Gustave de Molinari - The Production of Security (1849)

8/7/2019 Gustave de Molinari - The Production of Security (1849)

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Gustave de Molinari

Translation by

J. Huston McCulloch

The Production

of Security


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This essay was originally published asDe la production de la scurit, in Journal desEconomistes (February 1849): 27790.

This translation by was originally published asGustave de Molinari, The Production of Security,trans. J. Huston McCulloch,Occasional PapersSeries #2 , Richard M. Ebeling, ed. (New York:The Center or Libertarian Studies, May 1977).

2009 by the Ludwig von Mises Instituteand published under the Creative CommonsAttribution License 3.0.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/

Ludwig von Mises Institute

518 West Magnolia AvenueAuburn, Alabama 36832www.mises.org

ISBN: 978-1-933550-57-2


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The interests of the consumer

of any commodity whatsoever

should always prevail over

the interests of the producer. Gustave de Molinari


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C o n t e n t S

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thPrducifScuriy . . . . . . . .15

thnauralordrfSciy. . . . . . .17

CmpiiiScuriy?. . . . . . . . .22

Scuriyaexcpi?. . . . . . . . . .25

thAlraivs. . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

MplyadCmmuism . . . . . . .29

thMplizaiad

CllcivizaifhScuriyIdusry . .33

GvrmadSciy. . . . . . . . .41

thDiviRighfKigsadMajriis . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

thRgimftrrr. . . . . . . . . . .51

thFrMarkfrScuriy . . . . . . .53


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PrefaceBy Murray N. Rothbard (1977)

Never has laissez-faire thought been

as dominant as it was amongFrench economists, beginning

with J.B. Say in the early nineteenth cen-tury, down through Says more advancedollowers Charles Comte and Charles

Dunoyer and to the early years o thetwentieth century. For nearly a century,

the laissez-faire economists controlled the

proessional economic society, the SocietedEconomie Politique and its journal, theJournal des Economistes, as well as numer-ous other journals and university posts.

And yet, ew o these economists were

translated into English, and virtuallynone are known to English or Ameri-

can scholarsthe sole exception being


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Frdric Bastiat, not the most prooundo the group. The entire illustrious groupremains unstudied and unsung.

The most extreme and consistent, aswell as the longest-lived and most prolico the French laissez-faire economists wasthe Belgian-born Gustave de Molinari(18191912), who edited the Journal des

Economistes or several decades. The initialarticle o the young Molinari, here trans-lated or the rst time as The Productiono Security, was the irst presentationanywhere in human history o what isnow called anarcho-capitalism or ree

market anarchism. Molinari did not usethe terminology, and probably wouldhave balked at the name. In contrast toall previous individualistic and near-anar-chistic thinkers, such as La Botie, Hodg-skin or the young Fichte, Molinari didnot base the brunt o his argument on amoral opposition to the State. While anardent individualist, Molinari groundedhis argument on ree-market, laissez-faire


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economics, and proceeded logically to askthe question: I the ree market can andshould supply all othergoods and services,

why not also the services o protection?

During the same year, 1849, Molinariexpanded his radically new theory intoa book, Les Soires de la Rue Saint-Lazare,a series o ictional dialogues between

three people: the Conservative (advo-cate o high taris and state monopolyprivileges), the Socialist, and the Econo-mist (himsel ). The nal dialogue elabo-rated urther on his theory o ree-mar-ket protective services. Four decades

later, in his Les Lois Naturelles de lEconomiePolitique (1887), Molinari was still a rmbeliever in privately competitive policecompanies, public works companies, anddeense companies. Unortunately, in hisonly work to be translated into English,La Societ Future (The Society of Tomorrow,New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1904),Molinari had partially retreated to anadvocacy o a single monopoly private


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deense and protection company, ratherthan allowing ree competition.

It is instructive to note the storm ocontention that Molinaris article and hisSoires brought about in the laissez-fairestalwarts o French economics. A meet-ing o the Societe dEconomie Politiquein 1849 was devoted to Molinaris daring

new book, the Soires. Charles Coque-lin opined that justice needs a supremeauthority, and that no competition inany area can exist without the supremeauthority o the State. In a similarlyunsupported and a priori ulmination,

Frdric Bastiat declared that justice andsecurity can only be guaranteed by orce,and that orce can only be the attribute oa supreme power, the State. Neithercommentator bothered to engage in a cri-tique o Molinaris arguments.

