University College London

Department of Civil, Environmental & Geomatic Engineering

Disaster Risk Reduction

(CEGEG023 / CEGEM023)

Coursework 2

Guadalajara’s explosions of 1992

Luis Fernando Gutierrez Urzua 14060635

Lecturer: Dr John Twigg

Academic Year

2014-15

LONDON’S GLOBAL UNIVERSITY

1

Guadalajara’s explosions of 1992

LUIS F. GUTIERREZ URZUA (14060635)

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

MSC IN EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING WITH DISASTER MANAGEMENT

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON

After more than 48 hours of continuous reports of the smell of gasoline coming from the street

sewers and house toilets, a series of explosions disrupted the apparent calm of the traditional

barrio1 of Analco, in the city of Guadalajara. The morning of the 22nd April 1992, is

remembered as one of the biggest disasters in the history of the city, but also as the disaster

that could have been avoided. Poor urban planning of the city during the preceding 30 years,

many omissions made by the authorities and a lack of technical judgment by PEMEX workers,

led to the fatal events of that Wednesday. However, thanks to the lifestyle, immediate response

and organisation of the local residents of Analco, many of the potential fatalities were avoided.

Furthermore, the particular characteristic of this event was that the reconstruction process

was led by Non-governmental organisations and local residents due to the lack of trust in the

government and Mexico’s main party of that time, PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional).

Barrio of Analco before the explosions: vulnerabilities and pre-existing

conditions of the neighbourhood The Barrio of Analco

The working-class Barrio of Analco is located in the southern-central part of the city of

Guadalajara. In 1992, this neighbourhood was mainly populated by small local families who

had been living there for generations. These families had a strong social connection amongst

themselves and were usually very familiar with the customs and lifestyles of their neighbours

(SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993).

The majority of the people living in the zone had fixed regular working schedules (usually 9am

to 6pm in Mexico). Small family-led businesses were easy to find on Analco’s streets, as well

as a considerable amount of small industrial workshops and street based food carts.

Men tended to be the economic support of the families while women were usually housewives.

For most of the day, children were at school (usually 8am to 1pm) and once free, could often

be found playing football with neighbours on the streets. It was also common to find university

students, either as members of a family or renting a spare room in family home.

The buildings of Analco were usually constructed by non-professionals and therefore many of

them had a lack of foundations and concrete confinement on the masonry walls, needed to

properly resist blast impacts like the ones caused by the explosions (IBAÑEZ ET AL. 2003).

1 “Barrio” is Spanish for low-income neighbourhood. These places are usually characterised by having

old low-engineered buildings and heavily populated living complexes called “vecindades”.

2

Political situation of the country and relationship with the victims

The electoral process of Mexico in 1988 was far from being perceived as a clean process.

After 60 years of having elected presidents from the same party, PRI, polls tended to declare

the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) party as the winner. However, on the night

of the election when the PRD was leading the provisional results, the system for counting the

votes stopped working for several hours. The next morning, when it finally worked again,

Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the PRI candidate, was declared the winner (which is now stated as

an electoral fraud). This led the country to a social discontent, which, in the case of Guadalajara,

was against the three levels of government (all of them headed by PRI). This social discontent

is accompanied by a complete lack of trust in authorities and governments (SHEFNER AND

WALTON 1993; RAMIREZ SAIZ AND REGALADO SANTILLAN 1993; SHEFNER 1999).

PEMEX facilities and the induced hazard risk to Guadalajara

Guadalajara’s explosions were

not the first event of its kind in

Mexico. There were many other events

of different magnitudes throughout the

country. However, the event in

Guadalajara was caused by a series of

irrational decisions, typical of a

developing country: a dangerous plant

is located near a heavily populated

zone in order to take advantage of the

cheap costs of salaries and services,

not enough money is invested in safety

measures and there are no regulations

or planning for an eventual disaster, or

they are simply not enforced

(ANDERSSON AND MORALES 1992).

PEMEX (which stands for Mexican

Petroleum) is the state-owned

company in charge of all the oil-

related processes, from the exploration

to the final customer sales. One of the

responsibilities of this company is the

distribution within the national

territory. In the early 60’s, Guadalajara

was experiencing a shortage of oil-

derived products due to the increase of

industrial activity in the city, and the

usage of automobiles. Therefore, in March 1963 the new pipeline from Salamanca to

Guadalajara was confirmed by the state’s governor and its construction started three years later

(PARTIDA 1993).

