· received little attention from the expon ents of Niet zsch e. O n pp. I 4 7 f . Knight quotes a

Ιιιιιμ extract from C al lk lc s' s speech in the Gorgias. Sec also Nestle, VMruL, 3 4 1 f.

Ι Ο 7



The *Nomos'—Physis' Antithesis

v i e w s of the just taken from tradition or contemporary polemics'.

T h i s has been argued because they seem to many scholars to contradict

the more conventional morality advocated by Antiphon elsewhere.

Al te r na t ive ly it has been maintained that there is no contradiction,

because the passages that we are about to consider do not reveal theirauthor 'as the immoral foe of nomos and social control, but as its

critic, a realistic but socially minded utilitarian'. The first question

may be left because for the present discussion it is enough that they

represent v i e w s current in the fifth century. Whether or not they are

immoral and hostile to nomos should emerge as we look at them.1

It may seem rather that hostility to nomos is their one constant feature,

w h i c h in practice may lead sometimes to a selfish precept (' ignore

nomos in your personal behaviour if you can avoid being found ou t' ),

sometimes to a large humanity ('the distinction between Greeks and

barbarians is only a matter of nomas').

The f o l l o w in g is a paraphrased version of the papyrus fragments.2

O P 1364 , fr. 1 (Antiphon fr. 44 A D K ) : 3

justice consists in not transgressing

the laws and usages (ν ό μ ιμ α ) of one's state. Therefore the most profit

able means of manipulating4

justice is to respect the laws when witnesses

are present but otherwise to follow the precepts of nature. La ws are

artificial compacts, they lack the inevitability of natural growth. Hence

to break the laws without detection does one no harm, whereas any

attempt to violate the inborn dictates of nature is harmful irrespective

of discovery by others, for the hurt is not merely, as with the law

breaker, a matter of appearance or reputation but of reality. Justice in

1

That the papyrus fragments are throughout discussing the v i e w s of others is arg ued by

K e r fe r d in Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc. 1956—7. That they contain nothing directly hostile to nomos

is the opinion of, among others, Greene (Moira, 240; for similar interpretat ions see ibid. n. 122).

Antiphon himself w i l l be con sider ed in d etail later (pp . 285 ff.) .3

Omi tt in g 1364 fr. 2, whi ch is discussed on p p. i 52 f. T o translate in full Anti ph on' s spate

o f rhetorical antitheses, and his repetitions of a point in different words, would caricature rather

than reprodu ce his style, and tend to obscu re the argume nt. Tole rabl e in Gree k, they can

s c a r c e l y be rendered in anything like natural English. The papyri are translated into English

b y the editors of the OP and into Italian (with textual notes) by Bignone, Studi, 56 ff., 101 ff.3

That OP 1364 is an extract from An ti ph on' s wor k On Truth is fortunately established by

an attested quotation in Harpocration. See OP, xi, 92, or note at bot tom of D K , 1 1 , 346.4

χ ρ ή σ θ α ι . T o call this inconsistent with the advice to f o l l o w nature (Kerferd, toe. cit. 27!'.,

and cf. Havelock, L.T. 269) is surely hypercritical. If not strictly l o g i c a l , it is at least naturaland practical to advise overt conformity so long as one l i v e s in a community governed by law,

on nature's own principle of maximizing one's personal pleasure and comfort and minimizing

pain and inconvenience. Cf. p. 290 below.

108



Antiphon: Follow Nature not Law

Ι Ο 9

the legal sense is for the most part at odds with nature. The laws prescribe

what we should see, hear or do, where we should go, even what we should

desire [one thinks of the tenth commandment], but so far as conformi ty to

nature is concerned what they forbid is as good as what they enjoin.

Li fe and death are both natural, the one beneficial to men, the other

unprofitable. 1 But 'benefi t' as the law understands it is a drag on nature;

in its natural sense it means freedom. Pains do not assist nature more than

pleasures, and what is truly beneficial ought to help, not harm. It cannot be

said that what causes pain is more beneficial than what brings pleasure2

. . .

[gap of seven lines in the pa py ru s] . . . those who, though they defend them

s e l v e s , never take the offensive, those who cherish parents who have treated

them i l l , 3

and those who g i v e their opponents the opportunity to bind them

se lves with an oath while refraining from doing so themselves.4

Many of

these actions are against nature, because they i n v o l v e more pain than pleasure,

and ill treatment when the reverse is possible. If the laws protected such

behaviour and inflicted loss on those w ho did otherwise, it might be wo rt h

while to obey them; but as it is, legal justice is not strong enough for this.

It does not prevent the attack nor the victim's suffering, and when redress

is sought it favours the oppressor as much as the oppressed. A victim must

persuade the court that he has been injured, and his attacker has equal

facilities to deny i t . . .

' Ta ki ng ά τ τ ό as partitive in sense. (See LSJ , s.v. I 6.) Admi tte dly it is more usually under

stood as causative ('results from things be ne fi ci al .. . ' ). Kerferd notes (toe. cit. 31) that evide ntly

not ever ythi ng that is φ ύ σ ε ι is advanta geous, and Antip hon 's norm must be restricted to τ ά

φ ύ σ ε ι ξ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν τ α . ( C f. also He inima nn , N. u. Ph. 137. ) Th is seems mo re r easonable than

S t c n z e l ' s contention (RE Suppl. iv, 36) that all die emphasis is on l i fe , and death is only intro

duced as a 'polar expression' and for the sake of rhetorical antithesis. The argument seems to

be that both nature and la w ma y produ ce harm or go od (even an upho lder o f nature like An ti ph on

could hardly deny the occurrence of natural disasters like earthquakes and floods), but that they

have different standards o f wh at is go od and bad, and natur e's are to be prefe rred.

' A similarly hedonistic doctrine is criticized as Antiphon's in Xen. Mem. 1.6. As Croisetna ys , one can imagine what hav oc Socrates wo ul d make with such imprecise lang uage!

3

Kerferd (loc. cit. 29) s a y s , wi th special reference to this clause, that w ha t is mentione d here

g o e s be yo nd wh at the laws require, and represents therefore a third standard of action distinct

from both nature and the l a w s . But there would be no third standard in Antiphon's mind, for a

• o c i a l l y rec ogni zed du ty like that o f adult sons and daughte rs to suppo rt their parents (on e of

the most deeply rooted of any in Greek society) was a nomos as much as any positively enacted

l a w . (Cf. p. 56 above.)

B i g n o n e , in his atte mpted de mons tra tion that there is a close affinity be tw ee n the d oct rines

o f the two works On Truth and On Concord, both representing a 'philanthropic utilitarianism',

completely ignores this passage. In the whole of his essay in Studi sulpensiero antico there is no

menti on o f this statement that suc h beh avi our as refusing to attack other s except in self-defence,

unci treating undeserving parents w e l l , is inimical to that 'nature' which was Antiphon's ideal.4

f o r the procedu re of oath -tak ing, and the advan tages or disadvanta ges of ado pti ng a parti

cular course, see Arist. Rhct. i 3 7 7 a 8 l T . (the relevance of wh ic h wa s br ou gh t to my notic e by

Mr J. S. Morrison).




I Ι Ο

OP 1797 (still a part of fr. 44 in DK, 11, 353)r1

Justice is believed

to be something good, and to bear true witness about each other is

normally considered just, as well as helpful in human relations. But it

will not be just, if2

the criterion of justice is that one should inflict no

injury on another unless first injured oneself. The witness, even if truthful,

inflicts injury on the man against whom he testifies, though that man hasnot injured him, and may suffer injury in return. At least he will have to be

on his guard against the hatred of the other, whom he has made his enemy.

Thus wrong is involved on both sides, and to call such acts just cannot be

reconciled with the principle that it is just neither to inflict nor to suffer

injury.3

One must conclude that trial, judgment and arbitration are not

just, whatever their outcome, for a decision which benefits one side injures

the other...

These fragments are invaluable as a source for contemporary moral

v iew s , though their incompleteness makes it difficult to say how far

they represent the opinions o f Antiphon himself. One has only to think

what impression we should have of Plato if our knowledge of the

Republic were limited to some fragments of Glaucon's speech (for

example, the sentence at 359c: 'It is natural for every man to pursue

selfish ambition as a good, but nomos seduces us into a respect for

equality') without the explanation that he is temporarily acting as

devi l ' s advocate in order to have the case demolished by Socrates.

Here we are presented with three notions of justice, which have

sometimes been thought to be irreconcilable and so necessarily of

diverse origins.

1

Th er e is no con clu siv e external evid ence for the authorship o f tins fragment, as there is

for the previous one, and it is in a different hand, th ou gh it be lo ng ed to the same find and the

editors suggest (OP, xv, 1 1 9 f.) that the samehand

ma y have added breat hings , accents and marks

o f quantity in both, and that 1 7 9 7 may even be a later part of the same roll as 1 3 6 4 . Its subject

and styl e leave no reasona ble d ou bt of the author, and very little of the work in which it

occurred. Untersteiner (Sophists, 2 6 7 , n. 1 2 7 ) thinks that the fragment came between the two

fragments of 1 3 6 4 , but it is not clear to me how the cosmopolitanism of 1 3 6 4 fr. 2 (for which

see p. 1 5 3 be lo w) 'represents the conclus ion of the theory de velo ped in OP 1 7 9 7 ' . O n the

identification o f the fragmen t see also Bi gn on e, Studi, 9 8 - 1 0 0 .

1

<έτ τε Ιττ ε )ρ Wil amo wit z, Kranz. Dieis and Bigno ne preferred <ε ίττε )ρ as corresponding

better to the space to be filled. ( Th e orig inal editors supplied <κ α ί ya>p. ) Sinclair wro te (Gr. Pol.

Th. 7 2 , n. 1 ) : 'I t mak es all the difference to our kn owl ed ge of Ant iph on' s ow n doctrine wheth er

the missing letters are to be restored ε !ττ ε )ρ o r ίπ ε 1π ε )ρ . ' But either can equally w e l l introduce

the writer 's o wn opini on, and if ε ϊττε ρ is correct I am sure it does so.3

This, it w i l l be remember ed, is what Gl auc on in the Republic ( 3 5 9 a) describes as the ord inar y

man's view of the nature of justice, a compromise solution based on a ' social co mpa ct' : σ ν ν Ο έ σ θ α ι

ά λ λ ή λ ο ις μ ή τ ' ά δ ικ ε ϊυ μ ή τ ' ά δ ι κ ε ϊ σ θ σ ι (ρ . 98 above) .



Antiphon: Three Views of Justice

I I I

i . Conformity to the laws and customs of one's state. These, as in

G l a u c o n ' s account, are belittled as matters of human agreement.

Self-interest demands that a man conform only when he would

otherwise be found out and punished. Law and nature have different

ideals. In nature, life, freedom and pleasures are beneficial, and deathis not, but law enforces things that are painful and imposes artificial

restraints on nature. These are not truly beneficial. In the v i e w out

lined by Glaucon, the accepted virtues should be practised for fear

o f worse, though given the ring of G y g e s no one would or should be

virtuous, but here it is obviously believed that opportunities for

defying nomos undetected do occur and should be seized. This is

supported by a further argument, that the law cannot protect its own.It only acts after the event, and the arrival o f pede Poena claudo is of

small use to a murdered man. Worse than that, the courts in fact

give an equal chance to offender and victim.

The definition of justice here criticized sounds at first exactly like

that quoted with strong approval by Socrates in Xenophon's Memora

bilia ( 4 . 4 . 1 2 - 1 3 ) , namely that 'lawful and just are the same thing'.1

There too laws are admitted to be created simply by the citizens

agreeing on what ought to be done and what not, yet the merits of

this conception of justice are argued for at some length. Corporately,

obedience to the laws makes for unity, strength and happiness, and

for the individual it wins friendship and trust and (in direct contradic

tion to Antiphon) affords the best chance of victory in the courts. All

this applies to positively enacted l aws , but in contrast to Antiphon

Socrates goes on to include the 'unwritten l a w s ' which are o f universal

application and agreed by him and Hippias to be divinely ordained.

These are certainly not Antiphon' s' dictates o f nature', for they include

the duty of honouring one's parents and the requiting of benefits, yet

Socrates claims that obedience to them is profitable and rewarding to

the individual, and (like Antiphon with his decrees of nature) that

unlike human laws they cannot be flouted with impunity (p. 1 1 9 below).

1

Cf. also L y s i a s , 2 . 1 9 ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ι ; π ρ ο σ ή κ ε ι ν ό μ ω ο ρ ίσ α ι τ ό δ ί κ α ιο ν . T he equation o f ν ό μ ιμ α

lind δ ί κ α ι α b y Protagoras (in Plato, Theaet. 1 7 2 a ) is rather differ ent: the la ws o f a ci ty are

β ίκ α ια for that city as lon g as they are in force, but are not necessarily σ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν τ α . Cf. 1 6 7 c , and

pp . 1 3 7 , 1 7 2 below. Bignone (Studi, 7 4 f . ) thought Protagoras was the object of A nti phon 's

criticism.




1 1 2

2 . T o do no injury except in requital for an injury received.

3. Neither to do nor to suffer injury. It has been held1

that these

t w o definitions of justice conflict, and cannot therefore have been

adhered to by the same people. But it cannot have seemed so to A n t i

phon, for the way in which he introduces them at the beginning and

end of his argument that to testify against a man is 'not just' implies

they are identical or c lose ly similar. Complete freedom from wrong

doing, either as doer or sufferer, is the ideal, but it is not in anyone's

power to ensure that no other man wrongs him, so the best practical

expression of justice is never to take the initiative in wrongdoing; and

o b v i o u s l y if this were universally observed the other would f o l l o w :

if no one acted save in self-defence, there would be no attacks to make

self -defence necessary. V e r y probably the third description of justice

w a s in Antiphon's mind equivalent also to the first, since Plato makes

G l a u c o n say that in the general opinion law was ' a mutual agreement

neither to inflict nor to suffer injury '.

The general impression made by these fragments is of a single

writer determined to show up the inadequacy of current conceptions

o f morality. His own consistent standpoint is that a morality enforced

b y law and custom is contrary to nature, and nature's way is to be

preferred. In OP 1364, he claims that to refrain from doing an injury

except in self-defence is against nature, but this does not prevent him

from pointing out in 1797 that, if, like most people, you accept it as a

principle of right action, yo u immediately find yourself in conflict

with another generally accepted principle, that whoever has informa

tion that wi l l cause a criminal to be brought to justice is in duty bound

to produce it.B i g n o n e and Untersteiner both hold that the last definition (' neither

to do nor to suffer injury') is 'the true definition of justice according

to Antiphon'.2

For Untersteiner the state in which injustice is neither

inflicted nor suffered 'corresponds to the highest goal of the spirit',

in support o f w h i c h he refers to Republic 500 c, where not men, but the

objects of the philosopher's contemplation (i.e. the Forms), are said

to be in this state. It might be more apt to compare 359a, where1

B y Big non e and U ntersteiner. See the latter's Sof. iv, 100 and Soph. 251.1

Reference as in previous note.



Antiphon: Euripides

1 1 3

'neither to inflict nor to suffer injustice' is the compact entered into

b y ordinary men as a second-best to having their own way individu

al ly. For men, the highest goal of the spirit is surely a conception of

justice not mentioned here at all, namely to do no injury even in return

fo r injury suffered. This brings us to the leve l of Socrates or Jesus,

and Socrates argues for it explicitly more than once, e.g. in the

Republic (335 d, ' Then it is not the part of a just man, Polemarchus,

to harm either his friend or anyone else') and Crito (49b, 'Then we

must not inflict injury for injury, as most people b e l i e v e ' , and c,

'Then one must not use any man unjustly in return, or harm him,

whatever we may suffer at his hands').1

The present fragments offer

no evidence that Antiphon was a moralist o f this calibre. He was clearly

a serious thinker, and much of what he says here can be interpreted

altruistically: the statement that pleasure is more beneficial than pain

might represent a hedonistic utilitarianism o f a universal kind, advocat

ing conduct which w i l l ensure the maximum of pleasure in the world

at large. Elsewhere, however, as when he deprecates refraining from

unprovoked agression as contrary to that 'nature' which is his ideal,

it appears that the hedonism is selfish and individualistic.2

(iii) Other witnesses. The antinomian v i e w is reflected in many

passages of contemporary literature. It is probably in the isolated line

o f Euripides (fr. 920):

' T w a s Nature willed it, who cares nought for law,

and elsewhere in his plays an ostentatious reconciliation of the two

itself bears witness to the existence of the v i e w which he is contradict

i n g . At Ion 642, Ion counts himself happy because both his own nature

and nomos together make him good in the service of A p o l l o , and there

is a similar union of the two at Bacchae 895 f., on which Dodds re-

1

T o appreciate the rev olu tio nar y character of the Socratic ethic, one must remem ber h o w

deeply rooted in Greek morality was the doctrine that 'the doer shall suffer', which made the

exaction of retribution or veng ean ce not on ly a rig ht but often a relig ious dut y. C f. A e s c h . Ag.

15i>3f . , Cho. 144, 306-14, Eur. H.F. η ιη ί. Other passages are quoted by Thomson, Oresteia,

1 1 , 185.

' S o far as An ti ph on is conc erne d these com men ts are o f course made on the assum ption

lli. it the v i e w s in question arc his own. In spite of Bignone's and Kerferd's arguments, this is

mill my impression. Nat ural ly, in dealin g wit h such fragmentary extracts, accidentall y preserve d,

conclusions can only be drawn with caution, and the purpose of the present chapter is only to

n l l o w that such v i e w s were current in the fifth century.

http://lli.it/

http://lli.it/

http://lli.it/



The 'Nomos"—'Physis' Antithesis

marks that 'the chorus anticipate in principle Plato's solution of the

nomos-physis controversy, viz. that when the two terms are properly

understood nomos is seen to be founded upon physis'. It is the poet's

pr iv i lege to pronounce, as an eternal truth, what the philosopher feels

he has to prove by argument.1

The new morality is a favourite butt of Aristophanes, especially in

the Clouds. The Unjust Argument claims ( 1 0 3 9 f.) that he was the first

to bring counter-arguments against the nomoi, and declares self-

control to be an evi l , challenging the Just Argument to name anyone

for whom it did any good (1060 i f . ) . It deprives one of the pleasures

w h i c h make life worth l iv ing , and opposes 'the necessities of nature'.

'Indulging nature' should be the aim, and if caught in wrongdoing

( e .g . adultery) there are always arguments to prove your innocence.

The philosophy here pilloried is that of Cal l ic les , and the argument of

Antiphon is recalled that the law favours the guilty as much as the

innocent. The whole plot of the Clouds turns on the claim of'Socrates'

to teach his pupils how to escape the legal penalties of wrongdoing.

Instructed by him, Pheidippides defends father-beating: it is good ' to

slight the established l a w s ' (1400), and this, though 'nowhere nomos',2

is 'just' ( 1 4 0 5 ) . (It is 'nature's justice' as upheld by Cal l ic les . ) Theauthor of the nomos was only a man like you and me, so why shouldn't

I make a new nomos, that sons may beat their fathers in return for the

beatings they had from them? This is parody, but in Antiphon we

found it maintained in all seriousness that the sacred duty to respect

one's parents was 'against nature'.

Since 'nature' and 'natural necessity' figured so largely in these

antinomian tirades, it is not surprising that, as we have already noted,

3

they owed much to the professed writers ' On Nature', the Presocratic

natural philosophers. Aristophanes caricatures the l og i c of this in

an argument brought by Strepsiades against one of his creditors:

' H o w can you deserve to get your money back if you are so

ignorant of meteorological phenomena?'4

One can hardly do better

1

D o d d s ad lac. 179 . Fo r the nomos-physis contrast cf. also fr. 433 ,qu ote d on p. 1 0 1 , η . 1 above.2

ο ύ δ α μ ο ϋ ν ο μ ΐ3ε τ α ι (1420). C f. Birds 757 f. ε! y a p έ ν θ ά δ ' ε σ τ ίν α ί σ χ ρ ό ν τ ό ν π α τ έ ρ α τ ύ π τ α ν

ν ο μ ω , τ ο ΰ τ ' ε κ ε ί κ α λ ό ν π α ρ " ή μ ϊν .3

Pp . 58 f-, too ab ov e.4

Clouds, 1283. T h e practice o f tak ing the animals as our mod els has already been ment ione d

(p . 104 with n. 4 above), and Aristophanes has the answer to that too. When Pheidippiile-

1 1 4



The Opponents of6

Nomos'

1 1 5

than close this account o f the immoralist champions o f nature against

l a w with Plato's summary o f their arguments in the Laws.1

T h e

greatest and best things in the world are the w o r k o f nature, or chance

(which is the same thing). T h e four elements, and the earth, sun ,

moon and stars which are made o f them, are lifeless matter. M o v i n g inaccordance with their chance-got properties, the elements somehow

came together suitably—hot with cold, d r y with moist, soft with hard

—and combining b y the inevitability o f chance2

generated the wh o le

cosmos and everyth ing in it. Animals, plants and the seasons o f the

year all owe their existence to these causes, namely nature and chance:

no god, intelligence or art ha d an y part in it. Art , o r design (techne),!

came later, a more insignificant force o f purely human origin who se

creations have little substance o r reality in them. T h e on ly arts wo r th

anything are those which, like medicine, agriculture and physical

training, assist the forces o f nature. Political skill has some slight

connexion with nature, but is mostly a matter o f art , and legislation

lias nothing to do with nature at a ll . It is entirely artificial, and its

postulates are untrue.

T h e gods themselves have n o existence in nature, b u t are a product

o f human artifice, and va ry in different places according to local con

ventions. Goodness is one thing in nature and another b y nomos,

and as for justice, nature knows noth ing o f i t . M en are for ever dis

puting about it and altering it , and every change is valid from the

moment it is made, owing its existence to artificial conventions rather

than to nature. It is b y theories like these that agitators incite the y o u n g

just ifies father-beating b y reference to the unfilial habits of cocks, his father retorts: ' I f yo u

want to imitate the cocks, w h y not ea t dirt and roost on a perch? ' (ibid. 1430). It is only fair to

udd that stories of the gods (e.g. Zeus's frequent adultery) could b e equally invoked on the side

of the wicked (ibid. 1080). T h e crudity of popular religion, based on Homer, made i t s ow n

contribution to the growth of irreligious humanism. (Cf. Plato, Laws 886b-d.) This w i l l b e

discussed later (ch. l x below).

' 889aff. Th e first part of the passage is translated in full in vol. I , p. 144.

* κ α τ ά τ ύ χ η ν έ ξ α ν ά γ κ η ς . For the relationship between τ ύ χ η and α ν ά γ κ η , with special

reference to the atomists, see vo l. 1 1 , 4 1 7 - 1 9 . Besides the atomists, the cosmogonical views here

kummarizcd recall in particular Empedocles, frr. 59 and 35, vv. i6f. (vol. n, 203).1

No English word produces exactly the same effect as the Greek techne. ' A r t ' suffers from its

aesthetic associations, and also from the opposition between ' t he ar ts ' and the natural sciences.

Those who know no Greek may be helped by the word itself: its incorporation in ou r ' technical '

iiml ' technology' is not fortuitous. It includes every branch of human or divine (cf. Plato,

,V<I/»/I. 1 6 5 c) sk i l l , or applied intelligence, as opposed to the unaided work of nature.



The ''Nomos'—Physis' Antithesis

I l 6

to irreligion and sedition, urging them to adopt the ' r ight l i f e accord

ing to nature ' , by which they mean a l i f e o f selfish amb iti on instead o f

servi ce to their fel lo w- me n and to law .

I hav e cit ed this pas sage fro m Pla to as the bes t ac cou nt o f the

w a y in wh i ch selfish anti nomi ani sm o f the Cal licl ean ty pe wa s fou nde d

on, or at least appealed for confirmation to, contemporary natural

science. T h e juxtapo sitio n attributed to Arc hel aus ( ' l i vi ng creatures

first aro se from sl ime , and just ice and basenes s exist no t natu rall y

but b y conv en ti on ' , p. 58 ab ov e) was less inc ongr uou s than it sounds.

T h e cosmogonic theories are described in general terms which apply

to mo st o f the Presocratic syste ms. Emp edo cl es and the ato mis ts1

are perhaps most v i v i d l y recalled, bu t the und esig ned m in gl in g o f the

'o pp os it es ' to pr od uc e first the fr am ew or k of the co sm os and then the

creatures with in it is a c o mm o n feature from Anaxi man de r on wa rd s.

T h e general non-theisti c fo undatio ns o f Presocratic science we re

en ou gh for Pla to' s humanisti c op po ne nt s; the y did not trou ble to

discriminate to o nicel y bet wee n them .

It w o u l d be equ al ly mi sg ui de d to lo ok for a singl e aut hor o f the

ethical v i e w s which are Pla to 's c h i e f target. Protagoras, Critias,

Pro dic us, An ti ph on and ev en the you thf ul Ari stot le hav e all had their

cham pio ns, and the var iet y o f names put forw ard b y reputable scholars

is sufficient ev id en ce o f the fu tili ty o f the sea rc h.2

Plat o is spea kin g of

b e l i e f s wh i ch , w h e n he wr ot e, had lo n g bee n curr ent in influential and

pro gres siv e At he ni an circles. T h e Sophists had mu ch to do wi th

their promulgation, and were in general agreement with their scientific

premises. T h e selfish ethical con clu sio ns, h ow ev er , wh ic h Plat o fou nd

so sh ock in g, we re , as w e ha ve seen, neither c o m m o n to all the Sophis ts

nor exclus ive to the profes sion.

1

J. Tate (CR, 195 1, 157) objected that since most of Plato's opponents in Laws 10 asserted

that moti on ha d a beg inn ing th ey cannot have been atomists. N ot all, how eve r (895 a 6- 7) .

cf. also England's note on 889 b 5.2

For a summary of the various attempts at identification, see Untersteiner, Sof. iv, i8of. He

himself favour s Antiph on, a vi ew whi ch is criticized by Burk ert in Gott. Gel. Anj. 1964. The

latest discussion of the passage (in date of publication) is Edelstein's in The Idea of Progress

( 1 9 6 7 ) , 27ff.



Law and Justice

1 1 7

(β ) Humanitarian: written and unwritten law

Criticism o f law, and of a legal conception o f justice and right, in

favour o f so-called 'nature' o r ' f reedom', nearly always has tw o sides.

It can be selfish and brutal, as w e have seen it in its Calliclean form,

or o n the other hand it can b e wh ol ly well- intentioned, for in the w o r d s

o f a mo der n aut hor ity w h o describes him self as a 'moral izing anarchist '

(not a ba d description o f An t ip h o n ? ) ,

W e cannot maintain the complacent positive belief that only the law o f the

State is law properly so-called . . . W e know that the law can be used as an

instrument o f policy . . . W e have heard of, w e ma y have met, the victims

o f laws that are oppressive, brutal and degrading. W e believe t h a t . . .

Human Rights m ay stand above positive law.1

Similarly Antisthenes, the pupil o f Gorg ias (p . 306, n . 2, b e l o w ) , w h o

became a devoted fol lower o f Socrates, is said to have held that ' t h e

w i s e ma n in his activity as a citizen w i l l be guided no t b y the established

l a w s bu t b y the law o f arete '?

This altruistic championship o f physis against nomos can have

various applications. It ca n, an d did, g i v e birth to ideas o f equality,

1

A. H . Campbell, ' Obligation and Obedience to L a w ' , in Proc. Brit. Acad, for 1965. Most of

the questions he raises appear in the ethical debate of the fifth century, and it w i l l be interesting

to have them in mind while we are investigating it. He states as his main theme the question:

Ii there a moral obligation to obey every rule of the law, just because it is the l a w ? Among the

questions he asks are these:

1 . C a n security exist without a common morality? (He is argu ing against Lord Devl in' s

negative answer, which w a s also that of Protagoras, p. 66 above.)

2 . If so, does this mean that the existence of a common opinion, which i s what those w h o

advocate it seem to mean b y 'mora l i ty ' (it is one side of what a Greek meant b y nomos), justifies

Itn l e g a l enforcement?

3. Ca n one discover a common stock of ideas of right and wrong, and, if one does, w i l l it be

coterminous with the jurisdiction of a l e g a l system? (In Greek terms, does ν ό μ ι μ ο ν = δ ί κ α ι ο ν . 5 )

And he l a y s it down that:

I . Disapproval of my conduct b y others does not prove that I am wrong, still less that I

deserve criminal punish ment.

I . 'Morali ty ' ( = public opinion, i.e. nomos) ma y be different at different places and times.

He instances the moral values of the West Highlands as compared with those of London, and

the so-called ' n e w morali ty ' of sex, current in the 1960s. (Cf. p. 16 with η . 1 above.)

3. Law may forbid what I think beneficial, and either allow or command what I think wrong.

Campbell's lecture was prompted b y Devlin's on ' T he Enforcement of Morals ' , or iginally inProc. Brit. Acad, for 1959- hi 'he same year that i t appeared, however, Devlin republished his

own with six others, taking into account the criticisms which it had aroused and which he lists

In a bibliography. (The Enforcement of Morals, 1 9 6 5 . )

* D.L. 6 . 1 1 . f o r Antisthenes see pp. 304ft. below.



The 'Nomos'- Physis' Antithesis

I l8

and of cosmo poli tani sm and the unit y o f manki nd. The re were n o w

people (o f w h o m An ti ph on was one, see pp . 152if. be lo w) ready

to declare that distinctions based on race, noble birth, social status

or weal th , and insti tut ions suc h as sl avery, had no basis in nature bu t

w e r e only by nomos. These were revolutionary ideas of incalculable

potency, and deserve to be treated independently. This chapter w i l l con

clude wi th a closer loo k at the con cep t o f ' unwri tte n l a w ' wh ich has been

ment ioned ear lier (pp . 22 f., 5 5 f.) and is an in tegral par t o f the general

relationship between nomos and physis wh ich is our present subj ect .1

It is impracticable and artificial to make a break between the cen

turies, at 400 B . C . or the death o f Socrate s. W h e n the same questi ons

w e r e being raised in the same terms over perhaps a hundred years, we

cannot i gnor e the evid ence o f Ari sto tl e or Demo st hen es any more than

that of Hippias or Euripides. What we are seeing in this period is the

birth o f the concept o f natural law as it was later understood by thinkers

ran gin g from the Stoics to Ro us se au.2

T h e first use o f the actual term

( b y Plato 's C a l l i c l e s , p. 104 ab ov e) wa s perhaps unfortunate, and a

v e r b a l association of 'unwritten l a w s ' with physis only occurs, among

extant sources, in fourth -centu ry authors. Sp eak in g o f the p rop rie ty

o f punis hing deliberate crime but not inv olu nta ry error, Demo st hen es

s a y s (De cor. 275): 'Not only w i l l this be found in the [positive]

l a w s , but nature herself has decreed it in the unwritten laws and

in the hearts o f men. '3 Ari st ot le first equates unwrit ten wi th uni

v e r s a l l a w s , and then calls universal laws 'a cc or di ng to nat ure ' (Rhet.

1368b 7, 1373 b6 , 1375332). Bu t fifth-century supporter s o f the un

wri tt en laws we re the mse lves at the same time on the side o f physis

against the limit ations and errors o f posi tiv e nomoi.S u c h a one was the Sophist Hippias, who according to Plato

(Hipp. Maj. 285d) wa s an authori ty on 'anci ent hist ory in gener al,

and in particular h o w cities we re founded in the early day s ' . In Pla to' s

1

On the 'unwritten l a w s ' i n ge ne ra l see Hi rz el , "Α γ ρ α φ ο ς ν ό μ ο ς ; Cop e, Introd. to A.'s Rhet.,

App. Ε to book 1, pp. 239-44; Ehrenberg, S. and P. ch. 2 and Ap p. 4.1

Cf. Salomon, Savigny-Stift. 19 11 , 12 9f t; the historically important and influential formu

latio n of the concept first appea rs in post-Ar istotel ian times, abo ve all in the Stoa, but the ag e

of the Sophists must be considered first because it was then that questions were first raised in a

sharp and urgent form whi ch concern natu ral la w and prepare the way for its formula tion.3

For Demosthenes cf. also the contrast between writ ten and univer sal law in In Ar'uwa.

6 1 , and the use of ά γ ρ α φ α ν ό μ ι μ α to describe the unwrit ten tradit ions of the Areopagus court

(Ibid. 70 , p. 78 above).



Unwritten Law

Protagoras he praises physis as des tro yer o f the barriers w hi ch nomos

has erected be twe en ma n and man (p. 162 be lo w) , and X e n o p h o n

(Mem. 4.4.14ff.) represents him as questioning the equation of justice

with kee pin g the law, on the gr oun ds that la ws are no mo re than

tempo rary agreements wh ic h cannot be taken seriously because they

are often rejected and amen ded b y the v er y me n w h o ma de the m.

Socrates, ha vi ng count ered this argum ent, g oe s on to ask him whe the r

he k n o w s also o f un wri tt en la ws . He doe s, and designate s the m (like

Aristotle after him) as those which are observed in every country.

Since all w h o obse rve the m cannot poss ibly hav e met, and wo u ld not

speak the same la ngu ag e i f they did, they must ha ve been made b y

the gods. The first examples that occur to him and Socrates are to

worship the gods and honour one's parents.1

Concerning avoidance

o f incest and the dut y to requit e a benefit he is doubt ful , since such

laws are not universally observed,2

but Socrates argues that to say

that a law is some tim es br ok en is no d is pr oo f o f its val idi ty, and

sugge sts a ne w cr ite rio n: transgressio n o f man -ma de l aw s ma y escape

punishmen t, but o f the div ine law s nev er. T h e t w o in ques tion pass

this test (he clai ms) bec ause incest is dy sg en ic and ing rat itu de leads

to loss of friends. It is noticeable that these arguments would apply

equally to a world ruled not by gods but by an impersonal nature, and

indeed Antiphon made the same point about punishment, that for a

transgression of nature 's decr ees it is inevit abl e bu t not for an or di na ry

lawbreaker.3 However, this hardly justifies the surprising conclusion

o f L e v i that ' i t go es with ou t say ing that the unwrit ten law s o f wh ic h

1

This was traditional. See G. Thomson, Oresteia, I , 52, and 1 1 , 270. For universal l a w s as

divine cf. also Eur. fr. 346.* It is wor th rem ind ing ours elve s that Hippi as ma y hav e beli eved in the uni ty of manki nd

( p . 162 b e l o w ) . Incest wa s repu gna nt to the Gre eks, and its practi ce amo ng non -Gre ek

peoples wa s considered evide nce of their bar bari ty. Hermion e intend s a cruel taunt w he n she

reminds And rom ach e of her race, a race amo ng wh om par ents and children , brot her a nd sister

have intercourse, 'and no law prevents it' (Eur. Andr. 1 7 3 - 6 ) . Socrates speaks as if it were only

11 questio n of occasional breaches of a law by in div idu als , but Hipp ias kn ew that th ere wer e

whol e societies whe re such a law did not exist.3

Xen. Mem. 4 .4 .21 ά λ λ α δ ί κ η ν γ έ τ ο ι δ ι δ ό α σ ι ν ol π α ρ α β α ί ν ο ν τ ε ς τ ο υ ς ύ π ό τ ώ ν θ ε ώ ν κ ε ί μ ε ν ο υ ς

ν ό μ ο υ ς , ή ν ο ύ δ ε ν ΐ τ ρ ό π ω δ υ ν α τ ό ν ά ν θ ρ ώ π ω δ ι α φ υ γ ε ΐ ν , ώ σ π ε ρ τ ο υ ς ύ π ' α ν θ ρ ώ π ω ν κ ε ί μ ε ν ο υ ς ν ό μ ο υ ς

Ι ν ι ο ι π α ρ α β α ί ν ο ν τ ε ς δ ι α φ ε ύ γ ο υ σ ι τ ό δ ί κ η ν δ ι δ ό ν α ι, oi μ έ ν λ α ν θ ά ν ο ν τ ε ς ol 6έ β ι α 3 0 μ ε ν ο ι . Cf. Antiphon

fr. 44Α

ιε ο

'·2

>τ α ο υ ν

ν ό μ ιμ α π α ρ α β α ί ν ω ν ε ΐ ά ν λ ά θ η τ ο υ ς ό μ ο λ ο / ή σ α ν τ α ς , κ α ΐ α ί σ χ ύ ν η ς κ α ΐ 3η μ Ι α ς

ά π ή λ λ α κ τ α ι , μ ή λ α θ ώ ν δ ' ο ΰ . τ ώ ν δ έ τ ή φ ύ σ ε ι ξ υ μ φ ύ τ ω ν έ ά ν τ ι π α ρ ά τ ό δ υ ν α τ ό ν β ι ά ^ η τ α ι , ε ά ν τ ε

π ά ν τ α ς α ν θ ρ ώ π ο υ ς λ ά θ η , ο υ δ έ ν ί λ α τ τ ο ν τ ά κ α κ ό ν .

3 Ι Ι9

GS P



The 'Nemos'—Physis' Antithesis

I 2 0

Hipp ias speaks are, because o f their naturalistic, non -re lig iou s sig nifi

cance, utter ly different fro m those ment ion ed b y Sop ho cle s in a f amou s

text of the Antigone, 450 ff. '1

It is admit te dly not clear h o w the denial

o f burial to a bro the r co ul d be said to br in g its o w n pun ish ment in

the natural cou rs e, as (a cc or di ng at least to So crat es) incest and

ing rati tude do , bu t this is also true o f negl ecti ng one's parents, w hi ch

Hipp ias agrees is am o n g the unw rit ten l a w s . Th er e is no reason w h y

he shoul d not have beli eved wh at Xe no p ho n puts into his mou th , that

' t he go d s made these la ws for m e n ' and 'thi s does sug ges t the w o r k of

g o d s , for the idea that law s shou ld contain their o w n punis hment

for thos e w h o dis ob ey the m must, I think, c om e from a better l e g i s

lator than man'. It is not easy for us, with a different theological

tradition, to unders tand the place in Gr ee k th ou gh t o f divi ne po we rs ,

w h o might have personal names and characters or might equally w e l l

be wh at we sho uld class as abst ract ion s: N eces sit y, Persuas ion, Justice.

Fo r ma ny o f their most tho ugh tfu l min ds it wa s a matter of indiffer

ence whether some beneficent force was ascribed to a divinity or

simply to natural proces ses. W e ha ve seen already ho w the same

acco unt of hu ma n pr ogr ess was referred indifferently to the ag en cy of

Pr om et he us or o f necessity , exper ienc e and tim e. Hippi as thereforew o u l d see no inconsistency in contrasting positive with divine l a w s ,

and at another time saying t h a t ' la w is a tyrant wh i ch often does vio le nce

to nature' (Pla to , Prot. 337d) .a

In the tra gic poets , as is app rop ria te, the unwr it te n law s are un

e q u i v o c a l l y o f divine orig in, the ' unwri tten ordinances o f the g o d s '

in wh os e name Ant i go n e defies the po we r o f K i n g Creon.3 In Sophocles

1

Ad. Levi, Sophia, 1942, 450, n. 13 , quo ted b y Untersteine r, Sof. m , 69. Le vi also followsDiimmler (Ak. 255) and Bignone (Studi, 132 , n. t ) in the curious vi ew that Xenophon has put

much of Hippias's doctrine into the mouth of Socrat es. Dii mml er' s chapter is in parts a rat her

fantastic edifice of hypotheses built on hypotheses.1

For a go od exa mple of the equation of natura l wit h div ine l a w s see Hippocr. De victu 11

( v i , 486 L. ) : Men have l a i d down nomos for themselves but the physis of a l l thi ngs has been ordere d

by the gods. What men have l a i d do wn, be it rig ht or wro ng , is neve r constant, but wh at the

gods have l a i d do wn is rig ht for ever. (On the date of De victu see Kahn, Anaximander,

1 8 9 , n. 2.)

Thi s is not of cour se confined to the ancient wor ld . Loc ke in his second treatise, §1 35 , s a y s

that legis latio n 'm us t b e conformable to the law of nature, i .e. to the w i l l of God of which that

i s a declaration'.3

P. 22 abov e. Leav in g a bo dy u nbu ried is aga in said to flout the l a w s of the gods at Ajax

1 3 4 3 and Eur. Suppl. 19.



Unwritten Law

121 5-2

again , a cho rus o f the Oedipus Tyrannus (863 if.) speaks o f holiness in

wo rd s and deeds 'f or wh i ch laws are appointed on hi gh, br ou gh t to

l i fe in the clear air of heav en , wh os e father is Ol y m pu s alone, for no

mortal man1

begat them, nor w i l l forgetfulness ev er put them to

sleep' . Met aphori cal ly, these unwri tt en law s ma y be said to ha ve b een

'wr it ten b y the g o d s ' , as wh en Ion in Euripides' s play rebukes A p o l l o

for his sin against a mortal woman (440 i f . ) : h o w can it be ri ght for

the go ds , w h o have wri tte n the laws for mortals, th emsel ves to

dis obey the m? In Ae sc hy lu s, respect for parents (cited as one of the

unwritt en l aws in the conv ers ati on betw een Socrates and Hi ppias ) is

described by a chorus as 'wri tten in the statutes (θ ε σ μ ί ο ι ς ) o f Di ke

(Justice) highest in h o n ou r ' .2

In the famous funeral oration (Thuc. 2.37.3) , Pericles, like

Socrates, praises obs erv anc e o f bo th the posi tiv e and the unw ri tt en

l a w s : ' W e Athenians obey the l a w s , especially those w hi ch are

designed for the pro tecti on o f the oppre ssed , and those wh ich are un

written but bri ng ac kn ow le dg ed shame on those w h o brea k them.'3

T h e generally ac kno wl ed ged unwritte n laws were those that enjoined

reverence towards the gods , respect for parents, requi tal o f benefactors,

and also hospi tali ty to strangers. Re li gi ou s du ty is part icul arly in

question in anot her quo tat ion f rom Peri cles repor ted in the speech

against Andoc id es attributed to Lysias (ps eud o-L ys. Or. 6, 10):

Pericles, they say, once advised that in cases of impiety you should invoke

not only the written laws about it but also the unwritten in accordance

1

No special significance should be attached to the use of φ ύ σ ι ς here. Θ ν α τ ά φ ύ σ ι ς avepcov is

•imply a per iphras is for θ ν α τ ό ς ά ν ή ρ . See vol . I I , 352. On this passage see also p. 77 ab ove .

' Suppl. 707, on which George Thomson justly comments that 'written in the statutes ofJ u s t i c e ' is only another way of saying that they are unwritten in the statutes of mortal legislators

(Ortsteia, 11, 270). Cf. the δ ε λ τ ο γ ρ ά φ ο ς φ ρ ή ν of Hades at Eum. 275. Thomson 's long note on

Eum. 269-72 is excel lent , and I owe some of my own references to it. Note only (p. 269) that

In the conversat ion between Socrat es and Hippias it is Hipp ias, not Socrates, wh o argues that

the unwritten l a w s could not have been made by men and must therefore be the work of gods.

' Gomme (Comm. on Thuc. 11, 11 3) mentions as a difference between Sophocles and Peric les

that for the latter the unwritten law was hardly divine. But his audience would certainly believe

It to be divine, and he was speaking in a way that they wou ld understand. For a comparison

between the Antigone and the epitaphios of Pericles, see Ehrenberg, S. and P. 28-44,a r

*d the

criticism of it in Gomme, loc. cit. Another difference between Sophocles and Thucydides, s a y s

( • ι ι ι ιι ι ι κ ' , is that for the former the unwritten law is universal, whereas Thu cyd id es is ' pr ob ab ly '

thinkin g of Greek ν ό μ ιμ α only. To the Greeks this distinction was blu rre d: the same law , en

joining burial of the dead, is called τ ό ν Π α ν ε λ λ ή ν ω ν ν ό μ ο ν and ν ό μ ιμ α θ ε ώ ν in Eur. Supplices

( l i f t and 19) . Th e fact is that up to the fifth century the Greeks l a r g e l y ignored the barbarian

world : ' 1111- wo rl d' was the Greek world and 't he go ds ' were the Greek gods .





Written and Unwritten Law

S e x u a l indulgence in public is an example of the kind of thing which

Plato suggests should be discouraged by 'unwritten law', habituating

the citi zens to a sense of shame, rather than by legal prohibition (Laws

841b); and (like X eno phon ' s Socra tes) he cites incest as a case w he re

such unwritten law is already an adequate deterrent (ibid. 838 a-b).Aristotle attacks the subject with his characteristic zeal for classi

fication. He first, in Rhetoric 1, ch. 10 (1368by), divides law into

particular and univ er sal : 'pa rtic ular ' is the writ ten la w o f an indivi dual

state, 'universal ' embraces everything that is unwri tten b ut agre ed

up on b y all. In ch. 13, however , after the same initial divi sion ( i373b4)

into particular and universal (and an equation o f 'u ni ve rs al ' wi th

'natural' la w) , he proc eed s to div ide the la w o f particular states itselfinto writ ten and unwr it ten. A t this point it shou ld be stated that the

object o f the chap ter is to classify just and unjust act ions. T h e di vi sion

o f the laws is subordin ate to this end , because just and unjust acts

' have been defined relativ ely to tw o kinds o f l a w ' .1

The law of nature

exists because ' there really is a natural and universal right and wrong,

apart from any association or covenant'; and he quotes as examples

A n t i g o n e ' s famous claim and Empedocles fr. 135. There are then

(1374 a 18) tw o kin ds o f righ t and wr on g , the one laid d o w n in wr it in g

and the other not, and the second is again divided into (a) virtue and

v i c e in excess of that which the law takes note of, which are visited

with praise, honours and gifts or reproach and dishonour respectively

( i . e . non-legal reward s and pena lti es; exampl es o f the former are

grat itude for and requit al of benefits and readiness to help friends) ,

(b) acts wh ic h, th ou gh they migh t be the subject of pos it iv e la w, are

omitted b y it o wi n g to the impossibi lity o f all owi ng for eve ry vari ety

o f case within the fr amewo rk o f general ru le s: here wh at is no t wri tt en

is simply a supplement to what is . I t is kn ow n as equity ( τ ό ε π ι ε ι κ έ ς ) .2

1

In the Ethics (ii34bi8ff.) Aristotle argues that there is both a natural and a l e g a l form of

po l i t i c a l justice. Some, he s a y s , hav e doubted the existence of a φ ύ σ ε ι δ ί κ α ι ο ν , because what

i i M .ilural is constant (fire bur ns e verywhe re and a l w a y s ) , whereas τ ά δ ί κ α ι α κ ι ν ο ύ μ ε ν α

Λ ρ Λ ο ι ν . Thes e are the doubts of the sophistic age , ques tioni ng the certainti es of a Sol on or an

A c ' i c h y l u s . Aristot le counter s them by a some what obscure and unsati sfactory argum en t,

i r l l c c t i n g the conflict between Platonist and sophist in his own mind and ending l a m e l y with

the M.ttcment that there is 'only one natural, universal constitution, namely the best'. Barker

an interesting hut probably over -subt le comment ary on this passage in his introduc tion to

( i i e l l i e ' s Nulur.il / .me, WW.

' On die meaning of equit y in Aristotl e see also W. von Leyd en in Philosophy, 1967, 6-8.

1 2 3

http://nulur.il/

http://nulur.il/

http://nulur.il/




particular = written

Rhet. A 1 3 , I373b4ff.

universal — unwritten

Γparticular universal (=natural)

In addition the classification of r ight and wrong actions at 1 3 7 4 3 1 8 can be shown thus:

right and wr on g action s

determined b y written law not set down in writing

e x t r a - l e g a l types of

virtue and vice

1 24

supplementation of

existing law

A passion for reducing everything to classified or tabulated form

is always dangerous, and Aristot le has not escaped its snares. A s

Hirzel pointed o u t ,1

the divisions are inconsistent, and the passages

in ch. 10 and chs. 13-14 probably belong to different discussions.

Y e t , al though there are two kinds o f unwrit ten l aw, they are not

contradictory, and Aristotle held both v i e w s : (a) the nomoi o f a parti

cular community are both written and unwritten, the latter (based on

its customs and traditions) n o t contradicting b u t supplementing the

former ; (b) ' unwr i t ten l a w s ' signifies also the universal, natural laws

as in the Antigone and Demosthenes .

It must be remembered that Aristot le is wri t ing a handbook o f

rhetoric, based o n earlier handbooks. His object is not to see that the

eternal law o f nature prevails, but to show h o w a pleader can j uggle

with the notions o f writ ten and unwrit ten law as w i l l best suit his

case. So in ch. 15 he goes on to s how h o w the theories which he has

expounded may be applied in practice. If the written law is against

him, the advocate must appeal to the universal l aw, insisting on its

greater equity and justice. T h e wor ds o f the juror 's oath, 'according

to m y honest opinion' , mean that he w i l l no t slavishly f o l l o w the

1

Hirzel, "Α γ ρ . ν ό μ . ί ο . Aristotle's classifications can be put in tabular form thu s:

Rhet. A 10, I368b7ff.



Aristotle s Classification of Laws

writt en law . T h e unive rsal law is the law o f equi ty, the un ch an gi ng

law o f nature ,1

whe rea s writ ten l aws are unstable. He w i l l quote the

Antigone, and declare that the written laws do not fulfil the true pur

pos e of la w, and s o on . If on the other hand the wri tte n law supp orts

his case, he w i l l explain that the jur or' s oath is not mean t to ab so lv ehim from f ol lo wi ng the law , but o nl y to save him fro m the guilt o f

perjury if he misunder stands it ; that no one choo ses absolute go od ,

but only the good for himself;2

that not to use the laws is as bad as

not having any; and that it does no t p ay to tr y to be cl eve rer than the

doctor .

These are the tricks that Go rg ia s and his like we re already tea chi ng

their pupils and writing in their technai, and the passage shows howthe g r o wt h o f rheto ric and the pass ion for liti gati on amo ng the

Gre eks contr ibut ed to the unsc rupu lou s subo rdina tion o f ethical

con cep ts to the ex pe di en cy o f the mo me nt . In itself, the doc tri ne o f

unw rit ten la ws , val id at all times and for all men—nomoi which are

rooted in physis and at the same time divine ly orda ined and o f a loft y

moral tone —sta nds for the archaic traditions, bo th philos ophi cal and

popular, which were now being challenged by the new morality.Fo r Hes iod justice rested o n the law o f Ze us , as for Her acli tus all

human laws we re emana tions o f the divine (p. 5 5 abo ve) , and Em pe do -

cles (fr. 135) co ul d spea k o f a la w for all, 'e xt en di ng t hr ou gh the w i de

air and the imme nse ligh t o f he av en '. T h e religi ous ba ck gr ou nd to

this is seen at its bes t in the wor ds o f So lo n at the end o f the se ve nt h

century. What the immortal gods g i v e , no man can escape. Pro spe rit y

based on evi l co nd uc t is inev it ab ly insec ure, for Zeus is guard ian o f the

moral law. Soon or late the blow w i l l f a l l , th oug h Ze us ma y be slow

to pun ish and the sufferers ma y be the offender's ch ildren . It is the ol d

1

Bignone (Studi, 129 , n. 1) sees in these wo rd s a clear reminiscence of Antip hon . It mig ht

•· w e l l be Hippias or others, bu t at least his remark is further evide nce, if that w ere necessary ,

that Aris totle is sim ply repeating notion s alr ead y familiar in the hey da y of the Sophi sts. Hirzel

( ' A y p . vou. 8) finds it difficult t o unders tand ho w Arist otl e coul d sa y here of τ ό ε π ι ε ι κ έ ς that

If ά ιΙ μ ί ν ε ι κ α Ι ο υ δ έ π ο τ ε μ ε τ α β ά λ λ ε ι in vie w of the va ri et y which he has earl ier ascri bed to it. It is

uatnnishing how pr evio us scholars seem to hav e sole mnly analy sed this passage as a se rious

statement of Aristotle's v i e w s , whereas it is one of a pair of contrasting ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ί α ι to be usedη · occasion demands in the interests of victor y in the courts. (S ke mp is an exception, Plato's

Statesman, 198.) On the not ion of ε π ι ε ι κ έ ς see Cope, Introd. to Rhet. 190-3.

1

'Sc. and our written l a w s , which were made for us, may not reach the abstract ideal of

perfection, but they probably suit us better than if they did.' (R hy s Rober ts , Oxf. Tr ans, ad lac.)

I *1

)



The 'Nemos'—Physis* Antithesis

doctrine, whi ch w e see also wo rk ed out in Ae sc hy lu s, that ' the doer

shall suffer', hybris is inevitably followed by ate, do om , under the

author ity of Zeu s w h o 'wa tc he s ov er the end of ev er yt hi ng ' . In a

stri king simile So lo n com pa res the judg men t o f Ze us to a spr ing g ale

w h i c h stirs the sea to its very bottom, ravages the crops on earth and at

the same time sweeps the clouds from the sky so that the sun shines

ou t on ce mo re in all its str eng th.

S e v e r a l scholars have pointed out that in this pass age ' the v en ge an ce

o f Ze us falls wi th the wei gh t and ine vitab ility o f a natural p h e n o m e n o n ' ,

that ' S o l o n gi ve s us our first inti mati on o f the lawf ulne ss o f n a t u r e '1

—

surely an additional reason against supposing that the 'naturalist ic '

unw rit ten la ws o f w h i c h Hipp ias speaks are nece ssari ly different from

those upheld as divine in the Antigone (pp. n o f . above) .

Aris tot le has sh ow n h o w the unwrit ten laws cou ld be in vo ke d b y

an unsc rup ulo us adv oca te in the interests o f a particular case. T he re

was inde ed a da nge r o f their abu se, especi ally w h e n the ideal o f a

be nev ole nt and paternal aristocra cy had gi ve n place to the cr ow ni ng

achievement of Greek poli t ical genius, the polis or city-state, in which

the wr itt en cons tit uti on w as the gua ran tee o f a cit ize n's righ ts and the

bulwark against tyranny or oppression, and the watchword was

isonomia, equality before the law.3

Just as physis could be invoked

either to up ho ld human ita ria n ideals or in the interests o f ag gr es si on

and the ov er th ro w o f constit utional g ov er nm en t, so the idea o f un

writ ten law, wh ic h origina lly emphasized the moral gov er nme nt of

the unive rse, cou ld, in a mor e democ rati c soc iet y, appear s imp ly as

retro grade and a menac e to the ha rd -w on assurance o f hum an rights

that n o w was writ te n into the statute-book. T h e restored dem oc rac y

at the end o f the fifth cen tu ry de cree d that ' the magis tra te sh ou ld in

no case make use o f unwri t ten law' , that the laws shou ld treat all citizens

alike without distinction, and that they must be displayed in public

for all to see (Andocides, De mystt. 85). Theseu s, cond emni ng tyranny

in the Supplices of Euripides (429ff.), says that 'under writ ten laws

1

L e s k y , Hist. Gr. Lit. 125 ; Sn ell , Disc, of Mind, 212. Sol on , says Snell, is using the Hom eri c

typ e of simile, bu t for a ne w purpos e, to expre ss 'n ot so much the indivi dual expl osi ons ol

energy but the necessity which prompts them, not the unique event, but the continuous condi

tio n'. Th is insight 'pla ces him on the threshold o f philoso phy*. On e might compare the cosmic

δ ί κ η of Anaxi mand er. ( Th e passages of Solo n referred to occur in fr. 1 Dichl .)1

O n Ισ ο ν ο μ ί α ;ind democracy see p. 150, n. 2, below.

1 2 6



Importance of Written Laws

justice is meted out impartially to the feeble and the wealthy, the

lesser man o ve rc om es the greater if his cause is ju st '. Th i s happens

' when the demos is master in the la nd '.

T h e difference be tw ee n Sop hoc le s and Euripides here is interes ting.

It would seem that Sophocles in the Antigone is a passionate upho ld er

o f the unwr it ten law, and Euripides of the wr it te n.1

Y e t bo th are

equally opp osi ng the tyrant, and Sophoc les , w h o t oo k his fu l l share of

public duties, wa s no less a cha mpi on o f consti tutional and l egal

safeguards. In the Antigone itself (367 f . ) , the chorus declare that the

amazing inge nuit y o f man w i l l on ly lead to g o o d if he remain wi th in

the framework of the polis and respect the laws of the land,2

and in the

Oedipus at Colonus The seu s rebukes Cr eo n bec aus e, ' hav in g co me to a

c i t y which observes justice and determines nothing without law, you

reject the legitimate authorities' (9i2ff.). W e do not need the w or d

' wr it te n' here to tell us that Soph ocl es is thi nkin g o f posit ive, for mu

lated law as it was und ers tood in the Athens o f his day . Con ve rsel y the

The seu s o f Euripides, in the v er y same play in wh ich he insists on

the need for written l a w s , is asserting the same sacred du ty as An t igon e,

the duty o f bu ryi ng the dead. B y do ing this, he s a y s , I shall prese rve the

common nomos of Greece (526f.), and his mother Aethra accuses

C r c o n of ' f lout ing the nomima o f the g o d s ' (19).

That there is a difference o f mo o d and emphas is be twe en the two

poets no one could deny. It cannot be explained on chronological

grounds,3 yet in a w a y they do stand for tw o gener ati ons, beca use

Euripides was so much more attracted than Soph ocle s to the mod er n,

sophistic currents o f th oug ht . L i k e Protagoras, he knew that there

wore two sides to every question, and he enjoyed as much as Hippias

the 'contest o f w o r d s ' in wh ic h his characters ind ul ge .4

The debate

1

S o Hirzel, "Α γ ρ . ν ο μ . 69-71, in an interesting discussion with which on some points I am

venturing to disagree.1

Pohlenz (Kl. Schr. 11, 352) likens Sophocles to Prot ago ras in his respect for la w as man' s

highest cultural achievement.

' So far as can be judged, the Antigone was produced about 440, the Supplices of Euripides

about 420, and the Oedipus Coloneus posthumously in 401.4

Cf. fr. 1X9 (from the Antiope):

ίκ π α ν τ ό ς α ν τ ι ς π ρ ά γ μ α τ ο ς δ ι σ σ ώ ν λ ό γ ω ν

α γ ώ ν α θ ε ϊ τ ' &ν ε ϊ λ έ γ ε ι ν ε ΐη σ ο φ ό ς ,

l o r Λ μ ι λ λ α ι or Λ γ ώ ν ι ς λ ό γ ω ν see Suppl. 195, 42

7^> Med. 546, Or. 491. On the agonistic

i l l i i l a i l e r ol sophistic sec p. 41 above.

1 2 7




1 2 8

between Theseus and the herald as to whether the dead warriors

shou ld b e buried de ve lops into a set piece on absolute mo na rc hy

versus dem ocr acy . Al t ho ug h it is clear wher e Euripid es's sympath ies

l i e , the herald is no caricature o f a bombas ti c tyran t' s min ion, bu t an

accomplished sophist and or ator . M y city , he s a y s , has no use formob -rule. N o one can sw ay it this w a y or that b y pl ay in g on its

vanity, pleasing it for the moment but in the long run harming it.1

S i n c e a whole demos cannot j udg e argument s co rrect ly, h o w can it

direct a c i t y ? Education takes time, and even if a labouring man is no

f o o l , his work prevents him from g i v i n g proper attention to public

af fa i r s . ( W h y ha ve these arg uments a familiar ri ng? It is Socrate s in

the Gorgias who complains that orators in a de mo cr ac y lay th em

s e l v e s out to natter the demos rather than tell it what w i l l be for its

g o o d , and Socrates again who said, like Hume, that 'poverty and

hard labou r debase the mind s of the com mo n pe op le ' and unfit them

f o r polit ics, wh ich wa s a matter for trained exper ts .)2

Failure (continues

the herald) to co mp ly wi th Cr eo n' s demands means war . Y o u ma y

hop e to wi n : ho pe has been the cause o f ma ny a conflict. E ve r yo ne

thinks that its misfortunes w i l l fa l l on others, not himself. (Just so

did the Ath eni ans wa rn the unfortunate Melians of the snares of h op e

in T huc . 5.i o3-)3 If, wh en the vo te is taken, each citizen cou ld

v i s u a l i z e his o w n death in battle, Gr eec e wo u l d be safe from wa r-

madness. W e all k n o w h o w mu ch better peace is than war, ye t w e

renounce it in our lust to enslave one another, as men and as cities.

A wise man thinks o f his chi ldr en, his paren ts, and the safety of his

country. A rash leader is a danger: true cou rag e lies in for eth oug ht .4

Here is a man who has studied the technai o f Go rg ias and others and

mastered all the rhetorical tri cks. A n y arg ument y o u like can b e

' In similar vein Hip pol ytu s—a ver y different c harac ter— says pro udl y {Hipp. 986): * I have

no s k i l l to speak to the m ob ; m y wi sd om is rat her for the few, my equa ls. And this is fitting.

Those who in the e y e s of the wise are of no account—it is they who are more accomplished in

the art of mob-o rator y.'

1

Hume, Essays and Treatises (Edinburgh, 1 8 2 5 ) , p. 19 5. For Socr ates see e.g. Xen . Mem.

1 . 2 . 9 , Oec. 4. 2-3, Plato, Rep. 495 d- e, Ari st. Rhet. 1 3 9 3 b 3. More of this in Socrates, 89 ff.

3 It seems to ha ve been a comm onpl ace of the time. Anti pho n wrot e (fr. 58): 'Hopes are

not a l w a y s a goo d thing . Th e y hav e bro ugh t ma ny to irrepar able disaster, who in the end havesuffered themselves what they thought to inflict on their neighbours.'

4 Cf. Poly nice s (another unsy mpath etic character) at Phoen. 599:

α σ φ α λ ή ς γ α ρ ε σ τ ' ά μ ε ί ν ω ν ή θ ρ α σ ϋ ς σ τ ρ α τ η λ ά τ η ς .



Written and Unwritten Laws: Summary

subordinated to the oppo rtu nis m o f the mo me nt . Ev en the case for

pacifism (and no on e surpassed Eu rip ide s in his ho rr or o f w a r ; see

for instance the chorus in the Helen, 1 1 5 1 ff.) can be v i v i d l y presented

in the interests o f a ruthl ess ul ti ma tu m.

T o sum up a co mp le x situation, the term 'u nwr it ten l a w s ' was applied

in the first pl ace to certain moral prin cip les be li ev ed to be un iv er sa ll y

v a l i d , or alternatively valid all over the Greek world.1

Their authors

were the go ds , and no breach o f the m coul d remain unp uni shed . T h e y

were already c l o s e l y connected with the natural world, for to contrast

man with nature instead of seeing him as a part of it is a modern rather

than a Gr ee k habit. So for instance Heracl itus , w h o sp ok e o f all hu ma n

l a w s being nourished by the one divine law, also said that i f the sun

left his course the Furies, agents of D i k e , would find him out. In

contrast to these ord inan ces o f he av en , each co un tr y or ci ty had its

o w n nomoi. It made laws to suit its own beliefs and needs, laws which

had no force els ewh ere and in their o w n land mi gh t be altered to suit

changed circumsta nces. In general it w o u l d be tho ug ht just or r ight

to observe these l a w s , b u t th ey ha d not the scop e or force o f the di vi ne

or natural l a w s , and t o the ques tin g mi nd s o f the sophi stic ag e it w as

matter for debate h o w far dikaion and nomimon coin cide d, the answ er

dep endi ng ve ry mu ch on whe th er or no t a speaker wa s prepa red to

include the divine nomoi under the latter head.

A second mean ing o f 'un writ ten l aw ' derived from the ambig uit y

o f the word nomos (p. 56 ab o v e) . Since it mean t the c us to ms o f a

country as w e l l as its law, 'unwritten nomoi' stood for what was be

l i e v e d in that country to be right and equitable but could not in

practice be included in a cor pus o f writ ten l aw. Y e t it w o u l d be taken

into account in judging a particular case (Ar. Rhet. 13743261?.).

B y the midd le o f the fifth ce nt ur y a secula r tren d o f t h oug h t is

gaining gr ou nd at the expen se o f the theistic, wh ic h did not h o we v e r

b y an y means disappear co mp le te ly . Side b y side wi t h it appear s an

1

Sec p. i 2i , n. 3, above. On the so-called 'T hr ee Com man dme nts ' see Ehrenberg, S. and P.

1 Λ 7 72, who rig htly claims that the situation wa s much m ore fluid tha n this phrase sug ges ts.

Il In of some interest t hat three of Per icle s's unw ri tt en l a w s (to worship God, to obey parents,

mill to show gratitude to benefactors) recur in a modern writer's l i s t of commands which 'Locke

mid most other the oris ts' wo uld incl ude in the law of nature (vo n Leyd en, Philosophy, 1956, 27).

129




1 3 0

impersonal ' n a t u r e ' , whose decrees are as absolute, and their neglect

as in evi ta bl y pun ish ed, as thos e o f the go ds had bee n. But th ey do no t

necessarily f o l l o w the prec epts o f traditional m or al it y, for un der the

influence o f mec han is tic scientific theo ries the natural world is no

longer subject to moral government. The effect is seen in Antiphon,

for whom pleasure is the natural go al and the old divin e unwr itt en la w

that parents sho uld be ho no ur ed is 'of ten cont rary to na ture ' . F o r

C a l l i c l e s the ' law of na ture ' , which every man should f o l l o w w h o

has the str eng th and det er mina ti on t o do so , justified the c rudes t

hedon ism and the mos t outr ageous tyran ny.

T h e decline o f religi ous sanctions coi ncid ed wi th the rise o f d e mo

cratic go ve rn me nt , for wh ic h posi tiv e, writ ten la w appeared as a

safeguard against the re turn o f ty ran ny or oli gar chy based on the

new concept ion of ' na ture ' s l a w ' . T h e latter wa s perforce unw rit ten

and so, finally, the co nc ep t o f 'u nw ri tt en l a w ' to ok on a sinister

mea nin g and wa s banished fro m the mo der n, mo re nearly egalitarian

society .

This was the state o f the quest ion wh en Plato to ok it o v e r : at o ne

extr eme the equ ali ty o f all citizens und er a wr it te n and publ ishe d co de

o f la w, at the other the ideal o f the st ro ng ma n, nature 's he ro , who

spurn s the law in his mar ch to abs olu te and selfishly exercis ed p o w er .

T o bo t h of these Pl ato op po se d first his co nc ep ti on o f nature itself as

an intell igent and mor al for ce, and seco nd ly (Politicus 292 ff.) hi s

v i s i o n o f the wis e, enl igh ten ed and trained rul er, master o f the science

o f go ver nme nt , wh os e rule wo ul d inevit ably benefit his people . Su ch

a one would do better without writ ten l a w s , imposing the fruits of his

scientific unde rstan ding on subjects wi ll in g or unw il li ng , kil lin g or

bani shin g wh en necessary for the health o f the cit y as a wh ol e. (Ev en

the docile Y o u n g Socrates is moved to a protest at this point.) Codified

l a w is o nl y a set o f cl um sy rules of th um b, w h i ch can no t al lo w for the

infinite var ie ty o f particular cases . A magistrate w h o go ve rn s b y it,

as compared with the true statesman, w i l l be like a la ym an tr yi ng to

cure a patient b y l o o k i n g up the disease in a b o o k com par ed t o a

skilled and experienced phy sici an us in g his expert jud gme nt. Th i sdrastic conclusion is considerably modified when Plato goes on to

admit that in the absence of the ideal statesman a good code of laws



Plato s Attitude to Law

provides the best ' imitat ion ' of his rule and in all ordinary states

must be drawn up and enforced with the utmost r igour .

Finally, t o remind ourselves h o w lasting has been this dilemma

which the Greeks were the first t o f a c e , w e have only t o look again at

the passages from Rousseau and L o c k e quoted earlier (p . 23), an d the

twentieth-century judgment of Mr Campbel l , t o w h i c h m a y b e

appended as a com men t what Ernest Barker wro te o f the Natural L a w

school o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centur ies:

T o begin with, there was the current conception that Natural Law somehow

overbore law positive, so that enactments and acts o f State which ran con

trary to its prescriptions were strictly null and vo id , even if in actual practice,

o w i n g to the absence of any machinery for their disal lowance, these acts

and enactments retained their validity. Such a conception—applied in

various forms, sometimes with a greater and sometimes with a less degree

o f reverence for actual law—was a ready solvent o f political obligation.

The rebel against consti tuted authority could easily plead obedience to the

higher law, and could readily allege that he was only exerting, or defending,

the natural rights which he enjoyed under that l a w . . . A n English judge

had uttered the obiter dictum, in 1 6 1 4 , that ' even an A c t o f Parliament made

against natural equity . . . is void in itself; for jura naturae sunt immutabilia,

and they are leges legum'.

T hi s concept w a s invoked indifferently in the cause o f popular ism

and o f absolut ism, fo r ' nature cou ld b e used t o consecrate the monarch

as w e l l as the p eo p l e ' . In the Amer ican W a r o f Independence, ' i t wa s

the Law of Nature which, more than a n y other force, exp lod ed the

authority o f the British Parliament and the Bri t i sh connexion ' .1

A P P E N D I X

Pindar on 'nomos'

N o discussion o f the nomos-physis antithesis would be complete without a

mention o f Pindar's famous allusion to 'nomos king of all , mortals and

immortals alike', but there is no agreement as to its meaning. I can only set

out the alternatives and indicate what appears to me to be most probably

its purport.

The relevant passage is fr. 152 Bowra, 169 Schr. Plato at Gorg. 484b

ijuutcs the first 4 ji lines and g i v e s the sense down to v. 7 ; w. 1-4 occur also

• Barker, introduction to Gierke's Natural Law, pp. x l v i - x l v i i i .

1 3 1



The ' Nomos'— Physis' Antithesis

132

in schol. Pind. Nem. 9. 35, and 5-7 in schol. on Ael . Aristides ( h i , 408,

19 Dindorf). A great gain has been the publication in 1961 of a papyrus

(OP X X V I , 2450) o f the greater part o f the poem from v. 6 onwards.1

1 quote

vv. 1-8: , , , ,ν ο μ ό ς ο τ τ α ν τ ω ν β α σ ιλ ε ύ ς

θ ν α τ ώ ν τ ε κ α ι α θ α ν ά τ ω ν

α /ε ι δ ίκ α ιω ν τ ό β ια ιό τ α τ ο ν 2

υ π έ ρ τ α τ α χ ε ιρ ί. τ ε κ μ α ίρ ο μ α ι

ε ρ γ ο ισ ιν Ή ρ α κ λ έ ο ς

έ τ τ ε ί Γ η ρ υ ό ν α β ό α ς

Κ υ κ λ ώ τ τ ε ιο ν έ τ η ιτ ρ ό θ υ ρ ο ν Ε ύ ρ υ σ θ έ ο ς

α ΐτ η τ ά ξ 3 τ ε κ α ι ά τ τ ρ ιά τ α ς ε λ α σ ε ν .

The poem continues with Heracles's theft of the horses o f Diomedes,

including a gruesome description of a man's bones being crunched b y thehorses.

Plato's C a l l i c l e s quotes the passage in support of his own doctrine

that might is right: Pindar's nomos is not man-made law bu t the supreme

l a w o f nature which justifies the most extreme violence (or alternatively

does violence to accepted notions of justice). The irony of this interpretation

is apparent, but it still remains a question whether nomos has its usual

meaning o f ordinarily accepted custom or stands for a higher law of the god s.

Herodotus (3.38) associates Pindar's words with his own v i e w of therelativity of nomos as illustrated b y the experiment of Darius (p . 16 above).

This is certainly the sense of fr. 203 β (215 Schr.)

ά λ λ ο δ ' ά λ λ ο ισ ι ν ό μ ισ μ α , σ φ ε τ έ ρ α ν δ ' α ίν ε ΐ δ ίκ α ν

έ κ α σ τ ο ς ,

which is in keeping with Herodotus's remark that each would choose his

o w n nomoi as the finest, and shows that Pindar certainly could, on occasion,

speak o f nomos as human and relative. 4 "Wilamowitz and Theiler both g i v enomos in our passage the sense o f ordinary custom or usage (Brauch):

1

See also Page in Proc. Camh. Philol. Soc. 1962 and Theiler in Mus. Helv. 1965.3

This is universally agreed to be correct, though the manuscripts of Plato have β ι α ί ω ν

(for β ί α ι ω ν ) τ ό δ ι κ α ι ό τ α τ ο ν . W e need not here consider whether this i s a copyist 's error or a

deliberately ironic misquotation on Plato's part. See on that Dodds, Gorg. 270-2, and Theiler,

Mus. Helv. 1965 , 68 f.

3 α ί τ η τ ά ς Theiler, compar ing Pl at o' s paraphrase ο ύ τ ε τ τ ρ ιά μ ε υ ο ξ ο ύ τ ε δ ό ν τ ο ς τ ο ΰ Γ . and

Soph. Ο .Τ . 38 4 δ ω ρ η τ ό ν ο Ο κ α ϊ τ η τ ό ν . Ari st ides 's paraphrase ( π , 68 Dind.) is ο ΰ τ ε α ΐ τ η σ α ς

w he nc e Boe ck h' s ά ν α ι τ ή τ α ς w hi ch Sc hr . and Bowra follow, dvcrrel (' unpunished') Page loc. cit.1

Few , I imagine, w i l l wish to follow Heinimann (N. u. Ph. 7 1) in arguing that even ihis

does not imply the relative (and hence not universally oblig atory) character of l a w s and customs

because each is an expression of the w i l l of Zeus and therefore binding.



Pindar on 'Nomos'

it is customary to accept the violence of Heracles wi thout comment or

criticism, and though Pindar has a higher ethical insight he prefers to say

no more,as he makes clear in ί τ . γ ο Β . (quoted belo w: see Theiler,he.cit.75).

According to Aelius Aristides (11, 70 Dind. ) Pindar's lines are an indignant

protest (σ χ ε τ λ ι ά ξ ω ν ) against a nomos which approves such violent deeds as

those of Heracles; and he confirms this by quoting another passage (fr.70 B. , 81 Schr.) in wh ich Pindar says : Ί am on your side, Geryones , but

I w i l l never say what is displeasing to Zeus. ' The continuation of the present

poem is in the same sense, for Pindar says that Diomedes in trying to save

his horses acted ' brav ely, not wantonly, for it is better to die protecting

one's own than to be a coward' (w. 14-17).

The fullest discussion is that of M. Gigante.1

He believes Herodotus

wi l fu l ly misrepresents the quotation in the sense of fr. 203 B. , and that to

translate nomos here by custom closes the way to correct understanding.Nomos is ' t he absolute principle of divini ty '. Pindar intuits ' G o d as the

Absolute ' : to quote his own words, God becomes 'idea e forza del mondo,

non piu ideale della purezza e della pieta, ma ideale della giustizia che nel

suo compiersi si servi della forza '. Pindar admits the right of the stronger,

but only as the law and w i l l of Zeus, not for human and contingent interests.

The most violent action is justified because, being realized by the w i l l of

Z e u s , it leads to justice and well-be ing . Gigante quotes fr. 48 B. (57 Schr.),

in which Zeus is addressed as δ α μ ι ο ρ γ ό ς ε υ ν ο μ ία ς κ α ι δ ίκ α ς . (But whyshould not fr. 203 Β . , ά λ λ ο δ ' ά λ λ ο ι σ ι ν ό μ ισ μ α , be equally apt?)

Untersteiner and Ehrenberg, though they eschew mention of the

Absolute, come to not dissimilar conclusions in their own w a y s . Unter

steiner agrees that in Pindar nomos is 'an inviolable and sacred order',2

and Ehrenberg says (Rechtsidee, ii£>f.) that, though not a 'Schicksal s-

gottheit' as Schroeder thought, it is 'ancient and sacred custom', a usage

which can turn violence itself to justice, making holy even what is opposed

to the human sentiment o f what is right. Dodds too thinks it unlikely thatby nomos Pindar meant merely custom. It is ' the law of Fate, which for him

is identical with the w i l l of Zeus' , and he too compares fr. 70 Β . : Ί w i l l

never say what is displeasing to Zeus.'

A l l these interpretations seem to ignore what Pindar plainly says: not

that nomos is the w i l l of Zeus but that even Zeus is subject to nomos,

which lords it over gods as w e l l as men. Fr. 70 is capable of a less lofty

reference than to 'the law of fate'. Heracles was Zeus's son, so naturally

1

Nomos Basileus, chs. 5-7, pp. 7 2 - 1 0 8 . On pp . 79—92 he g i v e s a useful review of previous

discussions of the fragment, to which H. Volkmann, in Gnomon, 1958, 474f., ad ds E. Wolf ,

d r . HechtsJtnken, 11 ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 190if.

' Sophs. 297, n. 30. 1 ie puts the words between quotes.

1 3 3




!34

Zeus favoured him, and (gods being the jealous creatures diey are) it would

be unwise for a mortal to take his victim's side too openly. A similar reply

may be made to Heinimann's comment on Pyth. 2 . 8 6 , where nomos =

form of government. The changes between tyranny, democracy and aristo

cracy (for Pindar 'the rule of the wise') are enumerated, and it is said that

'the god' favours now this one, now that. This, Heinimann thinks, shows

that although nomos changes it depends not on human caprice but on Zeus

(N . u. Ph. 7 1 ) . What it does show is that a god can be as capricious as a man.

Pindar was pious in the sense that he thought mortals must submit to the

w i l l of the gods, but his religion retains much of the Homeric. He was

defender rather than critic of the Olympians. The more slanderous stories

about them must be rejected and their honour upheld (Ol. 1 . 2 8 f . , 5 2 ) , but

they were still the w i l f u l , amorous, powerful beings who fathered mortal

heroes and must have their way. In general he holds to the traditionally

prudent attitude o f the Greeks that the go ds are jealous and ' mortal things

befit mortals'. 'It is meet that a man speak fair things of the gods, for so

the blame is less.'1

T o know what was in Pindar's mind in this poem is obviously very

difficult , but I would venture the f o l l o w i n g : Recogn ized custom (usage,

tradition) has immense power. Both gods and men conform to it, and any

act, however wrong or terrible it may seem in itself, w i l l , if only it becomes

sanctioned by nomos, appear to be justified. What could be more violentand seemingly unjust and cruel than the theft o f Ge ryon's cattle or the

horses of Diomedes? Y e t the po wer o f nomos makes both men and gods

accept it.2

Pindar may w e l l be shaking his head over this state of affairs,

as Pohlenz said (Kl. Schr. 1 1 , 3 3 7 ) , but more probably he prefers to make no

judgment. That is the prudent course.

1

1sth. 5 .1 6 , Ol. 1.35. Th ere ar e simila r sentime nts in Ol. 5.27, Pyth. 2.34 and 3. 39.1

Dodds's comment (Gorg. 270) that 'the deeds of Heracles are no apt symbol ot the cus

to ma ry ' is beside the point. Wh at custom has done is to justify them ( δ ί κ α ι ω ν τ ό β ι α ι ό τ α τ ο ν ) .

To illustrat e the universal truth expressed in the first three lines the most appro pria te act was

one that was (a) extremely violent, and (b) perpet rated by a divine bei ng, the son of Zeus who

became a go d himself.



νTHE S O C I A L C O M P A C T

1

Op in io ns differ as to h o w far the theo ry o f the social con tra ct, or

com pac t, as un der st ood in the seven teent h and eigh teen th centuries

A . D . , wa s anticipated in our per iod o f Gr ee k th ou gh t, and the differ

ences spri ng large ly fro m the different mean ing s wh ic h scholars h av e

g i v e n to the phrase. W e shall l o o k at the evi de nc e first (bri efly in

some cases where it has already been touched on), and may then, if we

w i s h , see how close the Greek conceptions were to those of laterEurope .

O n e ancient bel ief ab ou t law attributed it ult imat ely to the go d s .

T h e hum an la wg iv er or constit ution- maker (w ho se existence wa s

not denied) was only the channel through which the commands of

heaven became k n o w n and effective. In Tyr tae us' s po em (sevent h

centu ry, fr. 3 Di eh l) Ly cu rg us 's const itu tion for Sparta is actu ally

dictated in detail by A p o l l o at De lp hi . Later, me n tended t o say that

L y c u r g u s dr ew up the cons tit utio n himse lf bu t we nt to De lp hi for

assurance that it had the god's approval (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8.5).

Herodotus (1 .65) finds t w o ve rs ions side b y side, the tradit ional on e

1

More usu all y kn ow n as the 'socia l contract the ory ', l a r g e l y through the influence of

Rousseau's Contrat Social, though Hume also wrote on The Original Contract. Bu t both Rousseau

and Hume use more general terms l i k e 'c om pa ct' and 'p ac t' indifferently, and as Pete r Laslett

has pointed out (Locke's Two Treatises, 11 2) , Locke scarcely applies the word ' con tra ct ' to

political matters at al l; it is 'c om pa ct ' or ' ag re em en t' whic h creates a society . In spe akin g of the

Greeks at least, the less specific and l e g a l term is pro bab ly to be preferred.It goes without saying that there were differences in the concept and its application arising

out of differences in historical situation. The people who were discovering their identity and

determining the place of monarchy after the wars of religion and the Reformation were in a

very different position from the Sophists. One thing that both have in comm on is the transition

from a rel igi ous to a secula r vie w of l a w , from the age nc y of God to that of man. Kaerst rightly

pointed out (Ztschr.f. Pol. 1909, 506) that the contract theory has two elements which must

be kept distinct, though they are combined in some modern formulations. These are (a) th e

doctrine of a social contract or compact proper, i.e. an agreement of association between equals,

(b) the pactum subiectionis, whereby die ordinary citizen is bound in subjection to a higher

uiiihority or sovereign. Only the former has its origin in Greek speculation. (For the history of

l l i c concept from the ancient wor ld onwa rd see Kaerst 's arti cl e; M. D' Ad di o, L'idea del contralto suciale dai Sojisti alia Rij'orma; and J. W. G ough , The Social Contract.)

1 35



The Social Compact

I3 6

o f a rel igi ous or ig in for the la ws , and a rati onali stic —ba sed on the

similari ty o f Spartan and Cr etan laws— that Ly cu rg us copied the

constit ution o f Cr et e. T h e Cr eta n law s in their turn were said to have

been the work of Zeus (Plato, Laws, ad init.). Even Cleisthenes, making

his democrati c reform s at the end o f the sixth ce nt ur y, re cei ved the

names for his new tribes from the Pythia (Arist. Ath. Pol. 21-6) , and

pr ob ab ly therefore s ou gh t the oracl e's ratification o f his wh ol e sche me.1

B y the fifth century an impersonal nature had in so me men' s min ds

replaced the gods as the worldwide power that produced the whole

order o f wh i ch me n are a part . For others, like Hippias, the two can

exist comfortably side by side, and Euripides, when he speaks in

'Pr es ocr ati c ' lan guag e o f the 'ageless order o f immor tal n a tu re ' ,2

and

elsewh ere in his po et ry , sho ws a desire to kee p the m united. W h e n

therefore, as w e ha ve seen, the vi e w wa s gai nin g gr ou nd that law is a

purely human institution designed to meet particular needs, with

noth ing permanent or sacred ab ou t it, it co ul d be contr asted wi th

either a divine or a natural ord er or bo th . In dr aw in g this contra st the

act o f legis lati on is usu all y said to be the out co me o f an agr eem ent or

c o mp a ct (σ υ ν θ ή κ η ) b e t w ee n the me mb e rs o f a c o mmu n it y , w h o h a v e

'put together' , composed, or agreed upon certain articles.3

T h e records of Pro tago ras do not contain the actual wo rd ' c o m

pa ct ' , but whe n the go ds are re mo ve d from his parable (as in v i e w o f

his agno stic ism the y must b e) , w e ha ve a picture o f me n perishi ng for

lack o f the art o f li vi ng to ge th er in cities and b y hard experience

learnin g to act ju st ly and respect the rights o f oth ers and so fo un di ng

1

See further G uthr ie, Gks. and their Gods, 1 8 4 - 9 .2

α θ α ν ά τ ο υ φ ύ σ ε ω ς κ ό σ μ ο ν ά γ ή ρ ω , fr. 9 1 0 Ν . B ur ne t (EGP, 10 , n. 3) s a y s that ά γ ή ρ ω is g en it iv e,which, th ou gh it soun ds tau tol ogo us, could be right. A nax iman der Β 2 has ά ί δ ι ο ν κ α ΐ ά γ ή ρ ω ,

which, whil e it sugges ts that the tau tol ogy could go back to Anaxi mande r himself, also show s

that the form ά γ ή ρ ω could be used for the accusative, as appears also from examples in LS J .

Nauck arbitr arily alters it to ά γ ή ρ ω ν to settle the matter.3

The prefix σ υ ν - in compound verb s has two use s: (a) objective, as in σ υ ν τ ί θ η μ ι ( a c t. ) ,

to put two or more things together, thus constructing a composite whole; (b) subjec tive, to do

something conjoindy or in harmony with someone e l s e , as in σ ύ μ φ η μ ι , which does not mean

to sa y tw o or more thi ng s tog ethe r or at the same time, but to s ay some thi ng in uniso n w it h

another person, i.e. to agree with him. The middle voice of σ υ ν τ ί θ η μ ι was used in both w a y s .

It meant, first, ' to put toget her for on es el f, or organ iz e, and also to hea r and unders tan d (' put

two and two t og et he r' ); second ly to agree wit h others, and (wi th an i n f i n i t i v e ) to agree to dosomething. When the object was l a w s , a treaty or the l i k e , it is prob able that both me ani ng s

were pres ent: the constituent art icles are composed or put toget her, and they are mut ual ly

agreed upo n ( the reflexive force of the middle a s s i s t i n g ) .



Protagoras

Π 7

p o l i t i c a l communities. This is a matter of 'self-control and justice'

(Prot. 322e). Prot ago ra s, said Ernest Bark er, wa s ' n o belie ver in the

doctrine of a social contract'. This is partly because of Barker's mis

taken conviction that he ' co nc eiv ed the state as an ord inan ce o f Go d ,

as existing jure divino, rather than as a crea tion of man, ex ist ing ex

contractu , partly because 'a contract issuing in an artificial unity

maintained b y artificial laws wo u ld be no soone r formed than br ok en .

Wh at is needed and wha t is ever yth ing, i s . . . a co mm on mind to

pursue a co mm o n purpose of g o od l i f e . ' That is true, but is such

a r t i f i c i a l i t y implied by the contract theory? Is not Popper right when

he claims that ' th e wo r d "c on tr ac t" suggests . . . perhaps mor e than

any other theory, that the strength o f the la ws lies in the i nd iv idua l' s

readiness to accept and obey them'?1

The moral virtues which made

a common l i fe possible (α ιδ ώ ς , δ ί κ η , σ ω φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η ) were necessary

precon dition s for the fo un di ng o f apolis, bu t since Prot ago ra s did no t

b e l i e v e that la ws we re the w o r k o f nature o r g o ds he mus t ha ve

b e l i e v e d , like other contemporary progressive thinkers, that they were

formulated as the result of a consensus of opinion between the citizens

w h o henceforth consider ed themselves bo un d b y them.

In the 'defence of Protagoras' undertaken by Socrates in the

Theaetetus (167 c ) we find a theory which refers only to present

conditions, though it is not inconsistent with a b e l i e f in an original

cont ract in the past. ' Wh a tever acts appear just and fine to a p articular

state are so for that state so long as it bel iev es in th em; bu t wh e n in a

particular case th ey are bu rd en so me for the citizens, the wi se ma n

substitutes others that appear and are beneficial.' This dictum f o l l o w s

from Prot ago ras 's doct rin e o f 'ma n the mea su re ' (p p. 183ff. b e l o w) ,

and, as Sal omon said, it is factual, no t n or ma ti ve : wha t is agr eed up on

by a city is just for that city so long as it continues to regard it as valid

( ν ο μ ί ^ η —hold it as nomos). T h e com pac t has mad e it just and rig ht

fo r the citizens to kee p the laws unt il the y are altered, ev en tho ugh the

1

The quotations are from Barker's Gr. Pol. Theory (first published 1 9 1 8 ) , 63, and Pol.

Thought of P. and A. (first published 1906), 7 3 ; and Popper, Open Soc. 11 5. Barker's censure

might be valid against Hobbes, but not against Rousseau or others who spoke of a social con-

li'iiet. Mere too one sees how misleading it is to speak of 'the Social Contrac t the ory ' (p. 142,

1 1 . 1, be low ). Wh at I have said of Barker appli es equ all y to a number of critic s who have started

limn the assumption th.it Prot agor as believed political institutions and law s to be gifts of God

in' 'n at ur e' , e.g. Locncn, P. and Gk. Comm. 50!'., 65 If.; Mewald t, Kulturkampf, 1 1 .

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The Social Compact

I38

c i t y might prosper better under different l a w s . Similarly Aristotle

later, in distinguishing between natural and legal just ice, equa tes the

latter with ' justice by agreement' .1

T h e first wo rd s o f An ti ph on fr.

44 Α ( Ί s ay that justice consists in not transgressing the laws and

usag es o f one's o w n stat e') and the identification o f just wi th lawful b y

Socrates in Xenophon (Mem. 4 .4 .12 , p. i n abo ve) suggest that this

l e g a l con cept ion o f justice wa s in v o g u e am on g the adva nced thinkers

o f the time, and the various conclusions to be drawn from it were

under l i v e l y discussion. It left open the question whether justice so

defined was ' benefic ia l ' (σ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν ) o r not . A t any rate we may safely

include Protagoras among those who explained the rise of political

commun iti es in terms o f a contr act or agre emen t.

Hippias, for whom law and nature wer e stro ngly contrasted (Pla to,

Prot. 337d), defined laws expl ici tly as 'c ov en an ts made by the citi zens

wh er eb y the y hav e enacted in wri ti ng wh at ou gh t to be done and

wh at no t ' (la ngua ge reminiscent of An ti ph on , pp. 108f. a bo ve ), and

pointed to the rapidity with which they may be changed as a reason

for not takin g the m ve ry seri ously (p. 119). An ti ph on , in the same

context of oppositi on betwe en nature and l aw, also calls laws the result

o f agreemen t, whi ch for him (unlike Protag oras ) justifies ig no ri ng

them in fav our o f the co mman ds o f nature. Untersteiner perceived the

idea of the socia l con tract again in the words ' neit her to inflict no r to

suffer inj ury ', w hi ch for med the cont ent o f the co mpac t ac co rd in g to

Glaucon in the Republic.'2,

So me th in g like it is also, as Do d ds said

(Gorg. 266), implicit in the Sisyphus o f Crit ias, wh er e laws and their

sanctions are instituted b y men to check the sav ag er y o f the state o f

nature.

O f sli ghtl y later writ ers, w e ha ve seen (p. 76 ab ov e ) h o w the au thor

o f the speech against Aristogeiton combines, in a way natural at the

time thou gh im pos sib le bef ore or since, the con cept ion s o f la w as a

1

. £7 / 11 34 03 2, ν ο μ ικ ό ν κ α ι σ υ ν θ ή κ η . The Theaetctus passage is dealt with more f u l l y on

pp. 172 ff. be low.

1

Ant iphon, fr. 44, DK, 1 1 , 347 and 355 (pp. 108, 110 ab ov e) ; Untersteine r Sof. iv, 100.

Heinimann (A^. u. Ph. 139) s a y s that since Antiphon speaks of transgression bringing α ί σ χ ύ ν η

a s w e l l as 3η μ 1α , he must be includ ing the 'unwrit ten l a w s ' and so his doct rine is not onl y oneof the social contract as origin of law, but also of moralit y as ori gina tin g in deliberate agre ement .

But (α ) I do not feel so cert ain that Antiphon would not associate disgrace with purely l eg a l

punishment; (h) it is a ques tio n whether Anti pho n intended his words in a historical sense.

( S e e pp. 143, 145 below.)



Hippias, Lycophron and Others

1 3 9

hu man co mpa ct and a gift o f div ine pr ov id enc e. But for som e reason

pride of place is always given to Lycophron, known to Aristotle as a

Sophi st and th ou gh t to have been a pup il of Go rg ia s. He is even

claimed as the foun der o f the social cont ract th eo ry in its earliest fo rm,

th ou gh , since he wa s pr ob ab ly no t wr it in g until the fourth cent ury ,

the evidence already reviewed makes this impossible.1

Our authori ty

is Aristotle in his Politics (1280b 10). Di scu ss in g the perennial que stio n

o f the relation between law and morals, he claims that the end and aim

o f a state is to prom ot e the g o o d life and therefore it has a ri gh t and a

du ty to con cer n itself wi th the mor al go od ne ss of its citizen s. ' Ot h er

w i s e ' , he goes on, 'the political society becomes a mere alliance, differ

ing on ly in respect of loc ali ty from alliances be twe en distant co un tr ie s;

and law becomes a compact, and as Lycophron the Sophist said, a

gua ran tor o f men 's right s against on e another , n ot a means o f ma k in g

the citizens g o o d and just.'

T h e only words which Aristotle here ascribes to Lycophron as a

description o f l a w are' a guarantor o f men' s rights against one an ot he r' ,3

not the actual no un ' co mp ac t' , th ou gh no dou bt their contractual

nature f o l l o w s and his definition comes close to that mentioned by

Glaucon in the Republic as one commonly held. The limitation of

l a w to the neg ati ve role o f prote cti ng the citizens against each other

had bee n pu t fo rward earlier as an ideal b y Hi pp od am us , the re mar k

able town-p lan ner and political theorist w h o liv ed in At h en s in

the midd le o f the fifth centur y, rebui lt the Piraeu s on a gr id plan an d

laid out the new colonial city of Thurii for Pericles. In his ideal state

he would allow three indictable offences on ly , wh ic h ma y be translated

as insult, injury (to per son or pr op er ty ) and murder.3 He was moreover

the first to pr op ose a sup reme c our t o f appeal against w r o n g ju dg men ts .