Only Charles Dunoyer did so, complain-ing that Molinari had been carried away bythe illusions o logic, and maintainingthat competition between governmental


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companies is chimerical, because it leads toviolent battles. Dunoyer, instead, chose torely on the competition o political par-

ties within representative governmenthardly a satisactory libertarian solutionto the problem o social conict! He alsoopined that it was most prudent to leaveorce in the hands o the State, where civ-ilization has put itthis is rom one othe great ounders o the conquest theoryo the State!

Unfortunately, this critical issue wasbarely treated in the meeting, since thediscussion largely centered on Dunoy-

ers and the other economists criticizingMolinari for going too far in attackingall uses of eminent domain by the State.(See Journal des Economistes XXIV (Octo-ber 15, 1849: 31516.)

With this publication o ProessorMcCullochs translation o Molinarisoriginal article, let us hope that Molinariwill now come to the attention o schol-ars and translators.


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The Production

of Security1

Gustave de Molinari

T

here are two ways o consider-ing society. According to some,the development o human asso-

ciations is not subject to providential,unchangeable laws. Rather, these associ-ations, having originally been organizedin a purely articial manner by primeval

1 Although this article may appear utopian in its conclusions,we nevertheless believe that we should publish it in order toattract the attention o economists and journalists to a ques-tion which has hitherto been treated in only a desultory man-ner and which should, nevertheless, in our day and age, beapproached with greater precision. So many people exag-gerate the nature and prerogatives o government that it has

become useul to ormulate strictly the boundaries outside owhich the intervention o authority becomes anarchical andtyrannical rather than protective and protable. [Note o theeditor-in-chie o the Journal des Economistes, 1849.]

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legislators, can later be modiied orremade by other legislators, in step withthe progress osocial science. In this sys-

tem the government plays a preeminentrole, because it is upon it, the custodiano the principle o authority, that the dailytask o modiying and remaking societydevolves.

According to others, on the contrary,society is a purely natural act. Like theearth on which it stands, society moves inaccordance with general, preexisting laws.In this system, there is no such thing,strictly speaking, as social science; there is

only economic science, which studies thenatural organism o society and showshow this organism unctions.

We propose to examine, within the lat-ter system, the unction and natural orga-nization o government.


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The Natural Orderof Society

In order to dene and delimit the unc-tion o government, it is rst necessaryto investigate the essence and object

o society itsel. What natural impulse do

men obey when they combine into soci-ety? They are obeying the impulse, or, tospeak more exactly, the instinct o socia-bility. The human race is essentially socia-ble. Like beavers and the higher animalspecies in general, men have an instinctive

inclination to live in society.Why did this instinct come into being?

Man experiences a multitude oneeds, on whose satisaction his happi-ness depends, and whose non-satisac-

tion entails suering. Alone and isolated,he could only provide in an incomplete,insuicient manner or these incessant

1


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needs. The instinct o sociability bringshim together with similar persons, anddrives him into communication with

them. Thereore, impelled by the self-interesto the individuals thus broughttogether, a certain division of laboris estab-lished, necessarily ollowed by exchanges.In brie, we see an organization emerge,

by means o which man can more com-pletely satisy his needs than he could liv-ing in isolation.

This natural organization is calledsociety.

The object o society is there-ore the most complete satisaction omans needs. The division o labor andexchange are the means by which this isaccomplished.

Among the needs o man, there is one

particular type which plays an immenserole in the history o humanity, namelythe need or security.

What is this need?


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It is in ones sel-interest to procuresecurity at the lowest price possible.

Whether they live in isolation or insociety, men are, above all, interested inpreserving their existence and the ruitso their labor. I the sense o justice wereuniversally prevalent on earth; i, conse-quently, each man conined himsel to

laboring and exchanging the ruits ohis labor, without wishing to take away,by violence or raud, the ruits o othermens labor; i everyone had, in one word,an instinctive horror o any act harmulto another person, it is certain that secu-

rity would exist naturally on earth, andthat no articial institution would be nec-essary to establish it. Unortunately this isnot the way things are. The sense o jus-tice seems to be the perquisite o only aew eminent and exceptional tempera-ments. Among the inerior races, it existsonly in a rudimentary state. Hence theinnumerable criminal attempts, ever sincethe beginning o the world, since the days


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o Cain and Abel, against the lives andproperty o individuals.

Hence also the creation o establish-ments whose object is to guarantee toeveryone the peaceul possession o hisperson and his goods.

These establishments were calledgovernments.

