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Does Latin America Have aDoes Latin America Have aDoes Latin America Have a Does Latin America Have a GrowthGrowth‐‐Impairing Saving Gap?Impairing Saving Gap?
Augusto de la Torre and Alain Augusto de la Torre and Alain IzeIze
World Bank World Bank –– Bank of Spain Research ConferenceBank of Spain Research Conference“Financing Growth: Levers, Boosters, and Brakes”“Financing Growth: Levers, Boosters, and Brakes”
Madrid, 23Madrid, 23‐‐24 June 201424 June 2014
11Chief Economist OfficeChief Economist OfficeLatin America and the Caribbean RegionLatin America and the Caribbean RegionThe World BankThe World Bank
LAC’s longLAC’s long‐‐term term ggrowth record has been uninspiring, rowth record has been uninspiring, lth h th l t d d i d hlth h th l t d d i d halthough the last decade raised hopes… although the last decade raised hopes…
Contrasting Convergence Paths in LAC andContrasting Convergence Paths in LAC and the Souththe South EastEast AsianAsian TTigersigersContrasting Convergence Paths in LAC and Contrasting Convergence Paths in LAC and the South the South East East Asian Asian TTigersigers(Per capita income as a percent of US per capita income)
2Note: The per capita GDP of regional country groups is a weighted average. The South East Asian Tigers include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Penn World Tables, WDI, and Maddison (2009).
… but now LAC is back to … but now LAC is back to its traditional low its traditional low growth, and growth, and thi i l t d ( t j t li l l d )thi i l t d ( t j t li l l d )this may signal a new trend (not just a cyclical slowdown) this may signal a new trend (not just a cyclical slowdown)
The Great Deceleration
11.0
12.0
Weighted Averages
8.0
9.0
10.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
0.0
1.0
LAC SEA MICs EE MICs China
2003-2011 (excl. 2009) 2012 2013 2014
3Note: The 2014 forecasts for Latin America are from the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects (GEP) of June 2014. Sources: WEO (April 2014), Consensus Forecasts (May 2014), and GEP (June 2014).
2003 2011 (excl. 2009) 2012 2013 2014
Is the reemergence of low growth somehow related to the Is the reemergence of low growth somehow related to the i ’ titi l h t ?i ’ titi l h t ?region’s uncompetitive real exchange rates?region’s uncompetitive real exchange rates?
External Competitiveness Gap
80
External Competitiveness Gap(Big Mac Index residuals after controlling for GDP per capita)
20
40
60
dex
‐20
0
20
Big Max In
d
‐60
‐40
g Ko
ngJapan
alaysia
n Fed.
Africa
a, Rep
.stralia
Mexico
h Re
p.en
tina
kraine
huania
States
China
Austria
onesia
India
Chile
reland
ston
iaealand
ngdo
mGreece
ortugal
ailand
Egypt
anada
nmark
ungary
rmany
Turkey
Lanka
France
Peru
Spain
elgium Italy
inland
ppines
ta Rica
ombia
uguay
wed
enkistan
Brazil
erland
orway
ezue
la
Hon
g
Ma
Russia
South
Korea
Au M
Czech
Arge
U Lith
United S A
Indo Ir E
New
Ze
United Kin G Po Th C
Den Hu
Ger T
Sri F Be F
Philip
Cost
Colo
Ur Sw Pa
Switze No
Vene
4Note: The real exchange rate gap is computed as the deviation from the mean Big‐Mac price index for the countries in the sample. Source: The Economist’s Big Mac Index (July 2013).
…and are the uncompetitive real exchange rates somehow …and are the uncompetitive real exchange rates somehow l t d t th i ’ l d ti i t ?l t d t th i ’ l d ti i t ?related to the region’s low domestic saving rates? related to the region’s low domestic saving rates?
