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PF/3345/GRP-1

BLENDING CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL

METHOD OF OPERATION AS A FIGHTING CONCEPTFOR BANGLADESH ARMY

INTRODUCTION

1. The geo-strategic environment demands that Bangladesh maintainssizeable army for protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However,economic constraints prohibit Bangladesh from maintaining an army ofreasonable size and also from equipping the existing army with weapons withadequate range and sophistication to carry the battle into enemy territory. To

strike a balance between these two opposing factors our present concept ofoperations envisage a conventional method of operation (CMO) against thepotential aggressor for a limited period and then transiting into guerilla warfare.

2. This existing concept is purely defensive in nature that is most likely to beadopted after a prescribed period. Besides, this concept has virtually no specificplan to exploit enemys vulnerabilities, which is so essential for success in war. Toreplace this age-old concept and postulate a definable, recognizable element ofvictory the draft operation of war volume one states, In future conflictsBangladesh Army must be prepared to blend conventional and unconventionalwarfare in the implementation of national strategy. 1 It also goes on to state that unconventional warfare is not regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war,rather should be waged simultaneously with conventional war. In fact, thecampaign plan should conceive the operational employment of the unconventionalforces as one of its major operations or battle and establish its relationship withother component parts. 2

3. The existing force structure of the army, para military and auxiliary forcesare quite capable of undertaking Unconventional Method of Operation (UCMO)with some restructuring and command and control set up. Some modification toinfantry battalions may also be necessary. Raising of special force like para

commando elements would strengthen the operational efficiency. The expectedshortfall of regular troops for UCMO at the outbreak of hostility would necessitatethe preservation of reservist form retired personnel up to a certain age limit.Different options are to be formulated within existing command structure to offsetenemy's aggression. Mission oriented training, smooth logistic support and finallyeconomic viability would expedite the blending operation to a success.

4. This blending of CMO and UCMO is not a new concept in BangladeshArmy. People had been thinking over it as they tried to grapple with the problem offighting hopelessly outnumbered. The concept provided a ray of hope of fighting

1

Draft Operations of War Volume One p. 2-62 Loc cit

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with numerical disadvantage and still retaining the chances to win. Over the years,the concept crystallized through extensive brainstorming by numerousindividuals/groups/ organization/ institutions. The above strategy obviously wouldcall for conducting battles behind the enemy line, that is engaging the enemy rightfrom his preparatory stage and destroying logistic bases. The modern concept of

conducting a deep battle will play an important role in shaping the battle in ouradvantage, so that our main effort can strike the enemy at our desired time andplace. It is assumed that this concept is likely to be considered as the cornerstoneof our future doctrine.

5. However, before a concept can mature into a doctrine it involves a tediousprocess of research, tests, trials and analysis. This research work is one suchstep in our effort towards crystallization of the future doctrine of war forBangladesh Army. This paper will discuss a few conceptual and relevant issuesincluding threat analysis. The concept of blending will be then discussed in detail,the main focus of the research being to highlight infrastructural changes for it's

implementation. Finally the paper will suggest recommendations to implement thisconcept.

AIM

6. The aim of this paper is to examine the concept of blending conventionaland unconventional method of operation in order to suggest measures forimplementation of the concept in Bangladesh Army.

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Definitions

7. Conventional Method of Operation (CMO). Operations, whichare conducted by conventional forces i.e. Army, Navy and Airforce followingestablished doctrine and principles of war, are termed as CMO. These forceswear uniform during operations and are subjected to Geneva Convention.3

8. Unconventional Method of Operation (UCMO). Operations, which

are conducted by forces other than conventional forces, are known as UCMO.These forces normally do not wear uniform during operations, live off the masspopulation and are not subjected to Geneva Convention. A broad spectrum ofmilitary and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held/ controlled orpolitically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to,the interrelated fields of guerilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion,sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature.These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly orcollectively by predominantly indigineous personnel, usually supported anddirected in varying degrees by external source during all condition of war.4

3

AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Indep Inf Bde4 Loc cit

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9. Guerilla Warfare. Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemyheld or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. It isconducted to complement, support, or extend conventional military operations orto wear down his resistance.

10. Total Peoples War. Total peoples war means all conventional andunconventional forces of a nation fighting unconventional form of warfare againstthe enemy. It means complete utilization and mobilization of all resourcesavailable to a nation, that is, economic, political and social to the war effort. Inother words, the entire population is drawn or involved in the war effort in someform or the other and the nation is unable to defend itself with conventional formof war.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

11. General. Most of the wars fought by weaker countries against asuperior enemy have blended the method of both conventional andunconventional warfare. The Chinese and Russians in Second World War foughttwo wars simultaneously. However, the Vietnam War and Afghan War are worthmentioning and provide lessons relevant to our requirement.