T h e passages are chiefly interesting as showing how l i v e l y in the

Greek world was a controversy that is re cei vin g so mu ch attent ion

from leading authorities on jurisprudence at the present day, namely

' For L ycophron see pp. 313 f. below. As founder of the social cont ract theor y, Popper

Q.S. 114.1

Ι γ γ υ η τ ή ς ά λ λ ή λ ο ι ; τ ω ν δ ι κ α ί ω ν . The brev ity and neatness of Lyc oph ron 's definition,rather than any orig ina li ty, may have been what caused Aristotle to singl e it out for quot ation.

1

ΰ β ρ ίζ β λ ά β η θ ά ν α τ ο ς . O ur a ut ho ri ty is ag ai n Ar ist ot le, Pol. I26jbj7f[. On Hippodamus

•ec the references in llignone, Stmli, 43, and the brief but lucid account of him in Barker, Pol.

Theory of P. and A. 44-6.



The Social Compact

1 4 0

that con ce rn ing the deg ree to wh i ch mor ali ty shou ld be enforc ed b y

l a w . Lycophron and Hippodamus would have agreed with J. S. M i l l

that the only purpose for which law could rightly be enforced against

a me mb er o f the co mm un it y wa s to prev ent harm to othe rs; his o w n

g o o d , physical or moral, was not sufficient warrant. In Aristotle's

e y e s this ignores the real purpose of political association, which is to

ensure no t simply life bu t the g o o d l i f e . He would have sided with

Lord Si mon ds, w h o in 1962 pro no un ce d it ' t he supre me and funda

mental pur pose o f the law to cons er ve not on ly the safety and orde r

but also the moral welfare of the State', and his general conception

would be close to that of Lor d Devl in , that ' wh at mak es a soc ie ty is a

co mm un it y of ideas, not pol itical ideas alon e bu t also ideas ab ou t the

w a y its members should behave and govern their l i v e s ' . 1

In Plato's Crito Socrates expounds in his prison c e l l the doctrine

o f an agre emen t b et we en hims elf and the la ws o f his cit y as an ar gu

ment against attempting to evade the judgment which those laws have

passed up on h im. H e says no th in g abo ut the orig in of law , but there

is no suggestion that it wa s div ine . T h e arg ume nt is that, since the

time when his parents we re married un der the law s o f At he ns , Socrate s

has o w e d his birth, e duca tion and li vel iho od to those l a w s . Moreover

the y ga ve him freedo m, shoul d he find an yt hi ng objectio nable in t hem ,

to leave At he ns wi th all his pr op er ty and settle els ewh ere . Sinc e he

had not ch ose n to do so, he shou ld cons ider hims el f their child and

their servan t. It wa s 'j us t' for hi m to abide b y their deci sions , and as

he had risked his life in batt le at thei r co mm and s so he shou ld g i v e it

up now that the y dema nde d it from him. Tha t wa s the a gree ment

be tw ee n the m (50c, 52d), and it wa s necessary to the ve ry existence o f

the state. I f pri vat e indiv idu als cou ld set aside the la w' s ju dg me nt s at

their o w n caprice, the wh ol e found atio n o f the cit y's life wo u l d

crumble.

In Pla to' s w o r k s w e ha ve also seen the conc ept io n of la w as a co m

pact put forward by witnesses hostile to it, C a l l i c l e s and the ' t h ey ' o f

1

See Devlin, Enforcement of Morals, 86 and 88, and cf. p. 1 1 7 , n. 1, above. On Aristot le's

side is also pseudo-Dem. 25 (In Aristog.), 1 6 - 1 7 : the l a w s aim not only at τ ό δ ί κ α ι ο ν but alsn

at τ ό κ α λ ό ν κ α ΐ τ ό σ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν . They have a twofold purpose, to prevent injustice and by the

punis hment of trans gress ors 't o make the others bette r' . For Dem ocr itu s's v iew see vol. 1 1 , 49^1

(fr. 245).



Socrates, Callicles, Glaucon

Glaucon (pp. 1 0 3 1 ? . , 98 above). Those who laid down the l a w s ,

said C a l l i c l e s , are the w ea k ma jo ri ty ; and again , just ice and self-

control and everything that militates against a life o f wa nt on ne ss and

licence are 'human agreements contrary to nature ' . Agai nst them C a l l i

c l e s exalts the sup erma n w h o w i l l burst their bonds and l i v e the lifeo f a self-indulgent tyrant . ' T h e y ' , on the other hand— the mass of

mankind as depicted by Glaucon—entertain no such heroic ideas.

T h e y acce pt the existen ce o f the comp ac t as a sec ond -be st to be in g

able to d o exact ly wh at one likes , since for ev er yo ne to beh av e so is a

practical impos sibi lity . Selfish be ha vi ou r is limited to eva di ng o f the

l a w w h e n it can be don e wi th ou t fear o f dete ctio n. Pla to him se lf is

o f course an advocate of nomos, as the Crito sho ws , and in his lat er

years mo un te d a po we rf ul attack against thos e w h o maintai ned that

it could be in any way opposed to physis. He therefore oppos es b ot h

the ideal o f the super man w h o b y be in g a la w to hims elf is fo ll ow in g

' na ture ' s just ice' , and the mor e comm on pla ce idea that the laws

should be accepted as a necessary e v i l but broken whenever it is safe

to do so.1

C a n w e say h o w far the the ory in Gree ce wa s a 'hi st ori cis t ' on e,

asserting or implying that in the re mo te past the first la ws t o ok shape

in som et hin g like a forma l contract be tw ee n me mbe rs o f an or igin al

pol i t ical community? Barker wrote that the social cont ract the ory ,

'which is not only that of Glaucon but also that o f mod ern wri ters

such as Hobbes, has been met by modern thinkers point by point.

In the first place, there never was any actual or expl ici t " c on t ra c t" :

there is and always w i l l be a con diti on o f things, wh ic h is a con dit ion

o f tacit and implied contract. '2

Popper on the other hand claims that

1

It w i l l be seen that I do not follow Popper when he sees 'a complete change of front ' in

Plato between the Gorgias and the Republic. See Popper, O.S. 116.

' G.P.T. 160. It may be releva nt to mention B ark er' s own position, wh ic h is a reconc iliation

of physis and nomos, at least on the human plane. Government is for hi m ' an essential attr ibut e

of political society, which is itself in turn an essential attribute of human nat ure '.

In fairness to Barker it must be added that in his introduction to Gierke 's Nat. Law (1934)

he was more cautious in his expression. He said there (p. x l i x ) : 'Natural-law thinkers were apt

to talk of an unhistorical "state of nature" and of an unhistorical act of contract by which men

issued from i t . . . On the other hand . . . the natural-law thinkers were not r e a l l y dealing with

the historical antecedents of the St at e: they wer e concerned wit h its logica l pres uppos iti ons; and

there is still a case to be made for the vi ew that the Stat e, as distinc t from soc iet y, is a l e g a l

N K s o c i a t i o n whi ch fundam ental ly rests on the presu pposit ion of contrac t.'

141



The Social Compact

1 4 2

this objection is not applicable to Lycophron's theory because it did

not take a historici st fo rm. T h e theori es men tio ned in the Gorgias and

Republic are to be identified wi th Ly co ph ro n' s, bu t hav e bee n gi ve n

this form by Plato.

Cross and W o o z l e y , wh os e criterion for a th eo ry o f social contract

is that it must express a moral obligation to obey the laws con

sequent o n the indi vidu al's o w n und ert aki ng t o do so, and that any

suppos ed ly histori cal fact ab ou t the ori gin of la w is irrele vant to it,

insist that wha t Gla uc on pro pou nds is not ' the S o c i a l Contract theory '

for the very reason which made Barker assert that it was, namely that

' t he emphas is is enti rely on the factual, or wo u ld - be historical , p r o

position supposedlyg i v i n g

an acc ount o f wh at induce d men to e mer ge

from a state o f nature into the organiza tion of a social c om mu ni t y' .1

Perhaps the first th in g to no te is the wides pr ea d acc ept anc e at th is

time of the historical theory o f the ev ol ut io n o f soci ety from a primiti ve

state in wh i ch ev er yo ne wa s for him self alone, until the fatal c on

sequence s o f suc h an 'uno rd er ed and brutish l i f e ' compel led men to

sub due their sav ag e instincts in the interests o f a c o m m o n de fence

against hostile nature. This we have already looked at, and prima facie

it wo u l d seem, i f no t t o necessitate a th eo ry o f a historical social

contract , at least to pr ov id e a setting hig hl y co nd uc iv e to it.2

As we

noted, it went with Presocratic scientific theories about the origin of

physical l i fe , and c onst itut ed a react ion against earlier my th ic al

acco unts o f hu ma n degene rati on. Prota gor as and Critias bo th he ld

this th eo ry , and bot h bel ieve d in the social co mp ac t as a historical

1

Comm. on Rep. 71 ff. As there defined, the the ory wou ld cer tainly exclude Glauc on's acco unt,

but is it not misle adin g to speak of' the S o c i a l Contract theory' ? (T he capi tals but not the i t a l i c s

ar e their s.) Wh a t the auth ors them selves say of Hobbes, L ock e and Rous sea u, all of wh om the y

admit as contractualists, shows that it is rather a question of this or that philosopher's theory

of a social contract, each one holding it in a somewhat different form; and it can hardly be denied

that Glaucon's is a contractualist theory (359a σ υ ν θ έ σ θ α ι ό λ λ ή λ ο ι ς . . . ν ό μ ο υ ς τ ί θ ε σ θ α ι κ α ΐ

σ υ ν θ ή κ α ς ) . To say that the only social contract theory is one that does not r e l y on a

historical statement, and is therefore im mun e from the objections br oug ht against it in that form,

i s surely to beg a big question. It seems more helpful to start with the fact that there are two

main forms of the theory, as Popper does whe n he dist ingui shes the theoretical form, concerned

s o l e l y wi th the end of the state (whic h he himsel f sees in Ly co ph ro n) , from the 'tr adi tio nal

historicist theory of the social contract' (O.S. 114) .

1

For this theory see pp. 6off. and Appendix (79ff.) above. Even Sophocles in the Antigone

chorus (355) mentions the l e g a l regulation of social l i fe as someth ing whic h man ' deve loped for

hi s own benefit, by his own efforts ' . (So Jebb explains έ δ ι ο ά ξ α τ ο . )



Was Greek Theory Historicist?

'

fact. The v i e w s o f An ti ph on and (as reporte d) o f Hippi as ma ke no

e x p l i c i t reference to hist oric al ori gin s, bu t neither d o th ey fu l f i l the

C r o s s - W o o z l e y condi tions for ' th e Social Con tra ct the or y' b y affirm

ing a mor al obl ig at io n to ob ey the law . In their eye s the fact that laws

are not natural but merely agr eemen ts releases the citi zen fro m a du ty

to o b e y the m in all cir cum sta nce s. In the four th cen tu ry the au th or o f

the speech against Aristogeiton drew the opposite moral: laws were

instituted against nature because nature is 'd is or de rl y' and law intr o

duces impar tiali ty and eq ual justice for all. A s the decis ions o f wi se

men guided by the go ds , they hav e been accepted b y c om m on agre e

ment and must be obe ye d. T h e evide nce for Ly co p hr on is sl ight, but

in call ing the la ws ' a gua ran tor o f mutu al r ig ht s' he mus t ha ve had a

similar v i e w in mind.

I f on e accepts as essential mark s o f a socia l cont rac t t he or y that it

shou ld make no historical statement abo ut the ori gin of law but ho ld

that ev er y memb er o f a state has a moral obligation to obey its laws

because he him sel f has contrac ted or underta ken, at least impl ici tly,

to do so , then the on e unm ist aka ble adher ent o f it at this pe rio d is

Socrates.1

It can hardly be doubted that the Crito is t rue to his convictions, which Plato shared when he wrote it. He held that his whole

l i fe , like that o f ev er y othe r citizen , had been the acti ng -ou t o f a

contract and agre eme nt acc or di ng to wh ic h, in return for their bene

fits, he wa s un de r ob li ga ti on to reg ard the law s as maste rs to be

obeyed. Infringement o f this principle w o u l d tear apart the whole

fabric of society.

Th er e is anoth er poss ibili ty to be consi dered, that a phi losophermay put his theory in historical form without intending it to be

literally so und ers too d. He may intend o nl y a 'g en et ic defin ition ', an

analysis of a state o f thin gs into its const ituent elements , be li ev in g that

the best way to make its structure clear is to represent it as being

built up bit b y bit out o f the elements wit ho ut i mp ly in g that such a

' Hume noted this , call ing the Crito 'the only passage I meet with in antiquity, where the

obligation of obedience to gover nment is ascribed to a prom ise '. 'T h u s ' , he commen ts, 'h e

|Socrates| builds a Tory conse quence of passive obedience on a Whig foundation of the ori gina l

contract.' (Of the Original Contract, a J Jin. W . C . ed. p. 236.) Th e attribut ion to Socra tes is

undoubt edly historical. As I)e Stryc ker has justl y pointed out (Melanges Gregoircs, 208), his

alt itud e is confirmed not onl y by the maimer of his death but by his soli tary champi onsh ip of the

la w against an infill i . i t i-d t/emos in the ease of the gene ral s after A rgi nus ae (Socrates, pp. 59 1.).



The Social Compact

1 44

process o f constru ction ever to ok temporal for m.1

A geometr ician m a y

explain th e structure o f a cube in terms o f constructing a square o u t o f

four equal straight lines and then a cube out of s ix squares without

meaning that straight lines existed prior in t ime t o plane figures, n o r

plane figuresto

solids. From Plato 's immediate pupils onwards,

commentators have disputed whether h e intended his c o s m o g o n y to

be understood in th is way, o r whethe r h e bel ieved in a literal process

o f creation. T h e idea o f genetic definition w a s extended from physics

to polit ical theory b y H o b b e s . In general, ' i f o n e wants t o " k n o w "

someth ing , h e must constitute it himself ; he must cause it to deve lop

from its individual e lements ' . Ubi generatio nulla . . . ibi nulla philo-

sophia intelligitur.3

Y e t as w e read the wri t ings o f the social-contract theorists w e find

that the distinction between literal and instructional use o f genet ic

exposi t ion is b y no means clear-cut. While claiming on the one hand

that the historical proposition, that before the contract m e n l ived i n a

state o f nature, is irrelevant t o their theory, they seem anxious t o g i v e

it all th e histor ical foundat ion they can. Thus Hobbes himself : ' I t m a y

peradventure b e thought there never w a s such a t ime n o r condi t ion

o f war as th is ; an d I believe i t was never generally so all over the w o r l d ,

but there are ma ny places wh er e they l i v e s o n o w ' ; a n d h e proceeds

to g i v e examples. Rousseau in the preface to the Discourse on the

Origin of Inequality calls the state o f nature a state wh ic h 'pe rha ps

never d id exist, a n d probably never w i l l exis t ; and o f w h i c h it is

nevertheless necessary to have t rue ideas, in order t o form a proper

judgment o f o u r present state'. H e says that facts do no t affect the

question, and that h is invest igat ions 'must not be considered ashistorical truths, b u t on ly as mere conditional an d hypothet ical

reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature o f things than to

ascertain their actual origin'. This seems a perfect example o f a genet ic

definition, an d in the Social Contract w e find:' I assume, for the sake o f

argument , that point w a s reached in the history o f mankind . . . ' and

' b y the social compact we have given l i fe and existence to the b o d y

pol i t i c ' ( m y italics). Y e t later in the Origin of Inequality he w r i t e s :

1

T h e nature and value of genetic definitions is l u c i d l y se t forth b y Cassirer in P. of E. 253 ff.

2

Hobbes, De corpore, pt. 1, ch . 1, § 8 , as paraphrased and quoted b y Cassirer, he. cit.



Historicism and Genetic Definition

1 4 5

' Such was, or may w e l l ha ve been , the orig in o f so ci et y' , and on the

next page, after repeating that the actual originating cause of political

socie ties is indifferent to his argument , he proceeds to g i v e reasons

w h y the one he has put forward is ' the mo st nat ur al ' and to defend

it against other s. Simila rly wi th L o c k e , Cross and W o o z l e y say (withno reference given) that ' as L o cke sa w more clear ly than Hobbes, the

factual prop osi tio n, ev en if it wer e true, w o u l d pr ov id e no suppo rt for

the theory' . Yet §§99-100 of the Second Treatise show plainly that

for Locke i t was a historical fact. He not only makes the unequivocal

statement: 'T hi s is that, and that only, which did or could g i v e begin

ning to any lawful government in the world', but goes on to state and

rebut the objection that no historical instances can be quoted of the

setting up of a go ve rn me nt in this w a y . Re co rd ed hist ory, he poin ts

out, can only begin when c i v i l society has already been in existence

long en ou gh to al lo w the dev el opm ent o f lettered leis ure.1

O f the Gree k theori sts, Pr otago ras seems the mo st lik el y to b e

g i v i n g a genet ic definiti on. His aim is no t a historical accou nt o f the

ori gin o f civil izati on bu t an answe r to Socrates's questi on, whe the r

political virtue can be taught; and it is a matter o f indifference to h im

whethe r he co nveys this answ er in the for m of a reasoned argument

or o f a narrative. Mo re ov er the narrative, wh en it co me s, has a fairy

tale flavour2

and ma ny myth ica l element s. Ye t it takes so mu ch from

seriousl y held theories o f hist ory that, like his po st- Ren ais sanc e

successors, he pr ob ab ly kep t a foo t in bot h ca mp s.3

O f the others

wh o m w e have considered, Hippias, Ant ip hon and Ly co ph ro n, so

far as our evidence goes, g i v e no sign o f pr op ou nd in g a historical

th eor y of the ori gin o f law, no r is it apparent in the speech agains t

Aristogeiton or in Plato's C a l l i c l e s . 4

Socrat es's is emph at ica lly no t a

1

References for this paragraph: Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. I , ch. 13 (ed. Wal ler , p. 8;) ; Rous seau,

Origin of Inequality, trans. Cole (Everyman), 169, 1 7 5 f., 221 f., S.C. ( W. C . ed. ), 254. Cross and

Woozley, P.'s Rep. 72.

' Th e beginning, ή ν γ ά ρ π ο τ έ χ ρ ό ν ο ς (once upon a time ), echoes the leg enda ry poets Linu s

and Orpheus and was used again in verse by Critias and Moschion. (References in Kern, Orph.

Frr. p. 303.)

' Al l that he s a y s on the subject in the logos that follows the mythos i s : 'T h e State sets u p

the l a w s , which are the invent ions of good law giver s of ancient times, and compels the citizens

to rule and be ruled in accordance with them ' (326d) .4

Popper (O.S. l i d ) s a y s that Plato here put s the theory in historic ist form, but I do not

find it so. At (iorg. 483 b the present tense is used throughout.



The Social Compact

1 46

historicist doctrine.J Only Glaucon in Rep. 2 claims to be g i v i n g a

historical account.

Final ly , in as kin g wh et her the Gr ee ks bel iev ed in the social contra ct

theory, we are putting to them a question which they did not ask

themselves. T h e ques tion the y did ask wa s wh et he r ' ju st ' wa s thesame as ' l a w f u l ' . T h e answers we re o f tw o types , normati ve and

factual. Eit her justi ce retai ned its me an in g of an ethi cal idea l, an d this

ideal was equated with keeping the l a w s , or it was claimed that w h e n

me n used the hi gh -s ou nd in g w o r d ' jus tic e ' all th ey meant b y it wa s

observance of the existing l a w s , which could in fact be an unwise

or harmful cou rse . Pr ot ag or as is represented in the Protagoras as

tak ing the first li ne : justic e, w h i c h is an essential element in ' hu ma n

excel lence ' as a whole (325a), is identified wi th 'po lit i cal exc ell enc e' ,

the respect for la w w h i c h has raised man fro m a state of sa va ge ry a nd

wit hou t wh ic h societ y wo ul d col lapse. In the Theaetetus he appe ars to

ado pt the sec ond , factual interpre tation, as his th eo ry of ' m a n the

me as ur e' de ma nd s: w ha t is just is on ly wh at one 's state declares to b e

just. The state may be persuaded that it was at fault and amend its

l a w s , wh er eb y the content o f just action in that state w i l l be altered.

But he would sti l l hold that obs erv anc e o f those faulty l a w s , until they

we re altered b y pr op er const itut iona l proces ses, w as mo ra ll y right as

an alternative to the ch ao s w hi c h w o u l d ensu e if ev e ry citiz en felt free

to disr egard the m. A n ti ph on an d Hip pia s on the othe r hand mainta ined

that, because all that was meant by justice was conformity to nomos, it

carried no moral obligation and one might do better to f o l l o w the

contrary precepts of physis. Such a belief cou ld, th ou gh it need not ,

lead to the brutal selfishness exemplified by C a l l i c l e s .

Socrates agreed with Protagoras that it was just (in the sense of

mora lly ob li ga to ry ) to obe y the law s or else ge t them c han ged b y

peaceful pers uasi on (this alternative is me nti one d in the Crito), and

that failure to do so w o u l d disrupt soc iet y. Bu t t w o further poi nts

m a y be note d. Firs t, there is a hin t in the Crito o f someth ing wh ich

does not oc cur elsew here, nam el y a distinction bet we en the laws the m

selves and their administration. In Socrates's ima gin ary conve rsati on

with the laws of Athens, they say that , if he abides b y the de cis ion o f

the cou rt and agrees to be exe cut ed instead of tr yi ng to escape, ' y o u



The Question in Greek Terms

w i l l be the vict im o f a w r o n g done to yo u not b y us, the laws , but b y

y ou r fel low me n' . I f on the other hand h e runs away, he w i l l be

be hav in g dish onoura bly b y break ing his agreements and contracts

with the laws themselves. In other words, once a verdict has been

l e g a l l y g i v en there is no le gal alterna tive to its execut io n. Socra tes s aw

not hin g wr o n g wi th this ev en in the case o f his o w n death-sentence,

but it seems that there wa s ro om for Hipp odam us' s pro posal for a

court o f appeal. Sec on dl y, in sa yi ng that ' j us t ' wa s identical with

' l a w f u l ' , Socrates wa s inc lud ing the universal and divin e unwr itt en

l a w s and t aki ng into acc ou nt ju dg me nt in a future life as w e l l as in this.

Fo r the unwr itt en laws w e have the evi den ce o f X e n o p ho n , and in the

Crito the law s g o on imm ed ia te ly fro m the poi nt just men ti one d to say

that the laws in the next world w i l l not receive hi m kind ly if they

k n o w that he has tried to destroy their brothers in this.1

' Th at Socr ates bel iev ed in a future life is disp uted (see Socrates, pp. 156 ff. be lo w) . Fo r the

idea of judgment pursuing a man from this world to the next cf. Aesch. Suppl. 228-31.

1 47



V I

E Q U A L I T Y

( i ) P O L I T I C A L E Q U A L I T Y

In the fifth ce nt ury d em oc ra cy , bo th as an established political c on

stitut ion and as an idea l, rea che d its cl ima x in A t h e n s and s om e oth er

Greek cities. Ag ai ns t it st oo d oli ga rc hy , b y no means a spent for ce,

and wheth er in p o w e r or in opp osi t io n al wa ys a foe to be r eck one d

wi th . Natu rally therefore an ideo logic al conflict de ve lo pe d1

w h i c h

led men on beyond consti tutional questions to larger problems ofhuman nature and human relations. Dem oc ra cy wa s part o f a gene ral

mo ve me nt towa rds equali ty, and the need to defend dem ocr acy wa s a

spur to further argu ment s in i ts fav our. Thu cy di de s pro vid es so me

o f the best examples of this, for instance in the speech of Athenagoras,

democra tic leader o f Syra cuse , w h o says to the y o u n g oligarc hs o f

his city (6 .38 .5 ) :

D o you dislike being polit ical ly on an equality with a large number? Buthow is it just for members of the same state to be denied the same rights?

I shall be told that democracy is neither sensible nor fair [literally 'equal'],

and that the wealthy are also the best fitted to rule; but I reply, first, that

demos means the whole state, oligarchy only a part ; secondly, that the

wealthy ma y be the best guardians o f proper ty, but the best counsellors

are the intelligent, and the best at listening to and jud ging arguments are

the many. An d in a democ racy all these, whe ther acting separately or toge ther ,

have an equal share.

He re w e ha ve the ideal o f a de mo cr ac y, in w h ic h the rich ha ve their

place, but it is for the most intelligent to g i v e counse l—poss ib ly

conflicting counsel , for there are t w o sides to ev er y ques tion —and

the decisio n is in the hand s o f the w ho le pe op le , w h e n they ha ve

listened to the arguments and sized them up. In practice it did not

1

A classic statement of it is the debat e wh ic h Herodotus somewhat incongruously re

presents as taki ng place betw een the three Persian usurpers on the respective merits of monarchy,

olig arch y and dem ocra cy. So far as the latter tw o are concerned, it is cast in an entirely Cre ek

mould. (Hdt. 3.80 -2 . )

I4 8



Homonoia

a l w a y s work out l ike that, for demos no less than oligoi could be applied to

a section only o f the popula t ion—could mean plebs as w e l l as populus1

-—

and as suc h co ul d be ruth less in its trea tmen t o f the ric h or inte lle ctua l.

More even than democracy, the concept most c l o s e l y connected with

equality was perhaps homonoia, con cor d (l i terally 'b ei ng o f one mi nd ') .

In the th ou gh t o f this per iod , the not ion s of justice, co nc or d, friend

ship2

and equa lit y we re seen as inte rdep ende nt i f no t identica l, and

essential to the pre ser vat ion o f the political order . Euri pid es ( to be

quo ted in con tex t sh ort ly ) sees equ ali ty as a bo n d o f un io n, un it in g

friend to friend, city to city, a l l y to a l l y . For Protagoras, it is justice

that 'b ri ng s orde r in to ou r cities and creates a bo nd o f friendship

and union' (Plato, Prot. 322c), and Socrates in the co ur se o fdemonstrating that the just is coextensive with the l a w f u l says that

co nc or d is the best o f all thi ngs f or a ci ty and its ob ject is to secu re

obedience to the laws (Xen. Mem. 4.4.16) . In the Republic (35 id )

the pursuit o f justice leads to co nc or d and friendship, and A ri st ot le

s a y s that i f the citizens are friends justice ma y wit he r aw ay . Leg isl at ors

are even more concerned with friendship than wi t h justi ce, for their

aim is to replace factio n b y co nc or d, and con co rd resemble s friends hip.Els ewhe re he defines co nc or d as 'fri endsh ip in the polit ical sp he re '. T o

inculcate friendship is the statesman's c h i e f end, for friends do not

co mm it injustice agains t each other . Indeed, 'jus tic e and friendship

are either the same or nearly so'. Concord does not mean simply

community of b e l i e f s . Th at cou ld exist be twe en strangers, or m ere ly

on an academic subject like astronomy. No, concord is a word applied

to cities wh en the citiz ens agre e ab ou t their c o m m o n interests, ma ke

' Cf . Vlas tos, Ί σ . τ τ ο λ . 8, η . ι : 'T he ambigu i ty in δ ή μ ο ς (pleps or populus) is all to the go od.

Opponents of demo cra cy can take it in the first s e n s e . . . whi le thoughtful demo crat s ca n

Invoke the second.'

' Philia, a wor d of re mar kab ly wi de applicat ion. Am on g hum an be in gs it is friendship or

•flection, but it extends be yon d t he human sphere. Arist ode (EN ι155a 18) saw it am on g bird s

end animals as w e l l , in the relati on betw een parents and offspring, and Theo phra stus eve n amo ng

plants. In the earlie r and more myth ica l cos mog ony of Pher ecy des (fr. 3) the wo rl d was c reated

b y α conflation of the opposites thr ough philia, and in Plato (Tim. 32c) cosmic philia resulted

from the geome tric struct ure of the wor ld. S i m i l a r l y in the Gorgias (508a) 'the w i s e ' say that

hcuven and eart h and god s and men are all hel d toge ther by com mu ni ty , philia, orderliness,

temp eran ce and justice . It is connected with the old doctr ine of ' l i k e to l i k e ' , for 'the wise men

who have written about nature and the whole say that l i k e must a l w a y s be philon to l i k e '

(l.y.\is 114b). In Umpcdoclcs the cosmic spirit of philia unites unlik es, but o nly because it has

(he power of assimilating them to each other (fr. 22.5), as the opposites were made to blend

In Pherecydes.

149



Equality

I 5 0

the same practical choices and carry them o u t .1

D o w n to the time o f

Plato and Aristot le , homonoia w a s mainly conceived as confined within

the polis, being in fact the virtue b y which it kept its unity and main

tained its elf agains t out sider s, a prevent ive o f that stasis (faction,

c i v i l strife) which so bedevi l led the life of the Greek city states.

' W a g i n g war ' is for Democr i tus (fr. 250) a mo n g the 'great deeds '

which concord alone makes possible for a ci ty . Gorgias however

seems to have used it in a pan-Hellenic sense, when he chose it as the

subject o f his oration to the inter-state assembly at O l y mp i a (fr. 8 a) ,

and this accords with his declaration that victories o f Greeks over

Greeks were matter for so r row (p. 162 b e l o w ) .

A t a t ime when democracy might in practice mean not the equal

participation o f the whole ci ty in government but the seizing o f p o w e r

b y the hitherto poor and underprivi leged at the expense of the rich

and wel l -born, the ideal o f homonoia, o f a concordia ordinum, might

w e l l seem to offer a better and truer concept ion o f equality. Equal

or equality itself is the most frequent catchword in the middle and

late fifth century, and the ideal is equal political and judicial rights.2

Pericles puts it ( T h u c . 2.37.1) tha t in the Athenian democracy power

is in the hands of the people, in private disputes everyone is equal

before the law, and public responsibilities are allotted n o t according to

1

Ar . EN H55a22ff . , EE I 2 4 i a 3 2 f f . , I234B22FF., EN 1 1 6 7 3 2 2 . For references to ο μ ό ν ο ια

se e further Schmid, Gesch. 163. Bignone {Studi, ZjR.) argued for a close relation between the

moral doctrine of concord in Antiphon's π . ο μ ο ν ο ί α ς and his doctrine of justice as developed

in the Α λ ή θ ε ι α . In the CUtopho, he noted, one of Socrates's pupils i s said to have maintained

that φ ι λ ί α was the product of δ ι κ α ι ο σ ύ ν η and ο μ ό ν ο ια the truest manifestation of φ ι λ ί α

(409 a- e, a ddi ng tha t it is not ό μ ο δ ο ξ ία , so that the whole passage stands in a very close relation

to Aristotle, especially EN 1 i 6 7 a 2 2 f f . ) . Bignone might have added Rep. 3 5 1 d, where Socrates

t e l l s Thrasymachus that injustice leads to hatred and fighting but justice to ο μ ό ν ο ι α and φ ι λ ί α .

In spite of the interesting passages which he adduces fo r comparison, Bignone hardly makes hispoint. Unfortunately, the extant fragments o f th e π . δ μ . make no reference to ο μ ό ν ο ια at all,

so we are quite in the dark as to what Antip hon said about it. Moreover, in reconciling ' Α λ .

and π . ό μ . he completely ignores col . 5 of OP 1364 fr. 1 (DK, 1 1 , 349 f . ) , where Antiphon s a y s

that people who do not attack others unless provoked, and who return the bad treatment of

their parents with kindness, are acting contrary to nature.

a

Ι σ ο ς , Ι σ ό τ η ς , Ι σ ο ν ο μ ία , Ι σ ο ν ο μ ε ϊσ θ ο π . For the meaning of Ι σ ο ν ο μ ία see Ehrenberg s.v.

in RE, Suppl. v n , 293 ff. Vlastos has argued against Gomme that, although not synonymous

with democracy, i t was a l w a y s identified with it in the fifth century. (Vlastos, Ί σ ο ν . π ο λ ι τ ι κ ή .

J a e g e r agreed, Paid. 1, 1 0 1 , n. 1.) This seems to be in general true, though I cannot go all the

w a y wit h Vlast os whe n he claims that the mention of ο λ ι γ α ρ χ ί α Ι σ ό ν ο μ ο ς at Thuc. 3.62.3

fits h i s theories perfectly. If, as he s a y s , the connotations of the two words are different, it isnot surprising if their denotations too should occasionally differ, if only to gain a special effect.

Cf. Ehrenberg, loc. cit. 296.



Political Equality

an y class sys tem but s ole ly on merit, n or is p ov er ty ever a bar to

of f ice . The new emphasis on equality as an ideal is perhaps best seen

in the pla ys o f Eur ipi des . O n dem oc ra cy itself his Th es eu s ech oes the

sentiments o f At he na go ra s and Pericles {SuppL 404): ' T h e ci ty is

free, the people rule in yearly turns o f of f ice , and the poor man is

g i v e n an equ al share wi th the ric h.' F o r the praise o f equa li ty as such

w e have the Phoenissae (531 ff.), where Jocasta pleads with her son to

renounce the pernicious daimon Am bi ti on , and hon our instead Equali ty,

who unites friend to friend, city to city and allies to their allies. What is

equal is a stable element in human l ife , but the less is always foe to the

greater and ushers in the day of hatred. Equality it is who established

measures and weights for men and delimited number. Equal in the year's

circuit are the path of dark night and o f the sun's light , and neither grudges

the other his victory. Shall day and nigh t serve mortals and you not br oo k

to g i v e your brother equal share in the dynasty with yourself? Where in

this is justice?

One notices again the readiness with which the Greek calls on nature

at large to endo rse a cou rse o f hu ma n ac ti on ; and as a reminder that

w e are in the ag e o f ferment wh er e ev er y arg ument has tw o sides w e

may notice that in the Ajax of Sophocles (668 ff.) the yielding of

wint er to sum mer and ni gh t to da y is used to sup po rt the con tr ary

moral that everywhere there are rulers and subjects, and sub miss ion

o f one to the other is necessar y. (Shakesp eare too th ou gh t that the

course of nature confirmed the indispensability o f ' de gr ee ' .) Interest

ing also is the connexion in thought between equality in the social

and pol it ical field and in the field o f metr ical standards and mathe

matical calculation. Evidently it was in the air before Archytas the

Pythagorean made his claim that the art o f calc ula tio n ' ends fa ctio n and

promotes unanimity' (see v o l . 1,336), and (as w e see from Pla to and Is o-

crates) led to a co nt ro ve rs y bet wee n th e' t w o equalities' , the geo metr ical

(anti-tyr annical bu t aristocratic) and the arithmetical (d emoc ra ti c) .1

1

lsoc. Areop. 21, Plato, Gorg. 508a, Laws 7 5 7 3 - 7 5 8 3 . It is interesting that to describe demo

cratic equality in the Laws Plato uses the same three words as Euripides in the same order: it is

τ ή ν μ ί τ ρ ω Ι σ η ν κ α Ι σ τ α θ μ ω κ α ΐ α ρ ι θ μ ώ , and in her praise of Ί σ ό τ η ς Jocasta s a y s (541 f.) :

κ α ΐ γ α ρ μ έ τ ρ ' ά ν θ ρ ώ τ τ ο ι σ ι κ α ι μ έ ρ η σ τ α θ μ ώ ν

Ί σ ό τ η ς έ τ α ξ ε κ ά ρ ι θ μ ό ν δ ι ώ ρ ι σ ε .

S ee uleo Soph. fr. 399 Ν . The phrase ο ϋ τ ' ά ρ ι θ μ φ ο ύ τ ε σ τ α θ μ ω at Xen. Symp. 4·43 suggests a

proverbial clement.

6 1 5 1 o s Ρ



Equality

(2) E Q U A L I T Y O F W E A L T H

A s to wealth there is, in its con tex t, some th in g almo st C hris tian in

Jocas ta's des ign ati on o f it as a trust from heaven (555): ' W e morta ls

do not hol d our we al th as a priv ate poss es si on; it is the god s' , and w e

have the care of it, but when they wish they take it back again.' Actual

redi stribution o f we al th on an egalita rian bas is, ev en if in a, to u s,

imperfect form, was first proposed by a certain Phaleas of Chalcedon,

pr ob ab ly ab out the end o f the fifth cent ury . ( O n his date see G o mp e r z ,

Gr. Th. 1, 578.) Aristot le (Pol. 1266339ff.,o u r o n

t y source) says he

was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal

possessions.1

By abolishing want he hoped to abolish crime, but

Aristotle comments that cold and hunger are not the sole incentives

to crime, and in fact the greatest cr imes are caused by excess and no t

b y nec es si ty: it is not me n's pos sessi ons but their desires and ambi tion s

that must be equalized, and this needs suitable education. Phaleas had

tho ugh t o f this to o, and wa s mod ern e no ug h to prop ose that not

only wealth but also education should be provided 'equally' by the

stat e: but, says Ari st otl e, it is no use ev er yo ne ha vi ng the same edu ca

tion i f it is o f the wr o n g sor t, and Phal eas sho uld tell us wha t kind o f

education he proposes.

(3) S O C I A L E Q U A L I T Y

T h e spirit o f egalitarianism led to a que st ion ing o f distinctions based

not only on wealth but on birth or race, and even to that between

master and slav e, wh i c h hither to h ad seemed to mos t Gr ee ks natural

and fundamental. An ti ph on , the oppo nent o f nomos in all its fo rms,

issued his cha ll eng e on bot h nobl e bir th and race in an impor tant

par agraph so far omi tte d fro m our summ ar y o f the pa pyr us fr agme nts .2

It runs thus :

1

ί σ α ; ε ί ν α ι τ ά ς κ τ ή σ ε ι ς τ ώ ν π ο λ ι τ ώ ν . Later however (126 709 ) Aristotle s a y s that he limited

this to the possession of land. Of cour se the e qua li ty, as wo ul d be expected at this time, appli ed

only between citizens, and Phaleas even proposed that all artisans should be publicl y ow ned

slaves ( 1 2 6 7 ^ 5 ) .1

OP 136 4, fr. 2, DK , fr. 44 B . It is thus from the fragment who se auth enti cit y is guarant eed ,though i ts relat ion to fr. 1 is un kno wn . (S ee OP, vol. x i , 93.) Consi derabl e restoration has

been necessary in the first few l i n e s , but their sense can be taken as certain.

152



Antiphon on Birth and Race

The sons of noble fathers we respect and look up to , but those from humble

homes we neither respect nor look up to. In this we behave to one another

l ike barbarians,1

since by nature we are all made to be alike in all respects,

both barbarians and Greeks.* This can be seen from the needs which all

men have. [They can all be provided in the same way by all men, and in all

this]3

none o f us is marked off as either barbarian or G reek; for we all

breathe the air wi th our mouth and nostrils and [eat wi th our hands ? ] . . .

I f the l o g i c o f this passage appears str ange (' W e pa y great attention

to hi gh birth, but this is to beh av e like barbarians, for (έ π ε ί) in

reality there is no difference be tw ee n barbarians and G r e e k s ' ) , that

may be due to the fragmentary state o f the te xt,4

and at least Antiphon's

message is plain, that in nature there is no essential dis tinction either

between high and low birth or between different r a c e s . 5 Another who

at about the same time or rather later (there is mu ch uncert ain ty abo ut

his date) castigated distinctions based on birth was the Sophist

Lycophron . W e kn o w o f this from Aris tod e,6

who in a dialogue On

Nobility of Birth mad e one o f the speakers confess his bewi ld erment as

to the appli cation o f the term. His co mp an io n replies that this is very

natural, for there is mu ch divi sion and o bscu rit y abo ut its significance,

even more among philosophers than am on g ordinary men.

1

Barbaroi stric tly means all non- Greek-speaking people, and is often used to mak e this

factual distinction with no der ogat ory implica tion. Nevertheless the Gree ks had a strong sense

of their superiority to other men, and more often the derogato ry implication wa s promine nt.

In ordinary speech the word carried an imputation of ignorance, stupidity, or l a c k of moral

sense. It is an insult when Tyndareus s a y s to Menelaus (Eur. Or. 485) β ε β α ρ β ά ρ ω σ α ι , χ ρ ό ν ι ο ; ώ ν

iv β ά ρ β α ρ ο ι ;.1

If this is the translation, the Greek is rather unusual. Grenfell and Hunt render: 'we are

a l l by nature a l i k e fu l ly adapted to be either barbarian s or Hell enes ', whi ch is prob ably more

accurate. Nevertheless the following sentences show that the intention is in fact to obliterate the

distinction between the two. The double emphasis in φ ύ σ ε ι τ τ ε φ ύ κ α μ ε ν is lost in English.

' Of the word s in squar e bra cke ts little is left in the Greek, and the tr anslat ion f ollo ws

Bignone's restoration in Studi, p. 65, for which he finds hints in a passage of Porphyry's De

abilinentia (3.25, p. 221 Nauck).

* And no doubt also to a soph isti c str ain ing after rhetorical effect b y mea ns of the doubl e

(factual and pejorative) significance of β ά ρ β α ρ ο ; . The whole argument may have been some

thing l i k e thi s: ' W e pa y too muc h attention to a man' s race or, withi n our o wn race , to his

descent. We c a l l the rest of mankind barbaroi, and use the term to mean ignorant or uncivilized;

and ut the same time we respect or despise people according to their ancestry. If barbaros means

•tupid, are we not the real barbaroi here? In point of fact there is no difference in nature between

Gre eks and non-Greeks. All men are the same at bottom, with the same needs and means of

satisfying them. Nor is there an essential difference between high and low born. '

' Turn's point that only biological equality is in question has been adequately dealt with by

Merlun, CP (1950), 164, and Baldry, Unity, 43ff.

' Fr. 91 Hose, p. 59 Ros s (Oxf. trans .). For Lyc ophron see pp. 3 1 3 f. below.

I 5 3 6-2



Equality

1 54

Is it a precious and good thing, or as Lycophron the Sophist wrote, some

thing altogether empty? C ompar ing it wi th other goods , he says that its

splendour is not apparent, and its dignity lies in words, maintaining that to

prefer it is a matter o f opinion, whereas in truth there is no difference between

l o w born and high born.

S i m i l a r sentiment s on the subjec t o f nob le birth are frequentl y on

the lips of the characters in Euripides, and it is typical of him that in

his Electro, he marries the daugh ter o f A g a m e m n o n to a po or peasant

remarkabl e for the cour tes y and nob il ity o f his charact er.1

His virtues

p r o v o k e Ores tes to reflections like these (367ff.): ' A b o u t ma nl y

virtue nothing is clear, for there is confusion in the natures of men.

I ha ve seen a wo rt hl es s so n o f a no bl e father, and fine chi ldr en sp ru ng

from the unw or thy , po ve rt y in the wi t o f a rich man and a great mind

in a poor man's body.' More outspoken is an unidentified character in

the Dictys (fr. 336): ' O f hi gh birth I have little g o o d to say. In m y

e y e s the go o d ma n is the nob le , and the unjust b ase-bor n thou gh his

father be a greater than Z e u s . ' In keeping with this are several passages

on bastar dy wh i ch insist that the bastard is b y nature the equal o f the

legitimate, and only inferior by nomos, or in name.2

The subject of the

Alexander (Pri nce Pri am di sguise d as a slav e-herd sman) g a v e Euripides

an oppo rt un it y of raising the questions o f bir th and of sl avery fro m

bo th sides.3 O n bir th the chorus sing (fr. 52):

W e go too far if we praise noble birth among mortals. Wh en first, long

a g o , the human race was born , and Earth our mother brought them for th,4

1

In the interests of accuracy it must be said that in the prologue the peasant proclaims him

se l f the descendant of a noble line, who has come down in the world, but as he s a y s , 'pover ty

wipes out nobility', and in view of Orestes's remarks it seems that litt le signif icance is to be

attache d to the fact. In Greece, even in Euri pide s's ti me, noble li neag e and material possession s

s t i l l went together more than they do with us (Nestle, Euripides, 323), and the helplessness of

the first wit hou t the second is emphasi zed elsew here in Eurip ides (frr. 22, 95, 326). For his

attitude to mone y in genera l, see Nestl e, Eur. 334ff. That poverty need not destroy inherited

nob ili ty of charac ter is repeated in a fragment of hi s Archelaus (fr. 232). But one must nev er

forget that his lines are spoken in character. Fr. 235 expresses utter contempt for wealth, but

fr. 248 appears to revil e pov ert y, an d all three fr agments are from the same pla y.

1

Androm. 638, frr. 14 1, 168, 377 . Th at the well- bor n are the virtu ous i s said to have been

maintained by Antisthenes (DL, 6.10).3

For the plot of the play and context of fragments see Vogt, Sklaverei, i6f.4

The choice of verb here ( δ ι έ κ ρ ι ν ε ) bet ray s the poet's interest in natural science, for to

hi s contempor ary Anax agor as and other philos opher s the process whic h ga ve birth to the

cosmos and all liv ing creatur es in it wa s one of conti nuous 's epa ra ti on '. T his primal uni form ity

of mankind appears also in Sophocles's Tereus (fr. 532).



Nolle Birth: Slavery

the land engendered all to loo k alike. W e have no peculiar traits, h ig h and

low born are the same stock, but time through nomos has made birth a

matter of pride.

T h e obscu ri ty and confu sion wh ic h Euripides and L y co p h r o n found

in this topic were natural en o ug h at a time w h e n the divi sio n aristo

cr at- co mm on er b y no means necessari ly coinci ded wi th the poli t ical

division ol iga rch-democra t . 'T h e who le deve lopment sho ws that up

to the end o f the fifth ce nt ur y in At h en s the no bi li ty fo rm ed a po w e r

which could make its influence strongly felt as much on the side of the

democratic consti tut i on as occasionall y in vehe ment o ppo sit ion to i t . '1

Fo r Eurip ides the test is mor al. N o long er can no bl e and g o o d , base-

born and bad, be interchangeable terms as they were for a Theognis,

whose wo r d s are o b v i o u sl y adap ted to a mor al sense in the lines

' N o b i l i t y consorts not with the bad, but with the good' (Alex. fr. 53).

(4) S L A V E R Y

Fo r most Gr eek s soci ety wit ho ut s lavery was unthin kable. T h e

t reatment o f slaves, and the w o r k they were gi ve n to do, varied w id el y .2

A t Ath ens they wer e em pl oy ed in domes tic service, in priv ately ow ne d

factories, in mines (where the conditions might be hard indeed), and

to a smaller exte nt on the land,3 wh ic h in At ti ca wa s mo st ly c ul tiv ate d

b y small peasant ho lde rs. T h e lot o f dom estic slaves natura lly vari ed,

but Aris top han es depicts them as spe aki ng freely, and som eti mes

imp ude ntl y, to their masters. Th e intelligent we re gi v en pos ts o f

responsibility as secretaries or bank-managers, and might ultimately

be freed by their ow ne rs . In the fourth ce ntu ry Arches tra tus beq uea the d

his ban k to his for mer slav e Pa sio n, w h o in turn leased it to his own

freed slav e. A co m m o n practice w a s for ow ne rs of industr ial sl aves to

al low them to w o r k ind epen den tly, pa yi ng a fixed sum from their

earnings and keep in g the rest, and these mi gh t save en ou g h to b u y

1

Nestle, Euripides, 324. Cf. p. 38, n. 1, above.

' For authorities see Α . II. M. Jones in Slavery, ed. Finle y. Th e other e s s a y s in this c o l l e c

tion are also to be recommended; also Nestle, Euripides, 348 ff., and J . Vo gt , Sklaverei und

llumuniiilt, 1 — 1 9 . V. Cttflley in JHI, 1966, deal s wit h it und er four he ad s: (1) as an i mpos itio n

of l a t e , (1) as the justifiable position of inferiors, (3) communal s l a v e r y , wi th , as a fourth,

tnrliiphiirical s l a v e r y of a man to hi s own base desi res.

I l l u l sec Finley in Slavery, 14H f.



Equality

i 5 6

their f reedom. The complaint o f the O l d Ol ig ar ch ' (pse udo- Xen .

Ath. Pol. ι . 10) is w e l l k n o w n : slaves at At he ns are an insolent lot w h o

w i l l no t get ou t o f yo u r w a y in the street, and y o u are no t all owed to

strike them for the simple reason that there is no th in g in their dress

and general appearance to distinguish them from free Athenians.Demosthenes too says that slaves at At he ns ha ve greater righ ts o f free

speech than the citizens o f oth er states, and there wa s a la w unde r

which anyone could be prosecuted for an act of hybris against slave

as w e l l as citizen.1

In spi te o f all this the hard fact remained that the

slave wa s a chattel to be bo ug ht and sold. So me we al th y men bo ug ht

large numbers and made a good income by leasing them out as

labourers.

I f slavery as an institution was accepted, there was a general feeling

against enslaving Greeks,2

and mos t slaves we re obta ined , b y war o r

raids, from no n- Gr ee k countries. In this w a y the question o f sla very

was con nec ted in the Gr ee k min d, as in the Am er ic an , wi th that o f

racial inferi ority. A s Iphi geni a says in Euri pides (LA. 1400): 'It is

right for Gr ee ks to rule ov e r barbarians, but not barbarians ov er

G r e e k s , for the y are slaves, bu t w e are free.' It is li ke ly therefore that

Ant iphon, who denied any natural distinction between Greek and

barbarian, also opp ose d the doctrine o f 'natura l sl ave s' wh i ch pre

domin ated at the time and wa s later defended b y Ar is to tl e ;3 bu t the

fact is not explicitl y record ed. C o lo ur wa s gi ve n to the idea o f

barbarian inferiority by the Gr ee k vi ct or y ov er the Persians and b y

the ten den cy o f othe r peopl es to be despo ticall y ruled, for sub miss ion

to a human despot rather than to la w wa s in Gre ek eye s equ iva len t

to slave ry. Mor eo ve r the mor al and intellectual inferi ority o f their

slaves was a fact, the inev itabl e effect, no t o f nature, bu t o f the c o m

plete depri vati on of initiative th rou gh be in g em pl oy ed as 'l iv in g

too ls ' , a life o f ' a l w a y s appeas ing the masters, for this is best for slav es,

and to please their lords in whatever task is assigned them Ά

1

Demosth. Phil. 3.3 , In Meid. 46-8. Cf. Eur. Hec. 2oif. On the l a w s of slavery at Athens

see Harrison, The Laws of Athens (1968), pt. I, ch. 6.2

For further information, see Ne wman , Politics, vol. I, 142 f.3

So Nestle, VMûL, 377. But on Arist otle' s description of the slave as a 'l iv in g tool ',see Harrison, The Laws of Athens, 163 , n. 2.

4

Eur. fr. 93. Th is enforced det erior ation w as alre ady recog nize d in Homer. See Od. 1 7 . 32zf . :

s l a v e r y robs a man of half his ά ρ ί τ ή .



Criticisms of Slavery

A c c o r d i n g to R . Schlaifer, o f all critici sm o f sla ver y as an insti tutio n

(as distinct from errors and abuses in its application) ' t here are only

three sur vi vin g scra ps: a sentence o f A l c i d a m a s , a reference in Aristotle,

and an ec ho in Ph i l e mo n ' . N o n e o f these be lo ng s to the fifth cen tu ry .

Schlaifer ho we ve r has excluded Euripides on the gr ou nd that, t h o u g h

he proclaims that the slave may be better than his mast er and ther efore

w r o n g l y enslaved, he shared the common belief that some were by

nature fitted only for slavery.1

T o isolate his o w n v i e w s is difficult,

since he wa s a dramatist and hi s character s utter opposing sentiments,

but at the ve ry least he prov id es eviden ce o f a mo un ti ng tide of p ro

test against slav ery in his lifetime. T h e theme o f the Alexandros, as

w e have seen, made it a natural forum o f oppo sing v i e w s , on the one

hand the splend id affirmation o f the equal ity of all me n (p p. i54f.

a b o v e ) , and on the other sentiments like these:

fr. 48:' There is no greater burden, no more worthless and useless pos

session in a house than a slave with thoughts above his station' (cf. fr. 2 1 6 ) .

fr. 49: 'So ev i l is the race of s l a v e s , all bel ly, never lo ok in g to the future.'

fr. 50: 'Slaves who are w e l l disposed towards their master's house incur

great hostility from their equals.'

fr. 5 1: 'I t is a bad th ing to have slaves wh o are too go od for their

masters.' (Cf. fr. 251.)

Fr. 86, from the Alcmaeon, says that anyone who trusts a slave is a f o o l .

From other passages we can be sure that these wo r ds we re uttered b y

unsym pathe tic characters. T h e freq uenc y wi th wh ic h a slave is sh ow n

as symp athe tic, and the relationship b et we en slaves and their masters

described in favou rable, eve n tou chi ng , terms, does not o f itself pr ov e

an antipathy to slavery as such,2

bu t is nevertheless strikin g. T h e

wretchedness of a slave's lot was alluded to in the Archelaus (fr. 245):

' O n e thing I ad vi se : nev er let yo ur se lf be taken alive into slav ery

if you have a chance of dying as a free man.' But it need not always

be s o : ' H o w pleasan t it is for slaves to find g o o d mast ers , and for the

1

See Schlaifer's informative essay in Finley, p. 127. But for Euripides's belief in natural slavery

hct relics entirely on fr. 57, whereas (a) it is completely without context, and sounds as if it

wrro upokcn by a tyrant or other unpleasant character, (k) the text itself is uncertain and the

word φ ύ σ ι ι an emendation.

' I ' l . H o , who was no abolitionist, says that slaves have often proved better than brothers or

•ο η · , unci have saved their masters ' lives, proper ty and whole families (Laws 776a).

1 57



Equality

1 5»

masters to have a w e l l dis pose d slave in the h o m e ' (fr. 529). T h e

slaves o f A l c e s t i s are dist raught w it h gr ie f at the death o f her wh o wa s

a mother to them (Ale. 1921!., 769 f.) , though th ey admit it is no t

everywhere thus (ibid. 2iof . ) , and there are many other passages

in the same strain.1

Hippolytus listens and replies seriously when hisslave offers ad vi ce , and the same slav e doe s not sh rink f rom def end ing

him against his father's anger (Hipp. 88 ff., i249ff.). B ot h the faithful

ness and the pathos o f a slave are reflected in the wo r ds o f A n d r o

mache's handmaid agreeing to go on a dangerous mission for her

mistress (Andr. 89): ' I w i l l g o , and if anyt hing happens to me —w el l ,

the life of a slave-woman is of little worth'; and in the Helena (1639)

another handmaid defends her mistress with the words: ' K i l l not your

sister bu t me , for to no bl e slaves it is a g lo ry to die for their lo rds. '

Th e freedom o f speech al lo wed to slaves in Euripid es wa s br ou gh t

against him by Aristophanes (Frogs 949), an d the general l ack o f it

is repeated ly men tio ned in his play s as a feature o f the slave 's hard lo t .2

I f in these passages Euri pides does no mo re than show sympathy

for slaves, and per haps reflect an actuall y exi sti ng relationship wh e n

at its best, else where he go es further in cla imi ng that a slave may be

the equal or superior o f the free. A t Helena 730 a slav e cla ims to ha ve

't he mind, t ho ug h not the name, o f a free man ', 3 just as in a fragmen t

from the Melanippe (511) it is said that ' t he na me o f slave w i l l not

cor rup t a g o o d man , and many slaves are better than the free', and

from the Phrixus (831): ' t o ma ny slaves the name brin gs disgrace

though in heart they belong more to the free than those who are not

s l a v e s ' . 4

In the Ion the statement is gi ve n univ ersa l for m. T h e old

slave-tutor of Creusa's father, whom she hails as a friend and w e l l -

wisher and promises to cherish as her own father (730 f f . ) , after de-

* Ion 725-34, 566; Med. 54, Bacch. 1027. S l a v e s share the j o y s and sorro ws of the h ous e

hold.1

Phoen. 392, Ion 674, fr. 313.3

Even Sophocl es wa s prepared to let a character go as far as this. See fr. 854 tl σ ώ μ α

δ ο ϋ λ ο ν , ά λ λ ' ό voOs ε λ ε ύ θ ε ρ ο ; ; and the accidental character of slavery, at least in a special case,

i s bro ugh t out by the chorus in Aesc hyl us' s Agamemnon (1084), when they say of C assan dra' s

gift of prophecy μ έ ν ε ι τ ό θ ε ί ο ν δ ο υ λ ί α π ε ρ έ ν φ ρ ε ν ί .4

Fr. 495 · 4 ' ff-> seem s to mean that the br av e and just, even if of slave stock, are nobler thanothers wh o are full of va in fanc ies ; bu t I do not find the text alt ogeth er clear , nor d oes the literal

translation in Nestle's note (Eur. p. 546) seem to correspond very w e l l with his version in the

text (p . 358) . Co nt ra st fr. 97ο ά κ ά λ α σ θ ' ό μ ιλ ε Τ ν γ ί γ ν ε τ α ι δ ο ύ λ ω ν τ έ κ ν α .



Euripides and Alcidamas on Slavery

claring that he is ready to die in her service adds (854): 'One th ing

alone br ings shame u pon slaves , the name. In all else the sl ave, i f he

be a good man, is no worse than the free.' In these passages, taken

with fr. 52, or a line like fr. 336, 2—' the well-born man is the good

ma n' —i t w ou ld be perve rse not to reco gniz e an out rig ht denial o f

natural div isi ons wi th in the human race wh er eb y one can be bo rn to

serve and another to rule, with the corollary that slavery is wrong in

itself. A slave as such is of no less worth than a free man. If he is

morally inferior, that is due either to his own individual character or

to slav ery itself, wh ich has ruined an ori ginall y g o o d ma n.1

Apart from Euripides (who died in 406), the only surviving affirma

tion o f this before the time o f Ar is to tl e is a quo tat ion fr om a pupi l o f

G o r g i a s named A l c i d a m a s : ' G o d has set all men free; nature has made

no man a slave.' This occurred in a speech to the Spartans recom

mending them to liberate Messene , wh os e inhabitants had bee n serfs

o f theirs for centuries, but no reference to the historical context can

w e a k e n the univer sal ity o f the principle as enunciated. Th at is guara n

teed by the wor ds ' G o d ' , 'a ll ' and 'na tur e ' .3

Sla ver y wa s already, as

Newman pointed out (Politics, 1, 143), 'undergoing a rigorous ex

aminati on, in the cour se of wh ich one form o f it after anot her wa s

being we ig he d in the balance and found want in g, and first ensl ave ment

for debt, then the enslav ement of Gr ee ks, then ensla vement th ro ug h

w a r , wer e successivel y be in g eliminated, so that a total con demn ati on

o f the institution might w e l l seem to be at ha nd '. N o w it has bee n

' Th is is wel l and forcefully put by Nes tle , Eur. 359.

* I therefore confine such reference to a footnote. The actual words ( ε λ ε υ θ έ ρ ο υ ; ό φ η κ ε

π ά ν τ α ; θ ε ό ; · ο ύ δ έ ν α δ ο ϋ λ ο ν ή φ ύ σ ι ; π ε π ο ί η κ ε ν ) are quoted by a scholiast on Ar. Rhet 1 3 7 3 b ,

where Aristotle is ar gui ng for the existence of a natura l as distinct from a mer ely leg al justice.

A l l c r quot ing the familiar lines of the Antigone about the eternal unwritten l a w s , and a passage

In lite same strain from Empedocles , he ad ds : 'an d so also Alc ida mas in his Messenian speech '.

Thus Aristotle himself had no doubt that Alci dama s was speaking of a universa l law of nature,

/ . f i l e r however (quoted by Newman, Politics, 1, 14 1, n. 1) thought that to hav e attacked the

whole Institution of slaver y woul d not have served the purpose of his speech, therefore he

would not have done so, and Levinson agrees (D. of P. 142 ): it is 'ext reme ly unlik ely that he

would have been led on to make a unive rsal application of his pri nc ipl e' (an excellent exampl e

11Γ ihr textbook rhetorical argume nt έ κ τ ο ΰ ε ΐ κ ό τ ο ; . See pp. 178 f. be lo w) . But the fact is thatthe uliilenicnt is universal, and no conjectures about what was prudent or tactful can stand up

ι ΐμ ,ι ιΙ ι ΐΝ ΐ the words themselves . Th e Sophist 's since rity, or his capa city for doub le- think, do

nut enter the question. Hrzoska (RE, I, 1536) supposed that the wor k was not a gen uin e speech

for the occasion but only a 'Schulstuck'. The scholiast's use of the verb μ ε λ ε τ ά ν ( Ο π ε ρ

Μ ι ο ο η ν Ι ω ν μ ι ι λ ι τ φ κ α ΐ λ έ γ ε ι ) supports this. For Al cid amas see pp. 31 iff. bel ow.

'59



Equality

(5) R A C I A L E Q U A L I T Y

T h e ans wer lies in the g r o w t h o f the co sm op ol it an idea, for, since the

enslavement of Gr ee k b y Gr ee k was general ly unpopul ar, slavery

could only be theoretically defended on the ground that barbarians

(non-Greeks) were naturally inferior. This was the v i e w of Plato,

1 60

uttered , and sure ly a grea t step forw ar d in the hi st or y of hu ma n rela

tions has been taken. O f cour se men 's exasperating abil ity to kee p

their th ou gh ts in separate comp art men ts persisted. Le vi ns on point s

out that the Justinian code, after laying down as a principle that

' s l ave ry is contrary to natural l aw ', proceeds to exp oun d the rights o fthe sl av e- ow ner in min ute d eta il ; and in the nineteenth cen tu ry an

Amer ican slave-owner could happily acquiesce in the words of the

Declaration of Independence, ' tha t all me n are created equ al '. T h e

struggle was destined to be long, but it had begun, and a powerful

we ap on for the oppo nen ts o f slav ery had bee n for ged , wh en the

assertion that it had no foundation in nature was first openly made.

Alcidamas wrote his Messenian speech about 360. Late in the same

cen tu ry the affirmation recurs in a pl ay o f Ph i le mo n (fr. 95 K o c k ) :

' E v e n i f a ma n be a sl ave, he has the same flesh; no on e was ever a

slave b y nature, though chance enslaves the body. ' The currency of

the idea in the sec ond hal f o f the fou rth ce nt ur y is also attested b y

Aristot le , who writes in the Politics ( i 253b2o) : ' S om e howev e r ho ld

that sla ve- own ers hi p is unnatu ral. It is on ly b y nomos that one is slave

and another free, for in nature there is no difference. Neit her , then, is

it just , for it is ba sed o n fo rc e. ' B y this time, then ( pr ob ab ly after 335),

these liberal sentiments were w e l l known, but it is a matter o f l i v e l y

controversy whether they were already current in the time with which

w e are now c h i e f l y con cern ed, in the At he ns o f Euri pide s and S ocrate s,

and are to be attr ibut ed to an earlier gen era ti on o f Sophis ts than

A l c i d a m a s . H o w true is the c la im o f Nest le in 1901 that ' i t w i l l re

dound for all time to the glory of Greek sophistic that, starting from

the conception of natural law, it opposed the existence of slavery on

theoretical grounds, and the Socratic school, Plato and Aristotle,

represent on this poi nt a deci ded ly retro grade st ep '?



Effect of Environment on Character

L6L

who would only admit the enslavement of barbarians (Rep. 4 6 9 b - c ) .1

I le wa s prepared to be mo re specific : on ly Gre ek s we re characterized

b y g o o d intellect and lo ve o f learning , nor therners like Thr ac ian s and

Scythians were bold and irascible by nature, Phoenicians and Egypt ian s

avaricious (435 e - 4 3 6 A ) . A l l this had a basis in co nt em po ra ry science,

for the fifth-century Hip poc rat ic treatise on Airs, Waters and Places

g i v e s a detailed acc ou nt o f the effects o f clima te on characte r and

intellect as we ll as phy si que . C ond iti ons in As ia Min or prod uc e peop le

o f go od phy siq ue but pleas ure-l ovin g and lac king in cou rag e and

indus try, dwe lle rs in the ho t marshes o f the Phasis re gi on are fat,

slu ggi sh and unfit for wo rk , and so on . Gr ee ks , li vi ng in an inter

mediate geographi cal posit io n, possess bo th intell igence and cou rag e,

which makes them a natural master-race.2

When, in spite of this

scientific veneer, it began to be claimed that racial distinctions we re

unnatural, exist ing only by nomos, the last theoretical p r o p of slavery

was removed, and this cla im, as w e ha ve seen, w as already ma de b y

Ant ipho n. Some mo re general statements ma y also be noticed wh ic h

tend in the same di rect ion. In a fragment o f Eu ri pi de s (902) w e f in d:

' T h e go o d [in som e authorities " w i s e " ] man, ev en if he l ive in a far-

o f f land, ev en if m y eye s nev er light on him , I ju dg e m y frie nd',

and there seems to ha ve been a pr ov er bi al ex pre ssi on to the effect that

a good man 's fatherland wa s the wh ol e wor ld. 3

It is impor tan t to distinguish between pan-Hellenism and a wider

cosmopolitanism which embraced the barbarians.4

T h e relations b e-

' Plato defended s l a v e r y to the end of his l i fe , in Laws as w e l l as Rep. Th e pass age in the

I'oliiicus ( z f a c - e ) where he g i v e s Greeks and barbarians as an example of a faulty classification,because one non- Gre ek r ace differs from an othe r as much as eithe r from the Gr eek, has been

died as evidence of a temporary change of mind (Schlaifer, op. ch. 98). Whether the illustration

in meant to have more than formal l o g i c a l significance is perhaps doubtf ul. In spite of Sk em p

1 1 1 / loc. it is difficult to fit 'b it in g sar cas m' here into Pla to' s general view , whi ch lasted until the

/.met, and Plato 's point in vol ves no nece ssary denial that all the different b arba rian race s are

In H O M E respects inferior to the Greek. It is not ewo rth y how eve r that in the Phaedo (78 a ) he

recommends searching not only the whole of Greece but also the barbarian nations to find a

cure L O R the fear of death.

1

I lippocr. A.W.P. chs. I 2 f f . (11 , 52 L. ) The last point, abo ut the Gre eks , is adde d b y Aris totle

( / W . 13 27 b 29), but obv iou sly in dependence on earlier sources.1

luir . fr. 1047, Dcm ocr . fr. 247 ( a g a i n in the form of an iamb ic trimeter, on whic h D K1 0

I I , Nachtr. p. 424, is inadequate), L y s i a s Or. 3 1 . 6 . It is adapted in Aristoph. Plut. 1151 and

Time. 2. 4] . 1.4

Ki r .1 brief acco unt of the gro wt h of the Greek sense of un it y and s upe ri ori ty to other

l a c e * , \cr Schlaifer, op. cit. 93 IT. On the pan -He llenic outl ook of the Sop his ts, pp. 43 f. abo ve.



Equality

ΐ62

tween the Greek city-states were paradoxical. Independent and jealous,

they made constant war on one another, yet the sense of Hellenic

unity was strong, and fostered by the great pan-Hellenic festivals at

O l y m p i a , De lp hi and the Isthm us, for wh ic h quarrels we re temp orari ly

set aside and a sacred truce pro cl ai med. A t these times the ties o f ac o m mo n langu age (e ve n if split into dialects), relig ion and cultur e

(typified by the Homeric poems) overruled the differences between the

states. In the fifth and fourth centuries the fragmentation of the

Greek-speaking world came more and more to be regarded as f o l l y ,

and writer s w h o use the lan gua ge o f cosm opol ita nism ma y mean on ly

to co mm en d pan-Hel len ism, wh i c h in itself accentuated rather than

softened the distinction be tw ee n Gre ek and barbarian. T h e ideal wa s

the uni on o f Gr ee ks against the no n- Gr ee k wo rl d wh ic h had b een

achieved wi th such success in the Persian wa rs . Go rg ia s wr ot e (fr. 5 b)

that victor ies ov er barbarians called for hy mn s of tha nks giv ing , but

those ov er fel lo w- Gr ee ks for dirges. Hippias in the Protagoras (337c)

c a l l s the wh ol e co mp an y, from different states, ' m y kin smen and

f a m i l y and fel low-cit izens—by nature, not by nomos, for by nature

l i k e is kin to like, but nomos, tyrant o f mank ind , violates nature in

many w a y s ' . It wo u l d therefore be scandalous i f they, the wis est o f

the Greeks, fe l l out am on g them selve s. Here opinion s ha ve differed on

the question whe the r Hippia s is prea chin g the uni ty o f man kin d or

simply of Greeks, or indeed of philosophers, for it could w e l l be they

w h o m he means to cal l 'natural ly a l ike ' ( ό μ ο ι ο ι ) .1

D o e s Hippias he re

' r ecogn ize ' , as Untersteiner thinks, 'as friends and kinsmen the men

o f all cities and all na ti on s' ? Hi s actual words are the same as those o f

Plato's Socrates at Rep. 470c when he says that the Gr ee k race is ' o n e

f a m i l y and one kin', but immediately adds that Gr ee ks and barbarians

are not only alien but natural enemies.2

The fact that Hippias, like

Ant iphon , distinguished nomos from physis and rejected the former

doe s not , o f itself, pr ov e that he would have joined him in assigning

dist inc tions o f race and class to it, no r does his acq uie scence in the

existence o f certain universal unwr itt en la ws in Xe no p ho n.

1 For various opinions see Untersteiner, Sophs. 283 f., Sof. i l l , 10 41" . ; Bignone, StuJi, 29;

Baldry, Unity, 43; Strauss, J. of Metaph. 1959, 433.1

a u y v E v e ' s τ ε κ α ΐ ο ίκ ε ί ο υ ξ Hi pp ia s i n Prot. of the assemble d (Gree k) company; τ ό

Έ λ λ η ν ικ ά ν yivos ο ώ τ ό α ϋ τ ω ο ί κ ε ϊο ν κ α ΐ σ ν γ γ ε ν έ ί Rep.



Greeks and Barbarians

1 63

T h e relations be tw ee n Gre ek s and barbarians w er e co mp le x, and

cannot be adequately discussed here.1

Plato might in one place dismiss

the Egy pt ia ns as ava ric iou s, bu t in the Timaeus he makes them the

repositories o f ancient wi s do m in contrast to the 'ch il dl ik e' Gr ee ks .

T h e debt of Gr ee k science and mathematics to non -G re e k peopl eswas freely ac kn ow le dg ed b y Her odo tu s and others. Hippias himself

said that in wr it in g a w o r k o f his ow n he had mad e use o f the poet s

'a nd the pro se-w rit ers bo t h Gr ee k and bar bar ian ' (fr. 6). Her e w e are

simply concerned with the question whether the idea later known as

the unity of man kin d or the br ot her hoo d o f man was alread y m oo te d

in the fifth cen tur y. It wa s, b y An t i p ho n, and pro ba bl y b y Hip pia s and

others too . T h o u g h our k no wl ed ge is lamentably scanty, i t wo u l d bestrange if b e l i e f in universal , 'nat ura l ' laws o f huma n beh avi our we re

not accompanied by a conviction that the hu ma n race is f unda ment all y

aki n. T h e idea o f the bas ic equ al it y o f ma nk in d wa s firmly ro ot ed in

anth ropo logi cal theo ry. Since all me n orig inal ly came from the earth,

a by -p ro du ct o f the fermentation o f mu d or slime, nature ga ve no one

the right to va un t hi ms el f as sp ru ng fr om better st oc k than anyone

e l s e .

2

Th at sort o f dist incti on cam e on the scene later as a pr od uc t o fnomos only. This anthropological basis for the nomos-physis antithesis

means that its justification o f equa lit y is unive rsal, and it is r easo nabl e

to suppose that a ma n wi th any pretensions to ph il os op hy w h o fou nd

it relevant to one disti nction w o u l d app ly it to al l— hi gh and l o w

bor n, master and slave , At he ni an and Spartan, Gre ek and no n- Gr ee k.

1

Vol ume v m of the Entretiens Hardt (Grecs et Barbares) is devot ed to a discuss ion of t hem.1

W e have just seen this ap plied to disti nction s of birth in Euripi des (fr. 52, pp. 1 5 4 f. above).

S e e also p. 58 (Archelaus) and vol. 1 1 , pp. 207, 315 with n. 4, 343, 472.



V I I

THE R E L A T I V I T Y

OF V A L U E S AND ITS E F F E C T S ON

E T H I C A L T H E O R Y1

I f physical philosophy begins in wonder, ethics may be said to have begun

in scepticism. G ra nt , Ethics, I , 1 5 5 .

T h e chapter on the Soph ist s (p. 49) men tioned Sir Al ex an de r Gr an t' s

division of morality into three stages, cor res pon di ng in a nati on tochi ld hoo d, adoles cence and matur ity in the ind ivi dual . In one respect

his div isi on w o u l d no t pass unc hal len ged t oda y. He calls the sec on d,

sceptical or sophistic era ' transitional' , and implies that only the th i rd ,

that is, a return to earlier beliefs mo re de ep ly hel d beca use attained b y

indepe ndent tho ug ht , represents maturi ty. In Gr ee k th ou gh t the

transit ion w as to the ideal ism o f Pl ato, a phi lo sop hical reaffirmation

and defence o f those absolu te valu es w h ic h are accep ted b y the

' s impl ic i ty and t ru s t ' o f ch il dh oo d as th ey are in the pre-critica l stag e

o f society. The second or sceptical stage might equally w e l l be called

posi tiv ist , and it is b y no mea ns ge ner all y acce pte d that b e l i e f in

absolute values is more mature than positi vism. No t eve ry adult re

covers the con vi cti ons o f his ch il dh oo d. T h e posit ivist rejects the v i e w

that posi ti ve la w mus t set out fr om the ideal o f a natural, i.e. un iver sal ly

v a l i d , standard of r igh t : there is only a relative right or goodness,

which is der ived fro m the pos it ive la w pre vai li ng at a particular time .

T h e posit ivis t knows that the search for go od ne ss is a chimaer a-hun t.

Similarly bea uty , as it wa s for Hu me , is ' n o qualit y in thi ngs them selv es,

it exists mer el y in the min ds w h i ch contempl ate the m, and each mi nd

perceives a different beauty' .2

In statements l ike these the mo der n

positivist would not wish to be told that his standpo int wa s either

pr e-P lat oni c or adol escen t, bu t he is in fact repeat ing the So ph is ts '

asserti ons in the co nt ro ve rs y o f the fifth and fourth centuri es B .C .1

Cf. pp. 59 f.

* See Cassirer, Phil, of Enlightenment, 307.

1 64



Positivism and Adolescence

1 65

V a l u e for him, as for Archelaus, exists by nomos only, not by physis.

For A y e r there is not even a controversy :

T a l k i n g about values is not a matter of describing what may or may not be

there, the problem being whether or not it really is there. There is no such

problem. The moral problem is: What am I to do? What attitude am I to

take? And moral judgments are direct ives in this sense. W e can now see

that the whole dispute about the objectivity of values, as it is ordinarily

conducted, is pointless and idle. 1

Pointle ss and idle th o ug h it ma y be , the dispute has reappea red

ma ny times, and in sp ea ki ng o f the po si ti vi sm o f fifth-century Gr eec e

one can hardly claim that it was rendered obsolete by Plato. In Euri

pides a character a sks rheto rical ly, ' W h a t acti on is shameful if it

seem not so to the actor? 5 , wh ic h dr ew from Arist oph ane s the pa ro dy ,

' Wh a t action is shameful if it seem not so to the aud ie nc e? ', and bo th

Plato and Antisthenes were credited with the r e to r t : 'Shameful is

shameful, seeming or no seeming' . 2 Eteocles in the Phoenissae,

asserting his lust for power in truly sophistic terms, says (499if.):

' I f the same thing were to all men by nature fair and w i s e , there

w o u l d be no disputes or quarrels among us. But as it is there is no

consistency or impartiality where mortals are concerned: it is all names,

without reality' , and when Hippias claims to know what justice is,

Socrates congratulates him ironically on a discovery which w i l l

cause juries to cease differing over their verdicts and put an end to

litigation, rebellion and war (Xen. Mem. 4 .4 .8 ) . A g a i n , in Plato he

remarks that when we utter words l ike ' i ron' or ' s i lver ' we al l know

what we mean, but when we say ' just ' or 'good' we disagree with

one another and even in our own minds.3 These quotations g i v e an

idea of the sceptical atmosphere of the time, to which Socrates himself

w a s so s trongly opposed, holding that agreement on the meaning of

moral terms was an essential preliminary to morality in practice.

T h e most distinguished advocate of the relativity o f v a l u e s ( t hough ,

as inev it ab ly happe ns, his th ou gh t wa s often dist orte d as it filtered

1

Ayer , Philosophical Essays, 242.

1 I'.ur. fr. 19 , Ar . Frogs 1475. The retort is attribu ted to Antis thenes by Plut arch , De aud.

/nut. 3} c, and to Pl ato in Stoba eus , Flor. 5.82 (both quoted by Nauck on the fr.).

' I'haedr. 2 6 1 . 1 . Cf. Euthyphro 7c~d,Alc. 1 m e - i i 2 a . Nestle (VMûL, 271) s a y s that the

l ines Iron 1 1 l ie Phoenissae ' unmistakably reproduce the doctrine of Prot ago ras ', but are we not

rather reminded of Socrates?



The Relativity of Values

166

through other, less gifted minds) wa s Prota gor as, and his philosophi cal

challenge to traditionally accepted norms was in its turn based on

relative and subjective theories of on to lo gy and epis tem olo gy. A s

applied to val ues, relat ivity ma y mean one of t wo things , (a) Th er e is

nothing to which the epithets good, bad or the like can be applied

absolutely and without qualification, because the effect of everything

is different according to the object on which it is exercised, the circum

stances of its appl ica tion and so on . Wh a t is g o o d for A ma y be bad

for B , wh at is g o o d for A in certain circumstanc es m ay be bad for

hi m in other s, and so on . Th e obj ec tivi ty o f the go o d effect is no t

denied, but it varies in individual cases, (b) When a speaker says that

g o o d and bad are only relative, he may mean that ' there is nothing

either g o o d or bad, bu t thin kin g ma kes it s o ' . A n y inve sti gatio n o f thenomos-physis antithesis turns up ple nty o f exampl es o f th is : incest

abominable in Greek e y e s , normal in Egyptian and so on. With

aesthetic values the case is even more obvious.

Heraclit us had earlier ad duc ed the first ty pe o f rel ativity as on e

justification o f his par adox o f the identity o f op po si te s: 'S ea wa te r ',

he said, 'is at the same time purest and most polluted, being drinkable

and salutary for fishes, undrinkable and deadly to men.'1

Protagoras

develops the theme in answer to a suggestion of Socrates that ' g o o d '

may be equated with 'beneficial to men' :2

E v e n if things are not beneficial to men, I still call them g o o d . . . I k no w

plenty of things—foods, drinks, drugs and many others—which are harm

fu l to men, and others which are beneficial; and others again which, so far

as men are concerned, are neither, but are harmful or beneficial to horses,

and others only to cattle or dogs. Some have no effect on animals, but only

1

Fr. 61; see vol. I , 445.1

Plato, Prot. 333 e—334 c. Th e uti li tar ian equ ati on of α γ α θ ό ν with ώ φ έ λ ι μ ο ν was a favourite

one with Socrates. (See Socrates, ch. m , § 8.) Nor can it be doubted that the speech of Protagoras

represents his actual view. Xenophon (Mem. 3 .8 .7) .shows Socrates saying something similar

(what is go od for a hu ng ry man is bad for one in a fever, e t c . ) , and on this account has been

accused of fathering on him the ideas of Antisthenes ( C a i z z i , Stud. Urbin. 1964, 65 ; not, oddly

enough, of Protagoras). What Socrates is arguing there, however, is that the goodness of any

thing l i e s in its fitness to perform its proper function—an unimpeachably Socratic tenet (el.

Rep. 352ε —353d). His tho ught wa s intens ely prac tica l: what is goo d must be useful, and the

same thing can be useful or harmful according to circumstances (Meno 87e-88c and Xeu.

Mem. 4. 6 . 8 ) . Pr ec is el y ho w his thoug ht differed from that of a Sophi st l i k e Pro tago ras is ,1l a r g e question, but it is not correct to say as Cai / . / . ί does that the passage in Xcnuplum is ' U<\ i r -

mente antiplatonico' (by which he means against the Platonic Socrates).



Protagoras: Morals and Medicine

on trees, and some again are good for the roots of trees but injurious to the

y o u n g growths. Manure, for instance, is good for all plants when applied

to their roots, but utterly destructive i f put on the shoots or young branches.

O r take olive oil. It is very bad for plants, and most inimical to the hair

o f all animals except man, whereas men find it of service both to the hair

and to the rest of the body. So diverse and multiform is goodness that evenwith us the same thing is good when applied externally but deadly when

taken internally. A l l doc tors forbid the sick to use oil in preparing their

f o o d , except in the smallest quantities.

T h i s able little spe ech has co me in for a surpri sing amo un t o f

criticism on the gr ou nd o f irr ele vanc e.1

Since Socrates has virtually

asked Protagoras what he means by the concept 'good' , i t is hardly

irrelevant for hi m to re pl y wi th his o w n the or y o f its div ersi ty. Th a t a

Sophist should at the same time s ho w off his miscell aneous kn o w l e d g e

is only in character. Hackforth2

objected that, the point being ethical,

the irrelevance lies in tak ing the meaning s o f ' g o o d ' be yo nd the ethical

sphere. But not only was Socrates's question purely general, concerning

the equation of ' g o o d ' wi th 'beneficial to m e n ' ; for the Sophists the

co nne xio n be tw ee n ethics , politics and rhetoric on the one han d and

hyg ien e or medic ine o n the other wa s impor tant, as t w o bra nche s o f

the art o f im pr ov in g hu ma n nature, moral and physi cal . In the Theae-

tetus (1670-c) Pro tago ras says, ' W h e n men exercise their skill on

bodie s I call them physi cians, wh en on plants, husb andm en. Th es e t oo ,

i f a plant is sick, g i v e it sound, healthy and true sensations instead o f

ba d ; and similarly g o o d and skilful orators ma ke g o o d instead o f e v i l

course s appear just to cities.' Ve rs en yi has poi nte d o ut the c los e

parallels that exist be tw ee n Pro tag ora s and the Hip poc rat ic treatise

On Ancient Medicine :3

Doth stress the facts that their arts are human inventions rather than original

endowments, that their arts are necessary because of the difference between

one man and another and between men and animals, and that there is a

resulting relativity of what is good for each. Both hold that 'our present

1

Adam and Grube both call it irrelevant. To H. Gomperz (S. u. R. 162) it wa s a 'dis turb ingInterruption', and he took its intrusiveness to be evidence that it was an extract from one of

I'ronigoras's own books. That it ma y well be, but Pla to i s not the sort of writer to push some

thing in where it is not wante d si mpl y in order to introduce a verbatim quotation.

' I n an u n p u b l i sh ed l ec tu r e .

' yM ) (quoted in part on p. 83 ab ov e) : Verso nyi, Soc. Hum. 33-5, 43.

I 6 7




l68

w a y of l i f e ' (laws, customs, regimen) is not by nature but 'has been dis

covered and elaborated during a long period of time'.

The aim of both [sc. the political and the medical arts] is to find what is

useful, appropriate, fitting, or due to the nature of what each has in his care

so as to promote healthy, harmonious and undisturbed l i fe . This similarity

o f aim, method, and (almost) subject not only leads to constant association

o f the two, but at times makes it exceedingly difficult to draw a sharp

dividing line between them.

' S p e e c h ' , said Gorgias (Hel. 14), 'bears the same relation to the mind

as dru gs to the b o d y . A s dr ugs dr aw off different hum ou rs from the

b o d y , and some put an end to disease and others to l i f e , so wo rd s can

induce joy or grief, fear or confidence, or by e v i l persua sion dr ug and

bewitch the mind.' This theory was actually put into practice by

An ti ph on in his 'ps ych iat ric cli nic ' as reporte d in the Lives of the

Ten Orators: hirin g a special ro om in Cor inth , he 'de ve lo pe d an "a rt

o f co ns ol at io n" parallel to the therapy o f the b o d y b y ph ys ic ia ns ' .1

Pro tag ora s sees a close parallel not o nl y, like Go rg ia s, be tw ee n

medicine and orato ry, im pr ov in g respectively the physica l and mora l

cond itio ns of men , bu t also be tw ee n bo th and husba ndr y, the care o f

men and that o f plants. Th is reappears in A nt ip ho n (fr. 60):

Primary among human concerns is education, for in any enterprise when

the beginning is right, the outcome is l i k e l y to be right to o. A s is the seed

that is ploughed into the ground, so must one expect the harvest to be, and

similarly when good education is ploughed into young persons, its effect

l i ve s and burgeons throughout their l i v e s , and neither rain nor drought

can destroy it.

This an al og y is appl ied specifica lly to the tea ch ing o f med ici ne in the

Hippocrat ic Law ?

The learning of medicine may be likened to the gr ow th o f plants. Ou r

natural ability is the s o i l . The v i e w s of our teachers are as it were the seeds.

1

[Plut .] Vitae 833 c, An ti pho n A 6. On this and the ide nti ty of Ant iph on see further be lo w,

pp. 2oof. Psy chol ogi cal insig ht is also sugg est ed by his dictu m (fr. 57) that i l l n e s s is a holiday

for the work-shy, for then they do not have to go out to work. I have assumed here that the

story in the Vitae is true, but see p. 290, wi th note s.2

Ch. 3, trans. Jones. Jones (Loeb ed. 2 5 7 f . ) cites D.L. 7.40 as evidence that the Law is late

enough to have been written under Stoic influence. But, apart from the fact that, as he s a y s ,

' th e resemblance ma y not appear str ik ing ', he seems to have over looke d the extract IromAntiphon.



The M edical and Agricultural Analogies

Learning from chi ldhood is analogous to the seeds' falling betimes upon the

prepared ground. The place of instruction is as it were the nutriment that

comes from the surrounding air to the things sown. Diligence is the

working of the soi l . Time strengthens all these things, so that their nurture

is perfected.

Th es e passages shou ld increase our ins igh t into the mind o f a

Sophis t and assist an unde rstanding o f Pro tag ora s's use o f medical

and agricultural examples in answering Socrates's question. It was the

medica l writ ers above all w h o insisted (as success in their craft de

manded) on the relativity o f ' g o o d ' and ' b a d ' to the individual .

Co mp ar is on be tw ee n wh a t is g o o d for man in health and man in

sickness, and between man and animals, is made in Ancient Medicine

(ch. 8), and in ch. 20 it is argued that, far from a knowledge of the

whole nature o f man be in g a prerequisite o f the medical art (as cert ain

philosophers maint ained), a kno wl edg e o f medic ine is nece ssary to

the kn ow le dg e o f man and indeed o f nature in gene ral. W h a t the

physician needs to ans wer is no t a general questi on like ' wh a t man i s ' ,

but what man is in rel ation to different foo ds , dr inks and w a y s o f l i f e ,

and what w i l l be the e f f ec t o f each on each ind ivi dua l.1

W e have already seen how widespread was the tendency to sub

stitute the conce pts o f interest and adv an tage , the useful or the be ne

ficial (σ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν , χ ρ ή σ ι μ ο ν , ώ φ έ λ ι μ ο ν ) , w i t h whi ch goes naturally

the appropr iate or f it ting ( έ π ι τ ή δ ε ι ο ν ) , for the universal standard o f

' just ic e ' or ' r ig ht ' . A s ' the interest of the stron ger ' (Th uc yd id es ,

Thra sym ach us) it beca me a doctrine o f self-aggrandizement and ne g

lect o f the righ ts o f others , but in itsel f it wa s si mp ly utilitarian and

practical. Bou nd up wi th it wa s the noti on o f necess ity {ananke), and

to the examples already cited (pp . 100 f. ab ov e) ma y be added ano the r

extract from Ancient Medicine, ch. 3, which emphasizes the connexion

1

It is sometimes supposed that VM wa s written under the influence of Protago ras (e.g .

Verncnyi, Socr. Hum. n , but denied by Lo ng ri gg in HSCP, 1 9 6 3 ) . Its date is unce rtain. If

I'eatugicrc were right in putting it anywhere between 450 and 420, Protagoras might have been

itc(|uuliited with it, but it was probably later (Lloyd in Phronesis, 1 9 6 3 ) . Even so, its conclusion s

•pi lug more from the exi genci es of medical practice than from the influence of any non -medical

thinker, and that Pro tagora s himself was influenced by the more empirical of con temp ora ry

physicians seems to me beyond doubt. Tha t accord ing to Sextu s he 'i nt ro du ce d' the 'man—

mrtmirc' doctrine (Verscnyi, op. cit. 1 1 , n. 9) is no evidence against t his. Perh aps a more

nccuiaif way of putting it would be that Protagoras's own empirical turn of mind led him to

lake an intercut in medicine and s i m i l a r l y practical subjects.

1 69




I70

between practical activi ty and a relative conc eptio n of va lu es : ' T h e

fact is that sheer necessity caused men to seek and discover medicine,

because sick men did not, and do not, profit by the same regimen as

do men in health.' T h i s again is bo un d up wit h the wh ol e ev ol ut io na ry

v i e w o f hum an pr ogres s (p. 83 ab ov e) .In all this it is not easy to find references to specifically aesthetic

v a l u e s , th ou gh in any di scussion of the relativity o f valu es these mi gh t

be the first to occur to us. Needless to say, the Greeks were not in

sensi tive to be au ty , bu t as the am bi gu it y o f their wo r d for it, kalon,

suggests, did no t speak much o f it in isol atio n. On e reason for this

was the close associa tion in their min ds of be au ty wit h appropria tenes s

and fitness for function.1

C . T . Seltman put the poi nt w e l l (Approach

to Greek Art, 29):

Beautiful is a misrendering of kalos. W e can perhaps get nearest to the

meaning by using Fine and Fineness, for these may be employed in most

o f the senses of the Greek words. To say that for the Greeks Beauty and

Goodness were one and the same is an error. But put it, that to the Greeks

Fineness automatically included excellence, because what is fine must be

fitted to its purpose and therefore good, and we are on the right track.

Fineness could become the ultimate Value by which all other Values couldbe measured.

A delightful illustra tion o f this assoc iati on in the G re ek min d is the

'beauty contes t ' in Xenophon 's Symposium (ch. 5). Socrates under

takes to prove to the company that he is more beautiful than the

y o u n g and handsom e Cri tob ulu s. Crito bulu s gi ve s his case a wa y at

the outset by saying that anything is beautiful (kalon) if it is w e l l con

structed for the pu rpo se for whi ch w e ha ve acqu ire d it, or is adap ted by

nature for our wa nts . Th e n , replies Socrates, i f w e hav e ey es for

seeing, mine are more beautiful than yo urs , since bei ng prominen t and

bulg ing they can see far to the side and no t sim pl y stra ight in fron t

o f t he m; and so on . (T h e pas sage is ful ly translated in Socrates, pp. 67 f.)

D i d Pro tag ora s also be lie ve in the relativity of val ues in the seco nd

sense, i.e.that

all va lu e- ju dg me nt s are pu re ly sub jec tiv e? A t first sigh t

1

According to Aristotle, the difference between α γ α θ ό ν and κ α λ ό ν is that κ α λ ό ν is the more

inclusive term, α γ α θ ό ν refers to actions only, but κ α λ ό ν is used uAo whe re no action or move ment

i s involved. (See Metaph. 1 0 7 8 3 3 1 . )



Beauty and Function: 'Man the Measure1

at least this would seem an inevitable conclusion from his famous

saying that man is the me as ur e:1

' M a n is the measure o f all thi ngs , of the thing s that are that they

are, and o f the th ings that are not that they are not.' In the Theaetetus

(152 a), Socrates asks The ae tet us if he has read th is. ' Of t e n ' , is the rep ly.

' T h e n y o u k n o w that he puts it something like this, that as every

single thing appears to me, so it is to me, and as it appear s to y o u , so

it is to y o u — y o u and I be ing men . ' Since this addit ion is mad e in

practically the same words in the Cratylus (386a), it too must be a part

o f Prota gora s 's o w n argu ment , and this is bor ne out b y Ari sto tle , w h o

adds the information that the ' things' in question include values

(Metaph. 1062b 13) :

Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply

and solely that what appears to each man assuredly also is. If this is so, it

follows that the same thing both is and is not, and is both bad and good,

and whatever else is asserted in contrary statements, since often a particular

thing appears good (or beautiful, kalon) to some and the opposite to others;

and the criterion (μ έ τ ρ ο ν ) is what appears to each individual .2

A l l the direct sources agree on the general meaning of Protagoras's

saying, namely that what appears to each individual is the only reality

and the refore the real w orl d differs for e a c h ; and this is all the mor e

likely because he would find similar ideas in contemporary natural

philosophe rs. Ana xa go ra s told his pupils that ' things would be for

them such as th ey sup po se d them to b e ' , and Em pe do cl es and Pa r-

menides emphasized the connexion between a man's physical condition

and his thoughts.3

So far so good, but now there come s a remarkable deve lopm ent.

A s Socrates says (Theaet. 161 c f f . ) , on the thesis as so far pr op ou nd ed

no man can be wiser than another, and there could be no sense in

Prot ago ras or any on e else settin g himse lf up as a teacher. Socra tes

therefore offers a defence which he says Protagoras would have given

1

Fr. 1. A detailed interpretation is reserved for the discussion of its epistemological i m p l i c a

tion*, pp. 1 83 ff. below.

' If it is admitted that the 'D ou bl e Ar gu me nt s' (pp. 3i6ff. below) reflect Protagoras's teach

ing, they prov ide further e vide nce that his r e l a t i v i t y included such concepts as good and bad,

light and wrong , laudable and blamewort hy.1

Aristotl e has collected the p assag es in Metaph. 1 0 0 9 b 1 5 ff. See on t hem vo l. 1 1 , 31 9, 229, 67.

I'ltr lino of ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ; is discussed more ful ly on pp. 1 8 8 If. below.

