Gudigwa Learning Document

A learning document

The Gudigwa Cultural Village

An historical overview of a community eco-cultural

tourism initiative in northern Botswana

The Gudigwa Cultural Village

Rowena Smuts Lovemore Sola Neel Inamdar Leo Braack Colin Bell

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Gudigwa Cultural Village – An historical overview of a community eco-cultural tourism initiative in northern Botswana

Acknowledgments

This review document was prepared by the Southern Africa Wilderness and Transfrontier Conservation Programme, based in Cape Town, South Africa, in collaboration with various members of the CI Global Tourism Team and other individuals. We would like to thank the following people, who generously contributed to the document through their historical association with the project over the years:

Conservation International Sharon Safran, Eileen Gutierrez, Karen Ross, Susan Stone, Edward Millard, Fred Boltz, Dave Bayard

Other Molefe Rantsudu (employed as a consultant to obtain information on community perspectives) Nathalie Barbancho (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) Parakh Hoon (independent PhD researcher at Virginia Technical University, USA) Kgoberego Nkawana (BigFoot Safaris, the Gaborone based tourism operator who took over management of the camp in 2006)

Donors The following organisations, companies and individuals generously contributed towards financing this project during the various stages of its inception and operation:

Bancker-Williams Foundation; Department for International Development - Business Link Challenge Fund (DFID-BLCF); European Union (EU) Micro Projects, Botswana; Kalahari Management Services (KMS), Botswana; Mulago Foundation Healthy Communities Initiative (HCI), USA; Swift Foundation; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC); United Nations Development Programme/National Conservation Strategy Coordinating Agency (now Department of Environmental Affairs) (UNDP/NCSA), Botswana; US Embassy- Ambassador Fund, Gaborone, Botswana.

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Preface

Tourism has long provided a rationale for conservation and economic development around the world. Since the first national parks were established in the United States by Theodore Roosevelt, the promise and lure of tourism dollars has been used to support the twin aims of biodiversity conservation and economic development.

The use of tourism as a tool for economic development and conservation has evolved dramatically over the past 100 years. The common approach in the 1960s and early 1970s involved a neo-colonial, heavy-handed enforcement model, often in tandem with mass tourism development investment funded by the World Bank. By the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a shift toward a greater emphasis on developing enterprises at the site level, such as Chalalan Ecolodge and others.

However, despite large-scale donor investment in site-based ecolodge development, the majority of these initiatives did not achieve economic success. This reality, combined with the growing donor desire to extend benefits to local people, led to the further evolution of tourism projects throughout the 1990s into integrated parts of rural development projects. By this time, tourism was widely accepted as a key component of many rural economic development initiatives which supported wildlife conservation.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Conservation International (CI) was at the forefront of the movement to support “local economic development as a strategy for wildlife conservation and conflict resolution” (IUCN / UNEP / WWF 1980). In Ecotourism and conservation: A review of key issues (K. Brandon, 1996), ecotourism was identified as a way to provide the following five benefits to conservation:

• Financing for parks and conservation;

• Economic justification for park protection;

• Economic alternatives for local people to reduce exploitation of conservation areas and resources;

• Constituency building that promotes conservation; and

• An impetus for private conservation efforts.

During this period it became more and more evident that “…the economic benefits of wildlife and biodiversity are diffuse and accrue to society in general,… (the) financial benefits generally accrue to governments and external entrepreneurs,... (and) many of the costs are acute and borne locally” (Dixon & Sherman, 1990; Wells, 1992; Balmford & Whitten, 2003).

Against this background and following the success of CI’s ecolodge project at Chalalan, Bolivia (which contributed in part to the establishment of Madidi National Park), CI decided to engage the community at Gudigwa in a tourism venture.

This document has been prepared to record the successes and failures of the initiative, and to support our learning around such interventions.

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Executive Summary

As a result of previous successes with ecotourism and their contribution to conservation, CI made the decision to invest in establishing what would be a demonstration ecolodge project in Gudigwa, Botswana. As is documented here, CI as an organisation had good intentions; however it made some fundamental and strategic errors in the early stages of project implementation that materially compromised the viability and sustainability of the project, dooming it to failure. While CI thought it was doing everything “right” based upon its knowledge and understanding of community tourism development initiatives at the time, the project was a commercial failure and continues to struggle as a tourism enterprise despite creating some lasting positive social impacts for the community. Understanding why this happened is crucial to informing the design and successful implementation of tourism based interventions which address the twin challenges of biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation. Some of the key “lessons learned” from this experience are:

• CI’s failure to include a private sector partner early in the project created a host of issues which hobbled the project from the onset; CI engaged in an activity outside its core competency, in a remote location and with minimal professional assistance in a highly competitive industry. Early involvement of qualified, private sector tourism operators / professionals is essential to ensure value chain linkages and operational integrity.

• Indirect incentive schemes that attempt to integrate economic development and conservation are a challenge and must be extremely well conceived, planned and implemented.

• At the community level, poorly implemented tourism initiatives often result in:

− Benefits that are few and which do not offset individual costs; − Benefits that are too indirect to act as incentives for conservation; and − A direct correlation between increased promises and increased aspirations.

More specific lessons learned from the Gudigwa experience include: • Company, Business and Management Structures are crucial – At the outset of the project

the facilitators lacked the understanding that an impoverished and marginalized rural community with little or no formal education did not have the capacity to directly manage a start-up tourism business. Structures and practices should have been in place to allow the community to slowly over time take more and more of the responsibility involved in running the business.

• Partner selection is crucial – There was a mismatch between the low volume/high revenue tourism model advocated by Wilderness Safaris, who had to package Gudigwa as part of a suite of luxury products, and the NGO facilitators’ expectations of the community’s capacity to run such a high end business.

• Partner timing is crucial – In addition to selecting the right partners, their early involvement is essential to ensuring the integrity of the tourism product. Wilderness Safaris should have been brought on board from the outset to both manage and market the business rather than just market it.

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• Tourism is very competitive – All tourism enterprises are highly competitive business ventures dealing with clients who have high expectations. Thus the involvement of a private sector partner that has experience in a commercial business environment is very important.

• Professional Management is crucial – Lodge Management should have been the responsibility of a high-end tourism operator. Neither CI nor the Gudigwa community were experts in business development, financial management of tourism enterprises or service delivery. As a consequence the operation lacked solid business principles and staff recruitment and financial management were not carried out in accordance with basic good business practice, despite training.

• High Expectations – Both CI and the community had unrealistic expectations of what could be accomplished in a short period of time. The community expected to obtain profits within the first couple of years of operation in order to improve the livelihoods of the people of Gudigwa. Expectations could have been managed if a professional operator had been included from the onset, leading to risks being carried by the operator rather than the community.

• Conflict resolution – there were problematic relationships between various project stakeholders at different times. It is possible that a more proactive approach to conflict resolution should have been taken earlier in the project cycle to address miscommunication issues.

The lessons learned from the Gudigwa experiences are being disseminated to other similar CI projects globally as part of our learning initiative. Embracing these lessons learned, and building on the explosive growth of the tourism and ecotourism industries over the past 15 years, CI has altered its strategy to focus more attention on the private sector. By focusing on the Tourism Value Chain and assuming the role of a facilitator as opposed to that of a participant, CI is attempting to utilize market forces and market players to address many of the challenges associated with tourism operations in areas of high biodiversity and poverty. Fortunately, this change in approach coincides with a heightened awareness within the tourism industry of the threats and challenges tourism creates in areas of high biodiversity and scenic beauty, and with an increasingly environmentally aware/concerned traveling public. CI now has the opportunity to achieve the five goals outlined by Katrina Brandon (1996) with the willing and active support of the broader tourism market.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

BCCT Bugakhwe Cultural Conservation Trust BLCF Business Link Challenge Fund CBNRM Community Based Natural Resource Management CBOs Community Based Organisations CI Conservation International CSO Central Statistics Office DFID Department for International Development, United Kingdom DWNP Department of Wildlife and National Parks EMC Enterprise Management Committee JVP Joint Venture Partnership KFO Kuru Family of Organisations LDC Less-Developed Countries NG12 Ngamiland 12 (Wildlife Management Area Unit) OCT Okavango Community Trust OWS Okavango Wilderness Safaris OWT Okavango Wildlife Trust PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal RADP Remote Area Development Programme RAMSAR Convention on Wetlands (RAMSAR, Iran, 1971) SADC South African Development Community TOCaDI Trust for the Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives TAC Technical Advisory Committee (a Botswana government

advisory body)

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Timeline of Development

2004: 29 May, Camp re-opened,

December - closed

2000: BCCT registered

1999: BCCT established. Initial conceptualization, development and

construction of camp

1998: Mike Taylor undertook research for PhD dissertation of San in northern Botswana – identified need for development of income generating activities for

Khwe San based at Gudigwa

1991: CI’s Okavango Program started in Maun – focused on conserving biodiversity associated with Okavango Delta

1987: Gudigwa village est. when Khoesan people from the area between the Okavango Delta and Linyanti River settled in NG12

2006: June, CI handed Camp over to BigFoot Safaris

2005: Camp not in operation

2003: 28 March – Gudigwa Camp officially opened

November – destroyed by wild fire

1987

2006

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

Preface

Executive Summary

Acronyms and Abbreviations Timeline Timeline of Development vii

1 Introduction 1 1.1 Purpose of report 1 1.2 Data gathering 1

2 Background 2 2.1 Overview of the Project 2 2.2 Motivation for Gudigwa Camp Establishment 4

2.2.1 CI’s perspective 4 2.2.2 The community's perspective 7 2.2.3 Wilderness Safaris’ perspective 8

2.3 Cultural History of Gudigwa 9 2.4 Establishment of the Bugakhwe Cultural Conservation Trust (BCCT) 10 2.5 CBNRM and Tourism Initiatives in Botswana 11 2.6 The Gudigwa Tourism Product 12

3 Operations and Management: Structures and Processes 13 3.1 The BCCT 13 3.2 The Enterprise Management Committee (EMC) 13 3.3 Camp Management and Staff 14 3.4 Community Capacity Building/Training 14 3.5 Management 15

3.5.1 Wilderness Safaris 15 3.5.2 Donor Evaluation 16 3.5.3 Lodges of Botswana 17 3.5.4 BigFoot Safaris 17

4 Financial Overview 17 4.1 Capital Investment - Funding Obtained 17 4.2 Visitor Numbers 18 4.3 Estimated Revenues and Operating Expenses 19

4.3.1 DFID/BLCF funds 19 4.3.2 Other organisations & consortium partners 19

5 Project Successes 21 5.1 Community perspectives 21 5.2 CI’s perspective 22 5.3 Visitors’ perspectives 26 5.4 OWS' perspective 26

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6 Challenges Encountered 26 6.1 Financial Feasibility Questionable 26 6.2 CBNRM in Botswana 27 6.3 Fire 28 6.4 Problems with the BCCT 28 6.5 Management 29 6.6 Client satisfaction 29 6.7 Issues of Capacity 29 6.8 Community Expectations 31 6.9 Partners 31 6.10 Participation of Stakeholders in the Project 32 6.11 Lack of Documentation 33

7 Lessons Learned 34 7.1 Include a private sector partner at project inception 34

7.1.1 Structuring a commercial agreement or clear Memorandum of Understanding 34 7.1.2 Representation 35 7.1.3 Selection of Appropriate Business Model 35

7.2 CI had unrealistic expectations of the Gudigwa community 35 7.3 Inclusive stakeholder consultation required prior to project being formalized 36 7.4 Model mismatch and unrealistic expectations 36 7.5 Inadequate levels of experience/capacity to manage a complex tourism product within community and NGO 37 7.6 Ongoing inclusive stakeholder consultation was necessary throughout the project 38 7.7 Conflict amongst project stakeholders 39 7.8 Poor business practices 40 7.9 Camp management 41 7.10 Marketing of the camp could have been improved 42 7.11 Poor financial management and reporting controls 43 7.12 CI’s exit from the project viewed as premature by Gudigwa community 43

8 Conclusions 43

9 Reference List 46

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of report

The Gudigwa Cultural Village Eco-tourism project, located in northern Botswana, received extensive support from a wide range of committed organisations and individuals over a seven-year period (1999-2006). Conservation International (CI) played an instrumental role in the conceptualization and establishment of this tourism initiative. Although the project was approached with the best of intentions at both an organisational and individual level, it failed in its objective of establishing a viable, sustainable and profitable community-based tourism enterprise during the time in which CI was involved.