12. Vietnam. In the Vietnam War the Vietminh conducted bothconventional and unconventional war simultaneously. It shows us how a peasantforce comprised of common mass were organised to fight a revolutionary war thatdefeated French and American Forces. The strategy of revolutionary war in

Vietnam had its objectives of seizing political power of the state. In operation ittotally integrated two principle forms of conflicts, armed conflict and politicalconflict. The strategy they followed can be summarized as follows:

a. It was a total war which mobilised all the people and used everyavailable facet of the power.

b. It was waged with total unity of effort. Every element of power wascoordinated with the others to gain the objectives.

c. It was by necessity and choice a protracted war.

d. It stressed on gaining and keeping of initiative. Thisinvolved not only to the military initiatives but to the political andpsychological initiatives as well.

e. It was a changing war. At the same time it constantly mixed allphases of war. The most important part in Vietnam War, was the difficultyin distinguishing the phases of war at a particular time. In one area it wasphase-3 while nearby it was phase 2 and somewhere else it was phase 1

insurgency.

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13. Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan was another example ofpeoples war against an occupation army. Though the war initially started as aresistance movement ultimately it turned into a full-scale war. When the Sovietsinvaded Afghanistan the resistance was weak, forces were ill armed and

disorganised. It had no experience of fighting a war against the professional armyof a super power. However with strong determination the resistance movementturned into a formidable force known as Mujahideen. After seven years of fighting,Mujahideen took control of more than 80 percent of the land. Within next sevenyears they evicted the super power from Afghan soil causing fourteen thousandkilled and sixty thousand wounded.

14. Bangladesh. We all are aware of our liberation war. During theliberation war of Bangladesh a large number of civilian volunteers joined theregular forces. Major General D K Palit in his book The Lightning Campaign said, Never in the history of mans resistance to a foreign oppressor has there totalmotivation as was displayed by the people of Bangladesh. The well known MuktiBahini carried out both conventional and unconventional operations deep insideenemy held territories. These operations helped the allied forces to shape thebattlefield to their design. Even during the final offensive by the Allied Forcesunconventional operations were carried out throughout the length and breadth ofthe battlefield. As a result the final offensive could achieve its objectives easilyand rapidly.

THREAT PERCEPTIONS

15. General. Bangladesh is surrounded from all sides by India except for asmall portion in the south-east with Myanmar and Bay of Bengal in the south.Considering this geographical reality, Bangladesh is likely to be subjected tophysical threat from India and Myanmar only. The chances of a limited warbetween Bangladesh and India always exists; while Myanmar poses a low threatbecause of limited common borders of almost inaccessible terrain.

16. India. India is a regional super power. She possesses the 5th largestarmy in the world, which is likely to pose a great threat for it's neighbours. Hismilitary venture in Sri -Lanka and Maldives bears the testimony of this possibility.India has bilateral problems with almost all her neighbours and Bangladesh noexception to it. In the event of a conflict of interest, the possibilities of a full-scaleescalation of war against Bangladesh can not be ruled out. However, consideringthe strained relations that India has with her other powerful neighbours like Chinaand Pakistan, it may be assumed that only a part of her forces will be musteredagainst Bangladesh in the event of a full scale war. Besides, India also posesthreat to the economy, culture and overall internal security of Bangladesh. Thelikely pattern of offensive by our potential aggressor may be envisaged as under:

a. During war, India may muster a sizeable proportion of mechanisedforces and combat helicopters against Bangladesh to rapidly secure the

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military objectives. However, their Armed Forces will encounter certaindifficulties to apply rapid manoeuvre concept in our terrain.

b. Enemy Armed forces has the capabilities to cause attrition to ourforces and combat assets, with long range weapons while remaining

disengaged. The same will also provide them with added advantage duringthe conduct of manoeuvre and close engagement.

c. Enemy Armed forces initial thrusts are likely to be directed tosecure defiles, across the rivers Jamuna, Brahmaputra, Meghna andPadma by dominant manoeuvre and then subsequently converge onDhaka from north, east and west as situation permits.

d. During the entire period of battle, enemy Air force is likely to beemployed for providing close support to ground forces and keep the defilesover the rivers under constant surveillance to prevent movement of our

forces and logistics support.

e. While progressing operations towards the defiles, enemy ArmedForces are likely to tackle the defences en-route with bypassingmanoeuvre and simultaneous development of operations in its flanks andrear areas. The aim of manoeuvre would be to engage the entire depth ofthe defended sector, isolate and gain positional advantages to capture thedefensive positions.

