Guerilla War History Lesson

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    These slides have been edited for release only to those with AKO access.

    PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING:

    --These edited AKO slides are a rough guide to class flow, and are not afull substitute for the classroom session.

    --They have been redacted for copyright and file-size reasons. Thus they

    lack most of the pictures and other graphics seen in the classroom slides.

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    INFANTRY BOLC-B

    GUERILLA WARFARE HISTORY,

    AND BATTLE ANALYSIS

    MCoE DIRECTORATE OF TRAININGDr. Douglas N. Campbell

    Military History InstructorFt Benning, GA

    Bldg 4, Rooms 3308

    PHONE: 706-626-2402

    E-MAIL: [email protected]

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    Enter Infantry School OES into AKO Search; pick the URL that

    says the same; then select IBOLC folder; then the Historyfolder; & then the Delta Co 7-12 Battle Analysis Guide file (or D

    Co 7-12 BA Source or Guerilla War History Lesson)

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    GUERILLA WARFARE HISTORY

    AND BATTLE ANALYSIS

    TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.

    TLO: Write a battle analysis that describes and analyzes a

    selected battle.

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    TRADOC Says

    Topical History: Guerilla Warfare (Insurgency)

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    GUERILLA WARFARE

    TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.

    ELO: Define guerilla warfare

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    GUERILLA WARFARE

    --Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or

    hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces

    (often associated with insurgency)

    --Irregular warfare favors the war of the flea: indirect and

    asymmetric (e.g., unconventional) approaches, though it may

    employ the full range of military & other capacities

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    CONVENTIONAL vs.

    UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

    --Conventional warfare implies direct military confrontation

    between regular armed forces, in which the enemys armed force

    or specific war-making power is targeted.

    --Unconventional warfare includes subversion, raids, robberies,

    ambushes, assassinations, sabotage, spying, and rescue

    conducted most often by irregular forces or by specially trained

    regulars.

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    GUERILLA WARFARE

    TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.

    ELO: Define guerilla warfare

    ELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.

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    GUERILLA WARFARE

    TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.

    ELO: Define guerilla warfareELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

    Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated

    themes from early through modern times . . . .

    Guerilla Success

    --Will & Popular support

    Algerian citizens support urban guerilla

    war against French Army

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

    Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated

    themes from early through modern times . . . .

    Guerilla Success

    --Over-stressed &/or bad govt/army

    Americans

    tar and feather

    British tax collector.

    The French execute Spanish rioters

    and help spark the guerilla war in Spain.

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

    Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated

    themes from early through modern times . . . .

    Guerilla Success

    --Charismatic, and/or opportunistic leaders

    Yugoslavias

    TitoIrelands

    Collins

    Carolinas

    Marion

    Cubas

    Castro

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

    Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated

    themes from early through modern times . . . .

    Guerilla Success

    --Discipline / organization / prep

    --Intimidation / terror / provocation

    Suicide bombers Tamil leader

    Velupillai Prabhakaran

    Viet Cong cadre

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

    Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated

    themes from early through modern times . . . .

    Guerilla Success

    --Favorable environment

    --Sanctuary

    --OUTSIDE HELP

    The Afghan countryside

    Allied commando teams

    help the French Resistance.

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

    Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated

    themes from early through modern times . . . .

    Guerilla Success

    --Surprise

    w/light, mobile, flex forces

    --Asymmetric ops; war of the flea

    American Patriot ambush Afghan Mujahedeen ambush

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

    Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated

    themes from early through modern times . . . .

    Guerilla Success

    --Mixed forces

    --Timing

    Viet Cong guerillas NVA regulars

    Germans in 1944 Paris face an

    uprising and Allied armies.

    Warsaw Jews must go it

    alone in 1943, and get

    crushed.

    AND COUNTER INSURGENCY (COIN) /

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    AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) /

    COUNTER-GUERILLA OPS ARENT NEW EITHER

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA

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    COIN / C-G Success

    --AIM / focus / will

    --Leadership /

    legitimacy

    --Popular support

    (And if youre using allies, this applies BOTH to you and to the ally.)

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA

    THEMES IN HISTORY

    Philippine Defense Minister

    Ramon Magsaysay greets supporters

    as Huk Rebellion subsides, 1953.

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA

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    COIN / C-G Success

    --Organization (of the whole effort) / discipline

    Briggs, Thompson, and Templarget Britains Malayan COIN effort under control --

    and then get the Malayan Insurgency under control.