Everywhere, even among the leastenlightened tribes, one encounters agovernment, so universal and urgentis the need or security provided bygovernment.

Everywhere, men resign themselves tothe most extreme sacrices rather than dowithout government and hence security,without realizing that in so doing, theymisjudge their alternatives.

Suppose that a man ound his personand his means o survival incessantlymenaced; wouldnt his rst and constantpreoccupation be to protect himsel romthe dangers that surround him? This


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preoccupation, these eorts, this labor,would necessarily absorb the greater por-tion o his time, as well as the most ener-

getic and active aculties o his intelli-gence. In consequence, he could onlydevote insufcient and uncertain eorts,and his divided attention, to the satisac-tion o his other needs.

Even though this man might be askedto surrender a very considerable portiono his time and o his labor to someonewho takes it upon himsel to guaranteethe peaceul possession o his person andhis goods, wouldnt it be to his advantage

to conclude this bargain?Still, it would obviously be no less in

his sel-interest to procure his security atthe lowest price possible.


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Competition in Security

I there is one well-established truth inpolitical economy, it is this:

That in all cases, or all commodities

that serve to provide or the tangible or

intangible needs o the consumer, it is in

the consumers best interest that labor

and trade remain ree, because the ree-

dom o labor and o trade have as their

necessary and permanent result the

maximum reduction o price.

And this:

That the interests o the consumero any commodity whatsoever should

always prevail over the interests o the

producer.

Now in pursuing these principles, one

arrives at this rigorous conclusion:That the production o security

should, in the interests o the consumers

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o this intangible commodity, remainsubject to the law o ree competition.

Whence it ollows:

That no government should havethe right to prevent another govern-ment rom going into competition withit, or to require consumers o secu-rity to come exclusively to it or thiscommodity.

Nevertheless, I must admit that, upuntil the present, one recoiled beore thisrigorous implication o the principle oree competition.

One economist who has done as much

as anyone to extend the application othe principle o liberty, Charles Dunoyer,thinks that the unctions o governmentwill never be able to all into the domaino private activity.2

Now here is a citation o a clear and

obvious exception to the principle o reecompetition.

2 In his remarkable bookDe la libert du travail (On the Free-dom o Labor), Vol. III, p. 253. (Published by Guillaumin.)


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This exception is all the more remark-

able or being unique.

Undoubtedly, one can nd economists

who establish more numerous exceptions

to this principle; but we may emphatically

afrm that these are not pure economists.

True economists are generally agreed, on

the one hand, that the government should

restrict itsel to guaranteeing the securityo its citizens, and on the other hand, that

the reedom o labor and o trade should

otherwise be whole and absolute.

But why should there be an exception

relative to security? What special reasonis there that the production o security

cannot be relegated to ree competition?

Why should it be subjected to a dierent

principle and organized according to a di-

erent system?

On this point, the masters o the science

are silent, and Dunoyer, who has clearly

noted this exception, does not investigate

the grounds on which it is based.


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Security an Exception?

We are consequently led to askourselves whether his exception

is well ounded, in the eyes o

the economist.

It oends reason to believe that a

well-established natural law can admito exceptions. A natural law must hold

everywhere and always, or be invalid. I

cannot believe, or example, that the uni-

versal law o gravitation, which governs

the physical world, is ever suspended in

any instance or at any point o the uni-

verse. Now I consider economic laws

comparable to natural laws, and I have

just as much aith in the principle o the

division o labor as I have in the univer-

sal law o gravitation. I believe that whilethese principles can be disturbed, they

admit o no exceptions.

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But, i this is the case, the productiono security should not be removed romthe jurisdiction o ree competition; and

i it is removed, society as a whole suersa loss.

Either this is logical and true, or elsethe principles on which economic scienceis based are invalid.


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The Alternatives

It thus has been demonstrated a priori,to those o us who have aith in the

principles o economic science, that

the exception indicated above is not justi-

ed, and that the production o security,

like anything else, should be subject tothe law o ree competition.

Once we have acquired this conviction,

what remains or us to do? It remains or

us to investigate how it has come about

that the production o security has not

been subjected to the law o ree compe-

tition, but rather has been subjected to

dierent principles.

What are those principles?

Those omonopoly and communism.

In the entire world, there is not a sin-

gle establishment o the security industry

2


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that is not based on monopoly or oncommunism.

In this connection, we add, in passing,a simple remark.