17. Analysis. Any confrontation with our potential enemy will have the

following implications for Bangladesh, which must be kept in mind:

a. Bangladesh will be deprived of sanctuary outside its border, a much-needed support, to conduct and continue a war against a superior enemy.Vietminh had China and Afghans had Pakistan as their sanctuaries for theirstruggle against USA and the then USSR respectively.

b. Bangladesh will face difficulty in procuring war materiel from abroad.Potential aggressor borders Bangladesh on three sides, and can effectivelyblock air and water routes as well. The only possibility is through Myanmar,if diplomatic manoeuvre can be won.

c. The threat is likely to dominate air space throughout that will hinderthe movement and operations of own conventional forces.

d. The threat will have overwhelming superiority in terms ofconventional force ratio as well as resources including long rangeweapons.

18. Myanmar. The border between Bangladesh and Myanmar is a ruggedhilly terrain. The movement of large body of troops through this terrain is a remotepossibility. As such conventional military threat from Myanmar is of less

significance. However, the chances of irregular border disturbances and low

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intensity conflict on the plea of Rohingya issue can not be ruled out. Myanmar islikely to undertake offensive by small-scale infiltration through the hilly areas ofBandarban and Coxs Bazar or across river Naf. An amphibious assault against StMartin Island may also be contemplated.

CONCEPT OF BLENDING

19. Objective and Method of Blending.

a. Objective. Unconventional war assumes greater importance indefensive operation as it significantly compensates the numericaldisadvantage of the defending forces. It makes the theatre/ battlefieldcellular by allowing simultaneous engagement of enemy forces throughoutthe length and breadth of the area of operation .5 Therefore, the main

objective of the blending CMO and UCMO is to compensate the numericalinferiority and lack of modern fighting assets of our conventional forcesagainst our potential adversary. It also involves the population right fromthe beginning in the conduct of war.

b. Method. The concept envisages blending of CMO and UCMOright from the beginning of hostilities as opposed to the age old concept oftransition into UCMO in the last phase of the war. The unconventionalforces will carryout operations under the over all command of theconventional force commander. For the peace time training andcoordination a separate chain of command will be maintained in each

divisional Area of Responsibility (AOR).

20. Blending CMO and UCMO and Clausewitz Paradoxical Trinity.According to Clausewitz, the outcome of a war depends on the perfect harmonyand balance between the people, government and military, which he termed asparadoxical trinity. The government decides to wage a war, directs its military toconduct it and provides all necessary resources. The military prosecutes the warto achieve the end-state set by government. The people support governmentsdecision and provide moral and material assistance to both the government andthe military. In modern wars it is the peoples support, which determines theultimate outcome of war; without it no military can continue the war. The USA had

to withdraw from Vietnam and Somalia because of its people negative attitudetowards the war. In war where CMO and UCMO are blended, people are involvedat all echelons of the war effort. This should be more pertinent in those countrieswhose military has less sophistication, but morale is high and peoples support isthe main driving force. Their elected leaders decide to go to war if forced upon,their national military plays the key role in conducting the war and the populationprovides both physical and moral support. Thus the blending of CMO and UCMOvalidates Clausewitz paradoxical trinity for prosecution of war.

5 Draft GSTP Operation of War Volume one, P. 9-27

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21. Blending of CMO and UCMO and Modern Fighting Concept. Tounderstand the modern fighting concept certain relevant aspects need to beclarified, understood and identified:

a. Definition of Victory. According to Richard E. Simpkin, one of

the foremost military thinkers and writers of recent times, the purpose ofmilitary operation can not be simply to avert defeat rather it must be to win.The defensive strategy must extend beyond simply denying victory to otherside. It must instead postulate a definable, recognizable victory for thedefender.6 The definition of victory is derived from the national securitystrategy. However the definition at national level in general term may be defeat enemys aggression. But for planners, this definition will be furthernarrowed down and given measurable statistics. While the threats victoryis the capture of our capital, own victory is likely to be forcing him to pullback immediately.

b. Identify Center of Gravity (CG) of Both Enemy and Own.Considering the definition of victory stated above in case of an aggressionby the potential enemy, the threats strategic CG s are likely to be, popularsupport and his diplomacy to carry international support for war effort.Own strategic CGs may be identified as capital Dhaka, maintainingpeoples support, continuous supply of arms and ammunition andmaintaining command and control arrangement. To achieve victory we areto tilt enemys CG and protect our own. To effectively tilt enemys CG, weare to cause large scale casualty right form beginning. This is possible bytaking the battle in to enemys territory from the outset of hostilities.