I 7 I




1 7 2

i f he were a l i v e . 1

It consists in maintaining that, th ou gh all beliefs are

equally true, not all are equ all y g o o d (agatha).2

The wise (sophos)

ma n is he w h o can ch an ge w ha t appears and is bad (kakon) to any

on e of us and ma ke it be and appear g oo d , (a) A sick man 's fo od is

bitter (for h i m ) : he cann ot be called mista ken wh e n he says it is, no r

more ignorant than the healthy. But the doctor, the sophos in the heal

i ng art, can so change his condition that it both appears and is sweet

and pleasant, (b) In education, the Sophist does with words what the

doc tor does wi th dru gs (com pare Gor gi as , p. 168 ab ov e) , na me ly

ch ang e the pup il to a better state. He does no t mak e hi m ex ch an ge

false beliefs for true , f or false beliefs are im po ss ib le ; but , w h e n a ma n

has a depraved (poneron) state o f mind and corr espon ding t houg hts ,

he makes his mind sound and so g i v e s him sound (chresta) t h o u g h t s —

not t ruer but better, (c) Such things as a whole city thinks just and

honourable (kala) are so for it as long as it thinks they are; but in

each case where they are injurious (ponera), the wi se ma n substitutes

others wh ic h are and appear so un d (chresta). In this way it is allowed

that some men are wiser than others, al though no man thinks f a l s e l y .

Her e is a pa ra do x: tw o me n' s beliefs can be equ all y true, but no t

equally valuable, even though th ey are beliefs ab ou t the go od ne ss or

badn ess o f so me th in g. In the case o f phy sic al sensation s, at least wi th

Plato's example, there is no difficulty. T h e sick ma n dislike s wh at he

tastes, and w i l l be gla d w h e n the do ct or , as w e sho uld say, restores his

norm al appreciation o f g o o d fo od or, as Pro tag ora s wo ul d ha ve i t,

1

Evid ently what follows was not to be found in Protagoras 's writ ings , but it is unl ike ly that

it departs from the sense of what he taught. As Cornford s a y s , he must have reconciled his

profession as a Sophist with his claim that all beliefs are equ all y true, and there is no other w a y

in which he could have done it. The point is argued f u l l y by H. Gomperz, S. u. R. 263 ff., an d

for other references see Untersteiner, Sophs, jof. (n. 1) . S. Mos er and G. L. Kusta s, in Phoenix,1 9 6 6 , claim that ' reading the Protagoras in the light of the Theaetetus' has been a prim e cause

of misinte rpretation of the earlier dial ogu e. Th is claim depends on accep ting Th . Gom perz 's

assumption (Gk. Th. 1, 4 5 7 f . ) that the one presents a 'genuine', the other a ' sh am' Protagora s—

a highly arbitrary procedure.

2

Plato uses a variety of words in this passage, all of which are sometimes simply translated

'b ad ' or 'g oo d' . I have inserted them in Rom an letters and append a rou gh approximation to

the different senses wh ic h they con vey ed to a Greek. Kakon: the most gener al wor d for bad;

agathon: the most general word for good, with the overtone of conducive to efficient performance

of function which was comm onl y present in Greek terms of approbation ; poneron: causing toil,

distress, pain or grief (from noun ponos, labour, trouble, suffering); chreston: useful, serviceable,

effective, wholesome (coupled with hygieinon, healthy, at 1 6 7 c 1) ; kalon: fine, beautiful, of goodq u a l i t y , laudable, honourable.



Protagoras on Truth and Value

1 73

makes his unpleasant food both seem and be pleasant to him. But

wi th mor al va lues the case is different. I f wh at a ci ty thi nks ju st and

fine is just and fine for it so long as it thinks so, it w i l l not want its

v i e w s or its laws ch ang ed nor, one w ou l d ha ve th oug ht , o ug ht th ey

to be ch an ge d. T h e y sho uld be like the oli ve oil o f the Protagoras

speech, good for that cit y th ou gh not perhaps for othe rs. It seems

however that the city may not be wise, nor its jud gme nts so und and

profitable, bu t useless and l ike ly to cause har m. H o w then can they b e,

as w e l l as seem, both just and fine (kala) for the city?

Protagoras is seeking his own solution to that burning question

o f the day, the relation between nomimon and dikaion, posit ive law

and morality. It was said:

( 1 ) T h a t the t w o we re identical by definition, and the state ment o f

their identi ty si mp ly ana lyt ic. Th i s mi gh t be (<z) the ol d re li gi ou s idea,

g o i n g back to tribal days, that la ws cam e from the go ds , and so cou ld

not err and mus t be o bey ed (' all hu ma n l aw s are nour is he d b y the on e

divine l a w ' ) ; or (b) a criticism cons eque nt o n the equat ion o f the t w o :

g i v e n the definition, that ' ju st ic e' includes on ly wh at is enjoined or

sanctioned by the l a w s , then, as Antiphon pointed out, a man has a

right to ob ser ve it o n l y in so far as it coin cide s w it h his o w n interests,

and a duty to ignore it when it conflicts with a fact of nature like the

equality o f Gr ee k and barbarian, no ble and comm on er , rich and po or .

( 2 ) A s a result o f (b), the iden tity o f just and le gal wa s deni ed.

' J u s t ' and 'r ig ht ' represented mora l valu es, wh ic h cou ld not be e quated

wi th the dictates o f pos iti ve la w, for the la w mi gh t be unjust andconversely wh at wa s just exten ded be y o n d the field o f lega l ena ctme nt.

(3) T he re wa s the doctri ne o f the social co mp ac t as held by Socr ates ,

acc ord ing to wh ic h, th ou gh the legal mach ine ry mi gh t lead to an

unjust judgment in an individual case, it was still right for the citizen

to accept it beca use his memb ers hip o f the state impl ied a pr omi se to

obey the laws in return for the ma ny l egal benefits of citize nshi p.

T h e topicality of the controversy, and the still fluid state of opinion,

led to a certain amount o f confu sion, wh ic h is reflected in Pr ot ag or as.

I le held that, tho ugh la ws wer e not ' b y na tu re ' , their inst itut ion and

obs erva nce wer e necessary for the preservati on o f soci ety. T h e wh o l e

funct ion o f ou r sense o f justice (dika) is ' t o mak e political ord er




1 7 4

p o s s i b l e ' (p. 66 a bo ve ). Na tur all y therefore he inclines to those w h o

equate dikaion w i t h nomimon. Y e t in the mi dd le o f the fifth c en tu ry

it wa s imp oss ibl e for a th in ki ng ma n to ig no re the e xistence o f ba d

l a w s , and he has at tempted a solution which w i l l take account of

the m. I f the result is an inco nsist ent or circula r ar gu me nt ,

1

its interestlies in the state o f the que sti on at the time, w h i c h led Pr ot ag or as

to take suc h a to rt uo us co ur se . It is, after all, a que sti on w hi ch has

not even now been resolved.

Since Protagoras was famous for his claim to 'make the weaker

argument the s t ron ger ' , H. Go mp er z (S. u. R. 269) suggested that

he may have used these epithets here, rather than ' w o r s e ' and ' be t te r '

which Plato uses in his defence and which make the circularity par

t icularly gla rin g. T h e y w o u ld not essential ly al ter the case, but g i v e

the appearance o f a mo re obje ctiv e standard. G om pe rz 's explan ation

o f the paradox is that each man is right because each sees one facet of

the truth, that w h ic h his disp osit ion al lo ws hi m to see, bu t (as wi t h

bod i ly healt h) there are nor ma l and ab no rma l disposit ions , and the

mo st norm al man, wh o m Pro tago ras cal ls the w i s e , has the mo st

normal, strongest and best belief. His theory corresponds to his

rhetor ical pract ice, is in fact an ep ist em olo gic al justification o f th e

impor tanc e of rhetoric. T h e rhetor m ust be able to defend o pp os in g

points of v i e w w it h equ al succ ess bu t finally to bri ng one to vi c to ry

as the ' s t ronger ' . Just so the epis temolog is t pro ve s that all v i e w s are

equally true because each grasps one facet of the t ruth, then decides

for one as the 'b et te r ' . Fo r Prot ago ras , the rheto r is identical w it h

the wi se ma n be ca use he has be en trained to see bo th sides, wh er ea s the

layman sees on ly on e—t ru th bu t part ial t ruth (p . 275).2

What this amounts to is that Protagoras 's cr i ter ion is quant i tat ive:

a l l jud gm ent s are equall y true, bu t no t equ ally valu able beca use, ac co rd

i n g as th ey gras p mo re or less o f reality, so th ey are mor e or less

nor mal or abno rmal and thus stro nger or we ak er . T h e explanation

1

' That there is a logical circle here cannot be denied . . . If val ue judg ment s are onl y vali d

for the individu al, ho w can a judg men t that tw o beliefs are of unequa l valu e be valid for mo re

than the individual who makes i t? ' (Gomperz, S. u. R. 269.) As von Fritz remarks (RE, x x m ,

9 1 7 ) , if Pro tag ora s's mora l doctr ine contain s an incons istenc y and contradic tion of his fun da

mental premise, he shares this inconsistency with most modern relativists, who l i k e him try

to combine their rela tivi sm wit h posi tive doctr ines and precepts for huma n action.

* For a criticism of Gomperz 's interpre tation of Pro tag ora s see ZN, 135 7, n. 1.



What Protagoras Meant

1 75

has its attractions, but is weakened by its reliance on the concepts of

'n or ma l ' an d ' abn orma l ' , for as Cornford sa id(PTK,73) ' so und er '

f o r Protagoras 'does not mean "normal", for that w o u l d set up the

majority as a norm or measure for the minority'. It can only mean

more useful or expedient, a b e l i e f that will pr od uc e bett er effects in t he

future; that is, for the individual, effects that w i l l both be and seem

better to the Sophist's pupil after his training. He w i l l then prefer his

new b e l i e f s . F o r a state, its la ws and c us to ms are ri gh t and laudab le

s o l on g as the y are enforc ed or socia lly ap pr ov ed , but a statesman

may persuade it that others wo u l d be o f greater adv an ta ge to it.

( T h e poi nt is mad e expl ici tly at 172 a.) Capi tal pun is hmen t, w e m a y

s a y , is right and proper so long as it has the backing of public opinion

and is l e g a l l y enforced. If these conditions are altered, it is l i k e l y to be

because in the first place a few advanced thinkers (sophistai as a Greek

might c a l l them) succeed in initiating the diffusion of different ideas;

and this they can on ly do (acc ord ing to the th eor y) b y co nv in ci ng

the citizens that the alteration w i l l be o f practical advantage (chreston)—

that, for instance, crimes of v i o l e n c e w i l l diminish rather than increase.

B e h i n d this tortuous argument is Protagoras's conviction that dike

e x i s t s for the preservation of social order, and that therefore the main

tenance of existing l a w s , even though they are not the best, is just

and laudable because the alternatives of disobedience or subversion

w o u l d destro y the 'b o n d o f friendship and un i on ' on wh i ch our ve ry

l ife depends(

Prot. 322 C 4 ) . O n l y i f ne w laws are enacted b y c o mm o n

conse nt and const itut ional processes can the ch an ge be for the bet ter .1

' Cf. p. 146 abo ve. By thi nk ing o ut this matter o n indepen dent lin es, I hope I have resolved

t l ie dil licu lty felt and expressed b y A. T. Co le in Yale C.S. 1966, wh ic h led hi m to the con clu -

nlon ihat Plato's 'A po lo gy of Pro tag ora s' wa s in fact 'no t one Ap ol og y but t wo ', contai ning

nwpectivcly "a "su bj ect iv is t" conception compatib le with the man -me asu re pri nciple as stated

in i6(5d and a "u ti li ta ri an " one not so compa tibl e' (pp. 11 2 and H 4f .) . In particular I do not

outre that Plato has misin terpre ted or misu nders tood the doctrin e of ιβ -ja-b (p. 116) . The

contention that i6 9d is inconsis tent w it h it is unt rue. A ll that Plato s a y s there is that, according

In Protagoras, 'some men are superior in the matter of what is better or worse, and these, he

• a i d , were w is e' (Cornfo rd's translation ). He does not say that these better judg es are the healthy

Μ op|>oscd to the sick. They are of course the doctors (or in their respective spheres the

l i i i » b i i u d n i c n , orators or Sophists).



V I I I

R H E T O R I C AND P H I L O S O P H Y

(Seeming and being, believing and knowing, persuading and proving)

( i ) G E N E R A L

Rh et or ic has alr ead y be en me nt ione d in these page s (20, 50 f . ) , but

demand s a closer lo ok . Ob v i o us l y w e are not here concer ned wi th

appraisal of the w o r k s o f L y s i a s , And oc ide s or other Attic orators,

nor wi th questions o f manner and st yl e;1

but the the ory behi nd

Greek rhetoric had philo sophic al implications, wi th wh ic h not on ly

the Sophis ts bu t Pl ato himsel f felt that they had to come to grips.

Plato could even describe his own dialectical philosophy as the

substit ution o f g o o d rhetor ic for bad, and it has be en conte nded that

rhetoric alone wa s the dis tin gui shi ng mar k o f a Sop his t.2

That this

is an exaggeration w i l l ha ve alr eady appeared, but all the lea din g

Sophists were deeply concerned with it, in its forensic, political and

epideicti c bran ches , bot h as act ive practitioners and as teachers, s ys te

m a t i z e s and writers of rhetorical hand book s.3 Pla to, w h o kn ew his

Sophists, distinguishes sophistic and rhetoric by an elaborate analogy,

designed to show how 'though they differ in nature, yet they are so

closely related that Sophi sts and orat ors, wo r k i n g in the same spher e

and on the same subject-matter, are confu sed, and k n o w not wha t to

ma ke of themselv es, no r other s o f th em '. It must b e read in the li ght

o f his o w n doctrine o f the superi ority o f kn ow le dg e, reality and teach

in g to belief, appearance and persua sion . A s gy mn as ti c kee ps the b o d y

fit, so legislation keeps a state so und and heal thy. I f the b o d y falls

1

Which may be studied in such works as B l a s s ' s Attische Beredsamkeit, Norden's Antike

Kunstprosa and Dobson's Greek Orators. One s hould also mention KjoU'saradeini?jf?,Suppl. V I I ,

1 0 3 9 — 1 1 3 8 , and G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece.1

B y H. Go mperz in his Sophistik u. Rhetorik. Th e thesis is deni ed in the Prodikos of H. M a y e r ,

who refers to the rebuttals of Wendland in Gott. Gel. Α η ζ . ( 1 9 1 3 ) , no. 1, and Drer up, Lit.Zentralbl. ( 1 9 1 3 ) , Sp. 681 f.

3

τ ά β ι β λ ί α τ ά π ε ρ ί τ η ; τ ω ν λ ό γ ω ν τ έ χ ν η ; γ ε γ ρ α μ μ έ ν α (PI. Phaedr. 266 d) or simply τ έ χ ν α ι

( p . 44 , n. 4, above ).

I 7 6



Rhetoric and Sophistic

i77

sick, medicine w i l l cure it, and the corresponding art in the state is

the exec utio n o f justice. Al l these arts hav e their counterfei ts. T o

gymnastic corresponds mak e-up, g iv ing the appearance of health,

and to legislation sophistic , cla imi ng to impart w ha t keeps a state

sound, but wit hou t real kn ow le dg e. T h e counterfeit o f the doctor isthe chef, who claims to know the best diet for the body but in fact aims

only at pleasing the palate, and similar ly rhetor ic co rr es ponds to the

due execution of justice in that it aims at caj oling an aud ien ce and

pr od uc in g the sem blanc e, not the reali ty, o f justic e. It can be said,

then, that sophistic and rhetoric are 'pretty nearly the same thing',

but, for wh at the difference is w or t h , sophist ic is supe rio r in so far

as the art which it imitates is superior, that is, in so far as pr ev en ti onis better than cure .

1

T h e rhetorical art wa s also k n o w n as ' the art o f logoi', and the wi de

meani ng o f this w o r d (from tal kin g or sp ee chma ki ng to arg ume nt,

reason, tho ugh t) mad e possible v e r y different conce pti ons of the art of

which it was the subject. Plato's aim was to get it out of the hands of

superficial persuaders and special pleaders, and sh ow that, proper ly

applied and based on knowledge of thetruth,

it was coextensive with

philosophy. This is the lesson of the Phaedrus (see especially 278 b-d),

and in the Phaedo (90b ff.) Socrates attributes the e v i l o f ' m i s o l o g y ' —

an aversion from logoi o f ev er y ki nd —t o lack o f proper training in

' the art of logoi'. Wi t ho ut it a man belie ves wh at ev er he is tol d, then

later discovers it is false, and in his disillusionment falls to abusing,

not his o w n lack o f expe rience, bu t logoi themse lve s, and so misses the

path to knowledge and truth. The worst offenders are the men who

deal in contradict ions ( ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ι κ ο ί ) and think it the height o f

cleverness to have discerned that there is no soun dness or cert ain ty

in any thi ng or an y arg umen t, bu t ev er yt hi ng go es up and d o w n like

the current in the Euripus and never stays the same for a moment.

Plato ma y hav e had Pr ota gor as and his Antilogiai (p. 182 with η . 1 b e l o w )

particularly in mind, bu t his censu re extends to all rheto rici ans and

Sophists, the 'un cul tu red wh os e desire is not for wi sd om bu t for

scoring off an op po ne nt ' (91 a), the ve r y people, in fact, w h o con sider ed

1

(κ ίΓ μ . I F F I f c , 510a. The comparison between mind and body, rhetoric and medicine or

dr i i |{« , »* wc have seen (pp. 1 6 7 ft.) , was not n ew. Plato refines on it.



Rhetoric and Philosophy

I78

the mse lves master s o f ' the art o f logoi' and the bes t teachers o f it to

others .1

In Plato's e y e s , as in actual fact, Socrat es was the real mas ter

o f this art. He put it to a different us e from t he Sop hi st s, bu t, al th ou gh

he was no rhetorician, if Critias in making it i l l e g a l to tea ch the art o f

logoi had Socrates particularly in mind,3

this wa s no t alto get herunreasonable. He wa s con vi nce d that if one un der st ood a th ing one

could ' g i v e a logos o f it ', and his de ma nd for definiti ons w a s a de man d

that people should prove that they understood the essence of courage,

justice or wh at ev er else w as un de r di scus sion by finding a ve rb al

formula w hi ch wo ul d cov er all cases o f it . ' He held that those wh o kn o w

wh at any gi ve n thi ng is must also be able to expo un d it to ot he rs '

( X e n . Mem. 4.6 . i ) . Th e f o l l o w i n g wor ds wh ich Xe no ph on puts in to

his mouth are characteristic (Mem. 3.3 .11; he is a rguing that a good

cavalry comm ande r must be a g oo d sp eaker ):

Has it not occurred to you that all the best things that we learned according

to custom, by which we know how to l i v e , we learned through speech, that

any other good lesson that may be learned is learned through speech, and

that the best teachers make the greatest use o f speech and those wi th the

deepest knowledg e o f the most important matters are also the best speakers?3

T h e 'i n ve nt i on ' o f rheto ric is attributed to t w o Sicilians o f the first

h a l f o f the fifth cen tur y, C o r a x and Tis ia s. Inv ent io n in this con ne xi on

had a specific meaning,4

na mel y the int rod uct ion o f the appeal to

pro bab ili ty instead o f fact, the dr aw in g up o f rules for its appl icati on,

and their emb odi men t in writ ten hand bo ok s. I f a man accused o f assault

can produce facts showing incontrovert ibly that he did not commit it,

he has no need o f the art, but, i f he cann ot, he must in vo ke the arg ume nt

from p rob abi lit y. I f he is smaller and we ak er than his victim he w i l l

say, ' L o o k at m e ; is it l i k e l y that so me on e like me should g o for a bi g

st ro ng ma n like h i m ? ' If on the oth er hand he is a Sam son , he w i l l

* Taylor has pointed out (VS, 92, 98) that Plato makes two things clear about antitogiki and

e r i s t i c : the y were rife in Socrat es' s tim e and not d ue to a perv ersi on of his elen chus , and thei r

ancestry is Eleatic.1

Xen. Mem. 1 . 2 . 3 1 . Gigon (Komm. erst. Buch 58) dou bts th e hist oric ity of the incid ent.3

Cf. Stenzel in RE, 2. Rei he , v. Hal bb . 821 f. Stenzel goe s so far as to s ay that language isthe starting-point of Socrates's teaching.

4

To be a good speaker as w e l l as a man of action had, as Lesky points out (HGL, 350),

been the ambit ion of a Gree k since Hom eri c times (//. 9.4 43) .



The Argument from Probability

ar gue, "Wou l d I be such a fool as to attack hi m w he n I am the first

person on w h o m suspicion wo ul d f a l l ? ' Th es e arg ume nts are pre

served as a sample from Co ra x and Ti si as .1

A go o d mod ern one wa s

reported in the Sunday Times for 21 May 1967. A n accusa tion o f ex

cee din g the 70 m.p .h. speed limit on a mo t or wa y was br ou gh t b y

police w h o cla imed to ha ve fo ll ow ed the defendant for nea rly a mile

with their speedometer registering 80-85. T h e defence wa s not cou nte r-

evi dence from the accused 's o w n speedometer. It wa s that the police-

car had a flashing bl ue li gh t, he nce that it was easy for him to see that

it wa s fo ll ow in g hi m, and ' W o u l d I be such a fool as to dr ive at o ver

80 wi th a po li ce -car on m y tr ai l? ' Rhet or ic teaches from the first that

what matters is no t wh at is the case, bu t what appears , what me n can

be persuaded o f (Phaedrus 267 a). It is 'the art of logos', which is not

only speech and argumen t b ut also appearance or be li ef as op po se d to

fact (ergon), and its go al is persuasion. O n the cred it side it ma y be

said that persuasion is bett er than force,2

and rhetoric is par excellence

the democratic art which cannot, either in its political or its forensic

form, flourish under tyranny. Its birth in Syra cuse, Ari st otl e noted

(ap. C i c , see n. 1), coi nci ded wi th the expuls ion of the tyra nts and the

establishment of dem ocr ac y.

T h e Sophi sts, then, we re not the pione ers o f rhetoric , but the y

were certainly ready to step in and supply the demand for it which

accompa nied the dev elo pme nt o f personal freed om all ov er Gre ece .3

A distinc tion m ay be dr aw n be tw ee n the Sicilian sc hool , carried on

after C o rax and Ti si as b y Empe do cl es (v ol . 11, 135), Go rg ias and

Polus and aimin g mainl y at fine speaking (ε ύ έ τ τ ε ι α ) , and that of other

Sophists w h o congr egat ed at At hen s, Protagoras o f Ab de ra , Prod icu s

o f Cos and Hippias of Elis. These latter, besides be ing interest ed in

1

Aristotle (Rhet. 1 4 0 2 a 17 ) connects it wi th C orax. Plato (Phaedr. 273 a-b) attributes it in a

mimewhat garb led and caricatu red form to T i s i a s , who was s a id to be his pupil. See also Arist.

up. Cic. Brut. 12.46 (presumably from the Σ υ ν α γ ω γ ή τ ε χ ν ώ ν ) for Corax and T i s i a s as the first

to have written handbooks on rhetoric after the expulsion of the tyrants from S i c i l y , and in

general A u l i t z k y in RE, x i , 1 3 7 9 - 8 1 .

' Λ point noted by Democri tus , fr. 181 (vol . 1 1 , 496), and claimed by Go rgi as in favour o f his

« rt (Pluto, Phileb. 58 a ) .

1 It in not to be thought that , because Gorg ia s on the emba ssy of 427 is s a id to have amazed

d i e Athenians by his art, they we re unacquainted with artistic and professional orator y. Th ey

were a l r e a d y in love with it ( φ ι λ ό λ ο γ ο ι ) , and what took them by surprise was Gorgias's exotic

and . i r t i lu i . i l s t y l e , which then appealed by its novelty, though later it was seen as cloying and

u l l c c t e d (Uiod. 12.13).

1 79

http://irtilui.il/

http://irtilui.il/




I 7 8

thems elves masters o f ' the art o f logoi' and the bes t teach ers o f it t o

o thers .1

In Plato 's eyes , as in actual fact, Socrates was the real master

o f this art. He put it to a different use fr om th e Sop hi st s, bu t, al th ou gh

he w as no rh etoric ian, i f Crit ias in ma ki ng it illegal to teach the art o f

logoi had S ocrates particu larly in mi nd ,

2

this wa s not alto gethe runreasonable. He wa s con vin ced that if one und ers too d a thin g on e

could ' g i v e a logos o f it ' , and his dem an d for definitions wa s a de man d

that people should prove that the y unde rst ood the essence o f co ura ge ,

justice or w ha t ev er else w a s un de r dis cus si on b y finding a ve rb al

formula wh ic h w ou ld co ve r all cases o f i t . ' He held that those who know

wh at any giv en thi ng is must also be able to exp ou nd it to ot he rs '

( X e n . Mem. 4 . 6 . 1 ) . T h e fo l l owi ng wo rd s wh ic h Xe no ph on puts in to

his mouth are characteristic (Mem. 3 . 3 . 1 1 ; he is arguing that a good

caval ry co mm an de r mus t be a g o o d speaker ) :

Has it not occurred to you that all the best things that we learned according

to custom, by which we know how to l i v e , we learned through speech, that

any other good lesson that ma y be learned is learned th rough speech, and

that the best teachers make the greatest use of speech and those with the

deepest kn ow le dg e o f the most important matters are also the best sp eakers?3

T h e ' i n v e n t i o n ' o f rhetoric is attr ibuted to t w o Sicilians o f the first

hal f o f the fifth ce ntur y, C or a x and Ti sia s. Inv ent ion in this con ne xi on

had a specific meaning,4

na me ly the int rod uct ion o f the appeal to

pro ba bil it y instead o f fact, the dr aw in g up o f rules for its appl ica tion ,

and their emb odi men t in wri t te n han dbo oks . I f a man accused o f assault

can produce facts showing incontrover t ibly that he did not commit it,

he has no need o f the art, but, i f he canno t, he mus t inv ok e the arg ume nt

from pr oba bil ity . If he is smaller and w ea ke r t han his victim he w i l l

s a y , ' Look at me; is i t l ikely that so me on e like me sho uld g o for a bi g

st ron g man like h i m ? ' If o n the oth er han d he is a Sa ms on , he w i l l

1 T a y l o r has pointed out (VS, 92, 98) that Plato makes two things c l e a r about antilogikiand

e r i s t i c : they were rife in Socrates's time and not due to a perversion of his elenchus, and their

ancestry is Eleatic.3

Xen. Mem. 1 . 2 . 3 1 . Gigon (Komm. ^. erst. Buch 58) doubts the historicity of the incident.3

Cf. Stenzel in RE, 2. R e i h e , v. Ha lb b. 821 f. Stenzel g o e s so far as to say that l a n g u a g e isthe starti ng-poi nt of Socrates's teaching.

4

T o b e a goo d speake r as w e l l as a man of action had, as L e s k y points out (HGL, 350),

been die ambition of a Greek since Homeric times (//. 9.443).



The Argument from Probability

argue, "Would I be such a f o o l as to attack him wh e n I am the first

person on w h o m suspicion wo ul d f a l l ? ' Th es e arg umen ts are p re

served as a sample from Corax and Tisias.1

A good modern one was

reported in the Sunday Times for 21 May 1967. A n accu sat ion o f ex

ceeding the 70 m.p.h . speed limit on a mo to r wa y wa s br ou gh t b y

p o l i c e w h o claimed to hav e fo ll owed the defendant for nearly a mile

with their speedometer registering 80-85. T h e defence wa s not coun ter-

evid ence from the accu sed' s o w n spee dome ter . It wa s that the police-

car had a flashing bl ue li gh t, he nc e that it was easy for him to see that

it was fol lo wi ng him, and ' W o u l d I be such a f o o l as to drive at over

80 wi th a po lice- car on m y tra il ?' Rhe to ri c teaches from the first that

what matters is no t wh at is the case, bu t what appears, wh at me n can

be persuaded of (Phaedrus 267a). It is 'the art of logos', which is not

o n l y speech and arg umen t b ut also appearance o r bel ief as op po se d to

fac t (ergon), and its goal is per suasio n. O n the cred it side it may b e

said that persuasion is better than force,2

and rhetoric is par excellence

the democrati c art wh ic h can not , either in its pol iti cal or its forensic

form, flourish under tyranny. Its bir th in Syracus e, Ari sto tle not ed

(ap. C i c , see n. 1), coin cide d wi th the expulsi on o f the tyrants and the

establishment of democracy.

The Sophists, then, we re no t the pione ers of rheto ric, but the y

were certainly ready to step in and supply the demand for it which

acco mpan ied the de ve lo pmen t o f perso nal freedom all o ve r Greece.3

A distinction m ay be dr awn betwe en the Sicilian sc ho ol , carried on

after Co r ax and T is ias by E mp ed oc le s (v ol . 11, 135), Go rgi as and

Polus and aiming mainl y at fine speakin g (ε ύ έ π ε ι α ) , and that of other

Sophists w h o cong reg ated at Ath ens , Protago ras o f Ab de ra , Pro dicu s

o f C o s and Hippias o f E l i s . These latter, besides be ing interested in

1

Aristotle (Rhet. 1402a 17) connect s it wi th Co rax . Plato (PhaeJr. 273a-b) attributes it in a

antnewhat garbled and caricatured form to T i s i a s , who was said to be his pupil. See also Arist.

a/i. Cic. Brut. 1 2. 46 ( pr es uma bl y from the Σ υ ν α γ ω γ ή τ ε χ ν ώ ν ) for Cora x and Tis ia s as the first

tu liuve written handbo oks on rhetoric after the expulsion of the tyr ant s from S i c i l y , and in

general Aulitzky in RE, x i , 1 3 7 9 - 8 1 .

' Λ point noted by Demoe ntus, fr. 181 (v ol. I I , 496), and claimed by Gorgias in favour of his

art (Pluto, Phileb. 58a).

) It is not to be thought that, because Gorgias on the embassy of 427 is said to have amazed

the Athenians by his art, they were unacquainted with artistic and professional or ato ry. Th ey

were already in love with it ( φ ι λ ό λ ο γ ο ι ) , and what took them by surprise wa s Gorgi as's exotic

and artificial s t y l e , which then appealed by its novelty, though later it was seen as cloying and

allotted (Diud. 12 .13).

1 79




l8o

education in its widest sense, emphasized the correct use of language

ό ρ θ ο έ τ τ ε ια , ό ρ θ ό τ η ς ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν ) and so w er e led on from their c on

cern wit h publ ic spe aki ng to initiate the studies o f ph il ol og y and

grammar, et ym ol og y and the distinction of sy no ny ms . (See § 6 be lo w. )

T h e essential theoret ical basis o f rhetoric wa s that which distin

guished it from the beginning, and which so shocked the absolutist

Plato, namely that (as he put it of Tisias and Gorgias, Phaedr. 267 a),

' t he y held the probable (or l ikely-seeming, plausible, ε ι κ ό τ α ) in

more honour than the true' .1

The justification of this was that, to a

Sophist and rhetorician, t ruth and kno wl ed ge wer e illusion.

Since all human inquiry moves within the realm of opinion, where deception

is easy, all persuasion (philosophic, 'scientific', legal or other) is a result of

the force of eloquence rather than of rational i n s i gh t . . . If men knew,

there would be a great difference between deception and truth. As it is, we

can only distinguish between successful and unconvincing, persuasive and

fruitless arguments.*

Tu rn in g Parmenides upside -down , Gorgi as claimed that nothing

exists (or is real), that if it did w e co ul d not k n o w it, and i f w e co ul d

k n o w it w e coul d not communic ate our kno wl ed ge to another. T h e

philosophical basis is the same as that of Protagoras 's 'W h a t seems

to each man is as far as he is concerned'.3

' I f , says Gor gia s (fr . 1 1 a,

35 D K ) , ' i t were possible thr oug h wo rd s (logoi) to make the t ruth

about reality (ergd) pure and clear to the hearers, ju dg me nt w o u l d

be eas y as sim ply fo ll ow in g from wh at w as sa id ; bu t since it is no t

so . . . '

T h e logos has supr eme p owe r, and it is neutral. It can do grea t g o o d ,

banis hing fear and gri ef and fostering jo y and comp assi on ( G o r g .

Hel. 8, D K 11 , 290). E v e n wh e n dec ept ive , the deceit ma y be a just one

and the deceived go away wiser than befo re, as happe ns wi th the

1

Plato must have enjoyed the irony of imagining Protagoras as protesting against precisely

the methods of arg umen t whic h he himsel f found objec tionable in the Sophist and his k ind :

'You adduce no compelling proof at all, but re ly on the prob abl e' (Theaet. i6ze).2

Versenyi, Socr. Hum. 4 7 f.3

Sicking (Mnem. 1 9 6 4 , 2 45 ) appear s to think oth er wis e; but it can hardl y be denied that if

nothing has real existence, nor can be recognized or communicated, the only alternative is that

each man' s priva te sensations and beliefs are alone val id, and valid for him alone. That Gorg ias 's

polemic is not aimed solely at the Eleatics (' nicht nur', Sicki ng p. 2 3 2 , tho ugh on p. 245 he dro ps

the qualification) cannot alter this.



The Power of the Logos

fictions o f tragedy, which to Gorgias was only rhetoric in verse.1

Bu t in itself it is si mp ly 't he art of per su asi on' , armed wi th wh i c h a

man can co nvi nc e o f wh at ev er he likes ' a ju ry in cour t, senators in

the Co un ci l, the peopl e in the Ass em bl y, or any other gathering of

cit izens' (Plato, Gorg. 452 ε ) . Th is art o f spea king Go rg ia s claimed to

teach, and not hin g mor e. T h o u g h it conce rned ri ght and w r o n g , he

disclaimed the teachi ng o f arete (Meno 95 c) and main tained that the

rhetorician is no t to be bla me d if his pupi ls em pl oy their skill for

wicked ends, any more than a boxing instructor if his pupil g oe s a wa y

and kn oc ks his father do w n . Rh eto ri c, it appears , is co nc er ne d enti rel y

witli means, not ends,2

and his teaching had different effects on pupils

according to their character . Xenophon (An. 2.6.16ff.) contrasts

Proxen us the Boe oti an, w h o paid Gor gi as 's fees because he lo ng ed for

greatness, fame and money, 'but had no desire to win them unjus t ly ' ,

with the unscru pulousne ss o f Me no the Thessal ian (who se co nne xi on

with Gor gia s is k n o w n from Pla to) . If Socrates's pupils did not all do

him credit, it wa s no t for the same reaso n.

(2) P R O T A G O R A S

Protag oras's su bjectiv ism has alre ady been intro duced in con ne xi on

wi th the rel ativ ity o f va lu es , and its close rela tion to his act ivi tie s as a

teacher of rhetoric is obvious.3 He taught his pupi ls to praise and

1

f'rr. 23 and 1 1 . 9 ( λ ό γ ο ν Ι χ ω ν μ έ τ ρ ο ν ) . Dece it then is possi ble. In spit e of hi s denia l o f

abtolut c truth, Gorgi as woul d not main tain that it is all the same whet her a murder takes place

on the st age or in r e a l i t y . But wha t is deat h? What ev er we are persuaded it is. Th ere i s a ni ce bit

of rhetorical effrontery i n Gor gias 's Palamedes, whe re, after play in g the argume nt from pro b

a b i l i t y throughout his speech, Palamedes towards the end (§34) exhorts his hearers μ ή τ ο ΐ ;

Aoyotf μ ά λ λ ο ν f\ TO IS i p y o i s π ρ ο σ έ χ ε ιν τ ο ν ν ο υ ν .

* Gorg. 4 5 6 C - 4 5 7 C When Socrates presses his argument, Gorgias does indeed admit, in an

offhand wa y, that if his pupil does n't k no w about rig ht and wr on g he supposes he can teach him

(1110 lubj ects for wh ich Socrat es and Plat o found a lifetime of philo soph y inade quate I ) , but,

when Socrates goes on to dra w the conclusion that in fact rhetori c cannot be used for wr on g

end*, it is time for the old and respect ed man to be released and h is brash pup il to tak e ov er.

' T i l e who le discussion with Go rgi as throws an inval uabl e ligh t on current concepti ons of rh e

toric, and bears no marks of caricature. See also Phileb. 58 a for his convic tion of t he sup eri ori ty

of pcrnuuslon to every other art, and on his disclaiming to teach α ρ ε τ ή pp. 2 7 1 f. below.1

Nestle (ZN , 1358 n.) s a y s it is not hing but apetitioprincipii to regard rhetoric as the sourc eof I'rotugonis's phi losop hy. It is of course unp ardo nabl y crude. Th e scepticism and subject ivis m

nl which lie was such a notable representative were rooted in the previo us histo ry of ph ilo sop hy,

II onl y Ha u reaction t rom its universa l assumpt ion of an unperceive d r e a l i t y underlying pheno-

l8l




I82

censure the same case, wa s no to ri ous for his claim ' to mak e the wea ke r

argu ment the st ro nge r' (see e.g . A r . Rhet. 1402323 f f . ) , and wrote two

b o o k s of 'C on tr ar y Arg um en ts ' whi ch must have been a rhetorical

textbook. 'There are' , he said, ' two opposite arguments on every

subject ' ,1

and in the Euthydemus (286b-c) Socrat es attributes to

'Protagoras and even earlier thinkers' the thesis that it is impossible

to contradict, which, he s a y s , amounts to saying that it is impossible

to speak f a l s e l y . 2

Aris to t le (Metaph. 1007 b 18) speaks o f the thesis

' that contradictory statements about the same thing are simultaneously

tr ue ' and ' it is poss ibl e either to assert or deny some th ing o f ev er y

subject ' as one that must be accepted by those who accept Protagoras's

dictum. L o w e r down, at 100936, he says (after mentioning denial of

the law of cont rad ict ion ): ' W h a t Pr otagor as says originates in thesame opinion, and they must stand or fa l l to ge th er ; for if all that

appears and is be li ev ed is true, eve ry th in g mus t at the same time be

true and fa l se , for ma ny peopl e ho ld opinions oppo sit e to each oth er .'3

mena or even ( in the case of the Eleatics) deny in g them their right to exist (cf. p. 15 abov e) .

It is best to avoid do gma tiz ing about cause and effect, and say on ly that, just as the democ rati c

freedom of Ath ens favoured the rapi d rise of rhetoric in pract ice, so the philosophical situatio n

pro vid ed a bac kgr oun d suited to its theoret ical justificatio n; and this the best of the S ophi sts,

who we re ver y much more than de mago gues or soapbox orators, wer e anxious to p rovi de.

1 Eudoxus ap. Steph. By z. (DK, A 2 1 ; cf. Arist oph. Clouds nzS.), D.L. 9.55 ( Ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ι ώ να ' β ' ) , D.L. 9 . 3 1 , of whic h an equ all y possible translation wou ld be : O f every thing two contrary

accounts can be given.'1

Th e 'e arlie r thi nke rs' need not be taken too seriousl y. Plato wo uld chiefly be thi nki ng of

Herac litu s and hi s do ctr ine of the ide nti ty of opposit es (vol . 442 ff.), whi ch no doubt influenced

Protag oras' s vi ews but contained them onl y in embry o. Plato liked to brin g in not o nly earlier

philoso phers but even poets as soi-disant paren ts of philosophic al doctrine s, as, for exa mpl e, at

Theaet. 152 ε and Crat. 402b he car ries the Her acli tean flux-doctrine ba ck to Homer. Nor, in

v i e w of many Platonic examples to the contrary, can we suppose ol ά μ φ ί Π . intended to exclude

Pro tag ora s himself. Th e thesis of the impo ssib ilit y of contr adict ion is usu all y ascrib ed to

Antisthenes on the evidence of Aristotle {Metaph. 102 4b 32, Top. 104b 20). D.L. (9 .5 3, cf. 3.3 5)

c a l l s it the thesis of Antisthenes, but adds, citing Plato, that it wa s first arg ued by Pro tag ora s.

Aristotle's words certainly do not exclude this, and Plato's language suggests that it may have

been w e l l kn own in sophistic circles of the fifth ce ntury . A pa py ru s from an autho r of the fourth

century A . D . ascribes it to Prodicus. This may be simply a mistake, but Prodicus was acquainted

with both Protagoras and Antisthenes (Xen. Symp. 4.62). See Binder and Liesenborghs in

Mus. Helv. 1966.

3

Untersteiner {Sof. 1, 49 f.) and H. Gomperz {S. u. R. 225 f.) ha ve argu ed from these pass ages

that the impo ssib ili ty of contr adict ion was not a tenet of Pro tag ora s himself, since Aristo tle

represents it as an inference from wh at he said. Th e most that can be claimed is that they do not

prove that it was, and other evidence mak es it practically certain. There is howeve r this qual i

fication to be made , that what cannot be contradicted mu st 'a pp ea r to, or be believed by ', at

least one man. Prota gor as wo ul d not agre e wit h Aristo tle that everything that can be utter ed must

be true and false ( i o o y b 2 o ) , io r after all nob ody believe s that men are triremes or w a l l s .



Protagoras: 'Man the Measure'

T h e theoreti cal fou nd at ion for all these statements lies in the thesis

with which he opened his work on Truth,1

and which has already been

quot ed for its bear ing on concepts of valu e (fr. ι D K ) :

Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are that they are, and of

ι he things that are not that they are not.1

T h e continuation shows that he had chiefly the individual in mind,

though unless Plato goes beyond him in this he would have extended

ii to the corp orat e op in io n o f a state as embodied in its laws. (See

p . 172 ab ov e. ) Besid es Pla to and Ar ist ot le, the statement is qu ot ed b y

S e x t u s , w h o also understands it o f the indiv idual, expl ain in g: 'truth is

N o m e t h i n g relative because everything that has appeared to, or been

believed b y , someone (τ ι ν ί ) is at once real in relation to him'.?

T h e word 'measure ' (metron) wa s pro babl y chosen b y Prot agor as

l o r the epigramm atic fla vour whi ch it gi ve s to his ve r y quot able

Haying, and there is no reason to doubt that Plato, followed by Sextus,

w as right in explaining it as kriterion, standard o f judg ment.^ Its

meaning is also br ou g ht ou t b y a criticism o f Ar is to tl e' s. A t the end

o f a discussion of metron in the Metaphysics (1053331) he says (to

paraphrase and expound a difficult passage) that, in addition to its

mor e usual mean ing s, the w o r d is applie d to k n o wle d g e and sensation

because they are a means o f learning about things, as a standard measure

enables us to learn their size, quan tity , w ei gh t, val ue, etc. Th i s ho we v e r

in a misuse o f the ter m w h ich ma ke s it mea n the op po sit e of wh at it

should. Far from our kn ow le dg e and sensations be in g the measure o f

reality, it is reality which must measure the amount and worth of our

cog ni tio n^ Kn o wl ed ge cannot determine the nature o f th in gs ; its job

in to adapt itself to thei r nature as alr eady deter mined , in order to

' The position of this sentence in his work is vouched for by Plato (α ρ χ ό μ ε ν ο ; τ η ; Ά λ η θ ε ί α ; ,

t'ktatt. 161 c) and Sextus (έ ν α ρ χ ά μ ε ν ο ; τ ώ ν κ α τ α β α λ λ ό ν τ ω ν , Math. -J.66). κ α τ α β ά λ λ ο ν τ ε ;

i ippc i i t s to have been an alternative title for the Α λ ή θ ε ι α (Bernays, Ges. Abh. I , 1 1 8 ) . A metaphor

l i m n w r e s t l i n g , it means arguments which overthrow others. Cf. Eur. Bacch. 202 (of ancestral

I I m i l l i o n s ) ο ύ δ ε ί; α υ τ ά κ α τ α β α λ ε ϊ λ ό γ ο ;.1

On the translation of this fragment, see the App endix , pp. 1 8 8 — 9 2 .1

Si-xt.Math. 7.60; cf. P.H. 1 .216 (DK, A 14).

4

ΙΊ .1Ι0, Thcact. 178b (and cf. κ ρ ι τ ή ; , 160c); Sextus, P.H. 1.216.

' TIIP analo gy that he uses to illust rate this is not part icu lar ly hap py but rathe r as B on iu

111IU It V xrin plui n piiriiin Icliuilcr ad ll ib it um ': it is, he s a y s , as if u e tho ught we wer e measur ing

l u n w l v r H when s i t n i c i M i c else measures us and we learn our own height from the number of times

l l iut lie applies (lie tout-rule.

l8 ( i s r




1 84

reach the t ruth. So , he adds, wh en Prot ago ras s ays that man is the

measure o f all thi ngs , mean in g the ma n wh o k n o w s or per cei ves , he is

talkin g nonsense, t ho ug h it sound s clever.

Aristotle is speaking from the point of v i e w o f his o w n and the

Platonic phi losophy, according to which there exists a reality beyond

and inde pende nt o f ou r k n o w le d g e or beliefs, and contras ting w it h it

the doctrine o f Pro tag oras that nothing exists save what each of us

percei ves and kn o w s . (Since our percep tions o n this the ory are

infallible, the y ma y be gi ve n the name o f kn ow le dg e, Theaet. 152c.)

It is our own feelings and convictions that measu re or determin e the

limits and nature of reality, which only exists in relation to them and is

different for ev er y one o f us. Ari sto tle 's op pos it ion s ho ws that for

him Pro tag ora s's w as a doc trin e o f pure subje ctiv ism or relat ivism.

W a s this a corr ect assessment o f it? T w o v i e w s ha ve been taken .

T o put it in the terms of Plato's example (Theaet. 152b), if the

w i n d is cold to me who feel it cold, and is warm to you who feel i t

warm, does this mean that the wi n d in itself is bo th w a rm and col d, or

that the wi nd in itself is neither w a r m nor co ld ? In general terms, are

w e to say (a) that all properties perce ived b y an yb o dy coexist in

a physi cal objec t, but so me are per cei ved b y on e man , others b y

another, or (β ) that the perc epti ble propert ies ha ve no ind epen den t

exis tence in the ob jec t, but c o m e to be as th ey are pe rcei ve d, an d f or

the percipient?

Cornford (PTK, 34ff.) favoured the first v i e w : Protagoras was

support in g ' the naive real ism o f co mm on se nse ' ,1

as w e l l as the Ion ian

tradition, that the senses were to be trusted and things were mixtures

o f the oppo site s appr ehen ded b y sense, against the Eleatics , w h o denied

the ev id en ce o f the senses and t he real ity o f the opp os it es . He wa s also

in ac cor d wi th Hera clit us's be lie f in the coex iste nce o f oppo site s and

to ok his side against Dem oc ri tu s. ( 'Be cau se ho ne y seems bitter to

so me and sw eet to others , De mo cr it us said it is neither s wee t nor sou r,

1

Von Fritz s a y s similarly {RE, X L V . Halbb. oi6f . ) tha tProtagoras 'ss ta tementdoesnotexpress

fu l l sensual ism, relat ivis m or phenome nalis m, bu t aims at oppo sing a ' Phil osop hic des ges unde n

Menschenverstandes' to the philosophies of the Eleatics, Heraclitus, etc., which are so far re

moved from communis opinio. He claims that this is borne out by the Theaetetus: Plato goes on

to point out that, if Pro tag ora s's statement is carried to its logi cal conclusion, it does lead to

absolute relativism and subjectivism, but makes it clear that this conclusi on wa s not draw n by

Protagoras ( i 6 o d f l . ) . Cf. also Cherniss, ACP, 369.



Protagorean Relativism

185 7 - 3

Heraclitus that it is both', S e x t . P.H. 2.63.) This, Cornford claimed,

is suppor ted b y Sextus, w h o wro te (P.H. 1.218) that ' the logoi

( "g r o u n d s ", Co rn fo rd ) o f all appearances subsist in the matter, so

that matter, in itself, can be all things that appear to all me n ' . He co n

cludes that for Prot ag or as cont rar y sense-objects, lik e the ho t and the

c o l d , exist ind epen den tly o f any percipient , and to c a l l his doctrine

' subjectivist ' , or even 'relativist ' , is misleading.1

But his ar gume nts

are not strong. The thesis that no man has the right to contradict

another because each man's sensations and beliefs are true for him has

little to do wi th 'th e naiv e realism o f c o mmo n sen se' , and little mo re

with Heraclitus, who urged men to f o l l o w the logos which was

common to all and despised them for l i v i n g as i f each had his o w n

private wi sd om (fr. 2; see vo l . 1, 425). T h e la ng ua ge o f Sex tus is so

entirely that of a later age as to cast suspicion on its substance, and his

conc lu s ion— 'T hus acco rd ing to Protag ora s man pro ves to be the

criterion of wha t exis ts '— do es not f o l l o w from his premises. Although

he denies it, ' t h i n g s ' on his inter pretation (that is, pro per tie s) ex ist

(as Cornford says) whether they are perceived or not: a jar of honey

lias its sweetness no ne the less because n o b o d y is tast ing it. T h e th eo ry

of a substance or matter containing properties which may or may not

be perceived is specifically denied for Pro tag oras b y Ar ist ot le . Wh e n

discussing the Megarian theory that there is no such thing as a poten

tiality that is not actualized, i.e. that nothing is cold, hot, sweet or in

general perceptibl e wh en n o on e is pe rc eivi ng it, he identifies this

theory with Protagoras 's .3

Ac co r di ng to Corn for d the second v i e w ,

that perceptible properties have no independent existence, corresponds

to the 'secret doctrine' (Theaet. i52cff.) which everyone agrees is

not Pro tag or ean ; but, in quo tin g Sextus, P.H. 1.218, as sup po rt for

the first, he omit s the pr ev io us sentence, in wh ich Sextus attributes to

Protagoras the doctrine that 'mat ter is in f l u x ' ( τ η ν ύ λ η ν ρ ε υ σ τ ή ν

ιΐν α ι). Th is , surely , be lo ng s to the 'secr et doc tri ne' , and Sextus

proves an unt rus two rth y witness o f genu ine Pro tag ore an ideas w h en

' I'niliiKiiras would thus be in agreement wit h the cont empo rar y p hilos opher Dioge nes of

Apollnnlu. l o r this, and for a simil ar theory in our own time, see vol . I I , 381, n. 3.

' Λ / » Μ / Ά . Ο , i l l. 3, especially 1 0 4 7 a 4 - 7 . It has to be remembered that δ υ ν α μ ί ξ , b esides i ts

Aila l iHi ' l l i i t i Miisc of potenti ality, was quite commo nly used to mean a prope rty l i k e hot, sweet

01 i t ' l l . Scr vol. 1, u. 1.




I86

he tries to g o further than the ' ma n -m ea s ur e' statement itself and its

obvious implicat ions.1

W e may conclude that Protagoras adopted an extreme subjectivism2

according to which there was no reality behind and independent of

appearances , no difference be tw ee n appe ari ng and bei ng , and we are

each the ju dg e o f our o w n impressio ns. Wh a t seems to me is for me,

and n o man is in a po si ti on to call ano ther mis tak en. I f wh at I feel as

wa r m yo u feel as co ld , w e can not a rg ue abou t i t: it is wa r m for me

and c ol d for y o u . N o natura l p hi lo so ph er we nt as far as this, for it is a

denial of the very meaning of physis. Democritus too said that al l

sensations are subjective, that ho t and co ld , swe et and bitter, ha ve no

existence in nature, bu t this wa s because th ey we r e to be expla ined as

due to the intera ction be tw ee n the atom ic structu re o f ou r b od ie s

and that o f the perce ived object. Th er e was a permanent physis or

reali ty, namely atoms and vo id (vol . π , pp. 438,440). For Protagoras

there is none, and for this Democritus attacked him, objecting that on

his v i e w 'nothing was any more such than such'.3 He was in the

van gua rd o f the humanisti c reaction against the natural phil osoph ers,

who se cont radi ctor y speculations wer e br in gi ng them into disrepute

among practical men—each one, as Gorgias said (p. 51 above),

claiming to possess the secret of the unive rse , bu t in fact on ly pit tin g

one opinion against another, each more incredible than the last. Like

a l l the Sophis ts, he wa s acqua inte d wi th their theo ries , bu t turned a w ay

from them to teach the one thing that mattered, how to take care of

on e' s o w n affairs and the bus iness o f the state (P la to , Prot. 318 c -

319 a ) .4

There is not much profit, therefore, in debating which of the

1

Th e vie w attributed b y Cornford to Protago ras seems rather to resemble that wh ich

Socrates in the Cratylus (386 d) dist inguis hes from his and assigns to Eu thyd emus, name ly

π α σ ι π ά ν τ α ο μ ο ί ω ς ε ί ν α ι ά μ α κ α ΐ α ε ί .1

If a label is wan ted , this is a better one than se nsuali sm or phen omen alis m, for the th eor y

applied to what was thought or believed as w e l l as what was perceived, to notions of right and

wrong as w e l l as sensations of hot and cold. Th e conclu sion here reache d as to Pr ota gor as' s

subjectivism agrees w ith that of Ad. Levi 's article in Philosophy, 1940, tho ugh it w i l l be evident

that I do not accept his further c laim that it applie d onl y to kn ow le dg e of natur e and that Pr ota gor as

did not extend it int o the ethical field. Th e difference betw een us rests on a different in ter pre

tation of his speech in the Protagoras.

3

μ ή μ ά λ λ ο ν ε ί ν α ι τ ο ϊ ο ν ή τ ο ϊ ο ν τ ώ ν π ρ α γ μ ά τ ω ν ε κ α σ τ ο ν , Democr. fr. 156 (Plu t. Adv. Col.

1 1 0 9 a ) . He also, it wo ul d seem, antici pated Plat o (Theaet. 1 71 a ) in argu ing that the doctrine is

self-refuting (DK, A 1 1 4 , Sext. Math. 7.389) .

4 Cf. Vlastos, Ph. Rev. 1945, 591.



Ethical Conclusions of Protagoras

philo sophe rs he bo rr ow ed f rom or reacted against , especia lly as w e

k n o w so li t tle o f the cont ent o f his wr it in gs : th ey we re all cha sin g

chimeras, th ou gh his direct polar oppos ite wa s o f cou rse Par men ide s,

w h o taught that all sen sati ons and o pi ni on s w e r e to be rejecte d as false.

W e have seen that his relativism extended to the field of ethics.O u r inform ation relates onl y to states, but o bv io us ly , i f a ma n s incer ely

believes that it is good to steal, then for him, so long as he believes it,

it is g o o d . Bu t, just as it is w o r t h wh il e for a do ct or t o ch an ge a sic k

man's world by his drugs (Theaet. 167a) so that what appears and is

to him sou r appears and is sw eet , so it is w o r t h wh il e for the maj ori ty,

or their appoi nted representativ es, to w h o m stealing bo th seem s and

is bad, to work upon him by persuasion until his view—that is , the

t ruth for h im —is chang ed. T h e logical concl usion o f Pr ota gor ean

subjectivism is mo ra l and politi cal ana rch y, bu t this w a s far fro m his

tho ugh ts, and mor als and the soci al ord er we re sav ed b y this c ur io us

doctrine, typical o f i ts peri od, wh e re by the standard o f t ru th or false

ho od is ab an don ed , bu t replaced b y the pra gma tic standard o f bette r

or wor se. ' S o m e appearances are better than others, though none is

truer* (Theaet. 167b) . Here , undo ubte d ly , the ep i s te mol ogi ca l -

on to log i c a l1

doctr ine o f comp lete subject ivi ty breaks d o w n : the

appearance of the mom en t is subo rdina ted to a hi gh er standard, the

etui or pur pose o f hu ma n nature and soc iet y. A t the same time the

other kind of relati vity co me s i n :2

me n and societies differ w i d e l y , and

»o therefore do their needs . T he re is no all-em brac ing ' g o o d for m a n ' .

T o diagnose the particular situation and prescribe the best course of

action for a man or a state under g iv en cond itio ns, as a do ct or doe s for

his patient, is, as Pr ot ag or as saw it, the task o f the So phis t.3 T o ensur e

' A cltimny expression, wh ic h ma y nevert heless brin g home the point that, howe ve r it ma y be

today, In Greek thought epistemology and ont olo gy , kn ow in g and being, are not to be separated .

' That wh ich is desc ribe d und er (a) on p. 166 above.

' Th e relation of Socrates and Plato to the Sophists is subtle. It is g e n e r a l l y s a id that, where as

• tin SuphUlN were empiricists who denied the possibility of a general definition o f ' g o o d ' on the

Μ Ι 1111111Ι · that it differed r e l a t i v e l y to individual men or societies and their circumstances, Socrates

( and Plain lifter hi m) insisted that there wa s one uni versal goo d, kn ow le dg e of whic h wo ul d

dive the key to right action for everybody everywhere. Thus Aris tode ( l i k e Plato in the Mend)

i l i ' | i k l « l i l in as insistin g on a gene ral definition of arete" in contrast to Gorg ias wh o preferred to

v i i i i i n r i a i e nepanile virtues (Pol. i 2 6 o a 2 7 ) . Yet in the Phaedrus it is the 't ru e rhe tor ic ian ', that is,

l l iu tliiilt't t l u i l l y n.iined philosopher, who is compared to a q u a l i f i e d doctor who not only knows

l i o w In administer various treatments but und ersta nds also which is appropriate to a particular

p u l l i ' i i l , an i l when and for how long—a man, it would seem, in the empirical tradition of the best

1 S 7




188

that that course is fo l lowed is the concern o f the rhetorician. Pro tag ora s

was both , and taught both arts. H i s o w n integrity, perhaps, prev ented

him from seeing that his art o f defending both sides, and making the

weaker argument appear the stronger, wa s a two-edged sword in the

hands o f less scrupulous m e n . T h e average rhetorician w a s satisfied

with the means and careless of the end. He turned the heads o f the

y o u n g b y telling them that i f they only mastered the art o f persuasion

they could have the wor ld at their feet: what they d id with i t was

their affair.

A P P E N D I X

Protagoras fr. i , DK: some points of translation

Controversy has flourished for many years over the translation o f threewords in this sentence: ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ς , cos, χ ρ ή μ α τ α .

ι . ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ς . Is Protagoras using it in (a) an individual or (β ) a universal

sense, or is he (c) unaware of the distinction? For older authorities see

Z N , 1357, n. 1. In the past at least the majority o f scholars have supported

(a), e.g. Zeller himself, H . Gomperz (S. u. R. 222 f., 234ff., in spite o f saying

on p. 217 that no one would have been more astonished at the question

than Protagoras), Nestle (with some qualifications; see his edition o f the

Prot., p. 14), Grant (Eth. 1, 135 f.), R. G. Bury (Sextus, Loeb ed. 1, xiv) ,

Burnet (Th. to P. 115), Campbell (ed. o f Theaet. x x i x ) , Heinimann (N. u. Ph.

1 1 7 ) , Calogero and A d . L e v i (for whom see Untersteiner, Sophs. 86 with

nn.).

Grote is always quoted as the originator o f (/>), bu t in his Plato, 11, 322 ff.

(to which Zeller refers) I do no t find this interpretation. T h e pages must be

read entire, but one may quote 328-9: 'However multifarious the mental

activities may be, each man has his own peculiar allotment and manifestation

thereof, to which his cognitions must be relative . . . Each man's mind, with

its peculiar endowments . . . is still the limit or measure or limit of his

cognitions.' (M y italics.) T . Gomperz on the other hand held the uni-

versalist v i e w unambiguously (G.T. 1, 451): 'M an . . . was obviously not

Greek medical teaching. In contrast, the ordinary rhetorician, w ho ' through ignorance of

d i a l e c t i c is unable to define the nature of rhetoric', resembles a quack who has learned from a book

how to g i v e an emetic or a purge, but has no idea when its use w i l l be appropriate {Phaedr. 2<58 a-c ,

269b). It may be that the Socratic search fo r definitions, and its offspring the Platonic dialectic of

'collection and divisi on', rather include and transcend than undo the work of Sophists and rhetor

i c i a n s . Their teaching i s , after all, describ ed in the Phaedrus as being , though not the art of rhetoric

proper, a necessary propaedeutic to it ( τ α τ φ ό τ ή ; τ έ χ ν η ς α ν α γ κ α ί α , 269 c ) . Such questions

ca l l for careful con sideration ; see e s p e c i a l l y Socrates, ch. Ill , § 8 .



Translation of Protagoras Fr. ι

1 89

the individual, but man ki nd as a wh ol e . ' If Ze l l e r (ZN, 1357) is c o r r e c t in

describing this v i e w as m e a n ing tha t a c c o rd ing t o P ro t a go ra s ' T h i ng s

present themselves to us as under the limitations and according to the dis

position of h u m a n natu re th ey mus t present th ems el ve s ' , then i t f its no ne

of the evidence.

Hold ers of interpret at ion (c), wh i c h has gain ed fa vo ur rece ntl y, inc lude

Joel (Gesch. 703-5), Unters te iner (Sophs. 42, 86f.), Classen (Proc. Afr.

("/. Ass. 1959, 35) and C o r n f o r d (u np ub li sh ed ). S o m e w h o ho ld this v i e w

combine it w i t h (a): Prot agor as was th in king o f the indiv i dual , but the

dlutinction wa s pr ob ab ly not present to his min d. T hi s seems l i k e l y e n o u g h ,

provided it is tak en to ex cl ud e (b). H. Go mp er z , in h i s a rg ument tha t

Protagoras would have made no dist inction, claims that ther e is n o co nt ra

diction bet ween the t w o , because , if what appears to an individual exists

lor him, then wh a t app ear s to all me n exi sts for all me n. T r u e e n o u g h , i f P r o t a

goras bel ieved that there was anything at al l tha t appeared the same to all

men. Hut wa s it n o t the es se nc e o f hi s te ac hi ng that this w a s no t so ?

After all this it is refreshing to t u rn to the c o m m o n sense o f a his to rian

of Greek literature, L e s k y , w h o says in his Hist. Gr. Lit. p . 345: ' Ce r ta in ly

lite sentence refers to the indiv idua l . A n y o n e w h o dou bt s i t must hol d tha t

Pluto is ly ing or mis taken . . . I f w e are deter mined to disb elie ve Pl at o, w e

littve still to rec kon wi th other authors [Aris tot le , Sextus] wh os e use of the

word ίκ α σ τ ο ξ s h o w s tha t they also took the sentence as referring to the

Individual.'

a. cos Ε σ τ ίν . D o e s it s impl y mean ' t h a t they are ' , cos be ing the equ iva len t

of ό τ ι , or doe s it con tai n the idea of ' h o w th ey ar e' , the manner of their

•xlstcnce? Go mp er z fa ther and son both sp ok e for the for mer, ci t ing the

mtnlogy of fr. 4 on the existence o f the go ds . (See Th . G. , G.T. 1, 452;

1 1 , f ί ., ,9. u. R. 204.) He in ri ch 's ar gu me nt s see m dec isi ve, t h o u g h he add s tha t

the question is of little im po rt an ce fo r the subs tan ce of the s tatement.

V on I'ritz (RE, X L V . H a l b b . 914) takes the same v i e w , n o t i n g tha t classical

ncholurs tend to the meaning ' t h a t ' , phi losophers to ' h o w ' . Z el l er ( Z N ,

n. 1) th ou gh t it mo r e cor rec t to inc lud e bo t h me an in gs . So did Joe l

(Gtsch. 708), w h o denied the val id it y o f fr. 4 as an ar gu me nt the oth er w a y .

Untersteiner agrees (Sopks. 84), th ou gh his interpretat ion is con nec te d wi th

Ilia curious concep t ion of μ έ τ ρ ο ν as 'm as te ry ' , whi ch has no t fo un d genera l

acceptance. (It in vo lv es t rans lat ing Sop h. El. 236, τ ί μ έ τ ρ ο ν κ α κ ό τ η τ ο ς

Ι φ υ , us 'w ha t wa y w i l l there be [sic] to get the better of w i c k e d n e s s ? ' T h e

Italics arc his . ) Calogero (see Untersteiner, Sophs. 90, n. 34) th inks it u n -

lilntnriciil to pose the quest ion becaus e the dis t incti on be tw ee n existenc e

Mild essence could not hav e been con sci ous ly present to Pro tag ora s ' s min d.




I 0 O

T h i s is ra ther l ike saying tha t , because t h e dis t inc t ions between a l l the

different senses o f λ ό γ ο ς c ou l d n o t ha ve been co nsc io usl y present to the

mind o f a w r i t e r o f t h e fifth century , therefore wh e n Her odo tus says Ι λ ε ξ ε

A o y o v ( i . 1 4 1 . 1 ) there i s n o sense i n asking whether h e meant a s t o r y o r

any o f th e other things t h e wo r d cou ld mea n: argumen t , pre text , prop or t i on ,

definition o r w hatever . Wha t dec ides i s th e con tex t .T h a t ώ ς c a n mean ' h o w ' is undeniable , b u t i t is also used i nte rcha ngea bly

w i t h ό τ ι . T h a t it is so used here is made over w he lmi ng l y p robab le b y i t s

set t ing (especial ly in the negative clause ώ ς ο ύ κ ε σ τ ι ) a n d b y c o m p a r i s o n

w i t h fr. 4, to w hich shou ld b e added t h e sophist ic Hippo crat ic t reat ise

De arte, ch . 2 ( v i , 4 L . ) , τ ώ ν γ ε μ ή έ ό ν τ ω ν τ ί ν α ά ν τ ι ς ο ύ σ ί α ν θ ε η σ ά μ ε ν ο ς

ά τ τ α γ γ ε ί λ ε ι ε ν ώ ς ε σ τ ί ν , w h er e ' t h a t ' is cer ta in ly t h e m o s t natural t rans

lation o f ώ ς .

D i scuss ion h a s concent ra ted o n t h e w o r d ώ ς i n this phrase, b u t t h e

w or d ε σ τ ι is equa l ly w or th commen t . L i k e other scholars I have hi ther to

wr i t ten o n t h e assumpt ion tha t t h e pr imary , i f n o t t he only, sense o f ε ί ν α ι

when used without predicates i s ' t o e x i s t ' , b u t C . H . K a h n is very persuas ive

in h i s cla im tha t i t s fundamental value i s ' n o t " t o e x i s t " b u t " t o b e s o " ,

" t o b e the c a s e " , o r " t o b e t r u e ' " . T h i s , as h e points o u t , fits Plato's e x

planat ion o f th e sen tence : 'as each thing seems t o m e , such is i t fo r m e ' , e t c .

' Plat o 's exegesis be co me s ent irely natural a n d in te l l ig ib le i f w e unders tand

the absolute u s e o f einai as . . . a n affirmation o f fact i n genera l , as " w h a t

is s o " o r " w h a t is th e c a s e " . T h e existential u s e , e . g . fo r an affirmation such

as " t h e r e a re a toms a n d v o i d " , w o u l d t he n b e inc luded as a special case o f

the general factual assertion intended b y Protagoras ' s s ta tement has esti.

I f m a n is th e measure o f all th ings , " that t hey a re so o r no t s o " , then h e is

the measure o f t h e exis tence o r non-exis tence o f atoms just as he is the

measure o f t h e b e i n g - c o l d o r n o t - b e i n g - c o l d o f t h e w i n d . ' S e e h i s article in

Foundations of Language, 1966, especia l ly p . 250.1 ( I t w i l l have appeared,

h o w e v e r , that I do n o t entirely agree with h i m w h e n o n p . 262 h e calls

P ro tagoras ' a phi losopher o f common sense ' . )

3. χ ρ ή μ α . T h i s is a w o r d o f ve ry wid e appl ica t ion , mean ing any thi ng

f rom a n oracle t o m o n e y ( so in s ing. H d t . 3 . 3 8 . 3 , t h o u g h c o m m o n l y i n pi . ) .

R e c e n t l y there h as been a t endency t o overstress i ts e tymolog ica l connex ion

w i t h χ ρ ή σ θ α ι a n d n a r r o w i t d o w n t o ' s o m e t h i n g o n e u s e s ' , and so s o m e

th ing i n close relationship t o m a n (Nes t l e , VMûL, 271), o r a c c o r d i n g t o

Unters te iner (Sophs. 79) ' the to ta l i ty o f th ings unders tood as act ion o r

exper i ence ' . H e professes to g i v e a r e v i e w o f its possible meanings, b u t it is

1 The use of ε ί ν α ι and -π ρ ά γ μ α in Aristotle's discussion of ψ ε ύ δ ο ς (Mtiaph. 1 0 2 4 b 1 7 /V . )

may lend some support to his view.



Translation of Protagoras Fr. ι

η very partial one. ( O n Unters te iner ' s in te rpre ta t ion o f t h e s a y ing i n genera l

] \ . F . Holland i n CQ, 1956, is severe b u t just.) T h e f o l l o w i n g (a l l easily

uvailable i n LS J ) find n o mention.

(</) In plural anything useful o r g o o d fo r ma n . See X e n . Oec. 1.7-8,

I lie passage w h i c h affor ds the strongest support t o Nest l e ' s thes is, th ou gh

not cited by h im in th is connexion. I n an y case it is o n l y o n e o f m a n y

meanings , an d seems to be confined to the plural .

(/ ') Cases where i t m igh t b e o mi t te d: δ ε ι ν ό ν τ ι χ ρ ή μ α έ π ο ι ε ΰ ν τ ο ,

' l l i e y thought i t dreadfu l ' ( H d t . 8.16.2); τ π κ ρ ό ν τ ι μ ο ι δ ο κ ε ΐ χ ρ ή μ α

(Ι υ α ι , ' i t seems to m e disagreeable ' (P la to , Gorg. 485 b ) ; τ ί χ ρ ή μ α λ ε υ σ σ ω ;

' w h a t d o I s e e ? ' ( A e s c h . Cho. 10 and e l s e whe re ) ; a t Eu r . Ale. 512

t ( χ ρ ή μ α means ' w h y ? ' , ' f o r what cause? ' .

(c) In per iphras is : Ooc μ έ γ α χ ρ ή μ α , ' a great boar ' ( H d t . 1 . 3 6 . 1 ) ;

λ ι π α ρ ό ν τ ό χ ρ ή μ α τ ή ς π ό λ ε ω ξ ' w h a t a fine ci ty! ' (Aris toph. Birds 826);

unci s o f requent ly: τ ό χ ρ ή μ α τ ω ν ν υ κ τ ώ ν δ σ ο ν , ' h o w l o n g th e nigh ts a r e ! '

(iilfniy Clouds 2).

(</) A s the Engl i sh ' bus iness ' in its wi d e col loquia l sense, ά τ τ α ν τ ό χ ρ ή μ '

ή μ α ρ τ ε , ' s h e mismanaged t h e wh ol e bus iness ' (So ph. Tr. 1 1 3 6 ) ; κ α κ ό ν

τ ώ χ ρ ή μ α , ' i t ' s a bad bus iness ' (idem, Ph. 1265; Untersteiner does g i v e

both these references, b u t explains them as an 'event... w h i c h o n e u n d e r

g o e s ( χ ρ ή τ α ι ) ' ) .

(e) Cases whe re ' d i i n g ' is the o nl y poss ible t ransla t ion: κ ο Ο φ ο ν χ ρ ή μ α

τ ι ο ι η τ ή ξ έ σ τ ι ν κ α ΐ π τ η ν ό ν κ α ι ι ε ρ ό ν , ' a poe t is a l igh t , winged a n d h o l y

t i l ing ' (P la to , Ion 534b). In expla ining Protagoras ' s sentence P la to (Crat.

\H ) a 386 e) equates i t w i t h π ρ ά γ μ α , a word which a lso h a d become es t ranged

from its parent v e rb a n d w a s used t o mean simply ' a n ex is t ing th ing ' .

(f) N umbe r , a m o u n t : χ ρ ή μ α π ο λ λ ό ν ν ε ω ν , ' a la rge number o f s h ip s '

(Hdt . 6.43.4), χ ρ ή μ α τ τ ο λ λ ό ν τ ι χ ρ υ σ ο Ο , ' a lo t o f g o l d ' (idem, 3.130.5).

N o doubt it is poss ible t o represent χ ρ ή μ α in all these cases as h a v i n g

tome relation t o mankind ( what th ing o f whose exis tence w e a r e aware

I i h s not? ) , but i t w o u l d b e fanciful t o suppose that this relation is in the

writer 's mind, a n d w e m a y conc lude that n o word more specific than ' t h i n g '

w i l l serve as its translation in the dic tum o f Pro tagoras . Th a t ' th in gs '

Include heat and cold, just ice an d injustice is undeniable, b u t Prot. 330c and d

a l l o w that these were s t i l l commonly regarded b y the Gre e ks as exis t ing

things ( π ρ ά γ μ α τ α ) , χ ρ ή μ α τ α w i l l have been fo r Protagoras what they were

f o r his c on t e m pora ry Ana xa go ra s : that i s , they w i l l have inc luded the

'o ppo sit cs ' atu l concrete things al ike (v ol . I I , 285). W e need n o t dismiss t h e

l i i l l e r from the a rgument on the grounds that m a n cannot b e a measure o f

(lie existence o f trees a n d stones (as Nestle does, VM\uL, 271): a c c o rd ing

to ii phi losophy o l ' f . v . v t ' est percipi he can. Hut there is little point in pursu ing

1 0 1




this line, since all the examples g i v e n by Plato and Aristotle are of properties

or attributes. These are what would concern Protagoras as a teacher of

po l i t i c s , ethics and rhetoric.

(3) G O R G I A S

G o r g i a s was primarily a teacher of rhetoric, associated with hiscou nt rym an Tis ias in the use of the argu ment from pr oba bil it y.

1

He

wr ot e manuals of the art (p. 44, n. 4, ab ov e ), whi ch ma y ha ve cons ist ed

l a r g e l y of mo de l declamat ions to be learned by heart, since Ari stot le

(Soph. el. 183 b 36) says that this wa s his me th od of inst ruct ion. O f

these the Helen and Palamedes (frr. 11 and 1 1 a) w i l l be surviving

e x a m p l e s , 2

ancTthe Helen KaTrjeen w e l l descr ibed asJan.essaj__on the

nature and power of logos' (Versenyi , Socr. Hum. 44), proving that

' the word is a mighty despot', and that (as Plato says Gorgias re

peatedly declared, Phileb. 58a -b ) : ' T h e art of persuasion far surpasses

all others and is far and away the best, for it makes all things its slaves

b y w i l l i n g submis sion, not by vi ol en ce '. So irresistible is its po w er

that if He le n was per sua ded in to adu lt ery she was as guil tle ss as if she

had bee n abduct ed by for ce. T h e epi stem olog ical implicati ons of this

have alr eady been ment ioned (pp . 50 f.), and we must n o w face the

problems of that remarkable tour de force, the treatise On the Non-

Existent, or On Nature. •

T h e Eleatics, by their primit ive limitation of the term ' b e i n g '

1

Plato, Phaedr. 267a. Lesky (HGL, 351) s a y s Tisias 'ce rta inl y accompanied him to

Athen s in 42 7' on his mission for Leonti ni. P erha ps h e did, but the sole evid ence is an unsupported

statement in Pausanias's handbook for travellers in Greece in the second century A . D . (6 .17.8).

S ee Stegemann in RE, 2. Reih e, i x . Halbb. 140. Gorgia s and Tisias must ha vebe enal most exact

contemporaries, born in the decade 490-480.2

On the character and genuineness of these two speeches see Dobson, Orators, 1 7 ;

H. Gomperz, S. u. Rh. 3ff.; Joel, Gesch. 657ff.; Schmid, Gesch. 72, n. 2; Untersteiner, Sophs. 95

and other references in his n. 54 on p. 99. The general opinion is now favourable to their

genuineness. As to date, see Calogero in JHS, 1957, 1, p. 16 with n. 23. The Pal. was dated

by E. Maa ss before 4 11 (Hermes, 1887, 579). The Hel. wa s put b y Preuss in 414, betwee n the

Troades and Helen of Euripides (De Eur. Hel. Leipzig, 1 9 1 1 ) and by Pohlenz before the Troades

(Nachr. Gott. Ges. 1920, 166). I should not b e surprised i f Helen's speech in the Troades (914-65)

owed something to what Gorgias makes her say on the same subject. In Euripides she takes the

offensive at once by say in g her troub les wer e Hecuba' s fault for bearin g Paris (! ), and goes on to

blame Aphrodite . The chorus appeal to Hecuba to destroy the τ τ ε ιθ ώ of this 'evi l woman wh o

knows how to speak'.

Gorgias himself c a l l s the Helena a τ τ α ί γ ν ι ο ν , on which the best comment is probably Ver -s e n y i ' s (Socr. Hum. 43 f . ) : it is certa inly not seriou s in its ostensible purpose (Gorgias docs not

mind whether Helen's memory is vindicated or not), which however he is using as a vehicle lor

his general views on the nature of λ ό γ ο ς and τ τ ε ι θ ώ .

1 92



Gorgias on the Non-Existent

>93

to what is one , un ch an gi ng and timeless, had d riv en practical pe op le

l i k e Prot agor as to the opp osit e extreme o f subj ecti vism, a denial of all

being in the Eleatic sense. Plato, convinced that any explanation of

phenomena must still allow for an eternal and changeless being over

and abo ve them, con tras ted Sop his ts as ' those wh o take refuge in the

darkness o f no t- be in g' wi th phil osoph ers w h o are 'd ev ot ed to the

nature of be ing ' (Soph. 254a). He meant, as Ari sto tle poi nted ou t

(Metaph. 1026b 14), that the Sophists recognized only accidental as

opposed to essential being, that is, the con di ti onal and relat ive as

opposed to the self-existent or absolutely existent. The way to these

uiteful distinctions had been closed for a time by the blunt antithesis of

Partnenides, and they were only established by Plato and Aristotle.

O b v i o u s l y Pro tag ora s's ' wh a t appears to me and is for m e ' had no

existence in the Eleatic or Platonic sense (in which 'what is' was com

pletely inaccessible to the senses), and G or gi as br ou gh t this op po si ti on

fu l l y into the op en, and to ok the Eleatic bull b y the ho rns , b y bo ld ly

proclaiming that ' nothing exis ts ' .

' f l i c treatise itself has no t sur vi ve d, bu t w e poss ess t w o paraph rases

o f its arguments, one in the little work On Melissus, Xenophanes and

(iorgias attributed to Ari sto tle , and one in Sext us. T h e y are no t alw ay s

In agre emen t, and the relevant secti on o f MXG contains lacunae and

corruptions, but between them they g i v e a g o o d idea o f the ty pe o f

argument which Gor gia s emp lo ye d.1

He set out to prove three t h ings :

(d) that nothing exists, (b) that ev en i f it doe s it is in com pre hen sib le

l o man, (c) that, ev en i f it is comp reh ens ibl e t o any on e, it is no t c o m

municabl e to an yo ne else. A great deal o f in k has be en spilt o v e r the

quest ion w he th er this wa s int ende d as a jo ke or par od y, o r as a ser iou s

contr ibution to ph ilo sop hy,2

but it is a mistake to think that parody is

' MXG 979 a 1 1 - 9 8 0 D 2 1 , Sextus, Math. 7.65 ff. Both texts are avail able wit h Italian translati on

III IJiilrratcincr, Sof. H, 36fT., Sex tu s in DK, Gor gia s fr. 3. See Ll oy d, Pol. & An. 1 1 5 , for a succinct

jllilKinmit on their relationship, and references to some of the many earlier discussions; also

Unmulr lncr , Sophs. t)6{. and Sicking, Mnem. 1964, 227fT. For MXG in gene ral , v ol . 1, 367

• l i d J70. W. Brockcr in Hermes, 1958 endeavoured to show that Sextus has no independent

Value an a aource when compared with MXG.

* I'nr orientation in the discussion see Untersteiner, Sophs. 1 6 3 — ; , Kerferd, Phronesis, 1955,

J , 11. 1, Silking, Mntm. 1964, 225-7. Sicking says rightly that ' e s doch keineswegs von v o rn -

luuelii I ' r N M i r l i t , d a s s man mit der Alternative Scherz-Ernst dem Charakter des We rk es gerecht

winded k ' t n n c ' ; an d Calogrro in JHS, 1957, i, 16 , n. 22, referring to the chapter on Gorgias in

lila Λ 7. .11// li/ttit., c l a i m s t l i . i l ' it is neither a joke nor an exercise, but a highly ironical reductio ad

http://tli.il/

http://tli.il/

http://tli.il/




I94

incom pati ble wi th serious intention. Go rg ia s 's pur pos e wa s neg ati ve,

bu t none the less seri ous. T o sh o w up the abs urd it y o f Eleatic, and

partic ularly of Parmen ide an, lo gi c (the absur dity o f ar gu in g fro m ' i t

i s ' and 'i t is n o t ' as such ) wa s o f the ut mos t impo rta nce bo t h to

co m mo n sense and to the theor y of rhetoric. Go rg ia s w o u l d har dly

w i s h to den y the existen ce o f ev er yt hi ng in the sense in wh i ch the

ordi nary man underst ands exis tenc e; his aim wa s to sh ow that, by the

sort of arguments that Parmenides used, it was as easy to prove

' i t is n ot ' as ' i t is ' . T h e inv ersi on o f Parmeni des's arg umen ts is

und oub ted ly amus ing, remindi ng one of Gor gia s 's advice to his

pupils ' to destroy an opponent's seriousness by laughter, and his

laughter by seriousness' (fr. 12).

T h e title o f the w o r k is itself sufficient indicat ion o f pa ro dy . Si m-

p l i c i u s , w h o sh ow s first-hand k n o w l e d g e o f the bo o k s o f bo th Par

meni des and Meli ssus , says that bo th g av e them the title ' O n Na tu re ' ,

and Melissus O n Natur e or Th at Wh i ch Is ' (CaeL 556, 557; see

v o l . 11, 102). Co ns id er in g the subject o f Par men ide s's w o r k , it is safe

to say that that wa s its full title to o. T h e na me ' O n Nat ur e ' wa s gi ve n t o

the w o r k s o f mo st o f the Presocrat ic natural phil oso phe rs either b y

the msel ves or b y their cont emp ora ri es (v ol . 1, 73), and by say in g that

' not hi ng is ' Go rg ia s wa s de ny in g the assumpt ion un der ly ing all their

systems, that behin d the shifting panor ama of ' b e c o m i n g ' or a ppear

ances there existed a substance or substances, a physis o f things, from

the apeiron o f An ax im an de r to the air o f Ana xim ene s, the four ' ro ot s '

o f Emp edo cl es and the atoms o f Dem oc ri tu s. A l l such permanent

'na tu res ' wo ul d be abolished on Go rg ia s 's thesis, but the form of his

arguments shows that their iro ny wa s aimed especiall y at Par meni desand his fol lo wer s, to demonst rate that on their o w n re aso ning it is as

easy to prove the contrary of χ as χ itself.1

absurdum of the Eleatic philo soph y ( especia lly of Zen o) '. Except that I see more of Parm enide s

in it than hi s paren thesi s sug ges ts , I am sure that this explana tion of it as ironi cal is co rrect.1

Th is applies at least to the first par t of the treatise pr ovi ng th e thesis that 'n ot hi ng i s ' ,

which to judg e from the summa rie s wa s the longe st and most impor tant . Kerferd (be. cit. 15)

finds it hard to belie ve that G orgi as could hav e arg ued in a certain w a y because havin g appealed

to a 'de cis ive agreed pri nci ple ' he then turns ro und and denies it : one argu ment depends on the

impossibility of sa yi ng that wh at is does not exist , yet the ve ry next one begi ns 'Ne ith er does

wha t is exist, f o r . . . ' and proceeds to arg ue it. But the 'dec isiv e agreed princ iple ' comes from

Parmenides, and considered as parody the idea of arguing from it as a premise and then dis-

proving Κ is a good one.




1 9 5

Th er e is one witness w h o , if on ly on accoun t o f his contemporanei ty,

cannot w e l l be ig no re d, th ou g h the signifi cance o f his tirades for the

character of On the Non-Existent has been vario usly ju dg ed . Isocrates,

thou gh a muc h yo un ge r man than Go rg ia s, wa s his pupil wh e n in his

c.irly twenties (Miinscher in RE, i x , 2152). A t the be gi nn in g o f his

Helen he attacks pa ra do x- mo ng er s and eristics o f all kin ds. T h e y are

not ev en origina l, for Prot ago ras and other 's op hi st s' o f his time

could do the same thing better.

Who could outdo Gorgi as , wh o had the audacity to say that nothing is, or

/cm) who tried to show that the same things were possible and impossible,

or Melissus who amid the infinite profusion of things tried to find proof s

ihut all is one? Wh at they did demonstrate was that it is easy to trump up a

false argument about whatever you like to put forward.

A g a i n in Antid. 268-9 he issues a similar warning against the 'old

N o p h i s t s ' , o f w h o m one said there wa s an infinite nu mb er o f be in gs ,

Kmpedocles four (with Strife and L o v e among them), Ion three only,

A l c m a e o n t w o , Par men ide s and Melissus one , and G or gi as no ne at all.

l i e compares their efforts to conjuring tricks which serve no useful

purp ose b ut are ga pe d at b y f o o l s . It has been argued that, since in

these attacks Isocrates has no qualm s in gr ou pi ng G or gi as w i t h the

lilcatics and philos ophers l ike Em pe do cle s, his 'n ot hi ng exi sts ' must

have been meant as a serious philosophical thesis. Probably however

more weight should be laid on the fact that Isocrates treats even the

philosophers as tricksters ready to maintain the most absurd hypo

t h e c s .1

In his own v i e w , exp oun ded on a num ber o f occas ions ,

phi losophy should turn its back on all such idle speculations, and

Gorgias con dem ned himse lf b y sto op ing to use their o w n argu ment s.

Scxtus classes Go rg ia s wi th those wh o aboli shed a cons tant standard

of judgment (/criterion), but adds that he use d a different met ho d o f

attack from Pr ot ag or as ; and after su mma riz in g his arg ume nts he

conc ludes : ' Th e se are the difficulties raised by G o rg i as , and t he y do

• Svt> DIHIIII, (iorff. 8, who reproduces the views of H. Gomperz , S. u. Rh. jol. I confess to a

•Ι Ι μ Ι ιΙ Ι ιΉ Ι ιιμ of uneasiness, because, if Isocrates kne w Gorgi as's treatise as an ironical exposure

n f Klrallr in isoning , lie would surely have claimed him as an ally rather than attacked him along

wllh ilir i r » l . He was, however , above al l things an advocate, ready to press anything into the

MM ν It 11 11I Ills ii ni ne di jl e case. 1 lis criticism of Gorgias would be that by bother ing at all about

llii) iilillnmiphi'm .11 id refilling ihein with their own weapons he put liimscli in die same class.




Ϊ 96

a w a y with the criterion, for there can be no criter ion for wh at neither

exists no r can be k n o w n nor is o f a nature to be desc ribe d to ano the r

pers on.' In their con clu sio ns Go rg ia s and P rot ago ras we re at one , and,

i f there is anything that may be spoken of as a general sophistic v i e w ,

it is this, that there is no 'cri ter ion ' . Y o u and I cannot, b y c omp ari ng

and discussing our experien ces, corre ct them and reach the kn ow l e dg e

o f a reality more ultimate than either, for there is no such stable reality

to be kn o w n . Similarly in moral s, no appeal to general standards or

principles is pos sib le , and the on ly rule can be to act as at an y mome nt

seems mo st expedien t. Th is pos iti vis m is impor tant bo th for its o w n

sake and for the reactio n wh i ch it pr od uc ed in thinkers o f the cal ibre

o f Socrates and P la to.

W e m a y n o w lo ok at som e of the argu ment s o f On the Non-Existent.

T h e f o l l o w i n g is not a complete account, but sufficient to convey their

character.1

It should be said as a preliminary that Parmenides's thesis

depended on one and the same Gr ee k verb ( ε ί ν α ι ) mean ing bot h ' t o

b e ' (w hi ch ma y refer to the relat ion o f subjec t to predic ate, ind iv idua l

to speci es, iden tity , etc.) and ' t o ex is t' . Wh e r e either is used in the

English version, they stand for the same word in Greek.

{a) Nothing exists. If_anythingêxists , it is either the exi sten t,or the

non-existentôr bot h. T h e non-exi stent does not exist ( ' wh at is no t is

no t ' ) . Th is migh t be thou ght obv iou s, but Gor gia s solemnly argues

it in ult ra- Par men idean te rm s: in so far as it is co nc ei ve d as no t- be in g

it is not, i.e. does not exist; but in so far as it is non-existent, it is,

i.e. exists. Bu t to be and not to be at the same time is absur d, the refore

the non -exi sten t is no t. T h e pu rpo se must be to br in g in the po in t that

b y saying that something ' is x', whatever the predicate, you are allow

i ng being to it; and since according to Parmenides 'is ' has only one

meani ng, name ly 'e xi st s ' , y o u can pr ov e on his o w n premises the

oppo site o f wh at he s a y s . A t the same time Gor gi as turns against him

his criticism o f the stupid c r o w d w h o claim that to be and not to be are

the same as w e l l as different (fr. 6 . 6 ) .

Nei ther does the exist ent exist. I f it do es , it must be eithe r eternal or

1

The re is a full sum mary in Un ters teine r, Sophs. 1 4 5 - 5 8 . See also Freeman, Comp. 3 5 9 - 6 1 ,and Brocker, Gesch. d. Phil, vor Sokr. 1 1 5 — 1 8 . One of the best e s s a y s on the subject in Engl ish ,

never noticed nowad ays , is that of Grant, Ethics, i , 1 3 7 - 4 2 .




I 9 7

generated o r both. T h e argument that it cannot b e eternal depends o n

i d e n t i f y i n g temporal with spatial infinity and then contending that

'wh a t i s ' cannot b e infinite. Since Melissus had said that i t was, and

moreover reached this conclusion b y the same confusion o f temporal

w i t h spatial (vol. n , lojff.), it seems l i k e l y that at this point he is th ebutt o f Gorgias's sophisticated w i t . T h e argument that it is not

generated f o l l o w s the lines o f Parmenides fr. 8.7if., b y denying in turn

that it could b e generated from what is o r what is no t . A g a i n , it must

be either on e or many. I f one, it must have quantity, discrete or con

tinuous, size and body , bu t then i t w i l l be divisible an d so no t on e.

Y e t for anything t o exist without magnitude is absurd. F o r this t o o

an Eleatic pr oo f wa s available , since i t ha d been argued b y Ze no (frr. 1

and 2 ; vol . 11, 391, n . 2 ) , and according to a fragmentary part o f MXG

( 979 b 36) Go rg ia s seems t o have referred t o this. N o r can i t be many,

fo r a plurality is composed o f ones, so if the one does n o t exist,

neither can the many.

Neither d o both exist.1

This would seem fairly obvious b y n o w ,

but Gorgias is enjoying his game with Parmenides. Although he has

already shown that ( a ) what is not and (p) what is do not exist, h e

n o w 'proves ' that both do not exist together. I f both exist, they

are identical so far as existence is concerned; and since what is n ot

d o c s not exist, and what is is identical with i t, what is w i l l n o t exist

either.*

In proving his second and third hypothes es, Gor gi as goe s be yo nd

the Eleatics, and his arguments are perhaps more interesting.

(6) If anything exists it cannot be known or thought of by man. W e

certainly think o f things that do no t exist, e.g . chariots c ross ing the sea

1

It wanof course Leucippus and Democritus w h o , trapped in the net of Parmenidean lan-

gungc, »uid that both being and non-being existed, meaning b y these terms solid body and void

( v o l . II , 391). Gorgia s m a y have had them in mind, but the nature of his 'proofs' shows that the

K I M I I C H mo hie main target all the time. Cf. Mondolfo, Problem, 180, quoted b y Untersteiner,

Λ ιι/Λ ι. ι A H , 1 1 . 32.

' llulcmtcincr, Sophs. 146, interprets th us : ' T h e attribution of existence to both Being and

Nnt-liplng lends to their identification " s o far as existence is concerned": therefore Being merges

l u l u that cxlntcncc of Not-being which is Non-ex iste nce; Being therefore, like No t-being,

Will mil cxliit.' This is probably the best that can be done. It is all, of course, en gag ing nonsense.

Tlim wlmt la not docs not exist is said in Sextus's summary to be ό μ ό λ ο ν ο ν (admitted, or com

mon μ κ mini) mid would seem to follow from the expression itself, though this has not prevented

( u ' l y l M Iti>m ' p roving ' it curlier.




198

and flying m e n ,1

and accord ing to Sextus Gorgias stated and defended

the converse, that, i f things thought are no t existent, then the existent

is no t thought . He may have been parodying someone w h o w a s

guil ty o f this, b u t more probably his argument was that, if our thought

o f something is no t sufficient to prove its exist ence, then, ev en i f w e

think o f something real, w e have n o means o f distinguishing i t from

the unreal.2

Gorg ias has indeed 'abolished the cri ter ion ' . MXG (980a

9 ff.), i f its corruptions are suitably emended, g i v e s a better sequence o f

thought . I f every th ing that can be thought o f exists (as Parmenides

had repeatedly said, frr . 2 .7; 3 ; 6 .1) , then nothing is untrue, even

the statement that chariots cross the sea. [This w e m a y assume to be

absurd.] W e cannot fa l l back on the senses, for they are unreliable

unless checked b y thought , which has already failed u s .(c) Even if it can be apprehended, it cannot be communicated to another.