Political economy has disapprovedequally o monopoly and communism inthe various branches o human activity,wherever it has ound them. Is it not then

strange and unreasonable that it acceptsthem in the security industry?


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Monopolyand Communism

Let us now examine how it is thatall known governments haveeither been subjected to the law o

monopoly, or else organized according to

the communistic principle.First let us investigate what is under-

stood by the words monopoly andcommunism.

It is an observable truth that the more

urgent and necessary are mans needs, thegreater will be the sacriices he will bewilling to endure in order to satisy them.Now, there are some things that are oundabundantly in nature, and whose produc-tion does not require a great expendi-

ture o labor, but which, since they satisythese urgent and necessary wants, canconsequently acquire an exchange value

2


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all out o proportion with their naturalvalue. Take salt or example. Suppose thata man or a group o men succeed in hav-

ing the exclusive production and sale osalt assigned to themselves. It is appar-ent that this man or group could raise theprice o this commodity well above itsvalue, well above the price it would have

under a regime o ree competition.One will then say that this man or this

group possesses a monopoly, and that theprice o salt is a monopoly price.

But it is obvious that the consumerswill not consent reely to paying the abu-sive monopoly surtax. It will be necessaryto compel them to pay it, and in order tocompel them, the employment o orcewill be necessary.

Every monopoly necessarily rests on

orce.

When the monopolists are no longeras strong as the consumers they exploit,what happens?


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In every instance, the monopoly nallydisappears either violently or as the out-come o an amicable transaction. What is

it replaced with?

I the roused and insurgent consumerssecure the means o production o the saltindustry, in all probability they will con-scate this industry or their own prot,

and their rst thought will be, not to rel-egate it to ree competition, but ratherto exploit it, in common, or their ownaccount. They will then name a directoror a directive committee to operate thesaltworks, to whom they will allocate the

unds necessary to deray the costs o saltproduction. Then, since the experience othe past will have made them suspiciousand distrustul, since they will be araidthat the director named by them will seizeproduction or his own benet, and sim-ply reconstitute by open or hidden meansthe old monopoly or his own proit,they will elect delegates, representativesentrusted with appropriating the unds


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necessary or production, with watchingover their use, and with making sure thatthe salt produced is equally distributed to

those entitled to it. The production o saltwill be organized in this manner.

This orm o the organization o pro-duction has been named communism.

When this organization is applied to a

single commodity, the communism is saidto be partial.

When it is applied to all commodities,the communism is said to be complete.

But whether communism is partial or

complete, political economy is no moretolerant o it than it is o monopoly, owhich it is merely an extension.


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The Monopolization andCollectivization of the

Security Industry

Isnt what has just been said aboutsalt applicable to security? Isnt thisthe history o all monarchies and all

republics?

Everywhere, the production o securitybegan by being organized as a monopoly,and everywhere, nowadays, it tends to beorganized communistically.

Here is why.Among the tangible and intangible com-

modities necessary to man, none, with thepossible exception o wheat, is more indis-pensable, and thereore none can support

quite so large a monopoly duty.Nor is any quite so prone to

monopolization.

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What, indeed, is the situation o menwho need security? Weakness. What isthe situation o those who undertake to

provide them with this necessary secu-rity? Strength. I it were otherwise, i theconsumers o security were stronger thanthe producers, they obviously would dis-pense with their assistance.

Now, i the producers o security areoriginally stronger than the consumers,wont it be easy or the ormer to imposea monopoly on the latter?

Everywhere, when societies originate,we see the strongest, most warlike races

seizing the exclusive government o thesociety. Everywhere we see these racesseizing a monopoly on security withincertain more or less extensive boundaries,depending on their number and strength.

And, this monopoly being, by itsvery nature, extraordinarily proitable,everywhere we see the races investedwith the monopoly on security devotingthemselves to bitter struggles, in order to


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add to the extent of their market, the num-ber o their forced consumers, and hencethe amount o their gains.

War has been the necessary and inev-itable consequence o the establishmento a monopoly on security.

Another inevitable consequence hasbeen that this monopoly has engendered

all other monopolies.When they saw the situation o the

monopolizers o security, the producerso other commodities could not help butnotice that nothing in the world is moreadvantageous than monopoly. They, inturn, were consequently tempted to addto the gains rom their own industry bythe same process. But what did theyrequire in order to monopolize, to thedetriment o the consumers, the com-

modity they produced? They requiredorce. However, they did not possess theorce necessary to constrain the consum-ers in question. What did they do? Theyborrowed it, or a consideration, rom


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those who had it. They petitioned andobtained, at the price o an agreed uponee, the exclusive privilege o carrying on

their industry within certain determinedboundaries. Since the ees or these priv-ileges brought the producers o secu-rity a goodly sum o money, the worldwas soon covered with monopolies.Labor and trade were everywhere shack-led, enchained, and the condition o themasses remained as miserable as possible.