In 1970, the industrial park “El Alamo” was created in the southern part of the city, under a

suspicious permission given by the government to the owners of the land where the park was

being created (apparently, there were family links between them). The new industries settling

Figure 1. Central Guadalajara, Analco Neighbourhood, affected sewer

system and "La Nogalera" PEMEX plant. (Shefner and Walton 1993)

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in this park required a higher demand of natural gas, therefore, PEMEX announced the

construction of a satellite distribution plant called “La Nogalera”, in 1973. Many changes to

the paths of the pipelines were made to allow the construction of the park (PARTIDA 1993;

OLIVER SANCHEZ 1993). One of these new pipelines was the one which had the leak that caused

the explosion.

Unfortunate chain of negligent actions

A drop in the pressure in the pipelines between Salamanca and Guadalajara was

registered eight days before the event, however, PEMEX officials decided to ignore it instead

of reporting the imminent leak (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995; SHEFNER

1999; PROCESO 2002). Macias and Calderon Aragon (1994) believed that the pipes were

actually leaking for at least 17 years prior to the incident, but the leak just became bigger days

before the explosions.

There were several reports from

the neighbours about the smell

of gasoline coming from street

sewers and the presence of

gasoline in toilets and sinks

(BLAS AND ROMERO 2012).

SIAPA, the state-managed

organisation responsible for

water and sewage in the

metropolitan area of

Guadalajara, attended the

reports and sent a work crew to

check for explosive levels in the

sewers. They reported alarming

levels in the sewers and SIAPA ordered the opening of manholes for ventilation. This was done

by firemen and SIAPA workers. However, even when the mayor and governor were informed,

no one gave the order to evacuate the zone (ANDERSSON AND MORALES 1992).

The smell of gasoline was widely spread at least three days before the explosions. Some of the

local radio broadcasters had journalists on site to report any news related to that strong smell

and many of the neighbours decided to evacuate themselves, even without an order from the

authorities (AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995). That was a very good decision.

Barrio of Analco during the explosions: scale of the disaster, impacts

and community behaviour Why the sewers exploded

There are many theories as to how the leak was produced, however, none of them have

been proved yet. The most widely known theory says that the steel-made gasoline pipe had

friction (or made a chemical reaction) with a recently installed zinc-made water pipe, damaging

the gasoline pipe and leaking the gasoline to the soil. From the soil it was matter of time for it

to reach the sewer system to continue flowing (PROCESO 2002). The leaks were calculated as 5

litres per second (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993).

Figure 2. Firemen opening manholes. (Blas and Romero 2012)

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After the gasoline infiltrated into the sewer pipes, it travelled under the Barrio of Analco to the

San Juan de Dios tubed river. Due to the recent development of an underground train line

crossing, the river was deviated with a U-shaped pump system (siphon). This system provides

a perfect solution for liquids because they push and flow by gravity. However, the gas expelled

by the gasoline got trapped in the sewer system before the siphon, right under Analco

neighbourhood, because it could not be pumped as it was lighter than liquid gasoline (MACIAS

AND CALDERON ARAGON 1994).

No one knows how the gas was ignited, it could have been a cigarette, a lighter or a car, but

between 10:00am and 10:10am on the 22nd April 1992, the first two explosions were produced.

During the following hour and a half around 15 explosions were registered in diverse points of

the sewer path (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993) and damaged 8.022 kilometres of street (other

sources say up to 13 kilometres were affected) and 98 blocks (PADILLA AND REGUILLO 1993).

Scale of the disaster

The official

government sources say that

the explosions left 210 dead,

600 injured, 3020 damaged

buildings (570 totally

collapsed), 135 damaged

commercial establishments,

525 damaged vehicles and

around 3,500 families in a

temporary homeless situation

(PADILLA AND REGUILLO

1993). However, dead count

was based on the number of

bodies found and did not take

into account the disappeared

ones. In addition, incomplete body parts were not even counted. Unofficial reports account up

to 1200 dead people (ANDERSSON AND MORALES 1992) and 2000 injured (ESPARZA 1997) but

this unofficial information cannot be confirmed.

The victims were mainly residents of Analco and usual clients of the businesses. Since the

explosions took place during school’s Easter break, many of the victims were children who

were playing on the streets or sleeping in their bedrooms (in this neighbourhood, most of the

bedrooms are street-facing rooms). On the contrary, many of the women of Analco survived

the explosions thanks to specific cleaning customs. Usually, they cleaned common rooms such

as the kitchen and living room during the morning (after breakfast) to account for the

unexpected visitors they might have in the afternoon. These rooms were usually located in the

rear rooms of the houses, which in many cases were not heavily affected (AGUIRRE ET AL.

