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Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

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Page 1: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

Philosophy 1

Spring, 2002

G. J. Mattey

Page 2: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Ethics

• Material philosophy has to do with specific objects and the laws governing them– Physics is the science of the laws of nature

– Ethics is the science of the laws of freedom

• Ethics has an empirical part, in that its laws concern a human will that is affected by nature

• The moral law concerns what ought to happen but may not in fact happen

Page 3: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

The Moral Law

• The moral law is the a priori part of ethics– It contains nothing empirical

• It governs with absolute necessity• It applies to all rational beings and does not

depend on the nature of man or the circumstances in the world

• It must be sought in pure reason• The moral law must guide our actions if they are

to be good

Page 4: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Good Will

• Only a good will is good without qualification• The virtues of the mind (e.g., intelligence) and of

temperament (e.g., courage) can become bad if the will is bad

• The same holds for external goods that complete the ancient conception of happiness

• A good will is a necessary condition for being worthy of happiness

• It is good in itself, through its willing, not through any utility it might have

Page 5: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Reason and Happiness

• Reason is not well-suited by nature for the attainment of happiness

• Happiness would be better entrusted to instinct

• So if reason has a purpose, it must be something other than happiness

• Its true function is to produce a good will• Good of the will is higher than happiness

Page 6: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Duty and Inclination

• We may act from duty, inclination, or selfish purpose

• Sometimes we do from selfish purpose what duty calls for, without inclination– A prudent merchant charges a fixed price

• Sometimes we do from inclination what duty calls for– Preserving one’s own life

• Sometimes we act purely from duty– Preserving one’s life when one does not wish to live

Page 7: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Moral Worth

• Only actions performed purely from duty have moral worth

• Acts that overcome inclinations and selfish purposes and arise from duty have the highest moral worth

• Even promotion of happiness has moral worth only insofar as it is done as duty

Page 8: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Maxims

• Moral worth is not found in the end of an action, but in the maxim that determines it

• The maxim is the principle that moves the will to action

• The rational maxim of duty is to follow the law even if it thwarts the inclinations

• The highest moral good is the representation of the moral law

Page 9: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Respect for Law

• The moral law motivates us without recourse to inclination or effects

• The only motivating principle remaining is to act out of respect for law

• One should act only on those maxims one can will to be a universal law

Page 10: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

An Example

• I am in distress, and to alleviate my situation I might make a promise with the intention of breaking it

• I might act according to the maxim, “make dishonest promises when in trouble”

• Making this maxim universal might lead to bad consequences for me

• The moral, rather than practical, reason for rejecting it is that the maxim would destroy itself if it were made universal

Page 11: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Moral Philosophy

• The moral law is accessible to everyone

• We do not need science or philosophy to be able to tell right from wrong

• Still, we need to investigate the moral law philosophically due to the bad influence of inclinations and needs (desire for happiness)

• This can corrupt the purity of the moral law

Page 12: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

The Dear Self

• It is difficult to find cases of acting purely from duty

• Philosophers have thus claimed that our motivation for acting is self-love

• We cannot even tell in ourselves whether this is a secret motivation

• We always seem to find the dear self at the basis of our actions

• Whether we have ever done it or not, we ought to do our duty

Page 13: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Pure Practical Reason

• The moral law commands all rational beings• It could do so only if is valid with absolute

necessity, subject to no contingencies• Such a law can be found only in pure practical

reason, not in knowledge of human nature• It cannot be derived from examples• Even the concept of God as the highest good is

derived from the idea of moral perfection

Page 14: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Will and Reason

• Everything that happens in nature is the result of laws

• Human action is based on our rational conception of laws (principles)

• Human will may be determined by principles• Or it may be determined by inclination • If determined by principles, it follows the

command of reason, which determines what one ought to do

Page 15: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Imperatives

• A divine will would always obey the moral law, so there is nothing it ought to do

• Humans do not always obey• All imperatives command in one of two ways

– Hypothetically: one should do this to accomplish that end

– Categorically: one should do this as objectively necessary in itself

• Only a categorical imperative declares what is good in itself

Page 16: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Hypothetical Imperatives

• The end in a hypothetical imperative might be good or not

• Children are trained to achieve many varied ends, without regard to their good

• The natural end of human action is happiness

• Skill in choosing means to the end of happiness is prudence

Page 17: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Prudence

• Hypothetical imperatives are possible because willing the ends requires willing the means (that in one’s power) to the ends