This thesis rests c h i e f l y o n a point insisted on by Gorgias's master

Empedocles , that each sense has its o w n objects and cannot distinguish

those o f another (Theophr. De sensuj; v o l . 11 , 231). I f there are th ings

existing outside ourselves, they w i l l b e objects o f sight, hearing, taste

and so forth. O u r means o f communicat ion is speech, which is none

o f these external objects, and is understood differently. Just as a

colour cannot b e heard, or a melody seen, s o ' s ince what is subsists

externally, i t cannot become o u r speech, and without becoming speech

it cannot b e communicated to another ' (Sext. Math. 7 .84 ; that c o g

nition can on ly b e du e to th e interaction o f similars is another Empedo-

clean doctrine, vol. 11, 229). ' Sight does n o t distinguish sounds, n o r

hearing colour; an d what a man speaks is speech, neither a colour n o r

an object ' (MXG 980b 1) . Accord ing to MXG 98ob9ff. Gorg ias

added that the hearer cannot have in his mind the same thing as the

1

That Gorgias had the ά π α τ η of t ragedy in mind is probable. Cf. fr. 23. (Gercke, followed

by Untersteiner, restored ά π α τ α ν ί ο Γ ά π α ν τ α at MXG 98039.) Untersteiner (Sophs. 1 7 1 , n. 71)

mentions the Oceanides of Aeschylus crossing the sea in winged chariots π τ ε ρ ύ γ ω ν θ ο α ίς

ά μ ί λ λ α ι ς (P.V. 1 2 9 ; MXG 980 a 12 ha s ά μ ι λ λ α σ θ α ι ά ρ μ α τ α ) and Bellerophon in Euripides.

( W h y not Daedalu s? Sophocles wrote a play of that name, and after all it was Pegasus w h o flew,

not Bellerophon except per accidens.)

1

So Ad . Lev i ; see Untersteiner, Sophs. T h e probability i s strengthened b y P.H. 2.64,

where in close proximity to a mention of Gorgias, and possibly s t i l l dependent on him, Sextus

s a y s : ε ! δ έ τ ι σ ί ν [sc. α ί σ θ ή σ ε σ ι κ α ΐ δ ι α ν ο ΐ α ι ; κ ρ ι ν ο ΰ σ ι τ ά π ρ ά γ μ α τ α ] , π ώ ς κ ρ ι ν ο ΰ σ ι ν ά τ ι τ α ϊ σ δ ε μ ί ν

τ α ΐ ς α ί σ θ ή σ ε σ ι κ α ΐ ( τ η δ ε ) τ η δ ι α ν ο ί α π ρ ο σ έ χ ε ι ν δ ε ι, τ α ΐ σ δ ε δ ' ο Ο , μ ή έ χ ο ν τ ε ς κ ρ ι τ ή ρ ι ο ν ό μ ο λ ο γ ο ϋ μ ε ν ο ν

δ ι ' ο ΰ τ ά ς δ ι α φ ο ρ ά ς α Ι σ θ ή σ ε ι ς τ ε κ α ΐ δ ι α ν ο ία ς έ π ι κ ρ ι ν ο ΰ σ ι ν ;




1 9 9

epeaker, for t h e same th ing can not , w i t ho ut lo s in g i t s ident i ty , be

present in m or e pe op le than o n e . Ev en i f i t cou ld , i t n e e d n o t appear

the same to th em bo th , since th ey ar e different from o n e an ot he r an d in

dif ferent p laces . E v e n t h e same m a n doe s no t appreh end th ings s imi lar l y

at different tim es, or a s pres ente d b y different se n se s .

Final ly one m a y quo te a p regnan t s ay ing o f Go rg ia s , appropr ia te ly

called b y U n te r st e in e r 'G o r g i a s o n t h e t r ag ed y o f k n o w le d g e ' . I t h a s

c o m e d o w n to us w i t ho ut co ntex t or a n y indicat ion o f i ts p lace in

his w o r k s :

F.xistence is u n k n o wn u n l e s s i t acquire appearance, a n d appearance is feeble

u n l e s s it acquire existence.1

N O T i i . F r o m t h e arguments used b y G o r g i a s i t shou ld b e clear tha t t h e

main weight o f h i s i r o n y fell u p o n t h e Elea t ics , an d in part icular o n P a r m e

nides, though th e thesis i tself is eq ua ll y co ge nt agains t al l those Presocra t ics

w h o h u d posi ted t h e exis tence o f a non-sensible real i ty ( o r real i t ies) behind

t h e changing panorama o f t h e sensible wor ld . ( S e e G . R e n s i , Fig. di fibs.

99, η . i , quoted b y Unters te iner , Sof. n , 36.) T h i s w a s i n essentials t h e v i e w

• i f <!rote ( / / i f f . i888ed. v o l . v n , 51 f .) . Gor gi as , said Gro te , is u s i n g t h e w o r d

Ί ο h e ' in the Eleat ic sense, according t o w h i c h i t d id n o t a p p l y t o p h e n o mena b u t o n l y t o ul t ra -ph enomenal ( noumenal ) exis tence . ' H e denied

t h a t a n y such ul t ra -phaenomenal S ome thi ng, or No u m e n o n , e x i s t e d , or

c o u l d be k n o w n , o r c o u l d b e descr ibed. O f this t r ipart i te thesis, t h e first

negat ion w a s neither more untenable n o r less untenable than that o f those

philosophers w h o before h i m h a d a rgued for the aff i rmat ive : on the last

two points h is conc lus ion s we re nei ther paradoxical , n o r scept ical , b u t

perfectly just , a n d have been ratified b y t h e gradual aban don ment , e i ther

a v o w e d o r implied, o f su ch ul t ra -phaen omenal researches am o n g t h e major

pari o f phi losophers . '

(ί η H e ' s v i e w has been crit icized b y several later scholars, e.g. b y A . C h i a p -

p e l l l , 01 1 t h e g r o u n d tha t t h e dis t inc t ion be tween noumenal a n d p h e n o m e n a l

it foreign to all Greek thought before Pla to . I t m a y have been Pla to w h o

f l f* l formulated it expl ic i t ly in those o r similar terms, b u t t h e cont ras t b e

tween appearance an d (non-sensible) real i ty is a l e i tmot iv o f Presoc ra t i c

ΐ ΐί ο ι ιμ ί ιι , an d t h e whole basis of the present account of the Sophi s t s a n d

their contemporaries is tha t th e quest ion o f their relations w a s a t the

' I 1. jn (I'rniii I'mcliis on Hcsiod's Erga 758) Ι λ ε γ ε δ έ τ ό μ έ ν ε ί ν α ι « φ α ν έ ; μ ή τ υ χ ό ν τ ο Ο

Seliflf, ιΛ Η ί ί π κ ι ΐ ν ά σ Ο ιν έ ς μ ή τ υ χ ό ν τ ο ΰ ε ί ν α ι . T h e implication no doubt w a s that

f t l . h ' i i . Γ i t i ink i i i iw i i l i l r , and appearance non-existent, and the Greek would bear the translation

' t a t i i M i i n ' Is* i i n k i i o w . i b l e y u r it does no t acquire appearance', etc.




200

centre of fifth-century philosophical controversy. (Cf. p. 4.) For Heraclitus

e y e s and ears were unt rustworthy unless the mind could interpret their

message and discover the underlying truth. Parmenides made the distinction

clearly, saying that only the objects of nous existed and the phenomenal

world was illusion. Democritean atomism also taught the doctrine of a

reality behind appearances, a noumenal (the object of'legitimate' as opposed

to 'bastard ' cognition) behind the phenomenal. (F or the relation of this to

Plato's phi losophy see vol . 11, 462.) This was the legacy which the Sophists

inherited and made the most of for their own purposes. Zeller also criticized

Grote (ZN, 1367, n. 2), saying that even the Eleatics themselves did not dis

tinguish appearance from what lay behind appearance, but only the true

v i e w of things from the false. In fact, however, Parmenides distinguished

τ ό ov—what exists or is real (or if we f o l l o w Kahn, p. 190 above, what

is the case)—from τ ά δ ο κ ο ΰ ν τ α , what appears but does not exist, which is

what Grote said he did.

(4) O T H E R V I E W S : S C E P T I C I S M E X T R E M E A N D M O D E R A T E

A certain Xeniades of Corinth, whom we know only from a brief

reference in Sextus,1

also adop te d an extr eme sceptic ism at abou t this

time. Ac co rd i ng to Sextus 'h e said that everything was false, that

e v e r y impression and opinion is false, and that everything which comes

to be comes to be from what is not and everything which is destroyed

is dest roy ed into wh at is no t ' . Wh a t argu ments , i f any , he used t o

supp ort this thesis w e do no t k n o w , and his assertion is wo r th qu ot in g

si mp ly as ano the r example o f the disr eput e into wh ich the rival theori es

o f the natural philo sopher s and especially the lo gi c o f Parme nide s

had br ou gh t the wh ol e subject of the nature o f reality and the pos si

bili ty o f ch ange . It wa s Par men ides w h o exp res sly attacked the idea

that an yt hi ng cou ld co me into bein g from wh at is not (fr. 8. 6ff .),

but the wh ol e o f Presocratic phi lo so ph y and indeed all Gr ee k thi nki ng

up to now had been based on the unquestioned assumption that ex

nihilo nihil fit.7,

1

Math. 7 .5 3. Mentions of him in §388 and P.H. 2.76 add noth ing. T he only indica tion of

hi s date is that accor ding to Sext us he was old eno ugh to have been mention ed b y Democ rit us.

On Xeniades in the context of his time see now Lloyd, Pol. & Anal. 11 3, and in general vonFritz in RE, 2. Reihe, x v m . Halbb. ( 1 9 6 7 ) , i438f., who has mis givi ngs about the trustworthin ess

of Sextus's report.

* For the Parmenidean thesis ο ύ δ ' ε ί ν α ι π ο λ λ ά ά λ λ ά μ ό ν ο ν α υ τ ό τ ό ό ν a s the l og ical co nc lu sion

of archaic thought based on die principle ίκ μ η O V T O S ο υ δ έ ν ά ν γ ε ν έ σ θ α ι see Ar. Phys. 19 1a 23 33.



Xeniades and Cratylus

Cratylus, a younger contemporary o f Socrates (Plato, Crat. 429 c!,

4 4 0 d), carried to extremes the Heraclitean doctrine o f the flux o r i m -

pcrmanence o f everything in the sensible world. Aristotle, discussing

In his Metaphysics the sceptical doctrines that every statement is both

true and false, o r alternatively that n o true statement can be made,

attributes them t o a belief that there is n o existence outside the sensible

world, in which (i) contraries emerge from the same thing, an d (i i )

every thing is constantly mo vi ng and chan gi ng.1

T h e latter o bservat ion,

he goes o n ( io ioa io ) , b lossomed in to the most extreme o f these

doctrines, that o f the ' Heraclitizers' an d Cr at yl us , w h o finally deci ded

that he ought to say nothing at a ll , b ut only moved h is finger, a n d

criticized Heraclitus for saying that o n e cannot step tw ic e int o the

same river on the ground that o n e could not do so even once. H e

evidently thought (as one would expect from what is put into his

mouth in Plato's Cratylus) that t o utter a n y statement is to commit

oneself to the affirmation that something is.2

In the fifth-century co ntrov ersy ab ou t nomos and physis, i t has n o w

become clear that two positions must be distinguished among those who

were sufficiently serious philosophers t o trouble about the ontological

and cpi ste molo gical impl icat ions o f their v i e w s . (Th is did no t include

a ll the controversialists, for the arg umen t itself arose in the context

of practical human action an d was used primarily to advocate a certain

attitude to l a w and morali ty.) I t was possible to think that l aw and

Ciutom, and with them t h e totality o f sense-impressions, were to be

contrasted as mutable a n d relative with a nature which w a s stable,

permanent and knowable, opposing l ike Democritus what w a s ' b ynomos' to what w a s ' i n reality' . I t m a y be that ' w e really know

nothing, for t ruth is in the depths ' (Democr . fr. 117), b u t there the

t r u t h is, if we can dive deep enough to find i t . Alternat ively it was held

1

I'tir (Iicm characteristics o f the sensible world cf. e s p e c i a l l y M e l i s s u s , fr . 8 . 3 : ' I t appears to

tW tllttt hot becomes cold and cold hot, hard becomes soft an d soft hard, the l i v i n g d i e s , and is

Burn out o f the non-living; that all these things change, and what was an d what i s no w are in

Hn wny «III"·: iron which i s hard i s worn a w a y b y contact with the finger, as ar e go ld an d sto ne

gllt l l ivery other tough-seeming substance, while out of water come earth and stone. It follows

tllMl w« do not nee or recognize what is real ( τ ά δ ν τ α ) . ' See vol. 1 1 , 1 0 5 , a n d Morrison in Phronesis,

Ι »Λ », | « .

' (V i i i . ^jyd. (Presumably he did not carry consistency so far as to deny himself speech in

i i k I i I i i u 11 ic ci il ic ism o f Heracl itus. ) This argu ment is attributed e x p l i c i t l y to Antisthenes;

< W ( i . i iu U c l o w .

201




202

that there wa s no obj ect ive and perma nent reality beh ind appearances

and therefore, since these were purely subjective, no possibility of

scientific kn ow le dg e. N o natural phil osoph er beli eved this, but sophists

seized on the inconsistencies between their accounts as evidence that

they were not to be trusted. (Cf . Gorgias , Hel. 13, p . 51 ab ov e .) It was

these sceptics w h o m Aris tot le criticized for ma ki ng ev er y statement

t rue and false, or true statements impossib le, and they inc luded

Pro tag ora s and G or gi as . It has bee n claimed that Antiphon was also

o f their number.1

The evidence is scanty and dubious, but so far as it

exists it points to a different conclusion. It is confined to fr. 1, a

passage in Ga le n wh i ch exists on ly in a co rru pt for m and has be en

var iously restored.2

T h e most thor ou gh examination, wit h the m ost

convincing result, is that of Morrison.3 Galen first says (Critias

fr. 40, p. 302 b e low) that Critia s in the second b o o k o f his homi lies

frequently opposes the mind to the senses, then adds that Ant iphon

does the same in the first book o f his Truth. The re fol lows the quotati on,

which therefore, whatever its precise import, must express a contrast

be tw ee n th ou ght and sense. In Morris on' s translation it ru ns : ' W h e n

a man says a single thing there is no cor res pon din g single mean in g

(ν ο υ ς ), no r is the subject o f his spee ch an y sing le th ing either o f those

thi ngs wh ich the mos t powe rf ul beh old er sees wi th his sight or o f

those things which the most powerful knower knows with his mind.'-*

N o readi ng or interpretation can put the mea nin g com ple tel y be yo nd

1

So Schmid, Gesch. 1 . 3 . 1 , 16 0: 'Ant iph on j oins in the epist emolog ical scepticism of Pro ta

goras and Gorgi as, in that he also contests the po ssib ilit y of real kn owl edg e and confines himself

within the limits of δ ό ξ α . With in this framework he distinguishes two l e v e l s of cognition: a

higher one through the mind ( γ ν ώ μ η ) and a lower one thro ugh the senses, wh ic h in his vi ew as in

that of the Eleatics and the atomist s cannot communi cate any valua ble cogni tion .' Yet everyother con tempo rary t hinker who dist ingui shed between mental and sensual perception associated

the one wi th real kn ow le dg e and the other wit h δ ό ξ α , and so far as I can see Sch mid produces no

evidence at all for the surpri sing idea that Antip hon, th oug h he accepted both modes of cogn i

tion, saw the functions of both a l i k e as confined within the limits of δ ό ξ α .1

In Hipp. De meet. off. x v i i i B., 656 K. Besides the attempts gi ven by DK in their appara tus,

that of H. Gomperz (S. u. R. 67) and the interpretation of Untersteiner, who accepts Bignone's

text (Sophs. 235 and 258), may be noted. Cf. also Stenzel in RE, suppl. I V , 37.3

Phronesis, 1963, 36ff. His text of the fr. itself is as fol lows : ε ν τ ω [or better τ ο ι] λ έ γ ο ν τ ι

ο υ δ έ γ ε ν ο υ ς ε ϊς , 2ν τ ε ο υ δ έ ν α ύ τ φ ο ύ τ ε ώ ν δ ψ ε ι ό ρ ς ί (ύ ό ρ ω ) ν μ α κ ρ ό τ α τ α ο ύ τ ε ώ ν γ ν ώ μ η γ ι γ ν ώ σ κ ε ι ύ

μ α κ ρ ό τ α τ α γ ι γ ν ώ σ κ ω ν .4

L i t e r a l l y ' the man who sees farthest' (or most deeply, μ α κ ρ ό τ α τ α ) with his sight and ' tin

man who has the deepest insight (or power of recognition, γ ι γ ν ώ σ κ ω ν ) with his mind ( γ ν ώ μ η ) . '

I have altered Morri son's 's ee r' to 'be ho ld er' to avo id the former's mis leadi ng associations with

prophecy.





(5) L A N G U A G E A N D I T S O B J E C T S

N o doubt Antiphon was n ot a profound philosopher, b u t o n e m a y

regret t h e scantiness o f our knowledge o f him because what w e have

g i v e s u s o n e brief glimpse o f a much-debated theme: the relation o f

language to i ts subject-matter. H i s reference to the equivocal u s e o f

wo rd s i n Galen's quotation is obviously disapproving, and in another

place Galen, commenting o n the fact t h a t ' each one of those con cerned

with logoi thinks fit to coin new names', adds that this is made suff i c i -

entlyjplainJby Antiphon, 'who teaches how they ought to b e m a d e ' .1

Presumably his teaching was that they should b e made to fit th e con

cepts which they were intended t o express. T h e problem o f t he

correctness o f wo rd s o r names (ό ρ θ ό τ η ς ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν ) aroused

widespread interest at this time, a n d Morrison has clearly shown t h e

importance o f this debate ' i n t he wider investigation o f the problem

o f ho w δ ν τ α (ex ist ing th ings) are t o b e k n o w n ' (Joe. cit. 49). Antiphon's

position i n this debate was perhaps n o t far from that taken u p b y h i s

sparring-partner Socrates, at least with reference t o moral terms: o n

the meaning o f ' ju s t ' a n d ' g o o d ' w e disagree with each other a n d

e v e n with ourselves, and this is a state of things that calls for r em ed y.2

Morrison (loc. cit. 42 f.) g i v e s good reasons fo r supposing that even

the method b y which , in Plato, Socrates proposes t o rectify it, namely

' division according t o natural k in ds ' ( κ α τ ' ε ϊ δ η δ ια τ έ μ ν ε ι ν fj τ τ έ φ υ κ ε ν ,

Phaedr. 265 e, cf. Rep. 454a), was not invented b y Plato but current in

the fifth century. H e cites th e Clouds o f Aristophanes (740 £), and the

Hippocratic De arte 2 (quoted b y D K after fr. 1 of Ant ipho n) . Ther e

the writer says that the arts, o r sciences (technai, p . 115, n.- 3, above) ,

take their terminology from the k in ds (ε ΐδ ε α ), n o t vice versa, fo rwo rd s are an attempt t o impose legislation o n nature (ν ο μ ο θ ε τ ή μ α τ α

φ ύ σ ε ω ς ) , whereas the kinds are not conventionally imposed but natural

g rowths ( β λ α σ τ ή μ α τ α ) . On e is reminded also o f Antiphon's contrast

be tween nature as a matter o f gr owt h and l a w as conv enti onal agreement.3

1

Galen, Gloss. Hipp, prooem. v , 706 Β . , X I X , 66, 7 K., quoted by Morrison, Proc. Camb. Philol.

Soc. 19 6 1 , 4 9 . ο ί π ε ρ ί λ ό γ ο υ ς έ χ ο ν τ ε ς sounds ver y gene ra l , but λ ό γ ω ν τ έ χ ν η re fe r red pa r t i cula r ly

to rhetoric (pp. I77f. above).2

Plato, Phaedrus 263a; see p . 165 above.

3 Fr. 44 A , D K 1 1 , 3 4 7 : τ ά τ η ; φ ύ σ ε ω ς φ ύ ν τ α ο ύ χ ό μ ο λ ο γ η θ ε ν τ α . Se e p . ι ο 8 a bov e . On

the De arte passage Heinimann, N. u. Ph. 157; an d cf. Nat. horn. 5 (ibid. p . 159) . Also relevant

is Xen. Mem. 4 . 5 . 1 1 - 1 2 (Socrates, pp. 119 f.).

204



orrec ness o anguage

Inst ructi on i n 't he correc tness o f na me s' is ascribed b y Pla to t o

Protagoras, Prodicus, and the Sophists in general.1

It is sometimes

taken to mean s im pl y the correct, or effective, use of la ngu age as we

shou ld understand it, and we ma y be sure that for mos t o f the Sophi sts ,

as teachers o f rhetoric , it incl uded that. But Plato's Cratylus shows

that the que st ion at issue wa s wh et he r the names o f things had an

inherent, or natural, fitness or wer e mere ly con vent ional signs.

T wo^xpr es s ions have to be considered, orthoepeia, o f wh ich the nearest

possible translation is perhaps 'co rr ect di ct i on \ and 'the correctness

o f names^Jop0oxrjs ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν ) . B o t h h av e b ee n t ho ug ht t o b e the

titles o f books b y Pro ta go ra s, bu t this is at least uncertain.* T h e y d o

not necessarily mean the same. Onoma is a single word, a name or a

noun. Epos ma y mea n a wo rd, sa yi ng or speech, but w as also a current

term for poet ry (not on ly ep ic ); and Fehl in g has dr aw n attention to

the significance of Prot. 338 eff., where Protagoras claims that an

educa ted man oug ht to be skill ed in this subject so as to unders tand

wh en a poet is co mp os in g corr ect ly and wh e n not,3 and challenges

Socrates to interpret a poem of Simonides. Moreover in his grammatical

pr onounc emen ts the target o f his cri tic ism is the Iliad. (See pp . 220

and 221, n. 2, below.) Fehling concludes that he had no systematic

pr og ra mm e to offer, but s uggest ion s for the right use o f langu age set

in the fra mewo rk o f a criticism o f poe tr y. T ha t orthoepeia had this

reference is indicated by the title o f Demo cr it us 's wo r k ' O n Ho me r,

orthoepeia and unusual wo r ds ' , from wh ic h a com men t on Homer ic

1

Protagoras, Crat. 391c; Prodicus, Crat. 384b, Euthyd. 2 7 7 ε ; the Sophists, Crat. 3 91 b .

' At Phaedr. 267 c Plato introduces ό ρ θ ο έ π ε ι α in connexion with Protagoras, and Hackforth

translates it as the tide of a book. Murray (Gk. Stud. 176) assumed that π . ό ρ θ . ό ν ο μ . was an

alte rnat ive title for it, pre sum abl y (tho ugh he gave no reference) on the streng th of Crat. 391c ,

where Hermoge nes is recommend ed to ask his brother τ η ν ο ρ θ ό τ η τ α π ε ρ ί τ ω ν τ ο ι ο ύ τ ω ν|.ιι·. the nature of names] ή ν έ μ α θ ε π α ρ ά Π ρ ω τ α γ ό ρ ο υ ; Classen on the other hand (P. Afr. C.S.

" M 9 » 34^) thinks ό ρ θ ο έ τ τ ε ι α was no more than a slogan or catchword, but it is at least vouched

lor as a title amon g the wor ks of Democ rit us (fr. 20a, from a sch olium on Dion. Thrac) , though

not among Prota goras 's as listed by D.L. (9 .5 5) . Act ual ly the repl y of Hermo genes at Crat.

1·;ιι· shows cl early eno ugh that whatever Protagoras wrote on the subject occurred in the

Α λ ή θ ε ι α .

Prod icus i s usual ly connected wi th ό ρ θ ό τ η ; ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν , but a l ate wri ter (Themis t ius , Or. 23,

p. 150 Dindorf) s a y s that h e t au gh t ό ρ θ ο έ τ τ ε ι α and ό ρ θ ο ρ ρ η μ ο σ ύ ν η . T h e cat ch-p hras e i s b ro ug ht

in by Aristophanes in connexion wi th Eur ip ides ( τ η ; ό ρ θ ό τ η τ ο ; τ ω ν έ π ω ν , Progs 1 1 8 1 ) .1 ι π ρ ί έ π ω ν δ ε ι ν ό ν ε ίν α ι· ε Ό τ ι δ έ τ ο ΰ τ ο τ ά ΰ τ τ ό τ ώ ν π ο ι η τ ώ ν λ ε γ ό μ ε ν α ο ΐ ό ν τ ' ε ί ν α ι σ υ ν ι έ ν α ι ,

Λ Μ Α ρ Ο ώ ξ π ε π ο ί η τ α ι κ α ΐ ά μ ή . T he association of the wo rd s έ π η and ά ρ θ ώ ζ s ur ely i s s ugg es ti ve .

S e e I chliiig in Rh. Mus. 1965, 213.

205




206

vocabulary has survived.1

Li ke the stu dy o f the 'corr ect nes s of na me s'

it probably included speculation on the natural fitness of names to

wh at the y signified, for Socrates introd uces H om e r as an auth orit y on

the latter subject, ci ti ng first o f all his practi ce o f me nt io ni ng t wo names

for a thi ng, on e used by men and the other b y the g o d s : ' ob vi ou sl y

the g o d s mus t call them b y the names wh ic h rig htl y and naturall ybelong to them' (Crat. 391 d).

'C or re ct ne ss of na me s' is the subject o f the Cratylus, which dis

cusses two opposing v i e w s .

1. The fact that a gr ou p o f me n hav e agre ed wh at th ey w i l l call a

thing does not make that its na me : indeed a w o r d wh ic h has no further

wa rr an ty is no t a name at all. B el on gi ng to each thi ng is one natural

and pr op er name , the same for Gr ee ks and forei gne rs alike . It mus t be

supposed to have been bestowed by an original name-giver or l e g i s

lator w h o had com ple te insig ht into the nature o f the thi ng itself,

doub tles s as a result o f supe rhuma n p o we r s.2

2 . T o this thesis o f Cra tylu s Her mog en es oppo ses his o w n that

correct ness o f names is determine d solel y b y co nv en ti on and a gre e

men t, and differs for different peo pl e. A s k e d for his o w n op in io n,

Socrates at first suppor ts Cr at yl us . T o maintain the co mp le te ly arbit rary

character o f names leads ine vita bly to accept ing the Prot ago rea n thesis

that there is no obj ect ive reality bu t th ings to o are different for each

individual, or else that of Euthydemus that all things possess all

attributes to get her and all the time. Th is the y agree is wr o ng . Pu tt in g

it in his o w n teleolo gica l terms, Socrates argu es that ac tio ns (τ τ ρ ά ξ ε ις )

l i k e things ( π ρ ά γ μ α τ α ) h av e a fixed nature and must be perfo rmed wi th

the prope r instrument , as cutt ing wit h a knife. Th i s includes spee ch,

whos e inst ruments , namely word s or names ( ο ν ό μ α τ α ) , have the func-

1

He approved the use of ά λ λ ο φ ρ ο ν ε Τ ν as a ter m for mental de rang ement . See vol . n, 452, n. 1.

Th at t his occur red in the above -ment ioned wo rk is not exp res sly stated, but it seems the ob vio us

p l a c e .1

ν ο μ ο θ έ τ η ς , 429a, ό θ έ μ ε ν ο ; ( τ ι θ έ μ ε ν ο ; ) τ ά ο ν ό μ α τ α , 436b—c, 438a. Hence as Fehling has

pointed out (Rh. Mus. 1965, 2i 8f f. ), the later contrast between a φ ύ σ ε ι and a θ έ σ ε ι theory of

names is not appropri ate at this date. (Perh aps one should not ove rlook the attribution of it to

Democritus by Proclus, in Democr. fr. 26, but in all prob abi lit y Pro clu s is impo rti ng the cate

gories of his own time. See Momigliano, Atti Torino, 1929—30, 95 f.) Th e oppos ition is bet ween

θ έ σ ι ς ( κ α τ ά φ ύ σ ι ν ) by a single, mythical divine or heroic ε ύ ρ ε τ ή ς and the collective action

(ο μ ο λ ο γ ί α or σ υ ν θ ή κ η ) of an evolv ing socie ty. (F or the place of speech in evol uti ona ry theori es

of society cf. Diod. p. 81 above, and Soph . Ant. p. 80; and for the divine teacher Eur. Suppl.

p. So.)



Correctness of Names; the ' Cratylus'

tion o f teach ing abo ut, and di stin guis hing , the essences o f real things .

T h e y are given by nomos, and hence by a legislator or word-maker

w h o (on the an al og y o f other crafts, e.g . a shuttle -maker w h o su b

serv es the w o r k o f the we av er ) must pr od uce the name naturally

fitted for its object , w o r k i n g unde r the dire ction o f the skilled user, that

i s , the dialec tician, or expert at dis cussi on.In wh at , then, d oes the correctness o f name s consis t? Socrates

disclaims kn ow le dg e— th is is the pro vi nce of the Sophists and po et s—

but is ind uce d to exp ou nd a theo ry . A name is a vo ca l imita tion o f an

ob je ct —n ot in the cru de sense in w hi c h one imitates a c o w b y sayi ng

' m o o ' , bu t conv eyi ng the nature o f the th in g, as, i f w e had no t speech,

w e might convey the nature of heaviness b y a do wn wa rd mov emen t of

the hand. Words being compound or simple, this applies most directlyto the simple, and still mo re dir ec tly to the letters and syllab les o f

w h i c h the y are co mp os ed . The se are lik e the pi gm en ts wh ic h the painter

may use either singly or in combination to build up his picture. The

for m o f the wo rd w i l l sometimes sh ow it ob vi ou sl y en ou gh , e.g. the

letter r imitates mot io n or viol ent action, / smo oth ne ss; but man y

words have become so battered and distorted in the course of history

that the inten tion o f the origin al nam e- mak er is no lon ge r reco gniz able .

Socra tes then proc eed s to illustrate his poi nt b y a series o f et ym ol og ie s

mo st o f wh ic h are ob vi ou sl y fanciful, ma ki ng evid ent his o w n sceptical

at t i tude towards them by several ironic remarks.1

He is parodying a

current practice,2

and ke ep in g his o w n opi ni on to himself.

Names , then, are no t arbi trar y labe ls, bu t a fo rm o f imitat ion o f

their objects. Ne ver the les s (tur ning to Cr at yl us ) it must be said that,

as with painters, some w i l l be better imitators than others, and so w i l l

be their products, the names. Cratylus disagrees. Either the names are

right , or the y are no th in g, sim ply un me an in g noises like the ba ng in g

o f a gong. (It is in keeping with this that Cratylus avows himself one

o f those who hold that it is impossible to speak falsely.) Socrates

1

E.g. the references to Eu thyph ro at 39<Sd—e, 400a, 4 0 7 c ! . Under his influence Socrates has

l>rc<>me possessed, and is uttering his e t y m o l o g i e s under d i v i n e inspiration. He w i i l let it run

iniJ.iy, but tomorrow w i l l find someone, 'either a priest or a Sophist', to purge it a w a y . Else

where (426b) he describes his e t y m o l o g i c a l g u e s s e s more st raightforw ardly as 'presumpt uous

.ind r i d i c u l o u s ' .

' A practice with which Euripides shows h i m s e l f f a m i l i a r when his Hecuba connects the

ΐ 'ρ ι u i n g s y l l a b l e s of 'Aphrodite ' with α φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η , ' f o l l y ' . (7>o. 989^: note the i n e v i t a b l e ο ρ θ ώ ς . )

207




208

counters that an imitation can never b e exactly like the original in all

respects, or it would be the original, bu t Cr aty lus remains unconv inc ed,

and falls back on the superhuman power o f the original inventor o f

names.1

These linguistic theories have an ob vi ou s conn exi on wit h current

theories o f knowledge and o f reality. T h e thesis o f Hermogenes, that

words are of purely arbitrary and conventional origin, is agreed in

the dialogue to lead to the Protagorean doctrine that there is n o reality

behind appearances. T h e opposite v i e w o f Cratylus allows fo r a reality

(physis') to which the name is essentially united (383a), so that ' h e

w h o k n o w s the names knows the things also' (43 5 d). False opinion

or statement is impossible, but for the opposite reason to that g i v e n

b y Protagoras. Whereas he dissolved reality in appearance, this more

paradoxical theory (which as we shall see immediately w a s that o f

Antisthenes) holds that there is a physis for everything and no possi

bil i ty o f naming or describing it wrong ly . T o apply to it what others

wo u ld call the wrong name or logos is to utter n o name at all b u t merely

unmeaning noises (430a, 438c). Only Socrates puts forward an ex

planation o f language based on the antithesis commonly called

sophistic, and maintained especial ly clea rly b y Democri tus and

Antiphon, between physis and nomos. Things have a fixed nature, and

words are an attempt to reproduce that nature through the medium o fsound ; b u t such imitation is never perfect, and in some cases very

imperfect, even from the beginning, besides which the words have

bec ome corrupted thro ugh use and the passage o f time (421 d) . N o r

are the imitations attempted in different parts o f the wor ld the same.

(The possibili ty o f a non-Greek origin fo r some words is mentioned

at 409 d- e , 416 a, 425 c ) Further, just as a picture o f Smith m a y b e

w r o n g l y identified as a picture o f Jones, so a w o r d t o o ma y b e w r o n g l y

identified with something other than that o f which it is the image

(430 c ) . O n such a theory it could wel l .be true, as Antiphon said, that

1

Aristotle in the first chapters of De interpr. obviously has his eye on the Cratylus. He sides

with Hermogenes in maintaining ( i6ai9) that a name i s φ ω ν ή σ η μ α ν τ ι χ ή κ α τ ά σ υ ν θ ή κ η ν and

that this means ( a2 7) ό τ ι φ ύ σ ε ι τ ώ ν ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν ο υ δ έ ν έ σ τ ι ν , ά λ λ ' ό τ α ν γ έ ν η τ α ι σ ύ μ β ο λ ο ν .

He distinguishes between inarticulate sounds, common to early man and animals, which are

natural and convey meaning but are not ye t language, and 'names' which are conventional

( a 28, δ η λ ο Ο σ ί γ έ τ ι κ α ί ο ί α γ ρ ά μ μ α τ ο ι ψ ό φ ο ι , ο ί ο ν θ η ρ ί ω ν , ώ ν ο υ δ έ ν έ σ τ ι ν ό ν ο μ α ) . See on

this L. Amundsen in Symb. Osl. 1966, 11 f.

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In his 'philosophical dictionary' (Metaph. Δ ) ,1

Aristotle deals with

the concept 'false'. It may refer (a) to thin gs or facts, i f they are non

existent (e.g . a diag onal com mens ura te wi th the side) or pr od uc e the

appearance o f so met hi ng non-exi stent (e. g. dreams , or illusionist

pa in t ing) ; (b) to logoi. Here Aristotle w i l l have had in mind the classic

difficulty, often referred to by Plato and used by Antisthenes himself

in sup por t o f his thesis o f the impossi bili ty o f co nt ra di ct io n: ' E v e r y

logos (statement) is true, for he who speaks says something, he who

says so me th in g says wh at is, and he wh o say s wh at is speaks t ru th . '3

Speaking absolutely ('qua false'), says Aristotle, a false logos is of

what is not, therefore in practice when we speak of a false logos we mean

one which belongs to something other than that to which it is applied,

e.g. the logos o f circ le is false i f appl ied to a tri angl e. ( A triangle eve rypoi nt o n whi ch is equidis tant from a gi ve n po in t doe s no t exist, yet the

logos 'p la ne figure ev er y poin t on wh ic h is equidistan t from a g i v en

po in t' does exi st; i.e. it describes some th in g wh i ch i s ; it has o nl y

been misapplied.) Further , al though there is in a sense only one logos

o f each thing, namely that whi ch descr ibes its essence, in ano the r sense

there are ma ny , since the th in g its elf and the thi ng pl us certain no n

essential attributes are somehow the same, e.g. Socrates and educatedSocrates (or Socrates the educated man). This is the reason, he goes on,

w h y it wa s fool ish o f Ant ist henes to su ppos e that a thing can only be

sp ok en o f b y its pro per logos, one to on e; from wh ic h it fol lowe d that

it is imp oss ibl e to contradi ct, and practi cally impo ssi ble to speak falsely.

T h e meaning of logos here emerges from the context. It has been

und er st ood as a single w o r d or term,3 but cl early means a d escrip tion,

or statement o f wha t a thing is. Th is accord s wi th D . L . 6. 3: An t isthenes said ' a logos is that whi ch sets forth w ha t a th ing wa s or is ' .

4

1

1024b 1 7 ff. The reference to Antisthenes comes at tine 32.

' Procl. In Crat. 37 Pasq. (Antisth. fr. 49) : "Α . Ι λ ε γ ε μ ή δ ε ϊ ν α ν τ ι λ έ γ ε ι » . π δ $ γ ά ρ , φ η σ ι ,

λ ό γ ο ζ α λ η θ ε ύ ε ι , ό γ ά ρ λ έ γ ω ν τ ι λ έ γ ε ι , ό δ έ τ ι λ έ γ ω ν τ ό ό ν λ έ γ ε ι , ό δ έ τ ό δ ν λ έ γ ω ν α λ η θ ε ύ ε ι .

C a i z z i (Stud. Urb. 34^) detects a discrepancy between Aristotle's witness and Proclus's, and

suspects that Proclus has given a current justification of Antisthenes's paradox without going

back to the original source.1

Campbell , Theaet. xl i: 'T he re is only one term applicable to one thing. ' He refers not

to Arist otl e but to Isocr. He/, ο υ δ έ δ ύ ο λ ό γ ω π ε ρ ί τ ώ ν α υ τ ώ ν π ρ α γ μ ά τ ω ν ά ν τ ε ι π ε ϊ ν , where

the rendering 'terms' seems even more improbable in the context. According to Plato in the

Snphht (262 a ff.) a logos must contain at least a noun and a verb.4

Fr. 45 . Caizzi not es (Stud. Urb. 29) that its authenticity is confirmed by Alexander, In Top.

4 2 , 1 j fT. (fr. 46). Ale xan der , comment ing on Arist otle' s definition of a definition as λ ά γ ο $ ό τ ό

2 1 0



Antisthenes on False Statement and Contradiction

The ' fool ishness5

o f Antisthenes is enlarged on b y pseu do- Alex and er

in his commentary (Antisth. fr. 44 B), w h o explains h o w the assertion

that each thing has only one logos led to the impossibility of speaking

f a l s e l y or o f t w o peo ple cont radic ting eac h other. T o contradict, they

must say different things about the same thing, but since each thing has

on ly one logos (w hi ch after all, in add iti on t o an y more spec ialized

uses , means s imply ' one th ing whi ch can be said—λ έ γ ε σ θ ο η —about

it ') this is imp oss ibl e. If they say different thi ngs they must be s pe ak ing

about different things and hence not contradicting each other. N o n e

o f ou r authorities gi ve s example s, and mod er n scholars ha ve be en

similarly reticent.1

Presumably Antisthenes would have claimed that

' o n e cannot sa y' 'm a n is a wi ng ed and feathered ani mal ', for that is to

say what is not , i .e . to say no th ing ( ο υ δ έ ν λ έ γ ε ι ν ) .2

He who says

no th in g cannot contradict or be contrad icted, and the on ly alternative

is that, alt hou gh uttering the sou nd ' m a n ' , the speaker is really talkin g

about birds and so, once again, is not contradicting another who gives

a different logos of man.3

Such theories of lan guag e are mad e more comp rehe nsibl e b y the

probabil i ty that they owed their origin to the prestige enjoyed by

rhetoric, the art o f persuasion. Fo r Go rg ia s persuasion w as sov ere ign

because there was no truth over and above what a man could be per

suaded to believe , and Pro tag oras w as already teachin g his pupils

that on every subject opposite positions could be argued with equal

xi fjv ε ί ν α ι σ η μ α ί ν ω ν , defends the insertion of ε ί ν α ι on the grounds that without it the formula

might apply e q u a l l y to a statement of the genus (it is an answer to the ques ti on ' Wha t is ma n ? ' to

s a y ' He is an an im al '; or, in the Peripatetic termino log y of Alexan der, genus is a predicate in the

category of b e i n g ) , wh ich howev er does not b y itself const itut e a definition. ' Th e fjv, then, is not

sufficient by itself as some have thought , of wh om Ant isthenes appears to have been the first.'1

My discussion of these matters owes much to C a i z z i ' s lucid interpretations in Stud. Urb.

1 9 6 4 . Nevertheless more concrete examples woul d have been wel com e there too, e s p e c i a l l y

in the discussion of essence and acciden tal attr ibutes on pp. 33 f. For Anti sthenes ( s a y s the

aut hor ), to say 'Socra tes is bl ac k' woul d be to say nothing at all, wherea s for Aristo tle it is to

s a y Socrates wit h an untrue predicate. One wou ld we lcom e a similar illustrat ion of a logos of the

essence of Socrates which would maintain the difference between the two philosophers. Field

g i v e s the example of a triangle (P. and Contemps. 166 ). Th is is helpful, but mathemat ical defini-

1 ii >ns are a special c a s e , and the application of the theory to natural objects is not so obvious to us.2

For the effect on proble ms of this kind of the amb ig uous Greek phrase ο υ δ έ ν λ έ γ ε ι ν

e l . vol. 1 1 , 20. Th e doctr ine expounded here is that parodi ed by Plat o at Euthyd. 28;dff. and

referred to π ο λ λ ο ί δ ή , and in particular to ol ά μ φ ί Π ρ ω τ α γ ό ρ α ν .1

If this sounds impla usible , I can only say that I see no al ternativ e explanati on, and thatothers have interpreted Antisthenes s i m i l a r l y but softened the implau sibil ity by refraining from

i l l u s t r a t i n g their interpretations with examples. Cf., in its context, Arist. Metaph. ioo6b20.

2 1 1




2 1 2

validity, wh at a man be liev ed wa s true for him, and no man could

con tra dict an oth er in the sense o f op po si ng a true v i e w to a false.

Antisthenes may have gone further than Protagoras in attempting a

philos ophical explanation of h o w this cou ld be so . In co nn ex io n

wi th the last pa ra gr aph it is int eresting that Plato (Phaedrus 260b)

exa min es the effects o f ap pl yi ng the name ' h o r se ' to the logos o f

d o n k e y ( ' tame animal wi th the largest ear s' ), and persuadi ng so me on e

that the creature signified by this logos possesses the virtues generally

ascribed to horses, in order to compare them to the harm done by

rhetoricians who, ignorant themselves of the nature of good and e v i l ,

advocate e v i l as bei ng really g o o d .1

Antisthenes himself wrote rhetorical

e x e r c i s e s , of which we still possess speeches of Odysseus and A j a x ,

contending for the arms of A c h i l l e s . *B u t Ari sto tle has mor e about Antisth enes (or his fol lowe rs) .

s Elsewhere in the Metaphysics (1043b23) he sa ys : 'Th ere for e the

, difficulty which was raised by the Antistheneans and other such crude

J thin ker s is no t inapp osite, that you cannot define what a thing is,

^ because a definition is an extended logos? Y o u can explain wh at it is

J like, e.g. of silver you cannot say what it is, but only that it is like tin.

j Th e re is a class o f substance of wh ic h definition (ό ρ ο ς ) or logos isI possible, namely composite substance, whether sensible or intelligible;

\ bu t its elemen ts canno t be defined, since definition predicates on e th in g

y

o f ano ther , an d the one mus t be matter and the other form.'

A s an example, pseudo-Alexander ad loc. (Antisth. fr. 44 B) takes

' m a n ' . ' M a n ' is a name. W e ma y say he is a rational mortal animal,

but this in turn is on ly a stri ng o f names . W e are simp ly listi ng,

enumerating or naming his elements, but neither separately nor c o l l e c t i v e l y do the y p rov id e a definition,* for a defin ition is different from

1

The re is a sto ry in D.L. (6. 8) that Antisthenes taunted the Athenians with the ignorance

of their strategoi by saying that they ought to vote that don keys are horses (or 'vo te donk eys

into the position of horses', T O U S S V O U S ί π π ο υ ς ψ η φ ί σ α σ θ α ι ) .1

Frr. 14 and 15 Cai zzi . He is said to hav e been a pupi l of Gorg ia s before he met Socr ates

( p . 306, n. 2, be lo w) , and to ha ve adopted a rhetorical sty le in his dial ogu es.3

λ ό γ ο ; μ α κ ρ ό ξ . That this phrase was used by Antisthenes himself is vouched for by pseudo-

Alexander, In Met. 554.3 Hayd. It suggests evasion, and Warrington renders it ad sensum,

'circumlocution' . Ro ss on Metaph. 109 187 giv es some evidenc e from lit erature that the word had

a contemptuous flavour.4

Arist otle wa s speakin g a little carelessly, or from his own point of vie w, whe n at 1 0 4 3 b 29

he used the two words opov κ α ι λ ό γ ο ν to describe Ant isthenes' s v iew.



Antisthenes and Aristotle on Definition

a name. Wh a t is ' r ati on al ' or 'an im al '? E v en if w e can div ide t hem

int o further pluralities o f names , ye t ult ima tel y w e shall co me to a

simple, elemental entity which cannot be so divided, and this w i l l be

indefinable. But how can we claim to have defined, or explained the

be in g of, so met hi ng if w e hav e sim pl y described it as co mp os ed o f

elements which are themselves indefinable?

Plato in the Theaetetus (201 dff.) describes a similar doctrine anony

mously. There can be no logos o f the first e lem ent s o f w h i ch w e and

eve ry th in g else con sis t; they can on ly be named . Bu t the co mp ou nd s

mad e up out o f th em, bei ng co mp le x the mse lve s, can ha ve the names

b e l o n g i n g to them combined to make a logos, for this is just what a

logos is, a co mb in at io n of names. Elem ent s, then , are inexpli cabl e and

unknowable , bu t can be perce ived , wher eas com ple xes are kn ow ab le

and expli cable and comp rehe nsib le b y a true opinion.

T h e theory assumes that a complex whole is no more than its parts

put t oget her in a certain w a y . T o this Ari sto tle opp ose s his o w n v i e w

(inspired by Plato) that the essence or substan ce o f an yt hi ng , wh i ch is

expressed in its definition (the 'what it was to be the thing'), is not

s imply elements-plus-combi nation but a new , unitary ' f or m' . For hi m

a defin ition mus t inc lu de an exp res sion o f the caus e (see e. g. An. Post. 2

c h . 10, Metaph. 1043 a 146°.), that is, the final cause, for in fact Ar is to tl e' s

th eo ry o f subst ance am ou nt s to an assertio n of his faith in te le ol og y. A

ho use is no t to be defined as bri cks en clo si ng a space and co ve re d b y a

roof. If that we re all that cou ld be said, Ant ist hene s wo u l d be right, for

that is mer el y an enu mer ati on o f (ult imat ely indefinable) elemen ts

and their arrang emen t. It is defined b y sa yi ng that it is a shelter for

man and his possessions, and this type of definition applies to natural

objects also, for ' na ture makes noth ing wit hou t a pur pos e ' (De caelo

291 b 13, De an. 432b21, e tc . ) .1

A s far as can be judged from these second-hand and hostile reports,

ii does not seem l i k e l y that Antisthenes supported the doctrine that

non e bu t identical pred icat ion is pos sib le. T h i s is referred to co nt em p-

1

I Icnce Antisth enes's mista ke of say ing that, wh en one thin g is predicate d of another, 'o ne

m i l . 1 he matter and the other fo rm' . A ll the element s stated in a definition are formal cons titu ents .

I I his is explained by pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph. 554, n ff .) F or Aristotle individu als are

i n i l r l i i i a b l c : only definitions of species and genera are possible. The mistake, in his view, resulted

Innii a confusion bet wee n the part icular and the univ ersal references of a noun l i k e ' ho r se ' .

ι< I. p. 215 , n. 3, below.)

21 3




2 1 4

tuously by Plato in the Sophist (251b) as something that is seized on

b y ' yo ut hs and old men of retarded intellect ' , 'who object that it is

impossible for many things to be one or one many, and enjoy insisting

that w e mus t no t say a man is g o o d , but on ly man is man and g o o d is

g o o d ' . So me have identified this wi th the thesis ascribed t o Ant ist henes

b y Aristotle that ' a th ing can on ly be sp ok en o f b y its pr oper logos,

one to one ' , bu t in the light o f other ev ide nce , inclu din g that o f

Aristot le himself, it is plain that logos here is no t limi ted to a single term.

It is not the same thing as ό ν ο μ α (a name ),1

which in v i e w of the

current uses of logos wou l d in any case be impr oba ble . I f it is true that

Ant is the nes said ' a logos is that wh ich sets forth w ha t a th ing wa s or

i s ' , he evide ntl y we nt on t o claim that such a logos could only sub

stitute for the name of the thing a collection of the names o f its elements,

which themse lves coul d on ly be named. Gr o te called hi m the first

nominal ist , because he denied the exist ence o f those forms or essences

(ε ϊ δ η or ο ύ σ ί α ι ) of part icular things, whic h Socrates sought to define

and Pla to was already proc la imin g as independent realities. (An t i

sthenes liv ed till about 360.) T h e rival ry be tw ee n the tw o phi los ophi es

is suggested by the anecdote that Antis thene s said to Pl at o: Ί see a

horse, but I don' t see hors enes s', to wh ic h Plat o repl ied: ' N o , fory o u have the eye with which a horse is seen, but you have not yet

acquired the eye to see horseness.' This is told by Simplicius, whose

teacher Ammonius also quoted the mot o f Ant ist henes as an illustr ation

o f his v i e w that ' th e kinds or forms existed on ly in our th ou gh ts '

(έ ν ψ ι λ α ϊ ς έ τ π ν ο ί α ι ς ).2

' Grote (Plato, in , 521) was one wh o thought that Aristotle was crediting Antisthenes with

the proposition that none but identical propositions were admissible, but had to admit (on

p . 526) that in that case the doctrine which Aristotle attributes to ot Ά ν τ ι σ θ έ ν ε ι ο ι at Metaph.

j 043 b 23 is no t in ha rm on y wi th that whi ch he ascribes to Antisthe nes himself. He also thoug ht it

probable Xp."<joj, n. x) that in the Sophist Plato does intend to designate Antisthenes as γ έ ρ ω ν

ό ψ ι μ α θ ή ί . (He may have been some 20 years older than Pla to. ) Ap ar t from the plural, such

commentators ignore the fact that the theo ry is ascribed equal ly to ol ν έ ο ι. Contr ast Ca mpb el l,

Theaet. x x x i x : the doctrine of Theaet. 201 d ff. (w hi ch we ha ve seen to be the same as that ascribed

to Antisthenes at Metaph. io43b23ff.) 'is surely very different from such crude nominalism

[sc. as that described in the Soph.]... The opinion quoted, if properly examined, is not a denial

o f predication, but rather a denial that anything can be predicated of the prime elements . . . which

is by no means the same thing.'

1

Simpl. Cat. 208, 28; Ammon. In Porph. Isag. 40, 6 (Ant is th . frr. 50 A and c). The story is

told in a slightly different form of Diogenes the C y n i c , naturally enough considering that he was

Antisthenes's pupil and Antisthenes himself came to be regarded as the founder of the C y n i c



Antisthenes a Nominalist ?

I f h o we ver no min ali sm is the doctr ine that assume s, as a recent

definition has it, 'that language imposes its own structure upon a

reality wh ic h b y itself lacks an y such dis tin cti on s',1

it does not appear

that Antisthenes was its advocate. His teaching does not resemble the

convent ion- theory o f names maintained b y Her mo ge ne s in Pl ato' s

Cratylus, so much as the nature-theory of Cratylus2

according to

w h i c h names ha ve a natural affinity wi th their objects (o r, if th ey do

not, they are not names, and the man who utters them 'says nothing',

429bff .): they 'r eve al the th in gs ' (433d), and he who knows the

names knows the things also (43 5 d). A complex object can be analysed

b y naming its elements, but the elements can only be named or des

cribed analog ically (silver like tin). T h e y are grasp ed b y intuition or

percept ion ( Ί see a h o r s e' ; cf. Theaet. 202b), but cannot be explained,or kn o w n as k n ow l ed g e was und ers too d b y Socrates and Plat o, for

w h o m it meant the ability to g i v e a logos o f the essence o f the th in g

known . If we may judge by the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle,

C a i z z i is rig ht in sa yi ng that Ant ist hen es' s th eo ry o f ' on e, and on ly

one, proper logos for each thing' is based on a lack of the distinction

between essential and accidental predication plus a confusion between

pro per and co mm o n names.3 Predi cation is not impo ssib le, bu t it must

school. Wh ethe r histori cally true or not, it is certain ly bien trouve. Other stories were also current

testifying to the ill w i l l between hi m and Plato, against wh om he wrote a dialo gue under the

opprobrious name of Sathon. (See p. 310, n. 2, belo w.)1

Lorenz and Mittelstrass, Mind, 1967 , 1. Th ey t hemse lves add (p . 5) that realism and

nomina lism can be recognized as variant s of the nature-theo ry and the conven tion-t heory of the

Cratylus. It might be interesting to compare the latter with the conventionalist theory of neces

sary truth as it appear s in Hobb es, w ho l ike the fifth-centur y phil osop hers saw a close connex ion

between names and t r u t h : ' the first truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed

names upon thi ngs '. See W. and M. Kneale, Dev. ofLogic, 3 1 1 f.

1

A simi lar conclusion wa s reached b y von Fr itz in Hermes, 19 27 : it is Antisthenean doctrine,

' glcichgultig, ob dort Antis then es per sonlich ode r allein geme int ist oder n ich t' ( p. 462). See

al.o Dummler, Akad. 5. Field, however, in a carefully reasoned account, concluded that ' there

i'. no real evidence for associating him with either view' (P. and Contemps. 168).3

Stud. Urb. 34. (T he confusion wo ul d be facilitated b y the fact that at this primitive stage of

) ' , i ' .un inat ica l study the one word ό ν ο μ α had to do duty for both 'name' and ' n o u n ' . According

i n l.orcnz and Mittelstrass (Mind, 1967, 5), it pe rsist s in the Cratylus an d throughout Plato's

w a i t i n g s . ) Cf. 32 : ' Fo r Plat o [and, one might ad d, for Aristo tle ] the object of definition is not

11 ιι· part icular but the un iv er sa l . . . Th er ef or e. . . the denial of τ τ ο ι ά τ η ς implies also the denial

1 if the definition of wha t a thi ng is. Acc or din g to Anti sthe nes w e not o nl y see but k no w the

indi vidu al horse, in who se na me is incl uded all that is proper to it. He does not seem to have

i i a l i / . c d that this wou ld i mp ly the necessity of a nam e for e ve ry sin gle thi ng, not o nl y for e ve ry• l . i A n d on p. 3 1 : ' T he probl em of predicat ion, whic h the thesis that only names can expiess

1 1 1 1 - rssence seemed to have rendered impossible, is therefore to be resolved on this plane, i.e.

I i . r . i c . i l l y the descriptive.'

« 2 1 5 G S P




2 l 6

be assumed that what eve r fol lo ws the copu la is essential to the subject

(a part o f ' w h a t it i s' ) , and i f an y of the element s named is inappl icabl e

to the subject the whole logos mus t be dismiss ed as meanin gle ss. (H e

w a s misled, says pseudo-Alexander, In Metaph. 435, 1, b y the fac t that

a false logos is not absolutely or primarily ( μ ή α π λ ώ ς μ η δ έ κ υ ρ ί ω ς )

the logos o f any thi ng into say ing that it was nothing at all.)

O n those wh o denied the possibi lity of predi cati ng on e thi ng o f

another , Aristotle has this to say:

The more recent of previous philosophers were disturbed by the thought

of making the same thing one and many. For this reason some abolished

the word ' i s ' , 1

as Lycophron did, while others altered the form of the

expression, saying not 'the man is wh it e' but 't he man has-been-whit ened '

[λ ε λ ε ύ κ ω τ α ι , one word in Greek], not ' is walking ' but ' wal ks ' , lest by

adding ' i s ' they should make the one many, as if O n e ' or 'b ei ng ' had only

one sense.1

Simplicius (Phys. 91) explains that Ly co ph ro n s imply omitted the

ver b ' i s ' , sayi ng 'white Socrates ' 3 for 'Socra tes is wh it e' , as if to state

the attr ibute in this wa y did not i nv ol ve the addition o f a ny th in g

re al ; bu t i f it did not, he adds , then there wo u l d be no difference

between saying 'Socrates ' and 'white Socrates ' . I t was to avoid the

consequence that no significant statement wa s poss ible that the

'o th er s' ( wh o m neither he nor Arist otl e identifies) tried usi ng other

ve rbs instead of the offensive cop ula . If L yc op h r o n tho ugh t it adm is

sible to say 'white Socrates' he cannot, any more than Antis thenes ,

ha ve been on e o f those at w h o m Pla to is til ting in the Sophist (251b).

T h e only other thing kn ow n abou t his tho ry o f kn ow le dg e is that he

descr ibed knowledge as ' an intercour se ( σ υ ν ο υ σ ί α ) o f the psyche withthe act o f k no wi n g ' . So Arist otle puts it (Metaph. 1045 b 9f f. ), and

pseu do- Alex and er explains (563, 21 ; D K , 83, 1 ) : ' L y c o ph r o n wh en

1

Sc. as copula. S i m p l i c i u s (Phys. 91) adds that Lycophron allowed its existential use. For

Lycop hron see pp. 3 1 3 ^ below.1

Phys. i 8 5 b 2 j . T o sa y that Socrat es is (a) white, (h) a philosop her, and (c ) an Athen ian

would be to mak e the one subject, Socr ate s, ma ny (Phil op. Phys. 49, 17 ).3 A c t u a l l y Σ . AEWKOS in the Greek, not XEUKOS Σ . One cannot folly understand these people

with out reference to current idiom. Th e c opula frequently was omitted in speech and writing, so

that Σ . λ ε υ κ ό ξ is as much a complete sentence, meaning 'Socr ate s is whi te ', as if the ί σ η were

expressly inserted. Lycophron was a l i t t l e na ive if he tho ugh t th at those wh o omitted it wer e

correcting a l o g i c a l fault. Themistius's comme nt on his proc edure wa s κ α κ ω τ ό κ α κ ό ν Ι ώ μ ε ν ο ς

(Phys. paraphr. 7 . 2 Schenkl, not in DK ).



Impossibility of Predication

asked what it was that caused knowledge and the psyche to be one,

wo u ld reply that it was their intercourse ' . Thi s ' int ercour se ' or

' coex i s tence '1

of the mind with knowledge suggests a v i e w like that o f

Antist henes , not sceptici sm but beli ef in kn ow l ed ge b y direct acquain t

ance. O n e canno t say 'S oc ra te s is wh i te ' (himself plus whi ten ess ), b ut

one experiences 'white Socrates' as a unitary essence.

T h e onl y peo ple specifically ment ione d as quali fyin g for Plat o's

condemnation by confining speech to identical propositions ('man is

ma n' , ' g o o d is g o o d ' , etc.) are Stilpo the Megar ian and the Eretr ians.2

Since Stil po wa s pr ob ab ly bor n c. 380 and the Eretri an s ch oo l was

founded by Menedemus who was born after Plato's death, it is

improbable that the former, and impossible that the latter, could have

been Plato 's target. But Euclide s w h o foun ded the Megaria n schoo l

was a friend o f Socrates , and the Eretrian wa s close ly link ed wit h it,

Menedemus having been a pupil of Stilpo. Plato stayed with Euclides

at Megara after the death of Socrates, and they may w e l l have differed

and had l i v e l y discussions of these questions. A doctrine w hi ch co ul d

lead to the same conclusion as that in the Sophist is ascribed to them

b y Simplicius (Phys. 120). After quoting from Eudemus that the

mistakes of Parmenides were excusable owing to the inchoate state

o f philosophy at his time, when no one had suggested that a word

could have more than one sense or had distinguished essence from

accident, he goes on :

/ Out of ignorance of this even the philosophers known as Megarians assumed

\ as an obvious premise that things having a different logos were different,

) and that different things were divided from each other, and so thought to

) prove that everything is divided from itself, e.g. the logos of 'educated

t Socrates' is different from that of 'white Socrates', therefore Socrates is

\ divided from himself.

1

In ordinary language σ υ ν ο υ σ ί α meant intercourse or association, but it could a l s o , and

more l i t e r a l l y , be under stood a s 'co-be ing*. In the late comment ator s, the ver b σ υ ν ο υ σ η ό ο μ α ι

i s used to express the idea of being essential ly uni ted . See LS J s.v.

' For Stilpo see Plut. Adv. Col. n i 9 c - d , and for the Eretrians Simpl. Phys. 91 , 28. It m ig ht

be interesting to compare their doctrine with that which has been derived in modern times from

a strict interpretation of Bishop Butle r's dic tum : 'E ver yth ing is what it is and not another thi ng' ,

I quot ed by Moore as the motto of Principia Ethica. This, it has been claimed, appears to rule out

I not only a definition of 'good' (the 'naturalistic f a l l a c y ' ) , but all definitions of an y term wh at

soever, on the grounds that they must be the result of confusing two properties, defining one

by another , or subst ituti ng one for another. See the discussion by Fra nke na reprinted in the

Foot e s s a y s , pp . J7ff.

217 8-a




2l8

The same doctrine is opposed b y Aris to t le in Soph. el. (i66b28ff.)

without attribution: ' Cor iscus is a man [but note that G r e e k has no

indefinite article], " m a n " is different from "Coriscus", therefore

Coriscus is different from himself.' I t bears a resemblance to th e ' o n e

logos to each thing' o f Antis thenes, bu t wa s br ough t to a more radical

conclusion.1

In the forego ing account an attempt has been made to attach the var ious

theories to indiv idual authors. Suc h assignment has been the subject o f

intensive research in the past, but the evidence is no t always sufficient

for certainty, nor is the matter o f great importance for the his tory o f

thought, since some o f the possible authors are now little more than

names. T h e important thing is to k n o w that in the lifetime o f Socrates

and Plato these questions o f language and its objects were being

zes t fu l ly thrashed ou t b y a gr oup o f contemporaries w h o in the course

o f their debate threw u p a number o f related o r rival v i e w s which were

a ll ultimately the result o f wres t l ing wi th the crude bu t e f f e c t i v e l o g i c

o f the Eleatics. T h e thought o f Socrates and Plato, whose influence

on the subsequent history o f phi losophy has been profound, must b e

seen against this background, as an integral part o f the debate an d anattempt to find a definitive solut ion to its problems. Tha t in Plato's hands

it became only an element in a great moral and metaphysical synthesis

does not alter this fact, which a reading o f the Cratylus and Euthydemus

alone (not to ment ion more important dial ogues like the Sophist)

puts beyond all doubt .

Summary of results. D u r i n g the lifetimes o f Socrates and Pla to the

f o l l o w i n g positions were held. Names o f some w h o held them are

g i v e n in brackets where either certain o r probable .

1. It is impossible to speak f a l s e l y , fo r that is to say wha t is not ,

and what is not cannot b e uttered. (Protagoras , Antis thenes. T h e

thesis depends o n Parm. fr. 2.7-8.)

2. A s a corol la ry , no one has a right to contradict another.

(Protagoras, Antisthenes.)

1

See on this Maier, Syllogistik, 2. Tei l , 2. Halfte, 7f7., wh ere th e relevance of Arist. Metaph.

Γ 4 is discussed, and it is suggested that in Aristotle's time the eristic of Antisthenes and the

Megarians w as undergoing a certain fusion.



Language and its Objects; Summary

3. Tr ut h is relative to the indi vidu al. (Pr ota gor as, Go rg ia s. )

4. W e use wo rd s inconsist ently and wi th no cor res pon den ce to

reality. T hi s is wr o n g , for there is a rea li ty ( δ ν , φ ύ σ ι ς ) and there are

natural kinds ( ε ί δ η ) , to which our terms should correspond univocally.

(Socrates, Ant iph on, Hippocr. De arte.)

5. Def ini tio n o f the essence of a thi ng is imposs ibl e, for one can

only list its elements and they themselves, not being subject to further

analysis, are indefinable, and can only be described analogically.

(Antisthenes, prob ably Lyco phr on. )

6. T o ev er y object be lo ng s one and on ly one pro per logos, which

says wh at it is b y namin g the elements o f wh ich it is co mp os ed . If

an y of the m do not ap pl y to it, there is no logos. (Antisthenes.)

7. Names have a natural affinity with their objects, wh i ch are

k n o w n b y direct cont act of mind w it h object as in sense-p ercepti on

(α ϊ σ θ η σ ι ς ) . A name wh ic h has no such affinity is not wr on g, but no

name at all . (Antisthenes, Ly co ph r on , ' Cr at yl us ' in Plato.)

8. Na me s are labels arbitrarily cho sen , ha v in g no natural connexion

wit h the objects to wh ic h they are applied. (De moc ri tus , ' He rm og en es '

in Plato.)

9. T h e use o f ' i s ' to join subject and predicate is illegi timate

because it makes one thing many, though one may perceive and speak

o f a subject and its attribute (e .g . wh it e Socrat es) as a un ity. ( L y c o

phron. )

10. O n the same Eleat ic gr ou nd s that a thi ng can not be bo th one

and man y, on ly identical predication is possible. (Megar ians, and pr ob

ably others.)

(6) G R A M M A R

T h e intense interest in the possibiliti es and limitations o f la ng uage led

to the beg in ni ngs of grammat ical st udy (distinction o f gen der s, parts

o f speech and so forth) , o f wh ic h there are traces from Pr ot ag or as

onwards. The foregoing sections, however, as w e l l as the treatment o f

these topics themselves, should make it clear that in contemporary

minds they were not divorced from wider questions, whether of the

ph il os op hy o f lan gua ge or of rhetorical practice. T h e aim wa s no t in

fact scientific, to sort out and c o d i f y existing usa ge, bu t practical, to

2 1 9




220

refo rm lang ua ge and increase its effectiveness b y a close r co rr es po nd

ence wi th rea lity.1

Pro ta gor as, w e are tol d, w a s the first t o di vi de spee ch (logos') into

f ou r ba si c k in d s (π υ θ μ έ ν ε ς λ ό γ ω ν ) : r eq ue st ( or p ra y er ), q ue st io n,

ί answer , c om m a n d ; or acc ord ing to other authorities into se v en :

narration, question, answer , command, repor t , request , summons.

A little later Alcidamas said that the four logoi we re affirmation, ne ga

tion, question and address.* This comes from a late source, but

Aris tot le refers to the di vi sio n w h e n in the Poetics (1456b 15) he

J records that Protag oras cr i ticized Ho me r for wri t in g 'S in g, go dd es s ' ,

' because this wa s to co mm an d wh e n wha t wa s wan te d was a pray er.

The distinction between noun and verb (rhema) occur s in Pla to,

and as Cornford remarks (PTK, 307), i t is in tr od uc ed in the Cratylus

(425 a) wi th ou t expl anat ion as so me th in g familiar, so wa s p ro ba bl y

ma de earlier b y Prot ag or as o r so me other So phis t.3 It is true, never

theless, that in the Sophist they are carefully defined and illustrated by

examples. A comb ina tio n o f no un w it h ve rb yields a statement

(logos)J Rhema is here defined as ' w h a t signifies ac ti on s' , wh ic h seems

definite en ou gh , bu t at this earl y stage te rm in ol og y is b y no mea ns

fixed, an d el sewh er e (Crat. 399 a - b ) w e find P la to sa yi ng that if the

name Dip hi lus is split into its co mp on en t parts ( Δ ι ϊ φ ί λ ο ς , ' de ar t o

Zeus ') i t becomes a rhema instead o f a name . Lit eral ly rhema means

on ly a 't hi ng sa id ', and a nam e or nou n is cont raste d w it h it as that o f

which things are said. Even Aristotle with his more technical vocabu

lary, for whom rhema is most often a verb and is so defined (De int.

1 ' A n c i e n t G r e e k grammatike was a τ έ χ ν η , an art or craft, a study aiming at practice; modern

p h i l o l o g y i s no t a τ έ χ ν η bu t a p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e . It takes the worldwide phenomenon of humanspeech as its object, and is concerned merely to ascertain and co-ordinate the f a c t s . ' T h i s is

from Murray ' s h i g h l y readable essay on The Beginnings of Greek Grammar (in Gk. Stud.), in

w h i c h he also poi nts ou t the enor mo us difference result ing fro m the f ac t that γ ρ α μ μ α τ ι κ ή was

concerned s o l e l y wi th G r e e k speech: 'The phenomenon that lay before the G r e e k grammatikoi

w a s no t all hum an la ngu age . It was the Logos'

1

D . L . 9.53 f. His wor ds might mean that others, not Pro tag oras , divi de into s e v e n , and so

Hicks translates. The second list l o o k s dubious, and it is dif f icu l t to see on what grounds, in such

a general classification, δ ι ή γ η σ ι ς was sepa ra ted f rom α π α γ γ ε λ ί α . U nfor tunately the re i s no

more nearly contemporary authority.3

T h e classification of letters as v o w e l s , sonants and mutes, w h i c h precedes it at 424 c, is

ascribed to ο ΐ δ ε ιν ο ί π ε ρ ί τ ο ύ τ ω ν .4

δ ν ο μ α ρ η κ ρ ή μ α = λ ό γ ο ; , Crat. 425a, 4 3 I D _ C > Soph. 262cff. "Theaetetus sits' is an example

o f the simplest λ ό γ ο ς . O n these t w o parts o f speec h as the sole essentials of a λ ό γ ο ς see the

comments of Cornford, PTK, 307.



Grammar

221

i 6b 6 ) , uses it also to mean an adjective (ibid. 20b 1-2), and the wider

term 'pr ed ic at e' must some time s be the best translation.

Stenzel noted (RE, x x v . H al b b. i o i o f . ) that, i f Pla to 's definition o f a

statement by its simplest grammatical form seems primitive, we must

bear in mind that his concern is not in fact with the grammatical formbut with such questions as how, of two grammatically equally correct

proposi t ions ( 'Theaetetu s s i ts ' , 'Th eaetet us f l i e s ' ) , one can be true

and the oth er false. T h e exalted po si tio n o f the logos in a Greek mind

is w e l l brought out by the build-up which Plato g i v e s it at Crat. 425 a.

N o u n s and ver bs are con str uct ed o ut o f letters and syll able s, and fro m

nouns and verbs we compose 'something great and beautiful and

complete , the Logos, for med b y the art o f na mi ng or rhet ori c or

whatever it be, just as a l i v i n g figure is composed by the art of the

painter ' . Thi s Gre ek attitude to L o g o s (in some contexts the capital

letter seems to impose itself) must never be forgotten when as cold

bl ood ed grammarians or logicians w e find ourselves g r o w i n g exaspera

ted by the looseness and ambiguity with which it appears to be used.

Protagoras's interest in the gender of nouns is vouched for by a

contemporary. Aristotle tells us that it wa s he w h o di vi ded no un s intomasculine, feminine and neuter,

1

and this is reflected in the Clouds o f

Ar ist op han es. T h e pla y contain s, und er the name of Socrates , an attack

on Protagoras's claim to make the weaker ( 'un jus t ' ) argument the

strong er, and Strepsiad es, w h o has co me to Socrates to learn the unjust

arg ume nt in order t o av oi d pa yme nt o f his debts, is dis may ed to di s

c o v e r that he mus t first learn ' ab o u t names , wh ic h o f the m are mas

culine and which feminine'. His failure (in common with all his

f e l l o w - G r e e k s ) to dis tin gu ish animals o f different sex b y different

termin ation s, a nd his use o f the mascul ine article wi th no un s wh i c h

ha ve wh at is usual ly a feminine end in g, earn him a sharp r eb uk e fro m

'Socra tes ' . Th is castigati on o f the gr amma r o f ord ina ry la ng uag e as

i l l o g i c a l or imprecise appears again in Protagoras's contention that

the Gr ee k wo rd s f o r ' wr at h ' an d ' hel met ' , wh ic h are feminine, ou gh t to

be masculine.2

1

Or things ( σ κ ε ύ η ) , Ar. Poet. 140707. Aristotle himself c a l l e d them μ ε τ α ξ ύ (Rhet. 1 4 5 8 3 9 ,

Soph. el. 166 b 1 2 , 1 7 3 b 28). Th e w or d ο υ δ έ τ ε ρ ο » (Lat. neuter) came into use with later grammarians.1

Arist. Soph. el. 173b 1 9 . Some have supposed that this was on account of the warlike or

'unf emin ine ch arac ter ' (M ur ra y) of the conceptions wh ich the wor ds signified. Mor e pro bably




2 2 2

Prodicus1

is ment io ned in the Euthydemus (277 ε ) as on e w h o in

sisted on the pri mar y impo rtan ce o f 't he correct ness of n am es ',

which Socrates there calls the first stage o f init iati on in to the mys te ries

o f the Soph ist s. His speci alit y wa s prec isi on in the use o f la ng uage and

the accurate distinction o f the mea nin g of wo rd s co mm on l y regard edas sy no ny mo us . He rebu kes me , says Socrates in the Protagoras

(341a), for usin g an expression like ' ter ribly cl ev er ' . 'T er ri bl e'

(deinos, see p. 32) must qualify unpleasant things like poverty,

disease or wa r. Th e same di al ogu e conta ins a pa ro dy o f his te ach ing ,

a somewha t po mp ou s speech in wh ic h he distinguishes bet we en dis

cussion and disput e, esteem and praise, pleasure and enj oy ment . In

the Laches (197 d) he is men tione d, in co nn ex io n wi th the disti ncti on

bet ween co ur ag e and fearlessness, as 't he best o f the Soph ist s at

drawing such distinctions ' .2

Aristotle shows him listing enjoyment,

delight and gl adn ess as sub div isi ons o f pleasure, and in co nn ex io n

with this a late comme ntat or credits him wit h t h e ' inv ent ion ' o f ' verbal

accuracy' .3

Perhaps the most interesting thing about all this is the evidence for a

personal relat ionship bet we en Pr od ic us and Socr ate s, w h o refers to

himself severa l time s in Pl at o as Pr od ic us 's pupil or friend.4 Pr od ic us 's

insistence on disting uishi ng preci sely be twe en wor ds o f close ly related

Protagoras was moved by purely morphological considerations connected with their termina

tions. See T. Gomperz, Gr. Th. I , 444f. and Fehling, Rh. Mus. 1965, 21 5, and cf. the argum ent

about κ ά ρ δ ο τ τ ο ς at Clouds 670ff. Note that once a g a i n his targ et is Homer , and indeed his crit icis m

of the concord μ η ν ι ν ο ύ λ ο μ έ ν η ν be lo ngs to the same cont ext as that of the mood of ά ε ι δ ε ,

v i z . a criticme of the opening l i n e s of the Iliad. See Fehling' s imag inat ive reconstruction, ibid.

2 1 4 , and, for his conclusions from this, p. 205 above.1

For Prodi cus in genera l see pp. 274 ff. bel ow.1

Other Platonic references to Prodicus in this connexion are Prot. 340am, Meno 75 ε ,Charm. 163d, Crat. 384b.

3

τ έ ρ ψ ι ς , χ α ρ ά a nd ε υ φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η , Ar . Top. 1 1 2 b 22; cf. schol. on Phaedr. — Hermias, p. 283

Couvreur (not in DK but added by Untersteiner, Sof. 1 1 , 1 7 3 f . ) : Prodicus τ η ν τ ώ ν ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν

ε δ ρ ε ν ά κ ρ ί β ε ι α ν . According to the scholiast, T i p y t s was pleasure through the e a r s , χ α ρ ά

pleasure of the mind, and ε υ φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η v i s u a l ple asu re; a classification whi ch, if r e a l l y Prodicus's,

shows once a g a i n the norma tiv e rather than des crip tive charac ter of this kin d of teac hing, for it

hardly corresponds to ordinary u s a g e . (In Prodicus's speech in the Protagoras, ε ύ φ ρ α ΐ ν ε σ δ α ι

is contrasted with ή δ ε σ θ α ι , and is defined as the enjoyment resulting from exercising the intellect.)

The scholiast, however , has ver y l i k e l y intr oduce d a Stoic classification. Cf. A l e x , in DK, 84 A 19,

and see on this Classen in Proc. Afr. C.A. 1959, 39f. C lass en thinks that e\'en Arist otle has

confused Prodicus with Platonic δ ι α ί ρ ε σ ί ξ .4

See pp. 275 f. be low. I agre e wi th H. Gomper z (S. u. R. 93) that these allus ions canno t be

dismissed as jokes without any historical foundation.



Prodicus on Precise Diction

mea ni ng has o b vi o u s affinities wi th the Socratic habit o f pi nn in g d o w n

an interloc utor and ma ki ng him say precisely wh at cour age , temper

ance, virtue, or whatever be the subject of their discussion, is—what

is its for m or b e i n g ; and the teach ing of Pr od ic us ma y w e l l have been

an influence directing his thought along these lines. Whether, as

Cal o g e r o has written, 'the difference between the two approaches is

v e r y sha rp' , Pro dic us caring on ly for 'co rre ct sp ea ki ng ' and Socrates

interested i n ' the real t h i n g ' or wh et he r, as W . S ch mi d has it, Pr od ic us 's

art o f div isi on wa s a 'scientific fertilization o f the So cratic sphere o f

thought ' and 'h is at tempt to sharpen and regularize the use of language

through l o g i c a l demands an und oub ted ly valuable prepara t ion for

the concep tua l clarification of literary l an gu ag e' , is a que sti on that

w i l l be taken up later.1

One may add here, however, that Prodicus

like oth er So phis ts had a hi gh reputat ion as a political orator and

g a v e paid public displays of eloqu ence, and also, like Pro tag ora s,

un de rt oo k to teach the art of success in poli tics and the ma na ge me nt o f

private estates. It is l i k e l y therefore that his insist ence on p reci se

lan gua ge occur red in the conte xt o f rhetorical inst ruct ion.2

A D D I T I O N A L N O T E S

( i ) Prodicus and Thucydides. Ant iph on, Gorg ias and Prodicu s were

al l mentioned in late antiquity as teachers or models of Thucydides.

(See D K, 84 A 9, H . May er , Prodikos, 61.) In May er' s o w n opi nio n

the 'Scharfe und Pr ag na nz ' o f Th uc yd id es ' s s tyle is a co mbi ned

inheri tance from Gorgi as ' s anti theses and Prod icus ' s 'S y n o n y m i k ' .

It is no t easy to see in Go rg ia s a teacher o f 'S ch ar fe und P r ag n an z' ,

but in any case I do not wish to enter here on a discussion of influ

ences on Thucydides in general but simply to f o l l o w May er in dr awi ng

attention to som e places whe re the distinction bet wee n ne ar- sy no ny ms

1

See pp. 275 fT. For some further assessments of the valu e of Prodi cus 's li ngu is tic wo rk see

Grant, Ethics, i, i24f . ( ' W e must ack now led ge the merit of this first attempt at sepa ratin g the

different shades ofl a n g u a g e ,

and fixing a nomenclature',e t c . ) ;

H. Gomperz, S. u. R. 124-6 (the

aim of his instruction was rhetorical—otherwise young men would not have paid 50 dr. a time

to hear h i m !— y e t ' aus der Bedeutun gslehre des Prodiko s ist die Begriffsphilosophie des Sokrat es

erwachsen ' ) ; and other authorities referred to in Untersteiner, Sophs. 225, n. 66. Unte rstei ner

i s not quite correct in s a y i n g on p. 215 that 'a ll scholars are ag re ed ' on the qu estion .

* Plato, Hipp. Maj. 282c, Rep. 600c, and see pp. 41 f. above.

3 ? . 3




224

is dr aw n in a w a y so str ik in gl y remin iscent o f Pr od ic us in the Protagoras

that th ey must sur ely o w e their inspira tion to hi m.

In 1.23.6 we have the famous distinction between the true but dis

guised cause (ι τ ρ ό φ α σ ι ς ) o f the war and the reasons ( α ί τ ί α ι ) which were

openly given.

1.69.6, α ί τ ι α and κ α τ η γ ο ρ ί α . 'Please do not think that our remon

strance arises out of any hostile feelings. Remonstrance ( α ι τ ί α ) is what one

employs against friends who have erred, accusation (κ α τ η γ ο ρ ί α ) against

enemies wh o have wr on ged one. '

2.62.4, α ϋ χ η μ α and κ α τ α φ ρ ό ν η σ η . ' A n y coward can be boastful out of

ignorance and luck, but a proper disdain comes from reasoned confidence

in one's superiority over the enemy.'

3.39.2, έ τ τ α ν α σ τ η ν α ι and ά τ τ ο σ τ ή ν α ι . T h e Mytileneans are ' no t so mu ch

revolutionaries—a wo rd wh ic h applies to people w h o have suffered harsh

treatment—as deliberate insurgents plotting with our enemies to destroy us'.

4.98.6, α μ ά ρ τ η μ α and τ τ α ρ α ν ο μ ία . 'Involuntary faults [the Athenians

claimed] earned sanctuary at the altars of the gods, and the name crime

should be reserved for wrongful acts committed gratuitously, not under the

pressure of circumstances.'

6 . 11 .6 , έ τ τ α ίρ ε σ θ α ι and Θ α ρ σ ε ϊ ν . ' W ha t matters is not to feel elation

at any chance setback of our enemies, but rather confidence in our own

superior planning.'1

A l l bu t one o f these instances occ ur in a spe ech , direct or rep ort ed,

and the use ma de o f them b y Th uc yd id es is further evi den ce o f the

rhetorical pur pos e o f such nice distinctions. T h e y can indee d be

remarkably effective.

(2) Synonymic and philosophy. Mo mi gl ia no has an interesting th eo ry

o f the possible bear ings of Pro dic us 's discrimination o f synonyms on

both phi losophy o f language and e th ics . T h e wo rd s ' t he or y ' and 'p o s

sible ' are m y o w n , for Mom ig li an o presents his con clu sion s as certain.

O n the evidence that w e ha v e, it is difficult to be so confident , but ev en

on a more cautious v i e w the interpretat ion is to o interest ing to be passe d

over . It is as fol lows QnAtti Torino, 1929-30, io2f.) . Democr i tus had

1

Not all the example s cited by Mayer see m rel evant. At ι . 84.3 the rhetor ical effect is ga in ed

by u si ng α Ι δ ώ ς a nd α ι σ χ ύ ν η ind ist ingu ish abl y rather than differentiating between them, and

at 1.36.1 φ ο β ο ύ μ α ι and δ έ δ ο ι κ α seem to be used simply to avoid clum sy repetition. Nor is any

difference of meaning between Ι σ ο ς and K o t vo s suggested at 3 . 5 3 . 1 - 2 .



Additional Notes on Prodicus

s a i d that w o r d s d o n o t r ef le c t r e a l i ty b e c a u s e ( a m o n g o t h e r r e a s o n s ) n o t

e v e r y w o r d h a s a n o b j e c t c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o i t . ( S e e v o l . 1 1 ,4 7 5 . ) T h e o n l y

w a y t o r e fu t e h i m w a s t o s h o w that i t d id , i . e . that o f s o - c a l l e d s y n o

n y m s ( l i k e τ ε λ ε υ τ ή , π έ ρ α ς , ε σ χ α τ ο ν , Meno 75 ε ) e a c h ha s in f a c t i t s

o w n s e p a ra t e o b j e c t . W h a t P r o d i c u s i s d o i n g w i t h h i s apparentp e d a n t r y i s t o o p p o s e th e p r e v a i l i n g s c e p t i c i s m . A n d , s i n c e t h e o r e t i c a l

s c e p t i c i s m l e d t o p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i v i s m , h e i s e q u a l l y i n r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t

' t h e a r m y o f T h r a s y m a c h u s e s a n d C a l l i c l e s e s ' . T h i s e x p la i n s h o w

P r o d i c u s t h e h a i r - s p l i t t e r i s a l s o t h e author o f t h e m o r a l i z i n g f ab l e o f

t h e C h o i c e o f H e r a c l e s ( p p . 2 77 f. b e l o w ) . T h e a r t o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g

s y n o n y m s h a d i m p o r t a n t b e a r i n g s o n e t h ic s , i n v o l v i n g t h e s e p a r a t io n

o f α γ α θ ό ς f r o m κ ρ ε ί τ τ ω ν , δ ί κ α ι ο ν f r o m σ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν . ( T h e s e p a r t i c u l a re x a m p l e s d o n o t , s o f ar a s I a m a w a r e , o c c u r i n t h e s u r v i v i n g r e c o r d o f

P r o d i c u s ' s a c t i v i t y . ) H i s r e a c t io n , c o n t i n u e s M o m i g l i a n o , i s t h e m o r e

i n t e r e s t i n g f o r n o t b e i n g s i m p l y a d e f e n c e o f t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s . O n t h e

d a n g e r o u s s u b j e c t o f t h e g o d s h e w a s b o t h b o l d a n d o r i g i n a l ( s e e o n

t h i s p p . 23 8 ff. b e l o w ) , y e t h e f el t t h e n e e d o f u p h o l d i n g s o u n d m o r a l

p r i n c i p l e s i n d a i l y l i f e . H e thus ( c o n c l u d e s M o m i g l i a n o ) o c c u p i e s a

s p e c i a l p l a c e a m o n g t h e S o p h i s t s , d i f fe r en t o n t h e o n e hand f r o m t h es c e p t i c is m o f G o r g i a s , P r o t a g o r a s a n d T h r a s y m a c h u s , a n d o n t h e

o t h e r f r o m A n t i p h o n a n d H i p p i a s w i t h t h e ir a n t it h e si s b e t w e e n natural

a n d c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y .

225



IX

R A T I O N A L I S T THEORIESOF R E L I G I O N : A G N O S T I C I S M

A N D A T H E I S M1

( i ) C R I T I C I S M S O F T R A D I T I O N A L R E L I G I O N

The Presocratic philosophers, whether or not they retained a b e l i e f in a

divine force or forces, all alike promulgated conceptions of religion

which we re far re mo ve d from the ant hro pom orp his m o f the po pula r

o r state cults based on the Ho me ric pant heon. X en op ha ne s open ly

attacked them, and substituted a non -an thr opo mor phi c mon oth eis m

or panth eism , whi le others ta citly aba ndo ned th em in fav our, first, o f

an eve r- l i v ing world- stuff described vag ue ly as go ve rn in g or s teer ing

the mo ti on s o f the cos mo s and ev er yt hi ng in it, and later, in A n a x a

go ra s, of a sin gle Mi nd separate fro m the matter o f the uni ver se and

the cause o f the rational ord er w hi ch it disp lays . W e hav e seen

Heracl itus co nd em ni ng phallic and other cults for their uns eemli ness

and D em oc ri tu s (doubtless under the influence o f already exist ing

evolut ionary theor ies) c laiming that it was only the alarming nature o f

thunder , l ightning and similar phenomena that made men think they

were caused b y go ds . A s 'en l ig hte nme nt ' gr ow s , i t sh ow s i tself under

t w o mai n aspects (wh eth er in ancient G re ec e or Eur op e since the

Ren ai ss anc e): first, the determi nati on to bel iev e on ly wh at is reason

able and a te nde nc y to identify reason wi th pos iti vis m and the p rog re ss

o f natural science, and se con dly a genu ine conce rn wi th mora lity .

Moral ity is identified w it h the amelio rati on o f hu ma n l i fe and the

elimin ation o f cru elt y, injury and all forms o f exp loi tat ion o f hu ma n

beings by their f e l l o w s , and is base d on pur el y huma nist ic and r elati ve

standards, for it is held that absolute standards claiming supernatural

1

For a gene ral aper cu of the criticism of tradit ional re lig ion in Greece, a subject wh ic h far

exceeds the scope of this history, see P. Decharme, La critique des trad. rels. che\ les Grecs.

2 2 ( 5



Criticism of Religion in the Fifth Century

authority not only have led in the past, but must inevitably lead, to

cruelty, intolerance and other e v i l s . The Greek gods were very

vulnerable in both these aspects, and as soon as conventional piety

began to y i e l d to a mor e though tful att itu de—wh en nomos in all its

aspects was no longer taken for granted but rather contrasted with what

was natural and universal1

—scepticism and disapproval began to

make themselves felt in increasing volume.

T h e attack on religion was indeed c l o s e l y bound up with the

nomos-physis antithesis. Plato (Laws 889 c) compla ins o f peo pl e w h o

claim that ' the gods are human contrivances, they do not exist in

nature but on ly b y cu st om and la w, wh ic h mo re ov er differ fro m place

to place ac co rd in g to the agre ement ma de b y each gr ou p wh e n the y

laid down their l a w s ' .

Wh e n Plato wro te , such contentions were not hin g new. T h e

Ari sto ph ani c Socrates rejected the go ds as an out -of- date cur ren cy

(nomisma, p. 56 ab o ve ), and in Euri pide s He cu ba calls nomos superior

to the gods because it is by nomos that w e bel iev e in them as w e l l as in

standards o f rig ht and wr o n g (p. 23). Th er e is pl ent y of evi de nce that

the ho ld o f rel igi on ov er men' s mind s was we ak en in g in the intellectual

fermen t o f the Pe ric lean age, and also that Athenian officialdom was

ne rv ou s and to uc hy abou t it. T h e cult o f the go ds wa s integral to the

l i f e of the state and a powerful cohesive force. It may be claimed that

a l l that was necessary was conformity with cult-practices,2

and that

thought was free; but it must have been as obvious to an Athenian

traditionalist as it was to Cicero's Cotta that those w h o den y outr ight

that the go ds exist 'n on mo do supersti t ionem t o l l u n t . . . sed et iam

religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur ' (N.D. 1.42.117) .

Hen ce the imp iet y trials and the decree o f Dio pe it he s against atheism

and cosmic speculation.

1

Th e conventional attitude is exemplified b y the reply of Socrates in Xenophon (Mem.

4 . 3 . 1 6 ) to Eut hyde mus, wh o ackno wle dge s divi ne provid ence but is worr ied by the thought

that no adequate return can ever be made to the gods by men. The gods themselves, he s a y s ,

hav e provide d the answ er, for whenev er the Delph ic oracle is approached wit h this prob lem,

it a l w a y s replies: 'Follow the nomos of your c i t y ' , which means propitiating the gods with

s a c r i f i c e s just as far as is in you r powe r. S uch an answer w oul d sca rcel y satisfy the more pro

gressive and inquiring spirits of the fifth century.2

'Ev en if we concentrate on the relig ious contr overs y whi ch occasioned the trial [of S o c r a t e s ] ,

the problem of faith never became an issue.' ( S n e l l , Disc, of Mind, 26.) See also p. 237 , n. 2 belo w.

227



Rationalist Theories of Religion

3.28

T h e y did not tolerate [says Plu tar ch (Nicias 23)] the natural p h i lo so p h e r s

and star-gazers,1

as th ey called th em, dis so lv in g di vi ni ty into irrational

causes, blin d forces and nec essa ry prope rtie s. Pr ot ag or as wa s b ani she d,

Anaxagoras p u t u n d e r restraint and wi t h difficulty sav ed b y Peri cles , and

Socrates, t ho ug h in fact he had n o con ce rn in su ch mat ters , lost his life

th rough h i s dev o t i on to ph i l osop hy .

A n d in his life o f Per icl es (32) :

A b o u t this t ime [sc. jus t befor e the out brea k of the Pelo ponn esia n W a r ]

Aspasia wa s p rosecu ted fo r i m p i e t y . . . and Diope i the s* in t roduced a b i l l

fo r the im pea chm en t o f tho se w h o deni ed the g od s or ta ug ht abou t celestial

phenomena, d i rect i ng suspi c ion at Per ic les th ro ug h Ana xa go ra s .

T h e mot iv es mi gh t be politi cal, bu t the state of opinion was such that

imputations o f athei sm and natural science were a sure way to secure a

prosecution, as Socrates's accusers knew w e l l . N o distinction wa s

drawn be tw ee n the scientific wri ter s and the paid teachers w h o m w e call

Sophists. T h e y shared the same reli gious scepti cism, wh ic h for the

Sophists wa s often the result o f re adi ng the w o r k s o f the scientis ts, and

at the time the word sophistes was applied as naturally to Anaxagoras

as to Pro tag ora s o r Hippias ( p. 30 ab ov e) .

Criticism o f the go ds on moral gro un ds ca me early. It need ed no

scientific speculat ion or logi ca l sub tle ty to be scandali zed b y Z eu s' s

castration of his father or his many amour s, the thefts and deceit o f

Hermes, or the jealou sy o f Hera and the malic ious and ve nge ful char ac

ter of the immo rtal s i n gener al. M yt hs in wh ic h the go d s appeared as

thieves, adulterers, sed ucers and glut tons we re alr eady rejected b y

Xeno phane s and Pindar . In the age o f enli ghte nment w e find Eur ipid es

eve rywh ere gi v i n g rein to such criticism. It can take different f or ms —reproach o f the go ds for their behaviour, declarations that gods exist

" μ ε τ Ε ω ρ ο λ έ σ χ α ; , lit. 'chat terer s about thing s in the sk y' . The wo rd occurs in Plato (Rep.

489 c ) , coupled with the adjective ά χ ρ η σ τ ο υ ; , to illus trat e the kind of abuse that was l e v e l l e d at

philosophers.a

Not much is kno wn about t he appro priat ely named Diopeithes . The n ame is mentioned

s evera l times in Aristophanes (Knights 1085, Wasps 380, Birds 988), but all that emerges is

that the holder of it was a soothsayer. Fragments of other comic poets depict him as a fanatic

and as a drum mer in the Co ry banti c rites (Ameips ias 10 K., Telec lid es 6 K. and Phr yni chu s 9 K.;

see Lobeck, Aglaoph. 981) . The prosecution of 'Anaxagor as the Sophis t' is mentioned (b ut not

Diopeithes or his ψ ή φ ι σ μ α . ) by Diodorus ( 1 2 . 3 9 . 2 ) . For the connexion of the Sophists wit h the

natural philosopher s cf. pp. 45ff. above , and for the supposed co nnexio n between ' sk y- ga z ing '

and immoral sophistic teaching Clouds 1283 (pp. H 4 f . ) .