Nevertheless, ater long centurieso suering, as enlightenment spreadthrough the world little by little, the

masses who had been smothered underthis nexus o privileges began to rebelagainst the privileged, and to demandliberty, that is to say, the suppression omonopolies.

This process took many forms. Whathappened in England, for example?Originally, the race which governed thecountry and which was militarily orga-nized (the aristocracy), having at its head


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a hereditary leader (the king), and an

equally hereditary administrative coun-

cil (the House of Lords), set the price of

security, which it had monopolized, at

whatever rate it pleased. There was no

negotiation between the producers of

security and the consumers. This was

the rule ofabsolutism. But as time passed,

the consumers, having become awareof their numbers and strength, arose

against the purely arbitrary regime, and

they obtained the right to negotiate with

the producers over the price of the com-

modity. For this purpose, they sent dele-gates to the House of Commonsto discuss

the level of taxes, the price of security.

They were thus able to improve their lot

somewhat. Nevertheless, the producers

of security had a direct say in the naming

of the members of the House of Com-mons, so that debate was not entirely

open, and the price of the commodity

remained above its natural value.


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One day the exploited consumers roseagainst the producers and dispossessedthem o their industry. They then under-

took to carry on this industry by them-selves and chose or this purpose a direc-tor o operations assisted by a Council.Thus communism replaced monopoly.But the scheme did not work, and twentyyears later, primitive monopoly was re-

established. Only this time the monopo-lists were wise enough not to restore therule o absolutism; they accepted reedebate over taxes, being careul, all thewhile, incessantly to corrupt the delegateso the opposition party. They gave thesedelegates control over various posts in theadministration o security, and they evenwent so ar as to allow the most inlu-ential into the bosom o their superiorCouncil. Nothing could have been more

clever than this behavior. Nevertheless,the consumers o security nally becameaware o these abuses, and demandedthe reorm o Parliament. This long-con-tested reorm was inally achieved, and


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since that time, the consumers have won

a signicant lightening o their burdens.

In France, the monopoly on secu-rity, ater having similarly undergone re-

quent vicissitudes and various modica-

tions, has just been overthrown or the

second time.3 As once happened in Eng-

land, monopoly or the beneit o one

caste, and then in the name o a certainclass o society, was inally replaced by

communal production. The consumers

as a whole, behaving like shareholders,

named a director responsible or supervis-

ing the actions o the director and o hisadministration.

We will content ourselves with making

one simple observation on the subject o

this new regime.

Just as the monopoly on security log-ically had to spawn universal monopoly,

3 Translators note: De Molinari was writing one year aterthe revolutions o 1848.


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so communistic security must logicallyspawn universal communism.

In reality, we have a choice o twothings:

Either communistic production is supe-rior to ree production, or it is not.

I it is, then it must be or all things, notjust or security.

I not, progress requires that it bereplaced by ree production.

Complete communism or completeliberty: that is the alternative!


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Government and Society

But is it conceivable that the produc-tion o security could be organized

other than as a monopoly or com-

munistically? Could it conceivably be rel-

egated to ree competition?

The response to this question on thepart opolitical writers is unanimous: No.

Why? We will tell you why.

Because these writers, who are con-

cerned especially with governments,

know nothing about society. They regardit as an articial abrication, and believe

that the mission o government is to

modiy and remake it constantly.

Now in order to modiy or remake soci-

ety, it is necessary to be empowered withan authority superior to that o the vari-

ous individuals o which it is composed.

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Monopolistic governments claim tohave obtained rom God himsel thisauthority which gives them the right to

modiy or remake society according totheir ancy, and to dispose o persons andproperty however they please. Commu-nistic governments appeal to human rea-son, as maniested in the majority o thesovereign people.

But do monopolistic governments andcommunistic governments truly possessthis superior, irresistible authority? Dothey in reality have a higher authoritythan that which a ree government could

have? This is what we must investigate.