CI realized that, in order to avoid this outcome on other projects, the organisation needed to critically review this project and recognize how certain activities could have been approached differently. It is hoped that the lessons learned from this experience will provide a learning tool that contributes to future planning of tourism initiatives.

This report aims to provide a historical overview of the Gudigwa Cultural Ecotourism Initiative since its inception, and to document benefits accrued to the local community and lessons learned during the implementation of the project. While intended primarily as an internal review document, it may also serve to answer some of the questions that have been raised by Botswana’s citizens, tour operators and the general public at large regarding this project. CI also intends to share this document with donor organisations and individuals who generously contributed towards this initiative.

CI is no longer involved in Gudigwa and handed over activities to a local Gaborone-based tourism operator named BigFoot Safaris in June 2006, who continue to operate the camp.

1.2 Data gathering

In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the project activities that took place, this document draws on the opinions and experiences of a wide range of project stakeholders including:

• Numerous CI project participants;

• The Gudigwa community; and

• Wilderness Safaris, the tourism operator responsible for marketing the product.

In many instances, various project stakeholders expressed conflicting opinions; some of these conflicting viewpoints have intentionally been retained in the document to illustrate different perspectives on the same issue. Differences of opinion were evident both within stakeholder groups (i.e. CI project proponents, Gudigwa community focus groups) as well as between the



different stakeholder groups. The Gudigwa community perspectives were obtained by Molefe Rantsudu (a previous employee of both CI and Wilderness Safaris)1 who visited Gudigwa during December 2007. Focus group discussions were held with the following groups of people, and a total of 25 respondents were interviewed:

• BCCT Board and members of the EMC;

• Former staff members at the Gudigwa camp;

• Craft makers, traditional guides and dancers;

• Elderly people;

• Youth; and

• Women.

In addition, Mr. Colin Bell of Wilderness Safaris was invited to provide his input to the document at its inception and for its final review, to ensure that the views of the operator were appropriately captured.

This study dealt with project conceptualization, planning processes, stakeholder involvement, competencies that existed prior to project inception within the community, and the support given to enable the community to launch a sustainable tourism business.

2 Background

2.1 Overview of the Project

The Gudigwa Community-Based Eco-cultural Tourism project was a unique eco-cultural tourism initiative situated on the northern fringes of the Okavango Delta in Ngamiland District, Botswana (Figure 1.1). The camp, which was initiated by the Bugakhwe Conservation Cultural Trust (BCCT) in partnership with Conservation International, was located five km from the nearest village, Gudigwa.2 The overall project goal was “to enable

1 A potential limitation of the data collection process arises from the fact that the researcher involved with the project was a CI employee who had a direct relationship with the communities prior to his engagement as a consultant for this study. Since the community was knowingly dealing with a former CI employee they may have filtered their responses to suit the researcher, particularly with regard to questions relating to CI’s involvement. The advantage of using this consultant was his familiarity with a number of the issues pertaining to this project.

2 Gudigwa village is the last in a string of villages that stretches from Mohembo village in the southwest, near the border with

Namibia. The village is about 65 km northeast of Seronga village on the eastern side of the Okavango River Delta.



the Gudigwa community to take advantage of economic development opportunities, while preserving natural resource management goals”.

The following performance indicator was identified to demonstrate whether the project goal had been accomplished or not: the creation of commercially viable, community-based enterprises that contribute to conservation and bring benefits, basic services and economic development structures to a remote area of Botswana. The overall project purpose entailed the successful operation of an ecotourism enterprise by the BCCT and Gudigwa community, simultaneously achieving their socio-economic development goals while actively helping to achieve biodiversity conservation goals. The envisioned impacts of the project included:

• A fully functioning traditional San village, receiving � 25,000 annually in revenues;

• The establishment of a development fund after year five, redistributing 7% of business profits into development projects;

• Ecotourism development that clearly resulted in biodiversity conservation outcomes and the preservation of cultural heritage by creating links between community development and the preservation of those resources.

Fig 1.1: Map showing Gudigwa Village, Northern Okavango Delta Source: Conservation International GIS (2008)

Gudigwa camp was viewed as an opportunity to offer guests a rare experience; intimate exposure to the cultural richness of the San3 who inhabit the northern reaches of Botswana

3 The terms San, Khwe, Sho, Bushmen, and Basarwa have all been used to refer to hunter-gatherer peoples of southern Africa. Each of these terms has a problematic history, as they have been used by outsiders to refer to them, often with pejorative connotations. In Botswana the official term is Basarwa however this is a Tswana term and is also seen as having negative



between the Okavango Delta and the Namibian border. Guests were accommodated in grass huts made from local materials and modeled after traditional San shelters but which included luxury facilities such as comfortable beds and linen, solar lighting and private open-air bathrooms with a flush toilet and hot-water shower. Meals consisted of local foods cooked over an open fire. Guests also had the opportunity to go on guided walks with experienced San trackers to learn more about traditional hunting and gathering techniques.

CI was instrumental in introducing and encouraging the BCCT and the community to develop a common vision of conservation and stewardship. CI conducted a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) in 1999 with the Gudigwa community. During the exercise, the people of Gudigwa were asked to identify possible projects that would benefit the community as a whole.

The idea of a cultural village was encouraged because: 1) the community liked the idea; 2) this community, as one of the world’s last true San communities, had extensive cultural knowledge to develop a cultural village; and 3) Wilderness Safaris (the Okavango branch was called Okavango Wilderness Safaris, OWS) became involved due to an established relationship between Karen Ross (the CI Botswana Programme Director at the time) and Colin Bell (then the CEO of Wilderness Safaris). Karen Ross invited OWS to market the camp. OWS was very interested in the idea of a San cultural village as an add-on to their normal game-viewing tourist ventures and they agreed to become marketing partners on this project.

The Gudigwa camp was officially opened on 28 March 2003 with Wilderness Safaris, and operated for seven months before a wild fire destroyed it in November 2003. It was reconstructed and re-opened to guests on 29 May 2004. The camp was not in operation in 2005 (as detailed later in this document), and renovation of the existing structures was required before the camp could be re-opened. In June 2006 CI facilitated the signing of a contract between the Bughakwe Cultural Trust and Gaborone-based tourism operator BigFoot Safaris who assumed management of Gudigwa, and who continues to operate the camp today.

connotations. The term San has been selected throughout this document since the term is appreciated by the group of traditionally hunter-gatherers who inhabit Botswana as opposed to either Basarwa or Bushmen (personal communication with ToCADI). The San are in fact the indigenous people of Southern Africa (Silberbauer, 1965) and their population numbers an estimated 100,000 in Southern Africa today (Taylor, 2000; Saugestad, 2001). They have lived for more than 15,000 years in Southern Africa, specifically in the area demarcated between present day Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Angola. The largest population, estimated to be around 60,000, live in Botswana today (Suzman, 2001; Saugestad, 2001).



2.2 Motivation for Gudigwa Camp Establishment

2.2.1 CI’s perspective

CI’s Okavango Programme (located in the Maun office in Botswana) was started in 1991. The establishment of this programme was driven primarily by the perceived need for CI to play an active role in contributing to the conservation of the extraordinary biodiversity associated with the Okavango Delta and to assist the existing players in maintaining the integrity and functionality of the ecosystem.4

CI’s overall conservation objectives are guided by the belief that human societies are able to live harmoniously with their natural environment. This was in line with conservation thinking in Southern Africa in the 1990s which sought to demonstrate Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) through tourism. Following its ecolodge success at Chalalan in Bolivia, CI believed this model could be replicated in Southern Africa at an appropriate site.

In 1998, Mike Taylor was collecting field data in Botswana for a PhD dissertation (Edinburgh University) on the San of Botswana. His work took him to a very remote settlement of Khwe San, who had recently been moved by the government to a site north of the Okavango Delta called Gudigwa. At the time, and even today, it was one of the world’s largest settlements of Khwe San, with more than 600 residents. Mr. Taylor was concerned about the welfare of the Khwe San because they had been removed from their ancestral lands in the late 1980s with the promise of a better life. However, at the time he visited Gudigwa there was not a single income-generating activity taking place in the entire community and the residents were entirely dependent on food aid from the government, a situation similar to that of many other villages in the NG12 area.

The Gudigwa community had heard of the economic activities that CI had been engaged with in other communities in northern Botswana, in particular a women’s basketry project, and through Mr. Taylor they requested CI’s help in developing income-generating activities. At first, CI-Botswana worked with Mr. Taylor and the Gudigwa community on a socio-economic/natural resources data activity called “Mapping the Land”. Mr. Taylor and select CI staff went out with members of the Gudigwa community, equipped with GPS units and 4x4 vehicles, to map the traditional lands of the Gudigwa community. One of the community members involved, Orakilwe Tsima, was the youngest son of the village chief and one of the few young people who had gone to school and was computer literate. He was dedicated, hard working and knowledgeable and his grasp of English, Setswana and Khwe made him

4 The Okavango River Basin covers an area of approximately 10 million ha, extending from Angola, through Namibia into the Okavango Delta in Botswana. The Okavango Delta is a RAMSAR Site and is one of the most intact of the three inland deltas in the world. It is unique for its mosaic of rivers, floodplains and channels and is home to a wide diversity of plant and animals species.



invaluable to the project. CI later hired him as a staff member and he worked with CI as the Gudigwa Traditional Village project developed.

The map was detailed, intricate and fascinating (available from Mike Taylor and/or Edinburgh University). It showed that until the late 1980s, the Khwe San community of Gudigwa was split into many clans that lived, hunted and gathered in a large area of northern Botswana, stretching north of Gudigwa settlement to the Namibian border. The area roughly comprised the land-use zone called NG13. Even more interesting was the fact that these ancestral lands had been annexed by the Department of Agriculture during the building of the Northern Buffalo Fence and the re-zoning of NG13 for cattle use. It became apparent from this study that the removal of this Khwe San community from their lands, and their resettlement at Gudigwa, was undertaken to clear NG13 of people so that the fence could be built and the land re-gazetted as cattle grazing territory.

CI-Botswana had had a long history of tracking the Botswana fences issue. In terms of conservation, CI felt that the fencing issue justified its involvement with Gudigwa, though the desire to assist this destitute and remote community of people was compelling enough. In terms of CI’s strategic interest in creating corridors in the Okavango ecosystem, it was hoped that by forming a trust and helping the community with income generating activities, CI could assist them in re-claiming their lost lands in NG13, and thus re-establish a conservation corridor between Okavango and Namibia’s Caprivi protected areas. This was CI-Botswana’s long-term vision; in the short-term, CI focused its activities on assisting the community in establishing income-generating activities.

To this end, a team of CI social workers, in particular Shex and Kathy Gouwe, worked with the community in conducting a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA exercise), assisted by Orakilwe, who by then was employed full time by CI-Botswana. The PRA identified the community’s desire to earn money by doing what they know and love – hunting and gathering on the land, living a traditional way of life, etc. The community expressed its desire to create a business through an ecotourism enterprise, and this idea evolved into the concept of a Traditional San Village that would be built, owned and operated by the community which would share the profits. This idea combined the concept of earning money through ecotourism with the use of their traditional skills and expertise as Khwe San.

Tourism initiatives are encouraged by CI as a means of supporting the organisation’s conservation objectives in a variety of ways:

• Tourism can function as a vehicle to finance conservation through the creation of concessions, user fees, trust funds, etc.

• Tourism has the potential to reduce impacts on biodiversity through planning, managing, assessing and monitoring within areas of high conservation importance, and sharing experience. Additionally the development of policies, legal frameworks, regulations and agreements can contribute to conservation objectives. The



development of standards, guidelines and best practices (community, private sector, protected area, visitor management) for a particular tourism operation can also have far-reaching benefits for other similar operations.

• Tourism can function as a sustainable economic activity in areas of high conservation importance, through the creation of alternative livelihoods, the development of entrepreneurial capacity in both communities and the private sector, and the creation of enabling environments.

• Tourism can create constituencies for conservation in communities, NGOs, government and businesses, and can help establish partnerships and alliances while simultaneously contributing to capacity building, education and interpretation.

Gudigwa provided CI with the opportunity to demonstrate how tourism could effectively contribute to some of CI’s conservation objectives in Southern Africa, building upon experiences at Chalalan, in Bolivia.

2.2.2 The community’s perspective

Community respondents unanimously agreed that Gudigwa Camp had been established predominantly for economic reasons and as a cultural preservation project. Economic reasons included the need to secure their future through a community income-generating project. It was thought that the income would contribute in some way toward alleviating the poverty articulated by community members.