Domestic Saving Gap
30
Domestic Saving Gap(Residuals after Controlling for GDP per Capita)
10
20
/GDP
‐10
0
Gross Saving/
‐30
‐20
ine
rica uay
ece
om azil
gal
bia
and
ypt
hile
nce
tes
ica
and
aly
eru
ada
nka
key
ary
ina
and
ed.
ico
ain
ark
alia
pan
tan
um ep.
nia
den
tria nia
any
esia
and
ela
ong
dia
way
and
ysia
ep.
nes
ina
Ukrai
South Afr
Urugu
Gree
United Kingdo Bra
Portu
Colomb
New
Zeala Egy
ChFran
United Stat
Costa R
Irela It Pe
Cana
Sri Lan
Turk
Hun
gaArgen
tiFinla
Russian Fe
Mex Spa
Den
ma
Austra
Jap
Pakist
Belgiu
Czech Re
Eston
Swed
Aust
Lithua
Germa
Indo
neThaila
Vene
zuHon
g Ko Ind
Norw
Switzerla
Malay
Korea, Re
Philipp
inCh
i
5
Two levels of discussionTwo levels of discussion
A very practical issue (does LAC have a domestic saving problem?) A very practical issue (does LAC have a domestic saving problem?)... A hot regional debate – inward (domestic demand oriented) vs.
outward looking (external demand‐oriented) strategies
How significant and widespread is the problem?
What can policy do about it?
…confronts us with largely unresolved conceptual issues (when and why can saving be a problem for medium‐term growth?)why can saving be a problem for medium term growth?) What does the literature say?
What does theory say?
What do the data say?
6
Structure of presentationStructure of presentationpp
Three channels linking saving and growth
Interpreting LAC’s growth experience in light of the channelsInterpreting LAC s growth experience in light of the channels
How to the channels interact? A minimalist formalization
Econometric estimation issues and strategy
Preliminary results
Next steps
7
The three channels linking saving and growthThe three channels linking saving and growthg g gg g g
8
Domestic saving would Domestic saving would notnotmatter for growth policy matter for growth policy ifif……gg g p yg p y ff
It is (constrained) optimal… If so, no need to bother
…or if it is fully growth‐elastic… If so, growth would raise saving sufficiently to finance itself
…or if it can be perfectly substituted with foreign saving…or if it can be perfectly substituted with foreign saving If so, foreign saving would compensate for any shortfall and…
… the composition of financing (foreign vs. domestic), demand (domestic vs. external) and output (tradables vs nontradables) would be of no consequenceexternal), and output (tradables vs. nontradables) would be of no consequence
Hence, saving can matter for growth via three channelsd h l ( f h l ) An endogenous saving channel ‐ SC (imperfect growth elasticity)
A real exchange rate channel ‐ EC (imperfect tradable/nontradable substitution)
An interest rate channel ‐ IC (imperfect foreign/domestic asset substitution)
9
ECEC: it works : it works through the current through the current account, aggregate account, aggregate d dd d iti d th l h titi d th l h tdemand demand composition, and the real exchange ratecomposition, and the real exchange rate
Positive learning Positive learning li ili iexternalitiesexternalities
geI e
gIeSFeSFSD e gI
A A saving gap (a reduction in the supply of saving relative to the demand for saving) appreciates saving gap (a reduction in the supply of saving relative to the demand for saving) appreciates the the real real exchange exchange rate rate because it because it worsens the current account and raises the worsens the current account and raises the price price of of nontradablesnontradables relative to relative to tradablestradables
10
What does the literature say?What does the literature say?yy
Two ways to generate learning spillovers via tradables production Tradables are more capital‐intensive and, hence, enable learning‐by‐
investing externalities (Korinek and Serven, 2010)investing externalities (Korinek and Serven, 2010)
Tradables are special (Rodrik, 2008) – e.g., links to global value chains
Estimating the real exchange rate channel (Rodrik, 2008) More depreciated exchange rates lead to higher growth
Countries that save more have more depreciated exchange rates Countries that save more have more depreciated exchange rates• While there is no attempt to tease out a causal saving‐to‐growth linkage, is this a change of heart compared to Rodrik (2000)?