22. Relevance of the Concept of Blending Conventional andUnconventional Method of Operation for Our Army. The geographicallocation of Bangladesh clearly dictates that our potential adversary would leave noroom outside national border from the beginning of hostilities. As such, we are toconduct operation within own territory. On the other hand, the approaches to ownformations area of responsibility have increased over last few years due todevelopment of communication net work. All these will pose difficulty for our armyto disperse and deploy. Similarly the shifting of troops from one sector to otherwould also be difficult and risky for lack of effective air cover. The inadequatedepth of the country and imbalance in force ratio signifies that a prolonged

conventional war against enemy would be a remote possibility. Therefore, bothCMO and UCMO have to be blended to neutralise enemys CG and protect ourown.

23. Outcome of Blending CMO and UCMO.7

a. Blending of CMO and UCMO will allow us to conduct deepoperations well inside enemy territory as well as behind enemy lines whenhe is inside our own territory. It may be conducted as under:

6

Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, Brasseys London, 1994, p- X.7 AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Indep Inf Bde

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(1) Right from the beginning the battle must be taken to enemyterritory to exploit his geo-political vulnerabilities. These forces canbe special/commando and unconventional forces in civil dress. Theywill hit high value and strategic targets to play havoc and create

chaos within civil population. As a result at the very outset of the warenemy will be concerned about his rear area security and employmore troops to protect those. Enemy civil population will find thebattle in their own area. This will also manifest our preparednessand determination to fight the war.

(2) As the enemy enters own territory in considerable depth theunconventional force hit enemys high value targets (HVTs) and hisflanks by continuously laying ambushes and conducting raids. Thetargets for deep operation will be selected at Army/Division/Brigadelevel based on the situation templates. Whether specially trained

conventional force (commando) or unconventional forces are to betasked will depend on the location of target and capability of theforce. So we are actually in the process of neutralizing enemys CGbefore the main battles are fought. These operations are alsoshaping the battlefield to own design. All these are conducted underoverall operational framework and conventional leadership.

b. The net result of blending CMO and UCMO are as under:

(1) Large-scale casualties will provoke his population against the

government. People will question government for the justification ofsacrifice. For example, Indian Peacekeeping Force was forced towithdraw from Sri Lanka because of large-scale casualty. The outcryof the civil population was evident in the newspaper.

(2) When the battlefield is taken in to their ground, people arelikely to lose confidence in their armed forces and react adversely.

(3) Continuous hitting of logistic installations and disruption oflines of communication will force enemy to commit more troops inprotecting those. This gives us the advantage of having lucrative

targets for unconventional operations.

(4) He can not concentrate on the main battle and bring in forcesto achieve concentration

(5) Simultaneously all echelons of enemy are engaged.

INFRASTRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS : FORCE

STRUCTURE AND RELEVANT ISSUES8

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General

24. For blending CMO and UCMO not many of changes have been suggestedfor the regular forces. The main focus has been on the unconventional/ reserve

forces who will complement the operations of the regular forces. The economicaspect has been generally highlighted without going into the details ofcalculations, for it is beyond the scope of this presentation.

Force Structure

25. Composition and Size of Forces. Composition of unconventionalforce and its size is the most important aspect of blending conventional withunconventional method of war. From the core concept of the new operationaldoctrine we find that the unconventional force should comprise of elements from

regular force, second line/paramilitary and trained segment of the population.Bangladesh is a populous nation and there is no dearth of population to formunconventional force if properly trained and motivated. Options for forcestructuring are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Options.