Members of the community stated the following reasons for wanting to set up the Gudigwa Project:

• To increase livelihood options in Gudigwa, aimed at developing the community and improving the lifestyles of the Gudigwa people;

• To create employment opportunities for community members and earn income that could be used to develop Gudigwa village and its people;

• To revive, preserve and celebrate Bugakhwe culture through tourism activities in the camp; and

• To set up their own San-owned community project separate from the Okavango Community Trust (OCT) and to address their perceived marginalization by the OCT. 5

5 In the early 1990s, the Gudigwa community had foregone their hunting rights (Special Game Licenses) and they were of the opinion that the Okavango Community Trust (OCT) was not doing enough to meet their basic needs and to compensate their loss of livelihood. The Gudigwa community had wanted to withdraw from OCT. However, on the advice of CI and Okavango



Gudigwa community members were consistent in their choice of at least three critical stakeholders, namely: CI, OWS and the government. The following were advanced as reasons for involving the stakeholders in the Gudigwa Camp before the formation of the BCCT:

• CI was chosen for its interest and its proven expertise in working with rural communities to develop community enterprises.

• OWS was chosen for its existing relationship with the OCT communities as the operator of the two community concessions of NG22/23, as well as its expert knowledge of the tourism business.

• The government was chosen because it is the representative of the people and was involved in the larger Community Based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRM).

Community respondents unanimously recognized that the partnership with CI was integral to the successful establishment of the Gudigwa camp. Equally important, OWS was seen as an indispensable business partner that would link the camp with its future clientele and ensure that it became a successful business operation.

2.2.3 Wilderness Safaris’ perspective

Wilderness Safaris has been involved in tourism in southern Africa for more than 25 years and is committed to the long-term conservation of wildlife and pristine wilderness areas. The company manages over 60 successful camps in 7 SADC countries and strongly believes in the future of African wilderness regions, parks and wildlife, while encouraging the active involvement of the people who live alongside those areas. Wilderness Safaris functions both as an international tour operator and a local destination management and marketing company, specializing in marketing and managing wildlife game lodges and wildlife safaris. As such, it was well placed to both market and manage the sales for the camps.

Since hardly any Gudigwa community members had a formal education, there were problems with marketing capacity for this new product. For that reason, CI approached OWS in 2002 to explore ways to collaborate on this ecotourism venture.

OWS liked the idea of a traditional village as a one-night add-on to its existing high-end camps nearby, notably Vumbura and Little Vumbura. OWS agreed to collaborate with CI/Gudigwa community as the sole market agents for the camp, and also to assist with training. Significantly, OWS was not expected to manage the camp; with the help of OWS the BCCT managed the day-to-day activities of the camp.

Wildlife Trust (OWT), Gudigwa remained involved in OCT and set up its own community trust, the BCCT, which contributed toward setting up the Gudigwa Camp seven years later, with assistance from CI.



2.3 Cultural History of Gudigwa

Gudigwa6 village was established in 1987 when the Khoesan people from the area between the Okavango Delta and the Linyanti River settled in NG12. Specifically, people of Khoe extraction were relocated there as part of the Botswana government’s Remote Area Dwellers Programme (RADP) (Mbaiwa & Rantsudu, 2003). The objectives of RADP were to encourage the San and other ethnic groups living in remote and scattered areas to come together and live in a collective of villages where they could be provided with services such as housing, education and water.

The Khwe people can be roughly divided into two groups: the “Buga,” who derive their subsistence from the wilderness or sand and are known as the Bugakhwe, and the Ani, who derive an existence from the water or river and are known as the Anikhwe. The riverine Anikhwe occupied the area around the Okavango Delta for centuries before the arrival of Bantu speakers in the 1800s (Tlou, 1985).

The Khwe people of Gudigwa are primarily (95%) Bugakhwe. Gudigwa has a population of approximately 732 people (Central Statistics Office (CSO), 2002), though it is estimated that the population may have grown to more than 1,000 individuals. The village has a Kgotla (customary court) and offices for the local police, a primary school, a clinic, a water tank and engine for the tank, a veterinary camp and accommodation houses for the local policemen. The village has several shops, including two bars. There are two offices for the BCCT and Okavango Community Trust (OCT), one of which houses a radio for communication between the people of the five neighboring villages of OCT. The Bugakhwe people are indigenous to the Okavango Delta, and related to the San tribes of the Kalahari. Officially, Gudigwa village represents the largest organized San community in Botswana, and is also the only Bugakhwe tribe still living on land that forms part of their traditional territory for hunting and gathering.

The Bugakhwe of Gudigwa is comprised of eight main clans,7 which came from eight different areas in the region. Taylor (2002) noted that most of the people of Gudigwa came from Gamwi and Letshaobe, not far from present day Gudigwa. The various clans and people who make up Gudigwa village lived for centuries in the northern Sandveld of the Okavango Delta. The Bugakhwe have historically moved freely between Botswana, Namibia and Angola. Taylor (2002) observed that Gudigwa could be more accurately described as a cluster of small villages spread over several kilometers, with each section separated by a band of trees.

��Gudigwa is a Bugakhwe name for a big and strong tree, representing the strength and unity that the Bugakhwe people of

Gudigwa envisaged when they settled in the area in 1987.

7 The eight main clans include Xhondoro, Xharango, Gwakeqwe, Xhwatau, Ghicudza, Xhwakatsu, Hqwengu and Thobokhuru. The eight chalets at Gudigwa Camp were named for these eight clans.



Although the San are the dominant group at Gudigwa, there are other ethnic groups that have since settled in the village. These include refugees from Angola, Basubiya, Bayei and Hambukushu. While the people of Gudigwa are of San origin, over time they have inter-married with the Bayei (Wayei) who reside in neighboring villages. The Bugakhwe residents of the Gudigwa village are the owners of Gudigwa camp.

The socio-economic activities of the people of Gudigwa are mainly pastoral and limited to dry land farming. However, the people of Gudigwa recognize the potential value of engaging in a natural resource project for the purpose of sustainable development. As a result, they are part of the Okavango Community Trust (OCT)8 and have also formed the Bugakhwe Cultural Conservation Trust (BCCT) to enable them to participate in and derive socio-economic benefits from tourism in the Okavango Delta.

2.4 Establishment of the Bugakhwe Cultural Conservation Trust (BCCT)

Once the Community had established (through the PRA Exercise) that it wished to engage in an eco-tourism enterprise, the next action of CI-Botswana was to assist the community in forming a legal entity; a trust that could legally participate in a community ecotourism project. The work of developing a trust was considerable, but eventually the Bugakhwe Cultural Community Trust was formed. With the Trust formed and OWS agreeing to market the traditional village, the stage was set for the camp to be built. This effort was spearheaded by Sharon Safran with the help of CI’s Ecotourism division in Washington, D.C.. Money was raised to build the camp, for training, to build an airstrip and so forth. The work was considerable; reconciling the group dynamics of a Khwe San community, an international NGO and an international tourism company (Wilderness Safaris) proved to be difficult.

The villagers of Gudigwa established the Bugakhwe Cultural Conservation Trust (BCCT) in 1999 and it was registered in 2000. The Trust was formed out of a Community Participatory Planning Process with the Gudigwa community members, facilitated (at the community’s request) by Conservation International’s Maun office, and is considered to be one of CI’s most significant legacies of the project. The Trust aimed to represent the Gudigwa community’s interests and to ensure that funds raised for the Gudigwa camp would provide direct and measurable benefits to the villagers and community members. The Board of Trustees had 10 members and any community member of Gudigwa over 18 years old was eligible to be a member.

The objectives of the Trust were three-fold: first, to revitalize Bugakhwe cultural practices and the utilization of natural resources found around the village of Gudigwa; second, to achieve an improved standard of living for its members through training and income generation; and

8 A Trust or CBO is the legal entity used by communities to conduct CBNRM activities.



third, to ensure the conservation of natural resources in the area. A number of specific objectives were also developed for the BCCT.9

This community-based eco-cultural tourism venture was developed by the BCCT in partnership with CI’s Okavango Programme serving as technical advisors and facilitators to the project. OWS was identified as the marketing and reservations partner in the project. OWS also provided supplies and made orders for the camp, however it had no management authority or input into the enterprise, although they did deploy the first managers to the BCCT to manage the camp.

2.5 CBNRM and Tourism Initiatives in Botswana

Community-based tourism is commonly approached through the CBNRM10 Programme in Botswana. In the past decade, the CBNRM Programme has become an essential component of rural development in the Okavango region, particularly for community-based tourism in the Okavango Delta and Ngamiland District. The government provides communities with guidelines for establishing community-based organisations (CBOs), in some instances the communities are also provided with a concession area. Only communities that are provided with land are required to abide by the guidelines, which include contributing a specified percentage of income to a conservation fund that can be used for development purposes. The amount which has to be contributed varies according to the income obtained.

In Botswana, there are two overriding policy documents that advocate the involvement of the rural communities in the sustainable utilization of natural resources: the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 and the Tourism Policy of 1990. The premise is that if rural communities utilize natural resources to derive economic benefits, this will cultivate the spirit of ownership and will ultimately lead to more sustainable natural resource use.

“CBNRM aims to alleviate rural poverty and advance conservation by strengthening rural economies and empowering communities to manage resources for their long-term social,

9 Specific objectives of the BCCT included the following:

• To promote cultural heritage for future generations of the people of Gudigwa. • To promote conservation of local natural resources, specifically land, soil, animals, plants and water. • To subscribe and adhere to government environmental policy and legislation. • To explore and utilize local fauna and flora economically. • To combat poverty and unemployment through sustained utilization of natural resources. • To represent the environmental conservation interests of the Gudigwa Community. • To empower the Gudigwa Community with environmental management knowledge for decision-making. • To facilitate networks between the Bugakhwe Cultural Conservation Trust and similar institutions in the region and

abroad.

10 “CBNRM within the southern African states has become a mode of development where the conservation paradigm has shifted

from a centralized preservationist and protectionist approach to a more integrated approach” (Mbaiwa, 1999). This approach recognizes the need for the promotion and empowerment of the local communities by linking economic and social development to natural resources management.



economic and ecological benefits” (Rozemeijer and Van der Jagt, 2000). The CBNRM Programme is perceived to be a hybrid of the modern system of development and the indigenous knowledge systems.

Based on the CBNRM framework, the BCCT was formed with the aim of involving the people of Gudigwa in tourism and natural resource management; hence the establishment of Gudigwa Camp to provide traditional tourism services to tourists.

2.6 The Gudigwa Tourism Product

Gudigwa camp was officially opened by the Minister for the Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT), the Honorable Pelonomi Venson, in March 2003. The camp offered guests on safari the opportunity to escape into the bush and experience the rich Bugakhwe cultural traditions through tourism services, including traditional accommodation, meals, music and dance, walking trails, and story telling. Guests who arrived by charter plane from Maun, Kasane or other safari camps in the Okavango, were met by a professional guide from the Gudigwa community and were then transported approximately five kilometers by safari vehicle to the camp. Accommodation was provided in eight units (with two beds each) that were constructed resembling traditional Bugakhwe huts.

Walks in the bush with a San guide provided a unique opportunity to experience first-hand some of the secrets of the bush. Guests could learn about the medicinal uses of plants, how to track animals on foot, discover how the San found underground water, learn to make fire from sticks, find out which plants were edible (and which not) and learn how the San survived off nature’s resources. The San shared their culture and background with guests through the aid of a professional guide who functioned as an interpreter while also ensuring the safety of the guests.11 The Gudigwa camp experience highlighted the intimate connection between the Bugakhwe San’s cultural heritage and their natural environment. By sharing their culture and knowledge of the bush they contributed to reviving their dying culture and passing on the intricate and intimate knowledge of the environment to future generations.

Meals included a combination of local delicacies and Western foods cooked over an open fire. In accordance with the Tourism Policy of Botswana, the camp was designed to cater to high-end visitors in low volumes. Due to the limited range of activities offered at the camp, the ideal length of stay was viewed as a single night to complement visits to the wildlife viewing camps of the Okavango Delta and Linyanti. In 2004, the camp operated from May to early November. Net rates (after travel agent, tour operator and booking office commissions) applied during this period (May to November) were US$308 and included air charters, dinner, bed and breakfast, entertainment and walking trails in the morning.