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The Divine Rightof Kings and Majorities

I it were true that society were notnaturally organized, i it were true that

the laws which govern its motion wereto be constantly modiied or remade,

the legislators would necessarily have tohave an immutable, sacred authority.Being the continuators o Providence on

earth, they would have to be regarded asalmost equal to God. I it were otherwise,

would it not be impossible or them to

ulll their mission? Indeed, one cannotintervene in human aairs, one cannot

attempt to direct and regulate them, with-out daily oending a multitude o inter-

ests. Unless those in power are believed

to have a mandate rom a superior entity,the injured interests will resist.

Whence the ction o divine right.

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This iction was certainly the best

imaginable. I you succeed in persuad-

ing the multitude that God himsel haschosen certain men or certain races to

give laws to society and to govern it, no

one will dream o revolting against these

appointees o Providence, and everything

the government does will be accepted.A government based on divine right is

imperishable.

On one condition only, namely that

divine right is believed in.

I one takes the thought into ones

head that the leaders o the people do

not receive their inspirations directly

rom providence itsel, that they obey

purely human impulses, the prestigethat surrounds them will disappear. One

will irreverently resist their sovereign

decisions, as one resists anything man-


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made whose utility has not been clearlydemonstrated.

It is accordingly ascinating to see thepains theoreticians o the divine right taketo establish the superhumanity o the racesin possession o human government.

Let us listen, or example, to Joseph deMaistre:

Man does not make sovereigns. Atthe very most he can serve as an instru-

ment or dispossessing one sovereign and

handing his State over to another sover-eign, himsel already a prince. Moreover,

there has never existed a sovereign am-

ily traceable to plebeian origins. I thisphenomenon were to appear, it wouldmark a new epoch on earth.

It is written: I am the Maker of sov-ereigns. This is not just a religious slo-

gan, a preachers metaphor; it is the lit-

eral truth pure and simple. It is a lawo the political world. God makes kings,

word or word. He prepares royal races,nurtures them at the center o a cloud

which hides their origins. Finally they


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appear, crowned with glory and honor; they

take their places.4

According to this system, which

embodies the will o Providence in cer-

tain men and which invests these chosen

ones, these anointed ones with a quasi-

divine authority, the subjects evidently

have no rights at all. They must submit,

without question, to the decrees o thesovereign authority, as i they were the

decrees o Providence itsel.

According to Plutarch, the body is the

instrument o the soul, and the soul is

the instrument o God. According to thedivine right school, God selects certain

souls and uses them as instruments or

governing the world.

I men had faith in this theory, surely

nothing could unsettle a governmentbased on divine right.

4Du principe gnrateur des constitutions politiques (On theGenerating Principle o Political Constitutions) Preace.


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Unortunately, they have completelylost aith.

Why?

Because one ne day they took it intotheir heads to question and to reason, andin questioning, in reasoning, they discov-ered that their governors governed themno better than they, simply mortals out o

communication with Providence, couldhave done themselves.

It was free inquiry that demonetized thection o divine right, to the point wherethe subjects o monarchs or o aristocra-

cies based on divine right obey them onlyinsoar as they think it in their own self-interestto obey them.

Has the communist iction ared anybetter?

According to the communist theory, owhich Rousseau is the high-priest, author-ity does not descend rom on high, butrather comes up rom below. The govern-ment no longer looks to Providence or


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its authority, it looks to united mankind,to the one, indivisible, and sovereign nation.

Here is what the communists, the par-tisans o popular sovereignty, assume.They assume that human reason has thepower to discover the best laws and theorganization which most perectly suitssociety; and that, in practice, these laws

reveal themselves at the conclusion o aree debate between conicting opinions.I there is no unanimity, i there is still dis-sension ater the debate, the majority isin the right, since it comprises the largernumber o reasonable individuals. (These

individuals are, o course, assumed to beequal, otherwise the whole structure col-lapses.) Consequently, they insist that thedecisions o the majority must becomelaw, and that the minority is obligedto submit to it, even i it is contrary to

its most deeply rooted convictions andinjures its most precious interests.

That is the theory; but, in practice,does the authority o the decision o the


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majority really have this irresistible, abso-

lute character as assumed? Is it always, in

every instance, respected by the minority?

Could it be?

Let us take an example.

Let us suppose that socialism succeeds

in propagating itsel among the working

classes in the countryside as it has alreadyamong the working classes in the cities;

that it consequently becomes the major-

ity in the country and that, proting rom

this situation, it sends a socialist majority

to the Legislative Assembly and names

a socialist president. Suppose that this

majority and this president, invested with

sovereign authority, decrees the imposi-

tion o a tax on the rich o three billion, in

order to organize the labor o the poor, as

Proudhon demanded. Is it probable thatthe minority would submit peaceully to

his iniquitous and absurd, yet legal, yet

constitutional plunder?