• But how do we will the end of happiness?• There is immense confusion over which means

will promote it• Wealth, knowledge, even health all can lead to

unhappiness• So there are only empirical counsels for

happiness, never commands for happiness

Page 18: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Categorical Imperatives

• Categorical imperatives to not prescribe means to an end

• Apparent categorical imperatives may be disguised hypotheticals– One may adopt a maxim against telling false promises

so as to remain credible

• So, we need to look to pure reason, not examples, to see how categorical imperatives are possible

• The categorical imperative is an a priori synthetic principle

Page 19: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

The Categorical Imperative

• The only element of a categorical imperative that can be determined in advance is conformity to universal law

• This gives the content of a single imperative: act in such a way that the maxim of the action can serve as a universal law

• Or: act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature through your will

Page 20: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Perfect Duties to Ourselves

• A perfect duty admits of no exception in the interests of inclination

• We have a perfect duty to preserve our own life, even if self-love would dictate ending it

• I cannot universalize the maxim of suicide without destroying all of life

• So one must act on the maxim of preserving one’s own life, which can be universalized

Page 21: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Perfect Duties to Others

• We have a perfect duty to others to make honest promises, even when dishonesty would help us out of difficulty

• I cannot universalize the maxim of making false promises without destroying all trust

• If all trust is destroyed, my promise would not then serve my interests

• So one must act on the maxim that one must make honest promises

Page 22: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Imperfect Duties to Ourselves

• An imperfect duty is one which permits exceptions in the interests of inclination

• We have an imperfect duty to develop our talents• I cannot universalize the maxim of indulging in

pleasure• Life would go on, but our rational abilities would

go to waste• So one must act on the maxim that one develop

one’s talents to the greatest extent possible

Page 23: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Imperfect Duties to Others

• We have an imperfect duty to help others• I cannot universalize a maxim of letting

others get along on their own• Life would go on, with less hypocrisy, but

if everyone behaved this way, I might find myself without help when in need

• So one must act on the maxim of helping others

Page 24: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

The Unity of the Duties

• All duties are derived from a single principle: that we be able to will the maxim of our action to be a universal law

• Acting against a perfect duty requires a maxim which cannot be thought of as a universal law of nature

• Acting against an imperfect duty requires a maxim which can be so thought, but which cannot be willed to be a universal law of nature

Page 25: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Transgression

• When we transgress our duties, we do not give up their claim to be universal law objectively

• Instead, we subjectively make an exception to the law to serve our own inclinations, in which case the law is only general

• There is no contradiction here, since it is reason that upholds objective universality and inclination that promotes only subjective generality

• So, even transgression of the categorical imperative acknowledges its validity

Page 26: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Justification

• Is there a categorical imperative that is binding on all rational beings?

• Justification cannot depend on an account of human nature, but must be a priori– A principle based on human nature could not be an

objective law valid for all rational beings

• But it is tempting to appeal to empirical motives and laws, given the difficulty of justifying objective laws a priori

Page 27: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Ends

• Ends are what determine the will to action• There are two kinds of ends

– Objective ends, which are valid for every rational being, based on reason alone, and depending on motives

– Subjective ends, which are arbitrarily proposed as the effect of one’s action, based on desire, and depending on incentives

• Subjective ends can be grounds for only hypothetical imperatives

Page 28: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

An End in Itself

• An objective end could be a ground for a categorical imperative

• Rational beings (persons) are objective ends, ends in themselves

• It is a categorical imperative that they may not be arbitrarily used as means to some other ends

• Non-rational beings are not ends in themselves and may be used as means

Page 29: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

The Examples Revisited

• Suicide is not permitted because it treats one’s self as a means to an end (relief)

• Making false promises requires using another person as a means to my ends

• Neglecting to develop one’s capacities is inconsistent with the advancement of the end of humanity

• Not furthering the ends of others is inconsistent with the fact that because they are ends in themselves, their ends are my ends

Page 30: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Legislation

• Insofar as everyone must be treated as an end in itself, we are not free to treat them as our subjective inclinations dictate

• The law constraining inclination is a universal law• The universal law comes from the rational will• So, a categorical imperative is to act only on a

maxim that is consistent with a law which is legislated by the rational will

• When we act out of duty, we act in a way that is not based on any interest

Page 31: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Autonomy

• The will acts autonomously when it dictates a law for itself– If it acts for some interest, then it acts heteronomously

• Previous attempts to discover the moral law all presume a heteronomous will– For example, divine law is backed by a system of

rewards and punishment

• As such, they were all doomed to failure

Page 32: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

The Kingdom of Ends

• A kingdom is “a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws”

• The moral law requires that we treat other rational beings as ends in themselves

• So, it presupposes the possibility of a kingdom of ends– Each rational being is a legislator in the kingdom– Each rational being is subject to the laws of reason

• The laws of the kingdom of ends have in view the relation to one another as ends in themselves

Page 33: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Dignity

• Everything in the kingdom of ends has a price or a dignity– A price is worth based on inclination– A dignity is an intrinsic worth based on something’s being

an end in itself, beyond all price

• Only morality and humanity have dignity, based on autonomy

• All the other virtues have a price of some sort (skill at work, wit, etc.)