11 The occurrence of elephants and other wildlife became more common throughout the life of the project.



3 Operations and Management: Structures and Processes

3.1 The BCCT

While the camp was in operation, the BCCT was largely responsible for the overall management of the Trust, although it was not responsible for the operation of the camp. The camp was managed by a management team that was officially employed by the Trust, but reported to the Enterprise Management Committee (EMC), of which the Trust was a member. The Trust Board was active in the development stage of the business and managed more general issues related to the tourism project and its relation to the community. The BCCT was administered by a 10-member board and ex-officio board members including, amongst others, the Kgosi12 of Gudigwa village. The general objectives of the Trust have been outlined in Section 2.4 above. The BCCT board met at least three times per year and was responsible for ensuring that adequate books and records of the financial and operational activities of the Trust were maintained. The Board of Trustees had the power (in consultation with members of the EMC) to select, appoint or dismiss personnel of the Trust (in accordance with established labor laws and policies), and establish conditions of service.

3.2 The Enterprise Management Committee (EMC)

Conservation International assisted the BCCT in implementing an advisory structure that is quite different from that usually adopted by CBOs. An EMC was established to assist in management by advising the Trust on business matters. It was recognized that the BCCT did not have the experience or expertise to manage its own business, and as a result, the EMC was developed into the advisory structure of the Trust. The EMC comprised the following representatives:

• Two members of the BCCT Board;

• Three business advisors;

• An accountant; and

• A representative from CI.

The EMC assisted the community in managing its business and in the development of good business practices and sound financial management.

12 Kgosi is the Setswana word for local chief of the village.



It is important to note that Wilderness Safaris were excluded from both the BCCT and the EMC, which was a strategic flaw in the governance and management of the enterprise.

3.3 Camp Management and Staff

The full-time staff at Gudigwa included approximately 21 employees (Table 3.3.1), although the exact number varied during the course of CI’s involvement with the project. The staff also included an additional 24 part-time workers who were mostly singers, dancers, and traditional guides. Of the full-time workers, all were from the Gudigwa community except the managers, who were deployed to the project and employed by the Trust. The first two couples were originally from South Africa with a successful track record of running camps in Botswana. People in the village that made crafts were not included as staff of the Trust, and were paid per curio purchased by the Trust or the camp.

Table 3.3.1: Full-time staff members at Gudigwa

Staff - Position Number Managers 1 (& partner) Assistant managers 2 Guides 2 Chefs 1 Prep cooks 3 Waitresses 2 Scullery 1 Laundry 3 Camp-hand 3 Night watchmen 2 Driver 1

Of the above mentioned staff, the management team, guides, chef and night watchmen were all employed on a full-time basis, while the rest worked a minimum of eight days a month, pro rata to the number of bookings.

The camp also employed traditional guides and dancers on a casual basis. Although the camp manager was South African, the assistant managers understudied her with the objective of slowly building management capacity in the community, so that at some point they would no longer require an external manager and would be able to run the camp independently. The responsibilities of the two assistant managers were split between administration and staff and operations. There were significant issues related to the qualifications of the community assistant managers as they did not have any training or background in the hospitality industry. This created significant challenges to the professional management of the enterprise.

3.4 Community Capacity Building/Training

All full-time staff of the camp participated in training programmes and courses before beginning their employment, which were funded in part by OWS, CI and supporting donors and partners. The manager, who was required to have prior camp management and/or tourism hospitality experience, participated in a three-week intensive training course organized by Wilderness Safari management staff to become familiarized with their company procedures.



The BCCT Office Manager and Gudigwa assistant camp manager were sent for a three-and-a-half-month training course in tourism and hospitality management, business communications, computers, word processing and spreadsheets, introduction to business, and human resource management. The treasurer participated in similar training, although human resource management was replaced by an introduction to bookkeeping and accounting. This intensive course followed a five-day financial management training conducted in the community. Guides and cooking/catering staff were sent on a three-month apprenticeship at another safari lodge in the delta. Guides also participated in a two-week course specifically designed to prepare for the Professional Guides exam administered by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. On-going training for the management and guiding staff was provided by the OWS Training Facility, an independent training school, to increase the capacity of the staff working in the camps that comprised their tourism circuit. Support staff was trained on-site and through short apprenticeships to other safari camps prior to opening

The following workshops were organized and facilitated by OWS and CI for a broader group of community members in Gudigwa: 1. Ecotourism Awareness (approximately 25 people participated), followed by a

familiarization tour to five other community-based or ecotourism destinations in northern Botswana.

2. Product Development (approximately 45 people participated). 3. Ecotourism Marketing (for five people), followed by a trip with the group to Indaba, the

largest tourism trade show for Africa, held annually in Durban, South Africa. 4. Planning and Managing a Business (approximately 20 people participated). 5. Book-keeping and Accounting course (for BCCT treasurer and manager and camp

assistant managers).

Furthermore, more than 40 weavers, carvers and bead/jewelry makers received training through five two-week Design, Production and Training workshops (one for carvers, two for weavers, and two for jewelry makers) and one, one-week Quality Control and Grading workshop.

Consultants were hired for a month to help get the camp ready before opening and to train the staff in their specific job duties. A professional chef was also hired to create a menu with the staff and practice its delivery and presentation.

3.5 Management

Two organisations were approached to perform the role of Operator/Manager as described in this section: Wilderness Safaris and Lodges of Botswana.

3.5.1 Wilderness Safaris

The Gudigwa camp was officially opened on 28 March 2003 with Wilderness Safaris’ support. OWS seconded a manager to the enterprise and agreed that they would provide relief



managers to assist in the interim and recommendations of candidates to manage the camp more permanently.

Additionally, a number of Gudigwa staff were placed in OWS camps for training prior to the opening of the camp, at some expense to OWS. Once opened, it was agreed that Gudigwa staff would have the opportunity to participate in OWS’ ongoing training activities.

However, due to OWS’ lack of representation in the governance structures of the project, and a lack of clear lines of authority and responsibility, the managers at Gudigwa rapidly departed. Once the word got out to the employment market after two successive managers had unhappy stays at Gudigwa, it became impossible to get anyone good to work there to try and manage the camp. As the managers did not have the authority to hire, fire or discipline the staff, and did not have access to the higher governance bodies of the enterprise, there was little incentive for any professional manager to invest their time in the project.

3.5.2 Donor Evaluation

OWS was the first company to be approached following recommendations from an evaluation in late 2005 by the major donor for the project (DFID through its implementing agency the BLCF) for the BCCT to enter into a joint venture management with a private company. The basis for approaching OWS was that the company was already a partner in the business, since it was involved in marketing. OWS declined the offer due to the issues with the governance structure and indicated that it would prefer to simply market the camp instead of repeat its experience with managing the camp. OWS made it clear that while it was willing to continue with the role of marketing and reservations, it did not want to take on a formal management function unless the governance issues were addressed. While never stated in open forum, it was assumed that OWS’ lack of interest was related to the widely expressed opinion that discipline among camp staff was poor and workers did not have a good work ethic. Several potential partners and local people anticipated that the Gudigwa employees would be difficult to manage. OWS also had personal experience of interference by the board members in the other OCT trusts. This, however, needs to be placed within the context that the Gudigwa community members were the first generation of a “settled” San community in Botswana. They had absolutely no experience with this type of activity, or indeed this type of life, historically having been a hunter/gatherer culture. The community members were not prepared, in training, life experience, or culture, for this type of high-level management and were thus considered “unreliable”. Additionally, a lack of understanding of certain subtle cultural aspects of this community may have contributed to the problematic working relationships that characterized the project later on.

In a letter written by OWS to the BCCT Chairperson (12/04/05), it was stated that: “OWS continues to believe that the Gudigwa experience is a marketable one, and should the BCCT be able to find a suitable new partner who will maintain the quality of the Gudigwa experience, we would be happy to negotiate a deal whereby we continue to sell this product.”



3.5.3 Lodges of Botswana

As early as 2005, Lodges of Botswana had expressed interest in entering into an Operating partner contract with the BCCT to manage and operate Gudigwa camp. Lodges of Botswana is owned by Mr. Peter Sandenbergh and operates two camps (Oddballs and Delta camps) in the Okavango Delta. However, despite the company’s interest, Botswana law requires that an open tender process be followed for such opportunities, in the interest of fairness. Due to various reasons13 Lodges of Botswana appeared to lose interest in Gudigwa camp and did not submit a bid when the camp was advertised for tender in January 2006. With the delay in the process as per the requirements by the Government of Botswana through the Land Board, it became too late for Lodges of Botswana to enter an Operational Agreement with BCCT. The Land Board only approved the request of entering into an interim operational agreement between Lodges of Botswana and BCCT seven months after the request was submitted. The approval was for a period of 12 months (January 1 to December 31, 2005).

3.5.4 BigFoot Safaris

Management of Gudigwa was taken over by BigFoot Safaris in June 2006. From June to October refurbishments of the lodge took place and the lodge was then operational between October 2006 and June 2007. An average of 12 guests per month visited Gudigwa over this period and the nightly rate charged was US$ 320. Unfortunately in October 2007 the lodge once again caught fire and required further refurbishment which BigFoot Safaris were still busy undertaking in early 2008.

4 Financial Overview

4.1 Capital Investment - Funding Obtained

Since the inception of this project, funds were received from various donors who generously supported the Gudigwa Cultural Eco-tourism camp. These funds were used for various project activities (Table 4.1.1). Most of the funding was used for the construction of the camp infrastructure, including buildings and the airstrip, while other activities included project management, staff time, training and workshops, stocking the camp with goods, provision of services and equipment, furniture and a vehicle for the camp. A second vehicle, a new safari type vehicle for transporting guests, was bought using Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) funds.

13 Reasons included the considerable delay in receiving interim approval from the Land Board pending outcome of an open tender process, the resulting missed opportunity of catching the peak tourism season (June-September), attrition of camp maintenance and theft of camp stock.



Table 4.1.1: Funds received from different donors

Name of Donor Amount received Date of receipt of Grant Department for International Development – Business Link Challenge Fund (DFID-BLCF)

UK� 158,540.00 (BWP 1,268,320.00)

(US$ 258,840.00)

2002

US Embassy – Ambassador Fund, Gaborone, Botswana

US$ 12,500.00 2002

United Nations Development Programme/National Conservation Strategy Coordinating Agency (now Department of Environmental Affairs) (UNDP/NCSA) Botswana

BWP 250,000.00 (US$ 50,875.00)

2002

European Union (EU) Micro Projects, Botswana

BWP 595,206.00 (US$ 121,470.00)

2002

Kalahari Management Services (KMS), Botswana

BWP 60,000.00 (US$ 9,230.00)

2002

Swift Foundation – Conservation International Sojourns USA

US$ 50,000.00 2002

Bancker-Williams Foundation US$ 20,000.00 Mulago Foundation (Healthy Communities Initiative (HCI)) USA

US$ 28,500.00 2002

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

US$ 100,000.00 2003

TOTAL DONOR FUNDS US$ 651,415.00

4.2 Visitor Numbers

During 2003, there were 19 full-paying guests in April and 38 full-paying guests in June. The camp was operational for the entire season in 2004, and during that period, visitor numbers at the camp increased (Table 4.2.1). The average occupancy during the period of operation from June to November 2004 was approximately 12 percent. The camp closed on a high note at the end of the tourist season in November, and by the end of 2004, Wilderness Safaris had already confirmed bookings for 2005 corresponding to occupancies of 20 percent in May, 21 percent in June, 30 percent in July, 22 percent in August, and 11 percent in September. However, soon after closing the camp in November, the camp general managers submitted their letters of resignation. The camp was never re-opened in 2005, because they could not find a willing management partner.

Table 4.2.1: Number of guests at the camp in 2004

Month No. of Guests Percentage Occupancy (%) June 29 8 July 42 11 August 68 18 September 91 25 October 28 7 November 22 6 TOTAL 280 12.9%



4.3 Estimated Revenues and Operating Expenses

4.3.1 DFID/BLCF funds

A snapshot of how the funds obtained from DFID/BLCF were used for the period from 1 April to 31 December 2003 is provided in table 4.3.1.

Table 4.3.1: Summary of operating expenses from DFID fund for period 1 April to 31 Dec 2003 in BWP.

Activity 1 Apr – 30 Jun

(BWP) % 1 Jul – 30 Sept

(BWP) % 1 Oct - 31 Dec

(BWP) % Quality control & standards training 22,032.15 15 12,668.20 6 0 HR & organisational management training 4,517.06 3 0 0 Financial Management 449.68 0 1,280.00 1 13,833.10 16 Marketing activities 0 39,550.00 20 0 Technical/ Environmental Planning 0 0 0 Communication/ IT development 10,316.00 7 69,037.12 35 0 Environmental Interpretation 0 4,760.00 2 2,602.70 3 Environmental Monitoring 481.56 0 370.40 0 164.48 0 Project Management14 & transportation 106,841.98 74 70,209.45 35 71,094.03 81 Total in Botswana Pula 144,638.43 197,875.17 87,694.31 Total in GBP (�) 18,079.80 24,734.40 10,961.79

The majority of funds obtained from DFID during the period of 1 April to 31 December were used for project management and transportation. From July to September 35% of the total expenditure was in the communications/IT development category due to the deposit for a vehicle.