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA

    THEMES IN HISTORY

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA

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    COIN / C-G Success

    --Deny aid

    & sanctuary

    -- isolate

    Building the Morice Line

    which cut guerilla traffic in

    Algerian War

    Successful coastal blockade,

    Philippine War

    Successful geographic, ethnic,

    and strategic hamlet isolation,

    Malayan Insurgency

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA

    THEMES IN HISTORY

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA

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    COIN / C-G Success

    --Divide & conquer; oil stain

    Enlisting Filipino scouts

    for the US Army,

    Philippine Insurrection

    British blockhouse,

    Boer War

    U.S. Army Apache scouts

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA

    THEMES IN HISTORY

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA

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    COIN / C-G Success

    --Intell, Surprise

    --Light, mobile, flexible forces

    Seminole guide

    and Army scouts,

    Second Seminole War

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA

    THEMES IN HISTORY

    Britains Orde Wingate

    and his Special Night Scouts help

    suppress the 1930s Palestinian Uprising:

    Ambush the ambushers and raid the

    raiders.

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA

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    COIN / C-G Success

    --Violent force, but judiciously

    --Conciliation

    --Terms

    Petraeus Kilcullen

    Sons of Iraq with US and Iraqi soldiers

    RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA

    THEMES IN HISTORY

    SOME GUERILLA WAR / INSURGENCY READINGS

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    SOME GUERILLA WAR / INSURGENCY READINGS

    --Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows (encyclopedic history of g-war)--Beckett, Ian. The Roots of Counter-Insurgency--CSI Publications has several works that address insurgency/COIN:

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp --Fall, Bernard. Street without J oy, andTheTwo Vietnams--Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice--Hammes,The Sling and the Stone--Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace (Algerian War)

    --Joes, Anthony. Various works (mostly on COIN)--Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerilla--Laqueur, Walter. Guerilla Warfare (dated, but still a nice survey)--Marston and Malkasian. Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare--Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command

    --Nagl, John. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife--ONeill, Bard. Insurgency and Terrorism--Poole, H. John. Various works (popular guides)

    --Record, Beating Goliath--Taber, Robert. War of the Flea--Van Creveld,The Transformation of War

    SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp
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    SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS

    --Brooks. Eyewitness to War Volume III: US Army Advisors in Afghanistan(interviews)

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/EyewitnessToWar_Vol

    umeIII_Brooks.pdf

    --Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and BinLaden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001

    --Courter, Jeff. Afghan Journal: A Soldiers Year in Afghanistan--Crile, George. Charlie Wilson's War--Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan--Grau, Lester. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost;

    andThe Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics inAfghanistan

    --Grau, Lester, and Ali Ahmad Jalali. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideenin the Soviet-Afghan War

    --Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires: Americas War in Afghanistan

    --Junger, Sebastian. War--Koontz, Christopher, ed. Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army

    Experience in Afghanistan, 2003-2005http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/enduring_voices/index.html

    SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont )

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/EyewitnessToWar_Volhttp://www.history.army.mil/html/books/enduring_voices/index.htmlhttp://www.history.army.mil/html/books/enduring_voices/index.htmlhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/EyewitnessToWar_Vol
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    SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont.)

    --Loyn, David. In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, andAmerican Occupation

    --MacPherson, Malcolm. Roberts Ridge

    --Maley, William.The Afghanistan Wars--Matthews, Matt. An Ever Present Danger: A Concise History of British Military

    Operations on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp#global (scroll down to it)

    --Matthews. We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There (Soviet experience)http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/MatthewsOP36.pdf

    --Naylor, Sean. Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda--Potter. American Advisors: Security Force Assistance Model in the Long War

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdf

    --Rasheed, Ahmad. (Two books)Taliban, and Descent into Chaos--Roe, Andrew. Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of bin

    Laden, 1849-1947--Rubin, Barnett.The Fragmentation of Afghanistan--Saikal, Amin. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival--Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the

    Fall of the Taliban

    SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont )

    http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/MatthewsOP36.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/MatthewsOP36.pdfhttp://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp
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    SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont.)

    --Tupper, Benjamin. Greetings From Afghanistan, Send More Ammo--US Army Combat Studies Institute. Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp (and then scroll down), or

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdf--West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan--Woodward, Bob. Obamas Wars--Wright, Donald, et al. A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation

    Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf

    --Wright, Donald, ed. Vanguard of Valor: Small-Unit Actions in Afghanistanhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/VanguardOfValor.pd

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/VanguardOfValor.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/VanguardOfValor.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp
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    OH BY THE WAY, OTHER SOURCES

    --Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website and its on-line library

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp

    --US Army Center for Military History (CMH) on-line publications

    http://www.history.army.mil/bookshelves.html

    --US Army Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press on-line publications

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp

    --US Army History and Education Center (AHEC; formerly Military History

    Institute) holdings

    http://www.ahco.army.mil/site/index.jsp

    GUERILLA WARFARE

    http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asphttp://www.history.army.mil/bookshelves.htmlhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://www.ahco.army.mil/site/index.jsphttp://www.ahco.army.mil/site/index.jsphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://www.history.army.mil/bookshelves.htmlhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp
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    GUERILLA WARFARE

    TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.