26. Nobody is ever sure when the next war will take place and whether or notwe will have all our existing deficiencies of the conventional forces filled up beforeit happens. It leaves us with three options as regards the quantum of regular andparamilitary forces that can be spared for the unconventional effort right from the

beginning. 8 These options are as follows:

Seria Options Army Components BDRComponents

1. Option-1(Army 2X Battalions per division (when 3 X Company

8

Ibid

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having fullstrength)

division is in full strength) per sector

2. Option-2(withexisting deficiency)

1 X Platoon per Infantry Battalion(when division having existing

deficiency)

1 X Companyper

sector

3. Option-3(withexisting deficiency)

Each Infantry Battalion providesorganizational framework as under:1 X Major2 x Junior Commissioned Officer7 X Other Ranks(when division having existingdeficiency)

2 X Companypersector

Note: Embodied Ansar- 1x platoon per Battalion and Armed police-50%shall be common to all the options shown above.

a. Option-1. This option is based on the assumption that theexisting deficiency of the Army has been filled up. The main advantage ofthis option is that the unconventional force is quite strong, well balancedand has a better command and control right from the beginning. Howeverthe only weakness or disadvantage is the weakening of the conventionalforce itself affecting its reserve capability and flexibility. This, in allprobability will be offset by the rich dividends that a strong unconventionalforce will be able to achieve.

b. Option-2. In this option, due to existing deficiency of regulartroops, one platoon from each Infantry Battalion and one Company fromeach BDR Sector will be dedicated for the unconventional forces at theoutset. These elements will be yet quite effective in making theunconventional force fairly strong and balanced producing a positiveoutcome. At the same time, the conventional force is not seriouslydepleted. This is the recommend option if we have to go to war withexisting deficiencies.

c. Option-3. In this option, due to paucity of regular forces, the

emphasis is placed on retaining the combat power of the conventionalforce. Only minimum essential elements are taken from the Army toprovide an organizational framework along with Ansar and Armed Policeelements which will still make the unconventional force fairly balanced andstrong. The main advantage of this option is retention of combat power forthe conventional force which will be better prepared to take the initialonslaught. The disadvantage of this course is the weakness of theunconventional force and the possibility of their initial inertia to set intomotion.

27. Reservist Policy.

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a. Reserve policy will be a key factor in the force structure for it willplay vital role in creating reserves and forming unconventional forcestructure/reserve units.

b. We suggest 4/5 years of voluntary service for soldiers. At the end of

the tenure only selected individual may be promoted/retained as non-commissioned officers (NCO). Rest of the soldiers to be in reservist list fornext 10 years. This will help to create a large pool of reservist who will formthe core of unconventional forces.

c. The voluntary service contract will not have any retirement liability.As they retire, they should leave the job with a handsome amount of moneyi.e. 2-3 lacs taka , a portion of this may be the forced saving from their pay.This will help them to pursue a different career later. It will act as a greatincentive to younger generation to join army for five-year contract.

d. An average soldier retiring at the age of 25, will be in reserve list tillthe age of 35. Reserve pool will be of younger generation. In addition wewill have better quality NCOs who will form the backbone of the army.

e. This will also have positive economic implications such as:

(1) Large number of trained/disciplined soldiers will retire everyyear.

(2) Society will benefit with the input of increased number ofdisciplined people. They can help in the socio-economic upliftmentof the country.

(3) Government may be free of pension, accommodation andration liabilities.

28. Modifications in Infantry Battalions. All battles will revolvearound the infantry battalions. These battalions, therefore, need to be selfsufficient in respect of reconnaissance, air defence and anti-tank capabilities. Atpresent, infantry battalions do not have proper reconnaissance assets. A scoutplatoon may be added to the organizational set-up of infantry battalions that would

help the battalion commander to keep the Named Area of Interest (NAI) in hisAOR under constant surveillance. In order to make them self contained in air-defence and anti-tank capability, light air-defence and anti-tank guided weaponsmay be provided to the infantry battalions. Two shoulder controlled air-defencemissiles may be provided to the infantry battalions. Three hand launchers insteadof one may be allotted to rifle platoon. These inclusions will be cost effectivecompared to the costly air defence assets and anti-tank missiles and tanks.

29. Raising of Para Commando Brigade. Bangladesh Army shouldhave a para-commando brigade as its strategic offensive force. The brigade hasone para commando battalion and two more para commando battalions need to

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be raised. The Army Commander may use them to engage deep targets' acrossthe international border.