4.3.2 Other organisations & consortium partners

Other organisations and consortium partners contributed to Quality Control and Standards Training (� 600), Marketing Activities (� 9,000), Technical/Environmental Planning and Expertise (� 667) and Project Management and Transportation (� 18,224). These contributions were repeatedly made on a quarterly basis.

Bugakhwe Cultural Conservation Trust (BCCT) made an in-kind contribution of £ 6200 between April – June 2003 without remuneration through assistance with the building of the

14 Project Management included salaries for drivers/messengers, receptionists and community development officers.



camp, formation of Policy and Procedures and Camp Operations Manual, the review of the Trust constitution and meetings with CI, partners and OWS (at least 1 meeting per week during this period). After the fire at the Camp, the Board was involved in even more meetings and the Trust members collected thatching grass and poles to be used in the re-building.

CI’s specific contribution to the project during the period April – December 2003 came to a total of approximately � 47,221.00. This was largely due to the time expended by CI staff including on-the ground project support, financial control in Cape Town and Washington, site visits, guidance by the Director of the SA Wilderness & Transfrontier Conservation Programme, a bookkeeper in Botswana and use of CI vehicles for project implementation.

Okavango Wilderness Safaris was responsible for marketing the Gudigwa Camp product and it was estimated that US$ 50,000 was spent on this annually (personal communication with Colin Bell). A breakdown of costs into specific activities indicated the following expenditure between 01 April and 31 December as shown in Table 4.3.2:

Table 4.3.2: OWS expenditure relating to marketing of the Gudigwa Camp product over the period 01 April to 31 December

Trade show participation and Sales trips (World Travel Market in London, BIT in Italy, ITB in Berlin, INDABA in Durban, Top Resa in France, Getaway Show in SA, ILTM in Cannes, etc.)

� 5,859

Overseas marketing trips � 2,000 Overseas marketing agents for Wilderness Safaris � 3,516 Promotional Materials (website update: www.gudigwa.com, brochure creation, CD Roms, banners, flyers, PowerPoint presentation etc.)

� 7,813

Public Relations & communications (journalist articles, press releases) � 3,125 Administration (admin, education, distribution, newsletters, tour operators) � 4,688 Quality Control & Standards Training (training for management trainees & support staff, visits to Gudigwa to offer feedback on improvements and driving and vehicle maintenance)

� 1,800

Technical/Environmental Planning & Expertise (tech. support on fire damage estimation and advice/reconstruction plans/site plans for relocation etc., participation in EMC Meetings, community meetings on staffing issues etc.)

� 1,250

Total � 30,051

Proposed expenditure for 2004, 2005 & 2006 focused on the following activities:

• Community development;

o Environmental education

o Income generation capacity building skills development

o Community awareness

• BCCT and community leadership capacity building;

• Business understanding;

• Development of Trust documents and agreements;

• Development of BCCT awareness of CBNRM practices;

• Gudigwa camp related support;

• Socio-economic assessment and monitoring;



• Environmental assessment and monitoring; and

• Project support.

5 Project Successes

5.1 Community perspectives

According to the interviewed community members and focus groups, there was a general consensus that they were happy to see the Gudigwa Camp vision realized when it opened in March 2003. Gudigwa Camp was more than just a camp; it also had a strong symbolic meaning for the people of Gudigwa, particularly since they had historically been marginalized in the socio-economic and political landscape of Botswana (Nthomang, 2005; Saugestad, 2001).

All of the respondents indicated that the Gudigwa Project was viewed as a viable tourism product, as it had a competitive advantage over other tourism products in the Okavango Delta. In their view, this competitive advantage outweighed the risks associated with the project. They also highlighted that their product was cultural, which made it unique and hence attractive amidst the plethora of wildlife-based products in the delta. Because the product reflected their culture, they were familiar with all aspects, did not have to learn about what they were offering their clientele, and could use the many different experiences on offer to celebrate their culture, with participants from various age groups.

During the community focus group interviews, it emerged that different respondents had quite independent views on what went according to plan in Gudigwa camp (Table 5.1.1).

Table 5.1.1: Perceptions of Gudigwa community respondents regarding which activities had been carried out according to plan

Focus Group Statement Women (craft makers, dancers, elders, guides)

We were happy to see our camp re-built after the fire, and clients started coming in again.

Elders (committee leaders, former chair persons, local authority leaders)

The business started having clients in the first year. Infrastructure development went according to plan. Training of staff, managers, drivers etc. Opening of the camp went according to plan.

Former staff guide (current Gudigwa Camp manager)

The camp was able to promote the culture of Gudigwa people. The first manager was good, knew how to work with people. CI was committed to seeing the camp run successfully.

Youth group (former staff, villagers, former manager)

Marketing in the first year was good. Equipment was purchased according to plan. The community experienced cultural awakening and revival.

Former chairperson BCCT, Former chairperson OCT.

The first manager was good, and knew how to handle community relations as well as take good care of camp customers and staff. CI was committed and provided very good support.



Benefits obtained from the project

Community informants listed, among others, the following benefits that accrued to Gudigwa villagers: a) The youth acquired skills and trades that they could transfer elsewhere if the project

collapsed (such as making and selling baskets, cooking, camp keeping, witnessing, guiding, etc.).

b) The community received a lot of exposure interacting with international guests in the camp and the tourism industry.

c) The village acquired a number of assets through the project, such as the airstrip, equipment in the camp, camp furniture, vehicles, and all other property in the camp.

d) The dancers were able to get re-organized and started dancing more regularly, and this has instilled a lot of cultural pride in the younger generation of the Khwe San.

e) Limited income accrued to some families whose relatives worked in the camp. f) The community had an opportunity to practice democracy during the various processes of

decision-making. g) The community acquired skills in tourism development enterprises. h) The land on which Gudigwa Camp is located, as well as the lease, is owned by the BCCT. i) There was a general cultural awakening in Gudigwa and a realization of the value of their

traditional culture. j) Employment, both part-time and full-time, became available to some of the members of

the community.

5.2 CI’s perspective

Direct Benefits

Employment of local community members

Twenty-one community members from Gudigwa village were employed on a full-time basis during operational phases of the camp, in addition to 24 part-time employees (dancers, trackers, hunters and casuals for maintenance). Numerous community members received training in tourism-related activities, including financial management and leadership skills. The money from working at the camp had a high multiplier effect as it was shared among extended families. Many staff members were able to get jobs in other OWS camps after the camp closed. Others who were not directly employed by the camp were nevertheless able to sell curios at the camp. Revenues from curios were quite significant: approximately P 5,000 a month (equivalent to US$ 1,000 per month) which was approximately three times more than what the assistant manager was earning per month.

Indirect benefits

A marginalized community was empowered

From the inception of this project, the rich culture of the Bugakhwe people was actively promoted. There was a programme that focused on the culture of the Bugakhwe, which



demonstrated the intimate connection between the Bugakhwe culture and the environment. This programme was popular within the community, and the children rallied around it. It helped to revive a sense of pride in the community and their connection to the environment and also helped to document some of the Bugakhwe language and cultural traditions.

Overall, the project could be considered to be empowering for a marginalized community that felt that it had not been recognized by developers in the area in the same ways as other villages had. The development of this camp made a lot of the community members realize that there was an opportunity to better themselves. Several entrepreneurial people in the community kept approaching CI with ideas of micro-businesses they wanted to start in the community, to ask if CI could assist. This was supported by the community.

The project also created more awareness of Gudigwa within the OCT communities. With the camp being built, people started paying more attention to the community, and as a result the Gudigwa people had a better voice on the OCT board.

Impacts on conservation and wildlife

CI’s focus was largely on getting the camp established and working with the local community to set up the business. Measuring and documenting specific conservation impact was not a focus of the project and thus baseline assessments and ongoing monitoring were not funded. Thus, very little data was gathered on changes in wildlife numbers associated with the establishment of Gudigwa Camp.

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the presence of the camp did make a positive contribution to wildlife conservation in the area. In 2003, elephants returned to Khwasa Island, where the camp is located. Khwasa means “the place where the elephants come to drink,” but severe drought over the previous few years meant that there was no water available for the elephants.

Water was pumped into the waterhole every day, and from June onwards there were up to 19 elephants at a time visiting – initially just in the dead of night but eventually at all hours of the day and night as they became used to the human activities in the area.

As local owners of livestock (cattle, goats, donkeys, horses) were responsible for ensuring that their animals were kept away from the camp area, some wildlife began to return to the area. The following animals were seen around camp: lions, hyena, kudu, wild dogs, duiker, leopards and cheetahs. However, no actual records of wildlife were kept during the camp’s operation.

Ecotourism awareness

Awareness seminars introduced the community to sustainable tourism as a development tool with the means to ensure the economic and social well being of local populations as well as environmental protection for conservation areas. These seminars provided information to help



communities make informed decisions about whether or not they should choose ecotourism as a sustainable development tool, by presenting the benefits as well as the risks of a tourism-based business.

Familiarization tours

Familiarization tours helped clarify concepts introduced during prior workshops. Community members obtained an understanding of the daily operations integral to running an ecotourism business, and at the same time were able to experience a tourism project as a tourist. Those participating in the tour were able to:

• Inventory the various services (transport, infrastructure) necessary for tourism to be feasible;

• Witness impacts from tourism/tourists (environmental damage, litter, etc.);

• Differentiate between the various types of tourism activities available (campsite, traditional village, etc);

• Determine the various types of infrastructure necessary for a tourism venture;

• Distinguish between tourists and residents by their behavior, activities, dress, etc.;

• Observe how community-based tourism ventures are advertised and marketed (signposts, brochures, etc.);

• Compare the advantages and disadvantages of the various enterprises, including management styles, benefits to the community, skills training, influence on local culture, etc.;

These tours helped facilitate a discussion of issues relevant to Gudigwa’s own ecotourism business.

Product Development Workshops

During the Ecotourism Product Development Workshops (EPD), participants learned about the tools needed to formulate mission statements, conduct resource inventory and market research, and develop, market and implement a product. Financial and profitability planning, legal issues, monitoring and evaluation, and business plan development were also incorporated into the workshop. The workshops illustrated that ecotourism products need to benefit local communities and meet conservation objectives in design, implementation and management.



Marketing Training Workshops

Marketing Training Workshops are designed to provide the community with information, to establish product-market matches and to create marketing strategies that will effectively promote local ecotourism products and help maximize a business’s success. The marketing workshop in Gudigwa was followed-up with a familiarization tour to local travel agents and a regional tourism trade show in South Africa.

Practical training

In addition to the workshops, which were used to teach tourism concepts or plan for the implementation of the business, it was necessary to train individuals who would be the employees of the Traditional Village and were directly linked to the success of the business. Since the majority of the positions were filled by individuals lacking prior job experience, apprenticeships and courses were arranged to build the capacity of individuals to satisfy the requirements of the jobs identified for the business. These apprenticeships and training courses included: guiding, driving, accounting, and cooking. Other employees, such as cleaners and waiters, were trained on-site two months prior to the opening of the business. High-level positions, such as the head chef and manager, were hired from outside the village at the beginning, as these positions required multiple years of training and significant on-the-job experience. Appropriate individuals from the community shadowed these staff members.

The project also aimed to publish leaflets, brochures and books that could be sold to tourists for supplementary income. While the information was meant for tourism purposes, the BCCT members saw the information as useful in creating a curriculum at the school that focused on the Bugakhwe cultural traditions and their connection to the environment. The process of collecting cultural information began through a programme initiated at Gudigwa Primary School in 2002. Children were asked to go home and collect information about their culture from their parents and grandparents and write sentences or draw pictures to represent the information in little booklets. Another aspect that BCCT members aimed to achieve was production of crafts for the tourism market at the camp. This would give people at Gudigwa who were not necessarily directly employed by Gudigwa camp the opportunity to create crafts, such as baskets, wood carvings, and San crafts that could then be sold at curio shops at the Traditional Village.

Establishment of Airstrip

The very fact that guests could arrive by charter plane, as the guests of the opening ceremony did, was perceived as a major achievement in this project, as Gudigwa had previously been extremely isolated. All the community work entailed long and difficult 4x4 drives into the village, taking more than 10 hours each way from Maun, where CI was based. For the community, this isolation meant that any casualty, snakebite, lion attack, malaria, etc., meant a long and bumpy vehicle journey (if a vehicle could be found) for medical treatment. CI



Botswana raised the funds and oversaw the building of the first bush airstrip in this extremely remote wilderness region.