    ELO: Define guerilla warfareELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.

    ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns of the pre-

    modern era

    ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and

    analyze selected guerilla warfare-related battles of themodern era, 1700s up to ~1900

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    BLACK MINGO SWAMP

    Swamp near Black River

    14 September, 1780

    Marions raid against isolated British

    Loyalist (Tory) outpost

    Patriot militia leaderFrancis Marion

    v. Tory leader John Ball

    ~1,500 Patriot militia

    v. ~800 Tory militia

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    BLACK MINGO SWAMP

    Preliminaries

    --Aggravated locals support Marions rapid, mounted move

    --Night, multi-axis attack

    --Too much noise crossing a bridge

    --Tories alerted; Marion presses the attack.

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    BLACK MINGO SWAMP

    Battle Summary

    14 September 1780

    --Dismounted frontal attack fails against intense Tory fire.

    --Dismounted right-flank attack falters, then rallies.

    --Left-flank mounted attack delivered with vigor.

    --Tories panic and run.

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    BLACK MINGO SWAMP

    Analysis

    Characteristics of the Offense

    --Surprise

    --Concentration

    --Audacity

    --Tempo

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    THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902

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    FOR THE U.S., A CLASSIC COIN SUCCESS

    --Political commitment in spite of controversies

    --Naval blockade: isolate enemy & deny aid

    --Outposts & small-unit interdiction

    Environmental awareness

    --Filipino constabulary: Isolate, Intell

    --Aid, and conciliation politicsPolitical factors,

    Legitimacy,

    Awareness

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    So with the Philippine War apparently

    winding down,

    A small-unit leader counter-insurgency

    problem arises . . . .

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    BALANGIGA MASSACRE

    Isolated village on south coast of Samar Island

    28 September 1901

    --A local Filipino reaction to US Army companys bad policies as

    Army tries to subdue rebellion on Samar Island

    --CPT Thomas Connell

    v. Valeriano Abador, village chief

    --US Army, ~75 troops of C Company, 9th Infantry Regiment

    v. ~500 townspeople and rebels

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    BALANGIGA MASSACRE

    Preliminaries

    --Cultural unawareness

    --Villagers and rebels plan well

    --Clever placement of attackers fools lax Army security

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    BALANGIGA MASSACRE

    28 September 1901

    Battle Summary / Result

    --Pre-arranged signal strikes Army soldiers at breakfast

    --Most guards eliminated by quick overwhelming attack.

    --FOB overrun; Connell and half of company killed; the rest escape.

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    BALANGIGA MASSACRE

    28 September 1901Analysis

    METT-TC

    --Mission

    --Enemy

    --Terrain/Weather

    --Troops/Support

    --Time Awareness--Civil Considerations

    GUERILLA WARFARE

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    GUERILLA WARFARE

    TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.

    ELO: Define guerilla warfareELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.

    ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns of the pre-

    modern era

    ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and analyze

    selected guerilla warfare-related battles of the modern era, 1700s up to~1900

    ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and

    analyze more recent guerilla warfare-related battles.

    GUERILLA WARFARE IN WW2

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    GUERILLA WARFARE IN WW2

    --Worked best mixed ops / outside help

    --Timing was very important.

    ROUGEMONT

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    Small village east-northeast of Paris, rolling terrain

    27 August 1944

    ROUGEMONT

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    Small village east-northeast of Paris, rolling terrain

    27 August 1944

    --Attempted French Forces Interior (FFI, Resistance) ambush ofretreating German units as Allies advance

    --Attempted French Forces Interior (FFI, Resistance) ambush of

    retreating German units as Allies advance

    --Captains Godfrey Marchant and J. Chaigneau (Jedburgh

    advisors), Major Dumont-Guillemet (FFI)

    v. German commanders

    --Jedburgh 3-man team & ~200-300 FFI

    v. elements of PanzerLehrand 9th Panzer Divisions

    ROUGEMONT

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    Preliminaries

    --FFI picks good ambush site

    --FFI amateurs v. German professionals

    --FFI poor armaments, & poor intell about targets

    ROUGEMONT

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    27 August 1944

    Battle Summary / Result

    --FFI is discovered and outgunned by German armor.

    --Blocking force allows most FFI to escape, and then flees from

    further German armored attacks.