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No, without a doubt it would not hesi-tate to disown the authority o the major-ity and to deend its property.

Under this regime, as under the preced-ing, one obeys the custodians o authorityonly insoar as one thinks it in ones sel-interest to obey them.

This leads us to afrm that the moral

oundation o authority is neither as solidnor as wide, under a regime o monopolyor o communism, as it could be under aregime o liberty.


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thPrducifScuriy 51

The Regime of Terror

Suppose nevertheless that the par-tisans o an artificial organization,

either the monopolists or the com-

munists, are right; that society is not nat-

urally organized, and that the task o

making and unmaking the laws that reg-ulate society continuously devolves upon

men, look in what a lamentable situation

the world would ind itsel. The moral

authority o governors rests, in reality,

on the sel-interest o the governed. Thelatter having a natural tendency to resist

anything harmul to their sel-interest,

unacknowledged authority would contin-

ually require the help o physical orce.

The monopolist and the communists,furthermore, completely understand

this necessity.

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I anyone, says M. de Maistre, attemptsto detract rom the authority o Godschosen ones, let him be turned over to

the secular power, let the hangman per-orm his ofce.

I anyone does not recognize theauthority o those chosen by the peo-ple, say the theoreticians o the school o

Rousseau, i he resists any decision what-soever o the majority, let him be pun-ished as an enemy o the sovereign peo-ple, let the guillotine perorm justice.

These two schools, which both takeartificial organization as their point o

departure, necessarily lead to the sameconclusion: TERROR.


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thPrducifScuriy 53

The Free Marketfor Security

Allow us now to ormulate a simple

hypothetical situation.

Let us imagine a new-born society: The

men who compose it are busy working

and exchanging the ruits o their labor. A

natural instinct reveals to these men that

their persons, the land they occupy and

cultivate, the ruits o their labor, are their

property, and that no one, except them-

selves, has the right to dispose o or touchthis property. This instinct is not hypo-

thetical; it exists. But man being an imper-

ect creature, this awareness o the right

o everyone to his person and his goods

will not be ound to the same degree inevery soul, and certain individuals will

make criminal attempts, by violence or

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by raud, against the persons or the prop-

erty o others.

Hence, the need or an industry thatprevents or suppresses these orcible or

raudulent aggressions.

Let us suppose that a man or a combi-

nation o men comes and says:

For a recompense, I will undertake

to prevent or suppress criminal attempts

against persons and property.

Let those who wish their persons and

property to be sheltered rom all aggres-

sion apply to me.

Beore striking a bargain with this pro-

ducer of security, what will the consumersdo?

In the rst place, they will check i he

is really strong enough to protect them.

In the second place, whether his char-

acter is such that they will not have toworry about his instigating the very

aggressions he is supposed to suppress.


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thPrducifScuriy 55

In the third place, whether any otherproducer o security, oering equal guar-antees, is disposed to oer them this com-

modity on better terms.

These terms are o various kinds.

In order to be able to guarantee the con-sumers ull security o their persons andproperty, and, in case o harm, to give

them a compensation proportioned to theloss suered, it would be necessary, indeed:

1. That the producer establish certainpenalties against the oenders opersons and the violators o prop-

erty, and that the consumers agreeto submit to these penalties, in casethey themselves commit oenses;

2. That he impose certain inconve-niences on the consumers, with theobject o acilitating the discovery

o the authors o oenses;

3. That he regularly gather, in orderto cover his costs o productionas well as an appropriate return


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or his eorts, a certain sum, vari-able according to the situation othe consumers, the particular occu-

pations they engage in, and theextent, value, and nature o theirproperties.

I these terms, necessary or carrying onthis industry, are agreeable to the consum-

ers, a bargain will be struck. Otherwise theconsumers will either do without security,or else apply to another producer.

Now i we consider the particularnature o the security industry, it is appar-ent that the producers will necessarily

restrict their clientele to certain territo-rial boundaries. They would be unableto cover their costs i they tried to pro-vide police services in localities compris-ing only a ew clients. Their clientele willnaturally be clustered around the center

o their activities. They would neverthe-less be unable to abuse this situation bydictating to the consumers. In the evento an abusive rise in the price o security,


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the consumers would always have theoption o giving their patronage to anew entrepreneur, or to a neighboring

entrepreneur.