5.3 Visitors’ perspectives

Nathalie Barbancho of SDC conducted a visitor survey at Gudigwa during the 2004 visitor season, and collated the results into a March 2005 summary report.

In the 50 questionnaires completed (out of a total 280 visitors in 2004), there was a very positive response from guests and, in many instances, the Gudigwa experience exceeded their expectations. The dances and bush walk were cited as the most enjoyable activities. Guests also valued the friendliness of the staff and the relaxed ambiance. The quality of accommodation, food, service and activities were rated from good to excellent. Suggestions for improvement included providing more background information (culture, livelihoods today, etc.) and a more in-depth experience of the village, having the possibility to buy curios (crafts, books), and also having more cultural activities available for guests (e.g. learning how to weave baskets).

Unfortunately, this data generates more questions than it answers. If clients were so happy, why was the project not a success? It is hard to make generalizations or make determinations based on these overall positive surveys. There is little information with regards to the conditions under which the data was collected. The general sense was that the clients who visited the enterprise were very happy with what they received.

5.4 OWS’ perspective

OWS is committed to working in remote parts of southern Africa and to working, where possible, with local communities to ensure that there is a win-win for all stakeholders and the environment. The opening page of the company’s website states its mission:

“Wilderness Safaris: responsible ecotourism and conservation. The reason we exist is to protect pristine wilderness areas and the flora and fauna – or biodiversity – that they support. We believe that in protecting these areas, and including the local communities in this process, we will make a difference to Africa and ultimately the world. In short, we believe that the world’s wilderness areas will save humankind.” (Wilderness Safaris, 2007)

OWS considered this initiative a failure, despite its track record of operating over 60 successful camps in seven SADC countries.

6 Challenges Encountered

6.1 Financial Feasibility Questionable The initial project feasibility appraisal was questionable. Although PRA determined ecotourism as an appropriate and viable economic venture in 1999, the first version of the



Gudigwa proposal stated that the project was not feasible due to poor access to markets and no communication infrastructure (roads, airports). However, an airstrip was built and Wilderness Safaris was brought in to do the marketing. A second version of the proposal specifically investigated access to markets and private-sector partnerships, which looked promising based on buy-in to the concept from Wilderness Safaris, which did not have any cultural tourism products at this stage.

However, the camp did not generate any significant profit for re-investment into the community. The camp had very high overhead costs, due to the large staff complement, remote location, and the fixed costs associated with running an operation like this. In the absence of a professional tourism partner, the camp could not benefit from an aggressive marketing and management regime, which could have cut the break-even period to under three years.

6.2 CBNRM in Botswana The CBNRM concept is a challenge in Botswana. In the country as a whole there are very few successful examples of community-driven business initiatives. Two examples of successes are:

• the D’Kar Trust, near Ghanzi;

• Khwai Development Trust, and the Ghanzi-Craft Centre, which aims to promote craft marketing for the craft producers in the remote settlements of Ghanzi and Kalahari.

These Trusts were established with the assistance of external advisors and donor funding. Many other CBNRM projects in the country have failed because of the lack of financial management capacity within communities, which on occasion has led to gross misappropriation of funds. In other instances, failure was due to the lack of ownership, because projects were brought in with a top-down approach. Also, a large number of CBOs have failed to produce audited financial statements as required by their leases.

The BCCT, through Gudigwa camp, also failed to successfully operate its enterprise, possibly for the following reasons:

• The local communities had a poor understanding of the CBNRM programme;

• Funds were not reinvested into tourism activities;

• The communities involved in community-based tourism were not sufficiently empowered to independently sustain what had been initiated;

• Insufficient managerial skills; and

• Absence of true ownership for the tourism enterprise.

CBOs that have disposed of their hunting quotas through auction sales have not been paying resource utilization royalties due to the responsible authorities - such as the North West



District Council - and the same applies to CBOs with joint ventures. There have even been cases where some joint venture partners have absconded without paying, leading to the CBOs having to pay legal costs for recovering lost income.

An additional complication arose from the development of this enterprise in the relationship between Gudigwa and the OCT. The other villages saw that Gudigwa was being looked after by CI and hence they were then excluded from some of the OCT benefits. It is entirely plausible that if the camp had not gone ahead, then the people at Gudigwa would not have been alienated from the OCT. Ideally, consultations should have taken place with more of the stakeholders in neighboring villages before this project was even discussed at the local level to work out ways to ensure a win-win situation.

6.3 Fire

Gudigwa camp was completely destroyed by a wild fire in November 2003. The cause of the fire is not known. Although some people hold the opinion that the fire was probably an act of arson, northern Botswana, including the site where Gudigwa camp is located, is susceptible to wildfires which normally occur during the dry season. Most of these fires are human induced to clear moribund growth and stimulate fresh growth, but there are some cases where the fires are caused by natural phenomenon such as lightning. The camp had to be rebuilt using insurance money and remaining donor funding. As a mitigation measure against future fires, a 40m-wide firebreak was constructed around the camp premises. The critical issue with firebreaks is that they need to be well-maintained (see Table 6.10.1); this one was not.

6.4 Problems with the BCCT It has been noted through reports by previous camp managers that the BCCT Board members used to interfere in the day-to-day running of the camp, leaving the camp managers with no autonomy to run and manage the camp. The BCCT board members often displayed poor business ethics in their dealings with the camp managers. Some of the employees took advantage of the fact that they had relatives who were members of the board, resulting in the camp managers not having full control of the employees because they could not easily discipline some of them. This contributed to low morale and frustration among the camp managers. Some members would request use of the camp vehicle for private errands. There was a case in which a staff member assaulted a female camp manager, resulting in the camp being temporarily closed. The BCCT did not take any disciplinary action against the staff member, making it appear that the BCCT condoned the lack of discipline by a staff member at the camp.15

15 It is important to present this issue from the perspective of contributing causes. The issue of the assault was very complex and linked to a number of factors aside from uncontrollable employees. Violence is never acceptable, but it should be noted that the camp manager in question had similar difficulties in her previous association with the Poler’s Trust that resulted in the termination of her involvement with that organisation. It needs to be recognized that there may have been significant issues related to CI staff/manager’s skills in intercultural communication and in handling conflict, which may have contributed to the



6.5 Management The camp had a high management turnover. Three camp managers resigned in close succession, all citing lack of discipline among staff as the primary reason for their departure. Despite these challenges, the camp closed at the end of the tourist season in November 2004, but soon thereafter the camp general managers submitted their letters of resignation. The BCCT board, together with CI, then began a search for new camp managers. Advertisements were placed in the local Botswana papers, but the responses that were received were from people who had no experience in camp management. It is possible that word had spread among experienced managers about conditions prevailing at the camp.

The impact of high management turnover and the over-involvement of the BCCT should not be underestimated. Combined with the lack of OWS representation on the governing body, this created an untenable situation for any private sector operator.

With particular reference to human resource management, the over-involvement of the BCCT was a significant contributor to the lack of discipline and the lack of consistently high standards of service. Staff thought that they were employed by the BCCT and as they had powerful connections to the BCCT, many thought that they were indispensable and could not be fired. Staff were caught stealing from the lodge, but the managers were forbidden from dismissing them, so a culture of ill discipline was reinforced and managers’ authority was undermined. In such situations, management is quickly rendered impotent and no competent manager will want to work in such an environment

6.6 Client satisfaction As a consequence of the poor management practices and the departure of the management, word rapidly circulated in the travel industry, in particular to travel agents and tour operators, that the camp had problems and, potentially, would be unable to provide adequate services for guests. Regardless of what clients say at the camp, in the absence of professional management, no operator would want to risk their reputation by sending clients to the camp; as a consequence demand for the product dried up. “When Gudigwa did not deliver the quality it promised, the market ran” (personal communication with Colin Bell).

6.7 Issues of Capacity Opinions among Gudigwa respondents were divided as to whether the community was adequately prepared to successfully embark on the project in 2003. Only 25 percent were in agreement that they were prepared, whereas the majority (75 percent) maintained that they were not prepared in many respects. The most opinionated group on this particular issue was the women’s group, which maintained that the community had done everything necessary to

escalation of the conflict situation. CI could have perhaps played a more active role in solving the issue of employee discipline and attitude toward employment by providing additional training in conflict resolution, etc. Since the community was clearly supportive of the project, there may have been significant misconceptions about the level of employment and benefits that contributed to the situation.



prepare itself to ensure the success of the Gudigwa Camp. The study, however, has shown beyond reasonable doubt that the Gudigwa community did not possess the relevant skills to run a camp successfully. Though the community possessed the culture that they were selling, the staff attitudes were incompatible with the kind of industry they were involved in. Different focus groups disagree on the issue of preparedness, but there is strong agreement that the community did not possess the right attitude toward work, which eventually led to the collapse of the camp.

Figure 6.7.1: Dancers, guides, and craft makers at Gudigwa Camp

Capacity building is an essential component of any project if sustainability is to be achieved. The BCCT and the employees at the camp did not have the capacity to ensure that Gudigwa camp was operated professionally and efficiently. As part of capacity building for the staff, OWS had a programme to train the staff on housekeeping, catering, public relations and other tourism-related activities. CI, through the Community Development and Tourism Sections, provided training to the BCCT in the following areas:

• Financial management and skills;

• Roles of treasurer, bookkeeper and accountant;

• Income and expenditure;

• Bank accounts - signatories, bank statements, financial control sheets, bank ledger, monthly reconciliation;

• Auditing requirements;

• Financial record-keeping;

• Asset and property registers;



• Financial reporting and monitoring; and

• Leadership qualities.

The above training was aimed at equipping the BCCT with the required skills for operating Gudigwa camp. The short courses that OWS conducted for staff at the camp were standard and critical for the tourism industry in the Delta. This training aimed to provide Gudigwa camp staff with the skills to provide a similar standard of service to that experienced by guests at other OWS camps. Many of the guests came from OWS camps and arrived with high expectations based on their experience of OWS camp standards and quality elsewhere in Botswana. The training process undertaken was insufficient to adequately prepare the community for effective management of the camp. CI should perhaps have carried out an assessment to determine what additional training was required to address inadequate capacity.

6.8 Community Expectations All community respondents maintained that their expectations were realistic, since tourism is a viable business in Ngamiland, especially around the Okavango Delta. They maintained that the camp was not competing with any other camp product in the whole of the Okavango Delta region and, as such, they were selling a unique and viable cultural product to supplement the OWS’ wilderness experience. Community members also affirmed that their expectations for benefits accruing from the business were realistic and commensurate with the market potential of Gudigwa Camp.

The main objective of the project from the community’s perspective was to improve the livelihoods of the people of Gudigwa. By providing extra income to the families, it was hoped that there would then be less dependence on the natural resources found in the area. The community anticipated that profits accrued from the project would be shared at the household level.

Since these expectations were not met, there was discontent among some of the community members. The only people who benefited directly from the camp project were those who were employees at the camp and the BCCT board members, who received “sitting fees” for board meetings.

6.9 Partners As residents of the largest remaining San village in Botswana, the Gudigwa people were proud to be promoting a cross-cultural exchange with visitors and reviving their traditional way of life, which is increasingly being threatened by modernization.

The partnerships established with the private sector, NGOs and donors were intended to benefit every member of the village (at least indirectly), as it was anticipated that the jobs created would funnel proceeds back into community development projects.



A product was indeed established and the camp operated for the whole of 2004 without major problems. The camp had great potential during the time when it was running.

Due to the various problems that the camp encountered, the community learned valuable lessons. The BCCT board members have also seen the consequences of intervening in the day-to-day running of the camp.

Following an evaluation of the community project by DFID BLCF in early 2005, a recommendation was made for the BCCT to consider a Joint Venture Partnership (JVP) with a private company. In accordance with the Government of Botswana regulations, this JVP had to be undertaken through an Open Tender Process. Initially, the BCCT refused this suggested approach as they felt that, since this was a community project, this partnership would result in a loss of control. They eventually agreed when they saw that no benefits (profits) were being obtained from the project and there was also a high turnover of camp managers. The BCCT decided that they needed to explore going into a joint venture with a private company. CI, together with the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) representatives from government departments, then assisted the community in drafting the tender guidelines.

CI then placed advertisements on behalf of the BCCT for a commercial partner to take over the Operations of Gudigwa camp on a lease basis. There were no responses to the advertisement, which ran in newspapers for two weeks in early 2006.