    --Ambush fails

    ROUGEMONT

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    Analysis (w/some Prelims & Summary)

    Warfighting

    Functions

    --Mission Command

    --Fires

    --Intell

    --Movement & Maneuver

    --Protection

    --Sustainment

    --FFI picks good ambush site

    --FFI amateurs

    v. German professionals

    --FFI poor armaments,

    & poor intell about targets

    --FFI discovered and outgunned

    by German armor.

    --Blocking force allows most FFI

    to escape; then flees

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    The American Experience in Vietnam (1961-1973)

    We would not accept a communist Southeast Asia.

    AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN

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    Rice-paddy area near small village complex in Quang Ngai

    Province, Evening, 18 June 1967

    --Part of campaign to disrupt and interdict Viet Cong operationsagainst nearby Chu Lai air base

    --SGT Lloyd Jones, squad leader)

    v. Viet Cong (VC) patrol

    --US Army, 2d Squad, 2d Platoon, C Co, 3d Bn, 21st infantry, U.S.

    196th Light Infantry Bde (10-man squad)

    v. VC patrol (~6+ troops)

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    AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN

    18 June 1967Preliminaries

    --Intell on VC activity near villages

    --Small teams with a mix of

    weapons (including claymore

    mines) and night-vision gear

    --Positioned near trail junction &accounts for flanking threats

    CLAYMORE

    M16

    M79

    Viet Cong

    AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN

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    Battle Summary / Result

    --About 6 VC approach; 4 enter the kill

    zone and stop.

    --Jones detonates claymore to

    initiate ambush & prevent

    premature detection

    --VC pt-man mortally wounded

    --General firing; VC scatter; firing VC

    supporting fire suppressed

    --Per ROE, no IDF support due to

    nearby village

    --2 confirmed VC KIA. Success?

    CLAYMORE

    M16

    M79

    Viet Cong

    AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN

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    18 June 1967

    Analysis

    Warfighting

    Functions

    --Command & Control

    --Fires

    --Intell

    --Movement & Maneuver

    --Protection

    --Sustainment

    --Small teams with a mix of weapons

    (including claymore mines)

    and night-vision gear

    --Positioned near trail junction &

    accounts for flanking threats

    --Jones detonates claymore to initiate

    ambush & preventpremature detection

    --General firing; VC scatter; firing VC

    supporting fire suppressed

    --Per ROE, no IDF support due tonearby village

    --2 confirmed VC KIA. Success?

    BEFORE WE GET TO THE SOVIET AND US EXPERIENCE IN

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    AFGHANISTAN, LETS LOOK AT ITS MODERN HISTORY

    INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN

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    --Afghanistan

    ---It appeared as a political entity in the 1700s.

    ---It even briefly flourished as a small empire.

    ---But it struggled to remain whole.

    WHY?

    A TOUGH PLACE

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    --We know the land is rugged.

    --What justified an attempt to control the entire area?

    --We have men and we have rocks in plenty,

    but we have nothing else. -- Dost Muhammad

    First Afghan War leader

    A TOUGH PLACE

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    --Breeds isolated, tough, and independent-minded people

    --Pashtunwali (the Pashtuns ethical guide: hospitality,justice/vengeance; bravery; group loyalty; religion; personal

    dignity; womans dignity)

    --Intense group loyalty for all Afghans; & zan zar zamin: land,money, women: what any Afghan will allegedly fight for if

    provoked re same

    =A different concept of honor from what many in the West call

    honor, but a strong sense of it nonetheless

    --Religion: conservative, & revivals

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    But for all of that, outsiders still like to meddle . . . .

    --The Great Game with Russia drove British influence in

    Afghanistan in the 1800s-early 1900s.

    INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:

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    INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:

    First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42

    --The underlying cause of the First Anglo-Afghan War was

    Britain and Russias Great Game struggle for control/influence in

    Central Asia. Britain incorrectly perceived that Afghan ruler Dost

    Muhammad had allied himself with Russia; and thus in 1839 the

    British Army entered Afghanistan via the Bolan Pass through

    Kandahar, up through Ghazni (after an excellent reduction ofGhaznis fort), and then on to Kabul. Muhammad fled (later

    surrendered) and the British emplaced an apparently more

    favorable leader, Shah Shujah, on the throne. But there was no

    local enthusiasm for Shujah, and the British Armys Sepoy troopswere uneasy about fighting outside of India proper.

    INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:

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    INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:

    First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.)

    --The British hoped to secure peace through bribes and

    manipulation of the disparate tribes, but their leaders made judgment

    errors. They withdrew most of their best troops to India. The remaining

    British general in Kabul, Wm. Elphinstone, was a weak leader and

    deferred too much to the arrogant civil governor, Sir Wm. MacNaghten.