Command Structure

30. Command and Control.Command and control (C2) of unconventionalforces and their operations will be a challenging task for the leadership at all level.Without proper C2 management, the whole thing will become a fruitless exercise.Here we have two options with regard to chain of command.

a. Option-1. In this particular option, unconventional forces willconduct operation within their respective AOR under the command andcontrol of regular force commanders at all level. The division commanderwill act as the highest authority to direct and coordinate both conventionaland unconventional operations simultaneously within respective formation

AOR. This option is better for peacetime coordination, training, orientation,planning and setting up organizational framework. The major advantage isthat the induction of more army elements at a later stage would be smooththey are already in command and oriented with their AOR and situation.The main limitation is with the dual command functions by the militarycommanders particularly brigade and below who will not be in directcommunication and control of the unconventional forces. A suggestedchain of command is shown below:

DIV ISION COMMANDERFORMATION AREA

BRIGADE COMMANDERSECTOR AREA

(Two or more Districts)

BATTALION COMMANDERZONE (One District)

COMPANY COMMANDER

Patrol Base AreaTwo or More Thanas

PLATOON COMMANDERPatrol

b. Option -2. In this option, the unconventional forces will conductoperations independently within the allotted AOR. The division commanderremains the highest commander to control and coordinate theunconventional operations. Separate commanders at Sector and belowlevel will be designated to organise, plan and conduct unconventionaloperations maintaining separate chain of command. This is the option we

recommend since there are separate people to command respective

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troops. The main disadvantage, however is the lack of coordinationbetween the regular and the irregular forces. For peace time the chain ofcommand suggested in the option 1 shall remain in force. The chain ofcommand is shown below:

DIVISION COMMANDER

UW FORCE COMD

SEC COMD(One or more Dists)

ZONE COMDOne Dist or No of

Thanas

PTL BASE COMDPtl Base Area

One Thana or No of Unions

PL COMDOne Unions or No of

Villages

31. Communication. All available means of communication will be used formaintaining communication. These include:

a. Conventional High Frequency sets(Command net).b. Telephone Civil/military exchange.

c. Existing Telegraph, railway communication.

d. Mobile/Cellular phones etc.

Training of Unconventional Forces

32. While the present practice of training on unconventional war by theconventional forces, that is the regular forces must continue with increasedimportance, it is the training for the other elements of the unconventional forcesthat we are primarily concerned with. This training will be organised both duringthe peacetime and during the war.

33. Bangladesh Navy and Airforce should include unconventional training forall their personnel during peacetime. They should also organise refresher trainingannually for duration of two weeks for all their retired personnel below the age of55.

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Normal Chain of Comd

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34. All second line forces, that is Bangladesh Rifles, Bangladesh Ansars andVillage Defence Party, Bangladesh National Cadet Corps and Armed PoliceBattalions of Bangladesh police should train all their personnel on unconventionalwarfare during the peacetime below the age of 50.

35. Training on unconventional war shall mainly comprise minor operations,that is raid, ambush, patrolling, tank- hunting, hideout, guerrilla warfare, use ofmines and explosives, sabotage, small scale attacks, field craft and training onsmall arms including firing.

36. Compulsory military training may be introduced for all able-bodied malepersonnel who are seeking higher education after intermediate, both at home andabroad or taking public or private jobs. This training can be organised annually fora duration of 4 weeks in each district headquarters by each area Headquarters ofthe Army. This training can be open to all civilian volunteers as well.

37. Unconventional training should also be organised by each AreaHeadquarters in their respective districts as soon as the government ordersgeneral mobilisation. This training should continue throughout the war for allcivilian volunteers who would join the unconventional war.

38. Training may be provided to the reservists, paramilitary forces and civilianvolunteers (BNCC) as a continuous process. Formations may arrange trainingcamps once in every 2 years for all reservists under that formation AOR. Thereservists can be trained as a full-fledged reserve unit in the operational role.Formations may organize 'Formation Battle School' to conduct this training. A jointexercise may be conducted every three years. The training curriculum may be asfollows.

a. Basic Military Training. All reservists, paramilitary and selectedvolunteers will be provided with basic military training for a period of fourweeks. Following subjects may be covered:

(1) Field craft.

(2) Weapon training (handling and firing)

(3) Minor tactics.

b. Advance Training. Advanced training may be provided tospecially selected personnel after basic military training, which may last forabout four weeks. Following subjects may be covered in their training:

(1) Explosive handling.

(2) Combat intelligence.

(3) Special operations.

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39. Joint Exercises. Joint exercises involving conventional andunconventional forces, civil administration and bureaucrats may be conducted tobring in cohesiveness. Mutual understanding, and co-ordination with a view topursuing a common cause during national crisis. The exercise may be organisedonce in every 3 years as mentioned before under the overall supervision of Armed

Forces Division. Such exercise will help to identify the training requirements,feasibility of logistic system, areas of co-ordination between armed forces, civiladministration and mass population. It will also help the formation commander toprepare a checklist of actions, which they would need to implement/undertake incase of actual mobilisation and execution of operations.