Criticism on Moral Grounds

but do not and cannot behave like that, or assertions that , since these

are the g od s w e are ta ug ht to be li ev e in, either th ey do no t exi st —it is

a l l li es —o r th ey are heedle ss o f hu ma n affairs and d o no t merit or

nee d our wo rs hi p. A s a dramatist Eurip ides co ul d reflect all poi nts o f

v i e w through his various plots and characters. In the Ion w e see thedisillusionment o f a pio us yo u n g acoly te w h o learns that the god he

serves has stooped to seduce a mortal woman. The Heracles contains

a vehement denial that the gods could behave wickedly ( i34if f . ) :

I do not believe that the gods take pleasure in unlawful intercourse, nor

have I ever thought nor can be persuaded that they load each other with

fetters, nor that one is lord over another. Go d, if he be truly g od, lacks

nothing. These are the wretched tales of bards.1

Co mp le te disbelief in the god s, based on the prosp erity o f the wi ck ed

and the sufferings o f the just, is vo i ce d in a passionate ou tburs t in the

Bellerophon (fr. 286): Th er e are no go ds in hea ven . T o bel iev e in su ch

old w i v e s ' tales is f o l l y . Y o u hav e onl y to loo k around y o u . T yr an ts

mur der , ro b, cheat and r av age , and are happier than the pious and

peaceful. Small god -fe ari ng states are ov er wh el med by the military

mi gh t o f thos e larg er and mo re wi ck ed . Mo re in the ve in o f theHeracles passage is the line, again from the Bellerophon (fr. 2 9 2 . 7 ) :

' I f gods act basely, they are no gods.' That the example o f the go ds co uld

be in vo ke d to excu se hu ma n failings is also poi nte d o ut b y Eur ipi des ,

for instance when Phaedra's old nurse co nd on es her illicit passi on b y

remi ndi ng her, wi th the examples o f Zeu s and Eo s, that Aphrodite is a

power too strong for the other gods themselves to resist, and again

b y Helen in extenuatio n o f her o w n con duc t (Tro. 948). T h e sam epoi nt is mad e in co mi c vein b y Aris top hane s, wh en the Unju st A r g u

ment claims that wi th ou t his rhetorical skill a sinner w i l l be lost, but

with it he w i l l confound his accusers (Clouds 1079):

Suppose you are caught in adultery, you w i l l argue that you have done

nothing wro ng, and point to Zeus, wh o could never resist lov e or wo me n.

How, you w i l l say, could you, a mortal, show greater strength than a god?

1

Yet so strong was the force of tradition that the whole plot of the Heracles depends on the

jealous wrath of Hera, of whose unspeakable cruelty the hero himself, who speaks these words,

has been the victim. Some have thought that the parado x was deliber ate, to bri ng out the inherent

abs urdi ty of the situation, but Le sk y (pr obab ly ri gh dy ) sees it as a product of the tension be

tween the subject-matter, impose d by tradition and my th ol og y, and the intellect of the d ramati st.

S e e Lesky, HGL, 382.

229




230

In contrast t o the ho me ly traditi onalism o f the nurse, the mo ral ist

could claim that a go d might be simpl y the prod uct of psy cho log ica l

transference: men gave the name to their own e v i l passions. ' M y son

was handsome,' says Hecuba to Helen (Eur. Tro. 987), 'and at sight

o f him yo ur mind bec ame C yp ri s. A l l foolish acts are called Aph ro di te

b y mankind . '1

T h e kind of criticism wh ic h so ug ht to abso lve the g o ds

from the unethical behaviour attached to their names in the myths

mus t not be th ou gh t of, and was not t ho ug ht o f at the ti me ,2

as an

attack on reli gio n as suc h, or ev en the established state- religi on. O n e

o f its most vigorous exponents was Plato, who in the Republic firmly

accused Homer and Hesiod of l y i n g , yet was an implacable opponent

o f unb eli ef either in the go d s or in their pro vi den tia l care for ma nk in d,

and an uph old er o f the off ic ia l cults.

Besides mor al pr ob it y, self-sufficiency was be in g dem and ed as an

essential pro per ty o f deity. Ai de d perhaps b y Xe no ph an es and Eleatic

notions of God as 'unmoved' and ' impassible ' , the rationalism of the

time saw the godhe ad as ' l ac ki ng no th in g' . T hes e wo rd s o f Euripides's

Heracles can hard ly be unc onne cte d wi th the pro nou nce men t o f

A n t i p h o n : ' Fo r this reason he has need of not hin g, nor does he expe ct

an yt hi ng from a n y b o d y , bu t is infinite and all-suf ficient. '3 B e l i e f in the

1

Cf. also fr. 254 N . :

A . Often the gods lead mortal men astray.

B . Yo u take the easy line, and blame the g ods .

G. Devereux has pointed out that Helen's defence is anticipated by what Penelope s a y s about

her at Od. 23.2 22. See his From Anxiety to Method, 344, n. 2. (T he com paris on is made by S tan

ford ad loc. in his edition.) But whereas Homer accepts, Euripides, in the person of Hecuba,

c r i t i c i ze s .2

Decharme {Critique, p. vii ) has poin ted out a reason wh y no suspicion of imp iet y attached

to this purgation. Fundamentalism was a phenomenon unknown to the Greeks because there

w a s nothing i n their rel igio us literature correspon ding to the 'w or d of God'. ' l i s ne cr urent

point que les dieu x eux -me mes eussent ete les aute urs de leur theo logi e, ou ils vire nt seule ment

l'ceuvre des poetes.'3

( a ) F r. 10. W i th An ti ph on 's ο ύ δ ε ν ό ; δ ε ί τ α ι cf. δ ε ϊ τ α ι γ ά ρ ό θ ε ό ; . . . ο ΰ δ ε ν ό ; in E ur ip id es.

(b) The re is so muc h unc ert ain ty abou t the date of Antip hon 's wr it in gs (see p. 286, n. 2,

below) that it is impossible on external grounds to say whether Euripides is copying this passage

from the "Α λ ή θ ε ι α or not. Some have used 'echo es' of Antiphon in Euripides as actual evidence

of his date , but this is a dan ger ou s criterion. Such statements as 'G od lac ks no th in g' could be

com mon to mo re than one writer of the time , and neither Euripi des nor Ant iph on need hav e

s a i dit first.

( c ) The quotation is given in a lexicon (the Suda) to illustrate the meaning of ά δ έ η τ ο ; .

S i n c e context is lacking, the reason referred to in δ ια τ ο Ο τ ο is unkno wn. It is not even stated

(but can scarcely be doub ted) that the subject is θ ε ό ;. (For the consensus of scholarly opini on

on this point see Untersteiner, Sophs. 259, n. 10.)



Divine Self-sufficiency and Providence

s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y o f the dei ty leads natu ral ly to doubt s abo ut the reality of

any divi ne pr ov idence or care for man kind. T h e idea wh i ch Pla to

deplored, that ' t here are go ds , but they take no tho ught for human

affairs' (Laws 885 b , 888c), wa s current in the fifth cen tur y. X e no ph on(Mem. 1.4.10) represents a man called Ar is to de mus as prot est ing to

Socrates, when taxed with refusing to g i v e the gods their customary

meed of sacrifice and prayer, that far from contemning the divine, he

th ou gh t it wa s too great to need his serv ice, and mo re ov er that the

gods could hav e no th ough t for mankin d. An t iph on is said to hav e

denied providence in the same work On Truth in which he declared the

s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y o f G o d and spo ke of the advisabil ity o f con fo rmi ng to

conventional morality onl y wh en under obser va ti on;1

and Thrasy

machus saw in the prevalence of wickedness evidence that the gods

are blind to what goes on among men (p. 97 above).

T h e rationalism o f the natural philosophers was not completely

atheistic (as w e shou ld use the wor d ) bu t none the less des tructi ve o f

the traditional and of f i c i a l pantheon. In the Ionian tradition divinity

for long was identified with the living physis o f the wo rl d, until

Anaxagoras separated it as a remot e Mind wh ich started the cosmic

proc ess in the be gi nn in g. More impor tan t to his cont empor ari es than

the existence o f this Mi nd was his reducti on o f the all-seeing Hel ios ,

w h o traversed the sky every day in his flashing chariot and was the

a w f u l wit nes s o f men' s mos t sacred oath s, to the status o f a lifeless

lum p of gl o wi ng stone. Euripides wa s bol d en ou gh to intro duce this

descr ipti on into his traged ies and it made such a dee ply unf avoura ble

(</) I have translated ά π ε ι ρ ο ς by infinite. Luria suggested that there wa s a double mea ni ng:

( i ) infinite, (i i) untr ied , and Unters teiner has followed hi m (Sophs. 259, n. 13 ). But in the

passages which he cited as parallel (Plato, Phil. 17ε and Tim. 55 d) , the second meaning is

active (ignora nt, inexperienced), L S J giv e no example of the passive sense (unexperienced, un

kn own or untr ied) , nor do I kn ow of any.

(e) Untersteiner (Sophs. 260, n. 13a, Sof. iv , 4 2 Q thinks Xen. Mem. 1 .6 .10 i s proof that

Anti phon was not giv in g his own vi ew but one that he was opposing. Schmid (Gesch. 1 . 3 . 1 , 1 6 0 )

take s the fr. at it s face val ue and includes Mem. 1.6.3 among his r e f 8 r e n c e s without comment.

Th e reader ma y take his choice. Pers ona lly I think ev en Xe nop hon 's Socrates wa s capabl e of a

bit of r a i l l e r y . What he s a y s i s : 'Y ou seem to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and

extravagance, έ γ ώ δ έ ν ο μ ί3ω τ ό μ έ ν μ η δ ε ν ό ς δ ε ϊ σ θ α ι θ ε ί ο ν ε ί ν α ι ', s l y l y bri ngi ng up his own word s

against him.

1

Fr. 1 2, from Or ige n. For refe rences to modern o pinions about this see Unter steiner, Sophs.

264, n. 74. It should be noted that Unterst einer is one of those who be lieve that the whole passage

Laws 888 d - 890 a repr oduces t he doctri ne of Anti phon . See Sophs. 23 1, n. 17 , 263, n. 70,

2 6 5 , n . 9 1 , a n d Sof. I V , I78ff.

I l l



Rationalist Theories oj Religion

232

impression on the Athenian mind that not only was it said to have

been the occas ion o f An ax ag or as 's banishment but Meletus th oug ht

it worth while to try to implicate Socrates in it at his trial.1

But the

most popular philosophi c th eo lo gy wa s that wh i ch identified div ini ty

with the air or aither, revived as a scientific theory at this time byDiogenes of Ap ol lo ni a and easily absorbed by popular thou ght o w i n g

to its affinities with ancient beliefs.2

Its familiarity is sh ow n b y the

invocat ion o f Socrates to the ' L o r d and Master, measureless A i r ' in

the Clouds, and the ident ification o f air or aither wi th Zeu s in the p ray er

o f Hecuba in Euripides's Troades. Aither also takes the name of Zeus

in t w o other places in Eurip ides. Th e atomic god s o f De moc ri tu s we re

even farther removed from off ic ia l religion.3

It is hard to arr ive at the mi nd o f Eur ipi des himself, be yon d sa yi ng

that he wa s int ense ly interested in the most adva nced th in king o f his

day. He speaks through his characters, who mirror almost every point

o f v i e w , 4

and i t is as su ch a mi rr or o f his time that he is (for our pre sen t

purposes, naturally) best regarded. A woman in the Thesmophoriaûsae

accuses him rou nd ly o f atheism (450f. 'In his tragedies he persuades

men that the god s do not exi st ') , but the co mi c poe t has har dly made

her an impartial witness. Plutarch (Amat. 756b-c ) says that, when the

Melanippe was first per fo rmed , the line (fr. 480) ' Ze us , whoev e r Zeu s

ma y be , for I k n o w no t save b y hear say' caused such an upr oar in the

theatre that for a sec ond pr oduc ti on he altered it to ' Z e us , as t ru th

i t s e l f has said 'J A similar phrase, 'w ha te ve r the go ds ma y b e ' , occ urs in

the Orestes (418) in a cont ext o f out spo ken criticism of divi ne p ow er s .6

1

See vol. n, 307, 269 and 323, Plato, Apol. z6d.1

Vol. 1 1 , chapter vn, and vol. I, i28ff.3

See vol. 1 1 , 3 1 0 1 " . , and Eur. frr. 877, 941 (quo ted from un kn ow n pl ay s and wit hou t con te xt );

also Euripides's α ί θ ή ρ Ι μ ό ν β ό σ κ η μ α at Frogs 892. For Demo cri tus vo l. II, 478 m, esp. p. 480, n. I .

There may be a flavour of Democritus in Tro. 886, but the idea was widespread. "Α ή ρ and α ί θ ή ρ

were inte rch ange abl e in these context s (vo l. 11, 480). In the Clouds it is α ή ρ w ho έ χ ε ι ; τ ή ν γ η ν

μ ε τ έ ω ρ ο ν , and γ ή ξ ό χ η μ α at Tro. 884 must be the same, whereas in fr. 941 it is α ίθ ή ρ whi ch

'ho lds the earth in its bux om ar ms '.4

Though Lucian, Zeus trag. 41, quotes both fr. 941 and fr. 480 as places where Euripides

is speaking his real mind, not bound by the e xigenci es of the drama tic situation.5

It is cur iou s that the same line occurred in the Peirithous, now gen eral ly attributed to Critia s

(Eur. fr. 5 9 1 . 4 N . = C riti as fr. 16 .9 DK ).6

The expressions of Euripides show a quite different spirit from some in Aeschylus which

s u p e r f i c i a l l y might be thought to resemble them.

( i ) The famous fr. of the Heliades (fr. 70),

Ζ ε υ ς Ι σ τ ι ν α ί θ ή ρ , Ζ ε ύ ; δ έ γ η , Ζ ε υ ς δ ' ο υ ρ α ν ό ;,

Zsus τ ο ι τ ά τ τ ά ν τ α , χ ώ τ ι τ ώ ν δ ' ύ π έ ρ τ ε ρ ο ν ,



Euripides

A str iking cho ric passage wh ic h mus t sur ely express h is o w n out look

is fr. 910 where he speaks o f the happiness o f a man w h o has learned

the w a y s o f scientific inquiry and observes ' t h e ageless order and

beau ty1

{kosmos) o f immortal nature, and how it was put together ' .

Such a ma n, he s a y s , w i l l have n o part in wic k e d or injurious deeds.

T his praise o f historia is not necessarily inconsistent with the dis

paragement o f meteorologoi in fr. 913 : 'Beholding these things, w h o is

not conscious o f g o d ? 2

W h o does n o t cast far from him the deceitful

w i l e s o f the star-gazers, whose mischievous tongues, void o f sense,

babble at random o f matters un kn ow n? ' Misguided prob ing into the

secrets o f nature has brought some to atheism, but for a wise m an the

ageless kosmos which she reveals can only lead to the conclusion that

there is a g o d , an intelligent orderer, in or behind it. F r . 913 can stand

beside the air- or aither-god o f the Troades an d frr. 877 and 941, an d

the g o d o f Di og en es from wh o m the y doubtless deriv e, the air which

is also a consc ious plan ning mind (vo l. 1 1 , 369). I f it does n o t preach the

Olympian religion, it is far from being atheism. Lacking the context,

w e do not k n o w for certain what 'these things' are, the sight o f which

makes one aware o f the divine, but, i f w e assume them to be natural,and especially celestial, phenomena, the lesson of the passage is the

same as Plato's in the Laws (9673-0): understanding of the taxis

(orderly arrangement) o f the stars does no t lead to atheism but to an

awareness o f the mind that brought about this kosmos. Astronomers

(says Plato) g ot the name o f atheists because some o f the earlier ones

thought that the he aven ly bod ies we re mere dead masses carried ro un d

b y necessity. B u t even among these the keener minds suspected that

does not reflect a n y rationalistic theories about an air-god, but c l e a r l y conveys the idea that

Zeus is present in all the manifestations of nature and at the same time transcends them. It is

deeply felt pantheism—the poet is conscious of a living spirit in earth and sk y and everything

else—and something more besides. Comparison with the last lines of Sophocles's Trachiniae

(Lloyd-Jo nes in JHS, 1956 , 55) misses the mark badly, for τ ο ύ τ ω ν there refers to the changes and

chances of human l i fe , not to 'aither, earth, sk y and all things' .

( i i ) At Ag. 160 the chorus invoke Ζ ε ύ ς , ό σ τ ι ; τ τ ο τ ' ε σ τ ί ν , but the following wor ds show

that this is the familiar case of a piety apprehensive lest it offend b y addressing a god by the

wrong name or one that is displeasing to h im (as in Euripides himself, fr. 912, where ό - π ά ν τ ω ν

μ ε δ έ ω ν is addressed with the w or ds Ζ ε υ ς ε ί τ ' ' Α ί δ η ; ο ν ο μ α ζ ό μ ε ν ο ς σ τ έ ρ γ ε ι ς ); and, as in theHeliades fr., the feeling expressed seems to be that Zeus is omnipresent: 'A l l things have I

measured, y e t nought have I found save Zeus.'1

T h e complex force of kosmos cannot be rendered by one word. Cf. vol. I , n o and 206.

* 6tou ο υ χ ί vo«I. For the meaning of voslv see vol . I I , 17"!.




their perfectly calculated movements could n o t have been achieved

without intelligence, and decided that , a l though the stars themselves

might b e lifeless clods and stones, there was a min d behi nd th em

directing their movement and the wh ol e cosm ic order .

(2) A G N O S T I C I S M : P R O T A G O R A S

According to Diogenes Laer t ius (9.24), the Eleatic philo sophe r Melis-

sus said that i t w as w r o n g to make a n y pronouncement about the g o d s ,

because knowledge o f them w a s impossible . Bu t the classic case o f an

agnostic in this century is his contemporary Pro tagoras , w h o w a s

famous fo r hav ing wr i t t en :

Concerning the gods I am unable to discover whether they exist or not,

or wh at they are like in form; for there are many hindrances to knowledge,

the obscurity o f the subject and the brevity o f human l i fe .

T h e full text is quo ted b y Diogenes Laer t ius and Eusebius , and the

major part b y S e x t u s ,1

and much nearer h is o w n t ime it is referred t o

by Pla to , w h o in t he Theaetetus ( i02d) imagines the great Sophist as

objecting to the in t roduct ion o f gods into the discuss ion , 'whose

existence o r non-existence I expressly refuse to discuss i n m y speeches

and writings' . T h e form o f the statement as one of personal opinion

(Ί a m unable . . . ' ) contrasts significantly wi th an expression like that

of Xenophanes fr. 34, that no man has seen, n o r w i l l any man ever

know, the t ruth about the gods. Some bel ieved in g o d s a n d some d id

not, an d so , in accordance with the 'm a n the measure ' pr inciple , gods

existed fo r some and not for o t h e r s ; but for Protagoras himself sus

pension o f judgmen t was the only possible course.2

Sextus and the

Epicurean Diogenes o f Oenoanda indefensibly ranked h i m w i t h the

atheists, b u t Ci ce ro carefully distinguishes them.3 T h e sentence is

said to have stood at the open ing o f a w o r k ( o r section o f a w o r k )

1

See Protagora s fr. 4 an d A 12 D K. It is also referred to b y T i m o n of Phlius (quoted b y S e x t u s ,

he. cit.), Philostratus (V. Soph. 1 . 1 0 . 2 = A 2) , Cicero (N.D. 1 . 1 . 2 , 12 . 2 9 and 23 .63) , and

Diogenes of Oenoanda ( A 23).1

Cf. J a e g e r , TEGP, 189. Th is disposes satisfactorily of T. Gomperz's contention (GT, I ,

457) that if Protagoras h ad believed, as Plato s a i d he did , that 'every man's truth is the truth

which appears to h i m ' , he could not have s a i d what he did about the gods.1

N.D. 1 . 1 . 2 , 'Dubi t a re se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras M e l i u s et Theodorus

Cyrenaicus putaverunt ' . Cf. ibid. 23 .63 , 4 2 . 1 1 7 .

234



Agnosticism of Protagoras

called ' O n the G o d s ' , 1

and scholars hav e naturally wo nd er ed wh at

could have f o l l o w e d on such an unp rom isi ng begi nn in g. W e shall

never know, but ' there is not hin g against su pp os in g' (to adopt a

phrase from the latest commentator)2

that it upheld religious worship

and cult according to the ancestral nomoi. Not only was this anintegral part of the l i fe of the polis, that c i v i l i z e d social and pol itical

com mu ni ty of wh os e va lue, and indeed necessi ty, he wa s firmly con

vinced, but also the instinct for worship was probably in his v i e w an

original and ineradicable trait of human nature .3

(Cf. p. 65 above.)

(3) A T H E I S M : D I A G O R A S , P R O D I C U S , C R I T I A S ;

P L A T O ' S T WO T Y P E S O F A T H E I S T

' A s a dogma ti c creed, consis tin g in the denial o f ev er y ki nd o f super

natural power, atheism has not often been seriously maintained at any

period of c i v i l i z e d tho ugh t. ' So A . C . Pearso n, in a bri ef article who s e

main merit is to demonst rat e the difficulty o f estab lishing beyond do ub t

that any Greek thinker was an atheist in the fu l l sense.4

There is first

the need to dist ingu ish a rejection o f traditional po ly th ei sm fro m denialo f the wh ol e idea o f div ini ty, sec ond ly the fragmenta ry and somet imes

un tr us tw or th y character o f our authorit ies for this per iod, and thi rdly

the ten dency to use a cha rge o f atheism as a we ap on against any pub lic

1

D.L. 9. 52 and 54, Eus. P.E. 1 4 . 3 . 7 = Prot . fr. 4, Cic. N.D. 23.63 (without t i t l e ) . For

σ ύ γ γ ρ α μ μ α applied to part of a work see Untersteiner, Sof. 1, 78, von Fri tz, RE, X L V . Halbb. 919.

Th e ' ti tl e' of a prose w or k at this rime often consisted, as in this case, of the openin g wor ds .

( S e e C. W. Muller, Hermes, 1967, 145.)1

'Ni cht s spricht gegen die Ver mut ung ', C. W . Muller. Earlier conjectures wer e collected

by Nestle, VMûL, 278—82. Untersteiner {Sophs. 38, n. 47) criticizes Nes tle' s, pa rt ly because

it does not fit his own conviction that τ τ . θ ε ω ν was part of the Ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ί α ι (in which he follows

H. Gomperz, S. u. R. 1 3 1 ) . Muller (Hermes, 1967) also thinks Nestle's suggest ion neither demon

strable nor probable, but his own is of course, l i k e everyone e l s e ' s , no more than ' Ve rmu tu ng' .

Nestle's idea (see also his edition of the Protagoras, p. 18) was that the work was directed against

popu lar proofs of the existence of gods and their care for men, and he adduced in support the

official anger which there is some evidence that it aroused at Athens.

3

Muller (Hermes, 1967, 143^) offers a new and subtle interpretation of Prot. 322a.

ό ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ς θ ε ί α ς μ ε τ έ σ χ ε μ ο ίρ α ς κ τ λ . is a mythi ca l r eve rsa l of the ' homo mensura' dictum:

man's 'kinship with the gods' means, when stripped of mythical clothing, that the gods are

simply projections or reflections of humanity. This interpretation, he s a y s , removes the objectionto regarding the Platonic passage as genuinely Protagorean. I doubt if it is necessary for that

purpose (cf. p. 6; above and my In the Beginning, 88f. and I4if . , nn. 10 and 1 1 ) , but it has

i t s attractions nevertheless.4

'Atheism (Greek and Roman)', in Hastings, ERE, vol. 1 1 , 184^

235




236

figure w h o m on other gr ou nd s it w as desired to discredit. A s the case o f

Socrates sh ow s, w e must b e careful ab out ac cep tin g such an impu tati on

at its face va lue, and co nv er se ly on e or tw o o f his contemporarie s w h o m

later antiqu ity regar ded, wi th som e reason, as out -an d-o ut atheists

seem never to have been brought to trial. That such atheists (' complete

disbelievers in the existence of the gods', 908b) were co mmo n by

Plato's time is certain from his mentions of them in the Laws, wher e

he carefully distingu ishes them fro m those w h o hol d (a) that g o d s

exist but have no interest in human conduct, (b) that they can be b ou gh t

of f by offerings.

In later writers we find a kind of stock list of atheists, that is, those

w h o denied outr igh t the existence o f the g o d s .1

I t included Diagoras

o f M e l o s , Prodicus of C e o s , Cri tias and ( o f a later date) Eu he me ru s o f

T e g e a and Th eo do ru s o f Cy re ne . Dia gor as in particular neve r appears

wi th out ha v i n g ' the atheist ' tacked on to his name. Y e t , if he defended

his atheism by any philosophical arguments, we know nothing at all

o f what they were.2

The only reason alleged for it, and that in late

sources, is mo ra l: he is said to hav e be gu n as a god -fe ar in g dit hyr amb ic

poe t, w h o later be ca me co nv in ce d o f the non-e xiste nce of go ds b y the

spectacle o f successful and unpu nish ed wr o ng do i ng , in this case a

s p e c i f i c injury done to himself, though its nature is vari ousl y reported.

Besides his unbelief, the only other fact recorded about him by con

temporaries is that he wa s con vic te d on a cha rge o f imp iet y b y the

1

They φ α σ ι μ ή ε ί ν α ι θ ε ο ύ ; (Aet. ι.η .ϊ) or 'om nin o deos esse neg aba nt' (C ic . N.D. 1 . 4 2 .

i i 7 f . ) . Cic. ibid. 1 1 8 adds, thou gh wit hout n aming him, the theor y of Cr itias , who appears

b y name in Sextus' s list (P.H. 3 . 2 1 8 ) and with Diagoras in Plutarch, De superst. 1 7 1 c. See also

S e x t . Math. 9 . 5 1 - 5 . On the or ig in of the list in the ι τ ε ρ ί ά θ ε ά τ η τ ο ; of t he A cademic C l it o -

machus (second century B . C . ) see Diels, Dox. 58 f. , and Nestle, VMûL, 4 1 ο . For Hippon,

known as ά θ ε ο ; and occurring in the list of Clem. Alex. (DK, 38 A 8), see vol. I I , 3 5 4 f f .2

All the sources of information on D iago ras are printed in full by Ja co by , Diagoras ό ά θ ε ο ;

(Abh. Bert. 1 9 5 9 ) , 3 - 8 . (He is omitted from D K.) For modern literature see ibid. 3 1 f., n. 2 , and

Woodbury, Phoenix, 1 9 6 5 , 1 7 8 , n. 1 . Perus al of the different a rg ume nt s and conclusi ons of

Jacoby and Woodbury w i l l tell a reader all he needs to kn ow about Dia goras- pro ble ms. Th e

Suda (Jacob y, p. 5 ) c a l l s him a phil osophe r ( as w e l l as a l y r i c poet) and s a y s that he wrote a book,

with the unintell igible title of Ά τ τ ο τ τ υ ρ γ ί ^ ο ν τ ε ; λ ό γ ο ι , describing his abandonment of religious

belief. Jerome (see Woodbury, op. cit. 1 7 8 , n. 5 ) mak es him out to hav e been a φ υ σ ι κ ά ; with a

following. Hi s book was already known to Aristoxenus in the fourth century (ap. Philodemus,

Jacoby, p. 5 = Aristoxenus fr. 1 2 7 a, Wehrli, Schule des Ar. vol. X, p. 1 9 8 ) , which, pace Wo o d

bury (p. 2 0 7 ) , is more significant than the fact that Aristoxenus wished to athetize it. The book,or one called Φ ρ ύ γ ι ο ι λ ό γ ο » (which may be the same), is mentioned in a number of late sources,

but beyond the meagre words of the Suda we have no clue as to its contents.



The Atheists: Diagoras

2 3 7

Athenians, and a price put on his head in his absence from the city.

Aristophanes {Birds i o y i f f . ) does n o t specify the charge, and pseudo-

L y s i a s (Andoc. 17) says merely that he 'committed impiety against the

rites and festivals in words ' . Later writers say that he insulted the gods

b ymock ing

anddivu lg ing

theEleusinian mysteries. This

is not thesame as a charge o f intellectual atheism, b u t puts h im more in line with

A l c i b i a d e s and his friends w h o parodied the mysteries, or wi th the

unknown mutilators of the Hermae. T h e evidence o f Aristophanes

suggests that his trial took place about the same time, shortly before

the launching of the Sicilian expedi tion , wh en nerv es we re taut and

the city prone t o take instant alarm at anythi ng wh ic h mi ght offend

the gods or be of e v i l omen .1

Nevertheless, though i t may have been

some such irreverent frivolity that led to his actual prosecution, the

fact o f his out-and-out atheism cannot be doubted. Jacoby is right

w h e n h e says that all witnesses alike attribute to him 'a repudiation

pure and simple of the whole concept o f gods , an atheism radical,

extreme and unco mpr omi sin g' . Thi s goes back to his contemporary

Aristophanes, for w h o m (and for his audience) Socrates could be

immediately branded as an atheist b y calling h i m ' Socrates the Mel ian ' .2

Since nothing is k n o w n o f Diag oras 's mind save the fact o f his dis

b e l i e f in the gods , he can not claim mu ch space in a history o f phi lo

sophy. More interesting are those who are k n o w n to have held a

* At Birds 10711" . Aristophanes introduces a quotation from the actual decree outlawing

Diagoras (which is known also from other sources: see Jacoby, p. 4) with the words TTJSE

θ ή μ έ ρ α έ τ τ α ν α γ ο ρ ε ύ ε τ α ι . T h e allusion would have had little point if it were not topical, and the

Birds w a s produced in 414. I do not see that a n y other evidence can stand against this, and

Jacoby 's attempt to make Diagoras a victim of the decree of Diopeithes in 433/2 has been

countered b y Woodbury in his Phoenix article.2

T h e ousting of Zeus b y Dinos does not mean that Socrates is here accused of introducing

δ α ι μ ό ν ι α κ α ι ν ά , but that he agrees with those w ho were substituting natural ( α ν α γ κ α ί α ) forces,

l i k e the vortex of the atomists and others, for gods. Woodbury (op. cit. 208) contends that before

the Hellenistic a g e (i.e. at the time when the label w a s first attached to Diagora s) ά θ ε ο ς did not

mean 'atheist' but only 'godless ' or 'god-forsaken' , but this is not so. Plato, Apol. 26c, does not

' show the transition from one meaning to the other ' . When Socrates s a y s κ α ΐ α υ τ ό ς ά ρ α ν ο μ ί ζ ω

ε ί ν α ι θ ε ο ύ ς κ α ΐ ο ύ κ ε ί μ ΐ τ ό τ τ α ρ ά τ τ α ν ά θ ε ο ς , he shows that ά θ ε ο ς a lready means ' no t believing in

the existence of the gods ' . Nor can Woodbury's argument from the use of ν ο μ ΐ3 ε ιν be

allowed. It may occasionally be possible to translate ν ο μ φ ι ν θ ε ο ύ ς as 'pay respect, or custom

a r y worship, to the gods ' (as at Aesch. Pers. 497- 8, thou gh even here the meaning 'believe i n '

would be equally appropriate), but never of course with ε ί ν α ι , and usually (as in the same sen

tence of the Apology) ν ο μ <3ε ιν and ν ο μ ί^ ε ι ν ε ί ν α ι are used interchangeably. There is no need

to g o into this, or cite once again examples l i k e Hdt. 4 .5 9 .1 or Plato, Laws 885c, because th e

point was demonstrated, it is to b e hoped finally, b y J. Tate in CR, 193G and 1937.




238

p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y o f t h e n a t u r a l a n d h u m a n o r i g i n o f t h e b e l i e f i n g o d s .

D e m o c r i t u s s a w i t , p a r t l y a t l e a s t , i n f e a r o f t h e m o r e v i o l e n t m a n i

f e s t a t i o n s o f n a t u r e ( v o l . π , 478). P r o d i c u s , l i k e m a n y o f h i s c o n t e m

p o r a r i e s , w a s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e o r i g i n s o f t h i n g s . T h i s i n c l u d e d c o s

m o g o n y ( f or t h e c o m i c c o s m o g o n y o f t h e b i r d s i n A r i s t o p h a n e s ,

Birds 684 ff., i s o f f e r e d a s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o P r o d i c u s ) a n d m o r e p a r

t i c u l a r ly , a s b e f i t t ed a S o p h i s t , a n t h r o p o l o g y . U n l i k e D e m o c r i t u s ,

h e s a w t h e o r i g i n o f r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f i n g r a t i t u d e , n o t fe a r . W e h a v e t h e

f o l l o w i n g r e p o r t s :1

(d) P h i lo d e m u s (E p ic u re a n o f f ir st c e n t u ry B.C.) De piet. c. 9, e d . G o m p e r z

p . 7 5 : ' P e r s a e u s2

sh ow s h i ms e l f des t ru c t ive , o r u t te r ly igno ran t , o f the

d iv ine w h e n in h is b o o k on the go ds he dec la res no t impr oba b le w ha t

P r o d i c u s w r o t e , n a m e l y tha t the th ings tha t nou ris h and benefi t us w e r e t he

first to b e co nsi der ed go d s and ho no ur ed as suc h, an d af ter the m the di s

co ve re rs o f fo od s and shel ter and the oth er pract ical ar ts su c h a s De me te r ,

D i o n y s u s a nd t he . . . ' [break in papyrus]

(β ) Min u c iu s F e l ix ( s e c o n d to t h i r d c e n t u r y A . D . ) , Octavius 21.2 ( t e x t

omi t ted b y D K bu t g i ve n in Unte r s te ine r , Sof. 1 1 , 192, and Nes t le , VMûL,

354, n. 22): ' P r o d i c u s sa ys tha t those we re acce p ted as g o d s w h o in the i r

j o u rn e y in g s d i s c o v e re d n e w c ro p s a n d so c o n t r ib u te d to h u ma n w e l f a r e . '

( c ) C i ce r o , N.D. 1 . 3 7 . 1 1 8 : ' W h a t so r t o f r e l i g i o n d id P ro d ic u s o f C e o s

l eave us , w h o said tha t t h in g s u se ful t o h u ma n l if e w e re a c c o u n te d g o d s ? '

(d) Ibid. 1 5 . 3 8 : ' Persaeus says tha t t h o se w e re c o n s id e re d g o d s w h o h a d

di sco ver ed wh at wa s espec ia l ly use fu l fo r c iv i l i zed l i f e , a n d tha t th ings use fu l

and sa lu ta ry we re the mse lve s ca l led b y the name s o f go ds . '

(e) S e x t . Math. 9.18: ' P r o d i c u s o f C e o s sa y s , " T h e a n c ie nt s c o n s i d e re d

as g o d s the sun and mo o n , r iver s , spr ing s, and in gen er al a l l the th in gs tha t

assis t our l i f e , on acc ou nt o f the he lp th ey g i v e , j us t a s the Eg yp t i an s de i fy

th e N i l e . " H e a d d s tha t fo r th i s reason bread wa s ca l led De me te r , w i ne

D i o n y s u s , wa te r Po se id on , fire Hep hae s tu s , and so on w i t h ev er y t h i ng t h a t

w a s o f s e r v i ce . ' ( T h i s is repe ated i n s l ig ht ly different w o r d s in cha pte r 52.)

(/*) Ibid. 51 includes Prodicus in a l is t o f a t h e i s t s ' w h o s ay t he re is n o g o d ' .

(g) Ibid. 39-41 c r i t i ci z e s ' t h o se w h o sa y tha t the anc ien ts supposed t h a t

all the th in gs w hi ch benef i t l i fe a re g o d s —s u n and m o o n , r ive rs and lakes

and the l i ke ' , on the g r ou nd s (a) tha t the ancients co ul d no t ha ve be en s o

stu pid as to ascr ibe di vi ni ty to th ing s th ey sa w per is hin g or ev en a te and

d e s t ro y e d th e mse lv e s , a n d (b) tha t on th is a r gum ent one oug ht a l so to be l iev e

1

Som e of the p a s s a g e s are in DK (P ro dic us fr. 5), and all in Unte rste iner , Sof. 1 1 , 1 9 1 S .

' S t o i c and pupil of Zeno, c. 306-243 B.C.



Prodicus on the Origin of Religion

that men, especial ly philosophers, are go ds , and even animals and inanimate

utensils, for all these work for us and improve our lot.

(k) The thirtieth oration of Themistius (fourth century A . D . ) is an

encomium of husbandry containing the kind of exaggerated claims that

had been commonplace at least since the days of Isocrates,1

about agri

culture not only providing the means of subsistence but being the mother

o f all c iv i l i zed life, the begetter of l a w s , justice, peace, cities, temples,

philosophy and much else. In the course of this he speaks (p. 4 22 Dindorf)

o f ' the wisdo m of Prodicus, wh o derived all relig ious practices, mysteries

and initiations from the benefits of agriculture, believing that the very

notion o f go ds came to men from this source and making it the guarantee

o f piety'.2

Thes e passages , the author s o f wh ich ran ge in date from 400 to

800 ye ars after Pr od ic us , exemp lif y the wr et ch ed ly inadequa te material

at ou r disposal for re co ns tr uc ti ng the th ou gh ts o f a fifth-century

Sophist. But we must do our best. Philodemus presents a theory,

rather like so me in the nineteenth cent ury , of the de ve lo pm en t o f

religion from the cul t o f inanimate objects to the deification o f cult ure-

heroes, the supposed discoverers of the amenities and arts which raised

man kin d f rom the beasts to civi liza tio n. It has bee n dispu ted wh et he r

the secon d hal f o f the statement, an d so the tw o- st ag e th eo ry o f

religion, sho uld be credi ted to Prod ic us or on ly to Persae us. T h e

former n ot on ly co nf or ms better to the run o f the sen ten ce3

but also

accords with Minucius F e l i x (passage b) and C i c e r o (</). T h e imp ort ant

thing about the latter is not that he attributes the theory to Persaeus

(for we know from Philodemus that Persaeus accepted it) but that he

puts both halves together as parts o f one and the same th eor y. Sext us,it is true (passage g), ridicules the idea that beneficial objects or pro

ducts were ever deified on the grounds (among others) that i t would

be as reasonable to bel ieve in the deification o f me n. I hesitate to

ado pt Unterst einer' s soluti on of this difficulty, na mel y that the 'dis-

1

Paneg. 28. See p. 62 with n. 2 above.2 θ ε ώ ν ίν ν ο ια ν is pr oba bly right, tho ugh since it is a correction b y Diel s of ε υ ν ο ι α ν (which

Din dor f prin ted) it is misl eadi ng of DK and Unterst einer to adopt it with no comment. See

Nestle, VMûL, 3 5 2 , n. 1 4 . In the last phrase, κ α ΐ τ τ α σ α ν ε ΰ σ έ β ε ι α ν Ι γ γ ν ώ μ ε ν ο ς , Untersteiner

prints the w i d e l y different conjecture of Kalbfleisch, έ γ γ ε ν έ σ θ α ι . As w i l l appear, a point of some

substance could depend on thi s. Die ls, followed by Unters teine r, supposed a lacu na after

ά σ έ β ε ι α ν .

' See Untersteiner, Sophs. 2 2 1 , n. 9, or Sof. I I , 1 9 1 f., Nestle, VMûL, 354 .

239



Rationalist Theories oj Religion

240

coverers ' whom Prodicus supposed to have been deified were never

in fact m e n , because I am not conv inced that it is r ight or even that I

understand it correc t ly .1 O n the other hand, even i f Sextus had

Prodicus chiefly i n mind, he is cast ing his crit icism in general form, a n d

al though the unexpressed conclusion o f his arg ume nt mi gh t seem mo stnaturally to be ' and nobody bel ieves tha t ' , this is impossible , fo r

Sextus w a s w e l l aware o f the bel ief that gods were deified men . H e

speaks o f the theory o f Euhemerus more than o n c e .2

This however

lands u s in a further difficulty, bec aus e in chapters 51 and 52 Prodicus ' s

theory is no t only described (repeating chapter 18) as a theory o f the

deification o f sun, moon, rivers, springs, and other beneficial objects,

but expressly distinguished, as a different form o f atheism, from that o f

Euhemerus w h o bel ieved in the dei f ica t ion of 'men o f p o w e r ' . It must

be said then that the evidence o f Sextus is decisively against a

'Euhemeris t ic ' theory fo r Prodicus , though that o f Phi lodemus and

Minucius Felix is in favour o f i t ( i f Minucius w a s only paraphrasing

Phi lodemus, at least he t ook hi m in this sense), and to a lesser extent

that o f C i c e ro , N.D. 1 .15 .38 . T a k i n g all things into account (includ

ing Cic. N.D. 1.37.118) , it must at least be agreed that the feature o f

Prodicus 's theory which made the greatest impression w a s that the

origin o f rel igion la y in th e tendency o f primit ive ma n to regard things

useful to his l i fe—including s un , m o o n and rivers as w e l l as bread a n d

win e— as gods.3 Th is theory wo ul d com e easi ly to the mind o f a

rationalizing Greek, for in his l i terature from Homer onwards h e

w o u ld find the name o f the appropriate g o d used for the substance

itself, as Hephaestus fo r fire ( ' They spi t ted the entrails and held them

over Hephaestus ' , / / . 2.426), and the su n, m o o n and rivers were g o d s .

1

Hi s n. 27 on pp. 222 f. of Sophs. I find very obscure. If the discoverers were not o r i g i n a l l y

men, wha t were they before they 'w er e received amo ng the g o d s ' ( p . 2 1 1 ) ? H is language here

does not sugges t that he thinks they were purely mythical fo r Prodicus, and I cannot reconcile

p. 210 and p . 223 at all.1

Math. 9 . 1 7 , 34 (without name), 51. H e would know, too , that the theory w a s older and

went back to Prodicus's time, for there are traces of it in Herodotus . (See Nesde, VMiuL,

3J4f.) H e must also have known that even man-made σ κ ε ύ η , l i k e the hearth ( H e s t i a ) , were

worshipped as gods.3

T h e theory of two stages of religious development is claimed for Prodicus b y Nestle

(VMûL, 3 5 3 f . ) , whom others follow including Untersteiner {Sof. 1 1 , 92, Sophs. 211 and 222,

n. 7) and Versenyi (Socr. Hum. 5 9 f . ) . None of these takes into account the w a y in which Sextus

contrasts the theory, as that of the deification of useful objects, with that of Euhemerus.



Prodicus on the Origin of Religion

' M y suitor was a river', says Deianeira quite naturally (Soph. Trach.

9 ) , and, be in g a g o d , he cou ld take any form he wis h ed —a bu ll , a

serpent or a man, as w e l l as wate r. Em pe do cl es ga v e the name s of

g o d s to the four elemen ts, and (for wh at it is wo rt h) E pip han ius says

that Pro dic us called them go ds , as w e l l as the sun and moon,' becausethe life o f ev ery th in g depen ds on t h em '.

1

A remarkable passage in the Bacckae (274 ff.) sh ows h o w e asil y

the G re ek min d cou ld slip from the idea o f a substance as e mb o d y i n g

a li vi ng g o d to that o f the go d as its inve ntor or disco verer. At te mp ti ng

to soften the imp iou s hostility of Penth eus to Di on ys us , Tiresias

tells him that

two things are primary in human l i f e : first, the goddess Demeter—she is

Earth, but call her by which name you like [and of course Ge, the earth, was

a great goddess by that name too]. She gives men all nourishment that is of

a dry nature. T o balance this came Semele 's son, wh o discovered the flowing

liquor o f the grape . . . He , being a god , is poured out to the go ds.2

Here Di o n y su s, the go d o f wi ne , is described at the same time, wi th n o

sense of incongruity, as the discoverer of wine and the wine itself.

Here, therefore, in all probability, is the key to Prodicus's doctrine.

In the pious pro ph et Tir esi as he wo u l d see a perfect exa mpl e (and, since

Euripides is sure to have known his teaching, he too saw an example)

o f the mentality ou t o f wh ic h relig ion aro se: to ask whe the r me n

imag ined their foo d, drink and other lif e-gi vin g or life-enhan cing

thing s as go ds , or alternatively the bein gs w h o disc ove red and pr o

vided them , wa s to mak e a p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y unreal dis t inction. Dionysus

was at the same time wi n e and the gi ver o f wi ne , Hep hae stu s fire and

the g iv e r o f fire.

W a s Prodicus an atheist?3

Cert ain ly all antiquity th ou gh t s o.

1

Epiph. Adv. haer. 3.21 (Dox. 591 and Untersteiner, Sof. 1 1 , 194, not in DK) . To o muc h

attenti on should not be paid to this . Th e Chr isti an wri ter is run ning h ast ily thr oug h all the

philosophers, one sentence to each, and commits some glaring blunders.

* Th er e is no need to translate the perfect p artic iple yeyebs as 'w he n he had be co me ' (' zu m

Gott geworden', Nestle VMûL, 354) and so see two c hronolog ical stage s. Th e perfect forms

of γ ί γ ν ο μ α ι mean rather ' to be '. For the god who is wine cf. the Indian parallel in Dodds,

Bacch. ioof., wh o quotes Sir Cha rle s Eliot on Vedi c hym ns addressed to So ma : 'I t is hard to

s a y whether they are addressed to a person or a beverage.'3

In tryi ng to reconstruct P rod icus 's outlook on reli gion and human l i fe , I have thought it

best not to follow scholars l i k e Cata udel la and Unter steiner in using the Birds of Aristophanes

a s a source . (See Untersteiner, Sophs. 22 1, n. 3, and 223, n. 33.) Th ey ma y be right , but the on ly

241




242

D o d d s (ad loci) identifies Tiresias's speech with the doctrine of Prodi

c u s , and then says that the reas on w h y it can be put in the mout h o f a

pio us and bel ie vi ng character is that Prodicus's doctrine was not in

fact atheistic. I have already offered a different explanation: to believe

that wi ne and bread are gods is o f cour se no t atheisti c, it is preci se ly

the bel ief wh ic h Pro dic us said 't he anci ents' had and from wh ic h

religion arose. T o Prod icu s him sel f they we re just wi ne and brea d.

T h e relevant passages in Sextus, o f wh ic h Do d d s quotes one, are

offered as explanations o f his athei sm. D o dd s translates the last wo r ds

o f the Themistius passage (h) as a claim that Prodicus had 'put piety

on a sou nd fou ndat io n' , but ev en if the ver b is no t co rrupt (see p. 239,

n. 2, ab ov e) , it need no t mea n that, and the claim that the very con

cept ion of go ds resulted from the practice o f agri cult ure doe s no t sou nd

as if it came from a be li ev er in them. Pr od icus may be just ly hail ed as

one o f the earliest ant hro pol ogi sts , wi th a the ory ab ou t the pur ely hu ma n

origi n o f beli ef in go ds wh ic h wo u l d not hav e disgraced the nine

teenth century. In this theory, as the passage from Themistius shows,

he laid especial stress on the eviden tia l va lue o f agr icu ltu ral practi ces .

This was entirely natural and reasonable when one con siders , first,

the belie f already curr ent that no t onl y ou r food bu t all the benefits o f a

settled and c i v i l i z e d life are owed to this source, and secondly the

numb er and var iet y o f religi ous cults that in fact owe their existence

to the fertility o f the soil. Pr od ic us , as wa s to be expe cte d of one w h o

was both Sophist and natural philosopher, and wrote on cosmogony,

evide ntly subscribed to a 'p ro gr es s ' , not a 'de gen era tio n' , theory of

hum an de vel opm en t (pp. 60 f. a b o v e ) ; and, like Pro tag ora s, he th ou gh t

o f religion, along with settled conditions, the building o f c i t i e s , the rule

o f la w and the advance men t o f kn ow led ge , as one o f the fruits o f

c i v i l i z a t i o n and essential to its pre ser vat ion . T o ho ld these v i e w s it is

not necessary to believe in the existence of gods as the objects of

wors hip independently o f men's conception of th em.1

certai n inference from the ment ion of Prod icus at v. 692 is that he produced a cos mog ony of

some sort, perhaps the very latest. It may equally be true that his nam e is sim ply being used to

stand for any ι κ τ ε ω ρ ο σ ο φ ι σ τ ή ς (Clouds 360): the birds can do better than any of these.

1 In my In the Beginning (p . 142 , n. 1 1) I quot ed the case of Freder ic Harrison , w ho 'r eg ar de d

a ll rel igi ons as false, but insiste d on the human necess ity of wo rs hi p' . Vers eny i (Socr. Hum. 60)

points out that 'g iv in g a psychological foundation to r e l i g i o n . . . is not tantamount to saying

that religion has no legitimate basis'. It is true that a modern Chr istia n can accept such an ori gin



Critias: Religion as a Political Device

Cri t ias1

was a wealthy aristocrat who would have disdained to be

a professional Sophist, yet he shared the intellectual outlook which

came to be known as sophistic. In his play Sisyphus7,

he depicted

reli giou s bel ief as a deliberate impo stu re b y go ve rn me nt to ensure an

ultimate and univers al sanction for the g o o d beh av io ur o f its subjects.

Al though the speech is pu t into the mo ut h o f Si sy ph us himself, the

not ori ous sinner w h o no doubt received his we ll -k no wn punishment

b y the end o f the pla y, this is a fairly obv ious devi ce o f the aut hor 's

for pr omu lg ati ng an atheistic vi ew wi th ou t gi vi ng to o mu ch offence.3

It starts wi th a br ief accou nt, wh ic h has already bee n qu ot ed

(p. 82 abo ve ), o f the pro gress of hu man life from lawless bru talit y to

the intro ductio n o f laws , punish ment and justice. Th is w e k n o w from

other source s to have be en a seri ously held current v i e w. It cont inu es

(fr. 25.off.):

Then when the laws prevented men from open deeds of vio lence, but they

continued to commit them in secret, I believe that a man of shrewd and

subtle mind invented for men the fear of the gods, so that there might be

something to frighten the wicked even if they acted, spoke or thought in

secret. F ro m this mot ive he introduced the concept ion of div ini ty. There is,

he said, a spirit enjoying endless life, hearing and seeing with his mind,

e x c e e d i n g l y wise and all-observing, bearer of a divine nature. He w i l l hear

everything spoken among men and can see everything that is done. If you

are silently plotting e v i l , it w i l l not be hidden from the gods, so clever are

they. With this story he presented the most seductive4

of teachings, con

cealing the truth with lying words. For a dwelling he gave them the place

whose mention wou ld most powerful ly strike the hearts of men, whence,

as he knew, fears come to mortals and help for their wretched l i v e s ; that is ,

for huma n beli ef in God with out ab andoning his convic tion of its truth, but thi s seems to me to

represent a stage of thought w e l l ahead of the pioneers of rationalism. (Drachmann (Atheism,

4 3 f . ) , l i k e Dodds and Ver seny i, thought Pro dicus believed in—in deed 'too k for gra nt ed' —th e

existence of gods , and did not connect the question of their existence wi th that of the ori gin of

the conception of them.)1

See be low , pp. 2o8ff.1

Our sole source for the extract is Sextus (Math. 9.54), who attributes it to Critias. Some

ancie nt author ities gav e Eurip ides as the author. On the autho rship see ZN, 1407, n. 2.3

On this, of course, two vi ew s are possibl e. For the opposi te one see Dra chm ann , Atheism,

45f., which goes against Sextus (P.H. 3.218, Math. 9.54) and Plutarch (De superst. 1 7 1 c ) .

Schmid (Gesch. i8of.) thought that in any case no Athenian archon would have allowed the play

to be performed, and Cr iti as must have intended it only for rea ding.4

ή δ ι σ τ ο ν is strange in this context of fear, and Nauck's suggestion of κ έ ρ δ ι σ - τ ο ν (TGF2

, 773)

i s tempting. Though he does not say so, Nauck doubtless had Eur. El. 743 f. in mi nd (quote d

on p. 244, n. 3, be lo w) .

*




144

the vault above, where he perceived the lightnings and the dread roars of

thunder, and the starry face and form of heaven fai r-wrought b y the cunning

craftmanship of time; whence too the burning meteor1

makes its way, and

the liquid rain descends on the earth. With such fears did he surround man

kind, and so by his story g i v e the godhead a fair home in a fitting place, and

extinguished lawlessness by his ordinances . . . So, I think , first of all, did

someone persuade men to believe that there exists a race of gods.

This is the first occur re nce in his to ry o f the th eo ry o f re ligio n as a

political invention to ensure good behaviour, which was elaborately

deve lope d b y Po ly bi us at R o m e and rev ive d in eightee nth-ce ntury

Germany .2

The re is no ot her m en ti on o f it at this time , so it ma y w e l l

have been as original as it was daring,3

and ingenious in the way in

which it subsumes under a more general theory the teaching of both

Democritus and Prodicus that be li ef in g od s wa s a produ ct o f either

the fear or the gratitude produced by certain natural phenomena. At

the same time the theory reverses the increasing volume of criticism

which attacked the gods on moral grounds, insisting that i f they existed,

or dese rve d the name o f go ds , th ey ou gh t to be the guardians o f the

ap pr ov ed mor al co de . It wa s the demand for a supernatural sanct ion

for mora l beh avi our , says Crit ias, wh ic h br ou gh t the go ds into b ei ng

in the first place.

Th i s exhausts the list of those known to have argued, on some

1

O r the sun ( D K , Untersteiner). I ha ve hesitantly f o l l o w e d R. G. Bury in the Loeb Sextus

(agains t D K ) in t aking λ α μ π ρ ό ; ά σ τ έ ρ ο ; μ ύ δ ρ ο ς to r efer to meteors o r meteori te s. (He g i v e s

no note.) Crit ias, i t is true, was writ ing after Anaxagoras had called the sun μ ύ δ ρ ο ; δ ι ά π ν ρ ο ; ,

and sun and rain make a natural pair as tw o o f the ό ν ή σ ε ι; of mortal l i fe . This seems to me

s l i g h d y out weig hed b y the difficulty of taki ng δ θ ε ν wi th bot h rain and sun : rain come s from the

s k y , but not, surely, the sun. In pseudo-Ar. De mundo (395 b 23) μ ύ δ ρ ο ι δ ι ά π ν ρ ο ι a re th e s t on es

thr own o ut b y volcano es, and after all it was pr obab ly the fall of the meteorite at Aegos pot ami

that ga ve Anaxagor as the idea that sun and stars might also b e μ ύ δ ρ ο ι. ( If W ec kl ei n' s σ τ ί λ β ε ι ,

not the MS σ τ ε ίχ ε ι, is what Critias wrote, this wou ld obviate the difficulty of δ θ ε ν .)

J

See H. Trevelyan, Popular Background to Goethe's Hellenism, 28, n. 2. It is ho we ve r no t the

same as theor ies o f the ex ploit atio n b y politic ians of already exi sting rel igi ous beliefs , curren t in

and after the Renaissanc e and cu lmin ati ng in Mar xis m, wh ic h are identified wit h it b y Ne st le

(VMzuL, 419).3

Eur. El. 743 f. φ ο β ε ρ ο ί δ έ β ρ ο τ ο ϊ σ ι μ ϋ θ ο ι κ έ ρ δ ο ς π ρ ό ; θ ε ώ ν θ ε ρ α τ τ ε ία ν may echo it,

though to say 'fear is conducive to worship of the gods' is not the same as saying that worship

based on fear is conducive to good behaviour and was invented to that end; and to express

d i s b e l i e f in the mo re incredible o f the m yt hs (λ έ γ ε τ α ι , τ ά ν δ έ π ί σ τ ι ν σ μ ι κ ρ α ν π α ρ ' έ μ ο ιγ * έ χ ε ι

ν . 737)w

a s certainly not atheism. Ther e is absolutely no evidence for Nestle's conte ntion

{VMruL, 416) that Di ag or as 's atheism was based on the same the or y as that of Critias, and

w a s indeed its source.



Immoralism and Sacrilege

1 4 5

kind o f theoretical ground, that the g od s were fictions o f the human

mind, for of Hippon's a theism w e k n o w n o more than o f Diagoras

( v o l . II , 355). B u t it is hard to bel ieve that the immoralis t upholders o f

physis against nomos, like C a l l i c l e s and A nt iphon (o r those whose

v i e w s he depicts), held a n y sort o f religious beliefs. A t t h e most, they

could have subscribed t o Plato's second type o f error, that gods exist

but have n o interest in human kind, b u t i t is unl ike ly that they thought

there wa s mu ch difference be tw een g od s that were totally ineffective

and n o gods at all. Antiphon indeed, wi th his advice to heed nomos

before witnesses, b u t disregard it when unobserved, exhibits precisely

the att i tude w h i c h o n Critias 's theory prevailed before the gods were

invented. Such irreligion must have been common among the intelligentsia o f the time. T h e profanation o f the mysteries and the muti la

t ion o f the Hermae were no t the w o r k o f believers. An ot he r instance

w a s Cinesias , a but t o f the comic poets o f the time o n m a ny c oun t s —

his inflated verse, unc onv ent ion al music, physical emaciation, a n d

impie ty o r ' a the i sm ' . T h e orator Ly si as named h i m w i th three others

as forming a kind o f 'He l l - f i re c lub ' o r band o f Satanis ts ( 'Kako-

daemonis ts ' as they called themselves), who deliberately chose unluckyor forbidden days o n w h i c h t o dine together a nd m o c k the g o d s and

the laws o f A the ns . H e was also said t o have defiled a statue o f Hecate ,

an exploit parallel to that o f the mutila t ion o f the Hermae .1

A l l this

may have little direct connexion with the history o f phi losophy , b u t

together with the rationalism o f natural philosophers a n d Sophists i t

contr ibuted to the atmosphere in which Pla to grew up , a nd w hic h

m o v e d him to construct in oppos i t ion a philosophical theology based

on a theory o f the or igin and gove r nm e n t o f the whole universe a nd

o f man's place within i t .

1

For the κ α κ ο δ α ι μ ο ν ι σ τ α ΐ see L y s i a s ap. A t h . 1 2 . 5 5 1 ε . T h e defilement of the statue i s

mentioned b y Aristophanes in the Frogs (366, cf. Eccl. 330), where the scholiast s a y s Cinesias

w a s the perpetrator. F o r further information about them, Maas in RE, X I , 4 7 9 - 8 1 , Dodds,

Gks. and Irrat. i88f., W o o d b u r y in Phoenix, 1 9 6 5 , 2 1 0 . Woo db ur y (p. 199) makes the interesting

point that such offences o f s a c r i l e g e and blasphemy 'presuppose the authorit y of somethin g ho ly.

A black mass implies the authori ty and validi ty of the sacrament.' This can be so . Medieval

Satanists no doubt believed themselves to be giving allegiance to one of two opposed, a n d

e q u a l l y real, powers. But it is also possible to commit offences which might bring down the

wrath of the gods, if they existed, simply to demonstrate one's confidence that they do not.

This, on the evidence, is more l i k e l y to be the explanation of the antics of Cinesias and his dining

club, and of die perpetrators of other outrages against religion at Athens.




246

It is of interest that Plato, commonly regarded as the most bigoted

and ruthless o f theists, distinguishes two types of atheist, one much

more dangerous than the other and deserving much mo re severe

treatment. He admits that atheism does not necessarily lead to immoral

con duc t, and recog niz es a ty pe somet hin g like the ethical humanistso f our own day. The relevant passage is Laws 908 b - e :

T h o u g h a man m a y be a co mpl et e unb el iev er in the existenc e o f the g o ds ,

i f he have a naturally upright character he w i l l detest evil doe rs , and o ut o f a

repugnance to wickedness w i l l have no desire to commit wrongful acts, but

w i l l shu n the unr ig ht eo us and be dr aw n to the g o o d . Bu t there are other s w h o

in addition to their b e l i e f that there are no gods anywhere are characterized

b y a lack o f self -con trol in pleasures and pains, co mb in ed wit h a v i g or o us

memory and keen intellect . Both sorts have in common the malady o f atheism,

bu t in res pec t o f in ju ry to othe rs the on e do es far less ha r m than the ot he r.

T h e one w i l l no d ou bt ha ve a v er y f ree w a y o f spe aki ng abo ut go ds , sacri

fices and oaths, and by ridicu lin g othe rs ma y per haps ma ke so me co nv er ts

i f he is no t restrained b y pu ni sh me nt ; bu t the other , ho ld in g the same

op in io ns bu t w i t h the re put ati on o f be in g a gif ted ma n, full o f craft and

tr eac her y—t his is the ki nd w h i c h bree ds y o u r div ine rs and expert s in al l

sorts o f qua cke ry . Som eti mes also i t pro duce s dictators , dem ag og ue s,

g e n e r a l s , con tri ver s o f priv ate myste ri es, and the de vi ces o f those calledsophists . Th er e are thus ma ny typ es o f atheist , bu t tw o w h i c h des er ve t he

attention o f the legislat or. T h e sins o f the hy po cr it es des erv e mo re than on e

death or ev en t w o , bu t the other s call for ad mon it io n and conf ineme nt.

In Plato's eyes the first and greatest crime against religion is not

open atheism but the encouragement o f supersti t i t ion. Earlier too, in

the Republic (3640 -6) , he had arraigned the pseudo-priests and pro

phets w h o fleeced the gu ll ib le rich wi th spurious Orphic bookspromising immuni ty from divine punishment to all w h o wo ul d pa y

for their rites and incantations. A character in Eurip ides calls pr op he cy

' a th ing o f naught , and full o f li es ' . T h e flames o f sacrifice, he thinks,

and the cries o f bir ds, hav e no th ing to teach us. Good sense and good

counsel are the best prophets .1

But this is not an attack on the gods,

1

From the messenger's speech in the Helena, vv. 744Ά With 757 γ ν ώ μ η δ ' ά ρ ι σ τ ο ; μ ά ν τ ι ;

ή τ ' ε υ β ο υ λ ί α cf. fr. 973 μ ά ν τ ι ; δ ' ά ρ ι σ τ ο ; ό σ τ ι ; ε 'ικ ά 3ε ι κ α λ ώ ; . Acco rdi ng to a late source

Antiphon made a similar remark, that μ α ν τ ικ ή was ά ν θ ρ ω π ο υ φ ρ ο ν ίμ ο υ ε ίκ α σ μ ό ; (Gnomol.

Vindol. DK, A 9). Thi s is anecdote, and , accordin g to Plutarch, Pyth. Or. 399 a (w ho also

quotes Eur. fr. 973 at Def. or. 432 c ) , the saying became proverbial. The attack on μ α ν τ ικ ή

goes back to Xeno phan es. See Ci c. Div. 1.3.5 Aex. 5 . 1 . 1 (in DK, 21 A 52).



Plato s Two Types of Atheist

for h e ad d s : ' Let us sacrifice to the g o d s a nd pray fo r g o o d , b u t leave

prophecy alone. ' N o r is Plato condemning all prophecy al ike. H e fully

respected the Delphic oracle, the mouthpiece o f A p o l l o himself, b u t

the mantic art had its h igher a nd lower forms, and there w as a w h o l e

tribe o f mercenary diviners, claiming to tell the w i l l o f the gods fromthe appearance o f sacrifices, the flight o f birds, o r written collections

o f forged oracles (such as are ridiculed b y Aris tophanes in the Birds)

w h o we re br in gin g religi on into cont empt . Plato gi ve s y e t further

evidence o f the need t o distinguish attempts to purify religion from

attacks o n religion itself.

(4) M O N O T H E I S M : A N T I S T H E N E S

T o detect a n d isolate a n y expressions o f pure monotheism in G r eek

wri t ings is as difficult as to pin d o w n unadulterated atheism. T h e

question of one god o r many, s o central in the Judaeo-Chr is t ian

tradition, hardly troubled the Greeks at all . This is manifest even in the

w o r k s o f so philosophical a theologian as Plato , w h o uses the expres

s i o n ' g o d '1

a nd ' t he gods' indifferently, a nd often in the closest

proximity. Many phi losophers were convinced of the existence o f a

single spirit or intel l igence in or behind the universe, b u t they would

not necessarily deny that there was either practical value or an element

o f truth in the polytheistic beliefs a n d cults o f the cities and the ordin

ary m a n . This single godhead, l iving a nd intell igent, could b e identi

fied, as w e have seen in many authors, with a physical element,

especially the air or aither. A n idea which came easily to the G r eek

mind was that the divine spirit entered, in a higher o r lower degree o f

purity, into creatures o f a lower order such as daimones, m e n o r ev en

animals. O n e form o f this be lief wa s that the l iv ing an d divine aither,

in i ts less pure form of a i r , was breathed in and so assimilated b y

mortals, a doctrine shared b y religious mystics and physical phi loso

phers from the time o f Anaximenes o r earlier .2

In a climate o f t hough t

which sa w the prob lem o f ' t h e one an d the m a n y ' in these terms, it

1

More often ' the g od ' , for Greek reg ularl y, though not invariably, uses the article, which

g i v e s the word less of the character of a proper name than our ' G o d ' . This applies to the New

Testament also.

1

It l i a s occurred 1'requently, and recently, in these pages, bu t see especially vol. I, 128ff.

i) 247 ο S P




248

was n o t difficult for a philosopher to take the popular gods under h is

w i n g b y supposing them to be genuine manifestations o f ' t h e d iv ine '

( τ ό θ ε ί ο ν : the abstract expression is frequent) in different aspects.

O n one point however the philosophers are agreed: ' the div ine ' i t s e l f is

not anthrop omorphic , whet her it be the Logos-f ire o f Heraclitus, theO n e g o d ' o f Xenophanes fr. 23 (vol . 1, 374) w h o is ' i n no w a y like

mortals either in b o d y or in mind ' , the g o d o f Empedocles w h o is

pure thought and expressl y denied all bo di ly parts (fr. 134, vol. 11 , 256),

or the original cosmopoeic Mind o f A n a x a g o r a s . So me o f these thinke rs

might b e classified, i f we wished, as monotheists o r pantheists, especi

a l l y Heraclitus and Xenophanes with their scathing attacks o n popular

b e l i e f s and cults. N o such attacks b y Anaxagoras are recorded, bu t h is

expression of h i s own doctrine w a s extremely outspoken and his

prosecution fo r impiety n o t surprising. Empedocles o n the other hand

found room fo r a number and variety o f gods in his unique amalgam

o f physical science an d religion (vol. 11, 257ff.). O n the whole it is

better t o av oi d these labels, wh ic h th ou gh ma de u p from Greek roots

were alien to the Greeks themselves.

Nevertheless in the period o f the Sophists a n d Socrates which w e

are now considering there does seem to be one unmista kable expressi on

o f a monotheistic v i e w , couched i n terms of the current antithesis

between nomos and physis. It is that o f Socrates's disciple Antisthenes,

whose theory o f the relation o f language t o reality w e have already

examined, and as usual w e have only tantalizing little fragments o f

indirect testimony. Said t o come from a w o r k o n Nature, they are to

the effect t h a t ' according t o nomos there are many gods , bu t in nature,

or in reality, there i s o n e ' ( κ α τ ά δ έ φ ύ σ ι ν έ ν α ) . S o Philodemus the

Epicurean reports, and Ci cer o' s Epicurean (all o u r other versions are in

Latin) puts it that 'Antis thenes, in the book called Physicus, b y saying

that there are many gods of the people, b u t only one in nature

(naturaliter unum), does away with the power of the g o d s ' . T h e

Christian Lactantius adds that the one ' na tural ' god is the supreme

artificer o f the whole, and phrases i t that h e alone exists al th ough nati ons

and cities have their o w n popular gods. Christian writers also quote

Antisthenes as saying that the g o d is like n o other thing (o r per son;

the dative could b e either masculine or neuter) and that for this



Monotheism

249 9-2

rea son no one can learn o f hi m fro m an i m ag e .1

If Lactantius is correct

in saying that for Ant ist hen es the one g o d wa s the creator o f the w or l d

(which in the absence of better qualified witnesses cannot be taken as

certain), then this is a remarkably early example in Greece of a pure

monotheism. The contrast between the many gods of nomos or

popular b e l i e f and the one real god is clear and emphatic. Without this

addition, however, the emphasis on the unity of God and the im

possibili ty o f repres entin g h im b y any visi ble ima ge is reminisc ent

o f Xenophanes and consistent with a pantheistic, rather than a mono

theistic credo.2

1

The testimonies are collected by Caizzi as frr. 39 A-Eand 40 A-D . Th ey are Phil od. De piet.

7,Cic.N.D. 1 . 1 3 . 3 2 , Min. Felix 1 9. 7, Lact. Div. inst. 1 . 5 . 1 8 - 1 9 and De ira Dei 1 1 . 1 4 , Clem.

Strom. 5.1 4 .10 8 .4 and Protr. 6 . 7 1 . 1 , Euseb. P.E. 1 3 . 1 3 . 3 5 , Theodoret. Grace, aff. cur. 1 . 7 5 .' Caiz zi, the most recent s cholar to mak e a special stu dy of Anti sthe nes, descri bes it cauti ousl y

a s 'u na fede monote istica, forse in ge rme pan tei stic a'.



χ

C A N V I R T U E BE T A U G H T ?

' C a n you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught? Or is it a

matter of practice, or natural aptitude or what?' The urgency with

which this que sti on was debate d in the fifth ce ntur y has been me n

tioned in an in tr oduct ory chapte r (p. 25), wh er e the mean in g of

arete was briefly outlined and it was suggested that it had pow erf ul

s o c i a l implications incli ning a writ er to ans wer in one sense or another

on grounds not purely rational. The debate reflected the clash between

old er aristocratic idea ls and the ne w classes which we re then risi ng to

promin ence under the democra tic syste m of go ve rn me nt at Ath en s

and seeking to establish what would today be called a meritocracy.1

T h e claim of Sophists that arete cou ld be impar ted for fees b y tr avel ling

teachers, instead o f be in g freely transmitted b y the precept and e xam ple

o f family and friends, and b y associati on wi th 'the right peo p le ' ,

cou pl ed wi th the qualities o f character nati ve to an y y o u n g man o fg o o d birth, was to the conserva tive-mi nded prof oundl y sho cki ng.

Philosophically, the question whether it was a matter o f natural

talent, or could be acquired by either teaching or assiduous practice,

is c h i e f l y impo rtan t becau se, as a co mmon pl ac e o f the time, it wa s

cau ght up in the thoug ht o f Socrat es and Pla to , w h o tried to ans wer

it at a deeper l e v e l . Since the present s tu dy mus t be in part pre

paration for meeting these two great figures we may take a brief

l o o k at the kind of answers offered in and before their time. A f t e r

war ds, of cour se, the topi c beca me more co mmon pl ac e still, till w e

get to Horace 's ' fortes creantu r fortibus et bon is . . . doctrina sed vi m

promovet insi tam' .2

T h e old idea is typified by Th eogn i s in the sixth cen tury . T o his

1

I fear it is too late to k i l l off this u g l y and bastard te rm and replace it b y its leg iti mat e half-

brother ' axiocracy ' .2

Odes 4.4.33. For other passages in Latin literature see Sho rey in Τ Α Ρ Α , 1909, 185, η . ι ,who rather surprisingly does not mention this one. In general his article (Φ ύ σ ι$, Μ ε λ έ τ η ,

Έ τ τ ισ τ ή μ η ) should be consulted on this topic.

25Ο



' Virtue' and Social Class

25Γ

y o u n g friend Cyrnus he writes (yv. 27 ff. Di e h l ; the rest o f his poet ry

makes it abundantly clear that for him ' g o o d ' and ' no bl e ' mean

O f the right class'):

Out of the goodwill I bear you I w i l l tell you what I myself learned from

g o o d men when I was still a child. Consort not with bad men, but alwaysc l i n g to the good. Drink , eat and sit wi th the great and powerful, and take

pleasure in their company, for from noble men you w i l l learn noble w a y s ,

but if you mingle with the bad you w i l l lose what sense you have. Under

stand this and consort with the good, and some day you w i l l say that I am

a good counsellor to my friends.

Th i s idea o f ha vi ng vir tue 'r ub off on on e ' thr oug h the right associa

tions was still a commonplace in the fifth century and later, its connex ion wi th social class be co mi ng mor e tenuous wit h time. It wa s as a

conservat ive membe r o f the go ve rn in g democratic par ty1

that A n y t u s

expressed his contempt for the professionals and claimed that ' any

Athenian gentleman' would fit Meno for political life better than a

Sop hist . In Eur ip ide s (fr. 609) it sounds mo re like the mor al c om mon

place which it became in Menander's ' E v i l communications corrupt

g o o d man ners '. A bad co mpan io n, he says , educates his fe ll ows to bel i k e himself, and a g o o d one similar ly, therefore yo u n g me n should

purs ue g o o d c o mp a n y ; a sentiment repeated in an actual S ophi st,

An ti ph on (fr. 62): Ά man necessarily com es to resemble in his wa y s

wh o mso e ve r he consorts with for the greater part o f the day .' Pindar' s

exaltation of natural gifts ( φ υ ά ) is ar istocratic,2

and the contexts in

which he expresses it show how the question whether arete is teachable

is a part o f the general antithesis be tw ee n physis and art, or physisa n d nomos.

Ο I. 2.8 6: 'Wi se are they to wh om knowledge of many things comes by

nature; but those who learn, vehement and garrulous as crows, utter

idle words.'

Ol. 9.100: 'What is natural is always best, but many have leaped to seize

fame through accomplishments (aretai) got by teaching.'3

1

See pp. 38, η . i, and 39 above.1

T h o u g h the Anon . Iambi, shows that by the end of the fifth century an emphasis on φ ύ σ ι ς

had lost this association. For him it is a matter of chance (p. 71 above).3

For an example of the antithesis in prose, see Thuc . 1 . 1 2 1 . 4 (speech of the Corinthians at

Sparta) : ' The good qualities which we possess by nature, they cannot acquire by teaching. '



Can Virtue be Taught?

252

T h i s does not mean that native talent cannot be improved by training.

A s he says in another Ol ym pi an ode (10.20), the man born to achieve

ment ( φ ύ ν τ ' ά ρ ε τ α ) is raised to great glor y wh en training has put a

k e e n edge on his arete and the gods are on his side. Pindar's poems

w e r e commis sio ned , and just as he con for med to the aristocratic out

l o o k o f his pat rons, so (as his edi tor Gi lder sleeve reminds us) so me

praise of the trainer, w h o m in this passage he has just ment ioned b y

name, wa s part o f the contract.

T h i s ode was in praise of a boy boxer, which is a reminder that

besides its genera l sense, in wh ich it st ood for the ty pe o f excell ence

most valued in the period of its use, arete could be qualified as e x c e l

l e n c e in a particular accomplishment or art. Just as w e (and the Gre ek s)speak not on ly o f a good man, but also o f a good runner, fighter, scholar

or carpenter, so arete, suitably qualified, stood for excellence or

p r o f i c i e n c y in these and other pursu its. T hi s is natural en ou gh , bu t

needs to be said in v i e w of the traditional but misleading English

translation 'virtue'. In the Iliad Polydorus as a swift runner 'displayed

arete of the feet ' (20.411) , and Periphe tes (15.641 f.) exce lled his father

in 'all kinds of arete, both in fleetness o f foot and in fi gh ti ng '. Th is

application persists in Pindar, who in the tenth Pythian (v. 23) writes

o f som eone w h o ' conque ri ng b y his hands or the arete of his feet wins

the greatest prizes by his daring and strength'.1

In this sense horses too

can have it (//. 23.276, 374; Xen. Hieron 2.2, 6.16), and inanimate

o b j e c t s or substances like soil (i.e. fertility, Thuc. 1.2.4, Plato,

Critias n o e , Laws 745d) or cotton (Hdt. 3.106.2) . Plato applies it

frequently t o particular skills, as wh en he makes Pr ota gor as speak o f

'arete o f carpentry o r any other cra ft' (Prot. 322d), and o f cour se o f

his own speciality 'political arete'. In the Republic (353b ff.) Socrates

c l a i m s that there is a pr oper arete be lo ngi ng to whate ver has a particular

function or job to perform, namely the condition in which it w i l l be

best able to perform that funct ion, and as examples he ment ions

pr un ing- hooks, eyes and ears. He then goe s on to mak e his o wn p oin t

1

Th is lingu ist ic usa ge could lead to what we cannot but re gard as a sli ghtl y comic confusion.

Arguing in the Meno that arete cannot be taught, Socrates (at 93 c-d) comments on the fact that

Themistocles was unable to impart his statesmanlike virtues to his own son, and with no hint

of ir ony points to the yo un g man' s abil ity to throw a javelin whil e standi ng uprigh t on horseback

a s proof that he was not l acki ng in natural talent.



The Meaning of1

Arete

b y claiming that the psyche o f man also has its function, namely to

gove rn the lower elements, to deliberate and in general to ensure a l i fe

l i v e d to the best o f human capacity, and that i t s own arete is to be

identified with justice or righteousness.

It might therefore b e said that i t was Socrates w h o enlarged the

meaning o f arete from talent o r proficiency in a particular art or

function to some thi ng like virtue in our sense, the prerequisite o f

a good human l i f e . T here is some justification for this, but i t needs

qualification. T h e absolute use o f the w o r d had al wa ys existed, al on g

side its particularization b y means o f a genitive or an adjective, to

stand for what its users thought w a s human excellence in general. It is

so used in Homer, though w e m a y translate it ' v a l o u r ' , that being the

virtue most prized in a heroic age. Used thus it was liable to ' persuasive

definitions' b y reforming spirits w h o claimed that excellence ' really '

consisted in this or that, as when Heraclitus (fr. 112) declared that

' the greatest arete is self-control ' . T h e general us e is seen in the title o f

a work o f Democr i tus ' O n Arete or Manly Vi rt u e ' ( ά ν δ ρ α γ α θ ί α ς ,

D . L . 9.46).1

T h e originality o f Socrates did n ot lie in recogniz ing the

general use , bu t in (a) the emphasis which he laid on it as a moral

quality, rather than simply the prerequisite o f success, and (b) his

attempt to g i v e it philosophical justification b y demanding a universal

definition. In his eyes a general term w a s only valid i f it corresponded

to a s ingle ' f or m' o r reality whose 'essence' could b e defined in a single

verbal formula. Here he w as on controversial ground. When he asks

Meno to tell h im ' w h a t arete i s ' , Meno thinks it an easy question, for

he can say what is the virtue o f a m an , a woman , a child, a slave, or

anyone o r anything else. B u t he is puzzled when Socrates replies that

he does n o t want a list o f virtues bu t a statement o f the essence, form

or being o f the one thing, virtue, which in his v i e w must b e c o m m o n

to them all to justify calling them by the one name. It looks l ike a

lesson in elementary l o g i c , and so in Meno's case it is, for he is no

philosopher but an impetuous young aristocrat w h o genuinely does

not understand the difference between enumerating a string o finstances and drawing an inductive generalization from them. B ut he

' See also p. 71 with n. 3, on t he Anon. Iambi., which however m a y have been influenced by

Socrates. Connexio n between this work and Democritus may be more than fortuitous. See

A. T. Cole in HSCP, 1961, 154.

*53




254

is introduced as an admirer o f Gorg ias , a n d w e k n o w from Arist ot le

that Gorg ias d id no t approve o f at tempting a general definition o f

arete. A f t e r mentioning Socrates b y name as ho ld ing that self -control ,

courage and justice are the same fo r a w o m a n as for a man, Aris to t le

goes o n {Pol. 1260325): ' T h o s e w h o speak in general terms, saying

that vir tue is " th e wel l -be ing o f the s o u l " o r " r igh t ac t ion" or the l i k e ,

are wrong . T o enumerate the vir tues, as Gorg ias did , is much nearer

the mark than to make this kind o f definition. '1

T o Socrates it is as

legitimate to a sk for a general definition o f vir tue as it is to as k fo r a

definition o f an insect and to object when a list o f insects is offered

instead; and M e n o is perhaps n o t al together t o b e blamed when h e says

that he can unders tand th e quest ion as applied thus t o a natural genus

but does n o t grasp it so easi ly when it is transferred t o vir tue, which

he feels is not altogether parallel to the other cases mentioned b y

Socrates (72 d, 73 a) . Gorg ias would n o doubt have claimed that

Socrates w a s t r y ing t o extend a method appropriate t o natural science

b e y o n d its proper sphere. T h e open ing o f his Helen is a good example

o f his o w n practice. T o explain th e meaning oikosmos, where Socrates

w o u l d have looked for an all-embracing definition, h e w r i t e s : ' Kosmos

is fo r a c i ty the manliness o f i ts citizens, fo r a body beauty , fo r a soul

w i sd o m , for an act ion vir tue, fo r speech t ruth. Akosmia is the opposi te

o f these. ' This reluctance t o g i v e a general definition is a consequence

o f the sophistic belief, shared b y Protagoras , in the relativity o f

va lues .2

A l t h o u g h M e n o puts h is quest ion to Socrates in the form o f clear-

cut alternatives, i t is n o t l i k e l y that anyone bel ieved arete to be attain

able solely b y the b o u n t y o f nature o r b y personal effort o r b y another 'sinstruction. Even Pindar admitted that natural endowmen t can be

sharpened b y training, an d al tho ugh Hesiod spok e as a peasant, no t an

aristocrat, when h e uttered h is famous line about the gods put t ing

sweat on the path o f achievement (Erga 289), h is poem became a part

1

Fo r the same view in Isocrates see Helen i , and cf. Nicocles 44.

' Compare Protagoras's miniature lecture on the r e l a t i v i t y of goodness in the Protagoras

(pp. 166 f. above). This point i s made b y Versenyi (Socr. Hum. 41 f . ) , w ho comments that ' i n

Protagoras, this reluctance leads not to the denial of the unity of virtue but to a formal rather

than a material definition ( the equation of the good with th e useful, fit, appropriate, e t c . ) ' .

On the difference between Socrates and the Sophists in this matter Versenyi is helpful. See

his pp . 76 ff.



Nature, Teaching and Practice

o f the Greek heritage, and no on e was so unrealistic as to suppose that

greatness could be achieved without effort. There w a s nevertheless

great difference in the emphasis laid on the three elements o f natural

endowment, practice or personal effort, and teaching respectively.

That 'v i r tue ' could b e taught w a s the basis o f the Sophists' claim

to a l ivelihood, and its justification la y in th e close connexion in the

G r e e k mind between arete and the special skills o r crafts (technai).

Protagoras's references, in Plato, to ' the craftsman's techne ' and ' the

craftsman's arete'1

show that for him they meant much the same. H e

h i m s e l f considers instruction in the special technai, which some

Sophists offered, to be beneath hi m, and the 'political art ' or 'political

v i r t u e '2

which is his o w n speciality is much closer to moral virtue, for

it has its roots in the ethical qualities o f justice and a respect for oneself

and others. Without these, he considers, l i fe in an organized society is

impossible. ( C f . p. 66 above.) Nevertheless this political art is capable

o f precise definition as ' prudence in personal affairs and the best w a y

to manage one's o w n household, and also in the affairs of the State,

so as to become a most powerful speaker and man o f act ion ' (3 i8d-e) ,

a subject practical and utilitarian and at the same time obviously suit

able for a course o f instruction. Protagoras's v i e w o n whether virtue

is natural or acquired can be extracted from his long and brilliant

speech in the Protagoras when its mythical elements are thought away.

T h i s has been done already (p p. 65 ff.), an d a brief summary is all that

is necessary here. It w a s no t, in the beginning, a part o f human nature

as such. Henc e, alt hou gh primiti ve men had the intelligence t o learn

various arts such as the use o f fire, the w o r k i n g o f metals an d so forth,

they treated each other savagely and could not co-operate sufficiently

to protect themselves within walled cities from the attacks o f animals

fiercer and mo re po we rfu l than they. Gradually and painfully some o f

them learned to exercise self-denial and fair play sufficiently t o enable

them to take joint action and so survive. N o one completely without

these virtues, therefore, is alive today, and even the most villainous

characters in ou r c i v i l i z e d societies have some elements o f vir tue. They

have been acquired b y teaching since early childhood, first from parents

and nurse, then from schoolmasters, and finally from the state, whose

' 322b and d. See p. 66, η . i .2

τ έ χ ν η 3 19 a, 3 22 b, α ρ ε τ ή 32 2c .




256

system o f l a w s and punishmen ts has an educative pur pose . A dm on it io n

and pun ishm ent are on ly appro priate in the absence of such g o o d

qualities as ma y be acqu ired th ro ug h 'c are , practice and te ac h in g ' :

they are no t em p lo yed again st natural deficiencies w h i ch a ma n can

do nothing to alter. All that the Sophist can claim is to carry the teach

i n g a litt le fur ther and do it a litt le be tte r, s o that his own pupils w i l l be

somewhat superior to their f e l l o w - c i t i z e n s . This does not mean of

course that everyone has an equal talent for learning political virtue,

any more than for mathemat ics o r pi an o- pl ay ing . It is an ob vi ou s fact

that all men are not equally endowed by nature, and this is no less or

more true of virtue than o f an y other accom plis hmen t.

For all this we rely on Plato, but it accords w e l l wi th the meag re

quotations from Protagoras himself that have any bearing on the sub

j e c t . Successful teaching, he said, requires that the pup il co ntr ibut e

both natural abi l i ty and assiduity in pract ice ( ά σ κ η σ ι ς ) , and he added

that to learn one must be gi n y o u n g (fr. 3). El se wh er e he said (fr. 10)

that art and pract ice, or s tudy ( μ ε λ έ τ η ) , were inseparable . Pla to, again

{Theaet. io yb -c ), make s him co mp ar e the influence o f the orato r o n

c i t i e s and the Sophist on individuals to that o f the hus ban dma n on

plants, recalling what seems to have been a commonplace, the com

parison bet we en edu cati on and husb and ry in w h ic h the soil represents

the natural capaci ty o f the pup il. W e ha ve seen it recu rrin g in A nt ip ho n

and the Hippocratic Law (p p. 168 f. ab o v e) .1

T h e claims o f t ra ining or pract ice ( ά σ κ η σ ι ς ) were preferred to those

o f nature by Democritus (fr. 242), and his comment on the relation

be tw ee n natural ab ilit y and t eac hi ng wa s less superficial than most and in

modern terms might be said to have an existentialist tendency. The twow e r e complementary, because a man's nature is not irrevocably fixed

at birth: he can be altered by teaching, which is therefore a factor in

the format ion o f his nat ure .2

A line o f Cri tia s is also quot ed (fr. 9) to

the ef fec t that m or e m e n be c om e go od t h r ough s t udy ( μ ε λ έ τ η ) than

b y nature. Iambl ichu s's an on ym ou s writ er puts 'n at ur e' first, f o l l o w e d

1 As Shorey pointed ou t (Τ Α Ρ Α , 1909, 190), Euripides in the Hecuba, 592ff., uses this simile

to make an entirely different point, that human nature cannot be changed by circumstances,

whether from bad to good or good to bad.2

Democr. fr. 33 . Hazel Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics, 33 f., speaks of Sartre's pronounce

ment ' that human nature is no t fixed, that man is indeed a creat ure w ho make s himsel f by a

process of constant change*.



Importance of the Question

* 57

b y sustained hard w o r k and willingness to learn, begun in ear ly youth.

Arete is only to be acquired b y applying oneself dil igently to it ove r a

l ong period o f time. (S ee p . 71 above . ) T h e ' D o u b l e A r g u m e n t s '

devoted a chapter to the same well-worn theme o f whether virtue is

teachable( p p .

3i7ff.b e l o w ) ,

Isocrates summedup the

posit ion,and

Plato himself in the Phaedrus speaks of it in m u c h the same vein,

indeed so similarly to Isocrates that it is usually supposed that o n e o f

these w a s acquainted with the other 's wri t ing.1 A s w i l l have appeared

b y n o w , much o f w h a t w a s said on the subject w a s sententious and

trivial, y e t at the time i t seemed o f paramount importance to k n o w h o w

arete w a s acquired. In the competit ive society of the day ambitious

y o u n g m e n like Meno a n d Hippocrates (in the Protagoras) were w i l l i n g

to spend fortunes o n Sophists w h o might b e able to impart the secret,

and the suggest ion that n o teacher could communicate i t w a s in

Socrates 's da y an attack o n a large vested interest. In this discussion

Socrates and Plato took a v i g o r o u s part . In the Euthydemus Plato

ridicules t wo charlatans w h o claim to teach it in the face o f Socrates 's

doubts whether i t ca n b e taught at a ll. In th e Protagoras h e expresses

the same doubts, a n d Protagoras counters them with skill an d force.

T h e Meno is whol ly devoted to the topic. Sometimes, as in the dis

cussion o f rhetoric in the Phaedrus already mentioned, Plato joins in

the argument at the same rather banal l e v e l as the rest .2 A t other times

he makes it the start ing-point for deve lop ing his o w n or the Socratic

phi losophy .

For Socrates—surely the most uncompromisingly intellectual o f all

ethical teachers—what one man could g i v e to another b y teachingwas k n o w l e d g e . I f then virtue ( in w hich h e certainly included the moral

virtues) could b e taught , it must b e a form o f k n o w l e d g e (Meno 87c) .

A s to the teaching o f i t , his answer w a s neither crude n o r simple (see

companion vo lu me o n Socrates) ; b u t that i t w as a form o f k n o w l e d g e h e

1

F o r references to, and discussion of, the relevant passages in Isocrates and Plato, see Shorey's

article in Τ Α Ρ Α , 1909.2

O f certain passages in Plato and Isocrates, Shorey points out (op. cit. 195) that ' there is

nothing in either of which the sufficient suggestion is not found in the apologetic and protreptic

literature of the day' . Pla to may be summarizing the opinions of Isocrates, a conclusion which

may be unpalatable ' o n account of our natural tendency to regard Plato as the more original

thinker ' , but, as Shorey righ tly adds, ' t he originality of a work so surpassingly rich in suggestion

a s the Phaedrus does not depend on these links of commonplace l i g h t l y assumed in passing ' .




258

w a s convinced. Bu t if virtue is knowledge , v i c e or wrongdo ing can

o n l y be du e to ignorance and it f o l l o w s that ' n o one sins deliberately'.

R i g h t action w i l l f o l l o w automatically o n knowledge o f what is r ight.

Socrates was judging others b y himsel f for, astonishing as it ma y seem,

in his case i t w a s true. H is calm assurance that he w as fo l lowing the

right course w a s unshaken b y the fact that its outcome w a s the cu p o f

h e m l o c k , which he tossed off in complete confidence t h a t ' n o harm can

c o m e to a g o o d m a n ' . Such heroic doctrine w a s not for most m e n .

A r i s t o t l e said bluntly that i t was ' i n flat contradiction t o experience '

(EN 1145 b 27). Pla to makes Socrates recog niz e the prevalence o f the

opposite v i e w in the Protagoras (352d-e). ' Y o u k n o w ' , he says,

' that most m e n don't believe u s . They maintain that there are many

w h o recognize the best but are unwil l ing to ac t o n it. It m a y be open

to them, b u t they d o otherwise.' Since the struggle betwe en conscience

and desire, or weakness o f w i l l , is essentially dramatic, it is n o t surpris

i n g that some o f the most striking expressions o f the opposite point o f

v i e w occur in Euripides, quite possibly in conscious contradiction o f

S o c r a t e s . This has been suspected o f Phaedra's words in the Hippoly-

tas ι1 ' We know, w e recognize the right, bu t d o it no t, some o f us from

i d l e n e s s , others thr ou gh ch oo si ng so me pleasure rather than the g o o d . '

F a c e d wi th the prospect o f kill ing h e r o w n children, Medea cries

(Medea io78ff.): Ί understand the e v i l I am prompted to commit ,

but m y passions (θ υ μ ό ς ) are stronger than m y counsel, passion wh ic h

is the cause o f men's greatest crimes.' In this connex ion 'nat ure' wi th

her 'necessity' , that despairing resort o f the weak-w ill ed, makes an

appearance once again. (S ee p . 100 above.) ' A l l that y o u warn m e

o f I k n o w w e l l ' , says another character (fr. 840), 'but though I k n o w

it, nature compels m e . ' N o r is the other parner of the antithesis,

nomos, lac kin g. ' Nature willed it, w h o cares nou ght for l a w ' is the excuse

o f an erring woman: women were made like that .2 A g a i n (fr. 84 1) :

' A l a s , this is a heaven-sent curse for mortals, that a ma n k n o w the g o o d

but pursue i t no t. ' ('Heaven-sent?' comments the moralizing Plutarch,

' N a y , rather bestial and irrational.' See De aud. poet. 33e-f.) ' T o b e

1

38off. See Snell in Philologus, 1948 ; Dodds, Gks. & Irrat. 186 with n. 47 ; O'Brien, Socr.

Paradoxes, 55, n. 78.1

Fr. g i o , and see Dodds, op. cit. 187 with n. 55.



Video Meliora.

overcome b y pleasure ' wa s a phrase o f the da y ,1

a phrase which is

subjected to a critical investigation b y Socrates in the Protagoras

(352d ff.). F o r hi m the natural course was to a ct as reason and k n o w

ledge dictated, though it does n o t f o l l o w (indeed there is some evidence

to the c o n t ra ry )1

that h e was entirely without emotions and w o u l d n o thave qualified for Antiphon's descript ion o f a temperate ( σ ώ φ ρ ω ν )

m a n . ' He w h o has neither felt the desire for, no r come in contact with,

wh a t is foul and e v i l ' , said Antiphon (fr. 59), 'is not temperate, for

there is nothing that he has ha d to overcome in order to show himself

well-behaved ( κ ό σ μ ι ο ν ) . '3

Antiphon also brought in the idea o f

'mas tery o f self ' , where ' s e l f stands for the lower s e l f o r base desires4

(fr. 58 ad fin.): ' T h e best judge o f a man's temperance is one who5

makes himself a bulwark against the momentary pleasures of the

passions and has been able to conquer and master himself. Whoever

chooses to yield to his passions at ev er y mome nt choos es the worse

instead o f the better. ' T hi s self-mastery ho we ve r is no t recommended

b y An t ip h o n on any purely moral grounds, bu t rather as a piece o f

calculated self-interest. He has just said that ' t emperance ' o r self-

restraint (it is the same wo rd , sophrosyne, or its adjective sophron, wh ic hunfortunately cannot b e fully covered b y any single English one)

6

consists in admitt ing the truth o f the o ld Gree k adage that the doer shall

suffer. ' Wh oe ve r th inks he can injure his neig hbo urs wit ho ut suffering

himself is no t a temperate man. Such hopes have br ou gh t ma ny to irre

v o c a b l e disaster, when they have turned ou t to suffer exa ctl y wh at th ey

though t to inflict o n others. ' Therefore think before y o u g i v e y o u r

passions rein. There is here at least the germ o f the ' hedonic calculus 'which Socrates advocates in the Protagoras and which ob vio usl y p layed

an important part in the formation o f his thought . Everything depends

1

See e.g. L y s i a s 2 1 . 1 9 , Thuc. 3.38.7. In the Gorgias Socrates c a l l s i t ' the popular notion'

( ώ σ π ε ρ ο ί π ο λ λ ο ί , 491 d ).1

See Socrates, pp. 73 ff.3

Scholars have made much of the moral tone of this, which is indeed sufficiently remarkable.