– His view then was that domestic saving is not a binding constraint; hence, “policies geared towards raising domestic saving do not deserve priority”
11
ICIC: it works : it works through the through the capital account, foreign debt capital account, foreign debt build up the country risk premium and BOP crisesbuild up the country risk premium and BOP crisesbuild up, the country risk premium, and BOP crisesbuild up, the country risk premium, and BOP crises
Positive learning Positive learning externalitiesexternalities
geI e
gIeSFeSFSD e gI
g
e I
Negative crises Negative crises
gr = + r*
externalitiesexternalities
AA saving gap leads to saving gap leads to a a debt build up, which can raise the debt build up, which can raise the risk risk premium and depreciates the premium and depreciates the exchange exchange rate. rate. If uncorrected it can lead to a BOP crisisIf uncorrected it can lead to a BOP crisis
12
If uncorrected, it can lead to a BOP crisisIf uncorrected, it can lead to a BOP crisis
What does the literature say?What does the literature say?yy
Our world is very close to one of full capital market integration…y p g Risk‐adjusted marginal returns on capital are largely equalized across
countries (Caselli and Feyrer, 2006)
I i ld i h f i ld Increases in world saving have a one‐for‐one impact on world investment (Feyrer and Shambaugh, 2009)
b hi d i l h f i d d i i … but this does not imply that foreign and domestic saving are perfect substitutes Foreign saving dependent countries grow less (Aizenman et al., 2004; Foreign saving dependent countries grow less (Aizenman et al., 2004;
Prasad et al, 2007)
Countries that grow less “tax” saving (Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2011)
Negative externalities of high debt and BOP crises (Korinek, 2010)
Lasting adverse growth consequences of high debt and BOP crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013)(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013)
13
SCSC: it works through saving itself: it works through saving itselfg gg g
Positive learning Positive learning externalitiesexternalities
geI e
gIeSFeSFSD e gI
g
e I
Negative crises Negative crises
gr = + r*
SDg
externalitiesexternalities
Multiplier effectMultiplier effect
14
What does the literature say?What does the literature say?yy
Many reasons for domestic saving to follow growthy g g Demographics (Modigliani, 1986)
Habits (Campbell and Cochrane, 1994)
Firms’ internal finance (Fazzari et al, 1988; Lewis, 1954)
Keynesian effects on steroids (Rowthorn, 1982)
Good empirical support Growth causes saving (Carroll and Weil, 1993; Loayza et al, 2000)
Countries with growth transitions save more durably (Rodrik, 2000)
China’s saving boom largely came from firms (Guariglia et al, 2008)
Yet, the key condition remains untested: does an autonomous increase in demand for domestic saving generate its own supply?
15
LAC growth experience in light of the channelsLAC growth experience in light of the channelsg p gg p g
16
During the last three decades, LAC’s growth bore the During the last three decades, LAC’s growth bore the f t i t f thf t i t f th ICICfootprints of the footprints of the ICIC
75
Country Risk Ratings Simple Averages
Lost Decade Washington Consens s Golden Decade
70
Incidence of Crises: Latin America and South East Asia
Lost Decade Washington Consensus Golden Decade
55
60
65
70Lost Decade Washington Consensus Golden Decade
40
50
60
ent
35
40
45
50
Inde
x
10
20
30Per
ce
25
30
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
LAC1 SEA MICs LAC-IT
0
10
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
LAC SEA
1980s and 1990s: Crises, capital flight => growth dip1980s and 1990s: Crises, capital flight => growth dipLast decade: Stabilization, low world interest rates => growth boostLast decade: Stabilization, low world interest rates => growth boost
17Source: Institutional Investor database
Looking forward, even if the Looking forward, even if the ICIC reappears, the reappears, the recent shift recent shift f d bt t it h ld iti t it ff tf d bt t it h ld iti t it ff tfrom debt to equity should mitigate its effects…from debt to equity should mitigate its effects…
18Source: Milessi‐Ferreti.
However, However, LAC’s LAC’s growth growth model is, structurally, a domestic model is, structurally, a domestic d dd d d id i (i(i t t ith th EAP MICt t ith th EAP MIC ))demanddemand‐‐driven driven one (in one (in contrast with the EAP MICscontrast with the EAP MICs)…)…
Domestic Demand External Demand
19Source: UN statistics.
…and this helps explain the significant appreciation of the …and this helps explain the significant appreciation of the l h t i th i th t d dl h t i th i th t d dreal exchange rate in the region over the past decadereal exchange rate in the region over the past decade
Real Effective Exchange Rates and International Reserves
125
130
LAC-IT
Real Effective Exchange Rates and International Reserves
2010 Dec2012 Dec
2013 Feb
110
115
120
ge R
ate
2013 Feb
2005 Sep
2008 Aug
2009 Feb100
105
110
Eff
ectiv
e E
xcha
ng
2008 Aug2010 Dec
2012 Dec
2013 Feb
East Asian MICsp 2009 Feb
90
95Rea
l E
2003 Jan 2005 Sep
2009 Feb
MICs
2003 Jan
80
85
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5Total Reserves Excluding Gold (ratio to GDP)
20
Total Reserves Excluding Gold (ratio to GDP)
Notes: The lines represent simple averages. Total Reserves Excluding Gold are measured as a share of 2006‐2007 average GDP in Current US Dollars. Sources: IMF and Bank for International Settlements.