Logistics Support

40. Logistics Cell. The unconventional forces Headquarters at therespective district headquarters shall have its in built logistics cell with required

number of men and staff who will be responsible for organizing logistics supportfor the unconventional forces in coordination with the Army and local authority.Conventional logistics support system which relies on central bases and wellestablished lines of communications will be unable to provide necessary supportto the unconventional forces operation behind enemy lines.

41. Food, Shelter, Medicare, Repair and Transportation. Theunconventional forces shall depend on local resources for their food, shelter,Medicare, repair and transportation. They would mostly live off the land and useindigenous transportation system.

42. Arms, Ammunition, Mines and Explosives. Small arms,ammunition, mines and explosives will be the principal commodities of theunconventional forces. The logistics staff at the Army Headquarters must work outthe overall requirement. Sufficient quantity of these weapons and ammunition areto be procured, stocked and maintained in each Army formation area. Formationlogistics staff is to work out requirement for each Thana and make arrangementsto place these stocks at the selected bordering Thanas only on declaration ofemergency according to the operational plan. The logistics cells shall arrangereplenishment from the central/forward depot which are still unaffected andfunctional in the area occupied by own force. This replenishment will be carriedout using unspecified and undesignated line of communications through cross-

country and difficult terrain. Indigenous transportation system, particularly riverinetransportation will be quite effective. In extreme emergency, important items maybe air dropped to meet urgent demands. Unconventional forces should alsowherever possible, try to capture arms and ammunition from the enemy. There issufficient stock of small arms mainly rifles available with the Army and the policeto arm the unarmed segment of the unconventional force.

Economic Aspects

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43. This is a key element that comes in, when force structure and defencepolicy is discussed. We have not gone into the details of this but we will highlight afew aspects to suggest that defence budget can be better managed. A study ondefence budget shows:9

a. Operating -81% (1) Pay and allowances 40%

(2) Food, clothing, POL and office16%

(3) MES project/ minor works18%

(4) Miscellaneous 7%

b. Development/ -19%

procurement

44. Modernisation of army is possible only if operation cost can be reduced.We believe that it is very much possible. Suggested reserve policy and detailedstudy on budgetary issues can reduce the operating cost in following heads:

a. Pay and allowances. Can be reduced. Less pension liabilitywith five years voluntary service to be introduced.

b. Food, Clothing and Miscellaneous expenditure. Can be

similarly reduced.

c. Military Engineering Service (MES). The presentexpenditure is 18%. This can be substantially reduced. For example, ifbunk system can be introduced in the barracks, the army will not have toconstruct any more SM barrack. One SM barrack costs about 2.2 croretaka to construct. This is just one example.

d. Logistic/Tail Arms Versus Fighting Arms. It is time tothink the relevance of having heavy tail arms in peacetime. Some of thesecan be raised during war. Some of their jobs can be taken over by civil

contractors. We hope that, a deliberate study on this subject can save lot ofmoney in this aspect.

45. With deliberate and dynamic planning and a commitment in it, there areenough possibilities to reduce unnecessary expenditure and save money. Thismoney can be used to modernise and improve the operational effectiveness of theArmy.

46. We must also think of having defence production infrastructure of our own-may be in a small scale. At least we should be able to produce small arms, anti-

9 Study Period Conducted by 71 Infantry Brigade

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tank weapons and their ammunition. During war we should not fall short of thesebasic fighting equipment.

Conclusion

47. CMO is undertaken by regular force wearing uniform and subjected toGeneva Convention. Contrary, UCMO is conducted by forces other thanconventional force devoid of uniform and Geneva Convention. The forces live offthe mass population and conduct clandestine operation. Similarly Guerilla war isconducted by both military and para military forces in enemy held or controlledarea. Total Peoples War involves both conventional and unconventional forcesand fight only unconventional method of operation utilizing and mobilising nationalresources.

48. There are number of examples in the military history where a weakernation had fought against its adversary blending conventional and unconventionalwarfare. In Vietnam War the Vietminh blended the conventional andunconventional war from beginning to end. Spontaneous participation of commonmass was the main strength of Vietminh. By following the technique of changingwar they created fluidity in the battlefield. It was difficult to divide the war intophases. Rather all phases of war were fought simultaneously. The Afghan warwas another example of peoples war against occupation army. The Afghansevolved their own technique of fighting and conducted a protracted war againstSoviet Army. They also established a remarkable logistics system and intelligencenetwork to support the unconventional warfare. Participation of common massand national will was the center of gravity during our liberation war. The

unconventional war conducted by the Mukhtibahini shaped the battlefield for Alliedoffensive. During the final offensive unconventional warfare operated extensivelythroughout the length and breadth of the battlefield.