    MacNaghten decided that, with Afghanistan apparently tranquil, the

    British Kabul garrison could be moved from the imposing Bala Hissar

    fortress to a low cantonment area a few miles away.

    --Also, the British brought families, spurring culture clashes over

    things like womens status. British troops fraternization with Kabuliwomen infuriated Kabuli men. A British attempt to build an Afghan Army

    at the tribes expense engendered more ill will; and MacNaghtens

    manipulative tactics failed to quell it.

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    First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.)

    --Rebellions against the British started outside Kabul. A British

    column returning to India had to fight its way through the KhyberPass in autumn 1840. Rebellion then erupted in Kabul in late

    1841. The British response was weak and disorganized. The

    supposedly reliable Shah Shujah increasingly favored the rebels.

    --Rebellion escalated. By early 1842, Britains Kabuli force was in

    dire straits and Elphinstone accepted a rebel offer of an amnesty

    retreat east to Jalalabad. Undisciplined rebel groups attacked the

    procession anyway; and except for Dr. Wm. Brydon, all British

    were either killed or captured.

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    First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.)

    --Britains response was brutal. In summer 1842, GENs Wm. Nott

    and George Pollock advanced through the Bolan and KhyberPasses, and crushed all direct opposition. They also rescued the

    remaining available captives.

    --But the British did not stay because: (a) they did not want theextra commitment; and (b) they achieved an understanding with

    the previous ruler, Dost Muhammad, that he would regain the

    throne and ally with them and not the Russians.

    Second Anglo-Afghan War 1879-80

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    Second Anglo Afghan War, 1879 80

    --The Second Anglo-Afghan War repeated the first one somewhat.

    Upset over Afghan ruler Sher Ali Khans apparent

    friendliness with the Russians, the British occupied much of the

    country in 1879 and forced Alis successor, Muhammad Yaqub

    Khan, to sign a treaty granting Britain various privileges. One of

    these was an expanded British mission in Kabul, which was

    massacred later that year in a Kabuli uprising after the BritishArmy returned to India.

    --The returning British Armys punitive expeditions occasionally

    struggled with Afghan forces (e.g., Maiwand), but they mostlydrubbed their opponents in conventional battles and regained

    general control of key areas. Suspecting Yaqub of complicity in

    the massacre of the mission, the British allowed Abdur Rahman to

    take power.

    Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1879-80

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    --As with the first war, the British did not want to spend money and

    resources occupying Afghanistan permanently. Indeed, a newly elected

    British government under Wm. Gladstone wanted no overt imperialexpansion in that area. Instead they wanted and got a more compliant

    Afghan leader who, in return for ample British subsidies, would maintain

    some order and not let the Russians gain an advantage.

    --Subsequent treaties set Afghan boundaries close to what exist today.The most notorious is the Durand Line, which mostly follows the

    southern mountain range crest but also splits many Pashtun mountain

    tribes between two national jurisdictions.

    --Neither the Afghan leaders nor the British colonial authorities evercompletely controlled the people in the Durand Line area. The British

    bought some order via bribes and the occasional punitive raid (e.g., see

    Churchills The Story of the Malakand Field Force

    http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/9404).

    INSURGENCIES in/near AFGHANISTAN

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    Post-Durand Agreement

    --Afghan struggles for full independence & with modernity

    Amanullah Khan,

    1919-1929, secures

    greater Afghansovereignty, but is

    overthrown for

    pushing reforms

    which upset tribal and

    religious order.

    Habibullah

    Kalakani, 1929, the

    ex-soldier and ex-bandit who briefly

    ran Afghanistan

    after Amanullahs

    overthrow

    Nadir Shah, 1929-

    1933, the officer

    who stabilized thecountry

    somewhat by

    nullifying most of

    Amanullahs

    reforms

    Accelerating Modernization and Upheaval

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    Zahir Shah

    1933-1973

    Daoud Khan

    1973-1978

    Nur M.Taraki

    1978-1979

    Hafi. Amin

    1979-1979

    B. Karmal

    1979-1986

    --Zahir Shah continued his father Nadirs moderate approach, but

    Daoud Khan and especially the communist leaders who

    succeeded him wanted to compel accelerated change. Afghanpolitics became unstable and bloody as communist factions vied

    for control.

    Zahir Shah and the new Great Game

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    --Moderate reform

    --US & USSRrentier state: superpower aid is a major sourceof Afghan GDP as Zahir plays the rivals. The Soviets give

    more aid, and with it comes unfortunate influence within

    Afghanistan

    --Pakistan (arguments over the Durand Line border and the fate of

    the Pashtun tribes split by same. Beset with border

    problems with its larger neighbor and bitter rival India,

    Pakistan rejects Afghan proposals to give Pahstun territory

    to Afghanistan or to create a Pashtunistan)

    --Cousin Daouds big ideas to accelerate Afghan modernization

    sparks his overthrow of Zahir.