S e e the quotations in Untersteiner, Sof. ι ν , I 4 4 f . Wh en Phaedra opposes Socratic doctrine in

the words {Hippol. 3 5 8 ) oi σ ώ φ ρ ο ν ε ς y a p ο ύ χ έ κ ό ν τ ε ς ά λ λ ' ό μ ω ς κ α κ ώ ν έ ρ ώ σ ι ν , Euripides m a y

have had Antiphon in mind.4

As is explained in the Republic, 4 3 0 6 - 4 3 1 a.5

Jacoby's alteration of ά λ λ ο ς to ά λ λ ο υ , adopted by DK, seems unnecessary. See Unter-

steiner's note, Sof. iv , 142 (where ά λ λ ο ν is presumably a misprint).6

A full-scale study of the history of the concept has now been made b y Helen North

(Sophrosyne, 1 9 6 6 ) .

259





X I

THE M EN

I N T R O D U C T I O N

In the for ego ing chapters man y o f the v i e w s o f Sophists a n d their

contemporaries have been introduced in a discussion o f the main topics

o f philosophical interest in the fifth century. T h e pr ior i ty given t o this

discussion over a treatment o f each thinker individually m a y b e

justified b y t h e reflection that on the whole this w a s a debate o f c o n

temporaries eagerly exch ang ing v i e w s a n d that the subjects o f peren

nial human interest o n which they argued d o n o t admit o f t h e same

linear progress from o n e thinker to the next which ca n be detected in

the more scientific theorizing o f the Presocratics. It seem ed best there

fore t o reproduce , so far as possible , the interplay o f their minds o n

this topic o r that . T h e r e is the further consideration that, as I have

tried t o br ing o u t more than once during the discussion, i t is not

a l w a y s possible o n the evidence available t o assign a particular v i e w t o

i ts author with certainty. Salomon went so far as to say (Sav. Stift.

1 9 1 1 , 131) that ' t h e picture of the individual Sophists which w e

construct o n the basis o f such o f their dicta as are preserved i s , in so

far as it is determined b y the vicissitudes o f the tradition, th e result

o f pure chance. ' A t t h e same time there i s someth ing in Nest le ' s

reasons (in the preface t o Vom Mythos ium Logos) fo r c hoos ing a n

arrangement b y persons rather than b y subjects, namely that O t h e r

w i s e much repetition would have been necessary an d the contr ibut ions

o f the great personalities, whose unitary vigour was i n fact responsible

for t h e intellectual pro gress achieved, wo ul d hav e been dis mem ber ed' .

A n attempt t o have th e best of bo th w orl ds w i l l ob vio us l y increase t h e

risk o f repetition, a point which must b e borne in mind. O n e reason

w h y , i f the advantages o f arrangement b y subject seemed t o o great t o

miss, it is nevertheless advisable t o attempt a short unified account o f

each individual is that in scattering the v i e w s o f o n e m a n t h rough

several wi de ly separated chapter s—here h is remarks o n l a w o r ethics ,

261



The Men

262

and far removed from these a dictum o n epis temology and another o n

the gods—it would be all too easy t o overlook inconsistencies an d

attribute to the same philosopher v i e w s which n o sane m a n could have

held simultaneously. It w i l l b e salutary to see i f together they add up

to a credible character, an d at the same time there remains some detail

to b e f i l l ed in about the evidence for the dates o f these people, the

events o f their l i v e s , an d in some cases aspects o f their teaching which

in the previous general discussion have been omitted o r dismissed with

a bare mention. In what f o l l o w s therefore I shall tr y to su m up what is

k n o w n o f each individual, with the briefest reference possible to what

has already been said. I have confined m y s e l f to those w h o have

appeared in the previous chapters, and omitted one or two minor

figures abo ut w h o m ev er yt hi ng neces sary has been said there.

( i ) P R O T A G O R A S

Protagoras w as a native o f Abdera , the city in the remote north-east

o f Greece which also gave birth to Democr i tus .1

Since for our p u r

poses relative dates are more important than absolute, w e m a y note

first that Plato makes him say , before a company which included

Socrates, Prodicus and Hippias, that he is old enough. _ t o . b f i L t h e father

o f any one o f t h e m (Prot. 3 1 7 c ) . In the Hippias Major (282ε ), to o,

Hippias describes himself as a much younger m a n than Protagoras .

This suggests a date o f n o t later than 490 for his birth (which would

make h i m about t wen ty years older than Socrates, probably the eldest

o f his auditors), and in the Meno (91ε ) he is said to have died at the

a ge o f about seventy after forty years as a practising Sophist. H is death,therefore, ma y b e assumed to have occurred about 420. 2

There w as a

story that he w a s a child at the time o f the invasion o f Xerxes (480),

w h o in return for his father's hospitality ordered the magi to g i v e h i m

1

A n isolated reference t o h im a s Π . ό Τ ή ι ο ; occurs in the comic poet Eupolis (ap. D . L .

9.50). Abdera w as colonized from Teos (Hdt . 1 . 1 6 8 ) , and the continuous long s y l l a b l e s of

Α β δ η ρ ί τ η ; would have been difficult to accommodate to the metre.1

T h e chronologist Apollodorus followed Plato ( D . L . 9.56), and gave Ol. 84 (444-441)

a s hi s floruit, probably in allusion to his drafting of the constitution of Thurii in 444-443. Accord

ing to D.L., some said he l i v ed t i l l nearly 90, but see on this Davison in CQ, 1953, 35. For

references to other discussions of his date see Untersteiner, Sophs. 6, n. 7, and fo r his l ife in general

Morrison in CQ, 1941 and Davison in CQ, 1953.



Protagoras: life

263

instruction. This may be some corroborative evidence for a date o f

birth about 490.1

T h e cause o f his death is said b y a nu mb er o f late

authorities (with some differences in detail) to have been drowning by

shipwreck after l ea vi ng At he ns wh er e he had bee n tried and banisKed

(or alternat ively cond emn ed to death) for the imp iet y o f his agn ost ic

assert ion about the gods.3

Plato says in the Meno (91 ε ) that t h rough

out his professional l i f e , and inde ε d ε ν ε Γ since, his high reputa t ion

had been con ti nu ou sl y maintained, w h ic h is not necessarily inconsi stent

wi th trial and co n v i ct i o n : he w o u l d hav e said the same abo ut Soc rat es.3

Protagoras was the most famous, and perhaps the earliest, o f the

professional Sophists , who trained others for the profession as w e l l as

for publ ic l i f e .4

He was w e l l k n o w n in At he ns , wh ic h he visi ted a

nu mb er o f times,5 and bε ca me a friend o f Peri cle s. Pl ut ar ch tells a

s tory that the tw o me n spent a w h o l e da y discussin g an interestin g

po in t o f legal respon sibili ty in vo lv in g also, in all pro bab ili ty, a m or e

phi loso phi cal quest ion o f causation. In an athletic cont est a ma n had

be en accide ntal ly hit and kill ed w it h a jav elin . W a s his death to b e

attr ibuted to the jav el in itself, to the ma n w h o th re w it, or to the

authorities respon sible for the co nd uc t o f the g a m e s ?6

A more practical

1

Philostr . V. Soph, ι . ί ο . ι (DK, 80 A 2), prob ably t aken from the Persica of D i non in the

late fourth century B.C., who also s a y s that he was a pupil of .Democri tus, w hi ch is ch rpn o-

l o g i c a l l y impossible. See vol. 1 1 , 386, n. 2. Th e same sto ry of educatio n b y mag i wa s told of

DemocritusTIimself (D.L . 9 .34) . For its evidenti al valu e see Davis on, loc. cit. 34.2

D.L. 9.54 , 55 ; Philostr . 1.1 0. 3 (A 2); Hesychius ( A 3 ) ; Sext. Math. 9.56 (A 12). D.L.

and Eusebius (A 4) add the picturesque detail that copies of his bo oks w er e collected from their

possessors and public ly burne d. Th e who le story is, perhaps righ tly , rejected b y Burnet , T. to P.

m f .3

See how ever Vl asto s in Plat o's Protagoras ( 1 9 5 6 ) , p. v i i i , n. 6, who thinks it compatible with

prosecution but not condemnation.4

See pp. 35 and 37 above. That he was the first to demand fees for his teaching is repeated

b y D.L. 9.52 and Philostr. 1 . 1 0 . 4 . (T he latter approved it, on the sensible gr ou nd that we value

what we pay for more than what is f r ee . )5

Plato in the Protagoras ( 3 1 0 e ) mentions two v i s i t s , and Eupolis in a p l a y produce d in 422-4 21

spoke of him as then present in Athe ns, i . e . later than the dramatic date of the Protagoras, which in

spite o f one anach ron ism must h av e been about 433. See Morri son, CQ, 1 9 4 1 , 2 f., an d D av is on ,

CQ , 195 3, 37. T he reference to the Kolakes of E upolis occurs in Athe naeu s 21 8c (A II ) . The

best summing-up of the evidence for the dates in Protagoras's l i f e (not all mentio ned here ) is

that of von Fritz in RE, XLV. Halbb. 9 0 8 - 1 1 .6

Plut . Per. 36 (DK, A 10). At Athen s both animals and l i f e l e s s instruments which had been

the cause of death we re tried in the court of the Pry ta ne um . See Demo sth enes 23 (/ « Aristocr.),

7 6 , and cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 57 .4, Pla to, Laws 87 3d ff.; and for the pre val enc e of the cust om

Frazer's long note, Pausanias, vol. 1 1 , 370-2. On the philosophical character of the discussion

see Rensi and Untersteiner in the letter's Sophs. 3of.



The Men

ou tc ome of their relationship was the invi tati on to Protag oras to

coll aborate in an exc it ing ne w enterprise. Af te r the sack and dest ruct ion

o f Sybari s in So ut h Italy b y the Cro toni ate s, the surv iv in g Sybari tes

appealed to Athens and Sparta to assist their return and share in the

ref oun ding o f the cit y. Sparta refused, but the Athenians accepted

w i t h enthusiasm, and invit ed vol unt eers from any Gr ee k city to joi n

the ne w co lo ny , wh ic h thus bec ame a truly pan-Hell enic enterprise.

A l l this is told b y Di od or us , but Heraclides Pon ti cus in a stu dy o f the

l a w s of Greek states added that Protagoras was the man chosen to

draft a lega l code for Th u r i i .1

He w^l Tfa lri ih' ar figure to the We st er n

G r e e k s , for he^ lS oT Iv ed for a time in S i c i l y , where he made a reputa

tion in his profession (Plato, Hipp. Maj. 282d-e) .

There is little point in trying to list the titles of his separate works.

D i o g e n e s Laertius (9.55) g i v e s a cat alogue, but m any o f the names

w i l l ha ve been arbi tra rily att ached in later cen tur ies . In the fifth c en tu ry

the cu st om o f att achi ng titles to pro se w o r k s wa s in its infancy , an d

fo r a long time those who quoted them would attach a descriptive

name to wha t wa s on ly a section of a lon ger con ti nuo us wo r k. Th er e

w e r e at least two main treatises: (1) Truth (known alternatively, at

least in later times, b y a wre st li ng term as the ' T h r o w s ' or arg ume nts

to floor an opponent), which is cited as such by Plato several times; it

opened wi th the 'm an the meas ure' pr ono unc eme nt ; (2) Antilogiae or

contrary arguments. On the Gods also sou nds like a separate wo r k , and

it is certainly ineffective to argue that after the agnostic first sentence

there would have been nothing left to say on the subject. It might, as

already suggested (p. 235), have dealt with the value of religious cults

as a part o f c i v i l i z e d l i f e , or alternatively have been an anthropologicaltreatise describing the forms of b e l i e f and wor shi p current am on g

various peo ple s. Th er e is also reference to a ' Gr ea t L o g o s ' , which may

be the same as Truth, and a nu mb er o f othe r ti tle s.2

1

Diod. 1 2 . 1 0 , Heracl. Pont . Π . ν ό μ ω ν , fr. 1 50 We hr li (ap. D.L. 9.50). There seems no

reason to doubt Heraclides's information, though it is a little curious that Diodorus does not

mention Protagoras with the others at 1 2 . 1 0 . 4 . On the foundation of Thurii see Ehrenberg in

AJP, 1948, 149- 70 . He speak s of the part play ed b y Protag oras on pp. 1 6 8 f.1

F or t he Α λ ή θ ε ι α in Pl at o see Theaet. 1 6 1 c, Crat. 391 c. T h e a lt er na ti ve tide Κ α τ α { ϋ λ λ ο ν τ ε 5

occurs in Sextus, Math. 7.60 (Prot . fr. 1). That Eur. Bacch. 202 is an allusion proving that it was

a l r e a d y current in the fifth century has been denied outright by Wilamowitz {Plat. 1.80 n. 1),

and asserted by Gigante (Nom. Bas. 21 6, n. 2) to be 'no t mer ely possible but ce rta in' . On

264



Protagoras: Plato's Evidence

265

Much o f our information about Protagoras's thought comes from

Plato's dialogues, and our assessment o f his philosophic achievement

therefore depends to a considerable extent on the historical value

which w e are prepared to grant them. Many scholars have joined in the

debate, and complete agreement w i l l probably never b e reached. O n ething, however, which cannot be argued against Plato's veracity is

that his aim wa s to blacken or destroy Protagoras's reputation. T h e

respect with which he treats his v i e w s is all th e more impressive for his

profound disagreement with them. In the dramatic setting which is

one o f the chief charms o f the dialogue Protagoras, the great Sophist is

certainly portrayed as fully conscious o f his o w n merits, with a harm

less vani ty and love o f admirati on wh ic h amused Socrates and tempted

h im to a l i t t le good-tempered leg-pull ing; but in the discussion h e

remains consistently urbane in the face o f considerable provocation,

including fallacious and unscrupulous argument, on the part o f

Socrates, displaying at the end, as Vlastos w e l l expresses it, a m a g

nanimity which is ' se lf-conscious but no t insincere'. H is o w n contri

butions to the discussion are on a consistently high l e v e l both intellec

tually and morally, and leave n o doubt o f the high esteem in wh ic h

Plato held h i m . Even Grote , the arch-castigator o f Plato for his un

fairness and animosity towards the Sophists (pp . 1 1 f. a b o ve ) , had to

agree that ' that dia logue is i tself enough to p ro ve that Plato did not

c o n c e i v e Protagoras either as a corrupt , or unwor thy , o r incompetent

teacher ' , and concluded that, on the evidence o f the Protagoras itself,

the ethical code o f Protagoras appears as superior to that of the

Platonic Socrates. 'P ro ta go ra s' , said Grant, ' i s represented b y Plato

th roughou t the dialogue as exhibi t ing an elevated standard o f moral

Π . Tfjs έ ν ά ρ χ η κ α τ α σ τ ά σ ε ω ; see p. 63 above. For those interested in opinions on this minor

and insoluble question here is a selection. Nesde identified the Μ έ γ α ; Λ ό γ ο ; (fr. 3) with the

Π . α ρ ε τ ώ ν , Frey with the Π ρ ο σ τ α κ τ ικ ό ; , DK and Untersteiner with the Α λ ή θ ε ι α . See Nesde,

VMûL, 296 (b ut cf. his edition of the Prot. p. 3 1 ) ; DK , 1 1 , 264 n . ; Unterst. Sophs. 1 4 . V o n Fritz

(RE, X L V . Halbb. 920) thinks it an independent work. For Π . τ ο ϋ ό ν τ ο ; see p. 47 with n. 1 above.

Untersteiner (pp. cit. ioff.) has an elaborate theory (charitably characterized b y Lesky, HGL, 344,

a s ' t o o sweeping to be f u l l y demonstrable') that all the titles in D.L .'s catalogu e refer to sub

sections of the Ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ί α ι , which contained four main sections: (1 ) on th e Gods, (2) on Being,

(3 ) on the Laws and other problems concerning the polis, (4) on the A rt s ( τ έ χ ν α ι , i nc lu di ng

π . π ά λ η ; and π . τ ώ ν μ α θ η μ ά τ ω ν ). One of D.L.'s tides is Π . π ο λ ι τ ε ί α ; , commonly assigned to

the Ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ί α ι because of the scandalous story of Aris toxenus (α ρ . D .L . 3.37 , and cf. 3 .5 7 ) that

almost all of Plato's Politeia was to be found in the latter work.



The Men

f e e l i n g s ' , and n o unpre judi ced reader o f the dia log ue co uld disag ree.

V o n Frit z, after poi nt in g out the fairness wi th w hi c h Plato treats the

'ma n-t he- mea sur e' doctrine in the Theaetetus, adds: ' In other w a y s

also Pla to , in spite o f all his opp osi tio n, has treated Pro tag ora s wi th

more justice than hav e other of his oppo nent s. ' Unl ike Aris toph ane s,

w h o interpreted ' w e a k e r ' as 'un jus t ' in Prot agor as 's claim to mak e the

weaker arg ume nt pre vai l, Pla to nev er accused hi m or other Sophi sts

o f flouting the est abl ished mo ra l rul es .1

For many people one of the c h i e f obstacles to beli evi ng in Plat o's

veracity has been the speech in which Protagoras g i v e s a brilliant

acc oun t o f the orig ins of hu ma n s oci ety delibera tely cast in the for m

o f a myth (Prot. ^ôc~^^^ά ), though, as he has said (32.0c), i t could

equally w e l l have been told as a rational logos without the mythical

accretions.* What sticks in their throats is the statement that man is

the onl y creature w h o believe s in the go ds and practises reli giou s cult

'b ec au se o f his kin ship wi th the di vi ne '. I ho pe I ha ve dispo sed of this

objection. Th a t the instinct to bel iev e and wo rs hi p is fundamental to

human nature is plain fact, and to attribute it to div ine kins hip no mo re

than is to be expected in an account confessedly cast in the form of

popul ar my th o l o g y to mak e it mor e entertaining (320c). 3 That Plato

reprod uced Prot agor as 's teaching wi th compl ete acc urac y is som eth ing

w e shall never know for certain, but with this proviso, so long as what

he says is bo th int ernall y cons iste nt and no t in confli ct wi th the rest

o f our scan ty inf orm ati on (and this I be li eve to be true) , I shall pre fer

to make use of it as I have done in the earlier part of this book rather

than assume, as w e sho uld ha ve to do if Pla to' s tes ti mon y is rejected,

that w e k n o w v e r y little inde ed abo ut this stimu lati ng and influential

figure.

Pro tag ora s's in no va ti on wa s to achie ve a reputa tion as a politica l

and moral thinker wi th ou t supp orti ng any political party, attem pting

political refo rm, or se eki ng p ow e r for himself, but s im pl y b y le ctur ing

and spe aki ng and offering hims el f as a professi onal advis er and ed uc a-

1

Grote, History (1888 ed.) , VH, 59-62; Grant, Ethics, I , 1 4 4 ; von Fritz, iv /i , X L V . Halbb. 917.

* For v ie ws on the aut hen tic ity of the my th see the references on p. 64, η . 1, abo ve, espe cial ly,

for objectors to the mention of divine kinship, Havelock, L.T. 408 f.3

See pp. 88 ff. a bo ve and In the Beginning, 88 f. If my expl anatio n i s unsat isfyi ng, read ers

have the choice of C. W. M i i l l e r ' s (p. 235, n. 3, above).

266



Protagoras s Teaching

267

tor to ma ke others better and mo re successful in bo t h their pers ona l

and po litical careers. It wa s a brilliant sol uti on for an able and amb it io us

man bo rn in an uni mpo rta nt city in the remo te north-east w h o lon ge d

for wea lth , reputati on and the co mp an y o f his intellectual equals bu t

could o n ly find th em in the le ad in g cities o f Gr ee ce , wh er e his alien

status debar red h im from active parti cipat ion in poli tical l i f e . His

character evi den tly seemed to ov er co me , in the min ds o f ma ny p ro m

inent At hen ian citizens, the prejudice against his profe ssion alism, and

it was not long before others f o l l o w e d his exam pl e. (C f . pp . 40 f.

above . ) T h e aim of his teac hin g wa s ab ov e all practical, and in acc or d

ance w i th the need s o f the d ay he ba sed it lar gel y on the art o f pe rsua

s i v e sp eak in g, trai ning hi s pup ils to argu e b ot h sides o f a case and

pr ov id in g examples to pr ov e his poin t that there are cont rary argu ment s

on ev er y subject. T h e art o f logoi was acquired by various exercises,

inc lud ing stu dy and criticism o f the poet s (the Soph ists ' pre decesso rs

in education for l i f e ) , and ana lysis and critici sm o f curr ent for ms o f

speech . T h e leg iti mac y o f taki ng either side in an arg ume nt ac co rd in g

to circumstances was found ed on theories of kn ow le dg e and be in g

w h i ch cons titu ted an extreme reaction from the Eleati c antithesis o f

k n o w l e d g e and opinion, the one true and the other false. There was no

such thing as falsehood, nor could anyone contradict another or c a l l

hi m mistak en, for a ma n wa s the sole ju dg e o f his o w n sensatio ns and

b e l i e f s , which were t rue for hi m so l o n g as the y app eare d to be s o.

Since there was no absolute or universal t ruth, no one needed to con

sider, before attempting to make an individual, a jury or a state change

its min d, whe th er or not he w o u l d be persuadi ng th em o f a truer state

o f affairs. The personal nature o f ou r sensations did no t mean that all

perc ept ibl e pro pert ies co exi st in an external object bu t I pe rce iv e so me

and you others. It meant rather that the y hav e no obje ctiv e existence,

bu t co me to be as th ey are pe rce iv ed, and for the perci pien t. Co ns is te nt

w i th this wa s his attack o n mathem atician s for deali ng in abst racti ons,

des cri bi ng straigh t lines, circles and so forth as no ma n per cei ve s th em

and as, the refo re, th ey d o no t exist . (See v o l . 11, 486.)

I f each of us l i v e s lik e this in a pri vat e w o r l d o f his o w n , the attem pt

to chan ge another man's wor ld mig ht be tho ugh t not on ly un obj ec

tionable but impossible. This difficulty is overcome by substituting a



The Men

268

standard o f adva nta ge and disadva ntag e for that o f truth and falsehood,

and exte nd in g b y an al og y the case o f sensations in health and sick ness .

T h e food that to a sick man tastes unpleasant is unpleasant, for him,

but a doctor can change his world so that it w i l l both appear and be

pleasant to him. The doctrine becomes more difficult when applied to

values in general. T o be consistent, Prot ago ras mus t hold an ext reme

relative the ory o f val ues acc or di ng to wh ic h not on ly ma y the same

thin g, or course o f action , be go o d for A but bad for B, but also,

just as w ha t a ma n bel ie ve s to be t rue is true for him, so also what he

b e l i e v e s to be g o o d is g o o d for him , so l on g as he belie ves it. W e ha ve

no record of h o w Prota gor as applied this doctrine to indivi dual mo ra l

i ty, bu t o f a state he certainly said that whatever customs or polic ies

it bel ie ved in and em bo di ed in its la ws we re righ t for it so lo n g as it

held them to be right. Th i s difficulty he go t ov er b y equa tin g ' ju st ' or

' r ig ht ' wi th ' l aw fu l ' but dis t inguishin g i t f rom ' the expedient ' , wh i ch

was that beli ef or co urse o f acti on wh ic h will produce better effects in

the future. A s the do ct or , wi t h the patient 's cons ent , administers treat

ment which w i l l improve the patient 's condition (cause pleasanter

sensations bo th t o appear and be for hi m) , so a wi se Sop hist or ora tor

may , wi th the cit y's g oo dw i ll , con ver t it b y arg ume nt and not b yv i o l e n c e to ge nui ne belief in the virtues o f a ne w pol ic y wh ic h w i l l

lead (e. g. b y pr om ot in g a sou nder e co n o my or better relations wi th

its ne ig hb ou rs ) to a hap pie r life for its cit ize ns. A t the root o f this

curi ous arg ume nt is Pro tag ora s 's invinc ible respect for the democrat ic

vir tues o f justice , respect for oth er me n's op in io ns and the processe s o f

peaceful persu asion as the basis o f co mm un al l i f e , and the necessity of

co mm un al life to the v er y su rv iv al o f the hu ma n r ace. L a w and ord er

were not in our nature from the beg in ni ng , but the agreem ent wh ic h

br ou gh t the m int o be in g wa s the fruit o f bitter exper ien ce, for th ey

are essential to our preservation. It f o l l o w s that all men now living in

society possess the capaci ty for mor al and intellectual vir tue , and tho se

in w h o m it is inade quatel y dev elo ped may be punished, if persuasion

f a i l s , prov ided that pun ish men t is des ign ed to be on e means a m o n g

others o f educ atio n in virtu e.

O n e would hardly expect a religious spirit in a man of these v i e w s ,

and Protagoras confessed that on the existence o f g o d s he pe rso nal ly



Protagoras. Gorgias

269

could on ly suspend jud gmen t. Th is wo ul d n o t preclude an interest in

the phenomena o f rel igious belief and w ors h ip , and w i t h his convic t ion

o f the value to soc ie ty o f established custom and law , he proba b ly

bel ieved that this nomos ( ' f o r ' , as Euripides said, ' i t i s b y nomos that

w e bel ieve in the g o d s ' ) w a s to b e encouraged as m uc h as others .

G o d s , after al l , existed fo r those w h o bel ieved in them.

A w o r d m a y b e added about Protagoras as a l i terary critic. There

is evidence independent o f Pla to an d Aris tot le that his criticism o f

poe t ry w a s n o t confined to grammatical pedantry o r mora l iz ing .

A papyrus o f about th e first century A.D ., conta ining comment o n

Iliad x x i , s h o w s h i m examining the poet 's purpose an d the structure

o f the poe m in a surpris ingly modern w a y . ' P r o t a g o r a s ' , runs th e

c om m e nt , ' s a ys that the purpose o f the episode immedia te ly fol low ing

the fight between the r iver Xanthus and mortal m e n is to div ide the

battle an d make a transition to the theomachy, perhaps also t o glor i fy

A c h i l l e s a n d . .

(2) GO RGIAS

The other great member of the first generation o f Sophists, almost

e x a c t l y contemporary wi th Protagoras , w a s G org ia s s o n o f Cha rm a n-

t ides . Though a Weste rn Greek , he t oo w a s an Ionian, for his c i ty

Lepnt ini in S i c i l y w as a c o l o n y o f Chalc idian Naxos in the east o f the

island. H e w a s born about 490 or a few years after, an d al l authorities

, ι are agreed that h e l ived to a grea t a g e : their reports vary between

11 105 and 109. 2

Tradi t ion says he w a s a pupil o f Empedoc les ( v o l . 11,

135), an d this is l ike ly, though h e could have been only a v e r y f e w

years younger . Pla to (Meno 76 c) con nec ts his name with t he E m -

pedoclean theory o f pores , and he would a lso o w e t o Empedoc les an

interest in the arts o f persuasive speech and o f medicine. H i s brother

Herodicus t o o w a s a doc tor , and he claimed to be o f service t o medic ine

b y br ing ing his p o w e r s o f persuasion t o bear o n recalcitrant patients

1

Oxy. Pap. II, 221. See Gudemann in RE, 2. Reihe, m . Halbb. 640.

* For the sources see Untersteiner, Sophs. 97, n. 2. Plato (Apol. 1 9 ε ) speaks of him as still

active in 399, and from Pausanias ( 6 . 1 7 . 9 , D K, A 7) it would seem that he e n d 8 d his days at thecourt of Jason, w h o became tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly about 380. (Plato , Meno 7 0 b , shows

him as already a familiar figure i n Thessaly b y 402.) Athenaeus (505 d, A 1 5 a) tells a story which

if true would mean that he lived long enough to read Plato's characterization of him in the

Gorgias, written probably c. 385 (Dodds, Gorg. 24 f f . ) .



The Men

o f his brother o r other practitioners.1

N o r could h e have failed to be in

touch with the Syracusan rhetoricians C or ax and Tisias (with w h o m

Plato associates h im, Phaedr. 267a), and his o w n oratory w as o f the

flowery S i c i l i a n t y p e : his name is not connected, as were those o f

Protagoras and Prodicus, with the linguistic studies o f orthoepeiajixia

' the correctness o f names ' (p. 205 ab ov e) . Li ke other Sophists he wa s

an itinerant, practising in various cities and gi vi ng public exhibitions

o f his skill at the great pan-Hellenic centres o f O l y m p i a and Delphi ,

and charged fees for his instruction and performances. Besides The ssa ly,

there are reports o f visits to Boeotia and A r g o s (where he wa s badly

received and his lectures balmecT).2

A special feature o f his displays w a s

to invite miscellaneous questions from the audience and g i v e i m

promp tu replies . W h e n h e came t o Athens in I427, o n an embassy

frjDmJLfiOiitim, he w as already abo ut si xty, and t o o k t h e c i t y b y s t o r m

wi th his novel style o f oratory, as w e l l as earning large sums b y

special performances and classes for the y o u n g ( p p . 40 an d 179, n . 3

a b o v e ) .

His written works included Technai, manuals o f rhetorical instruc

tion, which m a y have consisted largely o f models to be learned b y

h e a r t , o f w h i c h the e x t a n t Encomium of Helen and Defence of Palamedes(frr. 11 and 11 a) w o u l d b e examples .

3

T h e n there were his own

speeches, epideictic, political and other. Aristotle quotes from the

introduction to his Olympian orat ion, the subject o f which w a s

Hellenic unity (frr. 7-8 a) , which he also touched on in his funeral

oration for Athenians fallen in w a r (frr. 5 a - 6). A l s o in Aristot le is a

brief quotation from an Encomium on the Eleans (fr. 10), an d the

Pythian oration is mentioned b y Philostratus ( 1 . 9 . 4 , A I ) . T h e on lyconsiderable extant fragment is one from the funeral oration, quoted

b y a late writer to illustrate his rhetorical style (fr. 6), which Aris tot le

stigmatizes more than once as being in ba d taste (frr. 15 an d 16). Apar t

from the speeches, w e have paraphrases o f the argument o f the ironic

1

There is no t the slightest evidence for Schmid's topsy-turvy idea that Empedocles owed his

fame as a teacher of rhetoric (see vol. n , 135) to his brilliant pupil (Gesch. 1 . 3 . 1 , 58, n. 4) . See

Classen in Proc. Afr. CI. Ass. 1959, 37f. For Gorgias's assistance to the doctors by his 'master-

ar t ' of rhetoric see Plato, Gorg. 456 b. His interest in the π ό ρ ο ι theory is also mentioned b yTheophrastus (Gorg. fr. 5 D K ) .

1

See Untersteiner, Sophs. 93 with notes, and Schmid, Gesch. 1 . 3 . 1 , 59, n. 10 .

I3

On these two works see p. 192 with n. 2 above.

2 7 0



Gorgias, Sophist and Orator

271

treatise On Nature or the Non-existent, in w hich he turned the Eleatic

thesis upside-down.

A l l the Sophists indulged in disparagement o f their competitors.

Protagoras accused them o f wasting their pupils ' time o n useless

specialization,a n d G o r g i a s (n o doubt with a n e ye particularly o n

Protagoras) disclaimed a n y intention o f teaching arete. "What about

the Sophists, ' Socrates asks Meno, ' t h e only people w h o profess t o

teach i t ? D o y o u th ink they do? ' A n d t he reply is (Meno 95 c ) : ' W h a t

I particularly admire about Gorgias is that y o u w i l l never hear h i m

ma ke this cl ai m; indee d h e laughs at the others when h e hears them

d o so . In his v i e w his jo b is to make clever speakers. ' In an y case there

was no one th ing, arete, whose essence could b e k n o w n a nd defined

(pp. 253 f. abo ve ) . Wh a t was vir tue in a slave would no t be vir tue in a

statesman, and the same course o f act ion would in o n e set o f c i rcum

stances exhibit arete an d in another not . Bu t i f his sole accomplishment

was t o make his pupils masters o f the art o f persuasion, this, h e claimed,

was the queen o f sciences an d ha d all the rest in its power . O f what u se

was the surgeon's skil l i f the patient would n o t submit to the knife?

O f w ha t use w a s it t o k n o w the best policy fo r the ci ty i f the Ass emb ly

could not be persuaded t o adopt i t ? S k i l l in logoi was the road t o

supreme power. I t m a y b e an art o f deceit, b u t deceit, said Gorgias,

can itself be emp lo ye d in a good cause, as poet ry—espec ia l ly t ra ged y—

s how s (fr. 23). I t c an b e , b u t i t m a y no t. T h i s is th e essence o f Pla to ' s

complaint , the t ruth o f which emerges n o t only from h is criticisms

but from Gorgias 's o w n surviving composi t ions , namely that the art

o f G org ia s is morally neutral, concerned with means n o t ends. H e

himself was an upright m a n , w h o w o u l d n o t w ish to see his instruction

put to a ba d use ,1

and so , after he has disclaimed responsibility fo r this,

Plato 's Socrates is able t o force h i m into a contradiction. H e cannot

deny that right and w r o n g are part o f the subject-matter o f rhetoric

itself, so he supposes h e w i l l tell a pupil about them ' i f h e happens

1

Calogero in JHS, 1957 even claims to have found the Socratic principle that no one does

wrong w i l l i n g l y , and the idea of the psyche a s seat of consciousness and moral principle, in those

egregious documents of the persuader's art, the Helen and Palamedes. A s to the former, Socrates's

position w a s that wrongdoing can only be du e to ignorance of the good, for which the certain

cure is knowledge; Gorgias ' s , that there is no such thing as knowledge and a man's conduct

w a s in the hands of the most powerful persuader, however unscrupulous. I do not see much

resemblance.



The Men

not to know already'—an admission which makes nonsense of his

denial that he teaches arete.1

He makes it only, of course, because he

has been driven into a corner, and we cannot be certain that he would

have said such a thing in real l i f e . A t an y rate, wh er ea s rhetoric w as

in the cur ric ulu m o f ev er y Soph ist, Gor gi as mus t hav e put it mo re

pro min ent ly in his sho p w i n d o w than an y of the others. He saw the

I po we r o f persuasion as param ount in ev er y f i e l d , in the study of nature

! and othe r phil oso phi ca l subjects no less than in the la w- co ur ts or the

political arena. O n e essential to the art wa s the sense o f oc casion ,

hairos, the rig ht time or op po rt un it y, for, as Disra eli also k ne w , 't he

opp ort une in a pop ula r ass emb ly has some time s mo re success than the

weightiest efforts o f research and re as on '.2

T h e speaker must adapt

his w o r d s to the audie nce and the situ atio n.3

He was, said Dionysius

ι o f Hali carn assus , the first t o wr it e ab ou t this, t h ough neither he no r

anyone later had yet developed it as a techneA

H is rhetorical practices were based on, and justified by, a relativistic

phi losophy similar to that o f Pro ta go ra s. If there we re an y uni ver sall y

v a l i d t ruth wh ic h coul d be com muni cat ed to another, then no dou bt

only that truth, bac ked b y incont rovert ible evi denc e, ou gh t to be

c o n v e y e d .

* Gorgias's disclaimer has naturally aroused discussion. Joel (Gesch. 669) drew attention not

only to Plato, Gorg. 460a, but also to the epitaph writt en by his grea t-nep hew Eumolpus for his

statue at Olympi a (mentioned by Pausanias, 6 . 1 7 . 7 = DK, A 7, and discovered in 1 8 7 6 ) . This

speaks of him as hav in g 'in ven ted the best τ έ χ ν η f or training the soul f or the lists of vi rt ue '

( α ρ ε τ ή ς ^ ά γ ω ν α ; ) . Rensi, quoted by Untersteiner (Sophs. 182), forces this into agreement with

the disclaimer by a ( f o r its time) rather artificial distinct ion betwe en theoreti cal exposit ion and

practical training. Schmid (Gesch. 66 f.), relying on a h i g h - f l o w n bit of rhetoric in the Epitaphios,

claims Gorgias believed α ρ ε τ ή to be 'im vollen und hochsten Si nn ' a gift of the god s, ye t in the

same paragraph s a y s that, whereas f or Protagoras α ί δ ώ ; and δ ί κ η were part of a divine order, for

Gorgias the y wer e human and muta ble ! Wer e they not in his eye s a p r r a l ? I have ventu red toconnect the disclaimer with his denial that any single thing, arete, existed.

1

Quoted by Robert Blake, Disraeli, 266.3

In vol. II of his autobi ograp hy Lor d R ussel l describes his visi t to Russ ia soon after the

First World War. He speaks of the utter horror wit h whic h he observed the cruelt y, persecution

and poverty, the spying and hypocrisy that prevailed. The shock, he s a y s , was almost more than

he could bear. Later in the same year, when he was on his way to China, the English on the boat

asked him to give a lecture about Soviet R ussia and, he continues (p. 12 5), 'i n vie w of the sort

of people they were, I said only favourable things about the Soviet Government ' . This seems a

g o o d illustration of the Gorgian attitude to truth and kairos.

4

Dion. Hal. De comp. verb. 12 (Gorg. fr. 13) . In Philo str atus 1. 1 (A l a ) έ φ ι ε ί ; τ ω κ α ι ρ ώ

refers only to his gift of improvisation—•' trusting to the inspiration of the moment ' , as the Loe b

translation has it. Some have made a great deal of this ' K a i p o s - L e h r e ' , in which among other

things they see medical influence. See Schmid, Gesch. 1 . 3 . 1 , 58, n. 5, 65 wi th n. 2, 24, n. 3

(Protagoras); Nestle, VM\u L, 3i6f.; Shorey, Τ Α Ρ Α , 1909.

272



Gorgias: the Philosophy of a Rhetorician

I f everyone had a memory o f all that is past, a conception o f what is happen

ing at present and a foreknowledge o f the future . . . 1 But as it is, there is

no easy way o f either recollecting the past or investigating the present or

divining the future, so that o n most subjects most men have only opinion

to offer the mind as counsellor; and opinion is slippery and insecure {Hel.

I I ) .

T o express, with all th e intellectual force at his command, this thesis

that w e are all at t he m e r c y o f opin ion an d the t ru th is for each o f us

whateve r w e ca n be persuaded to believ e, because there is n o perman

ent a n d stable t ru th to b e k n o w n , h e cast i t into the philosophical form

o f a challenge to the Eleatic assertion o f a single changeless being

grasped by an infallible reason as opposed to the changing wor ld o f

appearance, o r opinion, which w a s unrea l . Nothing is as Parmenides

used th e ve rb , that i s , exists as at the same time an immutable reality

and the object o f human knowledge . I f there were such a reality w e

could n o t grasp i t , an d e ve n i f we could, w e could never communi ca te

our knowledge t o others . W e l i v e in a world where opinion (doxd) is

supreme, an d there is no higher criterion b y w h i c h i t ca n b e verified

or the reverse. This leaves the Sophist-orator, master o f the ar t o f

persuasion both private an d public , in command o f the whole field o f

experience, fo r opin ion can a lways b e changed. On ly kn owl edg e ,

based o n unshakeable proof, c oul d withstand th e attacks o f peitho, an d

there is n o such thing. This was, in Pla to ' s e y e s , the arch-heresy which

he must do his utmost t o destroy. H e must show, first, that there is

such a th ing as t rue a n d false opinion. Next, because i f they are only

opinions the true o n e w i l l be as vulnerable as the false to the w i l e s o f

the persuader, h e must restore the criterion o f judgment an d d e m o n

strate h o w opin ion ca n be conver ted to k n o w l e d g e b y ' t h ink ing o u t

t h e r e a s o n ' (Meno 98a).

T h e influence o f G org ia s w a s considerable, especially o f course o n

l i terary style, where i t was felt b y writers as diverse as the historian

Th u cy d i d es and the t ragic poet Agathon. ( F o r A g a t h o n see Pla to,

Symp. 198 c.) H i s most famous pupil wa s Isocrates . A m o n g others w h o

are said o r t hough t t o have been either his pupils o r subject to his

1

T h e apodosis, omitted here, is uncertain in text and meaning. For different solutions see

DK adloc. and Untersteiner, Sof. 1 1 , 101 f. It does not affect the main point, that knowledge is in

general impossible and f a l l i b l e opinion the only guide. Cf. fr. 1 1 a, §35, quoted on p. 180 above.

2 7 3



The Men

2 7 4

influence are Antis thenes and Alc idamas , a n d more doubtfully L y c o -

phron, Prodicus, and Hippocrates the great physic ian; and a m o n g

1

active politicians Pericles, Alc ib iad es, Criti as, Pr ox enu s and M e no .

(3) P R O D I C U S

T o a n y reader o f Pla to the name o f Prodicus inevitably recalls, before

anything else, t he picture o f the unhappy professor , ' suffering grievous

pa ins ' as the sobriquet Tant alus suggests , ly in g o n his be d wrapped in

sheepskins and blankets ( ' a n d plenty o f t he m ' ) , h i s words d rowned b y

the reverberations o f his droning voice in the small room in the house

o f Callias whe re h e holds forth t o a select group o f listeners. T o draw

such a pic ture, thoug ht S i dgw ick , w a s an ac t o f ' ref ined barbari ty '

on Plato's part , whereas Joel, taking Plato's picture for the t ru th ,

denied that this miserable creature could possibly have been t h e

author o f the heroic fable o f Heracles at the crossroads .1

In Joel 's

p s y c h o l o g y , a writer about Heracles should himself b e wrapped in

lion's skin, n o t sheep ' s . However that m a y b e , since there is n o other

evidence for Prodicus's personal idiosyncrasies, w e are free to accept

Plato 's i f we wish as a not unkindly exaggera t ion (so at least i t seems

to m e ) o f genuine traits.

H e w a s a native o f the Ionian c i ty o f Iulis o n C e o s in the C y c l a d e s ,

the home o f the poet Simonides, as Socrates reminds h i m w h e n that

poet ' s works are under discussion (Plato, Prot. 339 ε ff . ) . T h e Suda

( D K , A 1) calls h i m rather v a g u e l y a contemporary o f Democr i tus an d

G o r g i a s , whi ch a l lows anyth ing be tween 490 a nd 460 fo r h is b i r th ; b u t

it must have been nearer the second, for the Protagoras tells u s that

he w a s much younge r than Protagoras . O n e cannot d o better than

put i t , with Mayer (Prod. 3) and others , between 470 and 460. H e was ,

then, a fe w years older than Socrates, an d all that can be said about t h e

length o f his life is that h e out l ived hi m, for with Gorg ia s and Hippias

he is mentioned in the present tense at Pla to Apol. 1 9 c Plato says that

he often came t o A the ns o n of f i c i a l missions from C e o s , a n d l ike

Gorgias t ook the oppor tun i ty to earn some money b y declaiming h iscomposit ions i n public a n d giving instruction to the y o u n g me n. I f

' Plato, Prot. 3150-0!; Sidgw ick in J. Philol. 1873, 6 8 ; Joel , Gesch. 689.



Prodicus

w e accept the obvious dramatic date for the Protagoras, he must have

been w e l l k n o w n in Athens before the beginning o f the Peloponnes ian

W a r , an d Aristophanes could raise a laugh b y ment ioning his name in

423 and 414.1

He was a Sophis t in the ful l sense o f a professi onal freelance ed uc ato r,

whose name is coupled wi th that o f Protagoras as teaching the art o f

success in poli t ics and private l i f e . There seems to have been a standing

joke about the difference between his one-drachma lecture and his

fifty-drachma lecture ( o r course? See p . 42, n . 1) o n semantics. In the

Cratylus (384b) Socrates says that i f he could have afforded the

fifty drachmas he w o u l d n o w b e f u l l y expert on the ' cor rec tness o f

names ' , b u t unfor tunate ly he had to be content with the one-drachma

lecture. Aristotle (Rhet. 1415 b 12), g i v i n g hints on h o w to recall the

wander ing attention o f a n audience b y some str iking pr ono unce ment ,

says this is what Prodicus cal led ' s l ipping in a bi t o f the fifty-drachma

w h e n the audience begins t o n o d ' .

A s one o f those present at the gather ing o f Sophists described in the

Protagoras, h e takes part in the conversa t ion at vario us points , wh ere

the main emphasis is o n a somewhat ironic t reatment o f h is insistence

on fine distinctions o f meaning be tween words commonly regarded

as synonyms. Socrates ( o f wh os e relat ions wi th Pro dicu s som ethi ng

has already been said, p p . 222 f.) call s hi ms el f his pupi l in this s k i l l ,

and elsewhere in the dialogue speaks o f him as a m an o f ' inspired w i s

dom ' , w h ic h he thinks m a y b e ' ancient and god -g iv e n , go in g bac k to

Simonides o r even earl ier ' . In the Meno also h e speaks o f himself as

ha v ing been trained b y Prodicus as Me no b y G o r g i a s , and in the

Charmides says he has listened t o ' innumerable discourses ' o f Prodicus

on the distinction o f names. In the Hippias Major h e calls hi m h is

friend o r companion . In the Theaetetus, after explaining his maieutic

s k i l l in a iding the bir th-pangs o f me n whose minds a re b i g with ideas,

he adds that w h e n he has judged that people are no t pregnant (that i s ,

presumably, are w i thou t a good idea in their heads) , and so have n o

need o f him, he has passed many o f them on to Prodicus a nd other

'wondrous ly wise me n ' w h o a re m ore l i k e l y t o help them. T h e infer

ence is not f lat ter ing. Un do ub te dl y Socrates tho ugh t o f h i s o w n d ia -

1

Plato, Hipp. Maj. 282c; Aristophanes, Clouds 361 an d Birds 692.

275



The Men

276

l e c t i c , whereby one man helps another to mature and formulate his

o w n ideas, as the only genuinely philosophic method, and the implica

tion is that sophistic educat ion, as exemplified b y Pro dic us , treats the

pupi l rather as a pas si ve receiv er o f re ad y- ma de facts or theo ries .

In the Laches, on the other han d, it is Lach es w h o , in opp os iti on to

S o c r a t e s , disparages Pr odi cus 's acco mpli shme nt as ' the sort o f cl ev er

ness that befits a Sop his t rather tha n a sta tes man '. T o extract fro m the

nuances of Plato's literary portraits a prosaic and agreed account of

the relations bet we en the t w o men is prac tic ally imp ossib le, or at least

v e r y mu ch at the me rc y o f subjec tive impress ions. Th er e is no do ub t

that Socra tes had clo se pers onal relations wi t h hi m, attended his

lectures on the impo rta nce o f usi ng wo rd s preci sely, and (I shoul d sa y)

f e l t a certain affection for his don ni sh gu lli bil ity . T o Socr ate s, as to

C o n f u c i u s (Socrates, p . 168, η . i ) , corre ct la ngu ag e, ' t he rectification of

names', was the prerequisite for correct l i v i n g and even efficient

government, and it may w e l l be that this t ruth first dawned on him

w h i l e listening to the one -dra chma di scourse o f Pro dic us . But Pr od i

c u s , th ou gh his l inguistic teaching und oub ted ly included semantic

distinctions between ethical terms, had stopped at the threshold. He was

l i k e the orators who 'when they have learned the necessary pre

liminaries to rhetoric think they have discovered the art itself, and that

b y teaching them to others they have g i v e n them complete instruction

in rhetoric ' (Phaedr. 269b-c). T h e compl ete art o f logoi embraces no

thing less than the whole of philosophy.1

O n e would suppose from Plato that the essence of Prodicus's

teaching was l inguistic. ' T h e correctness o f na mes ' wa s the found a

tion of all else (Euthyd. 277 ε ) . The Suda however (A 1, D K ) classifies

' Other references for this paragraph: Plato, Prot. 341a , 315 ε , Meno 96c!, Charm. 163d,

Hipp. Maj. 282c, Theaet. 1 5 1 b , Laches ι <) η & . Whe th er or not one agrees wit h Joe l and Mo mi

gliano (see the latter in Atti Torino, 1929-30, 104) that the ' my t h ' of Prodicus as master of

Socrates is Cy ni c in orig in depends, of course, on ho w one chooses to interpret the man y refer

ences to their relations which, since they come from Plato, are free from suspi cion of suc h an

origin. However, Momigliano does go further than I have ventu red to go here in attri butin g to

Prodicus an awareness of the consequences of his semantic teaching as it affected both ethics and

epistemology, thus bringing him much closer to Socrates. (For more on this see pp. 224f. a bo ve .)

To say that it led him to renounce the scepticism and relati vism of his brothe r-Sophis ts is to p ay

hi m a comp lim ent wh ic h I sho uld be inclined to reser ve for Socrat es. For a su mmi ng up of t he

Socr ati c-Pl ato nic picture of Prodi cus see also May er, Prod. 18-22, who thought that th e Prot.

g i v e s distortion, caricatur e and iro ny ; elsewh ere Plato ackno wled ges the scientific va lu e of

Prodicus's procedure.



Prodicus

him as 'natural phil osop her and Soph is t' , and Ga len (see D K , 24 A 2)

includes him in a so me what indiscriminate list o f ' writ ers on nature ' ,

with Melissus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Alcmaeon, Gorgias 'and all

the rest'. Th is finds som e cont empo rar y confirmation in Ari sto phan es,

w h o in the Clouds (360) calls hi m μ ε τ ε ω ρ ο σ ο φ ι σ τ ή ξ , an ' as tr onomi ca l

exper t ' ,1

and in the Birds (692) implies that he produced a cosmogony.

Galen mention s a w o r k ' o n the nature of man', in which he brought

his linguis tic interests to bear on phy si ologi ca l terms, ins isting that the

w o r d phlegm should be applied to the hot humour because of its

e t y m o l o g i c a l connexion with the verb 'to burn', and assigning the

name blenna to the col d hu mou r co mm on ly called phlegm?

W e possess at least the content , i f not the actua l words , of anepideixis of Prodicus, which seems to guarantee its genuineness by

being exactly the sort of thing that one would expect a Sophist to

compose for recital before a popular audience, conveying elementary

moral com mon pla ces thr oug h the easily absorbed me diu m o f a fable

abou t one of the mos t popu la r figures o f legend. Its influence has been

surpris ingly great. X en op ho n describes it as 'th e com pos it ion about

Heracles wh ic h he delive red before the largest c r o wd s ' , and puts therepor t in the mo ut h o f Socrates as a cou nt erwe ig ht to the hed oni sm

and sensuali ty o f Ar is ti ppu s. A t the end Socrates says that what he

has gi ve n is 'ap pro xim at ely Pr odi cus' s story of the educat ion o f

Heracles by Virtue, though he clothes its sentiments in even more

magnificent words than I have n o w ' . It is pre suma bly the w o r k re

ferred to b y Plat o wh e n he speaks o f ' the g oo d Pro di cu s' as ha vi ng

writt en a prose en co mi um o f Heracles (Symp. 177b). Impeccable as

are its sentiments, fe w wou ld no wa da ys acco rd it the enthusiastic

e u l o g y of Grote , begi nnin g:

Wh o is there that has not read the well -known fable called ' Th e Cho ice o f

Heracles' ? Wh o does not know that its express purpose is to kindle the

1

One cannot altogether discount this on the ground that he appli ed the sam e wor d to

Socrates, for there is every likelihood that Socrates's earlier y e a r s were in fact marked by an

interest in natural philosophy sufficient to g i v e some factual basis to the description. (See Socrates,

100 ff.) For Cice ro' s reference to Pro dicus, toge the r wi th other Sophists, as having written

etiam de natura rerum, see p. 46 above. Gellius on the other hand contrasts him with Anaxagoras

a s a rhetor, not a physicus (15 .20, DK, A 8) .1

Galen, De virt. phys. 3.195 Helmreich (Prodicus fr. 4). Galen adds a reference to his l i n

g u i s t i c inno vat ions as described by Plat o.

277



The Men

imaginations of youth in favour of a life of labour for noble objects, and

against a life of indulgence? If it be of striking simplicity and effect even to

a modern reader, ho w much more powerfu lly must it have work ed upon the

audience for who se bel ief it was specially adapted, when set off by the oral

expansions of the author?

H j

It is, Gr ot e th ou gh t, a vin dic ati on o f Pr odi cus and a wa rn in g against

put tin g confidence in the sarcastic remarks o f Pl ato . O n e mig ht rather

say that if all sophi stic te ach ing we re like this it w o u l d con fir m the

v i e w expresse d b y Pla to in the Republic (493 a) that the so-called w i s

d o m o f the Sophis ts boils d o w n to a rehash o f the conven tiona l opini ons

o f the c rowd.1

There is no need to repeat every detail of the w e l l -

k n o w n tale. W h e n Heracles as a y o u n g man is pond eri ng wh ic h path

o f life to take, he is acco ste d b y t w o tall w o m e n represe nting Vi rt ue

and V i c e , w h o compe te for his allegia nce. Ea ch is suitab ly descri bed,

Vir tue han dso me an d noble in mie n, her b o d y clo the d in pur it y and

her eye s in mod es ty, her wh ol e appearance s ugg est ing self-control,

and V i c e plump and soft, with a complexion not left to nature, a

wa nd er in g ey e, and a dress rev eal ing rather than conc eali ng her charms.

She speaks first, and the pleasure and ease that she promises can be

ima gine d. Vir tu e b y contrast p romis es a life o f severe training, hard

w o r k and simplicity, wh ic h w i l l how ev er be rewarded with honour ,

t rue friendship and, if he wis hes it, wea lth and pow er , wh ic h ca n on ly

be w o n b y toil and sw ea t. Idlenes s, pleasu re and v i c e on the other

hand w i l l weaken his body and destroy his mind. His later years w i l l

be a bu rd en to him, w he re as if he has fo ll ow ed vir tue he can ba sk in

the mem or y o f past glo rie s and enj oy the happiness that his efforts

have merited.2

1

Grote, History (1888 ed.), V I I , 57. For a more balanced criticism see Grant , Ethics, 1,145 f.,

wh o make s some tellin g point s. Thi s is not to de ny that it may have become, as Schmid c a l l s it ,

' One of the most influential pieces of wor ld- li ter atu re' (Gesch. 4 1 ; see his n. 9 for bib lio gra phy ).

Its basic idea of the choice of two w a y s in l i fe , the primrose path and the arduous climb to virtue,

w a s alre ady in Hesiod (Erga 287—92). Schultz's article Herakles am Scheidewege, in Philol.

1 9 0 9 , go es further int o the myth ic al affinities of the tal e, esp eci all y its relation to t he Y sym bol

a s (a) crossroads and (J>) tree of l i fe .1

The full text, from Xen. Mem. 2 . 1 . 2 1 - 3 4 , is print ed as fr. 2 of Prod icu s in DK. It appe ared

in a work called Horai, a tide of dub iou s mean ing whi ch if it wa s the author's own (Le sky ,

HGL, 348) was doubt less expl ained so mewhe re in the wo rk itself. On this wo rk see especially

Nestle in Hermes, 1936 and H. Gomperz, S. u. R. 9 7 - 1 0 1 . Joel took the extreme view, which

has not been gen era lly followed , that the fable wa s not b y Prodi cus at all, but an Antisthene an

wor k Cy ni c in character. (See l i i s Gesch. 686-9 .) T hi s is refuted by the reference to it in a schol ion

278



Prodicus

Prodicus's outlook, l ike that o f other Sophists, w a s humanistic,

and he took a purely naturalistic v i e w o f religion ( p p . 2 3 8 ff . above).

His theory w a s that primit ive ma n, to whom many aspects o f nature

must have appeared hostile, w as so impressed with the gifts that she

prov ided for the furtherance o f his l i f e , welfare and en joyment—such

as the sun, earth and water, air an d fire, foodstuffs an d the vine—that

he believed them either to be the discovery and especial benefaction

o f divine beings o r themselves to e mb o d y the godhead. This theory

was n o t only remarkable for its rationalism but had the additional

merit o f discerning a close conn exio n betw een religion and agriculture.

This w a s based o n observed fact, since fertility-cults are not on ly

widespread at an early stage of c i v i l i z a t i o n b u t were especially common

in Greece, wher e moreo ver it w a s customary to trace all the benefits

o f c i v i l i z e d life to an origin in the invention o f agriculture.

T h e only recorded titles o f w o r k s b y Prodicus are On Nature,

On the Nature of Man, and Horai, and about these w e must remind

ourselves o f what was said earlier (p . 26 4) about the dubious authority

o f such titles in general. Some have thought that the Horai w as a

universal work including as internal sections his v i e w s o n nature,

human and otherwise, h is theory o f the origin o f rel igion, a panegyric

on agriculture leading to thoughts o n moral virtue an d the education

requisite to attain i t , an d even the doctrine o f s y n o n y m s .1

to Aristophanes (Prodicus fr. i ) , whose independence seems assured b y its mention of the title

and final choice of Heracles, which are not in Xenophon. There is of course no means of knowing

how close Xenophon has kept to the original. I have ventured what can be no more than an

opinion. Grote, Grant and Untersteiner (Sophs. 207) also regard it as authentic in substance;

others (Wecklein, B l a s s , Schacht, Mayer in Prod. 8f.) suppose him to have handled the tale very

f ree ly . In this connexion attention has been drawn to the use of words of clos ely related meaningwhich some have connected with Prodicus's 's yn on ym ic ' whi le to others they have appeared as

mere stylistic variations a la Gorgias and entirely unlike Prodicus, w h o insisted that no two

words ought to be used as if they had identical meanings. See Spengel in Gomperz, S. u. R. 101,

n.225, Mayer, Prod. 10 f. Although such arguments can never lead to certai nty, there is more to be

sa i d for Spengel and Gomperz. T h e first set quoted (κ α τ α σ κ ο π ε ί σ β ο η , έ π ι σ κ ο π ε ί ν , θ ε α σ θ α ι ,

α π ο β λ έ π ε ι ν ) neither have nor appear intended to have the same meaning, but give the im

pression of being carefully chosen for their context.

' See Untersteiner, Sophs. 207 an d (for Nestle's reconstruction) 225, n. 7 4. Fo r Untersteiner

the Horai was 'his greatest work, in which the c y c l e of things and the ethical law which governs

all found one of their unifying vi sion s'. Thi s would be difficult to substantiate. H is insistence

on the correct use of words naturally permeated all his work, but it is plai n from Pla to that

instruction in the subject was given in an independent lecture or course of lectures. T h e inclusion

of the Heracles fable involves, as Gomperz frankly s a y s (S. u. R. ioof.) , assuming that much in

Xenophon's description of it as an epidcixis is fiction.

1 0 279 G S Γ



The Men

280

F i n a l l y o n e m a y mention references t o Prodicus i n t w o pseudo-

Platonic dialogues. Their date is uncertain, and the v i e w s attributed

to h i m cannot b e regarded as certainly authentic. In the Eryxias

(397 d ff.) he is reported as saying that wealth, like everything else,

i s a blessing t o a g o o d m a n w h o k n o w s h o w to use i t proper ly , bu t a

curse to the ignorant a n d e v i l . I f he di d sa y this, h e wa s remarkably

in harmony with Socrates, w h o argues for i t in the Meno (87 ε f f .) ,

t hough the author o f the Eryxias makes h i m take part in the discom

fiture o f the Sophis t , wh o, h e s a y s , β ε ε π ^ t o e v e r y b o d y to b e ta lking

nonsense. B ut t he thesis itself was perhaps a commonplace , an d some

thing very like i t appears in the ' Anonymus Iamblichi ' (DK, 11 , 401,

16-19). * n t n e

Axiochus (366cff.) 'S oc ra te s ' , after s ome boo ri sh and

ill-phrased criticism o f Prodicus 's greed fo r f e e s , says that Ι ι ε ha s

heaxA him, in an epideixis d ε l iv ε r ed at the η ο ^ ε o f C a l l i a s , give vent

to such depressingly pessimistic comments on the worthlessn8SS o f

l i fe that h e himself felt a strong urge fo r death. T h e mention o f an

epideixis is circumstantial, and the allusion t o Prodicus as Tantalus in

the Protagoras, together with h i s b ε dr idden stat8 (until Ι ιε w a s hauled

out o f it b y the others) , m a y sugges t that he was inclined t o a g l o o m y

v i e w .1

W h e n all is said, however, the only facets o f his teaching about

w h i c h w e know e nough t o make i t o f philosophic interest are his

passion for the exact u s e o f language and his theory o f the or igin o f

r e l i g i o n .

(4) H I P P I A S

Hippias s o n o f D iope i t t ^ s w a s another o f the younger gen8ration o f

Sophists, con te mpo rar y with Socrates rather than with Prot agor as an d

G o r g i a s . H i s w i d o w e d daught8r mari^d Isocrates in the latter's o l d

a g e .2

T h e only authori ty for his date is Pla to , w h o simply says that

Ι ιε w a s much younger than Protagoras ,3 a n d implies that h e w a s alive

1

H. Gomperz has a long discussion of both these passages in S. u. R. 1 0 2 - 1 0 . For the first,

see also the references in Untersteiner, Sophs. 226, n. 82.1

F o r authorities see DK, A 3 an d 4.3

Prot. 3 1 7 c, Hipp. Maj. 282 d-e. Untersteiner's belief that he w as not born until about

443 depends on his theory that he wrote the proem to Theophrastus's Characters. (See Sophs.

2 7 2 and 274, n. 3.) Untersteiner also claims that he is the Anonymus of Iamblichus and wrote

Thucydides 3.4 (on events in Corcyra) . I cannot follow h is argument (Sof. in , 76) that,

because according to Pausanias 5.25.4 (a) Hippias wrote an inscription for the statues b y



Hippias

in 399. Com ing f rom E l i s , h e w as , as Nestle has pointed o u t (VMûL,

360), unlike most Sophists in b e i n g a Dorian , and hence travelled more

to Dorian cities than t o Athens, most often to Sparta (Plato, Hipp.

Maj. 281b) bu t also t o S i c i l y (ibid. 282 ε ) . H e boasts ( in Plato) that the

Eleans always turn to h im as the ideal m an to represent them abroad,and o f the vast sums o f money which he has earned o n these visits

b y his outs tanding vir tuosi ty as a Sophist , which he also displayed at

A thens and O l y m p i a and no doubt elsewhere. A t O l y m p i a , ' a t the

f e s t i v a l of al l H el la s ' , he offered both prepared discourses and ex

tempore answers to questions pu t to hi m on the spot (Hipp. Min.

363 c - d ) .

Most o f o u r info rmati on abo ut Hippias co mes from Plat o, w h o i ntwo dialogues made hi m the only interlocutor o f Socra tes

1 as w e l l as

inc lud ing him in the Protagoras. Those therefore w h o a re convinced

that Plato w a s possessed b y a hatred o f the Sophists which blinded h i m

to their real character m a y ignore i t and conclude that w e know li t t le

or nothing about h i m . O n t h e other hand there is a marked difference

be tw een his t reatment o f them as individuals . When o n e thinks o f

the respect which he accords to Protagoras , his tactful handling o f

G o r g i a s , w h e r e b y th e real onslaught o n what to Plato were th e dis

astrous effects o f his teaching w a s reserved for other, less sympathetic

characters, and even his mildly ironical att i tude to the pedantic side o f

Prodicus's semantic distinctions, the consis tency with which h e makes

broad fun of Hippias surely justifies a suspicion that he w a s in fact a

somewhat bombast ic , humourless and thick-skinned character.2 H e is

g i v e n to breath-taking remarks like ' I have never found a n y m a n w h o

Calon of the drowned Messenians which was later than the statues themselves, the inscription

on the base of a different statue b y Calon ( whi ch has been excavated) sho ws lettering of 420-410,

therefore the inscription b y Hippias is to be assigned to that decade. This is not t he inference

of Frazer, to whom Untersteiner refers.1

I w i l l not at this point enter into the question of the genuineness of the tw o Hippias dialogues.

For modern authorities pro a nd con see Friedlander, Plato, n , 101 with 316 n. 1, 146 with 326

n. 6, an d for the major D . Tarrant ' s ed. pp. i x - x v i i (she believed it to be probably b y a pupil of

Plato) and E. Edelstein, X u. P. Bild, 24, n. 7. T h e minor i s quoted b y Aristotle, Metaph. 1025 a 6,

though without mention of its authorship.

* Nestle drew a different conclusion from the varie ty of treatment (VMûL, 360) : because

Plato l i k e d Protagoras but felt a deep antipathy fo r Hippias, the picture of him in the Hippias

dialogues is just a caricature, though (Nestle admits) Plato does take h im more seriously in the

Protagoras. This, he thought , makes Hippias's character the most difficult to grasp of an y

Sophist 's, but tlic difficulty seems to be of his o w n making.

1 0 - 2



The Men

was m y superior in a n y t h i n g ' , and the unsuspecting innocence with

which h e laps up the mo st blat an tl y ironic al flattery from Socrates is

almost attractive. Certainly he is a man w i t h w h o m it w o u l d b e

d i f f i c u l t to b e angry .

T h a t he had someth ing t o boast about is equ all y certain. Pl ato

speaks o f h is Macaulay-l ike mem ory , wher eb y h e could retain a list

o f f i f t y names after a single hearing, and his astonishing versatil i ty.

W e l l migh t Xenophon c a l l hi m a po lymath . H e w a s evident ly o n e o f

those w h o absorb learning easily a n d quickly, some o f i t such as to

demand high intellectual g i f t s . Subjects that h e w a s prepared t o teach

included ast rono my, geom et ry , arithmetic, gramm ar, rhyth m, m usic,

g e n e a l o g y , m y t h o l o g y a n d history, including the history o f ph i lo sophy

and mathematics.1

H e also wrote declamations on the poets , which in

the hands o f a Sophist were more l i k e l y t o deal wi th mora l quest ions

than with what w e should c a l l literary criticism. In the Protagoras

(347 a) h e lays claim to a logos o n Simonides (which h e w i l l recite to the

company i f requested), and at the beg inn ing o f the Hippias Minor h e

has ju st finished an epideixis o n Homer. Most o f his subjects are listed

b y Plato without a n y illustrations, a fe w o f which have come down in

later writers. H e spoke o f Thales drawing from th e behaviour o f amberand the loadstone the conclus ion that inanimate objects h a d sou l ,

2

and o f Mamercus, brother of the poet Stesichorus, as a successor

o f Thales in geomet ry . A s a historian h e noted that th e w o r d tyrannos

was n o t used before th e t ime o f Archi lochus , spoke o f L y c u r g u s ' s

military talent, a n d published a list o f Olympic v ic to r s , as Aris to t le

did later o f the Pyth ian v ic tors . (Ol ymp ia w a s o f course o n his h o m e

territory.) An th ro pol og ic al interests are suggested b y a work cal led

Nomenclature of Tribes. In m y t h o l o g y h e differed from Pindar over

the name o f Phrixus 's s tepmother and claimed that the continents o f

A s i a a n d Eu ro pe wer e called after Oc ean ids o f these names. T h e on ly

astronomical pronouncement that has come down is that he put the

1

X e n . Symp. 4.62, Plato, Prot. 315 c, 3 18 ε , Hipp. Maj. 2850-6;.2

Aristotle introduces this cautiously at De an. 405 a 19 in the fo rm: 'Tha les too seems to have

supposed, from what is reported about h i m . . . ' , a n d D . L. (1.24) attributes the information to

both Aristotle and Hippias. Snell, and following h im Classen, have deduced that for this an d all

hi s other references to Thales Aristotle made use of the work of Hippias mentioned b y Clement

in fr. 6, of which they have detected further traces in Plato Crat. 402b a nd Symp. 1 7 8 a. S ee

Classen in Philol. 1965.

2 8 2



The Versatility of Hippias

number o f stars in the Hyades gro up at seven .1

His prodigious memory

was cultivated b y a deliberate technique o f mnemonics which he also

taught to others .2

N o t content with all this he wrote tragedies and

dithyrambs as well as prose, and w as as clever with his hands as his

brain, according to the story in Plato that he appeared at O l y m p i a

wearing nothing that he had not made himself, n o t only clothes b u t

also a ring, oil-flask an d strigil (Hipp. Min. 368 b - d ) . T h e Suda says

(A I , D K ) that he set up self-sufficiency as the goa l o f l i f e , and this

passage would certainly bear it out if it is not in fact the basis o f the

tradition.

He w as an omnivorous reader, and incorporated the results o f his

reading in a comprehensive work called the Synagoge, that i s , collec

tion or miscellany. T h e title is mentioned b y Athenaeus, and an inter

esting quotation in Clement o f Alexandria (the on ly o n e extant which

claims to give anything like Hippias 's o w n words) must surely b e his

o w n description o f this work. 3 i t runs :

It ma y be that some o f this has been said b y Orpheus, some briefly, here

and there, b y Musaeus, some b y Hesiod and some b y Homer, some in other

poetsand

somein

prose-writers both Greekand

foreign.For my

part,

I have collected from all these writers what is most important and belongs

together to make this new and composite work.

The only bit o f i ts contents vouchsafed to us concerns a certain

Thargelia o f Miletus, a 'w i s e and beautiful woman' w h o h a d fourteen

husbands.

One mathematical discovery is attributed to Hippias which, i f the

attribution is correct, 'differentiates h im ' , a s K . Freeman says (Com-1

Mamercus, Hipp. fr. 12 (Proclus) ; tyrannos, fr. 9 (schol. Sophocle s); Lyc urg us, fr. 11

( P l u t . ) ; Olympic victors, fr. 3 (Plut . ) ; Phrixus, fr. 14 (schol. Pind.); Ε θ ν ώ ν ό ν ο μ α σ ί α ι , fr. 2

(schol. Apoll . Rhod.); Hyades, fr. 13 (schol. Arat.).1

Besides the reference to his μ ν η μ ο ν ικ ώ ν τ έ χ ν η μ α in Hipp. Min. 368d, see Xen. Symp. 4 .6 2

( C a l l i a s learned τ 6 μ ν η μ ο ν ικ ώ ν from Hippias). Diss. Log. 9 (DK , 1 1 , 416) m ay be an echo of

Hippias. (According to Cicero, De or. 2.86.351—4, the first to evolve a mnemonic technique

w a s Simonides. He and Hippias are mentioned together b y Aelian, Hist. Anim. 6.10 and Amm.

M a r c e l l . 1 6 . 5 . 8 , both quoted b y Tarrant, Hipp. Maj. x x v i i . )3

Fr. 6, from Clem. Strom. 6 . 1 5 ( 1 1 , 434 St .) . Clement commits himself to no more than ώ δ έ

π ω ; λ έ γ ο ν τ α , but g i v e s i t as a direct quotation. (His object is to prove that Greeks are inco rri gibl ep l a g i a r i s t s . ) T h e phrase έ ν σ ν γ γ ρ α φ α ΐ ς τ ά μ έ ν "Ε λ λ η σ ι τ ά δ έ β ά ρ β α ρ ο ι ; is interesting. Even if,

a s Nestle thought (VMûL, 364), Hippias only knew the latter at second hand, perhaps from

Hecataeus it challenges the oft-repeated but improb able claim that Greek wr ite rs kne w no

l a n g u a g e but their own. For the title see fr. 4 (Ath. 608 f ) .

283 10-3



The Men

panion, 385), ' f r o m all other Sophists a n d places h im in the ranks o f the

scientif ic discoverers ' . This is th e curve called quadratrix ( τ ε τ ρ α γ ω ν ί -

·$ο υ σ α ), w h ic h as its name implies was used fo r squar ing the circle, an d

also for trisecting an angle o r div id ing it accord ing to an y given rat io .1

In mentioning it as Hippias's work Proclus does no t ad d ' o f E l i s ' , an d

since the name is not uncommon ( there are eighteen in the Real-

Encyclopadie) some have been sceptical, thinking i t scarcely credible

that o u r universal virtuoso could have achieved such original work

in a n y single field. Others argue that Proclus had earlier in his w o r k

attributed the remark about Mamercus to Hippias o f E l i s , and if he

now meant a different m a n would have said s o . This is not v e r y

cogent (particularly as the Mamercus passage comes nearly 200

Teu bne r pages before the earlier o f the t w o references to the quadra

trix'), b u t most modern opinion is in favour o f the attr ibution to the

Sophis t .2

Grote remarked (History, 1888 e d. , v n , 63 f.) that Plato , fo r all his

' sneer and con tem ptu ous ba nter ' , ne ver accuses Hippias, as he did

some other Sophists, o f preaching ' a l o w or corrupt moral i ty ' . In the

Hippias Major (286 a ) H i p p i a s m e n t i o n s a Trojan Discourse w h i c h h e

has recited at Sparta and intends to repeat at Athens . Its theme is adiscourse b y Nestor in reply to Neop to lemos , w h o h as asked h im (as

Grote puts i t) ' w h a t w a s the plan o f l i fe incumbent o n a y o u n g m a n o f

honourable aspirations' , and Grote suggests that fo r high moral pur

pose i t was probably n o t u n w o r t h y to be set beside Prodicus's Choice

of Heracles. T h a t m a y or m a y no t be so (we know noth ing o f i ts c o n

tent), but in any case Hippias has better claims to be accepted as a

serious ethical thinker. He w as on e o f those w h o contrasted l a w and

nature and upheld the latter o n moral and humanitarian, n o t selfish and

ambit ious, grounds. H e held a form of the social-contract theory o f

l a w : posi t ive l a w , be ing a matter o f human agreement and frequently

1

T h e sole authority is Proclus, Eucl. pp. 272 ( = Hipp. fr. 21 ) an d 556 Friedlander, whose

source i s Eudemus.2

Among the sceptics were Wilamowitz (Platan, 1, 136, n. 1) and Schmid (Gesch. 54 f.).

Bjornbo in RE, v m , i7o8f., mentions four objections to the attribution to Hippias, and finds

none of them cogent; but he makes no reference to the silence of S i m p l i c i u s , who at Phys. 546°.

seems to be giving as complete an account as he can of attempts to square the c i r c l e , and s a y snothing of Hippias. This might be thought significant. T h e authorship of Hippias w a s accepted

by Heath, Hist. Gr. Math. I , 23. For details of the quadratrix see Freeman, Comp. 386-8, or

Bjornbo, toe. cit.

284



Hippias on Mathematics and Morals

altered, w a s no t to be regarded as providing fixed a n d universal

standards o f conduct . It could be ' a tyrant doing violence t o nature ' .

He bel ieved ho we ve r that there were unwri t ten l a w s , divine i n origin

and universal in application, concerning such things as the w orsh ip o f

the gods an d respect for parents. With belief in universal , natural

l a w s (and for Hippias natural and divine appear to be the same) went

b e l i e f in the fundamental unity of the hu man race, wh os e divis ions

are only a matter o f nomos, i .e . posi t ive l aw and established, b u t

mistaken, convent ions o r habits (p. 163 above ) .

A s witness to his ethical v i e w s w e ha ve, finally, so me re ma rk s o n

e n v y and slander which were quoted b y Plu ta rch .1

T h e r e are , said

Hippias, t w o sorts o f e n v y , a right and a w r o n g . It is right to feel envy

when honours g o to ba d me n , wrong when they go to good . More

over the envious have a double share o f suffering: they are gr ieved ,

l i k e al l m en , b y their o w n troubles, b u t also by the good for tune o f

others. O f slander h e said that it is a curse because the law prescribes

no punishment fo r it as it does fo r robbery, though in fact it is robbe ry

o f th e best thing in l i f e , namely friendship o r g o o d w i l l (philid). Its

underhand nature makes i t w orse than open v iole nce. Here is a c o n

crete instance o f h is censure o f nomos, and in this respect at least h e

w o u l d regard today's laws as an improvement .

(5) A N T I P H O N

A n t i p h o n w as a very common name,* especially in Att ica , and the

identity o f A n t i p h o n t h e Sophist , whose v i e w s have been discussed in

earlier chapters o f this book, has been the subject o f endless scholarly

cont roversy . T h e main question is whether he is the same m a n as the

ora tor Ant iphon o f Rham nus w h o figures in T h u c y d i d e s as a m em ber

o f the Four Hundred an d wa s the author o f an extant collection o f

oratorical exercises called the Tetralogies and three forensic speeches.

T h e posi t ion is further complicated b y references t o A n t i p h o n as a

1

Frr . 16 and 1 7 . Actually w e have them from Stobaeus, w h o found them in a work of Plutarch

On Slander, n o w lost.1

For instance Plato had a half-brother called Antiph on, w ho m he introduces a s narrator of

the dialogue Parmenides. Blass {Ait. Bereds.2

I, 93 ff.) distingui shes six in addition to the orator

(summarized in Loch Plut. vo l. x , 346 note d~).

285



The Men

tragic poet, as the author of a work on dreams, and as a soothsayer.

Thus Heinimann (N. u. Ph. 134) pronounced: 'It must be taken as

certain that the Sophis t, the oligar chi c orat or and the trag edian are

three different people.' It has even been suggested that the works

On Truth and On Concord are b y different me n .1

Whatever the answer,

one thin g must be bo rn e in mi nd thr ou gh ou t: references in our autho ri

ties to 'Antiphon the Sophist' do not suffice to distinguish a Sophist

from an orator, since in ancient times the word sophistes would be

applied equally to both. In any case Origen says that the Antiphon

w h o wro te On Truth wa s k n o w n as an orator (A nt ip ho n, fr. 12). T h e

ques tion is o f mi no r interest for the his tor y of ph il os op hy , and dis

cus sio n o f it has be en rel egat ed to a no te (p p. 292-4 b e l o w ) , w h i c h

ma y be thankfu lly omi tte d b y all bu t classical specialists.

T h e oratorical wo r ks , wh oe v e r wr ot e them, are not our present co n

cern. A b o u t the external circumstance s of the Soph ist ' s l i fe (if he is

different from the ora tor ) no th in g is k n o w n , nor is there any precise

informat ion abo ut his date, th ou gh he wa s ob vi ou sl y a c ont emp or ar y

o f Socrates. The orator is said (pseudo-Plut. Vit. or. 832 f ) to ha ve

bee n bo rn ab ou t the time o f the Persian Wa r s , and to ha ve be en a

little younger than Go rg ia s, and this certa inly does not militate a gainst

their identity.2

An ti ph on nev er appears in Plat o's dial ogues , pos sib ly

because, as Schmid suggested {Gesch. 159), Plato thought him only

second-rate.

Th er e is another p ro ble m to be faced. Tw en ty -n in e fragments are

gr oup ed b y D K unde r the title On Concord, bu t few o f th em are

1

Schmid (Gesch. 100) said 'Die grosste Wahrscheinlichkeit spricht dafur' that the Sophist

wrote both. Nesde (VMûL, 1942, 38 7^ ) does not mention Schmid , but s a y s with a choice of

phrase that is surely deliberate, 'Es spricht daher die grosste Wahrscheinlichkeit dafur', that

the author of Concord is not the Sophist, who wrote Truth, but the orator.1

Attempt s have been made to date the Sophist's wri tin gs. Π . ό μ . has been put close to 440

on the rather shak y gro und of ' ec ho es ' in Euripides (A lt we gg and J. H. F i n l e y ) , and Π . ά λ .

about a decade later also on echoes of his ethical doctrines in drama plus A l y ' s a n a l y s i s of the

relation of his mathematical work to that of contemporaries. See Greene, Moira, 232 with n. 74

and 236 with n. 94. Heinimann (N. u. Ph. 1 4 1 f.), adding to the other arg ume nts one from the

s t y l e of the pap yru s fragments, puts Π . ά λ . in the twenties. He rejects the idea (see p. 11 4

above) that it is satirized in the Clouds in 423. Antiphon was not of course 'the Sophist against

whom Aristophanes is especially tilting', but that he as w e l l as Protag oras (and perhaps oth ers)

contri buted to the Sophis tic moral ity whic h is the target does seem at least l i k e l y . Schmid

(Gesch. 159) s a y s that the conversati on of Ant iph on wi th Socra tes in Xenophon is to be dated in

the last decade of the cent ury (i .e. after the orat or's deat h) and his wri tin gs shoul d be put no

later than the thirties.

286



Anttphons Writings

e x p l i c i t l y attributed to that work, and none of them deal with the

subject o f co nc or d.1

T h e str ength o f the case for so ass ig ning them

ma y be ju dge d from Schmi d's conte ntio n (Gesch. 163, n. 1) that,

because some of th em (those in Sto baeu s) are in the form o f max im s,

and Philo stra tus s ays in his l i fe of Anti phon ( of Rhamnus) that his

w o r k on con co rd included collect ions o f max ims (gnomologiai),

therefore we ma y safely assign these fragment s to the Sophi st' s w o r k

o f that name. E v e n if w e cou ld, the wo r d gnomologia does not g i v e

much encouragement to suppose that they express his original thought,

bu t in fact the genuineness o f these snippets from John of Stobi 's

anthology (there are tw el ve o f them, each headed sim ply 'f ro m

Antiphon') has been challenged.3

Comparison with the papyrus frag

ments, thinks Havelock (L T, 419), makes their rejection inev ita ble, wi th

the partial excepti on o f fr. 49.3 W . C . Gr ee ne , on the other hand (Moira,

239), saw no real inconsi ste ncy bet we en the ethical doct rines in the

supposed fragments of Concord and those of Truth as seen in the p ap yr i .4

M o s t o f the 'f ra gm en ts ' expressl y attributed to Concord come from

the lexico n o f Harpo crat ion and consist of single words.5 Th r ee o f

them (frr. 45-7) refer to myt hi ca l tribes, the Sciapods , Mac rocephali

and dwellers und er the earth or Tro gl od yt es , wh ic h wi th fr. 48 (' ma n

c a l l s himself the most godl ike o f animals ' ) sh ow an anthro pologi cal

1

Some have thought Ant iph on intended the word ( whi ch does not occur at all in the frag

ments) in the sense of inner harm ony (wh at Iamblichus many centuries later, and with Plato

behind h im, called τ η ν ε ν ό ς έ κ α σ τ ο υ τ τ ρ ά ; ε α υ τ ό ν ά μ ο γ ν ω μ ο σ ύ ν η ν , α ρ . Stob. 2 .3 3· Ι5)> wh ich

they equate with his emphasis on σ ω φ ρ ο σ ύ ν η and self-mastery. See Stenzel in RE, suppl. iv, 40f.

Nestle denied this (VMûL, 381) , while Praechter (Ueb er we g- P. 129) thought to have it both

w a y s .1

Comp are the case of Democr itus, vol . 1 1 , 489 ff.3

Thi s fragment deals with the cares of marr iage , and appears to Have lock to be compatible

with the oudook of Antiphon, provided we assume that a later wri ter has contaminate d wha t he

wrote with 'moralizing reflections borrowed from the Medea and the Phaedo'. It does indeed

contain phrases reminiscent of both these works (some have thought Euripides was influenced

by Antip hon) , and (as Have lock also notes) remarka ble coincidences wit h frr. 27 5- 7 ° f De mo

critus, but this does not deter h im from dissecti ng the passage in confidence that we kn ow the

mind of the Sophist w e l l enough to sift the true from the false.

4

Tha t there we re two separate wor ks is undoubte d, but we must remind ours elves at some

s t a g e , as Havelock (op. cit. 418) pertinendy does, that the titles of pre-Platonic works were

probably bestowed not by the author but by Alexandrian scholars with the conceptions of the

Academy, Lyceum and other schools in mind.5

An astou nding amount ha s been built on the entries in Harpocra tion, especia lly frr. 4- 8,

wh ic h afford no justification at all for cr edit ing Antip hon wit h an Eleatic belief that all things are

one, and sense-experience (sig ht, smell etc.) is illus ory, as Freeman does (Comp. 395, cf. Unter

steiner, Λ «/> /Ι Λ . 258, n. 5).

2 87



The Men

interest.1

Fr. 52 makes the 'phi losophical ' observation that y o u can't

take back your l i fe like a m o v e at draughts ,2

others comment in a

commonplace vein o n misplaced hesitation (55) and on consort ing

with flatterers instead o f true friends (65). Fr. 63 reads 'When they

k n o w the diathesis (setting in order, arrang ement) they list en', andM o m i g l i a n o in his article in Riv. diβ ίο ι. ( 1 9 3 0 ) built o n this, in con

junction with certain fragments o f the Truth, an interesting and v e r y

probable reconstruction o f a basic tenet underlying and unit ing A n t i

phon's philosophy o f the universe an d o f m a n . In fr. 24a w e read:

'An tip hon applied the w o r d diathesis to mind ( γ ν ώ μ η ) or i n t e l l i g e n c e . . .

In the second book o n T r u th he also uses it for the ordering o f the

universe ( δ ι α κ ό σ μ η σ η ) ' ; and in fr. 2: ' F o r all m en mind ( γ ν ώ μ η )

controls their body in matters o f health and disease and every th ing

e l s e . ' With these goes fr. 14: ' Depr iv ed o f material she would order

(δ ι α θ ε ϊ τ ο ) many goo d t hings badly .' ( T h e subject is generally taken

to be nature, b u t could now equally b e mind o r γ ν ώ μ η . ) Momigl iano ' s

conclusion is that Ant iphon sa w a single active rational principle at

w o r k in both man and nature, an idea which he could w e l l have taken

from the Nous o f Anaxagor as .3

I f ee l some difficulty in reconcil ing

this with his alleged denial o f providence (fr. 12), b u t from such sorry

fragments w e cannot hope for anything like a compl ete insight into

his tho ugh ts. Mo mi gl ia no him sel f thinks this active principle, wh i ch

otherwise would b e a completely autonomous natura naturans, must

be distinct from the supremely self-sufficient being mentioned in

fr. 10, and it is just conceivable that this possibility m a y conceal (for

one cannot sa y it reveals) the solut ion.

O f the Stobaeus extracts, three express deep pessimism. Fr. 49

1

θ ε ε ι δ έ σ τ α τ ο ν , not θ ε α ι δ έ σ τ α τ ο ν ( ' go d- f ea r in g ') , mu st s ur el y be correct (pace Nesde

VMûL, 382), in view of Photius's lemma. Momigliano (Riv. di β ίο ι. 1930, 129) thought that

in 45-7 Antiphon w a s giving examples of those living closest to the state of nature, his ideal,

whereas fo r Altwegg ( see Greene, Moira, 233, n. 78) they were 'types of man's wretchedness'.

(Both vie ws existed earlier, Nestle, VMûL, 382, n. 50.) Bignone (Studi, 86) connected them with

Antiphon's assertion in O.P. 1364 that there was no difference between Greeks and barbarians:

Antiphon's purpose, he thought, w a s probably to bring out that among the most barbaric

peoples there were traces of humanity and social l i fe . T h e names in Harpocration afford not the

slightest evidence for an y of these conjectures.

3 From Harpocradon. T h e wordiy anthologizer Stobaeus quotes a longer version of the

same sentiment under the name of Socrates! See Untersteiner, Sof. i v , 1 3 1 .3

Antiphon's interest in cosmology and natural philosophy has already been noted (p. 203

above).

2 8 8



Antiphon s Moral Aphorisms

is on m arr iag e (see p . 287, n. 3, a b o v e ) . I f a w i f e proves unsuitable ,

divorce is tiresome and makes enemies of friends, but keeping her is

painful. A good w i f e br in gs joy , bu t pain lur ks roun ds the cor ner . It is

ba d en o u g h to ha ve to lo o k after one' s o w n health, dail y need s and

g o o d name, but care is doubled when there are two. Children bringno th in g but w o r r y , and so on take the spri ng out o f y o u r step and the

b l o o m from your cheeks. L i f e , says fr. 50, is like a day on watch-duty—

just a single day to look at the light, then we hand it over to our suc

cessors ; and fr. 51 abuses it roundly: it has no greatness or nobility,

no th in g but wh at is small, we ak , sho rt-l ived and shot thr ou gh wit h

gr ievous pains. 53 an d 53a attack mise rs and thos e w h o l i v e in the

present l i f e as i f pr ep ari ng for ano the r, and s o let the tim e slip by(and ' t i m e ' , he sa ys in fr. 77, 'i s the mo st co stl y th in g that one ex

pends'), and 54 simply retells a fable of A e s o p o n the same th em e and

concludes that i f G od g i v e s a man wealth but not sense he in fact

deprives him o f bo th . T w o mo re are merely com mon pl ace s, 62

(character form ed b y the co mp an y ke pt ) and 64 (ol d friendshi ps mo re

necessary than n e w ) . Fr . 58, alre ady no ted (p. 259 ab o v e ), has mo re

individuali ty, with i ts warning that ind ulg ence in the imme dia te im pulse may get one into greater trouble than se l f -mastery. (A young

man's urge to marry might be an example of this, as w e l l as the urge to

assault a neighbour.) It could w e l l have stood in the same context as

59, that a ma n ca nn ot be called self -con tro lled if he has nev er be en

tem pte d. Fr. 61 is the stron ges t card in the han d o f tho se w h o wa nt to

argue that the teaching of On Concord (from which they assume it to

come, th ou gh Sto baeu s doe s not say so) is irreconcilable w i th that of the

Truth, bu t it is ha rd ly a tru mp . It be gi ns b y par aph ras ing a line o f

Sophocles which says that there is no greater e v i l than anarchy ,1

but

g o e s on to app ly this sol ely to the upb ri ng in g of ch il dr en : it is the

reason w h y ' th e men o f o ld ' accust omed children from the start to

su bm it to co nt ro l and d o as th ey are tol d, to sav e th em fr om ge tt in g

too great a shock when they grow to manhood and f ind things very

different. He nc e the imp ort an ce o f edu cat ion (fr. 60), for a g o o d

endi ng depends on a g o o d begi nnin g.

1

Ant. 672. Bignone (Studi, 140) thought Sophocles dependent on Anti phon. W e shall never

know.

289



The Men

I f w e may assume the fragments to be genuine, o r at least those which

bear an individual stamp, o n e thing that seems certain about An ti ph on

is that, for his t ime, he was a considerable psychologist. H e w a s

certainly ahead of the advocates of the ' do -as -you- l ike ' theory o f

educati on, especially popu lar wi ththe

intelligentsiaof the 1930s, in

realizing that this was n o preparation for adult l i f e , in which i f one does

not submit to the discipline imposed by the communi ty one is in for

some harsh experiences (fr. 61). Hi s phi losophy o f l i fe is a refined and

intellectual hedonism. O n e must plan to ge t the maximum o f pleasure

and the minimum o f suffering from ou r brief and imperfect existence,

and this could not be achieved in a comp let ely anarchic soci ety,

where everyone w a s free to act on the impulse of the moment , and

assaulted his neighbour at eve ry opportunity. Such behaviour w ou ld

v e r y soon bring i ts o w n nemesis. T o acknowledge this is no t to deny

that (as he says in fr. 44 A) laws are artificial and often bad, or that

while l i v i n g in such a w a y as no t to destroy their framework a m an ma y

disregard the la w for his o w n ends whenever he ca n d o so undetected

and wit h impun ity.

It is in this psyc hol ogi cal conn exio n that o n e must see the 'art of

painless l i v i n g ' ( τ έ χ ν η ά λ υ τ τ ία ς ), as to w h ich I should like to g o on

the assumpti on ( dev iat ing perhaps , as an occasional luxury, from the

strictest standards o f scholar ly cr i t icism)1

that the s tory in the Lives

of the Orators (ps.-Plut. 833 c, D K , A 6) is founded o n fact and refers t o

the same Antiphon w h o wrote On Truth? I f there were several A n t i -

1

I was seriously taken to task b y a reviewer of vo l. ι for report ing withou t comment C icer o's

statement that Anaximander gave the Spartans warning of an earthquake, and suggesting that he

might have done it by a method s t i l l employed (according to The Times) in modern Greece.

I confess that in this compar ativ ely unimport ant matter I thought readers might l i k e to know

the titbit about the storks without caring too much about the verification (no longer possible)

of Cicero's remark.

* Η . N . Fowler (Loeb Plut. x , 3 47 n.) and most others have supposed that the Sophist is

meant. There is no other authority except that Philostratus, also in a l i fe of the Rhamnusian,

s a y s that he 'announced a course of sorrow-assuaging ( ν η τ τ ε ν β ε ϊ ς ) lectures, claiming that no

one could tell hi m of a grief so terrible that he could not expel it from his mind' . ' Consolation-

literature' later became a regular genre (cf. Greene, Moira, 232), and many have supposed the

w or d τ έ χ ν η i n τ . ά λ υ τ Κ α ς to have been used in the sense of a written work, which Altw egg

even identified w it h Π . ο μ ο ν ο ία ς ( ' i r r i g ' St enz el , ' h a ld os ' D K ), but the context makes this

h i g h l y improbable, and in Plato (Symp. i86e) σ υ ν έ σ τ η σ ε ν τ ή ν ή μ ε τ έ ρ α ν τ έ χ ν η ν means 'founded

ou r ( the physicians ') ar t ' . (Cf. σ υ ν ε σ τ ή σ α τ ο in pseudo-Plut.) Morrison (Proc. Camh. Ph. Soc.

1 9 6 1 , 57) conjectures that the ' c l i n i c ' w a s originally a comic invention l i k e the phrontisterion

of the Clouds.