Thus, the Thus, the ECECmay become a key constraint on growth going may become a key constraint on growth going f d i i f d i blf d i i f d i blforward, even more so in view of renewed saving problemsforward, even more so in view of renewed saving problems
D i S i
40
Domestic SavingSimple Averages
30
35
P
20
25
Perc
ent o
f G
DP
15
20P
10
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
LAC1 SEA MICs
21Note: Domestic saving is calculated as GDP + Net Factor Payments + Net Transfers ‐ Total Consumption. Source: UN Statistics & WDI.
A minimalist macro modelA minimalist macro model
22
A minimalist macro model linking savings to growthA minimalist macro model linking savings to growthg g gg g g
Functional FormFunctional Form Linearized FormLinearized Form
SDt
k S
Dg gtk spSt
k St
k
I (e, , pI ) SD (g, pSD)SF (e, , pSF
)
g g(I
,e
,
, pg)
etk eSF
(I tk SDt
k ) e
tk epet
k et
k
g g( , , , pg)I t
k I
e etk I
tk I pI t
k I t
k
gtk g
I I tk g
e etk g
tk g pgt
k gt
k
23
SCSC: : if it is sufficiently powerful, if it is sufficiently powerful, ee can even depreciate can even depreciate as as d d f i (i t t) id d f i (i t t) idemand for saving (investment) risesdemand for saving (investment) rises
Saving underSaving underrespondsresponds Saving overSaving overrespondsresponds
e gg e gggg' gg'
gg pp gg pp
E 'E
IS
IS'IS'
E E '
g
IS
gIS
gI SD 1 gI SD 1
24
gI DggI Dg
ECEC: if strong enough, it can neutralize the growth impact : if strong enough, it can neutralize the growth impact f t i i i t tf t i i i t tof an autonomous increase in investmentof an autonomous increase in investment
TradablesTradables vs.vs. nontradablesnontradables TradablesTradables vsvs nontradablesnontradables
egg e gg
ppTradablesTradables vs. vs. nontradablesnontradablescomposition does not mattercomposition does not matter pp
TradablesTradables vs. vs. nontradablesnontradablescomposition composition mattersmatters
gg' gg'gg gg
E 'E '
IS' IS'E E
gIS
gIS
ge gI I e 0;gI SDg1 ge gI I e 0;gI SDg
1
25
g e I e I Dg
ICIC: depending on the relative strengths of : depending on the relative strengths of ICIC and and ECEC, a , a ii i d d d ti ii d d d ti i i l thi l thsavingsaving‐‐induced reduction in induced reduction in can raise or lower growthcan raise or lower growth
Exchange rate Exchange rate Interest rate Interest rate
e gg e gggg' gg'
channel dominateschannel dominates channel dominateschannel dominates
gg e gg
E '
gg gg'
E
E 'IS'
IS'E E
gIS
gIS
g g I e (g g I ) 0 g g I e (g g I ) 0
26
g gg gI I e (ge gI I e) 0 g gI I e (ge gI I e) 0
Econometric issues and strategyEconometric issues and strategygygy
27
Benchmarks and gapsBenchmarks and gapsg pg p
Benchmark: where a country is expected to be given its per capitaBenchmark: where a country is expected to be, given its per capita income, structural features, and “typical” peer policies Benchmarks facilitate cross‐country comparisons
Gap: the deviation from benchmark, i.e., from “typical” peer policies Ensures that countries “taxing” their savings show a saving gap
Equilibrium benchmarks and gaps: based on equilibrium model solutions, reflect cross‐correlations across endogenous variables, g Where the EC dominates, countries that under‐save should be overvalued and
grow slower
Where the IC dominates countries that under save should be undervalued and Where the IC dominates, countries that under‐save should be undervalued and grow slower
The SC explains part of the correlation between the saving and growth gaps
28
EndogeneityEndogeneityg yg y
Obvious, major problem, j p Saving growth
Real exchange rate saving
Real exchange rate growth
Determination of the country premium?