    Daoud Khans

    F t l W lt ith M d it 1973 1978

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    Fatal Waltz with Modernity, 1973-1978

    --Factional resistance, as usualsome of it in the university that

    Daoud promotes as part of modernization. Also, someAfghans dont like his ruthless approach to reform

    --Pakistan: occasional arguments over the border; and to make

    things hot for the pesky Afghans, Pakistan supports therebel activities of one of the university radicals, Gulbuddin

    Hekmatyar

    --Misunderstandings with the Afghan communist allies who helped

    him seize power. They dont like his distancing himself

    from them and their even bigger plans for Afghanistan.

    =They kill him in the overthrow

    The Communist Regime to the mid 1980s

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    Nur M.Taraki1978-1979

    Hafi. Amin

    1979-1979

    B. Karmal

    1979-1986

    --Communism/modernity forced hard on Afghans

    ---Sweeping socio-political reforms

    ---Max coercion

    --Communist factions

    roughly match Afghan tribal divisions

    --Top-level rift within a faction

    = another bloody overthrow

    --Enter the Soviets & their idea about leadership

    SO WHY DID THE SOVIETS GO THERE

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    in LATE 1979?

    --To reinforce an unstable client & pre-empt any U.S. involvement

    --Aging Soviet leaders goofed the assessment of the place

    ---Assumed more support: decades of Soviet aid

    ---Brought a military designed for conventional

    European warfare, not a mountain insurgency.

    Soviets, 1979-1985:

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    --Afghan Army defections

    --Hearts & minds? Nahhh, Drain the sea.

    --Questionable will, focus;

    ---Low #s (

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    Mujahideen, 1979-1985:

    --Wouldnt give up

    --Sanctuary & increasing aid

    --Tactics good & bad (they use terrain and stealth well, but often attackSoviet mech infantry columns instead of more vulnerable targets)

    --Cannot eject Soviets

    --Divided force: There werefactions within the factions.

    =Stalemate

    VS. VS.

    VS.

    Soviets

    MassoudHekmatyar

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    DOBANDI AMBUSHMay 1987

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    May 1987

    Preliminaries

    --Mujahideen check beforecommitting supplies

    --Dispersed march formation

    --Soviet ill-defined,

    open-ended kill zone

    From Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali,

    The Other Side of the Mountain:

    Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

    DOBANDI AMBUSHMay 1987

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    May 1987

    Battle Summary

    --Soviet premature ambush

    --Mujahideen good fire control

    --Mujahideen fire support against

    relief column

    --Mujahideen escape from trap

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    WARS PROGRESS

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    1986-1989

    --Gorbachev & a reassessment of the war

    --Better outside aid, to include Stinger SAMs

    --Over-stressed Soviet government

    =Soviet withdrawal in 1988-89

    Post-Soviet Occupation, Pre Taliban

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    --Continued rebellion, but fractious rebels cannot unite against regime

    --Soviet aid helps Najibullahs communist regime

    --Najibullah coopts some opposition leaders and potential

    troublemakers in the regime; he can still be ruthless as needed

    --Outside players shift, as US and UK reduce rebel aid dramatically

    --USSRs fall = Najibullahs fall in 1992

    --Chaos as factions vie for power over the next four years.

    PAKISTANS SITUATION

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    --India is divided when it gains independence from Britain in 1947.

    --Pakistans multiple wars with India over, among other things, Indias

    possession of mostly Muslim Kashmir and its key terrain

    --Pakistans ISI & radicals: Pakistani intelligence use Islamic radicals for

    guerilla-war baiting of the Indians in Kashmir. This can be a two-edged

    sword for the Pakistani government

    --The Afghanistan Front & the Taliban. Pakistan wants Afghan leaders who are

    sympathetic with Pakistans border concerns and who wont ally with

    India against Pakistan. The newly formed Taliban fits that bill, and gets

    critical Pakistani support in Afghanistans post-Soviet civil war.

    --The Taliban takes most of Afghanistan (Ahmed Shah Massouds Northern

    Alliance continues resistance)

    --The Talibans brutal regime, friendship with bin Laden, and 9/11

    OEF

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    --October 2001, first US air raids against Taliban

    --US air power and special forces work with Northern Alliance--November 01, Mazari-Sharif & Kabul fall to N. Alliance & US

    --December 01, Kandahar & Tora Bora fall to N. Alliance & US

    THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006

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    --After Soviet occupation, destructive civil war, and Taliban repression,

    Afghanistan needed assistance if it was to move forward with a stable,

    non terrorist-influenced regime. So, what kind of assistance?