290



Antiphon as Psychologist

291

phons , the wri ter h as probably confused them. H is subject is Ant iphon

o f Rhamnus , a n d , after saying that sixty orations are ascribed t o h im ,

he adds that h e also wrote tragedies and' invented an art o f painlessness

comparable to the medical therapy of the diseased. In Cor in th h e

fitted up a r o o m near th e agora a n d advertised that he could cure thedistressed b y words . Wha t he d id was t o bring consolat ion to those in

t rouble b y questioning them as t o th e causes. ' T o suggest that Ant iphon

set u p the first psychiatric clinic is at an y rate n o more improbable than

some proposed explanations, e . g . that the techne in this case w a s a

wri t ten work. H e knew, after all, that the roots o f phys ical il lness wer e

to b e sought in the mind (fr. 2) an d that it could sometimes b e explained

as an escape-route from active l i fe (praxis, fr. 57 ). It is in keeping wi th

Ant iphon ' s ph i losophy o f the hedonic calculus, h is advocacy o f self-

mastery and deprecation o f yie ld ing to the pleasures a n d impulses o f

the mome nt, that the ideal so ugh t sho uld be a negat ive one, freedom from

pain. Bignone (Studi, 83) justly compares this state o f calm content

(alypid) w i th th e euthymia o f D e m o c r i t u s and the ataraxia o f E p i c u r u s . A

utilitarian hedonism, h e adds, was undo ubte dly the basis o f A n t i p h o n ' s

ethics, bu t in the moderate form upheld by these two other philosophers.

O f th e ethical doctrines o f the Truth, whi ch have been expou nded

in earlier chapters a n d o f necessity referred to in the present account,

w e need on ly remind ourselve s that they were based o n a sharp c o n

trast be tween physis a n d nomos to the advantage o f t he former. Nature

compels us to avo id pain an d seek the maximum o f pleasure, fo r pain is

harmful an d pleasure beneficial. O n e should therefore f o l l o w th e dic

tates o f conven t ion and the laws only in so far as flouting them fo r

one's immediate pleasure would bring more pain in the form o f punish

ment o r disgrace. (There is n o suggest ion o f destroying them b y open

rebell ion.) Moreover nature k n o w s n o distinctions o f class o r race.

S o far as w e know anything about Concord, i t m a y seem t o s h o w a

different emphasis, b u t nothing t o make o n e suppose that i t w a s no t

wri t ten by the same m a n , perhaps at a different stage o f l i f e , bu t i n

v o l v i n g n o convers ion to contrary convict ions. In fact , however, in

spite o f many attempts, the attested fragments o f this work, o r testi

monies to i ts contents , a re insufficient to prov ide th e basis o f any con

t inuous argument.



The Men

T h e r e is no need t o repeat h is v i e w s o n language, whi ch, l ike h is

ethics an d doubtless n o t uncon nect ed wi th them, seem to have been

based on the nomos-physis antithesis (p . 204) a n d l inked with a n

o n t o l o g y a l lowing a place t o both reality an d appearances ( p p . 202 f .) .

A s y e t unnoticed are his interesting observation about time (fr. 9),

that i t has n o substantive existence but is a mental concept o r means

o f measurement ,1

an d his attempt t o square the circle b y a method o f

exhaustion which Aristotle crit icized as not based o n geometr ical

pr inciples.2

A D D I T I O N A L N O T E : T H E I D E N T I T Y O F A N T I P H O N

Hermogenes (3rd century A .D . , D K A 2) is the first extant writ er to dist inguish

two Antiphons, though he says that Didymus did so some 200 years earlier.

There were several of the name, b u t ' t w o w h o practised sophistry', (a)

the orator, cited as author o f speeches o n homicide cases, political speeches,

and suchlike logoi, (b) the one w h o is also said to have been a diviner and

interpreter o f dreams, to whom are ascribed On Truth, On Concord, and a

Politicus. Hermogenes himself is convinced o n grounds o f style that these

are different people, bu t when he reads what Plato and others say (Plato,

Menex. 236a, mentions Antiphon o f Rhamnus as a teacher o f rhetoric) he

is again thrown into doubt. Many cal l Thucydides a pupil o f the Rhamnusian,

whom he knows as the author o f the forensic speeches, ye t he finds Thucy-

dides's style more like that of the Truth. In any case he thinks it necessary to

treat the tw o as separate, because the difference between the tw o groups o f

writing is so great.

O f the many modern discussions, I summarize Bi gnone's , wh ich is the

fullest and most judicious.3

A f t e r citing Hermogenes, he remarks that it is

strange that n o contemporary distinguishes between t w o such famous m enl i v i n g in Athens at the same time. Moreover w e are told the orator's deme

1

This is d ie earliest extant Greek definition of time, fo r that ascribed to Archytas (Iambi.

ap. Simpl. Phys. 786, 1 1 ) , even i f genuine, would be a little later. Aristotle (Phys. 223321) also

doubted whether there could be time without thinking beings, for time, he said, is not simply

succession but 'succession in so far as it is numbered ' (ibid. 2 1 5 ^ 2 ) , and nothing can be numbered

or counted i f there is no one to count. H e s a y s in agreement with Antiphon that time i s a measure

('the measure of motion and rest ' , ibid. 22ob32, 22 ib22) , b u t also that the relations between

time and motion are reciprocal: ' w e n o t only measure motion b y time but also rime b y motion,

because they are defined b y each o ther ' (ibid. 220b 1 4 ) .

J

Phys. 1 8 5 3 1 4 . It is explained in detail b y Simplicius (Phys. 54, see Antiphon fr. 13 DK),

whose description is summarized b y Freeman, Comp. 397.3

' A . oratore ed A. sofista', in Studi, 1 6 1 ^ 7 4 .

2 92



The Identity of Antiphon

293

and his father's name, but not those o f the Sophist (Gomperz, S. u. R. 58),

and pseudo-Plutarch, writing about the Rhamnusian orator (832c), says

that he had conversations with Socrates as recorded b y Xenophon. That

Xenophon called him 'Antiphon the Sophist' is not against the identity,

and Croiset supposed him to be distinguishing the orator-cum-Sophist from

others including the tragedian.1

Aristotle always refers to 'Antiphon'simply, without feeling the need for a distinguishing title. T h e chronology

o f both is about the same. T h e orator died in 411 (Thuc. 8.68), and the dis

pute with Socrates in Xenophon is probably earlier than this, because

Plato, who became Socrates's follower after this date, says nothing about it.

[I should not attach much weight to this argument.] T h e orator was born

c. 480 ( B l a s s , Att. Bereds. i2

, 94ft.) and probably wrote the extant orations

late in life, after 427, because they show the influence o f Gorgias. Cou ld he

not have been Sophist-philosopher first and orator later? (Croiset thoughtit probable.) T h e oratoi shows marked sophistic characteristics, and both

o f them taught the young and had schools (for the orator o f Rhamnus see

Plato, Menex. 236a, for the Sophist Xen. Mem. 1.6) and took fees . (Bignone's

references for this are Xen. ibid., pseudo-Plut. 833 [doubtful?], Diod. ap.

C l e m . A l . r . 365, 2.66 D . , Amm . Marc. 30.4 and the papyrus o f Antiphon's

Apology published b y N i c o l e , REG, 1909, 55.) Th e orator had an active

political l ife , and the Sophist rebuked Socrates for taking no part in politics

( X e n . loc. cit.).

On the argument from style, already used b y Hermogenes, Bignone says

that the papyrus fragments, the most extensive that w e have o f the Sophist,

do in fact suggest that he was not also the orator, but on the other hand this

is a somewhat subjective criterion and the same man might have changed his

style during his lifetime. However , there is also a strong historical argument.

The orator wa s a pugnacious aristocrat and oligarch (Thuc. 8.68, 89, 90,

A r i s t . Ath. Pol. 32), whereas fr. 44 Β of the Sophist expresses extreme

democratic sentiments. A l s o the orator wa s an emphatic upholder o f the

l a w s , as is shown b y many passages in his speeches, wh ic h again contrasts

strongly with the Sophist. Bignone's final conclusion therefore was that

orator and Sophist were different persons (though he thought that the Sophist

could w e l l be the diviner and writer on dreams).

1

A s to the tragedies, it is b y no means impossible that a Sophist should write them, and it is

interesting that one line employs a form of the ν ό μ ο ς - φ ύ σ ι ς antithesis, of which Antiphon the

Sophist w a s such an enthusiastic exponent (fr. 4 Nauck: τ έ χ ν η κ ρ α τ ο ϋ μ ε ν ώ ν φ ύ σ ε ι ν ι κ ώ μ ε θ α ) .

On the other hand the tradition associates the tragedian (as the Rhamnusian) with Dionysius I

of S y r a c u s e , which some have thought puts him later than the Sophist (Vit. or. and Gnomol.

Vindob. A 6 and 9 DK), tho ugh Wil am owi tz felt this no objection (Platon, 1, 84, n. 1.). T h e

Rhamnusian w as k i l l e d in 4 1 1 , but we know nothing of ho w long the Sophist l i v e d if h e is a

different man.



The Men

This is the conclusion which has found most favour, so that Stenzel could

begin his article in the RE (suppl. i v , 33) 'Antiphon, o f Athens, to be dis

tinguished, as is n o w generally recognized, as a Sophist from the orator o f

Rhamnus' , and Untersteiner (Sophs. 228 f.) simply refer to Bignone and add

Ί do not think that there is any occasion to re-examine the question'.

However, J. S. Morrison in 1961 reopened it, and maintained that the orator

whose speeches w e possess w a s identical with the Sophist w h o wrote the

Truth and the Concord and is shown arguing with Socrates in the Memora

bilia of Xenop hon. Thi s provo ked a sharp retort from S. Luria, wh o quoted

f ree ly from the speeches to show that the orator, whom Thucydides (8.90.1)

named as an extreme oligarch, and singled out among the Four Hundred

as one w ho wa s particularly strongly opposed to democracy, could not

possibly have held the left-wing v i e w s expressed in the papyrus fragments

o f the Truth. These are b y one w h o rejects the laws in favour o f 'nature ' ,

and is a fervent preacher o f egalitarianism. T h e speeches reveal an ultra-

conservative, w h o upholds the laws in the traditional manner as sacred,

and all the better for having lasted through centuries unchanged (Or. 5.14,

6.2). ' I t does not do ' , he continues, ' t o start from the accuser's speech and

ask whether the laws are w e l l founded or not ; w e must rather judge the

accuser's speech b y the l a w s , and see whether he is setting forth the matter

rightly and lawfully.' T h e speech-writer is moreover an enthusiastic sup

porter of the traditional religion, praising the gods and exhorting to worship

and sacrifice in terms impossible (says Luria) for one w h o denied divine

providence as did the author o f Truth (fr. 12). 1

(6) T H R A S Y M A C H U S

Thrasymachus came from Chalcedon on the Bosporus , a c o l o n y o f

Megara. T h e only fixed points from which t o j udge h is date are (1) The

Banqueters o f Aristophanes, produced in 427, i n w hic h he is made funo f ( D K, A 4); (2) a sentence from on e o f h i s speeches (fr. 2) w h i c h

shows i t to have been written during t he rule o f Archelaus o f Macedon

over Thessa ly (413-399). T he r e is an obscure hint that h e m a y have

1

Morrison in PCPS, 1 9 6 1 , Lur ia in Eos 1963. O f course, i f Kerferd were right i n supposing

that th e views expressed in the papyrus fragments were not Antiphon's at all (p. 108 above) ,

most of Luria 's argument wou ld fa l l to the gr ound ; but I find n o evidence in them that Antiphon

i s simply setting forth the ideas of others fo r examination, an d Kerferd seems someti mes t o raise

imaginary difficulties in order to dispose of them b y this hypothesis (especially on p. 28). Nesde

(VMiuL, 394) adopted an unusual division, attributing Truth and the tetralogies to the Sophist,

and Concord to the Rhamnusian. F o r further references see Morr ison , loc. cit. 50, n. 1, an d for an

excellent brief survey, culminating in a non liquet, Lesky , HGL, 353 f.

294



A Speech by Thrasymachus

295

committed suicide.1

He wa s known primarily as a teacher o f rhetoric,

in which he wa s something of an innovator, and most of the extant

references to him are concerned with his style. In writ ing his hand

b o o k s and model speeches he paid great attention to the technical

details o f the art, and experimented with the use o f prose-rhythms, as

w e l l as developing the appeal to the emotions o f an audience (Plato,

Phaedr. 267c). Aristotle (Soph. el. 183 b 31) called him a successor o f

T i s i a s , and Theophrastus named him as the inventor o f the so-called

'middle s tyle ' (fr. 1). The only considerable fragment o f his writ ing

w h i c h has survived w a s preserved b y Dionys ius o f Halicarnassus

s o l e l y as an example o f his style. H e wa s a Sophist in the fu l l sense,

w h o charged for his instruction (Rep. 337d), travelled to fore ign cities,

and though specializing in rhetoric w a s prepared to answer ethical

questions also. His teaching on justice seems to have been w e l l k n o w n .

I n the Republic (loc. cit.) he c l a i m s a fee for it, an d in the Clitophon

the young m a n threatens to desert Socrates for Thrasymachus, w h o ,

he thinks, is better informed on this subject.

T h e sur vi vi ng passage o f his works (fr. 1) is the opening o f a speech

to the Athenian Assembly. A s a foreigner he could no t have delivered

it himself, but it reads like a genuine contribution to a debate held in

the later stages o f the Peloponnesian w a r rather than a mere school-

p i e c e . T h e speaker feels it necessary to begin b y apologiz ing for his

you th .2

T h e rule that y o u n g m e n should keep silence w as a g o o d one

s o long as the older generation were managing affairs competently,

but those for w h o m the prosperity o f the city is only hearsay and its

disasters their o w n experience3

—disasters moreover which cannot be

blamed on heaven or chance bu t only on the incompetence o f those in

charge—must speak out. He cannot submit to deliberate mismanage

ment or carry the blame for the unprincipled plotting o f others. W e

have seen, he s a y s , the city pass from peace to wa r and peril and from

internal harmony to quarrelling and confusion. Elsewhere it is pros-

1

Nestle (VMtuL, 348) states this as a fact, but it depends on a corrupt line of Juvenal ( 7 .

204), in which some editors prefer th e reading 'Lys imac hi' , with the comment of the scholiast

'rhetoris apud Athenas qui suspendio periit' (DK, 85 A 7 ) .2

That the prooimion should engage the audience's sympathy was a textbook maxim. See

Theodectes in Rose, Arist.frr., Berlin ed. vol . v, 1499 a 2

7 32

>a n < l Arist. Rket. 3, chapter 14.

3

In this imperfectly preserved clause I have followed Havelock's rendering, which seems to

combine Blass's τ ά ς μ έ ν Ε ΰ τ τ ρ α ξ ί α ς with th e τ τ ά σ χ ε ι ν of Diels. Thi s makes good sense.



The Men

perity that leads to arrogance and faction,1

but we kept our heads in

the good times and have lost them in adversity. The parties are simply

fighting mindlessly for power. They may think their policies are

opposed but in fact there is no real difference between them. What, if

one go es ba ck to first principles, are bo th sides loo k ing for? In the

first place it is the ques tio n of the 'ancestral co ns ti tu ti on' wh i ch th ro ws

them into con fusion, th ou gh it is the easiest th in g to gra sp and mo re

than an yt hi ng else the con cer n of the wh ol e citizen b o d y. Th e n in the

last sentence of the extract, pres uma bly wi th his o w n com par ati ve

youth still in mind, the speaker says that for matters go in g back bey ond

our experi ence w e mus t rely on the accou nts of former gener atio ns or,

wh e n the y are wi th in the me mo r y of older men , learn direct from th em.

T h e speech is ma in ly of poli tica l interest, and the reference t o the

'ancestral constitution' suggests that it was written by an oligarch,

's om e y ou n g aristocrat o f Spartan sympathie s' . Hav elo ck ho we ve r

is impressed b y its 'no n-pa rti san quality, its air o f obj ect iv ity , its

plea for clar ity o f t hi nk ing ' , and sees in it ' a serious intell ectual

posi tion , a rationale o f political beh av io ur and meth od, if not a the ory

o f polities'. Certainly its main plea is the timeless one for e f f i c i e n c y

and principle in government, and for reconciliation between the

parties to that end.2

Its cou nse l w o u l d be no less useful tod ay , and

the point that party struggle is based on the thirst for power rather

than on fundamental differences o f p o l i c y has an unc omf or ta bly familiar

sound.

This is the onl y indep endent passage b y wh ic h w e can ho pe to j ud ge

the fairness or oth erw ise o f Pla to' s sketch o f Th ra sy ma ch us in the

Republic(p p. 88 ff. abo ve) . T h e spe ech is co mp os ed for a client to

deliver, but let us g i v e Thrasymachus the credit for not writing any

thing that wa s against his o w n principl es. It ma y fairly be sup pos ed

that he cou ld onl y put the arg ume nt in so co nv in ci ng a form i f his o w n

mind w as behind it. Ev er yt hi ng , o f course, depends on wha t v i e w w e

1

Thi s accords wit h the common Greek view that κ έ -pos breeds ύ β ρ ι ς , but Thucydides

woul d not have agreed wi th the speaker . Cf. 3. 8 2. 2: ' In peace and prosperi ty cities and in di

viduals behave more sensibly because they are not forced to act against their w i l l , but war which

deprives them of their d a i l y cheer is a harsh s choolmaster and reduce s the temper of most me n

to the level of their cir cumstances .'2

ο μ ό ν ο ι α , concord or conse nsus. On the importa nce of this concept cf. pp. 149 f. above,

t o r ll av el oc k's analysis and appraisal of the piece see his L.T. 233—9.

296



Plato on Thrasymachus

take o f the scene in the Republic. Th at P lato disliked him is plain e no ug h

from the outb urst s o f rudeness and bad temper in w h i c h he ma ke s hi m

indulge (though his pugnacity and sharp tongue are almost the only

other things independ ently recorded of hi m) .1

If ho we ve r m y interpre

tation has been correct, that he speaks there in a m o o d o f bitter dis

illusionment as w e l l as opposition to what in his v i e w is the facile

opt imi sm o f Socrates, and if w e al lo w for a certain exa gge rat ion due to

Pl at o' s desire to prese nt tw o hu ma n characters in dramati c contr ast,

the incompatibility between the dialogue and the speech is at least

mitig ated. G ov er nm en ts , he declares in the former, rule for their o w n

aggrandizement and justice is the name given to obedience to their

l a w s : it means se rvi ng the interests o f others. Ac c or d i n g to his an gr y

l o g i c , i f a subj ect see k p o w e r for himself, this is injust ice. T o be jus t,

he should obey the laws which the rulers have laid down in their own

interests. If however his 'injustice' is successful and he becomes a

ruler and law gi ve r hims elf (and the tyrant, s ays Th ra sy ma ch us , is

the supreme e xampl e o f injustice), ev er yo ne w i l l flatter rather than

bl am e hi m. Trea son doth never prosper. What 's the reason?

Fo r if it prosper, none dare ca l l it treason.

Justice, then, does not pay, and the man who observes it is noble but

a simpleton (348 c ) . Th es e, he says bru tal ly, are the facts, and y o u

cann ot ge t aw ay from them. H e is on ly descri bing, wi th cynic al realism,

wh at he sees aro und him. At he ns , as Th uc yd id es consta ntly reminds

us , reached the hei ght o f her po we r, and ende avo ure d to maintain it,

b y acting on the b e l i e f t h a t ' the only law in earth or heaven is that the

str ong should subdue the w e a k ' (T hu c. 5.105.2) . Bu t, b y the later

year s o f the Pelopo nne sia n Wa r , the pursuit o f this ph il os op hy in

externa l relatio ns and do mes tic poli tics wa s thre aten ing to lead to

defeat from outside and internal disintegratio n. T h e po li cy o f domi na

tion and oppressi on no long er wo r k e d to the adv ant age of At he ns ,

and, as it br ok e do w n , internal faction and strugg les for p o w e r o nl y

made t hings wor se . T h e Thr asy mac hus o f the polit ical speech doe s

not deny that the earlier po li cy w as ri gh t for its tim e, indeed he calls it

sophrosyne2—'in the g o o d times w e kep t ou r he ad s' —b ut it no

1

Arist. Rhet. 1 4 0 0 b 19 and 1 4 1 3 3 7 .

' Just as in the Republic he c a l l s injustice 'good counsel' , ε υ β ο υ λ ί α (p. 90 above).

297



The Men

298

longer w o r k s . He is no less o f a realist, bu t the Athe ni an s mus t learn

to adapt themse lve s to ch an ge d circu mstan ces. T h e y cann ot afford the

luxury o f an internal stru ggle for po we r. T o quot e Hav el oc k agai n

( Ζ . Γ . 2 3 4 ) :

T o begin with, he assumes that the purpose o f government is to be successful

and efficient; this is the criterion by which it should be ju d g e d . . . He

assumes that prosperity and disaster are not god -g iv en but man-made; and,

s e c o n d l y , that it is the purpose o f any governmen t to preserve the one and

a v o i d the o t h e r . . . Traditional piety, and the archaic fatalism of the Gree k

temper, seem to be rejected.

T h e character depi cted b y Pla to w o u l d no t ha ve quarrelled wit h these

assu mpti ons, no r w o u l d the ma n w h o , to quo te a final bit o f in de pe n

dent ev id en ce (fr. 8, p. 97 ab o v e ) , affirmed that the go ds to ok no heed

o f hu ma n affairs, or th ey w o u l d no t a ll ow justi ce to be set aside as it is .

Plato has shown his worst side, perhaps relying on things that he said

or wr ot e wh en Ath en s wa s at the heig ht o f her p o we r and arro ganc e

(the most l i k e l y dramatic date for the Republic is ab ou t 322), bu t w e

need f e e l no doubt that it w as on e side o f the real ma n.

(7) C R I T I A S

C r i t i a s1

would seem to provide Plato with the perfect example of a

fine nature ruined b y the soci ety o f his day , and b y sophist ic te ach in g

wi th its emphasis on the attainment o f p o we r and indifference to the

mor al con sequ enc es o f rhetorical and debati ng s k i l l . Weal thy , h igh

born and handsome, he was also richly endowed with philosophic

and liter ary gifts and an eager listener to Soc rat es, ye t desert ed hi m toplay pow er- pol iti cs and ended up as the most bloo dth irs ty and un

scrupul ous membe r o f the Th ir ty . The se men, elected at the end o f

the war to draw up a constitution, made themselves tyrants instead and

massacred their op po ne nt s. He wa s pers ona lly respo nsibl e for the deat h

o f Theramenes, an oligarch like h i m s e l f and a pers onal friend, w h o wa s

u n w i l l i n g to go to such extre mes . In the ey es o f the dem oc ra cy the fact

that Socrat es had associated wi th men lik e Criti as tol d str on gl y agains t1

Where references to authorities are not given in the following paragraphs they can be

found in the accounts of Critias given by Diehl, RE, x i , 1 9 0 2 — 1 2 , and Nestle, VMûL, 400—20.



The Enigma of Critias

299

him. He seems exactly to fit the role of a C a l l i c l e s , or might, one would

think, be designed to prove Plato's point in the Republic (49 id ) that

'the finest nature given the wrong nurture w i l l turn out worse than

the commonest ' and that (495a) ' the very qualities which make a

phi losophic nature w i l l , with bad upbringing, be the cause of his

f a l l i n g away, no less than wealth and other external advantages' . But

doe s Pl at o speak of hi m lik e this? O n the con tra ry, he sho ws hi m o n ly

as an intimate me mb er o f the So crat ic circle , wi th no hint that he was

w o r s e than the rest, and ev er y indi cat ion o f a ge nu in e interest in

philosophy. In the Timaeus and Critias he has a le ad in g ro le , an d the

w h o l e story of Atlantis is told thr ou gh his mout h. T h o u g h wri t in g

ye ar s after his death, Pl at o still th ink s of his unc le Cri ti as wi th r espect

and affection. 1

There is a mystery here which the evidence does not allow us to

s o l v e co mp le te ly . It is lessened , of cou rse, if w e be li ev e w i t h Sir Kar l

Popper that Plat o 'bet ra ye d Soc rates, just as his uncles had do n e'

(O.S. 194). W e can not dec ide that here, but in any case no one would

a c c u s e Plato of co nd on in g the murd erou s excesses o f the Thi rt y, nor

did he, if the Apology and the Seventh Letter (3240-d) are any evidence

at all . There are however certain points to take into account, beginning

w i t h their relatio nship. T h e family wa s an old and distin gui shed on e,

including Solon among its earlier generations, and family feeling

w o u l d be strong. Critias was the son of Callaeschrus and cousin of

Pla to's mot her Peric tione , wh os e father Gl au co n wa s Callae schru s's

brot her, and wh en Gl au co n died her broth er Cha rmi des b ec ame

Critias's ward. Plato would also be attracted by his brilliant intellect

and literary and artistic g i f t s , and undoubtedly they shared the con

v i c t i o n that unbri dled de moc ra cy wa s the ruin o f the state. Aris tot le

w a s o f the same min d, and there is a cur iou s disc repa ncy be tw ee n his

references to Critias and the Th ir ty and the acco unt o f X e n o p h o n in

his Hellenica wh ic h is our sole co nte mpo rar y so urce for the l eadi ng

part played by Critias. In the Constitution of Athens (3 5 if.) he fra nkl y

1 Besides the Timaeus and Critias, he has a part in the Charmides and Protagoras, and also

in the pseudo-Platonic Eryxias. On the question whether the speaker in the Critias was the

sam e one or his gran dfather see Die hl in RE, x i , ioo i f . , Levinson, Defense, 35 9^ , and R osen-

meyer in AJP, 1949. It is only fair to add that in Plato's picture of him in the Charmides

M. J. O'Brien sees 'a self-assertive man more concerned with honour than with t ru t h ' (Socr.

Parad. I 2 4 f . ) .



The Men

relates the atrocities of the T h i r t y and the exec uti on o f T her ame nes

for atte mpti ng to curb them , bu t wit h no men ti on o f Crit ias, and in

the Politics (1305b 26) he names Char ic le s as their leade r. In the

Rhetoric ( i 4 i 6 b 2 6 ) , on the subject of e u l o g i e s , he s a y s , with seemingly

deliberate intent , that if y o u wa nt to praise A c h i l l e s y o u need n ot

recount his deeds, because everyone knows them, but in praising

Critias you must, because they are little known. This may have been

true.1

Philos tratus , wri ti ng in the time o f the 'se co nd So ph is ti c' , said

that his ph il os op hy wa s not tak en seriousl y b y the Gr ee ks becau se his

wo rd s we re difficult to reconci le wi th his character. X en o p ho n 's

acco unt o f his relations wi t h Socrat es (Mem. i . 2 . i 2 f f . ) is that he and

A l c i b i a d e s wer e consu med wit h ambition, and, kn ow in g Socrates 's

mastery of argument, thought that his teac hing wo u l d help th em to

gain their ends. They had no desire to be converted to his way of l i f e ,

and left hi m as so on as th ey thou gh t th ey had learned en ough to attain

their politi cal amb it io ns . In spite of this, such wa s Socra tes' s influence

that so long as they were with him their worst passions were held in

check. T h e break came wh en Socrates pub lic ly reprimanded Critias

for tr yi ng to seduce a y o u t h in their circl e, a hurt for which Critias

neve r for gav e him . Wh e n the Th ir ty came to po we r, he wa s in troublewi th Criti as and C har icl es for his ou ts po ken criti cism o f their co nd uc t,

and as we learn from Plato's own version of his Apology (32 c ) , deliber

ately di so bey ed an order from the m wh ic h wa s desig ned to implicate

him in their guilt.

Co ns id er in g all this, Pla to ma y indeed hav e th ou gh t o f hi m as the

type o f brilliant y o u n g man w h o m he describes in the Republic, with the

roo ts of ph il os op hy in hi m and an immen se capaci ty for g o o d b utalso for harm if his en vi ro nme nt c orr upte d him . Unf ort una tel y it did,

and the sto ry o f his e v i l latter day s wa s on ev er yo ne 's lips. T o redress

the bala nce, and ou t o f reg ret for one wh o wa s his relative and at one

time a co mp an io n o f his master S ocrates, Plato on this hyp oth esi s w i l l

ha ve conc ent rat ed on the earlier, happ ier year s o f ho pe and pr om is e.

He reserved his attack for the corrupting forces which he considered

responsible for the dow nfa ll o f such prom isi ng yo u n g men, the licence

and mo b- or at or y prev ail ing und er the de mo cr ac y and the rh etorical

1

See Diehl in RE, x i , ic>iof.

300



Critias: Character and Beliefs

301

teachers who claimed that the art o f spe aki ng had no th in g to do w i t h

moral standards.1

Critias died in c i v i l war against the democrats in 403, when he is

generally believed to have been about fifty. He first appears in politics

in 415, w h en wi th others o f his persua sion he wa s im pri son ed forcompl ic i ty in the mut ilat ion o f the Herm ae. H e w as bo th a bitter

oppo nent o f dem ocr acy and violent ly pro-Spartan, and ma y have

be en , wi t h his father, a me mb er o f the Fo ur H un dr ed in 41 1 .z

H o w e v e r ,

he wa s not im med ia te ly exiled after their f a l l , and helped to engineer

the recall o f Al ci bi ad es . Late r the de mo cr ac y did exile hi m and he

we nt to Thess aly , wh er e if he did not conso rt with G or gi as persona lly

the intelligentsia w er e steeped in his teach ing.3 Af te r the capit ulat iono f Athens in 404 he re turned, and wa s elected one of the co mm is si on

o f Thirty, with the consequences that ha ve been m enti oned .

Cr it ia s wa s no t o f cour se a Sophi st in the full sense of a pai d teacher,

but it has been fairly said t h a t ' in his personality we find a union of all

the impulses of the sophistic mo ve me nt , wh os e peri od o f Sturm und

Drang reached a sy mb ol ic end in his dramatic dea th ' (L es ky , HGL,

357). W e ha ve seen that he shared wi th Prota goras , Demo cri tu s andothers a bel ief in the progre ssi ve ev ol ut io n o f man kin d b y their o w n

efforts, that he th ou gh t o f la ws as neither inherent in human nature

fro m the beg in ni ng no r a gift of an y go ds , and o f rel igi on as a pu re ly

hum an inventi on aimed at prev enti ng lawless behav iour. Re li gio n was

for the subject, to ensure his obe die nce , no t for the enl igh ten ed ruler.

Hi s interest in techni cal prog re ss co me s ou t also in a set o f ele gia cs in

w h i c h he assigns inve ntio ns to particular people s or countri es. T h e yinclude chariots, chairs, beds, working in gold and bronze, writing,

ships, the pot ter 's wh ee l and (curio usly en ou gh ) the ga me o f Kottabos

(fr. 2). Perhaps for this reason, coupled with the close relationship

1

Acco rdin g to Philostratu s, ep. 73 ( C r i t i a s A 1 7 ) , C r i t i a s learned from G org ias but t urn ed his

teaching to his own purposes.2

See Diehl in RE, x i, 1903, Nestle, VMiuL, 401. The only evidence is [Dem.] 5 8 . 6 7 .

Nestle speaks of his 'striking reserve' v i s - a - v i s the Four Hun dred , whi ch he interpr ets as a

concession to the demos to f a c i l i t a t e A l c i b i a d e s ' s return.3 S y o p y l a j o v tv Θ ε τ τ α λ Ι α μ ι κ ρ α ί κ α ΐ μ έ λ ο υ ς τ τ ό λ ε ι ; , Philostr. V.S. 1 . 1 6 (Cri t . Α ι ) .

Cf. Plato, Meno 70a—b. Xenophon {Mem. 1.2.24) c l a i m e d that it was the Thessalians that

corrupted him. Plato's opinion of the country was that it was fu l l of α τ α ξ ί α κ α ΐ α κ ο λ α σ ί α

(Crito 53d). But Philostratus concluded {V.S. 1.16) that it was rather C r i t i a s who corrupted

th e T h e s s a l i a n s .



The Men

be tween arete in general and the craftsman's s k i l l , his aristocratic

sympathies did not prevent him from saying that more men become

g o o d by practice than t h rough natural e n d o w m e n t .1

His literary ou tp ut

was large and diverse, inc lud ing bo th po etr y and prose. His po em in

praise o f Alc ibi ade s revi ves the polit ical e l e g y o f his ancestor So lo n

and of Th eo gn is , th ou gh w it h characteristic bold nes s, since the name o f

Alcibiades resisted incl usi on in dac tyl ic ver se, he substitut ed an i amb ic

for the cus tom ary pentame ter. Th er e is no recor d of his speeche s, bu t

He rmo ge nes (see A 19) ment ions a colle ction o f 'p ro oe mi a for publ ic

spe ake rs' . W e ha ve fragments o f t w o sets o f Politeiai, so called, one

in prose and one in verse. The prose set included one on the Thessalians

(fr. 3i) ,3

where he mentioned their extravagant w a y s , and one on the

Spartans, o f w h i c h the on ly extant fragme nts do not deal wi th their

constitution but with their way of l i f e . He menti ons their d rin kin g

habits and cup s (ma de suitable for use on camp ai gn s) , dress, furniture,

dancing, and the precautions which they take against the Helots, and

praises the eu ge ni c effects o f the hard y reg im e im po se d on me n and

w o m e n alike (frr. 32-7). His poem on the Spartans also deals mainly

wi th their drinking habits, emphasizing their moderation, and a t t r ibut

ing to Chi lo n the s ay in g ' not hin g too m uc h ' ( fr r. 6- 8) .3

Literary interestis shown in his hexameters on Anacreon (fr. 1) and his prose works.

It is combined with aristocratic pride when in fr. 44 he takes A r c h i l o -

chu s to task for ex po si ng his hu mb le birth a nd we akn es ses in his vers e.

T w o b o o k s o f Homilies mus t have been mo re philos ophi c in conten t,

and a quo ta ti on fr om the first tou ch es o n the relation be tw ee n the

mi nd an d the sense s. A t least the cont ex t in Ga le n ma ke s it fairly

certain that 'they' are the senses in the sentence (fr. 40): ' I f y o u

yourse l f study to become strong in intellect, you w i l l be least wronged

b y them . ' T hi s co me s in a passage wh er e Gal en is quo ti ng e xamp les

to prove his point that gnome in earlier times was used with the same

mea nin g as other wo rd s for mind or tho ugh t. He adds tw o mor e quo ta-

1

See pp. 2; 1 and 256 above.2

The manuscripts g i v e the author's name as Cratinus, but the alteration has been accepted

since Casaubon.3

A prose 'Constitution of Athens' has been inferred as the l i k e l i e s t home for two unassignedquotati ons. In one, Critia s charact eristica lly g i v e s the exact amount of the fortunes made out of

politics by Tlie mis toc les and Cl eo n, and in the other he has the effrontery to criticize Cim on

lor his pro-Spar tan poli cy. (Fr r. 45 and 52. See Diehl i n i ? £ , x i , 1908, and Nestle, VMûL, 405.)

302



Critias: Writings

t ions which he says are from the Aphorisms o f Critias (fr. 39) : 'Ne i the r

what he perceives with the rest o f his body n o r what he knows with his

m i n d ' an d ' Men hav e awareness whe n they have accu stom ed themselv es

to b e healthy in their mind'. Aristotle (De an. 405 b 5) says he w a s on e

o f those w h o identified the psyche with blood: regarding sensation as

the mo st typica l characteristi c o f psyche, they believed that i t w a s due

to the nature of the blood. Philoponus in his commentary (after

identifying Critias as ' o n e o f the Thirty ' ) at tr ibuted to hi m the line o f

Empedocles (fr. 105.3) which says that ' t h e blood around the heart is

thought ( ν ό η μ α ) ' . (See Critias, A 23. He m a y have learned o f E mpedo-

clean theor y from Gor gia s.) In fact Empedocles, and evidently also

Critias, distinguished tho ugh t from sensation, th ou gh cons ide rin g

both to be equally corporeal phenomena. T h e Hippocratic treatise o n

the heart uses the w o r d gnome when it declares that the mind rules the

rest o f the psyche and resides in the left ventricle. (See on this vol. n ,

229 with n . 2.)

Critias also wrote dramas. W e have excerpts from three tragedies,

the Tennes, Rhadamanthys and Peirithous, and the l on g passage from

the satyr-play Sisyphus containingthe

theoryo f

the origino f

re l ig ion.1

T h e Rhadamanthys (fr. 15) contains a list of the various objects o f

men's longing. Similar lists were commonplace,2

b u t Critias's has

s o m e touches of the sophistic ag e . Health is missing, and w e have,

besides high birth and wealth, the power and audacity to persuade

one's neighbours o f what is unsound. T h e speaker then declares that

his o w n choice is to have a f i n e reputation. T w o choric fragments o f

the Peirithous are cosmological . Fr. 18 speaks o f unwearied Time

endlessly bringing itself t o birth in unceasing f l o w , and in fr. 19 the

epithet 'self-born' suggests that it is again Time that is addressed as

embracing all nature in the heavenly whirl, while light and darkness,

and the innumerable host o f stars, perform their endless dance around

him. Clement o f Alexandria, w h o quotes the passage, took ' t h e

1

P p . 243 ff. above. T h e reader should be warned that all were commonly attributed to

Euripides in antiquity, though the Vita Eur. rejected the tragedies ( C r i t i a s fr. 1 0 ) , and the Sisyphus

is given to Critias b y Sextus. They were rescued for him by Wilamowitz , N. Job. 1908, 57;

Hermes, 1927, 291 f.; and Analecta Eurip. 166. Schmid s t i l l had reservations about Critias's

authorship (Gesch. 176) .!

Cf. the sclinlion on the good things of l i fe , Diehl, Anth. Lyr. no. 7 (11, 183) with the

various autlioinic. 1 in-d.

303



The Men

304

self-born' to be ' the demiurgic nous',1

no doubt with Plato rather than

Anaxagoras in mind, but most scholars have seen a suggestion of

Ana xa go ra s in the passage as a w ho le . Mor e prom ine nt is the e f f e c t o f

Orphic cosmogonies or of Pherecydes of S y r o s , where Chronos

( T i m e ) appears as a primeval creative power. Evidently Critias (assum

ing that he and no t Eur ipi des is the aut hor ) shared Eu rip ide s' s interest

in cosmological speculat ion.2

A fe w further q uot at ion s from this pl ay

in Stob aeus' s an th ol og y are easy to reconci le wi th Cri tias as w e k n o w

h i m :3

fr. 21 ' H e had no unp ract ised mi nd w h o first said that fortune

fights on the side o f the w i s e ' ; fr. 23 'Better not to l i v e at all than to

l i v e miserably ' ; and fr . 22 on the sup eri ori ty o f charact er to nomos

(p. 69 above).

W e are left w i t h the pict ure o f a ma n o f brilliant int ellect ual and

artistic g i f t s , pl un gi ng eag erl y into the phil osop hica l discussions of his

time, all the more so as many of them had a direct bearing on political

l i f e . But some of the headier theories consp ired w it h his o w n a mb i

tious, hea dst ron g and unstable character, the pro duc t of gene rati ons

o f politicians and poets, to lead him away from the wisdom of Socrates

to vio le nce , crue lty, and death in c i v i l str ive.

(8) A N T I S T H E N E S

Ant ist hene s is one of those interesting bri dge-f igure s w h o ser ve to

remi nd us h o w mu ch happ ene d in a short space o f time be tw ee n the

ma nh oo d o f Socra tes and the death o f Plato . A s a pupil o f Socrat es,

and reputed teacher of Di og en es and founder o f the C y n i c schoo l ,

his pro per place in the hist ory o f th ou gh t mi gh t see m to be as a

'S oc ra ti c' , after an acc oun t o f Socrates himself. Y e t he li ve d in

the he yd ay o f the Soph ists , pr ob ab ly a little older than Prodicus and

Hip pias , and, as w e hav e seen, wa s dee ply in vo lv ed in the arg ume nt

abo ut the use of la ngu age and the possi bili ty o f cont radi ctio n wh i c h

formed part o f the the ore tic al ba ckgroun d o f fifth-century rh et or ic ,

and in wh ic h Prot agor as pla yed a leading part . Sin ce this has

1 Strom. 2. 40 3. 14 Staehli n, quoted by Na uck on Eur. fr. 5 9 3.1

For Chronos in Orphic cosmogonies and Pherecydes see Guthrie, O. & Gk. Ret. 85-91

and Kirk in KR, 56.

' liv en if we ignore our comp lete i gnora nce of the dramatic context and the speakers.



Antisthenes, a Bridge-figure

305

br ou gh t him into our discussion already, it seems approp riate to ma ke

so me general obser vation s about him n ow . Before co mi ng unde r the

influence o f Socrates, he wa s himse lf a rhetorician and pu pil of Go rg ia s.

In recent times he has be en the subj ect o f v er y var ied ju dg me nt s.

Popper ' s verdic t , that he wa s the on ly w o r t h y successor o f Socrat es,

the last o f the 'G re at Gen era tio n' (O.S. 19 4) , was foreshadowed

b y G r o t e : 'Ant is the nes, and his disciple Di og en es , wer e in m an y

respects closer app rox ima tio ns to Sokr ates than either Plato or any other

o f the Sokra t ic companions ' (Plato, in , 505 ). O n the other hand

Schmid considered that ' i n spite o f his enth usias m for Soc rate s in

Socrates 's last yea rs, his o w n ph il os op hy we nt the w a y o f an un

disciplined free-thinking against which Plato had to be emphatically

on his guard ' (Gesch. 2 7 2 f . ) , and to Campb el l , re lyin g on X en op ho n

and Ar is to tl e, he ' seems to ha ve been the but t of the Socratic school, a

sort o f mixtu re o f A j a x and Thers i tes . . . He fol l owed rather the form

than the spirit o f the Socrat ic te ac hi ng ' (ed. o f Theaet. x l - x l i ) . Karl

Joel 's verdict is also interesting (E. und X. S. 2 5 7 ) :

W h at in Socrates was an unconscious miracle of his nature became in

Ant isthenes a set purpose, a basis for var iety and an artificial product. He

copied the Socratic mo de of life and fanaticized the Socratic teaching,

trust ing thereby to seize upon the essence o f his master, to w ho m he s tood

in the relationship of flagellants imitating a genuine saint, or better of the

Romantics—the poet of Lucinde—to Goethe.

Pe rh ap s the truest statements are tho se o f P op p er (O.S. 2 7 7 ) , that

' V e r y little is k n o w n ab ou t An ti st he ne s from first-rate s o u rc es ', and

Fie ld , that there has be en ' an imm ens e amo un t o f conjec ture and h y p o

t h e s i s a b o u t h i m ' (Plato and Contemps. 1 6 0 ) .

Most o f ou r info rmat ion ab ou t his l i f e and circumstances comes

f rom many centuries later, and must be treated with corresponding

reserve .1

I t was believed that he had founded the C y n i c school and

th ro ug h it influenced the Stoics , and a certain am ou nt o f hinds igh t

m a y ha ve crep t into ac cou nts o f his tea chi ng wr it te n after these

1

The source-material is collected in Caizzi 's Antisthenis Fragmenta, the arrangement of which

i s unus ual. After the title ' Fr am me nti ' the passages are number ed contin uous ly throughout, but

divided into three parts: 'Frr. i — 1 2 1 ' are the testimonia and actual fragments (or what are

reckoned as suc h), 122-44a r

e ' not izi e bio gra fich e' and 1 45-9 5 anecd otes. The re is als o a full

bibliography.



The Men

schools became famous. He wa s said to be the so n o f an Athenian and

a Thracian slave, and hence not an Athenian citizen,1

and to have

fought at Tanagra (D.L . 6. i) , which must refer to the battle there in

426 (Thuc . 3 .91) . Diodorus (15.76) speaks o f him as still alive in 366

and Plutarch (Lycurgus 30) quotes a remark which he made on thebattle o f Leuctra (371). Xenophon (Symp. 4.62) says that he introduced

the Sophist-lover Callias to Prodicus and Hippias, and speaks o f h im

in general as an older m an than himself and Plato, s o (al though w e

have n o certain informa tion) abou t 455-360 w i l l no t be far o u t fo r the

span o f his long l i f e . H e wa s a rhetorician and pupil o f Gorgias , whom

he afterwards attacked, and some have seen in him the influence o f

other Sophists as w e l l .2

Later he became a friend and fanatical admirer

o f Socrates. That at least is certain, and Plato (Phaedo 59b) mentions

him among the few intimates w h o were with Socrates in prison in the

last hours o f his l i f e .

He w a s especially attracted b y the ascetic side o f Socrates's life and

his independence o f wor ld ly goods , and carried this to such lengths

that in later antiquity he was commonly regarded as the founder o f

the Cyn ic school , with D iog ene s ' t h e D o g ' f o r h is pupil. (S ee frr.

138 A - F , 139 C a i z z i . ) N o w a d a y s it is generally held that the Cynics

o w e d their most distinctive features, as well as their name, to Diogenes .

There never was a Cynic school in the literal sense in which the

A c a d e m y , L y c e u m and Stoa we re schools. Anti sthen es himsel f m a y

have had a sort o f school , or at least a group o f pupils with a fixed

place o f meeting, for Diogenes Laert ius (6.13) says that he used to

converse (or 'use dialect ic ' ) in the gymnasium o f Cynos a r ges ,3 bu t

1

D.L. 6.1, 2. 3 1; Seneca Deconst. sap. 1 8 . 5 . But Field notes (Plato and Contemps. i 6 o n . ) t h a t

in the Phaedo Plato speaks of him as an ί τ τ ι χ ώ ρ ιο ς wi th no hint that he wa s different from Cr it o,

Aeschines and the rest. D.L . introduces the fact to g i v e point to two probably apocryphal

anecdotes.2

Antisthenes and Gorgias, D.L. 6 . 1, Athen. 22od (from the Archelaus of Antisthenes). For

Protagoras and the impossibility of contradiction see p. 182, n. 2, above. Diimmler (Akad. 194)

argued that Antisthenes's denial that one can ca l l a statement false originated with Gorgias

(MXG 980a 1 0 ) , and claimed also to see the influence of Prodicus and Hippias (ibid. 158, 161,

2 5 6 , 274)·3

This wa s the gymnasi um assigned to bastards, or me n of mixed descent (Demosth. 23.213

and later sources), which t a l l i e s with the report of his half-foreign origi n. Bu t D.L. or his sourcei s trying b y every means to represent hi m as the founder of Cynicism. 'Cynosarges ' i s brought

in as an alternative origin for the name, and D.L. immediately goes on to say that Antisthenes

h i m s e l f was called Ά τ τ λ ο κ ύ ω ν (just as he was also called Κ ύ ω ν b y Herodicus in the first century B . C .

306



Antisthenes and the Cynics

307

this certainly does n o t bring h i m closer to the C y n i c s , w h o never

adop ted su ch met hod s. Antisth enes was pr oba bl y horrified at some o f

Diogenes 's principles and behaviour. There is every reason t o think

that they were acquainted, and the stories about them are all to t he

e f f e c t that Diogenes was far from a favourite o f his, b u t w o n h i m over

b y sheer importunity and persistence. Nevertheless the portrait o f

Antisthenes in Xenophon ' s Symposium does show traits which ,

developed to an extreme, were characteristic o f the C y n i c s . 1 H e called

himself the richest o f men, because wealth resided i n men's souls, n o t

in their pockets, and equated poverty with independence. M e n w h o

went t o all lengths t o increase their fortunes he pitied as diseased. They

suffered as much as m en whose bodies were never satisfied however

much they ate. Happiness lies no t in having great possessions bu t in

los ing the desire fo r them. A l l this he claims to ha ve learned fro m

Socrates. There is a specially C y n i c touch in his reference t o se x as a

purely bodily need, fo r whose satisfaction a n y w o m a n w i l l d o (Symp.

4.38). C y n i c also w as h is anti-hedonism. Later sources m a y perhaps

be suspected, because they had already adopted h i m as the founder o f

the sect, when they report hi m as declaiming that h e would rather g o

mad than enjoy pleasure (frr. 108 A - F ) ; b u t the bias is already there in

X e n o p h o n (Symp. 4.39), when in speaking o f the appetite fo r s e x —

wh ic h h e regards as a natural o n e like that for food—he says that h e

w o u l d prefer t o satisfy i t without pleasure, since the intense pleasure

derived from it is harmful. Similarly o n e should eat an d drink solely

to banish hunger and thirst. T h e only pleasure to be recommended

is that which f o l l o w s from hard w o r k (fr. 113) and which brings n o

ap. Ath. 2 1 6 b ) , whereas there can be little doubt that the original D o g was Diogenes. Aristotle

a l r e a d y knew him by that name (Rhet. 1 4 1 1 3 2 4 ) , but spoke of the followers of Antisthenes as

Ά ν τ ι σ δ έ ν ε ι ο ι . T h e story in D.L . (loc. cit.) that he had few pupils because as he said he 'drove

them a w a y with a silver rod', if it ha s a n y basis in fact, implies that in spite of his Socraticism h e

charg ed h igh fees whic h many were unwi lli ng to pay. H e would have learned to do so as a

rhetorician and pupil of Gorgias.

1 Cf. Socrates, p . 21 . (C yn ic s wer e notor iousl y 'difficult' characters.) Thi s h a s been most

recendy argued b y Caizzi, Stud. Urb. 1964, 73 f. Wilamowitz made a vigorous protest against

the ' legend' of Antisthenes the Cynic in Platon, 1 1 , 1 6 2 - 4 , and rm>n

yn a v e

followed him, e .g .Taylor , Comm. on Tim. 306, Dudley, Hist, of Cyn. 1 ff., Field, Plato and Contemps. 162 £., and

the references collected in Burkert, Weish. u. Wiss. 197, n. 6 9. Bu t see also Popper, O .S . 277,

and, for an older view on the other side, Ueberweg -Praecht er, 160 n. Fo r Zeller too Antisthenes

w a s ' t h e founder of Cynicism' (PA. d. Gr. 280-1). Chroust in his Socrates Man and Myth

speaks of a unitary philosophy which he c a l l s ' Antisthenean-Cynic' , but not everyone would

follow him.



The Men

repentance (fr. n o ) . T h e virtues o f hard w o r k he reco mmended

th ro ug h the exam ple s o f Heracl es and C y r u s in b o o k s called after

them (frr. 19-28).1

Through the C y n i c s he wa s su pp ose d also to ha ve bee n a fou nde r o f

Stoici sm befo re Ze no , and the succ essi on- wri ter s, represented for u sb y Di o ge n es Laer tiu s, assu med a direct line o f master and p u pi l :

An t i s t he nes -Di og ene s-C ra t es -Ze no . If, a s i s genera lly supposed no w

adays, this is not strictly historical, it is probably true that he gave the

impu lse to an out sta ndi ng characterist ic o f ea ch : that is , as Dio ge ne s

Laertius puts it , ' t he indifference o f Di og en es , the self-control o f

Crates , and the endurance o f Ze n o '— a l l traits which he himse lf would

claim to hav e fou nd in Socrat es. In his doct rine o f vir tue as the end o fl i fe (fr. 22) he cert ainl y anticip ated Ze no . Vi rt ue can be tau ght and

on ce acqu ir ed can no t be los t (frr. 69, 71 ). It nee ds a Soc rat ic st ren gt h,

is taught by deed and example rather than argument and erudition,

and is sufficient in its elf to ensu re ha ppiness (fr. 70). Ed uc at io n is

nece ssar y (fr. 68), b ut it is the ki nd o f ed uc at io n that C h i r o n

g a v e Her acl es (fr. 24). V ir tue has no use for l o n g speec hes (fr. 86).

The sage is self-sufficient, for his wealth includes that o f all oth er me n

(fr. 80, a par tic ula rly Stoi c t ouch ) . So far as ou r evi de nc e g o e s , it

seems that his ethical tea chi ng was pu rel y practical . Th er e is no trace

o f systematic th eor y no r o f any conn exi on wi th his logi cal doctrine

such as w e ha ve foun d in some o f the Sophi sts . T h e nomos-physis

antithesis (also to be fou nd in his th eol ogi cal pr on ou nc em en t, p. 248

above ) is echoed in the dictum that the wi se ma n acts no t acco rd in g to

the established la ws bu t to the la ws o f vir tue (fr. 101, p. 117 ab ov e) .

Otherwise a l l that one can say of his political v i e w s is that he was no

egalitarian, as appears f rom his reference to w ha t the lions th ou gh t

w h en the hares made pu bl ic speeches in fav ou r o f equal rights for all.

(This comes from Aris totle , Pol. 1284315.) His Politikos Logos, w e

are told, a t tacked 'a l l the dema gog ues of A t h en s ' ,2

and he made a

special target o f A l c i b i a d e s (frr. 43, 29, 30). His Archelaus attacked his

former master G or gi as , a natural cons equen ce o f his con ver sio n t o

" For Antis thene s's vi ew s on pleasur e Caizzi has collected references in her notes to frr.

1 0 8 - 1 3 .

* Compa re his advice that they ought to vot e asses to the posi tion of horse s, p. 21 2, n. 1,

above.

308



The Teaching of Antisthenes

Socrates.1

H e m a y have argued that rhetoric was n o t s imply the creator

o f persuasion, bu t the criterion and vehic le o f t ru th .2

T h e forego ing account has made use o f late as w e l l as early sources,

but the result is a consist ent ethical standpoin t. A pa rt from this, o n

the philosophical side w e k n o w o f h is logic and his assertion of the

uni ty o f God, which have been discussed in an earlier chapt er. Th er e

is nothing else save the report o f a Johnsonian riposte to Parmenides 's

assertion o f the impossibil i ty o f m o t i o n : n o t being able to counter the

arguments in words , h e simply stood up and w a l k e d .3

The interpretation o f poetry, usually for its ethical lessons, w a s

part of the business o f a Greek teacher, and Antisthenes was no

exception. A number o f quotations from his studies in Homer have

survived, mainly ethical in tendency and sometimes trivial, as w h e n he

said that the reason w h y o ld Nestor wa s the only m a n w h o could raise

the cu p ( / / . 1 1 . 6 3 6 ) w a s n o t that he w as exceptionally strong b u t that

he w as the on ly o n e w h o w a s n o t drunk. In a lengthy analysis o f the

epithet polytropos applied to Odysseus , he said that it applied both to

character and to speech, which gave him the oppor tuni ty o f in t ro

duc ing the contemporary definition o f a sophos as a clev er speaker, and

hence polytropos because master o f many tropoi o r turns o f speech an d

argument . H e also bro ugh t H ome r up to date b y introducing into the

poems the distinction between t ru th and opinion. It would appear that

his Hom eri c interpretations wer e set as squarely in the ambit o f the

fifth-century enlightenment as the argument over Simonides in the

Protagoras, though he did no t agree with Protagoras an d Gorg ia s that

opinion w a s every th ing and there w a s n o objective criterion o f truth.

D i o Chrysos tom, o u r authority here, does n o t enlarge on the distinc

t ion between t ru th and opinion in Homer, indeed h e says that A n t i

sthenes did no t deve lop it an d it was only wo rk ed ou t in detail b y Zeno .

In Xenophon ' s Symposium (3.5) he is made to laugh at the claim o f

1

Fr. 42. Thi s Archelaus was the tyrant of Macedon whom Gorgias's pupil Polus held up to

Socrates in Plato's Gorgias (47od ff.) as a man w ho wa s both wicked and supremely happy.

He was arguing against the Socratic teaching that it is better to be the victim of wrong than to

commit i t . (Dummler, in quellenkritisch vein, claimed to have discovered the content of the

Archelaus in the thirteenth speech of Di o Chrysostom. See his Akad. 1 - 1 8 . )1

See Ca i / . / . i , Stud. Urb. 1964, 54.3

Fr. ι ή ο . This seems wor th m entio ning, th oug h it is attributed to Diogenes by D.L. , 9 .39 .

Probably the am ilmtinn of some other 'fragments' is e q u a l l y open to doubt. Though a few are

assigned m 11.111 H d « 1 i iί ι ψ . ·. nl Antisthenes, many in C a i z / . i ' s collection are simp ly given a s ' s a y i n g s ' .

309



The Men

Niceratus that he is a better man beca use he k n o w s the Home ri c po em s

b y hear t : so does any rhapsode, he retorts, and there is no more foolish

set of men than the rhapsodes. A h , says Socrat es, but Nicer atus has

been to sch ool wi th the allegor izers and kn o w s all the hidden mea nin gs.

Later (4.6) Ant ist hen es asks Nic era tus ironi cal ly i f he co ul d take o v er

a kingdom because he knows all about Agamemnon. These exchanges

are in a li ght post -p ran dia l ve in, bu t it doe s no t l oo k as i f in his refe r

ences to Homer as writ ing now 'opinion' and now ' t r u t h ' he was

beguiled either b y the craz e for finding allegor ical mea nin gs or b y the

current idea that Ho me r wa s a practic al gu id e to all the subjects me n

tioned in the poems.1

Many scholars, particularly in Germany, have claimed to discover

veiled attacks on Antisthenes in various dialogues of Plato, sometimes

under other names, and b y this means to rec onst ruc t mu ch o f his

teachi ng. Gre at labo ur and considera ble ing enu ity ha ve been expe nded

in this attempt, and there is g o o d reason to assume hostility be tw ee n

the t w o . Ap ar t from anecd otes, Antis thene s wr ot e a dial ogue ab usi ng

Plato under the oppr obr ious n ame of Sath on.2

Nev ert hele ss the results

are in no case certain, and in recent times a more cautious attitude has

prevailed.3 The same may be said of K. Joel 's theory that Xe n o p h o n ' s

por tr aya l o f Socr ates had no historical valu e beca use it mad e hi m into

an essentially Anti sth enea n and C y n i c figure. In Joel's bo o k the im

portance and influence o f Antisthenes gr o w to eno rmo us propo rtio ns,

and Pla to himse lf is pu t he av il y in his de bt .4

So long as we know no

1

The Homeric interpretations are in C a i z z i ' s frr. 5 1 - 6 2 , and discussed by her in Stud. Urb.

1 9 6 4 , 5 1 ff. The re has been con tro ve rsy over the question wheth er Antisthe nes was an al leg ori st:

see the references in C a i z z i , loc. cit. 59, n. 47.

* See Antisthe nes frr. 36—7. Its second title w a s ' On contradi ction' (D. L. 6 . 1 6 ) , lending colour

to the anecdot e that he wrot e it as a counter blast to Plat o's critic ism that his denial of contr adic

tion could be turned against i tself. Σ ά β ω ν , applied to babies, was a diminutive of σ ά θ η meaning

penis.

3

See e.g. Field, Plato and Contemps. 160. Suc h speculation we nt v er y far. In 1894 Nat orp

could c l a i m it as 'proved repeatedly' that the Theaet., Euthyd., Crat. and probably also Hipp.

Maj. and Min., Ion and Euthyphro, were c h i e f l y devot ed to polem ic agai nst Antis thene s, either

anonymously or under another name. On the Ion see now C a i z z i , Antisth. Frr. p. 109. On

Theaet., Crat. an d Soph. pp. 2 1 3 - 1 5 abo ve, and for Crat. von Fritz in Hermes 1927.

Rep. 495 c- d w as supp osed b y Dum ml er to refer to him , but see Ad am ad loc. For the same

possibility elsewhere in the Rep. Popper, O.S. 277. For Socrates 's 'd re am ' in Theaet. Gillespie

in Arch.f. G. d. Phil. 1913 and 191 4.

1 J o e l , Der echte u. d. Xenoph. Sokr. Joel held the remarkable theory that Prodicus in both

Xenophon and Plato was not Prodicus but a mask for Antisthenes, to whom even the fable of

3 Ι Ο



Antisthenes in Plato ? His Writings

more than w e d o about Antisthenes from independent sources, the on ly

topic o n which such theories can claim any th in g like a firm basis is

his logic. Plato says n o more o f him than the bare mention o f h i s name

a m o n g the int imate friends w h o were present with Socrates in prison

up to the moment o f h i s death.

He was a prolific writer, both rhetorical and philosophical . Diogenes

Laert ius lists abo ut se ve nt y-f our titles div ided into ten vo lumes . In his

rhetorical period, like h is teacher Gorgias he composed declamations

on mythical themes, t w o o f which have survived, in which A j a x and

Odysseus defend i n turn their claims to the arms o f A c h i l l e s .1

A defence

o f Orestes is also mentioned. Ac co rd in g t o Diogenes Laer t ius ( 6 .1 ) ,

his rhetorical style overflowed into his dialogues, and Aristot le gives

an example o f his so me wh at extravagant metapho rs.2

O f t he dialogues,

some, though not a l l , were Socratic ( D . L . 2 .6 4) . T h e Heracles a n d

Cyrus were ethical in content, extolling the virtues o f hard w o r k , and

the Aspasia contained scurrilous attacks o n Pericles and h i s sons. T h e

Sathon, Archelaus and Politicus have already been mentioned, a n d w e

hear o f a Physiognomonicus an d a Protrepticus, as wel l as the w o r k s o n

Nature, which contained the statement o n monotheism, a n d ' O n

Educat ion or on N a m e s ' (pp. 248, 209 a b o v e ) .3

(9) A L C I D A M A S

A c c o r d i n g to the Suda, Alcidamas w a s a native o f the Aeol ian c i ty o f

Elaea, the por t o f Pergamon.4 T h e only indication o f h i s date i s that ,

l ike Antisthenes and L y c o p h r o n , he w a s a pupil o f Gorgias.5 Gorgias

the choice of Heracles must be transferred. (See on this H . Mayer , Prod. 120.) T h e book has

been criticized b y many , including Jo el himself (see his Gesch. 7 3 1 , n. 3) , an d a reappraisal of the

question has now been undertaken b y Caizzi, Stud. Urh. 1964, 60-^76.1

Their authentici ty h a s been queried, but see Caizzi, loc. cit. 43.1

Arist . Rhet. 1 4 0 7 a 10. H e compared a l ikeable bu t thin and w e a k l y man to frankincense,

which g i v e s pleasure as it is consumed!3

I hav e mention ed som e wh ich occur outside D.L .'s c ompreh ensive list. References w i l l be

found in Caizzi ' s Fragmenta. According to the list, the Physiogn. was given the subtitle ' on th e

Sophists ' .4 F o r gene ral information ab out h i m see Brzoska in RE, 1, 1 5 3 3 - 9 . T h e survivi ng remains a re

in Baiter—Sauppe, Orat.Att. pt. n (1850), 1 5 5 - 6 2 , and Radermacher, Artium Scriptores, 1 3 2 - 4 7 .5

Shorey (Τ Α Ρ Α , 1909, 196) discussed the possibil i ty of dating h i m through coincidences

between h is work on the Sophists, Plato's Phaedrus, and Isocrates's Panegyricus, b u t concluded

that 'these facts hardly suffice to date Alcidamas relatively to either Plato or Isocrates' .

• 5 T I



The Men

himself had dealt both in carefull y prepared wr itt en declamat ions an d

in im pr omp tu speeches, but h i s ' school ' evidently divided i tse lf o n

this point, with Alcidamas as the champion o f improvisation, e m

phasizing Gorgias 's doctrine o f kairos or the oppor tuni ty of the

moment, and Isocrates o f the written speech. W e still possess a short

piece b y Alcidamas entitled ' o n those w h o co mp os e writt en speeches,

or o n Sophis ts ' , in w h i c h h e begins b y attacking some o f those called

Sophists fo r neglecting research a n d culture ( o r education) an d ha v ing

no technique o f public speaking. They parade their cleverness in

written words a n d think themselves masters o f rhetoric when they

possess only a small fraction o f the art . H e w i l l censure them n o t because

the written word is alien t o ora tory b u t because it should be n o more

than a parergon, not a th ing t o pride oneself on , and those w h o spend

their l i v e s on it ignore a great deal o f rhetoric a n d phi losophy and do

not deserve the name o f Sophists. When this is taken with passages

from Isocrates's works it is evident that they are conscious rivals and

f o e s .1

H i s little treatise shows that w e are a m o n g the epigoni, a n d that

Sophists have changed their methods since the great days when

Protagoras a n d Gorgi a s were in their prime.2

Alcidamas has acquired great, an d perhaps justifiable, fame among

the moderns for his bold assertion that ' G o d has s e t a ll m en free,

Nature has made no man a s l a ve ' (p. 159 a bove ) . He wa s h o w e v e r

primarily an orator an d a faithful pupil o f his master i n defining rhetoric

as ' t h e p o w e r o f t he persuas ive ' . Demosthenes is said t o have studied

his speeches.3

Apart f rom the one comp lete pamph let against wri tten

speeches* almost a l l ou r quotations from h i m occur in the Rhetoric o f

Aristotle, w h o cites most o f them no t for their content bu t as examples

o f faulty style.5 A s a n instance o f inappropriate metaphor he mentions

1

F o r their opposition see the references in Lesky, HGL, 353, n. 4.1

Cf. Morrison in D.U.J. 1949, 56.3

Plut. Demosth. 5, 7 (Radermacher, p . 154) and [Plut .] Vic. orat. 844 c.4

There is also a speech against Palamedes, one of those exercises on mythical subjects which

the teachers of rhetoric provided fo r their pupils to learn, but its authenticity is doubtful. It i s a

poor thing, and bears n o relation to the Palamedes of Gorgias.5

A n exception is the sentence about slavery in the Messenian oration, introduced to illustrate

the difference between l e g a l an d natural justice. ( T h e actual quotation w e ow e to the scholiast.)

He also g i v e s at 1 3 9 7 3 1 1 an d 1398 b 10 exampl es from Alci damas of types of argument (argument

from the opposite and inductive argument) as used in oratory. Elsewhere he castigates hi m for

his use of poetical comp oun ds (1406a 1 ) , of exotic voca bul ary ( 1406a 8), of redundant epithets

or descriptive phrases (e .g . 'damp sweat ' , ' l a w s the monarchs of c i t i e s ' , i4o6ai8ff . ) and in-

3 1 2



Alcidamas: Lyophum

3 1 3

'p hi lo so ph y, a bu lw ar k against the law. (numoi)' ( A ' / n y . I - | O O I I I I ) ,

and we may take this, together with ι lie* dei la ia i ion ili.il »ilavery is

against nature and the plea that Sophists six>ιil«I return in philosophy,

as indications that Al ci da ma s aspired to be .1 Sophist o l the old sch oo l,

in w h i c h rhetoric and ph il os op hy weni Ii.iucl in k i nd , and was c o m

parable to An ti ph on as a cha mpi on o f naiuie against co nv en ti on .1

O f his other works wc hear ol a MoiiM-inn or miscellany, which

included a con tes t be tw ee n Hom er and I lesiod and p erhaps also the

'e nc om iu m of dea th' mentioned by Ci ce ro as conta ining a catalo gue

o f the ills of human l i f e . The whole collection was probably a source

b oo k o f material for orat ors.1

Athenaeus (592c) mentions an encomium

o f a hetaera called Nats, and ac co rd in g to D io ge ne s Laerti us (8.56) he

also wr ot e a w o r k on natural phil osop hy conta ining historical assertions

which , for a champion o f historia and paideia, have generally been

thought rather wi ld , unless they ha ve bee n man gle d in transmi ssion.

O n this ho we ve r see n ow D . O' Br ie n in JHS, 1968, 95 f.

(10) L Y C O P H R O N

Lycophron has already found mention in these pages for his theory

that la w wa s a means o f gua ran tee ing an ind ivid ual 's right s against his

fellow-cit izens but had no concern with positive morality, his dis

paragement o f noble bir th , and his the ory of lan gua ge and epi stem o-

l o g y . T h o u g h the challenge to aristocracy wa s c om mo n en ou gh at or

befo re his time, as w e see from A nt ip ho n and Eurip ides , these dicta are

collect ively sufficient to make hi m appea r a h igh ly in te rest ing figure,

and it is unfortunate that w e k n o w scarcely an yth ing else abo ut him.

Aristotle referred to him as a Sophist,3

and he is gen era lly agr eed to

appropriate metaphor ( 1406 b n ) . Cicero thought better of him, calling his redundancy ulertas

and judgi ng him rhetor antiquus in primis nobilis, wh il e admi tti ng that the subtlet ies of phil osop hic

reasoning were beyond him (Tusc. 1 . 4 8 . 1 1 6 ) .1

Nestle (VM\uL, 344f.) const ructs a theor y of the relation between politi cs and phi los oph y

in Alcidamas by translat ing a poor ly attested reading ν ο μ ί μ ο υ ς for ν ό μ ο υ ς in Ar . Rhet. 1406323.

No editor prints this, and it wo ul d weaken Aristot le's point about red undancy , but Nestle

adopts it with out comme nt or hint of another rea ding . (He has in fact silent ly take n it over from

Salomon in Savigny-Stift. 1 9 1 1 , 154.)3

Cic . Tusc. 1 . 4 8 . 1 1 6 . See Radermacher, 155.3

Pol. 1 2 8 0 b : 1 . Th is is presum ably w h y DK include him in the Vorsokratiker but not A l c i

damas with his striking statement about slavery. The testimonies occupy just a page (DK no. 83,

vol. 1 1 , 307 f . ) .

http://ili.il/

http://ili.il/

http://ili.il/



The Men

have been a pupil o f Gorgias, which, though it is nowhere expressly

stated,1 w e m a y take as extremely probable, as also that he was roughly

contemporary with his fellow-pupil Alcidamas. Aristotle cri t icizes all

three for similar faults o f style. O f Lycophron's birthplace, date and

life-history nothing whatever is recorded.

( i l ) A N O N Y M O U S W R I T E R S2

( a ) The 'Anonymus Iamblichi '3

O f the content o f this work I have spoken above (p p . 71 ff.). T h e

Protrepticus o f Iamblichus is a cento o f unacknowledged borrowings

from earlier philosophers, as one may see from its incorporation o fword-for-word extracts from the Phaedo. It is universally agreed

(however much opinions m a y differ in detail) that Bywate r w a s

correct in detecting in it considerable portions o f the lost Protrepticus

o f Aristot le . The re is then n o a priori difficulty in supposing that other

parts are taken straight from an otherwise unknown wri t ing of the

late fifth or early fourth century, and this w a s demonstrated b y

Friedrich Blass in 1899, though that is not to say that the paragraphs

in question form either one continuous extract or the whole o f the work.

Many attempts have been made to assign the fragments to a k n o w n

author, but none has w o n general assent. B l a s s , wh ose ac umen first

detected their origin in the period of the Aufklarung, thought o f

Ant iphon the Sophist, b u t this w a s disproved by the later discovery

o f the papyrus fragments o f Ant iphon ' s Truth. F o r K . Joel he wa s

Antisthenes (and it is true that Antisthenes wrote a Protrepticus,

which Iamblichus could have plundered as he did Ari s to t l e ' s ) ;

W i l a m o w i t z surprisingly thought Critias ' no t impossible ' ( though he

had earlier considered Protagoras); Cataudella saw the w o r k as a

collection o f extracts from an ethico-political treatise o f Democr i tus ,

1

DK say 'vielleicht Gorgiasschuler' ( n , 3 07 η . ). T h e argument for placing him in the school

of Gorgias (an d it is a stron g one ) depe nds on Aristotle's criticisms of his s t y l e . See ZN, 1 3 2 3 , n. 3,

and Nestle, VMiuL, 343. On his date and relation to Alcidamas see Popper, O.S. 261, wh o

frankly admits that all this, l i k e anything to do with th e circumstances of Lycophron's l i fe , must

be highly speculative.3

Of the 'Anon. τ τ . ν ό μ ω ν ' enough has been said above, pp. 75 ff.

3 Text, from Iambi. Protr. chapter 20, in DK, 1 1 , 400 ff.

3 M



'Anon. lamblichi': Authorship ,ιη ,Ι Ihiw

Nest le thought o f A n t i p h o n o f Rhainmr; , I inirnii-itn-ι b ι nnv i iu rd

that the author is Hippias. H . G o m p i r / . . il- .n im l imd m ihh v i e w hut

did not , in Untersteiner 's opinion, yn l.n r n n i i | ' , h in ρ π ι ν ί ι ι μ , i l .

(Contrast Nestle , V M { u L , 4 3 0 : 111»· U I I I < T v. ' i n evident opposit ion

to the reo^zoj-doctrine o f H i p p i a s * . ) M 0 . 1 nu nl rm ciitii'-i ho we ve r

w o u l d admit that w e cannot now In >pe in |>ni Ι mi linger on the aullinr.

He could w e l l b e some pupil ο ! Ι Ί η ΐ . Ψ Η Ι . ΐ Ί , , κ ' ψ ι .t in ted wi th the

teaching o f other Sophists a n d wiih Ν Η ΐ Ί ,Ι ΐ Ι ··,, ,ιη ιΙ probably not himsell

a professional S oph ist. I I . C o m p e l / . ιΙ ιο ιψ ,Ι ιι he w as on e (.V. u. It. 79),

bu t o n shaky grounds , and N e s t l e (op. cii. 424) i hough t o f hi m as an

educated layman l ike C r i i i a s . Wh.il makes il especially unlikely that

he was a Sophis t is his lo w opinion o ! rhetoric .1

Estimates o f the d a t e of the w ork o n which Iamblichus drew have

varied from the later years o f the Peloponnesian W a r , t h e t ime o f the

' pos t -Per ic lean extreme democracy ' (Nest le , op. cit. 430; D o d d s ,

Gr. and Irrat. 197, n. 27, mak es a similar guess), to some time in the first

half o f the fourth century. Thus Gigante (Norn. Bas. 177) t hough t o f

it as having a l ready a Socratic-Platonic basis . Paul Shorey struck a

note o f caut ion in Τ Α Ρ Α , 1909, 192, η . ι . H e pointed o u t that since

Blass's t ime the fragments have been pruned b y the rejection o f some

material taken from Plato and Isocrates, a n d claimed to see echoes o f

Plato here and there in what remains. H e thought therefore that w e

should limit the amount o f dir ect ly qu ot ed fifth-cen tury pr os e still

further, and admit the hypothes i s that what remains came to Iambl ichus

t h r o u g h an intermediate Plat oniz ing source. In m a k i n g use o f the

extracts earlier I have tried t o confine myse l f to indubitably fifth- and

fourth-century matter .

For b ib l iography on the subject see Z N , 1328, n . 2; D K , 11,400 n .

(wi th the Nachtrage in later editions); Untersteiner, Sof. 1 1 1 , 1 1 of . ;

Gigan te , Norn. Bas. 17 7; and the notes t o A . T . C o l e ' s article in

HSCP, 1961.

1 A. T . Cole has recently ( in HSCP, 1961) argu ed stron gly for a modif icadon of Cataudella 's

view, according to which th e writer i s 'an Athenian follower of Democri tus , much more influ

enced than his master b y late fifth-century rhetoric \ His article is especially interest ing abou t theinfluence of the ' A n o n . ' on later philosophy.

1 1 3 1 5 G S P



The Men

(b) The 'Double Arguments'1

This curious little work in a mainly Doric dialect appears at the end

o f manuscripts o f Sextus Emp iri cus wi th no indication of author or

title. It is ob vi ou s ly inc omp let e, and the ultimat e purp ose of the wri te r

is not clear. Stephanus christened it the Dialexeis, but in recent times

it has been known as the Dissoi Logoi,' Double (o r Tw in ) Argu men t s ' ,

from the ope nin g wo rd s, wh ic h recur later, ' D o u b l e argu ments are

maintained (or ' two v i e w s a re t a k e n ' ) c o n c e rn i n g . . . '2

It has no

literary or philosophical merit, and is most plausibly thought to be a

pupil ' s notes from a teacher w h o had adopt ed P rot agor as' s me tho ds

or alternati vely somet hi ng wr it te n by a teacher for his pupils . A s suc h

it is o f interest for the typ e o f te ach ing current in the seco nd gen erati on

o f Sophists and also as sh ow in g h o w the arg ume nt a bout the teach

ability o f virt ue had degenerat ed into a sch ool com mo npl ac e. T h e

date is fortunately fixed at about 400 B . C . b y a refer ence to the

vic to ry o f the Spar tans ov er the At he ni an s an d their allies as ' v e ry

recent ' .

Protagoras, we know, maintained that there are t wo cont rar y a rg u

ments on eve ry subject, and himsel f com pos ed tw o bo ok s o f 'A nt il o

g i e s ' . In this w a y he set his pupil s to debate, rec onc ili ng the op po si ng

v i e w s or justi fying one against the other. Th e present lec tur e— or

series o f te xt boo k ex am pl es —l oo ks like an imitation o f this met hod .

Many of the chapters start off by saying that ' t w o v i e w s are taken'

about good and e v i l , or justice and injustice, fair and foul, t ru th and

falsehood: the one that they are the same, the other that they are differ

ent. The writer sets out the arguments, and adopts one v i e w himself.

Th us in chapte r 1, ' O n G o o d and E v i l ' , we have the relativist v i e w o f

g o o d and bad set forth in a way similar to Protagoras's in Plato's

dialogue (Prot. 334, pp. 166f. a bo v e ) , but w it h so me rid icul ous ar gu -

1

For a fuller account see Taylor, Var. Socr. i, chapter 3, 9 1 - 1 2 8 . Attempts to assign the wor k

to a particular author have not been successful. For various views on this, and on its general

character, see Untersteiner, Sophs. 308, n. 2, and Sof. i n , I48f. Further bibliography w i l l be

found in O'Brien, Socr. Paradoxes, 75, n. 47. Text in DK, I I , 405 ff.2

If the conception is Prot agor ean, the phras e itself seems to be an allusion to E uri pid es,

fr. 189 (from the Antiope):έ κ π α ν τ ό ς ά ν τ ις π ρ ά γ μ α τ ο ς δ ι σ σ ώ ν λ ό γ ω ν

α γ ώ ν α θ ε ΐ τ ' α ν εΐ λ έ γ ε ι ν ε ϊη σ ο φ ό ς .

For other echoes of Euripides see Taylor, Var. Socr. 1, 96.

3 1 6



Thei

Double Arguments'

3 1 7 1 1 - 2

merits added. T h e writer sides with those w h o s a y that the same thing

is bo th good and bad , be ing good for some and bad for others , and

for the same man in some circumstances good and in others b a d .

A f t e r adduc ing the Protagorean instance o f the different e f f e c t o f food

and drink in health a n d sickness, he goe s on to say things like this:a l i fe o f dissoluteness and extravagance m a y be bad for the dissolute

man b u t g o o d for trade, sickness bad for the sick ma n bu t g o o d for

the doctors, death ba d for the m an w h o dies b u t g o o d for the under

takers, and so on . T h e identi ty o f honourable and disgraceful is argued

b y appealing to the different customs and beliefs o f Athenians and

Spartans, Greeks and barbarians, wi th instances taken from He ro do tu s

(p . 16 a b o v e ) .T h e little work repeats all the sophistic tricks with which Plato w a s

familiar: a talent is heavier than a mina b u t lighter than t w o talents,

therefore the same thing is both heavy and l igh t : wha t is here is n o t in

L i b y a , therefore the same thing both is an d is no t, and so for th .1

T h e

sixth chapter is headed 'Co nce rn in g wis do m and vir tue , whether

teachable ' , and b e g i n s : ' T h e r e is a certain argument neither true n o r

n o v e l , that w i s d o m and virtue cannot b e taught or learned. ' It thenenumerates five arguments used b y supporters o f this v i e w a nd p r o

ceeds to refute them.

1. I f y o u hand ov er something to another, y o u cannot possess it

yourself.

2. If it were teachable, there would b e recognized teachers o f i t ,

as o f music. (This appears in the Meno.)

3. T h e wise m e n o f Gre ece w o u l d hav e taught their skill to those

near and dear t o them. ( S o Socrates argues at Protagoras 319 that

Pericles could n o t teach h is o w n sons his w i s d o m and at Meno 90 that

no great statesman has done so . )

4. So me hav e go ne to Sophists and g o t no good f rom i t. ( A t Meno

92, An y t u s claims that the Sophists do their pup ils mo re har m than

g o o d . )

5. Ma ny have bec om e dist inguished without go in g to Sophis ts .

1

Cf. Rep. 479ff., Theaet. 1 5 2 a , 1 5 5 D - C , and Euthyd. 2 8 3 C - d and passim. In the Theaet. the

idea of the same thing being both heavy and l ight is put forward as a ' secret doctrine ' o f Prota

goras, i .e. as a necessary consequence of his teaching even if he himself was not aware of it.



The Men

These evidently form a series o f stock objections to the sophistic

profession. T h e writer proceeds to reply t o them one b y one .

1 . This argument, he thinks, is ' v e r y s i l l y ' (κ ά ρ τ α ε ύ ή θ η ) , for

he knows that teachers o f wri t ing and lyre-playing d o retain the k n o w

ledge they impart.

2. In reply to the argument that there are n o recognized teachers o f

virtue, what, he asks, do the Sophists teach, i f no t wisdom and virtue?

(In the Meno Socrates suggests that the Sophists are the right m en to

teach virtue. Anytus is furious at the idea, and Men o admires Gor gi as

because, unlike the other Sophists, he makes n o claim to teach i t .)

A n d what , he goes o n , were the Anaxagoreans and Pythagoreans?

(Meaning presumably that they were pupils w h o learned wisdom and

virtue from Anaxagoras and Pythagoras.)3. Against the third argument, he simply says that Polycl i tus did

teach his sons to make statues (thereby imparting his particular sophia

and arete). (Polycl i tus w a s instanced at the v e ry end of Protagoras's

speech, Prot. 328 c, with the suggestion that, i f a man's sons did not

turn out to equal him at h is own arete, this w as no t necessarily for

l a c k o f teaching.) Moreover, i f someone has failed to teach, this is no

argument, whereas, i f a single one has taught it, that is proof that it

can b e taught.

4. If it is true that some have no t learned wi sdo m from Sop hists ,

it is also true that many w h o have been taught to read and write have

not learned these arts.

5. Against the fifth argument he says that after all natural talent

(physis) does count for something. O n e w h o has no t learned from the

Sophists ma y do v e ry w e l l , i f he has a g i f t for picking things u p easily,

after learning a little from those w h o teach us language—that is , our

parents. O n e m a y learn from his father, another from his mother, one

more, one less. I f anyone believes that we do not learn language bu t

are born with a knowledge of it, let him consider that, i f a newborn

child were sent straight to Persia and brought u p there, he would

speak Persian and not Greek. W e learn language without knowing

wh o are our teachers.

In the same w a y Protagoras at Prot. 327 introduces the notion o fnatural bent ( ε ύ φ ν ί α , cf. ε υ φ υ ή ς in Diss. Log.), s u g g e s t i n g that some

3i8



The 'Double Arguments' on Teaching Virtue

have a greater talent for virtue just as for flute-playing, and goes o n to

introduce the ana logy o f language, which w e learn with out k no wi ng

w h o are our teachers. A child's education in virtue begins at birth

wi th his parents and nurse and is continued b y the school and in later

l i fe b y the city itself thro ugh its laws (325 c if .) . T h e Sophist does no t

claim to be the sole teacher o f virtue, but on ly to carry this education

further than others.

Since w e m a y assume this document to hav e bee n wri tten befor e

Plato 's Protagoras, it shows that the objections to the thesis that virtue

is teachable, which Socrates raises in that dialogue in order to draw

Protagoras out, are based o n we ll -k no wn material from current and

earl ier controversy. When w e add the points in common between the

writer's reply and that o f Plato's Protagoras, it lends support to wh a t

one would in any case think probable, that the long speech which

Plato assigns to Protagoras reproduces substantially the v i e w s o f the

Sophist himself.1

Chapter 7 argues that the use of the lot rather than election in

appointment to O F F I C E is neither efficient nor truly democratic, chapter 8

is an attempt to maintain that the good speaker knows everything

about everyth ing ,2

and the final, incomplete section deals with the

value o f a good memory . T h e argument that magistrates ought no t

to b e appointed by lo t because expert knowledge is as necessary for

government as for a n y other occupation is on e used b y Socrates. That

which f o l l o w s it , h o we ve r , that the lot is undemocratic because it

l e a v e s it to chance whether a friend o f democracy or an oligarch is

appointed, would n o t have commended itself to Socrates, w h o h a d

grave doubts about the wisd o m o f democrat ic government. It recurs

in Isocrates.3

1 P. 64 above, with notes. Cf. Nestle in his edition of the Protagoras. H e takes it for granted

that the obvious connexions of Dissoi Logoi, chapter <5, with th e speech in the Prot. are connexions

of both with the original work of Protagoras on which they are based, and suggests that i t wa s

the Π ε ρ ί α ρ ε τ ώ ν mentioned in D.L. 9.55, just as the story of human nature and progress in the

dialogue w as based on his Π ε ρ ί τ η ς ε ν ά ρ χ η κ α τ α σ τ ά σ ε ω ς .1

1 cannot agree widi Taylor that the purpose of this chapter is to establish the Socratic thesis

that th e dialectician is also the philosopher wh o is identical with the ' true' statesman and orator.

Its claim is far more l i k e that of Hippias (whom Taylor mentions in a footnote, VS, 127, n. 1)

that th e Sophist-orator is omniscient.3

See Xen . Mem. 1.2 .9, Arist. Rhet. I393b4, Isocr. Areop. 23, Taylor , VS, I23f.

3 1 9





B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Th e fo ll owin g list conta ins full particulars of boo ks or articles mention ed (often with

shortened titles) in the text or notes. In addition, a few titles have been included which

may be useful for reference although there has not been occasion to mention them in the

course of the work, but the list makes no pretensions to completeness. More extensive

bibliographies relating to the Sophists will be found in Untersteiner's The Sophists and

in the separate fascicules of his / Sofisti. T h e conc ludin g section of Kerferd's ' Rec en t

W o r k on Presocratic Philosophy' (Am. Philos. Q. 1 9 6 5 ) is also useful.

Co lle cti ons of source-material have been included in the general bib lio graphy under

the names of their editors.

T h e Gre ek comment ators on Aris totle are referred to in the text b y page and line in

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Graeca, various dates).

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Plato und die alte Akademie. 5. Auflage, Leipzig, 1 9 2 2 (repr. 1 9 6 3 ) .

' Z E L L E R — M O N D O L F O . ' La filosofia dei Greci nel suo svi lu ppo storico. Florence, various

dates from 1 9 3 2 . (Zeller's work translated and enlarged b y R. Mondol fo .)

' Z E L L E R - N E S T L E . ' E . Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, 1. Teil , 1. Halite ( 7 t h ed.,

1 9 2 3 ) and 2. Halfte ( 6 t h ed., 1 9 2 0 ) , edited by W. Nestle (Leipzig).

Z E P P I , S. 'L'etica di Prodico', Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 1 9 5 6 , 2 6 5 — 7 2 .

Z E P P I , S. 'L a posizione storica di Antiphon', Rivista di storia della filosofia, 1 9 5 8 , 3 5 7 - 7 1 .

Z E P P I , S. Protagora e la filosofia del suo tempo. Florence, 1 9 6 1 .

330



I N D E X E S

I N D E X OF P A S S A G E S QUOTEDO R REFERRED T O

AELIAN

H.A. 6 (10), 283 n. 2

V.H. 12 (32), 42

AELIUS ARISTIDES

2 (68 Dindorf ) , 132 n. 3; (7 0) , 133

AESCHINES, orator

In Tim. (173) , 34 n. 2

AESCHINES, Socraticus

fr. (34 Dittmar) , 30 n. 4

AESCHYLUS

Ag. (160), 232 n. 6 ; (385 f. ), 50 n. 2 ; (1084),

15 8 n. 3; (1563 f.), 113 η . 1

Cho. ( 1 0) , 1 9 1 ; (144) , 11 3 n. 1; (306-14) ,

1 1 3 η . 1

Eum. (269-72) , 121 n. 2; (275)51 2 1 Η

·2

Pers. (496-8), 237 n. 2

Pr- (39) , 32 η · ; (59 ) , 3*η

· ; ( 6*) , 3 3 " · ' ί( i29 ) , 1 98 η . ι ; (442-68), 7 9 ; (444),

80 η . 3 ; (450), 8o η . 2 ; (478-506), 79

Sept. (269), 56 η . 2 ; (382), 2 7 η . 2

Suppl. (228-31) , 147η

· ; (7°7) ,1 2 1

η ·2

>

(770), 27 η . 2; (1039 f-) , 5°

fr. (314), 3 °η

·2

; (373) , 32 η

· ; ( 3 9° ) ,2 8 η

·1

AETIUS

Ι ( 7 . 1) , 2 36 η . ι ; (η . ι), 69 η . ι

5 ( ι . ι ) , 246 η .

[ALEXANDER]

In Metaph. (435· 0 ,2 ΐ 6

ί (554· 3) ,2 1 2 η

· 3 ;

(554· " ff-),2

ΐ 3 η ·; C5<>3-2

0 >2

ΐ6

^ ί ί / A r . Metaph. (1043023) , 2 1 2

In Top. (42. 13 ff.), 210 η . 4 ; ( ι 8 ι . 2 ), 222η . 3

AMEIPSIAS

fr. (1 0 Kock), 228 n. 2

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS

1 6 (5. 8), 283 n. 2

3 ° (4) ,2

9 3AMMONIUS

In Porph. Isag. (40. 6), 2 14 n. 2

ANAXIMANDER

fr. (2) , 136 n. 2

ANDOCIDES

De myst. (85) , 126ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI

in D K 11 (400. 3-4), 71 n. 3; (400 n. ) , 315 ;

(400 ff.), 314 n. 3; ( 401 . 16 ), 71 n. 3;

( 4 0 1 . 1 6 - 1 9 ) ,2

8 ° , (401-16—23), 72 η

·2

;

(401. 23) , 72 n. 1; (402. 1 2 ) , 72 n. 2 ;

(402. 29 f .) , 72; (403. 3), 74 n. 1; (403.

16-18) , 81 n. 1; (404. 27 ff.), 74 η . 1

Anthologia Lyrica

I (78 ff.), 45 n. 2

II (183, no . 7 ) , 303 n. 2

ANTIPHON, orator

5 (14),2

9 4 ! 6 (2), 294

ANTIPHON, Sophist

fr. ( 1 ) , 202 and n. 3, 203; (2) , 288, 2 91 ;

(4-8) , 287 n. 5; ( 9), 292 ; (1 0) , 230 n. 3,

228; ( 1 2 ) , 231 n. 1, 286, 288, 29 4;

( 1 3 ) , 292 n. 2 ; (14) , 288; ( 1 5 ) , 203 nn. 1,2

; (2 2

" 4 3 ) , 46; (23-36) , 203 η . 1 ; (24a) ,

288; (44 ), 138 n. 2 ; (44Α ), 100 n. 3, 11 9

n. 3, 12 2 n. 4, 1 38 , 203 n. 3, 204 n. 3, 290,

(44B), 100 n. 3, 203 n. 3, 29 3; ( 4 5 - 7 ) , 287,

288 n. 1; (48), 287; (49),2

« 7 - (50) ,2

« 9 ;

( 5 1 ) , 2 8

9 ! ( 52

) ,2

»8 ; ( 53 ) ,2

8 9 ; (53a) ,

289; (54), 289; (55) , 288; (57) , 168 n. 1,

291 ; (58), 128 n. 3, 259, 260 n., 289; (59),

259, 289; (60), 168, 289; (61) , 289; (62) ,

2 5 1 , 289; (63), 288; (64), 289; (65), 288;

(77) , 2

« 9

ANTIPHON, ? tragoedus

fr. (4 Nauck) , 293 n.

ANTISTHENES

fr. (1-121 Caizz i ) , 305 n.; (1 4) , 21 2 n. 2;

( 1 5 ) , 212 n. 2 ; (19—28), 308; (22), 308;

(24), 308; (29), 308; (30), 308; ( 3 6 - 7 ) ,

310 n. 2 ; (38), 209 n. 1; (39 A-E), 249

η . 1; (40 A-D), 249 η . 1 ; (42) , 309 η . 1 ;(43), 3°8; (44 B), 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 ; (45), 210 n. 4;

(46), 210 n. 4; (49), 210 n. 2; (50 A), 214

n. 2; (50 c ) , 214 n. 2 ; (51-62) , 3 1 0 η . 1 ;

(68), 308; (69), 308; (70), 308; (71) , 308;

(80), 308; (86), 308; (101) , 308; (108 A-F),

307; ( n o ) , 3 0 8 ; ( 1 1 3 ) , 307; (122-44) ,

305 n.; (138 A-F), 306; (139), 306; ( 1 4 5 -

95), 3°5 ( ι 6 ° ) , 3° 9η

· 3A R C H Y T A S

fr- (3), 73 n-2

ARISTOPHANES

Birds (684 ff.). 238 ; (692), 241 n. 3, 275 n.,2

7 7 ; (753 ff-), 104; (757 f-), " 4 n. 2 ;

(826), 1 9 1 ; (988), 228 n. 2; (1071 f .) , 237

η . 1 ; (1071 ff.), 237

Clouds (2) , 1 9 1 ; (98), 38 n. 3; ( 1 1 2 ff.), 182

n. 1; (248), 56 n. 2; (331), 33 ; (360), 33,

331



Index ofpassages quoted or referred to

A R I S T O P H A N E S (cont.)

241 n. 3 ; (3 61) , 275 n.; (376 ff.), 100;

(432), 38 n. 3; (670 ff.), 221 n. 2; (740 f.),

204; (1039 f. ), 1 1 4 ; (1060 ff.), 1 1 4 ;

( 1 0 7 5 ) , 100, 101 n. 1; (10 79) , 229; (1080),

1 1 4 n . 4 ; ( " " ) , 33 ; ( 1283) , 1 1 4 n . 4,

228 n. 2; (1309), 33; (1400), 1 1 4 ; (140 5),

1 1 4 ; (142 0), 1 14 n. 2; (142 7 ff.), 104 ;

(143 0), 1 14 n. 4

Ecct. (330), 245 n.