49. The main objective of blending CMO and UCMO is to compensate thenumerical superiority and lack of modern fighting asset of our conventional forcesagainst our potential adversary. It involves the population right form the beginningin the conduct of war. Thereby it validates Clausewitz paradoxical trinity forprosecution of war. As per modern fighting concept, victory can be achieved bytilting enemy's CG and at the same time protecting that of own. The strategic CG

of our potential adversary is likely to be it's continuous peoples support for the wareffort. Our CG may be identified as the capital Dhaka and popular support. Itenvisages that CMO alone can not effectively assail enemy's CG neither it caneffectively protect our own CG. Large-scale casualty and engagement of enemykey installations, HVTs within enemy's territory will denude the hostilegovernment's popular support. On the other hand it will show success of ourpeople right from beginning and entails confidence in them. Hence blending CMOand UCMO will help us achieving victory by tilting enemy's CG while protectingown CG. The concept thus fulfilled the requirement of fighting concept of weakercountry of ours to face the superior adversary.

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Economy is the backbone of proper execution of operation by either conventionalor unconventional forces. The lack of which would slow down the fighting spirit ofany fighting formation. The operational budget needs to be maintained at anycost. Reduction of budget in pay and allowance, MES and other construction workwould increase budget for operation. We should produce small arms, anti-tank

ammunition and other war material to maintain fighting efficiency at any cost.

Recommendations.

53. Most of the recommendations regarding the options of force and commandstructure of the unconventional forces are already stated earlier. Only the otherimportant recommendations will be covered here.

54. All the three Services and the paramilitary forces should carry out regulartraining on unconventional operations for their personnel. They should alsoorganize refresher training on the same annually for their retired personnel.

55. Compulsory military/training may be introduced for all able-bodied malepersonnel who are seeking higher education after intermediate both at home andabroad or taking public or private jobs. This training will be organized annually fora duration of 4 weeks in each district headquarters by each area Headquarters ofthe Army. This training may be open to all civilian volunteers as well.

56. Enactment of laws should be made in favour of people's participation in warefforts.

57. Provision of small arms, mines and explosives for the irregular forces to bemade available to the Army.

58. Training for civilian volunteers to be organised in each districtHeadquarters with the declaration of emergency till the end of the war under thearrangement of respective Infantry Division.

Mirpur Cantonment S M SALAHUDDIN ISLAM

MajorNovember 2001 Group Leader

Distribution :

Sponsor Directing StaffDefence Services Command and Staff CollegeMirpur CantonmentDhaka

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Richard E. Simpkin. Race to the Swift- Thoughts on Twenty FirstCentury Warfare, Brasseys, London,1994.

2. Martin Van Creveld, On Future War, Brasseys (UK), 1991

3. Lieutenant General Philip B. Davidson, USA (Retd), See References ofVietnam War, New Delhi,Lancers Publishers pvt ltd, 1992.

4. John Fullerton, The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, Hong Kong, FarEastern Economic Review Ltd, 1983.

5. Singh, Major General Lachhman, Victory in Bangladesh, Dehra Dun :Natraj Publishers, 1991.

Journal

6. Lieutenant Colonel Alauddin Mohammad Abdul Wadud, BP,psc, MilitaryTheory and Doctrine-An Analysis of Their Relationship, Bangladesh ArmyJournal, 22nd Issue, June 1994.

7. Haque, Major Md Fayzul, " Bangladesh : A Geo-political Study",Bangladesh Army Journal, 13th Issue, December 1988.

Training Manual

8. Draft GSTP Operation of War, Volume One.

9. FM 100-5 Operations, US Army Command and General Staff Colege, FortLeavenworth, kansas, 1993.

AHQ Project Study Papers/Div Level Study Papers

10. AHQ Project Study1998 by 46 Independent Infantry Brigade.

11. Division Level Study Periodconducted by 71 Infantry Brigade

12. Division Level Study Periodconducted by 19 Infantry Division.

13. Military Research Project on Blending Conventional and

Unconventional Warfareby Major Anwarul Momen.

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Discussions/Other Documents

14. Major Kane, US Army ,(Student Officer of 26th Army Staff Course)

15. Major Rajiv Kumar Singh, India Army, (Student Officer of 26th Army StaffCourse)

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