    --American assumptions / aims: a big foreign presence will spark an

    insurgency, and big nation-building projects usually fail anyway, so

    keep the US presence (footprint) small and temporary

    ---Misimpressions of the Soviet experience. We assumed thatthe fierce Afghan resistance to the Soviets 1980s occupation was due

    mainly to their large forces, but there were never more than 120,000

    Soviet troops in country. Soviet brutality inspired Afghan anger.

    ---Aversion to nation building. The Vietnam War and stability

    operations in places like Somalia led many Americans, including theBush administration, to prefer not to build nations in troubled places

    that we dont understand or where we dont want to remain for long.

    Indeed, President Bush and staff regarded most such deployments,

    even the one to Bosnia, as wasteful diversions if not outright failures.

    THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006

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    --Stability and security issues: If we wanted a small foreign footprint,

    then Afghan national peace at least required a rebuilt Afghan Army /

    police force and stable central government. US leaders worked withnon-Taliban local leaders to promote an Afghan approach to these tasks;

    but it meant working with the fractious warlords and factional leaders

    who helped sustain the chaos that followed the Soviets 1989

    withdrawal. Other problems with building effective national

    government and security institutions included: illiteracy, corruption, low

    army status among Afghans, poor soldier pay, factionalism, and related

    disputes among Afghans over who served and how.

    --But given a relative calm after the Taliban governments overthrow;encouraging signs like the 2004 Afghan national elections; and a big US

    distraction in Iraq, the US commitment to Afghanistan remained small

    and policy formation remained uncertain for several years.

    THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006

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    Small footprint & uncertain policy formation

    --US force size remained at about, or below, 20,000 for years

    --At first, commanders were told to avoid heavy commitments to

    stability-force or COIN ops because we were not supposed to be

    there long.

    --At the time, US Army familiarity with COIN & local area needed work

    --The situation improved some as commanders like LTGEN David Barnostrove to implement COIN pros and to coordinate efforts better;

    but still the US commitment remained small.

    --Obviously, there was also a big distraction with OIF.

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    9

    04

    12

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    4

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    05

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    4

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    6

    06

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    30

    20

    10

    0

    904

    1204

    405

    605

    905

    1205

    406

    606

    906

    1206

    U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops

    04 2005 2006

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    04

    12

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    4

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    0

    904

    1204

    405

    605

    905

    1205

    406

    606

    906

    1206

    Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan

    Relatively low

    04 2005 2006

    Afghanistan Mid-2000s

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    --Security & services breakdown as local Afghan forces struggle

    --Local corruption: old warlords still run some places--Willpower issues: Ours declines as OIF continues. Allied forces

    often operate under serious restrictions imposed by their

    governments. Over time, the Taliban starts to resurge.

    --The rebels outside help, and this involves Pakistan, with its

    internal troubles.

    Afghanistan, Mid 2000s

    Control, and the lack thereof: as the

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    04

    12

    04

    4

    05

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    9

    05

    12

    05

    4

    06

    6

    06

    9

    06

    12

    06

    4

    07

    6

    07

    9

    07

    12

    07

    4

    08

    6

    08

    9

    08

    80

    60

    40

    20

    0

    904

    1204

    405

    605

    905

    1205

    406

    606

    906

    1206

    407

    607

    907

    1207

    408

    608

    908

    Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan

    Steady Increase

    04 2005 2006 2007 2008

    ,

    situation deteriorates, can we control the

    countryside per classic COIN?

    Control, and the lack thereof: as the

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    04

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    4

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    06

    9

    06

    12

    06

    4

    07

    6

    07

    9

    07

    12

    07

    4

    08

    6

    08

    9

    08

    40

    30

    20

    10

    0

    904

    1204

    405

    605

    905

    1205

    406

    606

    906

    1206

    407

    607

    907

    1207

    408

    608

    908

    U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops

    04 2005 2006 2007 2008

    ,

    situation deteriorates, can we control the

    countryside per classic COIN?

    Afghanistan, Mid-2000s

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    --Security & services breakdown

    --Local corruption

    --Willpower issues

    --The rebels outside help, and this involves Pakistan.

    Afghanistan, Mid 2000s

    --Control, the lack thereof, and the Battle of Wanat. US forceswere already having trouble maintaining full control of eastern

    Afghanistans Waygal Valley, and had pulled one of their outposts

    back down the valley to Wanat village. Just after the Wanat

    outposts establishment, rebels attacked it with much firepowerbut its small garrison repelled the assault. Controversy arose over

    preparation and whether the Wanat outpost was still too isolated.