1995). The different timing distribution of the explosions allowed the partial evacuation of

certain blocks, reducing the casualties. A few cases of cholera followed the destruction,

however, it was controlled on time by the Green Cross (government emergency organisation)

(MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993; OLIVER SANCHEZ 1993).

Figure 3. Some of the vehicles ended on the roofs of buildings. (Blas and Romero 2012)

5

Response of authorities and emergency services

A poor emergency services reaction was seen in Guadalajara’s explosions. According

to witnesses, the first emergency vehicles were firemen and in some zones they arrived up to

three hours after the first explosion (IBAÑEZ ET AL. 2003). This could be due to both the

impossibility of access for vehicles and the fact that emergency services were occupied

avoiding further explosions in other areas (in fact, 2 firemen lost their lives while they were

opening manholes). On the other hand, private aid associations such as the Red Cross, arrived

almost immediately to start helping the victims (SHEFNER 1999). The army and police also

supported by creating perimeter controls and helping the victims. These rescue efforts were

very much appreciated by the citizenry (AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995).

The reactions by the three levels of government were changing as the information about the

explosion was released. In the afternoon of that day, PEMEX made its first attempt to evade

responsibilities by blaming a local cooking-oil manufacturer “La Central” of throwing hexane

gas into the sewers. The company representatives quickly proved this accusation could not be

sustained because they had a registry of the sales of this waste chemical. In addition, the

company was closed due to Easter break. Actually, PEMEX did not accept their responsibility

until several days later. However, they never accepted their knowledge about the leak days

before the explosions (even when it is proved and documented nowadays) (ANDERSSON AND

MORALES 1992; MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993).

The following days, the mayor of Guadalajara, Enrique Dau Flores, resigned in order to allow

better investigations (according to him) but pointing out that he could not give the order to

evacuate since SIAPA is managed by the state. The governor, Guillermo Cosio Vidaurri,

evaded this accusation by saying that the security of the population is responsibility of the

mayor and the explosions were caused by PEMEX, a federal government-owned company.

Actually, Cosio Vidaurri never accepted his responsibility in the disaster and days later was

obligated to resign. One day after the explosions he declared that the surviving victims were

“behaving like kids” (MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993) and that was making the reconstruction

more difficult. However, the neighbours argued that they were only blocking the entrance of

heavy machinery to the zone of explosions, until they rescued all the buried victims, recovered

all the bodies and made the investigations to determine who was responsible for this fatal event

(SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; SHEFNER 1999). It was evident that the people did not trust the

government and were afraid that it wanted to minimise the tragedy by burying the evidence

(IBAÑEZ ET AL. 2003).

At the end, the three levels of government, PEMEX and SIAPA all avoided responsibility by

blaming each other and the responsibility was diluted (LOMELI MEILLON 1993). One of the few

voices that dared to make direct accusations was the recently fired chief fireman of the city, J.

Trinidad López Rivas (current State’s Civil Protection Secretary) who said that the explosions

could have been avoided. He was fired the day after the explosions along with the SIAPA

director (MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993).

6

Response of the community

After the poor

response of the emergency

services, the neighbours

started to organise

themselves to create human

chains to remove the debris

and try to save buried

victims. Due to the high

demand of emergency

vehicles, the neighbours of

Analco and other places

started to organise

transport for the injured

people in private cars

(AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995;

IBAÑEZ ET AL. 2003).

Since waiting for the emergency services to start search and rescue (SAR) of buried people was

not an option for the families, they started with their own SAR process and the authorities

became part of it when arrived. This was a good decision because most of the victims were

rescued during the first two hours after the explosion, which happens in most disasters. Some

neighbours from close streets and university students became part of the rescue team by helping

the victims to locate their missing relatives (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; AGUIRRE ET AL.

1995).

Right after the explosions, the victims were usually concerned about where their family

members and friends were. The explosions modified the entire landscape of the streets and that

made it more difficult to find buried people. Several rescue cases were successful thanks to the

extensive knowledge of the daily routine of the community members. For example, one man

who lived two blocks away from the affected area could find his wife by knowing where she

was supposed to be at the time of the explosions. Eventually he helped other people to find

their relatives by guessing their most likely location under the rubble with information provided

by the families (RAMIREZ SAIZ AND REGALADO SANTILLAN 1993; AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995).