• Keeping of promises, e.g., provides “immediate favor and delight,” as well as respect

Page 34: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Absolutely Good Will

• A will is absolutely good when it cannot be evil– Its maxim cannot be in conflict with itself it willed to

be a universal law

• The categorical imperative is the supreme law of an absolutely good will– Obedience to the categorical imperative is the only way

to avoid self-conflict

• The end of the actions of a good will must be an end in itself

• The good will legislates universal law

Page 35: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Happiness

• Moral principles based on the promotion of happiness are based on experience

• Happiness is construed as a physical or moral feeling

• The worst form of such a principle is that of one’s own happiness (egoism)

• There are three problems– Being well is not the same as doing well– Being prudent is not the same as being morally virtuous– Motives of virtue are on a par with motives of vice

Page 36: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Moral Feeling

• The principle that the good act is one that elicits happy moral feeling is superior to egoism

• It values morality for its own sake• But appeal to it is superficial

– Due to variation in people, are not a uniform standard of moral appraisal

– No one person’s feelings can be the basis of the judgments of everyone’s actions

Page 37: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Rational Principles of Morality

• Philosophers have tried to base morality on a concept of perfection

• The ontological concept is empty and presupposes the morality it is supposed to explain

• The theological concept of perfection is that of a divine will– We have no understanding of divine properties except on

the model of our own– If it is not derived from our concept of morality, it would

be based on notions such as domination and vengeance, which are opposed to morality

Page 38: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Freedom

• The will is a causality that living beings have insofar as they are rational

• Freedom is a property of this causality, where the will acts independently of alien causes

• This conception of freedom is negative• Positive freedom is autonomy: the will dictates a

law to itself, the moral law• So, a free will is one which is subject to moral law

Page 39: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Practical Reason

• Practical reason is the will of a rational being• A will cannot be rational if it is directed by

something other than itself, e.g., impulse• So, a rational will can be directed only by itself• So, a rational will must be considered to be free

(in the positive sense)• This is so even though we cannot demonstrate the

metaphysical reality of freedom

Page 40: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Our Interest in Morality

• Why should I subject myself to the moral law?

• It is not that so doing will serve my interests• The answer is that I would do so insofar as I

am a rational being and am not hindered• But I am also a sensible being and am

subject to inclinations, so I only ought to obey the moral law

Page 41: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

A Circle?

• We suppose that we are free of external causes so that we can understand how we are subject to moral laws

• But we think of ourselves as being subject to moral laws only because we suppose that we are free, autonomous, wills

• So it seems that freedom depends on morality and morality depends on freedom

Page 42: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Resolution

• When we think of ourselves as free from external causes, these causes are in the order of appearances

• When we think of the will as an autonomous cause, this cause is in the order of things in themselves

• There is a faculty in human beings which is distinct from all external causes: reason

• Rational causality can be thought only as freedom

Page 43: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Duality

• All my actions, viewed as appearances, can be explained in terms of desires and inclinations

• If I were a purely intelligible being, all my actions would be explained by freedom

• Since I am both sensible and intelligible, the laws of freedom express only what I ought to do

• Even the “meanest villain” recognizes that he would conform to the moral law if he were not such a slave to his impulses

Page 44: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

Compatibilism

• There is no contradiction between freedom of the will and natural necessity– We think of the human being in different ways in each

case

• So, natural necessity, which we know a priori holds, is no threat to freedom

• Inclinations and impulses are not all-controlling• But on the other hand, we cannot explain anything

in the natural world through freedom, which is a mere idea

Page 45: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Philosophy 1 Spring, 2002 G. J. Mattey

The Limit of Moral Inquiry

• Moral feeling is not a criterion of morality• Our pure interest in the moral law (membership in

the kingdom of ends) is the basis of moral feeling• Moral feeling, in turn, is what moves us to act in the

world of appearances• But we cannot understand how something

intelligible explains something sensible• We only have an idea of a reason that serves as a

causality in and of itself• This is the limit of all moral inquiry