Frogs (36 6), 245 n.; ( 761 ff.), 27 n. 2 ; ( 892),

232 n. 3 ; (949), 15 8; (1009 f. ), 30 n. 1;

( 1 0 5 3 - 5 ) , 3° 1; ( 1 1 8 1 ) , 205 n. 2;

( 1 4 7 5 ) ,l 6

5 n-2

Knights (1085), 228 n. 2; ( n i l ) , 87 n.

Plut. ( 1 1 5 1 ) , 161 n. 3

Thesm. (450 f.), 232

Wasps (380), 228 n. 2

fr. (198. 5 ff.), 294

A R I ST O T L E

Anal. Post. 2 (ch. 10), 213Ath.pol. (2 1- 6) , 13 6; (27. 4), 35 n.; (32),

293; (57· 4)>2<

*3η

·6

;De anima (405 3 1 9 ) , 282 n. 2; (405 b 5), 303;

(432b2i ) , 213

De caelo ( 2 9 ^ 1 3 ) , 2 1 3

De interpr. (init.), 208 n.; (1 63 19 ), 208 n.;

(i ua 27 ), 208 n.; (i 6a 28 ), 208 n.j

( i 6b 6) , 22 1; (20b 1-2) , 221

EE (i 23 4b 22 ff.), 150 n. 1 ; (1 24 18 32 ff.),

1 5 0 η . 1

EN (i o9 4b 25 ), 54 n. 1; (109 8326 ff.), 54

n. 1; (11023 23) , 54 n. 1; (110382 4), 68;

(n o3 b2 7) , 545(110433) , 54 n . 1 ; (11 34b

1 8 ff.), 123 n. 1; ( i i 3 4b 3 2 ) , 138 n. 1;

( " 4 5 b 2 7 ) 12

58

; ( " 5 5 3 1 8 ) , 149η

·2

;

( 1 1 5 5 a22 ff.), 150 n. 1; ( 11 64 33 0) ,

3 7 η . I ; ( I I6 7 3 22 ) , 1 5 0 η . i ; ( n 6 7 a 2 2 f f . ) ,

1 5 0 n.

Metaph. ( Γ 4), 218 n. ; ( i oo 6b 2o ), 211

n. 3; (1007 018), 182; ( i oo 7b 2o ), 182

n. 3 ; (1 009 36) , 18 2; (10 09b 15 ff.), 171

n. 3; (10 10a 10), 201 ; (10 24b I7 ff.), 190 η .,

2i o η . ι ; ( io 24b 32) , 182 n. 2; (102536),

281 n. 1; (1026b 14), 19 3; (io 43 ai 4f f. ),

2 1 3 ; ( io 43b 23) , 21 2, 214 n. 1; (1 043b

2 3 f f . ) , 214 n. 1; (i o4 3b 29 ), 212 n. 4;

(1045t>9ff.), 21 6; (104714-^ 7), 185 n. 2;

( 1 0 5 3 3 3 1 ) , 1 83 ; ( i o 62b i 3 ) , 1 7 1 ; (1 078a

3 1 ) , 170 n.; (1091 a7 ), 21 2 n. 3

Phys. (185 314) , 292 n. 2; ( i 85 b2 5) ,

2 1 6 n. 2 ; (191323-33) ,2 0 0 η

·2

! ( '93a

9)>

203η . 2; (2 i9 b2 ), 292 n. 1; (220D14),

292 n. 1; (220b 32), 292 n. 1; (2 21 b 22),

292 n. 1; (22 332 1), 292 η . 1

Poet. ( i4 07b 7) , 221 n . 1 ; ( i 45 6b i5 ) , 220

Pol. ( i2 53b 2o ), 160; (1260825), 54,2

5 4 !

(1260 327) , 187 n. 3; (i2 66a3 9ff. ), 1 52 ;( i2 07b 9), 152 n. 1; ( i 26 7b i5 ) , 152 n. 1;

( i 2 6 7 b 3 7 f f . ) , 139 n. 3; (12 6932 0), 57;

( 1 2 7 5 b7 ), 57 n.; (1 280b 10), 139; ( 1280b

1 1 ) , 313 n. 3; (1284 a 1 5 ) , 308; (1305 b 26),

300; ( i327b29) , 161 n. 2

Rhet. (1. 10), 124; (1. 1 3 - 1 4 ) , 124; (1. 15) ,

1 2 4 5 ( 3 . Μ ) , 295 n . 2 ; ( i 3 6 8 b 7 ) , 1 1 8 , 1 2 3 ;

( i 3 6 8 b 7 f f . ) , 124 n. ; ( i3 73 b4 ), 123 ;

( i 3 7 3 b 4 f f . ) , 124 n . ; ( i37 3b6 ) , 118 ;

( 1 3 7 4 3 1 8 ) , 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 η . ; (1374 326 ff .) , 129;

( 1 3 7 5 3 3 2 ) , 1 1 8 ; ( i 37 7

a8 ff . ) , 109 n. 4;

(i393t>3)>1 2 8 n

-2

; ( i393b4), 3J

9η

· 35

( i 3 9 7 3 i i ) , 3 1 2 η . 5; ( 1 3 9 8b ί ο ) , 3 1 2 η . 5 ;

( i4 0o b i9 ), 97 n. 3, 102 n. 3, 297 n. 1;

( 1 4 0 2 3 1 7 ) , 179 n. 1; (1402 323f t.), 182 ;

(i 405 b2 4) , 38 n. 2; (1406 31) , 312 n. 5;

(1 40638) , 31 2 η . 5 ; ( i 4o6a i 8 f f . ) , 31 2 η . 5 ;

(1406823), 313 η . ι ; (1406b 1 1 ) , 312 n. 5,

3 1 3 ; (14 073 10) , 311 n. 2; ( 1 4 1 1 3 2 4 ) ,

306 n. 3; ( 1 4 1 3 3 7 ) , 297 n. 1; (14 15 b 12),

2 7 5 ; ( 1 4 1 5 b 15), 42 n. 1; (i 4i 6b 26 ), 300;

(145889), 221 η . 1

Soph. el. (1658 21) , 37 n . 1 ; ( i 66 bi 2) ,

221 n. 1; ( i66b 28ff . ) , 218; (1 73 37 ), 58;( i73bi9) , 221 n. 2; ( i73b28), 221 n. 1;

( i 83 b3 i ) , 295; ( i83b 36) , 192; (183b

36 f . ) , 37 η . 1

Top. (104b 20), 182 η . 2; ( l I2 b2 2) , 222 η . 3

fr. 29 n. 1; (9 1 ) , 153 n. 6

[ A R I S T O T L E ]

De mundo (395 b 23), 244 η . 1

MXG (979 3 1 1 - 9 8 0 b 2 1 ) , 193 η . ! ; (979b 36),

1 9 7 ; (98089), 198 n. 1; (98o a9ff .), 198 ;

(980310), 306 n. 2; (980312), 198 n. 1;

(9 8o bi ) , 198; (98ob9ff . ) , 198

A R I S T O X E N U S

fr. (127a Wehrli), 236 n. 2

A T H E N A E U S

(200b), 30 n. 4; (216b), 306 n. 3; (218c),

263 n. 5; (220c!), 306 n. 2; (505c!), 269

n. 2; (55 1ε ), 245 n.; (5 92c), 313 ; (6o8f.),

283 n. 3

C I C E R O

Brut. (1 2. 46), 179 n. 1;

De div. 1 (3. 5), 246 n.

De inv. 2 (2. 6), 53 and η . 1

N.D. 1 ( 1 . 2), 234 nn. 1, 3; (12. 29), 234 n.

1 ; (13· 32

) ,2

49 n- 1; (15· 38

) ,2

38

,2

3 9 ,

240; (23 . 63), 234 nn . 1, 3, 235 n. 1 ; (3 7.

1 1 8 ) , 238, 240; (42. 1 1 7 ) , 227, 234 n. 3;

(42. H 7 f . ) , 236 n. 1; (42. 118) , 236 η . 1

De or. 2 (86. 3 5 1 — 4 ), 283 n. 2

3 (32. 126-8), 46

Tusc. ι (48. 1 16 ), 312 n. 5, 313 n. 2

C L E M E N T OF A L E X A N D R I A

Protr. 6 (7 1. 1), 249 n. 1 ; 24 (1 . 18. 75 St. ),

236 η . 1

Strom. 2 (403. 14 ), 304 n. 1 ; 5. 14 (1 08 . 4),

249 n. 1; 6. 15 (2 . 434), 282 n. 2 ,

283 n. 3

C R I T I A S

fr. (1 ) 302; (2), 301 ; (6 -8) , 302; (9), 2 56;

( t o ) , 303 n. i ; ( i 5 ) , 3035(16. 9) , 232 η . 5;

3 32



Index of passages quoted or referred to

C R I T I A S (cont.)

(18), 303; (19 ), 303; (2 1) , 304; (22),

69 n. 2 bis, 304; (23), 304; (25), 69 and

n. 1; (25. 1-8), 82; (25. 2), 80 n. 2;

(25. 9ft".), 243; (25. 9 - 1 1 ) , 69; (31), 302;

( 32

- 7 ) , 3 °2

! (39), 303; (40), 202, 302;

(44). 3 °2

; (45), 3 °2

n. 3; (52), 302 n. 3

DEMOCRITUS

(9)> 5*5η

· 4! (2

°α

) >2 0

5Η

·2

J (2<

S)>

206 n. 2; (33), 256 n. 2; ( 1 1 7 ) , 8 n. 2, 201;

(156), 186 n. 3; ( 1 8 1 ) , 69,179 n. 2; (242),2

5<S; (2

45 ), 140 n.; (247), 16 1 n. 3; (250),

1 5 0 ; (2

55), 73 n-2

i (2

7 5 - 7 ), 287 n. 3;

(278), 63 n. 3, 100

DEMOSTHENES

Aristocr. (6 1) , 118 n. 3, 122 n. 3 ; (65), 78 ;

(70), 78, 1 1 8 n. 3, 122 n. 3; (76), 263 n. 6;

(213), 306 n. 3

Cor. (275 ), 11 8 ; (276), 32

Meid. (46-8), 156 η . 1

Phil. 3 (3), 156 η . ι

[DEMOSTHENES]

Aristog. ( n ) , 82 n. 2 ; (1 5) , 82 n. 4; (15 ff.),

7 5 - 6 ; (1 6) , 75 n. 2, 7 6 ; ( 1 6 - 1 7 ) , 140 n.

Theocrin. (67), 301 n. 2

D1 0 C H R Y S O S T O M

Or. (13 ), 309 η . 1

D 1 0 OF HALICARNASSUS

Comp. verb. (1 2) , 272 n. 4

DIODORUS

1 (8. 1 ) , 80 n. 2, 82 n. 4; (8. 1 - 7 ) , 81

1 2 (10), 264 n. 1; (10. 4), 264 n. 1; (39),

30 n. 4; (39 . 2), 228 n. 2; (5 3) , 179 n. 3;

(53·J

-2

) > 40 n. bis; (53. 2), 38 n. 2, 44 n. 4

1 3 (26. 3), 62 n. 2, 84

1 5 (48), 1 5 1 - 1 ; (76), 3°<5

'ap. Cl em. 1. 365, 2. 6 6 D . ' : 293

DIOGENES LAERTIUS

1 (12 ), 28 ; (24), 282 n. 2

2

(31) , 3 °6 η

· 1; (6

4 ) , 3 "

3 (35) , ι »2

η · 2 ; (37), 264 η . 2; (57), 264 η . 2

5 (42), 58 η .

6 ( ι ) , 3°6 and η η . ι , 2 , 31 1

; (3),2 Ι Ο >

(8), 2 ΐ 2 η . ι ; ( ί ο ) , 1 5 4η

·2

> ( " ) > ι ΐ 7η

·2

;

( ΐ 3 ) , 3°6; (ι ό

) , 31 0 η

·2

; ( ΐ 7) , 209 η . ι

7 (40), ι68 η . 2

8 (5<S), 31 3; (59), 44 η . 4ί (ft), 42

η . y, (66),

42 η . 3

9 (ι8 ), 42 η . 3J (24), 234; (34), 263 η . ι ;

(39), 3°9η

· 35 (46), 253; (5° ). 262 η . ι ,

264 η . ι ; ( 5 * 0 , 51 η

· ι »2

η . ι ; ( 52 ),

43η

· 4,2

3 5η

·Ι

> 263 η . 4; (53),ι 8

2 η . 2 ;

(53 ί · ) , 22θ η . 2 ; (54),2

3 5η

·2<

^3η

·2

;

(55), *53η

· 3, ' 82

η . ι , 205 η . 2, 263 η . 2,

264, 3!

9η

·Γ

; (5*5),2

^2 η

·2

·

DIOGENES OF OENOANDA

fr. (12 c. 2. 1, p. 19 Wil l iam) , 234 η . 1

Dissoi logoi

( 1 ) , 31 6; (6), 31 7, 319 n. 1; (7), 31 9; (8),

3 1 9 ; (9), 283 n. 2

DITTENBERGER, Sylloge

(704), 80 n. 2, 84

E M P E D O C L E S

fr. (22 . 5), 149 n. 2; (35. i 6 f. ), 1 15 n. 2 ;

(59), 11 5 n. 2; (9 5), 56 n. 4; ( 10 5. 3),

303; ( '34),2

4 8 ; (135), i2

3 ,I 2

5

EPIPHANIUSHaer. (3. 21), 241 η . 1

EUDOXUS

ap. Steph . By z . ( s. v. Ά β δ η ρ α ) , 18 2 n. 1

EUPOLIS

fr. (1 46 ^ Ko ck ), 46

ap. D. L. (9. 50), 262 n. 1

EURIPIDES

Ale. ( i92ff . ) , 158; (2io f . ) , 158 ; (512), 1 9 1 ;

(769 f . ) , 158

Andr. (89), 158; (173 -6) , 16 ; 119 n. 2,

(638), 154 n. 2

Bacch. (200), 28 n. 1; (202), 183 n. 1,

264 n. 2; (274f f.) , 2 41 ; (395 ), 28 n. 1;

(895f-), " 3 J (102 7), 158 n. 1

El. (357ff-), 154; (737),2

44 n. 3; (743*'·),

243 nn. 3, 4

Hec. (291 f . ) , 156 n. 1; (799 m ) , 23

Hel. (730) , 15 8 ; (744ft".), 246 n. ; (757),

246 n.; ( 1 1 5 1 f t " . ) , 129; (1639), 158

Heraclid. (993), 31

Here. (727 f-), 113 n. 1; (i 34 if f. ), 229

Hippol. (88ff ) , ! 5 8 ; (98), 7 7 ; (358),2

5 9

n

- 3; ( 38o ff. ), 258 n. 1; (915 ft".), 1 9 ;( 9

2 1

) , 31

; (986), 128 n. 1; (1249ft".), 158

I.A. (749), 27; (1400), 156

I.T. (1238), 27 n. 2; ( 1 4 7 1 ) , 56 n. 2

Ion (440ft".), 1 2 1 ; (442), 7 7 ; (566), 158 n. 1;

(642), 1 1 3 ; (674), 158 n. 2; ( 725 -34) ,

158 n. 1 ; (730ft".), 158 ; (85 4), 15 9

Med. (54) , 158 n. 1 ; (546), 1 27 n. 4;

(1078ft".), 258

Or. (418) ,232 ; (485) , 15 3 η . i ; ( 4 9 i ) , i 2 7 n . 4

Phoen. (39 2), 15 8 n. 2 ; (499ft".), 1 65 ;

(5 09f.) , 105 n. ; (531ft".), 1 5 1 ; (J41 ff.),

1 5 1 η · ; (555), I 5 2 ; (599), " 8 n. 4Rhes. (924), 30 n. 2

Suppl. (19), 120 n. 3, 121 n. 3, 122 n. 3, 127;

(195), 127 n. 4; (201 f.), 1 8; (2 01 -1 3) , 80;

(244 f.), 6 3; (404), 1 5 1 ; (420), 41 1 ;

(427f.) , 43, 127 n. 4; (429ft".), 23, 70,

1 2 6 ; (52 6), 12 n. 3; (526 f . ) , 127; ( 9 1 3 - 1 5 ) ,

67 n.

Tro. (884), 232 n. 3; (886), 232 n. 3;

(914-65) , 19 2; (948), 229; (987), 230;

(989 f . ) , 207 n. 2

fr. (1 9) , 16 , 165 n. 2; (2 2), 1 54 n. 1; (48),

M 7 ; (49), M7 ; (50), 1 5 7 ; ( 5 1 ) , 1 5 7 ; ( 5 2 ) ,

1 5 4 , 159,I < 5

3 n-2

; (53), 15 5 ; (57) ,

1 5 7 n. 1; (70), 232 n. 6; (86), 157; (93),

1 5 6 n. 4; (95 ), 154 n. 1; ( 1 4 1 ) , 154 n. 2;

(168), 15 4 n. 2 ; (189) , 127 n. 4, 316 n. 2;

(232 ), 154 n. 1 ; (235 ), 154 n. 1; (245 ),

1 5 7 , (248), 154 n. 1; (25 4), 230 n. 1;

333




EU R I P E D E S (cont.)

(286), 229; (292. 7), 229; ( 3 1 3 ) , 158 n.2

>2

33; O2 6

), ' 54 n. 1; (336), 15 4;

(336. 2), 15 9; (346) , n 9 n. 1; (372),

27 n . 2; ( 377 ), 154 n. 2 ; (433), 101 n. 1,

114 n. 1; (480), 232 and n. 4; (495. 41 ff.),

1 58 n. 4; ( 5 1 1 ) , 158; (529), 158; (591. 4),

2

32 η

· 5; (59 3), 3° 4 1; (609),2

5 ' i

( 8 3 1 ) , 15 8; (840), 2 58; (841) , 258; (87 7),

232 n. 3, 233; (902), 1 6 1 ; (910) , 136 n. 2,

2

3 3 ; ( 9 " ) ,2

32 η

·6

; (913),2

33; (92

°)>

1 1 3 , 258 n. 2; (941), 232 n. 3 bis, n. 4, 233;

(973),2

4 ° n- (976 ), 158 n. 4; (104 7) ,

1 6 1 n. 3

EUSEBIUS

Chron. (Ol. 84), 263 n. 2

13 (13. 35), 249 η ·1

Γ

4 (3- 7), 235η

·1

G A L E ND e virt. phys. 3 ( 1 9 5 ) , 277 n. 2

Gloss. Hipp, prooem. (v ), 204 η . 1

G E L L I U S

7 (21), 58 n.1

1 (20), 277 η . 1

Gnomologium Vindobonense

(50, p. 14 Wachsm.), 246 n., 293 n.

G O R G I A S

Helen (passim), 50; (ink.), 19 5; (6), 99,

103 n. 2 ; (8), 44, 180; ( 1 1 ) , 27 3; (1 3),

1 5 n. 2, 5 1, 202; (14), 168

Palamedes

fr.(3), 193 η . 1; (5) , 270 n. 1; (5 0- 6) , 2 70;

(5<*-9), 42 n. 2; ($b), 44 n. 1, 162; (6),

44 n. 4, 56 n. 1, 270; (6.6) , 1 96; ( 7- 80) ,2

7 ° ; (s), 43η

· 3; (8 α

) > ' 5 ° ; 0 ° ) ,2

7 ° ;

( i l ) , 192, 270; (1 1. 9), 181 n. 1; ( n o ) ,

180, 192, 270; (i it z. 35), 273 n.;

( i2

) , 194; (13),2

72 n. 4; (1 5) , 270; (16 ),

270; (23), 181 η . i , 198 n. 1, 271 (26),

1 9 9 n.

H E R A C L I D E S PO N T I C U S

fr. (46 We hr li ), 15 n. 1; (150), 264 η . 1H E R A C L I T U S

fr. (2), 1 8 5 , ( 6 1 ) , 166 n. i ; ( i i 2 ) , 253; ( 1 1 4 ) ,

55

H E R M I AS

(p. 283 Cou vr eu r) , 222 n. 3

H E R M O G E N E S

D e ideis (B 401. 25 Rabe), 302

H E R O D I C U S

ap. Ath en. (2 16 b) , 306 n. 3

H E R O D O T U S

1 (29. 1) , 29 nn. 1, 2; (36. 1) , 19 1 ; (65) ,

77 n. 1, 135 ; (1 41· 1), 190; ( 'ΰ 8

) >2 6 2 n

-1

2 (49. 1 ) , 29 nn. 1, 2; (64), 104

3 (38), 16 n. 2, 13 2; (38. 3), 19 0; (80 -2) ,

148 n.; ( 106. 2), 252 ; (130. 5), 1 91 ;

( 1 3 1 . 2), 38 n. 2

4 (8. 2), 56 n. 4; (3 9. i ) , 56 n. 4; (5 9. 1) ,

2

37 n-2

5 (59·2

)> 57 n. ; (95 . 2) , 29 nn.

1 ,2

6 (43· 4), '9^

7 (104), 69

8 (57), 35; 0 6 . 2), 191

H E S I O D

Erga (259), 82 n. 2; (276), 55; (287-92),

278 η . 1; (289), 254; (649), 28 η . 1;

(758), 199 n-

fr. (15 3 Rz ac h) , 27

H E S Y C H I U S

α ρ . Σ P la t. (Rep. 600 c ) , 263 n. 2

H I P P I A S

fr. (2), 283 n. 1; (3), 283 n. 1; (4), 283 n. 3;

(6), 163, 282 n. 2, 283 n. 3; (9), 283 n. 1;

( 1 1 ) , 283 n. 1 5 ( 1 2 ) , 283 η . 1 5 ( 1 3 ) , 283 η . ι ;

( 1 4 ) , 283 n. 1; (1 6) , 285 n. 1 ; ( 17 ),

285 n. 1; (2 1) , 284 η . 1

H I P P O C R A T I C W R I T I N G S

Deaereaqu.loc.(passim), 58; I2ff. ( 1 1 , 5 2 L . ) ,1 6 1 n. 2; 16 ( 1 1 , 64 L. ), 70 η . 1

D e arte (passim), 21952 (vi, 4 L.), 190, 204

Law (3), 168 and n. 2, 256

Med. off. ( x v m B, 656 K.), 202 n. 2

Morb. sacr. 17 (vi, 392 L.), 56 n. 4

Afar. horn. (5), 204 n. 3

Vict. 1. 4 (vi, 476 L.), 56 n. 4; 11 (vi,

486 L ) , 120 n. 2

V.M. 3 ( ' , 57 4- 8 L. ) , 62, 80 n. 2, 83,

1 6 7 n. 3, 1 69 ; 8 (1 , 586 L. ), 1 69; 14

( 1 , 600 L . ) , 61 n.; 20 (1 , 620 L . ) , 31 , 169

H O M E R/ / . 1 (426), 240

9 (443),J

78 n. 41 1 (636), 309

1 5 (412), 27 n. 2

20 ( 4 1 1 ) , 252

2 1 : 269

23 (276), 252; (374), 252

Od. 17 (32 2f. ), 156 n. 4

23 (222), 230 η . 1

H O R A C E

Od. 4 (4. 33), 250 n. 2

IS O C R A T E S

Antid. (9), 36 η . 3; (i5 5 f.), 36 n. 4; (1 66) , 38

η ·2

J (2

3 5 ) ,2

9 n- 1, 35 « · ; (2

49), 5°; (2

5 4 ) ,

80 n. 2 ; (268) , 3 1 , 36 n. 4 ; (268—9), 195

Areop. (21 ), 151 n.; (23), 319 n. 3 ; ( 3 1 - 2 ) ,

73 n. 2

Busiris (25), 80 n. 2

Helen ( 1) , 254, n. 1; (2) , xiv

Nicocl. (44), 254 n. 1

Panath. (169), 78

Paneg. (1 ff.), 43 η . 1; (28), 80 n. 2, 239 η . 1;

(28ff.), 83; (32), 83; (39), 81 n. 2; (42),

8t n. r ; (45), 43 η . 1

Soph. (1 9) , 44 n. 4

JU V E N A L

7 (204), 295 η . 1

334




L A C T A N T I U S

De ira Dei ( n . 14) , 249 η . 1

Div. inst. 1 (5 . 1 8 - 1 9 ) ,2

4 9η

·1

L U C I A N

Peregrinus (1 4) , 34 n. 2

Zeus trag. (41), 232 n. 4

LY S I A S

Or. (2), 74; (2. 1 8 - 1 9 ) , 74 ; (2. ' 9 ) , " ι

(6. ί ο ) , 12 1; (21. 19), 259 n. 1; (25. 8),

60 n. 2 ; ( 31 . 6), 161 n. 3

ap. Athen . (12 . 5 5 1 ε ) , 245 η .

[ L Y S IA S ]

Andoc. (17), 237

M E L I S SU S

fr. (8. 3), 201 η . 1

M A RC E L L US

V. Thuc. (36), 223

M I N U C I US F E L I X

Octavius (1 9. 7 ), 249 n. 1; (2 1. 2), 238, 239

M O S C H I O N

fr. (6 Nauck), 81; (6. 2), 63 n. 3; (6. 23),

62 n. 2; (6. 29), 62 n. 2

O R I G E N

Cels. (4. 25), 286

Oxyrhynchus Papyri

vol. 11 (2 21) , 269 η . 1; xi (93), 1 52 n. 2; xv

(i i9 f. ) , n o n. 1; xx vi (2450), 132

(1364), 108 and nn. 2, 3, n o n. 1, 11 2,

1 5 0 nn . 1, 2, 15 2 n. 2, 288 n. 1 ; ( 1 7 9 7 ) ,

n o and n . 1, 112 , 203 n. 3; (225 6), 82 n. 2

P AR M E N I D E S

fr. (2. 7), 198; (2. 7-8), 218; (3), 198;

(6. 1), 198; (8. 6 f f . ) , 200; (8. 7 f f - ) , 19 7

P A U S A N I A S

5 (2

5· 4), 280 n. 3

6 ( ΐ 7 · 7 ) , 2 72 η . i ; ( i 7 . 8) , 192 η . ι ; ( ΐ 7 · 9 ),

269 n. 2

P H E R E C Y D E S

fr- (3), M 9η

· 2P H I L E M O N

fr. (95 Kock), 160

Meineke, C.G.F. iv (54), 82 n. 3

P H I LO D E M US

D e piet. (7 ), 249 η . 1; (9. 7) , 238

P H I L O P O N U S

Phys. (49. 17 ), 216 n. 2

PH I LO S T R A T U S

Ep- (73), 3°!η

· ι

V.S. 1 (1), 272 n. 4; (9. 4), 270; (9. 5), 42

n. 2, 44 η . 1; (10 . i ) , 263 η . 1 bis; (10. 2),

234 n. 1; (10. 3), 263 n. 2; (10. 4), 263

n. 4; ( 1 1 . 1) , 45 n. 4; (1 6) , 301 n. 3 bis

P H E Y N I C H U S

fr. (9 Kock), 228 n. 2

PINDAR

Isth. 5 (16), 134 n. 1; (28), 30 n. 2

Ο ί. 1 (28 f.), 134 5(3 5), '3 4 n. 15 (5 2) , 134

2 (86), 28 n. 1, 251

5 (27) , 134 η · 1

8 (21), 82 n. 2

9 (100), 251

1 0 (20), 252

Pyth. 2 (34 ), 134 n. 1 ; (86) , 134

3 (39),!

34 η · 14 (219), 5°

η

· 2

5 ( " 5 ) , 27 η . 2

ί ο (23), 252

fr. (48 Bo wr a) , 13 3; (70), 133 quater;

( 1 5 2 ) , 1 3 1 ; (203), 56 n. 2, 132 , 133 bis

P L A T O

Alcibiades I ( 1 1 1 e - H 2 a ) , 165 n. 3; ( 1 1 8 c ) ,35 η · ί ( "9

a

) > 38 n- 2;Apology (19 ε ) , 40, 269 η . 2, 274, 280 η . 2;

(2oa), 41 ; (20b), 45 ; (26d), 46 η . , 232

η . ι ; (32 c ) , 300

Axiochus (366 c), 41 and n. 3, 42 ; (j oo cf f. ),

280

Charmides (163 d ) , 222 n. 2, 276 n.

Clitophon (409 a- e) , 150 η . 1

Craiy/uJ(383 a ) , 208 ;( 384 b) , 42 n. 1,205 n. 1,

222 n. 2, 275; (3853- 3866), 1 91 ; (386a),

1 7 1 ; (386d ), 186 n. 1; (39 1b ), 205 n. 1;

(391 c ) , 205 nn. 1, 2 bis, 264 n. 2; (391 d),

206; (3 96d -e ), 207 n. 1; (3998-0 ), 220;

(400a), 207 n. 1 ; (4 02 b) , 182 n. 2, 282

n. 2; (403e), 31 n

- > (407d)> 207 n. 1;

(40 9d- e), 208; (41 6a) , 208; (4 i2 d) , 208;

(424 c ) , 220 n. 3; (425 a ) , 220 and n. 4,

2 2 1 ; (425 ε ) , 2o8; (42 6b) , 207 n. 1;

(429a), 206 n. 2; (42 9 bf f . ) , 215 ; (429d) ,

201 and n. 2; (430a), 20 8; (430 c) , 208;

(431 b - c ) , 220 n. 4; (433 d) , 21 5 ; (4 35d ),

208 ,215; (436b- c) , 206n. 25(4383), 206η .

2; (438c), 208; (44od), 201; (fin.), 209

Critias ( n o e ) , 2 5 2

Crito (49b), 11 3; (49c), 1 1 3; (50c), 140;

(5 2d ), 14 0; (5 3d) , 301 n. 3

Epist. 7 (324 c- d) , 299

Eryxias ( 39 7 c) , 4 1 ; ( ^ d f f . ) , 280

Euthydemus (27 7ε ) , 44 η . 4 , 205 η . ι , 222,

276; (2830-d) , 317 η . ; (285dff . ) , 211η . 2; (2 86 b- c) , 1 82; (286c), 51 n. 2

Euthyphro (3 c) , 34; (7 c- d ) , 165 n. 3

Gorgias (447c), 42; (452d), 45 n. 1;

( 45 2ε ) , i 8 i ; (45<5t>), 270 n. 1; ( 4 5 6 c - e ) ,

39 n. 1; ( 4 5 6 0 - 4 5 7 C ) , 181 n. 2; (460a ),

39 n. 1, 272 n. 1 ; (465 c) , 177 n.; (4 7o d) ,

1 0 3 ; (47 odf £), 309 n. 1; (4 71 a) , 103;

(48 3b) , 145 n. 4; ( 4 8 3 C - d ) , 103 n. 2;

(48383), 104 n. 2; (484b) , 1 3 1 ; (485 b),

1 9 1 ; (48 6a- b) , 106 n. 2; (486d-487b) ,

106 n. 2; (488 b—d), 103 n. 2; (491 c ) , 105;

(4 9i d) , 259 n. 1; (492a), 105 ; (508a),1 4 9 n. 2, 151 n.; ( 5i 2d ), 102; (513C2),

106 n. 2; (515 a) , 102; (520a) , 37, 102 η . 2,

1 7 7 η . ; (520 ε ) , 38 η . 3

Hipp. Maj. (281a), 40; (281b) , 281;

(282b), 40 n.; (282b 5), 36 n. 4; ( 2 8 2 D - C ) ,

40; (282c), 41 n. 2, 223 n. 2, 275 n.,

335




PLATO (COM.)

2 7 6 n . ; ( 2 8 2 C 1 ) , 3 6 ; ( 2 8 2 d - e ) , 264,

280 n. 3; ( 2 8 2 ε ) , 262, 281; ( 2 8 3 b ) ,

44 n. 1; ( 2 8 5 b ) , 4 6 ; ( 2 8 5 c - e ) , 282 n. 1 ;

(2 85 a), 1 1 8 ; ( 2 8 6 a ) , 42, 284; ( 2 8 6 b ) ,

4 1

Hipp. Min. (ink.), 282; ( 3 6 3 0 ^ ) , 42, 281;

( 3 6 4 a ) , 4 3 ; (3<58b-d), 45 n. 4, 28 3;( 3 6 8 c ) , 4 2 ; ( 3 6 8 d ) , 4 4 n. 4, 2 8 3 n. 2

Ion ( 5 3 4 b ) , 191

Laches (179a), 3 7 ; ( i 9 7 d ) , 35 n., 44 n. 4,

2 2 2 , 2 7 6 n.

Laws (ink.), 77 ,136; ( 6 2 4 a ) , 7 7 η . 1 ; ( 7 4 5 d ) ,

2 5 2 ; ( 7 5 7 3 - 7 5 8 3 ) , 151 n . ; ( 7 7 6 d ) , 157

n . 2 ; ( 7 8 8 a ) , 1 2 2 n. 3; ( 7 9 3 a ) , 7 7 n. 2 , 1 2 2 ;

( 8 3 8 a - b ) , 1 2 3 ; ( 8 4 1 b ) , 1 2 3 ; ( 8 7 3 d f f . ) ,

2 6 3 n. 6; (885 b ) , 2 3 1 ; ( 88 5 c ) , 2 3 7 n. 2;

( 8 8 6 b - d ) , 1 1 4 n. 4; ( 8 8 8 c ) , 2 3 1 ; (888d-

890a), 231 n. 1; ( 8 8 9 a f f . ) , 115 n. 1;

(889ε ) , 2 2 7 ; (8

9 ° a ) , 94 n. 3, 1 0 1 ; (908b),2 3 6 ; ( 9 0 8 b - e ) , 2 4 6 ; ( 9 0 7 a - c ) , 233

Lysis ( 2 0 4 a) , 3 1 ; ( 2 1 4 b ) , 1 4 9 n. 2

Menexenus ( 2 3 6 a ) , 2 9 2 , 293

Meno ( 7 o a - b ) , 301 n. 3; ( 7 0 b ) , 44 n. 1,

2 6 9 n. 2; ( 7 0 c ) , 4 2 ; ( 7 2 d ) , 2 5 4 ( 7 3 a ) , 2 5 4 ;

(7 3 d ) , 4 5 η . 1 ( 7 5 ε ) ,2 2 2 η

·2

,2 2 5 ! ( 76 c ) ,

2 6 9 ; ( 8 5 b ) , 3 1 ; ( 8 7 c ) , 2 5 7 ; ( 8 7 e ) , 7 2 n. 2 ;

( 8 7 e - 8 8 c ) , 1 6 6 n. 2; ( 8 7 e f f . ) , 280; (90),

3 1 7 ; ( 9 1 c f f . ) , 3 6 ; ( 9 1 d ) , 36, 38 n. 2 ;

( 9 1 e ) , 37 n. 2, 262, 26 3; ( 9 1 6 - 9 2 3 ) , 3 5 ;

( 92

) , 3 1 7 ; ( 9 3c

~ d ) , 2 5 2 η . ; (9 5 c ) , 39 n. 1 ,

1 0 2 n. 2, 1 8 1 , 2 7 1 ; ( 9 6 d ) , 276 n.; ( 9 8 a ) ,2

7 3

Phaedo ( 5 9 b ) , 306; ( 6 o d ) , 4 5 ; ( 7 8 a ) , 161

n . 1; ( 9 o b f f . ) , 1 7 7 ; ( 9 1 a ) , 1 7 7 ;

Phaedrus ( 2 5 7 d ) , 3 7 ; ( 2 6 0 b ) , 2 1 2 ; ( 26 1 b - c ) ,

4 n . 4 ; (2 6 3 a ) , 1 6 5 n. 3 , 2 04 n. 2; (2 6 5 e ) ,

2 0 4 ; ( 2 6 6 d ) , 44 n. 4 , 1 7 6 n. 3; ( 2 6 6 d ff.),

44 η . 4 ; ( 2 6 7 a ) , 45 n. 2 , 1 7 9 , 1 8 0 , 1 9 2 n. 1,

2 7 0 ; ( 2 6 7 c ) , 44 n. 4 bis, 205 n. 2, 2 95 ;

(2 6 8 a - c ) , 182 n. 3; ( 2 6 9 b ) , 187 n. 3;

( 2 6 9 b - c ) , 2 7 6 ; ( 2 6 9 c ) , 1 8 7 n. 3; ( 2 7 0 a ) ,

4 6 n . ; ( 2 7 i c ) , 44 n. 4 ; ( 27 3 a - b ) , 1 7 9 η . ι ;

( 2 7 8 b - d ) , 1 7 7Philebus ( 1 7 ε ) , 2 30 η . 3 ; ( 5 8 a ) , 1 7 9 η . 2,

ι 8 ι η . 2 ; ( 5 8 a - b ) , 192

Politicus ( 2 62 c - e ) , 1 6 1 n. 1 ; (292 ff.), 130

Protagoras ( 3 1 0 ε ) , 2 63 η . 5 ; ( 3 1 1 b ) , 38 η . 2 ;

( j i i c ) , 38 η . 2 ; ( 3 1 2 a ) , 3 7 ; ( 3 i 2 d ) , 4 4 ;

( 3 1 3 c ) , 3 7 ; ( 3 1 5 a ) , 372

; ( 3 ' 5 4 46,2 8 2 η . 1 ; ( 3 1 5 c - d ) , 2 7 4 n . ; ( 3 1 5 e ) , 2 7 6 n . ;

( 3 i 6 d ) , 3 5 , 37 n. 2 ; ( 3 1 7 c ) , 2 6 2 , 280 n. 3 ;

( 3 i 8 d - e ) , 45 n. 4, 255; ( 3 1 8 ε ) , 38, φ ,

2 8 2 η . ι ; ( 3 i 8 e - 3 i 9 a ) , 1 8 6 ; ( 3 1 9 ) , 3 1 7 ;

( 3 1 9 a ) , 3 9 , 2 5 5 n. 2 ; ( 3 2 0 c ) , 82 n. 1 , 266

bis; ( 3 2 0 c f f . ) , 6 4 ; ( 3 2 0 c — 3 2 2 d ) , 266;( 3 2 2 a ) , 8 1 nn . 3, 4, 2 3 5 n. 3; ( 3 2 2 a - c ) , 6 7 ;

( 3 2 2 b ) , 6 6 η . 1 bis, 8 1 n. 2, 2 55 nn. 1, 2;

( 3 2 2 c ) , 6 6 , 1 4 9 ; ( 3 2 2 C 4 ) , 1 7 5 ; ( 3 2 2 Q ) > 5 5 ,

6 6 n. 1, 2 5 2 ; ( 3 2 2 ε ) , 1 3 7 , 2 55 η . 2 ; ( 3 2 3 c ) ,

6 6 , 6 7 ; ( 3 2 3 C - 3 2 8 C ) , 39 η . 2 ; ( 3 2 4 3 - 0 ) ,

6 7 ; (325 c ff.), 3 1 9 ; (326 d ) , 6 8 n . ; ( 3 2 6 e f f . ) ,

6 8 ; ( 3 2 7 ) , 3 1 8 ; ( 3 2 7 a - b ) , 6 7 ; ( 3 2 8 c ) ,

6 8 , 3 1 8 ; ( j 2 8 d ) , 63 n. 3; ( 3 2 9 b ) , 4 2 ;

( 3 3 0 c) , 1 9 1 ; ( 3 3 o d ) , 1 9 1 ; ( 3 3 3 e - 3 3 4 c ) ,

1 6 6 n. 2; ( 3 3 4 ) , 3 1 6 ; (3 3 5 a ) , 42, 43 sn d

n . 4! ( 3 3 7 c ) , 44 n. 4 , 1 6 2 ; ( 3 3 7 a. ), 40 , 120,

I38 ;(338eff.), 2 0 5 ; ( 3 3 9 ε f f . ) , 2 7 4 ; (340a

ff.), 2 2 2 n. 2 ; ( 3 4 1 a ) , 222, 2 76 η . ; ( 3 4 1 3 -b ) , 3

2

η ·; ( 3 4 7 a ) , 2 8 2 ; ( 3 4 9 a ) , 3 5 ; ( 3 52

d -

e ) ,2

5 8 ; ( 3 52

< i f f . ) ,2

5 9 i ( 3 5 6 d - 3 5 7 b ) ,

2 6 0 n . ;

Republic ( 3 25 a ) , 1 4 6 ; ( j 2 6 d ) , 145 n. 3;

( 3 3 5 ° ) , 1 1 3 ; ( 3 3 6 b f f . ) , 88 n. ; ( 3 3 7 d ) , 295

bis; ( 3 3 8 ε ) , I03; ( 3 3 9 c ) , 96 n.; ( 3 4 1 a ) ,

9 6 n . ; ( 3 4 2 b ) , 89; ( 3 4 3 c ) , 89 n. 3, 9 4 ;

( 3 4 4 a ) , 93 η · , 95 ; ( 3 4 4 c ) , 93η

· ; ( 3 4 4 d ),

9 6 ; ( 3 4 5 b - c ) , 89 n. 2 ; ( 3 4 7 a ) , 9 5 ; ( 3 4 8 c ) ,

9 7 , 2 9 7 ; ( 3 5o d

) > 9° , 91 η

· » ; ( 3 5 i c i - 3 ) ,

9 1 ; ( 3 5 1 a . ) , 9 1 , 1 4 9 , 1 5 0 n. 1 ; ( 3 5 2 b ) , 9 1 ;

( 3 52

« - 3 5 3 d ) , 1 6 6 η . 2 ; ( 3 5 3 a - b ) , 90 n. 1 ;( 3 5 3 b f f . ) , 2 5 2 ; ( 3 5 3 c ) , 9 i ; ( 3 5 4 a ) , 9 i n . 2 ;

( 3 5 9 a ) , n o n. 3 , 1 1 2 , 142 n. 1; ( 3 5 9 c ) ,

9 9 , n o ; ( 3 6 1 a ) , 95 n. 2; ( 3 6 1 c ) , 96 n.;

( 3 6 4 b - e ) , 246 ; ( 3 6 5 d ) , 97 n. 2; ( 3 6 7 c ) ,

9 4 n. 3; (400b), 35 n.; ( 4 2 4 c ) , 35 n.;

(4308-431 a ) , 2 59 n. 4; ( 4 5 3 e - 4 3 6 a ) , 1 6 1 ;

( 4 5 4 a ) , 204; ( 4 6 9 b - c ) , 1 6 1 ; ( 4 7 0 c ) , 1 6 2 ;

( 47 9f f

0 , 3 1 7 η . ; (488ε ) , 3 7 4 ; ( 4 8 9 c ) , 228

η . 1 ; ( 4 9 1 a ) , 299 ; ( 4 9 2 a - 4 9 3 d ) , 21 n. ;

( 4 9 3 a ) , 21 n., 3 7 n. 1, 41 n. 1, 2 7 8 ; ( 4 9 5 a ) ,2 9 9 ί ( 4 9 5 ^ - d ) , 31 0 n. 3; ( 4 9 5 d - e ) , 128

n. 2 ; ( 5 0 0 c ) , 1 1 2 ; ( 5 6 o d ) , 1 0 5 n . ; ( 5 6 3 d ) ,1 2 2 n. 2; ( 5 9 6 d ) , 30; ( 6 0 0 c ) , 223 n. 2;

( 60 0 c - d ) , 48 η . 1

Sophist ( 2 3 2 d ) , 44 n. 4; ( 2 5 1 b ) , 2 1 4 , 2 1 6 ;

( 2 5 4 a ) , 1 9 3 ; ( 2 6 2 a f f . ) , 2 1 0 n. 3; ( 2 6 2 c f f . ) ,

220 n. 4; ( 2 6 5 ε ) , i i 5 η . 3

Symposium ( 1 7 7 b ) , 2 7 7 ; ( 1 7 8 a ) , 282 n. 2;

( 1 8 6 ε ) , 290 η . ζ ; ( 1 9 8 c ) , 2 7 3 ; ( 2 0 8 c ) , 31

η . , 7 2 η . 2

Theaetetus ( 1 5 1 b ) , 276 η . ; ( 1 5 2 a ) , 51 η . 2 ,

I 7 I ; ( 1 5 2 b ) , 1 8 4 ; ( 1 5 2 c ) , 1 8 4 ; ( i 5 2 c f f . ) ,

1 8 5 ; ( i 5 2 d ) , 3 17 η . ; ( 1 5 2 ε ) , 182 n. 2;

( 1 5 5 b - c ) , 3 1 7 η . ; ( 1 6 0 c ) , 18 3 n. 4 ; ( 1 6 1 c ) ,1 83 n. 1, 2 6 4 n. 2; ( 1 6 1 c f f . ), 1 7 1 ; ( i 6 2 d ) ,

6 5 , 234; ( i 6 2 d - e ) , 65 n. 2; ( 1 6 2 ε ) , i 8o

n . 1; ( i 6 6 d ) , 175 n. ; ( i 6 6 d f f . ) , 184 n.;

( 1 6 7 a ) , 1 8 7 ; ( i 6 7 a - b ) , 175 n. ; ( 1 6 7 b ) ,

1 8 7 ; ( 1 6 7 I 5 - C ) , 1 6 7 , 2 5 6 ; ( 1 6 7 c ) , i n n .,

1 3 7 ; ( 1 6 7 C 1 ) , 17 2 n. 2; ( i 6 9 d ) , 175 n. ;

( 1 7 1 a ) , 186 n. 3; ( i 7 i e - i 7 2 a ) , 59 n. 1;

( 1 7 2 a ) , i n n ., 1 7 5 ; ( 1 7 8 b ) , 183 n. 4;

( 2 0 i d f f . ) , 2 1 3 ; ( 2 0 2 b ) , 2 1 5 ; ( 2 i o d f f . ) ,

2 1 4 η . 1

Timaeus ( 1 9 ε ) , 40; ( 3 2 c ) , 1 4 9 n. 2; ( 5 5 d ) ,

2 3 0 n. 3PLUTARCH

Adv. Colot. ( 1 1 0 9 a ) , 186 n. 3; ( m 9 c - d ) ,

2 1 7 n. 2

Amat. ( 7 ) 6 b - c ) , 232

De aud. poet. ( 3 3 c ) , 165 n. 2; ( 3 3 ε — f ), 258

3 3 6




P L U T A RC H (com.)

De def. orac. (432 c ) , 246 n.

De malign. Herod. (862), 43 n. 2

De Pyth. orac. (399a), 246 n.

De superst. ( 1 7 1 c ) , 236 n. 1, 243 n. 3

V. Demosth. (5. 7), 312 n. 3

V. Lycurg. (5), 77 η . 1; (6), 77 η . 1; (30), 306

V. Nic. (23), 22SV. Pericl. (4 ), 35 n. ; ( 8), 65 n. 2 ; (32 ), 228 ;

(36), 263 n. 6

V. Them. (2), 35

[PLUTARCH]

V. or. (832c), 293; (832Ο , 286; (833), 293;

(83 3c ), 168 η . i , 290; (838a ), 280 n. 2;

(844 c ) , 312 n. 3

PORPHYRY

De alst. (3. 25 ), 153 n. 3

PROCLUS

Eucl. (p. 272 Frie dlan der) , 284 η . 1; (p. 356),

284 η . 1In Crat. (37 Pasquali), 210 n. 2

PRODICUS

fr. (1 ) , 278 n. 2 ; (2) , 278 n. 2 ; (4), 46,

277 n. 2 ; (5), 238 η . 1

P R O T A G O R A S

fr. ( i ) , 17 1 n. 1, 183 , 188 ff., 264 n. 2 ; (2) ,

47 n.; (3), 68, 256, 264 n. 2; (4), 65 n. 2,

189 bis, 190, 234 η . ι , 235 n. 1; (10) , 256

QUINTILIAN

3 ( 1 . 8), 44 n. 4

S C H O L I A

Σ Ael . Aris tid. (3. 408. 19 Din do rf) , 132

Σ A r. Rhet. (1373 b ), 159 n. 2

Σ Ju v. 7 (203), 295 η . 1

Σ P in d. Nem. (9. 35), 132

Σ P la t. Phaedr ( = Her mia s p . 283 Co uv -

reur), 222 n. 3

SENECA

De const, sap. (18. 5), 306 η . 1

SEXTUS

Adv. math. 7 (5 3), 200 η . 1; (60), 183 nn. 1,

3, 264 n. 2 ; (65 ff.), 193 n. 1; (84), 19 8;

(388 ), 200 n. 1 ; (38 9), 18 6 n. 3

9 ( 1 7 ) , 240 η . 2; (18) , 238, 240; (34), 240η . 2;

(39- 41 ) , 238, 239; (5θ > 238,2

4 ° snd

η . 2; (5 i - 5) , 236 η . ι ; (52) , 240; (54),

243 nn. 2, 3; (5 5 ) , 234 η . ι ; (56), 234 η . 1,

263 η . 2

P.H. 1 (216), 183 nn . 3, 4; (21 8) , 185 bis

2 (63), 1 8 5 ; (64), 198 n. 2; (7 6), 200 η . 1

3 (218), 236 n. 1, 243 n. 3

S lM P L I C I U S

Cad. (556, 557), 194

Cat. (208, 28) , 214 n. 2

Phys. (54), 292 n. 2; (54ft".), 284 n. 2; (91),

216 and η . 1; (91 . 28), 217 n. 2; (120 ), 21 7 ;

(786. 1 1 ) , 292 η . 1

S O L O N

fr. (1 Di eh l) , 126 n. 1 ; ( 1 . 52), 28 η . 1

S O P H O C L E S

Ajax (668ff.), 1 5 1 ; (13 43), 120 n. 3,

122 n. 3

Antig. (332ff . ) , 18; (332 - 71 ) , 80; (355),

142 n. 2; (367 f.) , 12 7; (450ff.), 22, 120;

(672), 289 n.; ( 1 1 1 3 ) , 56

El. (236), 189; (770), 32 n.

O.C. ( 9 i 2 f f . ) , 1 27O.T. (384) , 132 n. 3; (484), 27 n. 2 ;

(863 ff.), 77, 121

Phil. (439^ ) , 27 η . 2 ; ( 1 246) , 28 η . ι ; (1265),

1 9 1

Trach. (9) , 241; ( 1 1 3 6 ) , 1 9 1 ; (fin.), 232 n. 6

fr. (83. 3 Nauck), 56 n. 4; (97), 33; (399),

1 5 1 n.; (532 ), 154 n. 4

STESIMBROTUS

ap. Plut . V. Pericl. (8), 65 n. 2

STOBAEUS

2 (33· 15 ), 287 η . 1

3 (38- 32), 2S5 n. 1; (42. 10), 285 η . 15 (82), 165 n. 2

ST RA B O

8 (7. 2), 1; η . 1

T E L E C L I D E S

fr. (6 Kock), 228 n. 2

THEMISTION

Or. (23 p. 350 Di nd or f) , 205 n. 2; (30

p. 422), 239

Phys. paraphr. (7. 2), 216 n. 3

THEODORETUS

Graec. aff. cur. (1 . 75) , 249 η . 1

THEOGNIS

( 1 9 ) , 28 n. 1; (27ff.), 2 5 1 ; ( 1 1 9 f t " . ) , 27

THEOPHRASTUS

De sens. (7), 198

THRASYMACHUS

fr. ( 1 ) , 295 bis; (2), 294; (8), 97, 298

T H U C Y D I DES

1 (2. 4) , 252 ; (21 . 1) , 43 n. 2; (22 . 1) , 85 ;

(22. 4), 43 n- 2; (23. 6), 224; (36. 1),

224 n. ; (42 . 1 ), 88; (69. 6), 224; (7 6. 2),

86; (76. 3), 99 n.; (84. 3), 224 n.; ( 1 2 1 . 4),

251 n. 3

2 (37) , 70 ; (37 . 1 ) , 150 ; (37- 3) , " I ; (38) ,

57 n.; (39. 4), 69η

·2

; (43· 2), 735 (43· 3 ),

1 6 1 n. 3; (47. 4), 15 n. 1; (62. 4), 224;

(63. 2), 86; (97. 3- 4) , 16 n. 2

3 (4) , 280 η . 3; (9· ι ) , 87; ( 1 0 . 1 ) , 88; ( 1 1 . 2),

88; (36ff.), 20 n. 1; (37. 2), 87 n.;

(38· 4), 43 n. 1; (38. 7) , 4 ' , 259 n. 1;

(39. 2), 224; (39. 3), 87, 92; (29. 5), 87,

99 n.; (40. 2), 87; (40. 4), 87; (44. 4), 87;

(45· 3), 99 (45· 4) , «7" (45· 7 ) , 87,

99 n.; (4 7. 5), 87 ; (53. 1-2 ), 224 n. ;

(56. 3), 88; (62. 3), 150 n. 2 ; (82), 84;

(82. 2), 296 n. 1; (82. 4), 72, 90 n. 2,

105 n. ; (82. 6), 56 η . 1; (83. 1) , 90 n. 2 ;

(86. 3), 40 n.; (91), 306

4 (60. 1 ) , 86; (61. 5), 86, 99 n.; (86. 6), 92;

(98. 6), 224

337




338

i H U C Y D I D E S (cont.)

5 ( 8 5 - 1 1 1 ) , 8 5 ; ( 9 0 ) , 8 5 ; ( 9 8 ) , 8 6 ; ( 1 0 3 ) ,

1 2 8 ; ( 1 0 4 ) , 8 6 ; ( 1 0 5 ) , 8 6 n ., 9 2 ; ( 1 0 5 . 2 ) ,

1 0 0 , 2 9 7

6 ( 1 1 . 6 ) , 2 2 4 ; ( 3 8 . 5 ) , 1 4 8 bis

8 ( 6 8 ) , 2 9 3 bis; ( 6 8 . 1 ) , 3 2 ; ( 8 9 ) , 2 9 3 ; ( 9 0 ) ,

2 9 3 ; ( 9 0 . 1 ) , 2 9 4

TYRTAEUS

fr. ( 3 D i e h l ) , 7 7 n . 1 , 1 3 5

XENOPHANES

fr . ( 1 8 ) , 6 2 , 63 n . 2 ; ( 2 3 ) , 2 4 8 ; ( 3 4 ) , 2 3 4

XENOPHON

Anab. 2 ( 6 . 16 ff. ), 1 8 1

Cyneg. ( 1 3 ) , 3 7

Cyrop. 3 (1 . 1 4 ) , 3 1 ; ( 1 . 3 8 ff.), 3 1

Hier. ( 2 . 2 ) , 2 5 2 ; ( 6 . 1 6 ) , 2 5 2

Mem. 1 ( 1 . n ) , 3 1 ; ( 2 . 6 ) , 3 9 ; ( 2 . 9 ) , 1 2 8 n. 2 ,

3 1 9 n . 3 ; ( 2 . I 2 f f . ) , 3 0 0 ; ( 2 . 2 4 ) , 3 0 1 n . 3 ;

( 2 . 3 1 ) , 1 7 8 n . 2; (2. 4 6 ) , 2 8 n . 1 ; ( 4 . 1 0 ) ,

* 3 > ;

( 4 . 1 3 ) , 6 5 n . 2 ; ( 6 ) , 2 9 3 bis; ( 6 . 3 ) , 2 3 0

n- 3 ; ( 6 · 5 ) , 3 9 ! ( 6 · 1 0 ) , 2 3 0 n . 3 ; ( 6 . 1 3 ) ,

3 6 ; ( 7 . 1 ) , 7 1 ; ( 1 6 . 1 3 ) , 4 0

2 ( 1 . 2 1 ) , 63 n . 3 ; ( 1 . 2 1 - 3 4 ) , 2 7 8 n . 2

3 ( 3 . 1 1 ) , 1 7 8 ; ( 8 . 7 ) , J 6 6 n . 2 ;

4 ( 2 . 1 ) , 3 0 ; ( 3 . 1 4 ) , 65 r> . 2 ; ( 3 . 1 6 ) , 2 2 7 n. j ;

( 4 . 8 ) , 1 6 5 ; ( 4 . 1 2 ) , 1 3 8 ; ( 4 . 1 2 - 1 3 ) , m ;

( 4 . I 2 f f . ) , 7 0 n . 2 ; ( 4 . 1 4 f f . ) , 1 1 9 ; ( 4 - 1 6 ) ,

1 4 9 ; ( 4 . 21), 1 1 9 n . 3 ; ( 5 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) , 2 0 4 n .3 ; ( 6 . 1 ) , J 1 7 8 ; ( 6 . 6 ) , 7 0 n . 2; ( 6 . 8 ) ,

1 6 6 n . 2 ;

Oec. ( 1 . 7 - 8 ) , 1 9 1 ; ( 4 . 2 - 3 ) , 1 2 8 n. 2

i?ep. Z a c . ( 2 . 4 ) , 5 7 n . ; ( 8 . 5 ) , 1 3 5

Symp. ( 3 . 5 . ) , 3 0 9 ; ( 4 . 6 ) , 3 1 0 ; ( 4 . 3 8 ) , 3 0 7 ;

( 4 · 3 9 ) , 3 ° 7 ; ( 4 · 4 3 ) , M i η ·! ( 4 · 02), ι82Π .

2 , 2 8 2 η . ι , 2 83 η . 2 , 3 0 6 ; ( 5 ) , 1 7 0

[XENOPHON]

Const. Ath. (1 . ί ο ) , 1 5 6 ; ( 3 5 ff-)>̂ 9 9

ZENO

f r . (1), 1 9 7 ; ( 1 1 ) , 1 9 7



G E N E R A L INDEX

Bold figures denote a main or more important entry. The entries for modern scholars are often

selective, and as a rule no entry is made where the text has not more than a reference

Adimantus, 94 n. 3, 99, 103

Aeschines of Sphettus, 30

A e s c h y l u s , 28, 49, 50, 121, 158 n. 3

Agathon, 273

agnosticism, 23, 234 f.

agriculture (see also medicine), as origin of law

and ci vi li za tion , 61 f., 239

aidos, 66

a i r , divinity of, 232, 233, 247

aither, divinity of, 232, 233, 247A l c i h i a d e s , 237, 274, 301, 308; relations with

Socrates, 300

A l c i d a m a s , 48 n. 1, 15 7, 220, 274, 3 1 1 - 1 3 ;

on slavery, 24, 159 f.

Alc mae on, 31, 195

ananke, 100

Anaxagoras, 18 , 30, 154 n. 4, 203, 226, 232,

248

Anaximander, 14, 136 n. 2, 194

Anaximenes, 194

Andron , 102

a n i m a l s , as model s of huma n beh avi our , 104,

1 1 4 n. 4

'A no ny mu s Ia mbl ich i', 71 ff., 253 n. 1, 256,

280 j authorship and date, 314 f.

Ant igo ne , 22, 120, 127

Antimoerus, 37

Antiphon, 52, 122 n. 4, 125 n. 1, 128 n. 3, 143,

145, 208, 285-94; upholds physis against

nomos, 22, 100, 1 0 7 - 1 3 , 11 9, 130, 146, 203,

2 9 1 ; on birt h and race, 24, 152 f., 156, 1 6 1 ;

On Truth, 107 ff., 291 ; equate s justic e wit h

conformity to law, 108, i n , 138;On

Con-cord, 150 n. 1, 286 ff.; as men ta l therap ist ,

1 6 8 , 290 f.; on educat ion , 16 8; ho w far a

sceptic, 202 f.; on lan gua ge , 20 2- 4; stud y

of natu re, 203; on God and provi denc e,

230, 23 1, 245, 288; on sophrosyne, 259;

ide nt ity of, 285 f., 29 2- 4; date , 286 wi th

n. 2; on time, 292

Antisthenes, 117, 1 6 5 , 1 8 2 n. 2, 208, 274, 304-

1 1 ; on impossi bil ity of cont rad icti on, 209 ff.;

on def ini tion, 210 f., 21 2 f.; retort to Plato,

2 1 4 ; monoth eism of, 247 - 9; datea n

^ setting,

304 ff.; relation to Socrates, 305 ff.; to

C y n i c s , 306 f., 307 η . 1 ; pupil of Gorgias,

306; character, 307; doctrine of virtue, 308;

anti-egalitarian, 308; reply to Parmenides,

309; as Home ric crit ic, 309 f.; att acked

Pl ato , 31 0; theor ies of his influence, 310 f.;

works, 311

Anytus , 38 n. 1, 39; attacks Sophists, 36, 37,2

5 i

Aphrodite, 229, 230

Apollo (see also Delphic oracle ), as legislator,

1 7 , 77, 135

Archel aus (philosoph er), 58 wi th n. 1, 11 6, 165

Arc hel aus of Macedo n, 294, 309 η . 1

Archytas, 151

Areopagus, 78

arete, how acquired, 2;, 250 ff., 317 f. ( 'Doub le

Arguments'); political, 64 ff.; according to

Prot agor as , 65 ff., to A ris tot le, 68, to

'An on. Iambli chi', 7 1 ; as practical s k i l l ,

66 n. 1, 25 2; as fitness for function, 90 n. 1,

252 f.; aris tocratic associa tions, 250 ff. See

also Socrates

Arginusae, affair of, 143 η . 1

Aristippus 1, 277

Ari sto gei ton , speech aga ins t, 75 ff., 138, 145

Aristo phane s, 49, 15 8; on function of poets ,

29 f.; on sophist s, 3 3; critic of the ne wmor alit y, 100, 11 4

Ari stot le, rela tion to Sop his tic , 53 f.; on

acquiring virtue, 68; his classification of

l a w s , 123 f., 12 6; on l aw and m or al it y, 139,

1 4 0 ; on friendship, 149 f.; on eq ua li ty , 1 52 ;

on slavery, 160; on metron, 183 f.; cr it ic ism

of Antiphon, 203; criticism of A ntist hene s,

2 1 0 ; criticism of Alcid ama s, 312 wit h n. 5;

on nam es , 208 n. 1; on def inition, 210 n. 4,

2 1 3 ; on gram mar, 220 f.; on C ri ti as , 299 f.

Aspasia, 228

atheism, 23, 1 1 5 , 235-47Athena, 80 n. 2

Athena goras , 148, 151

Athenians, suspicious of intellectuals, 32;

att itude to Sophist s, 38 f., 40

Athe ns, constitutional devel opme nts at, 1 9;

originator of agriculture and civilisation,

83 f.; sl av er y at, 155 f.; her p hi lo so phy of

power, 85 f., 297

A y e r , A. J . , 165

Bacon, Francis, 8 f.

B a l d r y , H. C , 153 n. 5barbaroi, 153 nn. 1 and 4

Barke r, E., 13 1, 137, 141 wi th n. 2

beauty competition, 170

Bentham, J . , 72 η . 1

Bignone, E., 20 n. 2, 94 n. 1, 109 n. 3, 150

n. 1, 292 f.

339



General index

blood, as vehicle of thought , 303

Burnet, J . , 17 , 48 n. 2

Butler, Bishop , 217 n. 2

C a i z z i , F., 210 n. 2, 21 1 n. 1, 215

C a l l i a s , 41, 306

C a l l i c l e s , 22, 37, 41, 72, 97, I 0 I - 7 , 130, 132,

1 4 0 f., 145 , 245

Calogero, G., 271 η . 1

Camb ridg e University, 20 η . 1

C am pb el l, Α . Η ., 117

Cassirer, E., 3 η . 1

C h a r i c l e s , 300

Charondas, 17

C h i a p e l l i , Α . , 199

Chr ist ian ity , 5 f., 242 η . 1

C i n e s i a s , 245

Classen, C. J . , 205 n. 2

Clei sthe nes, 19, 38 n. 1, 136

Cle on, 19 , 41 , 43 n. 1, 87

climate, effect on character, 161

Cole, A. T. , 175 n. 1, 315 η . 1

concord. See homonoia.

Confucius, 276

'con sola tion -lit erat ure' , 290 n. 2

contradiction, imposs ibilit y of, 182, i t o ff.

Co ra x, 178 f., 270

Cornford, F. M., 50 n. 1, 172 n. 1, 17 5, 184 f.

cosm olog y, effect on moral theory , 100, 1 1 4 -

1 6

Cosmopolitanism. See Unity of Mankind.

Crates, 308

C r a t y l u s , 20 1; (in Pl at o) , 206 ff., 2 1 ;

Crete, l a w s of, 136

C r i t i a s , 22, 48, 145 n. 2, 236, 274, 298-304;

on or ig in of rel igi on, 23, 243 f.; on ori gin of

soci ety, 82, 14 2; on l aw , 68 f., 13 8; rela tion s

wi th Socra tes , 178 , 300; on sensation and

thought, 202, 302 f.; on nature and training,

2 5 6 , 302; l i fe and character, 298 ff.; interest

in tec hno log y, 30 1; wo rk s, 302 ff.; on time,

303 f.

Critobulus, 170

Cros s, R. C , and Woo zl ey , A. D., 89 n. 2,

91 nn. 1 and 3, 92 n. 1, 96 n. 1, 142 , 143C y n i c s , 305, 306 ff.

Cynosarges , gymnasium of, 306 with n. 3

Damon, 35 η . 1

Darius, 104, 132

definitions (see also Socra tes) , Antisthe nes on,

2 1 2 ff.; of arete (Socrates and Gorg ias) ,

253 f.; m us t inclu de function, 213

deification, of inanimate substances, 238 fl.; of

human benefactors, 238 ff.

deinos, demotes, 32 f., 34

Delph ic oracle, 13 5, 227 η . 1

Dema rat us, 69, 122 n. 2

Demeter , 61, 83, 241

democ racy , 38 η . 1, 87 η . ι , 126, 130, 148, 15 0;

gr ow th of at Ath ens , 19 f.; and rhet oric,

1 7 9 ; Socrates 's view s on, 128

Democr itus , 9, 18 , 52, 56, 61 , 73 n. 2, 100, 197

η . i , 208, 25 3; on limita tions of hum an

kno wle dge , 8; on law, 69; on concord, 15 0;

on sensat ions and r eal ity , 186, 201, 203; on

correct la ng ua ge , 205 f.; la ng ua ge and

r e a l i t y , 225; on belief in gods, 216, 232, 238;

on nature and training, 256; compa red to

Antiphon, 291

Demos, 102

Demosthenes, 118

Descartes, R., 7

de Strycker , \V., 143 η . 1

Devereux, G., 230 n. 1

Dev lin , Lor d, 1 1 7 n. 1, 122 n. 4, 140

Diagoras of Melos, 236 f.

dike, 66

Diodotus, of Athens, 87 η . 1

Diogenes of Apollonia, 31, 185 n. 1, 232, 233

Diog en es of Sin op e, 306 f., 30S

Diopeithes, 227, 228 n. 2

Diotima, 31

Disraeli, B., 272

division, method of (in Plato), 204

Dodds, E. R. , 102 nn. 1 and 4, 106, 107, 133,

1 3 4 n. 2, 242

'D o u b l e Ar gu me nt s' , the, 171 n. 2, 257,

316-19

earth, as god tamed by man, 80; men born

from, 15 4 f., 163

education, compared to agriculture, 168 f.

Ehrenberg, V., 38 n. 1, 85 n. 2, 129 n. 1, 133

Eleatics, 202 η . 1, 203; influence on Sop his ts,

8, 1 4 f., 1 9 2 f., 273

Eleusin ian myste rie s, profanation of, 237, 24 ;

Empedo cles, 29, 31 , 42, 56, 62, 116 , 149 n. 2,

1 5 9 n. 2, 1 79 , 194, 241 , 303; relation to

Gorgi as, 198, 269, 270 η . 1

empiricism, 8, 47

Enlig htenm ent, the, xiv, 48

Ephialtes, 19

Epicurus, 291

epideixeis, 41 f.

epos, 205

e q u a l i t y , c h . VI ; geometrical and arithmetical,

equity, 123

Eretrian school, 217

e r i s t i c , 178 η . 1

eras (Platonic), 40

etymology, 207 with n. 2.

Euclides of Megara, 217

Euenus, 45

Euhemerus, 236, 240

Euri pid es, 28, 49, 136, 205 n. 2 ; on s lav ery , 24,

1 5 7 - 9 ; and Sophis tic , 43, 48, 127 f.; on

nomos—physis antit hesis , 1 13 f.; on di vi ne

l a w s , 1 2 1 ; on written and unw ritten law,

1 2 6 - 9 ;o n

equali ty ( g e n e r a l ) , 149, 15 1, (of

hig h and lo w bir th ) 154 f.; on re lat ivi ty of

v a l u e s , 165 ; on the go ds , 228 ff.; inf luenced

by Antiphon?, 230 n. 3 (b); on natural

340



General index

Euripides (com.)

phi los oph y, 2 33; on prop hec y, 246 I.; on

weakness of w i l l (against Socrates), 258

Eu th yd em us , 30, 186 n. 1, 206

Euthyphro , 207 η . 1

falseho od, im pos sib ili ty of, 182 n. 2, 207, 21 of.

Fehling, D., 205, 206 n. 2

Filmer, Robert, 6 η . 1

Four Hundred, the, 102, 301

Fr itz , K. vo n, 17 4 n. 1, 266

fundamentalis m, w h y unk no wn in Greece,

230 n. 2

genetic definitions, 143 f.

Gigante, M., 75 n. 2, 133

Gla uco n, 22, 95 n. 2, 97, 99, 101 n. 2, 112 , 1 41 ,

1 4 2 , 146

god, gods (see also names of separate gods,

atheism, religion, providence, deification),

or ig in of belief in, 23 f., 238 ff. (Pr od ic us );

moral f a i l i n g s of, 13 4; crit icism of, on moral

gr ou nd s, 228 ff.; as personif ication s of

pas sions , 230; self-sufficiency of, 230 f.;

replaced by natural forces, 237 n. 2

Gomme, A. W. , 12 1 n. 3

Gomperz, H., 20, 167 n. 1, 174, 189

Gomperz, T., 13 , 49

Gorgia s, 8, 14, 56 η . i, 99, 103 n. 2, 125, 211,

269-74; attacked Presoc ratic philo sophy ,

1 5 , 51, 186; denied that he taught arete, 20,

3 9 , 44 f., 102 n. 2 , 181, 271 f.; refused to

define arete, 254 ; mission to A the ns, 21 , 40,

1 7 9 n. 3, 192 n. 1, 27 0; on th e pow er of

rhet oric , 25, 44, 168, 180 f., 2 7 1 ; moral

neu tral ity of, 25, 2 7 1 ; ear nin gs of, 36;

public speeches, 42, 44; Helen, 42, 50, 192,

2 5 4 ; Palamedes, 42, 181 n. 1, 192; On Non-

Being, 47, 180, 192 ff.; pan-Hellenism of,

44, 150, 16 2; on tr age dy, 1 81 ; date and l i fe ,

269; relation to Empedocles, 269; works,

270 f.; epi tap h on, 272 η . 1; pu pi ls of, 273 f.

grammar, 219 ff.

Grant, Α ., 12 , 13 n. 1, 49, 164, 265

Greene, W . C ., 73, 108 η . 1

Greenleaf, W . H., 7, 59

Grote , G., 11 ff., 33, 188, 199 f., 214 n. 1, 265 ,

2 7 7 f., 284

Grotius, H., 6

Gy ge s, ri ng of, 98, 99, m

Hack for th, R., 167, 205 n. 2

Harri son, E. L., 96 η . 1

Harrison, Freder ic, 242 η . 1

Hart , H. L. Α . , ι 6 η . ι , 57

Have lock , Ε . Α ., ί ο , 13 , 34 n. 1, 51 f., 64 n. 1,

287, 296

Hecata eus, 17 n. 3

hedonic calculus, 259

hedonism (see also pleasur e); of C a l l i c l e s , 1 0 ; ;

of Antiphon, 11 3, 290

He in ima nn , F., 56 n. 3, 57 n. 1, 58, 132 n. 4 ,

1 3 4 , 138 n. 2

Helen, 192, 229, 230

Helike, disaster at, 15 η . 1

Hep hae stu s, 80 n. 2

Hera, 228, 229 η . 1

Heracles, 132, 133, 308; see also Prodicus

Heracli des of Pont us, 15 η . 1

Her acli tus , 55 , 125 , 129 , 200, 203, 248, 253;

and Pr ota gor as, 14 , 166, 182 n. 2, 18 5;

attack on religious cults, 22(5

Her mae , muti lati on of, 2 37, 245, 301

Hermes, 66, 228

Hermocrates, 86, 93

He rmo ge nes (in Pl at o) , 206 ff., 215

Herodotus, 16 , 28, 132 , 133 , 148 η . 1

Hesiod , 29, 55, 62, 125 , 254, 278 η . 1

Hippias, 136, 146, 165, 280-5;o n l a w s as

huma n compacts, 24, 70, 138, 143, 14 5; as

dip lom at, 40; pub lic spee ches , 42 f.; bre adth

of interests, 45, 46, 282 f.; on un wr itt en

l a w s , i n , 118-20; and the unity of man

kin d, 11 9 n. 2, 162, 16 3; date and character,

280 ff.; dis cov ere d qu ad ra tr ix , 283 f.; eth ica l

v i e w s summarized, 284 f.

Hi ppo da mus , 139 f., 1 47

Hippon, 245

Hirzel, R., 125 η . 1

Hobbes, Th om as , 96, 98 n. 1, 137 n. 1, 14 1,

1 4 2 n. 1, 144, 215 η . 1

Homer, la ng ua ge of, cr iti cized, 205 f., 221 n. 2

homonoia, 149 f.

Hu man is m, rise of in Greece, 14 ff.

Hume, D., 1 2 8 , 1 3 ; n. 1 , 1 6 4 ; on the Crito, 143

η . 1

Ideas, Platonic. See Forms

incest, 16, 11 9 wit h n. 2, 1 23, 166

Iolanthe, 60 n. 2

Ion of Chios, 195

Isocrates, 28, 36, 43 n. 1, 78, 83, 151,T

95 ,2

7 3 ,

tsonomla, 126, 150 n. 2

J a e g e r , W., 106 n. 2

J e s u s , 34 n. 2, 113

J o e l , K., 13, 49, 310

Joseph, H. W. B., 89 n. 1, 96

Jowett, B., 12

j u s t i c e , relation to interest (Thucydides),

85 ff.; as interest o f stro nger (T hr as y-

machus), 88 ff.; as obedience to the l a w s ,

88 ff., 98, 108, i n (A nt iph on ), 146 ;

'na tu re ' s ' ( C a l l i c l e s ) , 1 0 3 - 5 ; other defini

tions of (Antiphon), 1 1 1 - 1 3 ; natural ( A r i s

t o t l e ) , 123 η . 1

Kaerst , J . , 66 n. 2, 72 n. 1, 135 η . ι

Kahn, C. H., 190

kairos, 272 with n. 4, 312

kalos, 170

34'



General index

Kant, I., 48

Kerferd, G. B., on Thr asy mac hu s in Republic,

91 n. 3, 92 n. 1, 95 n. 2, 96; on Antiphon,

108 nn . 1 and 4, 109 nn. 1 and 3, 294 η . 1 ;

on Gorgias On Non-Being, 194 η . 1

Knigh t, A . H. J. , 107 η . 1

l a n g u a g e , origin of (in Diodorus), 81, 20(5

n. 2; theories of (Antiphon), 204, (Plato'sCratylus), 206 ff.; conn exio n w it h kn ow

ledge and being, 208 f.; Greek acquaintance

wi th foreign l an gu ag es , 208, 283 wi th n. 3

Laslett, P., 135 η . 1

l a w (see also justice, unwritten law, nomos,

social compact), religious and secular views

of, 17 , 76 f., 135 n. 1, 13 6; con nex ion wi th

agriculture, 61 f., 2 39 ; Gr eek pr id e in , 69 ff.;

criticized as unnat ural (A nti pho n), 108 f.;

natural and divine law (see also Zeus,

A p o l l o ) , 1 1 8 - 2 0 , 123 f., 125 f., 131 , 136 ;

divin e orig in of, 17 , 13 5; relation tomo ra li ty , 11 7 wi th n. 1, 139 f., 17 3 f.

L e s k y , Α . , i 8 9

L e v i , Ad ., 11 9 f.

Levinson , R. B ., 10, 106, 159 n. 2, 160

l i f e , or igi n of, 14, 163, 203 η . 1

Linus , 27, 145 n. 2

Locke, John, 6, 23, 120 n. 2, 129 n. 1, 135 n. 1,

1 4 2 n. 1, 145

logoi, art of, 177 f.

logos, meaning of, 210 f.

Lorenz , K. (and Mittels trass, J . ) , 215 n. 3

lot, appointment by, 319

Luria, S., 294

Lyc oph ro n, 48 n. 1, 313 f.; his contra ctual

theory of law, 22, 139, 142, 143, 145; on

noble birth, 1 5 3 ! " . , 1 5 5; on omission of

copula, 216 f.

L y c u r g u s , 76, 78, 135, 136

L y s i a s , 60

M a c a u l a y , Τ . B., 8, 18

Macrocephali, 287

M a g u i r e , J . P., 97 η . 1

Mamercus, 282, 284

mathematics (see also quadratrix), 15 1, 267

medicine, 62; analogies with agriculture,

rhetoric and education, 1 6 7 - 9 ,l 8

7η

· 3

Megarian school, 185, 217

Meletus, 232

M e l i a n dialogue, 21, 85, 92, 104, 128

M e l i s s u s , 31 , 194, 195, 197, 201 η . 1

Melos (see also Melian Dialogue), 20

Menedemus, 217

Meno, 2 ;, 181 , 274

metron, 183

M i c c u s , 31, 33

microcos m-macroc osm ana log y, 6, 151

M i l l , J . S., 140

Mittelstrass, J . , see Lorenz, K.

mnemonics, Hippias's technique of, 283

Mnesiphilus, 35 f.

Momigliano, Α . , 224, 288

Moor e, G. E., 2 17 n. 2

Morality (see also relat ivi ty, Protagoras, la w) ,

three eras of, 49, 164

Morr ison , J . S. , 29, 202, 203 n. 3, 204, 294

Mo sc hion , 81 f., 145 n. 2

M i i l l e r , C. W., 23; n. 3

Mu rr ay , G. G. R., 205 n. 2, 220 η . 1Musaeus, 35, 283

M y t i l e n e , 19, 87

names (see also onoma), 206 ff., 212 f., 215

natural philosophers, 142 ; relation to So phist s,

4, 14, 100; short coming s of, 1 5 ; immorai

use of, 100, 1 1 4 - 1 6 ; religious conceptions

of, 226, 231

nature, contrasted with nomos, ch. iv passim;

and neces si ty, 99 ff., 11 4 , 25 8; la w of, 104 ;

relation to divi nit y, 120 wit h n. 2

nature, human, 99, 100 n. 2Naucratis, 17

Nazi party, 10

necessi ty, 169 f.; natu ral, 86, 100, 104, 1 1 4 ;

hypothet ical, 96 η . 1; of nomos, 101 n. 2; see

also nature

Nestle, W., 160, 261

New man, W . L., 159

Nietzsche, F., 13 , 107

nobility, disparaged, 152-5

nominalism, 214 f.

nomos (see also la w) , meaning of word ,

5 5 *nomos-physis antithesis, 21, ch. iv passim,

201 f.; in lang ua ge , 204 ff.; in re ligi on , 227

Nott , K., 9

O'Brien, D., 313

oligarchy, 148

Olympia, Sophists compete at, 42 f.

onoma, 205

Orpheus, 35, 145 n. 2, 283

Orphism, 246, 304

orthoepeia, 205

Oxford University, 20 n. t

pan- Hell enic festiv als, 42 f., 162

pan-Hellenism, 44, 161 f.

Par meni des , 6, 29, 31, 47, 193, 200, 2 1 7 ; and

Gorgias, 180, 194 if.

Peitho, 50

P e r i c l e s , 19, 28 n. 1, 35 n. 1, 38 n. 1, 65 n. 2,

7 0 , 86, 274; relations with Protagoras, 21,

7 8 , 263; on unwritten l a w s , 121 wi th n. 3;

on Athenian democracy, 150 f.

Persaeus ( S t o i c ) , 238, 239

personifications, 120

persuasio n, Gorg ias o n, 50 f., 181, 271 ff.

Phaleas, 152

Ph ere cyd es, 149 n. 2, 304

Phile mon, 157, 160

342



General index

philia, 149 n. 2

phrontisterion, 361

physis (see also nomos-physis antithesis),

aris tocr atic associa tion s of, 102 n. 4, 251

Pindar, 28, 131-4, 228, 251 f.

Plato (see also Forms), 4, 6, 164, 165, 257; on

the Sop hi st s, 9 ff., 21 , 34, 35 ff., 39 n. 2, 19 3,

265 f. (P ro tag ora s) , 273, 274 (Pr odi cus ),

2 7 8 , 281 f. ( Hip pi as ); moral v ie ws of, 106;Protagoras, tone of, 10 7; his su mm ar y of

atheistic philosop hy, 11 5 f.; on unwritt en

l a w s , 122 f.; gene ra l attit ude to l aw , 130 f.,

1 4 1 ; on philia, 149 n. 2; on eq ual ity , 1 5 1 with

n. 1; on s lave ry , 157 n. 2, 160 f., 161 n. 1;

on Gr eek s and bar bar ian s, 1 62 f.; on soph

i s t i c and rhetoric , 176 f.; co nve rsa tio n wi th

Antisthenes, 21 4; visit to Megar a, 21 7; on

gra mma r, 220 f.; rel igi ous vi ew s of, 230;

hi s two types of atheist, 246

pleasure (see also hedonic calculus), Antiphon

on, 109poets, didactic function of, 29; called sophistai,

30

Pohlenz, M., 75, 76 f.

Polus, 103

Popper, K. R., 10, 34 n. 1, 97 n. 1, 137, 141,

1 42 n. 1, 299

Poseidon, 15

positivism, 164

pred icat ion, imp oss ibi lit y of, 209, 213 f.,

2 1 6 - 1 8

Priam, 154

probability, argument from 178 f.Prodicus, 33, 36, 182 n. 2, 236, 27 4- 80 ; on

or ig in of relig ion , 23 f., 2 38 -4 2; on the

accurate use of words, 32 n. 1, 205, 222,

275 f., 278 n. 2; mission to Athens, 40;

On the Nature of Man, 46, 277; relations

wi th So cra tes , 222 f., 275 f.; phil osop hical

implic ations of his s yn on ym ic , 224 f.;

Choice of Heracles, 225 , 277 f.; l i fe and

character, 274; fees of, 42, 275; as natural

philosopher, 277 ; wor ks, 279

pro gr ess , theo ries of, 60 ff., 24 2; Pro tag or as

on, 65 ff.; pass ages ill ust rat ing , 79 ff.Promethe us, 32, 61 , 79

prophecy (see also Delphic oracle), 246 f.

Pro tag ora s, 4, 8, 14, 21 , i n n. 1, 149, 202,

262-9; called himself Sophist, 20, 34; rela

tions with Per icles, 2 1 ; agno stic ism of, 23,

65 n. 2, 234 f., 268 f.; on a rg uin g both sides,

24, 44 n. 4, 50 f., 182, 2 1 1 f., 267, 3 1 6 ; 'man

the measure', 2 5 , 1 7 1 ff., 183 ff.; earnings of,

3 6 ; as teacher of political arete, 38, 255 f.;

on verbal contests, 43 with n. 4; rhetorical

w r i t i n g s , 44 n. 4; as critic of poetry, 45, 205,

2 6 9 ; and natura l phi los oph y, 46 f.; reactionagainst Eleatics, 47; On the Original Stale

of Man, 63 with n. 3, 64 n. 1, 264 n. 2; on

origins of society and morality, 63 ff., 142,

266; theory of punishment, 67; drew Lip

constitution for Thurii, 78, 263; social com

pact in, 1 3 6 - 8 , 14 5; on re lation of law to

j u s t i c e , 146 , 172 ff.; on re lat ivi ty of va lue s,

1 66 ff., 254 n. 2, 267 f.; and m ed ic in e, 167 ,

1 69 η . 1; on langu age, 205; on gramm ar,

220 f.; date and l i fe , 262 f.; works, 264; on

mathematicians, 267

providence, 227 n. 1, 231

Proxenus, 274punishment, Protagoras's theory of, 67

Pusey, Ε . B. , 6 η . 1

P y r i l a m p e s , 102

Pyth agor as, called 'so phi st ' , 28

quadratrix, 284

Rationalism, in 17th-century England, 7

r e l a t i v i t y , 47 ; of customs and moral standa rds,

1 6 , 59 f.; of truth, 51 , 272 f. ( Go rg ia s) ; of

v a l u e s , ch. vn

r e l i g i o n (see also god, fundamentalism), 14 f.;and the state, 227; as political device, 244

Rensi, G., 106

retributio n, as typ ical ly Greek idea, 1 13 n. 1;

rejected by Protagoras, 67; divine, 125 f.

rhapsodes, 42, 310

Rhetoric (see also Sop hi st s) , 50 f., 1 2 5 ; in

Aristotle, 1 2 4 ^ ; ' inve ntion' of, 17 8; two

sch ool s of, 179 f.

Rousseau, J . - J . , 23, 61 , 135 n. 1, 137 n. 1,

1 42 η . 1, 144

R u s s e l l , Bertrand, 9, 272 n. 3

Sa lo mo n, M., 64 n. 1, 94 f., 96 n. 1, 261

scepticism, 47,50 f., 1 6 4 , 1 8 0 , 200 ff.; religious,

1 4 f., 227 ff.

S c h l a i f e r , R., 157

Schmid, Wilh elm, 202 η . 1

S c i a p o d s , 287

self-interest, 99; identified with justice, 88 ff.

Seltman, C. T., 170

S e v e n S a g e s , 28, 30

Shakespeare, 151

S i c k i n g , C. M. J . , 180 n. 3

S i d g w i c k , H., 11 f.Simonds, Lord, 140

situational ethic, 60

Ske mp , J . B. , 125 n. 1, 161 η . 1

s l a v e r y , 24, 155—60

S n e l l , 13., 126 n. 1, 227 n. 2

s o c i a l compact, 6, 70 f., ch . v ; 'hi sto ric ist '

theory of, 1 4 1 - 3 ; takes vari ous forms,

1 42 n. t; gen eti c exp lan ation of, 144 f.

S o c i e t y , or ig in s of, 60 ff., 142

Socrates (see also table of contents'), 4, 43, 113

with n. 1; called 'sophist', 33, 34; attitudeto teaching for fees, 39; respect for law,

70f.; argument with Thrasymachus, 88 ff.;

on unwritten l a w s , 119 , 147 ; poli t ical v ie ws

1 2 8 ; identifies just with lawful, 138, 1 4 6 ! ' . ,

140; on the social compa ct, I. j o, 143. 145;

3 4 3



General index

Socrates (com.)

b e l i e f in a future l i fe , 14 7; on relat ivity of

v a l u e s , 165 , 187 n. 3; util itar ian ism of, 166

n. 2; tel eol ogy of, 166 n. 2; as maste r of

the art of logoi, 177 f.; r elati on to Sop hist s,

1 8 7 n. 3; to Prodicus, 222 f., 275 f.; to

C r i t i a s , 300; his concept ion of arete, 253;

'vi rtu e is kno wle dg e', 257 f.; wro ngd oing

i s involuntary, 258, 271 n. 1; as intellectualmidwife, 275

Sol on, 17, 19 , 28, 29, 125 f., 299

Soma (in Vedic hymns), 241 n. 2

sophia, sophos, 27 f.

sophist, meaning of word, 27 ff.

Sophists (see also table of contents), 35 ff.;

perma nent r eleva nce of, 3; conn exio ns wi th

Presocratic thought, 4, 45 ff.; modern as

ses sments of, 10 ff.; an d rheto ri c, 20, 44 f.,

1 7 9 f.; relati on to poet s, 29 ; as teach ers of

arete, 38 f., 255; sca les of fees, 38 n. 2, 42

wi th n. 1, 45, 27 5; compe tito rs at festiv als,42 f.; as lite rar y criti cs, 45 ; reactio n agai nst

Eleatics, 47; common philosophy of, 47 f.;

loss of writings, 51 ff.

Sophoc les, on huma n ach ievemen ts, 18, 142

n. 2; on unwri tten la w, 22, 120 f., 12 7; on

s l a v e r y , 158 n. 3

Spartans, 86, 302

Stenzel, J . , 109 η . 1

S t i l p o , 217

S to da rt , Μ . Α . , 6 η . ι

S t o i c s , 308

Strauss, L., 10 η . 1sun, god or stone?, 231 f.

superstition, condemned by Plato, 246

Tar n, W . W. , 153 n. 5

Tate, J. , 116 η . 1

Taylor, A. E., 96

technai, 44, 125, 128

techne, meanin g of word, 115 n. 3

technology, Greek attitude to, 18; develop

ment of, 62, 79 ff.

teleology, in Aristotle, 213

Thales, 282Thamyris, 30

Thargelia of Miletus, 283

Themistocl es, 35, 41 η . 1

Theodorus of Cyrene, 236

Theognis, 27, 28, 29, 250 f.

Theo phr ast us, 149 n. 2

Theramenes, 298, 300

Thersites, 27

Theseus, 80, 126-8

Thirty, tyranny of the, 298, 300

Thomson, G., 121 n. 2, 122

Thrasymachus, 46, 85, 101 n. 3, 103, 104 n. 1,

294-8; wrote techne, 44 n. 4; in the Republic,88-97, 296-8

Thucydides, 48, 55, 85 ff.; debt to Prodicus,

223 f.

Thurii, 33, 78, 139, 264

Tigranes, 31

time, 292 with η . 1 (Antiphon and Aristotle ),

303 f. (Critias)

T i s i a s , 178 f., 180, 192 , 270

Troglodytes, 287

tyranny, results from breakdown of law

( 'An o n . Iambi. '), 73

uni ty of manki nd, 24, 119 n. 2, 153 (An ti

phon), 160-3

Unters teiner, M., 1 33, 138, 189, 197 n. 2,

239

unwritten l a w s , 22 f., 55, 77 , 1 1 8 - 3 1

utilitarianism (see also Socrates), 72, 169

v a l u e s , inv ers ion of, 84 f.; re la ti vi ty of,

c h . v i i ; take s two for ms, 16 6; aesth etic, 170

Versenyi, L., 167

Vlastos, G., 149 n. 1, 150 n. 2, 263 n. 3, 265

w i l l , weakness of, 258

Wo od bu ry , L., 236 n. 2,237 nn. 1 and 2,24 5 n. 1

Woozley, A. D. See Cross, R. C.

Xeniades, 200

Xenophanes, 42, 48 n. 2,62; attack on religion,

226, 228; concep tion of de ity, 230, 234, 248

Xe rxes , 69 f., 104

Zaleucus, 17

Zeller, E., 1 1 , 48, 159 n. 2

Zeno of Citium, 308, 309

Zeno of Elea, fees of, 38 n. 2

Zeus , 1 5 , 66, 100, 133 f.; as la wg iv er , 55, 77 ,

1 2 5 f.; mor al fai lin gs of, 228, 229 ; in

A e s c h y l u s , 232 n. 6

344



I N D E X O F S E L E C T E D G R E E K W O R D S

Greek words transliterated in the

α γ α θ ό ν , 1 7 0 η . ι

α γ ώ ν ε ς λ ό γ ω ν , 4 3 η . 4

ά β ε ο ς , 2 3 7 η . 2

α ν ά γ κ η ( s e e a ls o g e ne ra l i nd e x ) , 1 01 n . 2

ά ν τ ι λ ο γ ι κ ο ί , 1 7 7

ά π ε ι ρ ο ς , 23 0 n . 3 (d )

α ρ ε τ ή ( s e e a ls o g e n e ra l i n d e x ) , 90 n . 1

ά τ α κ τ ο ς , 82 n . 4

β ε λ τ ί ω ν ( C a l l i c l e s ' s interpretation o f ) , 1 0 3 n. 2

δ υ ν α μ ι ς , 1 85 n . 2

ε π ι ε ι κ έ ς , 1 23

ε ύ έ π ε ι α , 1 7 9

ή μ ε ρ ο ς , 6 2 n . 2

θ ε σ μ ό ς , 6 2 n . 2

θ η ρ ι ώ δ η ς , 63 n . 2 , 80 n . 2

Ι σ ο ν ο μ ί α , 1 50 n . 2

κ α λ ό ν ( s e e a l so g e ne r al i n d e x ) , 1 7 0 n . 1

κ α τ α β ά λ λ ο ν τ ε ς , 1 83 n . 1

μ ε τ ε ω ρ ο λ ό γ ο ς , 4 6 n . 1

/ will he found in the general index

μ ε τ ε ω ρ ο σ ο φ ι σ τ ή ς , 2 7 7

μ ύ δ ρ ο ς , 2 4 4 n . 1

ν ο μ ί τ ε ι ν , 5 7 n . 1 , 2 3 7 n . 2

ν ό μ ι μ α , 1 22 n . 3

ό ρ θ ο έ ι τ ε ι α , i 8 o, 205

ό ρ θ ό τ η ς ο ν ο μ ά τ ω ν , 1 80 , 204 , 205

σ ο φ ί ^ ε σ θ α ι , 28 n . I

σ ό φ ι σ μ α , z 8 n . 1 , 3 3 n . 1

σ υ μ φ έ ρ ο ν , 8 5, 1 4 0 n . 1 , 1 6 9

σ ύ ν ε σ ί ς , 65

σ υ ν θ ή κ η , 7 5 n . 2 , 1 3 6 w i t h n. 3

σ υ ν ο υ σ ί α , 2 t 6 , 2 1 7 n . 1

τ έ χ ν α ι ( s e e a l s o g e n e ra l i n d e x ) , 4 4 n . 4

τ έ χ ν η ( an d α ρ ε τ ή ) , 66 n . 1

τ έ χ ν η ά λ υ τ τ ί α ς , 290

τ ρ ό π ο ς , 69 n. 2

τ ύ χ η , ι ι 5

n - a

χ ρ ή μ α , 190 f .

χ ρ ή σ ι μ ο ν , 86 , 1 69

ώ ς , 189 f.

ώ φ έ λ ι μ ο ν , 7 2 n. 2 , 166 n . 2 , 1 69

345

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Guthrie W K C History Greek Philosophy Volume 3 Part 1 Sophists