On‐going effort to instrument the equations
H d i i d l i h i li i d Here, endogeneity is dealt with in a limited way Use three‐year averages
Approximate the OLS bias for e Approximate the OLS bias for
Use Var‐Covar matrix of residuals to estimate the relative contribution of each channel in explaining the correlation between macro variables
eSF
29
(Very) (Very) ppreliminary resultsreliminary results( y)( y) pp yy
30
OLSOLS‐‐based estimated based estimated elasticitieselasticities and their significanceand their significancegg
SDgeSF I e gIge e I gIe g
RFE .013** .08*** ‐.05 ‐3.2*** 3.8*** ‐.22*** ‐.19*** ‐0.8*
TFE .023*** .04*** ‐.33*** ‐2.9*** 3.9*** ‐.18*** ‐.26*** ‐0.8***
31
Estimated strengths: all three channels support a positive Estimated strengths: all three channels support a positive li k b t i d thli k b t i d thlink between saving and growthlink between saving and growth
RFE RFE* TFE TFE*
0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09gI SDgSC :
0.55 0.94 0.36 1.20gs**
eSF(ge gI I e)
1 eSFI e SDg
eSF(ge gI I e)EC :
0.72 0.72 1.04 1.04g gI I e (ge gI I e)IC :
*/With adjustment for OLS error in estimating **/Calculated for a ten percentage points of GDP autonomous increase in savings */With adjustment for OLS error in estimating **/Calculated for a ten percentage points of GDP autonomous increase in savings
eSF
32
LAC 4 country groupings based on domestic saving and LAC 4 country groupings based on domestic saving and l h t ( l ti t b h k)l h t ( l ti t b h k)real exchange rate gaps (relative to benchmark)real exchange rate gaps (relative to benchmark)
Exchange controls Exchange controls EC low
savingEC low saving countriescountriessaving
countriessaving
countries
EC high savingEC high saving
IC countriesIC countries
saving countriessaving
countries
33
Contrasting country experiences in LAC of underContrasting country experiences in LAC of under‐‐ and and i i t t ith th ECi i t t ith th ECoverover‐‐saving consistent with the ECsaving consistent with the EC
0.2
.4e
Rat
e
0.5
Savi
ng
-.4-.2
0Exc
hang
e
-.50
Dom
estic
0 2 4 6 8 10 123 Year Period
0 2 4 6 8 10 123 Year Period
.2 2
-.10
.1In
vest
men
t
6-4
-20
GD
P pc
Gro
wth
-.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 123 Year Period
-8-6G
0 2 4 6 8 10 123 Year Period
34
RED: LAC1-OU (Chile, Panama, Mexico, Peru); BLUE: LAC1-UO (Costa Rica, Barbados, Bahamas, Brazil, Uruguay)
The savingThe saving‐‐real exchange rate linkreal exchange rate link(E ilib i l ti t ilib i b h k )(E ilib i l ti t ilib i b h k )(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)
.5
LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2
LAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UO
LAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OU
0Rat
e
EAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAP
5Exc
hang
e R
-.5-1
-1 -.5 0 .5 1Domestic Saving
35
The real exchange rateThe real exchange rate‐‐growth linkgrowth link(E ilib i l ti t ilib i b h k )(E ilib i l ti t ilib i b h k )(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)
.5
LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2
EAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAP
LAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UO
LAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OU
0Rat
e
EAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPLAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OU
5Exc
hang
e R
-.5-1
-5 0 5 10 15GDP pc Growth
36
Putting it together: saving and growthPutting it together: saving and growth(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)(Equilibrium gaps relative to equilibrium benchmarks)
15101
Gro
wth
EAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPEAPLAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OULAC1-OU
5G
DP
pc G
LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC1LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2LAC2
LAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UOLAC1-UO
LAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OULAC1 OU
0-5
-1 -.5 0 .5 1Domestic Saving
37
Next steps and policy discussionNext steps and policy discussionp p yp p y
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Before one can formulate firm policy recommendations, Before one can formulate firm policy recommendations, f th h i l l d df th h i l l d dfurther research is clearly needed…further research is clearly needed…
Endogenizing the country risk premium How much of the risk premium reflects saving?
What is the dynamic link between saving, debt, and the risk premium?
h l h ? What else is in there?