Since no new managers were found and the process of engaging a private operator was unsuccessful, the camp remained closed for the whole of 2005. Only in June 2006 was an operating partner eventually engaged, at which stage CI formally withdrew from further involvement in the Gudigwa initiative.

6.10 Participation of Stakeholders in the Project There are opposing views with regard to the question of whether different stakeholders applied themselves adequately to the project. Table 6.10.1 presents these views with regard to local stakeholders and their participation, while Table 6.10.2 presents a variety of views with regard to external stakeholders and their participation.



Table 6.10.1: Respondents’ views with regard to participation of local stakeholders

Local stakeholders Perceptions on participation Community 75% of the respondents, including leaders, argued that the community was

not ready to embark on a large-scale project such as the Gudigwa Camp. Their negative attitude contributed to the downfall of the camp. Speculation was rife that the fire that gutted the camp was deliberately caused by unhappy villagers. This is said to have been done by an individual as a protest against management action that had been taken against his relative, who was an employee in the Camp.

Camp staff There was complete consensus that staff lacked the necessary skills in tourism and running of camps, and was considered to be an uncooperative group who managed the camp along family ties. The assistant managers were also thought to lack managerial skills and, as such, were not able to assist the manager and often teamed with junior staff against the camp manager.

Board and local leaders

75% of the respondents concluded that the Board was responsible for most, if not all, problems inside the camp. It did not know its role and its limits in camp matters. It often interfered with camp management, making the supervision of staff very difficult for management, which was largely foreign.

Table 6.10.2: Respondents’ views with regard to participation of external stakeholders

External Stakeholders

Perceptions on participation

Managers Most lacked the know-how to deal with community camp issues, and this was not helped by having a Board that sometimes sent conflicting messages to the community members and staff. In a community-owned enterprise, the power to hire and fire staff rested with the community board, as opposed to the manager.

EMC There was 100% consensus that the EMC was an ideal but not practical management structure. Its limitation was mainly its absence and that most of its members were active business people who were often not able to convene in a timely manner to address Gudigwa Camp staff issues. They were a management team in absentia.

CI CI performed well to prepare for the opening of the camp, but left the management of the camp too early before the camp managers, staff and communities were ready to work together. Fifty percent of respondents maintain that CI should have placed its field staff in Gudigwa to supervise activities inside the camp directly, since they understood the community better. CI should also have gradually withdrawn from the camp as relations became firmly established.

Government agencies Government agencies were not active on the ground, since they only came to Gudigwa Camp as arbitrators when there were staff-related challenges.

6.11 Lack of Documentation

CI was not particularly vigilant in the records that it kept on this project. It was an extremely arduous process to retrieve documentation on financial and management data over the



duration of the project and very little information was recorded in terms of game or species associated with the establishment of Gudigwa camp. It appeared that no conservation indicators were set up which could be monitored during the course of CI’s involvement in this project. Although early on in the project CI prepared a financial feasibility study that questioned the project viability based on its remote location and absence of communications infrastructure, the project still went ahead.

7 Lessons Learned

This section presents a variety of issues that were mentioned by respondents as factors that undermined the success of Gudigwa Camp. These issues can be summarized into the following major challenges for future community tourism enterprises, which are (in order of priority):

7.1 Include a private sector partner at project inception

CI’s failure to include a private sector partner early in the project created a host of issues which hobbled the project from the onset. CI was engaging in an activity outside its core competency in a remote location with minimal professional assistance in a highly competitive industry.

7.1.1 Structuring a commercial agreement or clear Memorandum of Understanding

Time should have been invested in negotiating and establishing a commercial agreement at the onset of the project to address issues related to:

• Profit and loss – the private sector partner should carry the early year losses and guarantee early payments through a lease mechanism which protects the community from the fluctuations and seasonality of the travel industry.

• Community Equity – include conditions to secure community equity at the onset in exchange for a recognition of the cultural value of the land, as well as potential resources (labour, raw materials etc), as well as an opportunity to earn equity over a predefined time / period.

• Site Planning, Design and Construction – utilization of low-impact, environmentally sustainable and culturally suitable design and building methods should be agreed by all concerned. Where appropriate, measures to mitigate impact / construction damage should also be included / resolved. The private sector should be brought in prior to the design and building process to ensure that the facilities being built will be suitable to their company and the target clientele.



• Staffing – the training and recruitment of local employees, along established principles of professional management and human resource development and a service ethic should be included in such agreements along with an agreed schedule for inclusion and promotion.

• Human / Wildlife Loss – ensure that if the project is in an area where there is a problem with human / wildlife conflict, a compensation scheme, funded by tourism, is established. This is especially important where livestock co-exist with predators.

• Transparent Payment Mechanisms – ensure that money, when distributed, is distributed in an open and transparent manner, and where appropriate, fairly throughout the community. Where possible have a payment scheme that ensures that every household gets the money directly.

• Community Outreach – ensure that the private sector agrees to continue outreach programmes and projects over the life of the project. These should not just be a one off PR exercise, but part of the ongoing enterprise and involve tourists / visitors.

7.1.2 Representation

Combined with the late inclusion of the private sector in the project, the failure to ensure the representation of the private sector on the governance committee of the project was a major flaw.

7.1.3 Selection of Appropriate Business Model

The right business model needs to be selected for the development of such projects. For remote areas where access costs are very high the budget traveler and budget market is most often eliminated. In these instances the low volume / high revenue products are the only effective business model. That said, these products carry with them a particularly high set of consumer expectations for which the communities’ capacity to provide must be evaluated to inform the venture’s viability. A good idea with improbable implementation capacity is not an appropriate business model.

7.2 CI had unrealistic expectations of the Gudigwa community

The community selected to illustrate CBNRM and show that a local community could run a tourism enterprise was an extremely isolated one with virtually no exposure to Western business paradigms or the tourism industry. The existing lack of capacity suggested that it may have required a generation as opposed to a couple of years to enable the community to accomplish the project’s objectives.



7.3 Inclusive stakeholder consultation required prior to project being formalised

While CI felt that it had communicated with OWS on a regular basis regarding the proposed design of the camp, OWS’ CEO claimed that he had not been directly informed of the proposed project by CI and had instead learned of the project by hearsay and secondary sources. This may be due partly to a breakdown in communication between OWS’ employees on the ground and executives within the organisation who later stated that the camp design was inappropriate for the type of clientele that it was trying to attract. This misunderstanding put CI on a bad footing with its operator. The lesson to be learned here is to ensure that effective communications and minuted meetings are held with the relevant decision makers within the organisations. In addition CI’s concept of the project hinged on a village that was essentially OWS’ landlord as well as their neighbor. OWS felt that, although they were not part of this major decision, it had a considerable impact on their operations in the area.

Discussions with all stakeholders, particularly the private sector and tour operators that could have been impacted by the tourism initiative, should have happened before the project obtained the official go-ahead. Key stakeholders should have formed part of the decision- making process for the project go-ahead prior to it becoming public knowledge.

Community perspective: The majority of respondents indicated that they were involved in the planning of the camp through various community processes, such as the PRA, Community Workshops for Product Development and various stakeholder meetings, some of which were held at the Kgotla (customary court). Respondents, however, also noted that the current board of the Gudigwa Camp stopped consulting with them and as a result they are now uninformed about the progress of the camp project since CI left.

CI perspective: There was the need for an improved cultural and socio-economic assessment prior to project design.

7.4 Model mismatch and unrealistic expectations

CI had unrealistic expectations regarding the community’s ability to manage a high-end tourism operation in a short space of time. Since the community capacity was not being developed fast enough and CI already had funds and donor commitments that needed to be met, capacity was achieved by bringing on board various consultants who were able to provide support for a number of activities. There was the need for permanent CI staff on site. The ability of staff to effectively run a project from eight hours away was a major issue. CI had difficulty in trying to deliver a product which was compatible with the standard of other OWS camps with a community who had no prior experience in tourism operations.

The community was impatient as to when the lodge was going to open. During a community meeting it was noted that there were conflicts and tensions between the community members and CI staff on the ground. The community was upset that they were not already obtaining



direct benefits from the project at an early stage. CI staff had a Land Rover, while the community had not received any means of transport. The need for a facilitator to iron out some of these conflicts was recognized. While the community did not understand the time constraints of the project, it was recognized that the project team needed to take the time to hear their issues and address their concerns where possible. Due to the staff on the ground being overextended, the requisite open communication channels between the community and CI were compromised, and the community’s issues were not always adequately acknowledged by CI.

OWS believes that one of the keys to success is to under-promise and over-deliver. This is particularly true with the low volume/high revenue (high jobs - low impacts) model. While this is a recognized business approach, it is unfortunately not always practiced by NGOs. OWS felt that CI was responsible for raising community expectations in the early days of the project’s inception and that it was almost impossible to recover from these expectations when they could no longer be met.

7.5 Inadequate levels of experience/capacity to manage a complex tourism product within community and NGO

According to OWS, the project implementers (the persons in charge at the site level) were considered to have inadequate experience in the business world and inadequate capability to manage or direct a project of this complex nature. While there was no absence of enthusiasm for and commitment to the project and funds were effectively raised, experience in working with such communities and experience in running the financial side of a business as well as ecotourism expertise was lacking. A community member was contracted to lead the community engagement component of the project; while this person was respected within the community and was competent in basic business planning and training of the community and spoke Setswana, there was still limited capacity within their combined expertise. The staff members on site were also not receiving adequate support from the experts based in the head office in Washington, DC.

OWS felt that once a project has been set up incorrectly, it is extremely hard to “rescue” it – especially in such a demanding industry as tourism. It is often too late to bring in more experienced people (e.g. private sector experts or consultants) at a later stage once the damage has already been done. Experienced people need to be involved in guiding the project at the onset/inception phase. Gudigwa did not receive the focused, experienced attention it required and acquired a reputation of difficult management that proved difficult to overcome. Consultants did not always fulfill the expectations of delivering the desired level of expertise needed to guide a particular process.

OWS had concerns about handing over the running of the business to the community. Although the community was involved in guide training and safaris, they were not being taught how to run and own a business and how to work with the private sector. Commercial operators found the Gudigwa community to be quite unprepared for running a tourism



operation, despite the fact that they had received a great deal of training and skill building. Put bluntly, they were perceived as remote rural villagers with little or no previous contact or experience with the business world, who had been thrown into a commercial business environment. The necessary skills required could not be gained in the short time period available; sometimes it takes decades to instill such skills in a relatively uneducated community that has been isolated from the rest of the world for an extended period.

It was thought that too much unconditional control and power was put in the hands of this unsophisticated community, in that the BCCT was left to administer the project without the necessary skills to do so. Skills transfer and training takes time to be assimilated and internalized, particularly by a community that has not had a great deal of exposure. The community could thus not be expected to successfully administer this type of project sustainably without a benevolent private-sector partner. A strong partnership between the local community and a private-sector partner was considered to be crucial to achieving a successful business operation, as illustrated by numerous other successful community tourism projects. However, this was never implemented, nor was it ever even discussed as a possibility. The private sector partner was never treated as an equal by the community and was even excluded from the community’s advisory board.

Since considerable aid was flowing into this community without any conditions, a culture of having to earn money was not instilled. The communities were used to government handouts and knew nothing about productivity versus revenue, so when NGO money came pouring in, it further entrenched this trait.

Accounting and marketing problems were identified: the project costs and business costs were confused, and spending on different donor accounts were mixed up. There were no calculations of expenditure and income. This aspect of operational management was primarily the responsibility of CI-Botswana. An external accountant was then brought in to assist in rectifying the situation.

7.6 Ongoing inclusive stakeholder consultation was necessary throughout the project

The tourism operator was not consulted on the original design of the camp and proposed accommodation units. It was thus unable to verify whether the proposed design was in line with market requirements and was subsequently unhappy to discover that various inappropriate ideas were going ahead without their consent or approval - some of which were considered entirely unsuitable for the proposed target market. There needed to be a much closer relationship and ongoing communication between the responsible NGO and the tourism operator which would be responsible for marketing and selling the product, particularly when decisions affected the product in question.



7.7 Conflict amongst project stakeholders

The three project stakeholders, CI, the community and OWS, did not always agree, which stalled decision-making and resulted in conflict. These conflicts could have benefited from external intervention in order to be resolved as they arose. Some of the issues are outlined below:

• OWS was the owner of the concession to the southwest of the Gudigwa area that belonged to OCT, of which Gudigwa was one of five member villages. A number of previous community developments had taken place at Seronga (a larger community) and Gudigwa felt that it had been marginalized and had not benefited from any of OWS’ previous developments. The community was thus doubtful of how it would benefit from a partnership with OWS.