It can be said that the success in the rescue duties was due to the participation of the victims,

who offered a fast response because were already there and became participants of their own

emergency management. This was because of their abundant and specific knowledge about

their communities and their personal commitment to the cause. Most of the survivors who were

rescued from the rubble had strong social connections with the community and for that reason

they facilitated the SAR operation. The strong community spirit in Analco helped to rescue

more people: when a person was rescued from the debris, the family usually joined in the SAR

of other community members.

In order to support the SAR, two local private radio broadcasters (owning 5 frequencies) altered

their normal functioning to serve as a massive communication tool. Personal messages,

information about missing people and massive distribution of information was their main role.

In addition, seven radio field stations were donated by a local manufacturing firm (AGUIRRE

Figure 4. Human chains in the affected zones to remove rubble and provide goods.

(Blas and Romero 2012)

7

ET AL. 1995). This fulfilled the necessity of information among the people on the emergency

site.

Local universities sent teams of professionals to support the victims. Architects, engineers,

psychologists, doctors and nurses were sent in to be in direct support of the victims. Since

college students were on Easter break, the universities organised volunteer teams to participate

in the emergency phase by helping with the transportation of goods and services (AGUIRRE ET

AL. 1995).

Barrio of Analco after the explosions Management of the post-emergency situation

After the explosion risk was reduced and the first SAR phase ended, the main concern

of the government was to provide shelter for the surviving victims. Therefore, they enabled

many public buildings as shelters. The universities also allowed the establishment of refugees

in their facilities. However, the majority of the victims decided to seek for shelter in houses of

relatives in other zones of the city. The reconstruction of the affected streets took approximately

one year, however the government only reconstructed the public zones and not the private

properties.

The federal government released resources for relocation (or reconstruction) of the houses of

the victims. In addition, it started a tax-free programme for the business and people affected by

the tragedy in order to preserve jobs and companies. However, victims complained about the

amounts they received from the government because they only covered a small portion of the

real cost. The government invested 11 billion Mexican pesos, however, some sources calculate

the real cost as 280 billion Mexican pesos (In April of 1992, 3.068 Mexican pesos were

equivalent to 1 American Dollar). However, these funds were complemented by fines imposed

on PEMEX. There is no clarity about how much of the resources reached the victims since

Mexico did not have a transparency law in those days (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; CEFP

2014).

Community post-disaster organisation

The first sights of organisation of the victims were seen when they organised the SAR.

They became a consolidated group when they did not allow the heavy machinery to enter, one

day after the disaster. Therefore they created an organisation called “Damnificados del 22 de

Abril” to back up the claims to the government. This organisation made political pressure that

led to higher payments and support for the victims. This organisation still exists and they are

still fighting for justice (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993).

In the reconstruction and relocation phase some civil organisations supported the victims.

Among these organisations are Rotary International, Lions Club, Scouts Clubs and Red Cross.

In the political context, Universidad de Guadalajara and the Catholic Church supported the

victims by asking the government to put the responsible in jail, in their opinion, the governor

(MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993).

Analco nowadays

The reality is that most of the victims had to move to cheaper parts of the city and most

of the businesses broke down. There are testimonials of victims who worked in the government

saying that they received more money than other victims, actually more than they needed for

8

recovery (IBAÑEZ ET AL. 2003). The Barrio of Analco is now fully reconstructed but only a few

of the original inhabitants returned.

Even though the mayor, the director of SIAPA and 7 officials of PEMEX went to jail, no one

remained there for more than 9 months (DE PALMA 1993). Recently, the state’s governor for

2006-2012 blamed PEMEX and Cosio Vidaurri as responsibles of the tragedy (SANTOS 2010).

Conclusions Guadalajara’s explosions show the importance of the community based disaster

management and how allowing the victims to become participants of the emergency plans, a

lot of losses can be avoided. A tailored emergency plan for each community can take advantage

of the knowledge of the people to increase their resilience.

The Analco explosions ask us to better understand better how the responsibility is distributed

among different levels of government. The responsibility and authority must be clearly stated.

If the mayor or governor had ordered the evacuation of the neighbourhood when the explosive

gases were detected, many lives could have been saved. If everyone is responsible for the same

task, the responsibility will be evaded.

In Analco, the biggest vulnerability was not the low-engineered buildings or the lack of

foundations, it was having a severe corruption problem within government and a very poor

enforcement of the law. This hazard was caused by a natural chemical chain reaction, but

powered by the impunity, corruption and indifference of governments and institutions.

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