This option the consumer5 retains obeing able to buy security wherever he

5 Adam Smith, whose remarkable spirit o observationextends to all subjects, remarks that the administration o jus-

tice gained much, in England, rom the competition betweenthe dierent courts o law:

The ees o court seem originally to have beenthe principal support o the dierent courts o jus-tice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw toitsel as much business as it could, and was, upon thataccount, willing to take cognizance o many suitswhich were not originally intended to all under its

jurisdiction. The court o kings bench instituted orthe trial o criminal causes only, took cognizance ocivil suits; the plainti pretending that the deendant,in not doing him justice, had been guilty o sometrespass or misdemeanor. The court o exchequer,instituted or the levying o the kings revenue, andor enorcing the payment o such debts only as weredue to the king, took cognizance o all other contractdebts; the plainti alleging that he could not pay the

king, because the deendant would not pay him. Inconsequence o such ctions it came, in many case,to depend altogether upon the parties beore whatcourt they would chuse to have their cause tried;and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatchand impartiality, to draw to itsel as many causes as


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pleases brings about a constant emulationamong all the producers, each producerstriving to maintain or augment his clien-

tele with the attraction o cheapness or oaster, more complete and better justice.

I, on the contrary, the consumer is notree to buy security wherever he pleases,you orthwith see open up a large proes-

sion dedicated to arbitrariness and badmanagement. justice becomes slow andcostly, the police vexatious, individual lib-erty is no longer respected, the price osecurity is abusively inated and inequita-bly apportioned, according to the power

and inluence o this or that class oconsumers. The protectors engage in bit-ter struggles to wrest customers rom one

it could. The present admirable constitution o thecourts o justice in England was, perhaps, originallyin a great measure, ormed by this emulation, which

anciently took place between their respective judges;each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court,the speediest and most eectual remedy, which thelaw would admit, or every sort o injustice. (TheWealth of Nations [New York: Modern Library, 1937];originally 1776), p. 679)


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another. In a word, all the abuses inherentin monopoly or in communism crop up.

Under the rule o ree competition, warbetween the producers o security entirelyloses its justiication. Why would theymake war? To conquer consumers? But theconsumers would not allow themselves tobe conquered. They would be careul not

to allow themselves to be protected by menwho would unscrupulously attack the per-sons and property o their rivals. I someaudacious conqueror tried to become dic-tator, they would immediately call to theiraid all the ree consumers menaced by this

aggression, and they would treat him as hedeserved. Just as war is the natural conse-quence o monopoly, peace is the naturalconsequence o liberty.

Under a regime o liberty, the natu-ral organization o the security industrywould not be dierent rom that o otherindustries. In small districts a single entre-preneur could sufce. This entrepreneurmight leave his business to his son, or sell


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it to another entrepreneur. In larger dis-tricts, one company by itsel would bringtogether enough resources adequately to

carry on this important and difcult busi-ness. I it were well managed, this com-pany could easily last, and security wouldlast with it. In the security industry, just asin most o the other branches o produc-tion, the latter mode o organization willprobably replace the ormer, in the end.

On the one hand this would be a mon-archy, and on the other hand it would bea republic; but it would be a monarchywithout monopoly and a republic with-

out communism.On either hand, this authority would

be accepted and respected in the nameoutility, and would not be an authorityimposed by terror.

It will undoubtedly be disputed whethersuch a hypothetical situation is realizable.But, at the risk o being considered uto-pian, we afrm that this is not disputable,that a careul examination o the acts will


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decide the problem o government moreand more in avor o liberty, just as it doesall other economic problems. We are con-

vinced, so ar as we are concerned, thatone day societies will be established to agi-tate or the freedom of government, as theyhave already been established on behal othe reedom o commerce.

And we do not hesitate to add thatater this reorm has been achieved, andall artiicial obstacles to the ree actiono the natural laws that govern the eco-nomic world have disappeared, the situ-ation o the various members o society

will become the best possible.


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n o t eGustave de Molinari (March 3, 1819January 28, 1912)

was a Belgian-born economist associated with the French

conomistes, a group o laissez-aire liberals. Through-

out his lie, Molinari deended peace, ree trade, reedom o

speech, reedom o association, and liberty in all its orms. He

was the originator o the theory o Market Anarchism.


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Documents

Gustave de Molinari - The Production of Security (1849)