• There were hunting concessions near OWS operations that sometimes conflicted with OWS’ concession activities, which centered on non-consumptive wildlife viewing. However, there was a strong hunting lobby and the chief allies were the community members who hunted. OWS was keen to lease one of the community’s concessions, and Gudigwa was thus mistrustful of OWS’ intentions with regard to the tourism project. There was a perceived need to sensitize the private sector partner to the community’s historical issue of mistrust for OWS.

• One of CI’s key staff had also turned against OWS’ ideas and was against a long-term agreement with OWS.

• Despite a breakdown in communication between the project manager and the community, CI kept this manager on and a consultant was hired to re-establish communication between CI and the community.

• A problem that sometimes emerges from a small amount of training is the belief among recipients in such training that they now have sufficient expertise to make the experts redundant. In this instance the trainees believed they now had the expertise to run what was essentially a global business when, in reality, they were nowhere near capable. This arrogant attitude created problems among the stakeholders.

• The Gudigwa community believed that the expatriates were a liability and not an asset. This caused constant friction and misunderstanding with the day-to-day managers of projects who were brought in later on.

• The advisors to these communities, in the form of various government departments or NGO staff, are often by their very nature distrustful of private enterprise, and advise as such. This was perceived to be a key problem at Gudigwa. Most of the project stakeholders (including CI’s staff) were negatively attuned to the private sector, yet the project demanded private sector disciplines to ensure that it was sustainable and



profitable and that money earned was well accounted for and responsibly spent within the community.

• The NGO and government stakeholders of such projects often lack real experience of running successful and sustainable business operations, and are thus ill-placed to advise on setting up such businesses. There was no perception of the business or administrative skills that are required by an inexperienced community or the young NGO staff responsible on the ground to run a sustainable global business.

7.8 Poor business practices

A number of poor business practices were identified by OWS as well as community members and are touched on below:

• Corruption emerged as a serious problem within the community, and aid and assistance were not correctly or equitably distributed. The clans and elders had power and greater access to resources, causing concern among those within the community who were not in power. Community projects need to take this into account and effective systems need to be put in place to ensure that money does get paid equitably throughout the community. If there are no checks and balances, the poorest of the community don’t get any benefit. An adequate cultural and socio-economic context analysis was needed prior to project design.

• Staff recruitment for this commercial operation was carried out inappropriately in a number of instances, although some employees were recruited by means of an open interview process. Staff were usually selected by their peers and relatives (within the community) and not by the private-sector management. In a number of instances, the employee often didn’t actually want the work and would have been happier at home. There is no incentive or motivation as these workers can exist without work anyway and the job functions as sheltered employment. As previously stated, the normal business environment and work ethic was completely foreign to this group of people.

• Discipline is critical in a well-organized business – and in particular in safari camps and lodges that deal with international guests. The Gudigwa community did not understand the effort required to get guests to this camp and were not aware of the service delivery required to keep them coming. Tourism is one of the most competitive industries in the world. Just about every country in the world wants tourists, and communities have to compete with every country and against every lodge within their country for business. Tour operators, travel agents and the tourists themselves very quickly stop marketing, promoting or visiting a place if they personally experience (or hear of) poor service during a visit.

• During the community perspectives data gathering the community agreed that if they were to restart Gudigwa Camp, they would hire professional staff from different



villages and towns to ensure the project got a good pool of skilled people who could produce the profit needed to develop Gudigwa village. Group members who were interviewed also indicated that staff should work harder and have less strikes.

• Community members learned that they need to guard against social values competing with business values. They believed that if the camp was run on strong business values, its success would be guaranteed. Gudigwa community ran the camp as a social enterprise and compromised business values, which led to the collapse of the camp.

• Sustainable business principles should be used to build adaptive business strategies based on existing local human capacity of the community. This would have allowed the experience of the people to grow with the business.

• Sometimes democratic values took precedence over running of the camp and led to bad practices of hiring staff based on equality, as opposed to competence and skills levels. When hiring staff, particular care was taken to ensure each family had a member recruited. The skill of the candidate was not necessarily considered; hence the focus was on equality of families in their participation as opposed to quality of staff recruited (skill base). This too undermined business values. The numerical strength of the staff would often override rational management decisions, for example when assistant managers teamed up with local staff against the expatriates.

7.9 Camp management

The Gudigwa community provided a number of suggestions on how camp management could have been improved, these included the following:

• Decrease overhead by buying cheaper vehicles, employing fewer staff and reducing managers from three to one for a 16-bed camp.

• Increase the number of trackers as opposed to managers.

• Ensure management takes full responsibility for the camp and not the BCCT Board.

• Have management report directly to the EMC and not the BCCT Board.

• The community also recognized the need to make time to evaluate the running of the project on a regular basis, to ensure a better-managed project in the future.

• A quarter of community respondents argued that the community would have to accept that it had contributed to managers fleeing the camp, and thus they would have to improve future relations with camp managers.

• The BCCT Board needed to take direct responsibility for the Trust and not get involved in day-to-day activities at the Camp.



• The Board needed to provide timely feedback to the community on all major development proposals and give regular updates on camp progress.

• The Board would have to take stringent action against staff and community members who tarnished the image of Gudigwa Camp.

• The Enterprise Management Committee (EMC) should have taken immediate action whenever there were problems in the camp.

• CI should have placed staff on site at Gudigwa Camp to supervise activities at the camp and to ensure camp staff developed good working relations.

7.10 Marketing of the camp could have been improved

Community perspectives

• Community members felt that the tourism sector which Gudigwa was trying to address was inconsistent with the capacity of the community. They suggested the need to alter the tourism segment target market from high-paying clients to cheaper clientele who are ready to receive a developing product that grows with the community, staff and manager’s capacity to run the camp.

• A clause that allowed the Gudigwa Camp to be marketed by more than one company should have been included in the marketing agreement with OWS.

OWS’ perspective

Wilderness Safaris is one of the most powerful travel marketing companies in southern Africa. OWS spared no expense to promote and ensure the success of Gudigwa. Initially there was huge enthusiasm from the travel agents and tour operators that OWS sold the Gudigwa experience to.

However, two things worked against Gudigwa:

• Cultural villages – A large number of “cultural villages” have been developed and exist across Africa, particularly East Africa. More often than not, these are highly commercialized operations with little cultural learning or input. These businesses tend to negatively cloud the market’s perceptions of cultural visits. Gudigwa needed a number of years of consistently delivering great experiences to break down the resistance of the cynical travel agents, operators and the market as a whole. The project was not operating long enough to be able to break out of this stigma.

• Product Delivery – When word got out to agents and tour operators that the experiences were inconsistent or “acceptable” at best and substandard at worst at Gudigwa, most agents stopped encouraging sales.



7.11 Poor financial management and reporting controls

From CI’s perspective, CI-Botswana needed more effective financial controls and reporting. Financial record keeping was very poor at the project, and it was difficult to track financial management once the key staff members were no longer employed by CI on the project. This, to a large extent, explains the lack of financial information in this report.

7.12 CI’s exit from the project viewed as premature by Gudigwa community

Community projects in Botswana are viewed as medium-to-long term and it is generally thought that, once engaged, this engagement may last for five-to-ten years before the project becomes stable and the original implementing agent can exit. It has been expressed by some stakeholders that CI made a fundamental error by pulling out of the project prematurely (after seven years of involvement). The project was initially designed to assist the community with income generation, using their traditional skills and knowledge as San and not as a showcase tourism project for CI in the Okavango. However, BigFoot Safaris, which subsequently took over this camp, saw this as the appropriate time for CI to pass the project on to a private operator and viewed what CI had accomplished in the time available as commendable (personal communication with Kgoberego Nkawana of BigFoot Safaris).

8 Conclusions

Ecotourism has the potential to provide a myriad of benefits for biodiversity conservation and communities. In order to ensure these benefits, government and parks, communities and the private sector all need to work together to create a strong and secure structure and this needs to be guided by an NGO framework. Although CI has successfully used ecotourism as a tool to accomplish conservation and community development objectives in numerous operations around the globe this was not widely recognized as the outcome for its seven year engagement in the Gudigwa Cultural Village tourism initiative in northern Botswana. The venture was not regarded as a success in terms of establishing a viable, sustainable and profitable community based tourism enterprise during the time that CI was involved. A critical review of the project has shed light on how certain activities could have been approached differently. Formal interviews and informal discussions held with stakeholders from the Gudigwa community, CI and Wilderness Safaris as well as some independent project participants (such as researchers) all contributed towards providing a comprehensive overview of the project activities that took place.

Some of the specific lessons learned from the Gudigwa experience include the following:

• Appropriate partnerships are the critical building block to ensuring success of any tourism venture. Good partnerships draw on strengths to complement each others' weaknesses. CI was not focusing on its strength, which is biodiversity



conservation, instead it was engaging in an activity outside its core competency, in a remote location with minimal professional assistance and in a highly competitive industry. The private sector was not adequately utilized to do what it does best, namely manage and advertise a tourism enterprise. CI’s expectations of the community’s ability to implement the low volume/high revenue tourism model advocated by Wilderness Safaris were inappropriate given the time frame and the capacity of the community.

• Unless the private sector drives a tourism product’s development the venture will be doomed to failure since tourism is a very competitive industry. High-end tourism enterprises are extremely competitive business ventures dealing with clients who have very high expectations. CI thought that focused training could quickly convert hunter-gatherer pastoralists into high-end lodge operators working in a commercial business environment. The necessary skills could not be gained in such a short period of time in a community that has been isolated from the rest of the world for so long.

• Management according to strict business principles is crucial to the success of a tourism development. Lodge Management should have been the responsibility of a high-end tourism operator. In the case of Gudigwa, Wilderness Safaris was only involved in marketing the product while the community, through various management structures and together with CI, collaborated to operate this tourism venture. Neither CI nor the Gudigwa communities were experts in business development, financial management of tourism enterprises or high-end service delivery. As a consequence the operation lacked solid business principles, and staff recruitment and financial management were not carried out in accordance with basic good business practice.

• Stakeholder expectations need to be managed on an ongoing basis throughout any development project through consistent, inclusive consultation and communication. Both CI and the community had unrealistic expectations of what could be accomplished in a short space of time. The community expected to obtain profits within the first couple of years of operation of the camp and when these were not forthcoming it led to ructions and misunderstandings. The reality is that tourism operations typically take three to five years to break even.

• Conflict resolution needs to form part of the consultation process as problems amongst stakeholders arise. As in any business, the personalities of the partners that combine their skills together to establish the business are critical to its success. It appears that there were problematic relationships between various project stakeholders at different times. It is possible that a more aggressive approach to conflict resolution should have been taken earlier in the project cycle to address miscommunication and issues.



• Communities need to realise material benefits from business ventures early on in any new venture. This can be accomplished by developing contracts with the private sector which build this into the development model.

The lessons learned from the Gudigwa experiences are being disseminated to other similar CI projects globally as part of our learning initiative.

Embracing these lessons learned, and building on the explosive growth of the tourism and ecotourism industries over the past 15 years, CI has altered its strategy to focus more attention on the private sector. By focusing on the Tourism Value Chain and assuming the role of a facilitator as opposed to that of a participant, CI is attempting to utilise market forces and market players to address many of the challenges associated with tourism operations in areas of high biodiversity and poverty. Fortunately, this change in approach coincides with a heightened awareness within the tourism industry of the threats and challenges tourism creates in areas of high biodiversity and scenic beauty, and an increasingly environmentally aware/concerned traveling public. CI now has the opportunity to achieve the five goals outlined by Katrina Brandon in her 1996 paper with the willing and active support of the broader tourism market.

Gudigwa is still in operation under the management of BigFoot Safaris and time alone will tell if this enterprise will succeed or fail.

The authors would like to thank all those who contributed to this project and the subsequent documentation of its successes and failures.



9 Reference List

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Taylor, M. (2000). Life, land and power: Contesting development in northern Botswana. (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2000).

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www.wilderness-safaris.com (2008). Wilderness Safaris, South Africa.

© 2008 Conservation International

Photo credits: Cover: © Michael Poliza p 30: © Molefe Rantsudu Other: © CI

Southern Africa Wilderness and Transfrontier Conservation Program, Centre for Biodiversity Conservation, Kirstenbosch Botanical Gardens, Private Bag X7, Claremont, 7735, South Africa. Tel: +27 (0)21 7998896, Fax: +27 (0)21 7975960, Email: [email protected], www.conservation.org

Documents

Gudigwa Learning Document