    Later the US would withdraw further down the valley.

    OP KAHLER WANAT K P i 13 J l 2008

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    OP KAHLER, WANAT, Kunar Province, 13 July 2008

    Small village in mountain valley

    WANAT, Kunar Province,

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    13 July 2008, small village in mountain valley

    --Mujahideen attempt to disrupt US outpost move

    --CPT Matthew Myer v. Mawlawi Sadiq Manibullah

    --ANA Platoon & 2nd PLTN, C Co, 2nd BN, 503rd IR (~73 troops)

    v. Lashkar al Zil (~150-300 rebels)

    WANAT,

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    Preliminaries

    --Move to this COP is quite recent; valley bottom

    --Chilly locals, but US assumes delay before big attack

    --COP abuts village; detached OP

    --US does early AM stand-to anyway

    WANAT, 13 July 2006

    Battle Summary

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    Battle Summary

    --All-aspect rebel attack, maximum firepower

    WANAT, 13 July 2006

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    Battle Summary / Results

    --All-aspect rebel attack, maximum firepower

    --Key US weapons disabled; detached OP high losses

    --US directs remaining fires well

    --Commander calls in fire support & QRF; COP saved

    WANAT, 13 July 2006

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    , y

    Analysis: METT-TC

    --Mission --Enemy

    --Terrain --Troops/Support

    --Time --Civil Issues

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    MARCH 2009,

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    U.S. STRATEGY

    FOR AFGHANISTAN

    AND PAKISTAN

    The goal is . . . to defeat, disrupt, and dismantle

    Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan,

    and to prevent their return to either country.

    For Afghanistan, the strategy commits to

    increasing U.S. troop levels

    to fight extremists along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border,train Afghan security forces,

    and provide civilian experts to help the Afghan government.

    President Obama

    CENTCOM commander

    Petraeus

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    --The goal and strategy reflect the presidents resolution of conflicting

    opinions among his top deputies.

    ---Some leaders (both mil & civ) wanted a COIN full-court press

    with ample troops and dedication to rebuilding Afghanistan.

    ---Others (both mil & civ) were concerned about American

    domestic problems (economy, war weariness, etc.), the dauntingprospects for a timely resolution of Afghanistan and Pakistans many

    internal problems; and so wanted a reduced commitment by relying

    more upon high-tech weapons and small special forces.

    Afghanistan, Mid-2000s

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    --Security & services breakdown

    --Local corruption

    --Willpower issues (ours/the rebels/allies)

    --The rebels outside help (Pakistan)

    --The new surge

    --Control, and the lack thereof

    --

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    08

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    1

    09

    4

    09

    6

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    1

    10

    80

    60

    40

    20

    0

    906

    1206

    407

    607

    907

    1207

    408

    608

    908

    1208

    409

    609

    909

    1209

    410

    610

    910

    1210

    411

    611

    911

    1211

    412

    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

    U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops

    2011

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    08

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    1

    09

    4

    09

    6

    09

    12

    09

    1

    10

    80

    60

    40

    20

    0

    904

    1204

    405

    605

    905

    1205

    406

    606

    906

    1206

    407

    607

    907

    1207

    408

    608

    908

    1208

    409

    609

    909

    1209

    410

    Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan

    04 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 10

    THE DEFINITION OF WAR

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    THE DEFINITION OF WAR

    A conflict between organized groups with unknownresolve, each seeking to impose its will on the other

    Afghanistan, Recently

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    g , y

    (President Obama Speech, 22 June 2011)

    --Reduce forces used for surge---10,000 out by end of 2011

    ---33,000 total reduction

    --Meeting our goals

    ---Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time since 9/11.

    (Bin Laden death, 2 May 2011)

    ---We've inflicted serious losses on the Taliban and taken a

    number of its strongholds

    ---Afghan Security Forces have grown . . . . [and] we have already

    begun to transition . . . security to the Afghan people.

    Afghanistan Recently

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    Afghanistan, Recently

    (President Obama Speech, 22 June 2011)

    This is the beginning -- but not the end -- of our effort to wind down this

    war . . . . But we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate; as strategic as we

    are resolute.

    At a time of rising debt and hard economic times . . . we must invest in

    America's greatest resource -- our people.

    Living within our means . . . . we must recapture the common purpose that we

    shared at the beginning of this time of war.

    We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place . . . . America, it is time tofocus on nation building here at home.

    So please . . . preach for more study of books and

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    history, a greater seriousness in military art. With 2,000

    years of examples behind us we have no excuse . . . for

    not fighting well.

    T.E. Lawrence,alias, Lawrence of Arabia, 1933