Instrumenting the endogenous variablesInstrumenting the endogenous variables We made a head start with the saving‐exchange rate link, based on
Rodrik’s formulation
But there is a long road ahead…
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Tentative policy implicationsTentative policy implicationsp y pp y p
There is little or no support for the spend your way to growth strategy Condition for growth to finance itself is far from fulfilled
Instead, efforts to raise saving rates are likely to make sense for many LAC countries as part of a comprehensive growth strategy
But countries should mitigate the risk of a low‐demand Keynesian trap By improving countercyclical policy capacity (monetary, fiscal)
By changing the macro policy mix towards easier monetary/tighter fiscal
P d ti it ( l id ) f i l t th i l Productivity (supply side) reforms are crucial to square the circles To raise fiscal saving without undermining social equity objectives
To offset via productivity gains the adverse effects of the EC
An emphasis on equity over debt in the use of foreign saving can mitigate external viability problems (the adverse effects of the IC)
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Thank youThank youyy
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EEXTRAXTRA SSLIDESLIDES
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Saving regressionsSaving regressionsg gg g
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Exchange rate regressionsExchange rate regressionsg gg g
44
Investment regressionsInvestment regressionsgg
45
Growth regressionsGrowth regressionsgg
46
RodrikRodrik (2008) estimation 2.0(2008) estimation 2.0IV
Rodrik Results (0) (1) (2) (3)
Domestic saving as a share of GDP 0.492*** 0.430*** 0.430*** 0.449+(0.0965) (0.0771) (0.156) (0.279)
OLSDEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln Undervalue*
(0.0965) (0.0771) (0.156) (0.279)pvalue for Domestic saving 2.76e-08 0.00659 0.108
ln Terms of trade -0.115*** -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.159***(0.0402) (0.0259) (0.0569) (0.0586)
Government expenditure as a share of GDP -0.045*** -0.427*** -0.427 -0.449(0 1957) (0 163) (0 395) (0 412)(0.1957) (0.163) (0.395) (0.412)
Capital account openness -0.031*** -0.0171*** -0.0171 -0.0166(0.0052) (0.00655) (0.0190) (0.0173)
ln (1+ inflation rate) 0.039 0.0335*** 0.0335** 0.0309*(0.0355) (0.00775) (0.0162) (0.0162)
FDI inflows as a share of GDP -0.382*** 0.0629 0.0629 0.0805(0.1257) (0.0745) (0.0851) (0.0868)
Exchange rate regime dummies: Crawl or managed float 0.071*** 0.0575*** 0.0575 0.0497
(0.0146) (0.0218) (0.0585) (0.0472)Float 0.026 -0.0627 -0.0627 -0.102+
(0 0317) (0 0461) (0 0779) (0 0701)(0.0317) (0.0461) (0.0779) (0.0701)Currency in free fall 0.162*** 0.139*** 0.139* 0.146**
(0.0338) (0.0407) (0.0805) (0.0638)Dual market with missing parallel market data 0.021 -0.156** -0.156* -0.197**
(0.0538) (0.0607) (0.0835) (0.0855)
Observations 2,757 2,701 2,701 2,573R-squared 0.290 0.290 0.137Number of id 160Kleibergen-Paap rk LM pvalue (Underidentification) 0.00381Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat (Weak Identification) 30.32Hansen Jstatistic (Overidentification of all instruments) 3
Notes: *The dependent variable is ln Undervalue, calculated as the gap between the ln RER and the fitted ln RER, estimated as a function of GDP per capita. All regressions include country and yeareffects. Standard errors in parentheses. Specification (O) is Rodrik’s (2008),. Specification (1) reruns Rodriks estimation, which has robust standard errors that are not valid asymptotically in a large "n"panels. In specifications (2) and (3) the standard errors are clustered at the country level. In (3) the instruments included are domestic saving as a share of GDP lagged 2 years, speed of aging growth,fertility rate, and young dependency ratio. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15. Source: Authors calculations based on Rodrik (2008).
Hansen J statistic (Overidentification of all instruments) 3
Breaking down the savingsBreaking down the savings‐‐toto‐‐exchange rate link exchange rate link g gg g gg
48*/With adjustment for OLS error in estimating eSF
Breaking down the Breaking down the exchange exchange rate rate to growth link to growth link gg gg gg
49eSF*/With adjustment for OLS error in estimating eSF
Breaking down the Breaking down the saving to growth link saving to growth link gg g gg g
50*/With adjustment for OLS error in estimating eSF