Ground Vehicles Rollout Brief 6mar121

8/2/2019 Ground Vehicles Rollout Brief 6mar121

1/22

Click to edit Master title


2/22


Army and Marine Corps vehicle modernization plans are at a critical junction

Planners need to take a long view, given long development times and servicelives of ground vehicles, a dynamic security environment and increasingly scarce

We have identified seven trends that suggest that the future operating environmlethal, and also less permissive to the deployment, operation and sustainment oexpeditionary forces

U.S. ground forces (especially the Army) appear likely to face serious challengesdeploy, fight, and sustain themselves that vehicle modernization by itself canno

Given the need to think through these challenges, the absence of ready technolthem, and prospective constraints on modernization funding, the ground forcesless ambitious approach to modernization, while maximizing the ability to adap

and preserving key sectors of the industrial base


3/22


1. Two central challenges to current modernization planning

a) Uncertainty

b) Austerity

2. Dealing with Uncertainty

a) Seven important trends affecting the future of land warfare

b) Their implications for ground vehicles

3. Dealing with Austerity

a) Conserving scarce resourcesb) Maximizing adaptability

c) Exploring crucial technologies

d) Protecting the industrial base


4/22

Click to edit Master title Army and Marine Corps vehicle

modernization efforts currently at a critical junction

Modernization driven by aging of systems procured in the 1980s and

additional wear and tear and lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan

A number of ambitious programs are in their relatively early, uncertain stages:

Army:

M2/M3 Bradley to be replaced with new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)

M113 family of vehicles to be replaced with new Armored Multi-Purp

Marine Corps

AAV-7 to be replaced with new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)

LAV-25 to replaced with new Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC)

Both HMMWVs, MRAPs to be replaced with new Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

HMMWV to be recapitalized as Medium Enhanced Capability Vehicle (M

None of these programs have reached Milestone B, (the point at which a design

production), so all plans are relatively flexible at this point

All are planned to be funded more or less simultaneously

DEFUNDED


5/22


Uncertainty

Given the long development times and service lives typical of

ground vehicles, planners need to think long-term20 to 30years out

Easier said than done, of course, as the world is undergoing

rapid demographic, political, economic, technological change

Austerity

Budget cuts are certain; their full extent is not

Defense cuts may not be fairly divided among the Services

Diminished resources make it more important than ever that we ge

not wrong)


6/22


Predicting the future is a fools errand

BUT it is possible to reduce the risk of surprise and

hedge against the surprise that will still (inevitably) occur Careful analysis of trends can help identify potential discontinuities

in the future security environment that could have significant

implications for the ground forces and their vehicles

Seven key trends stand out:

1. The evolution of the armor/anti-armor competition

2. The emphasis of force protection

3. The growing importance of partners

4. The proliferation of precision-guided weaponry

5. The prevalence of non-linear operations

6. The urbanization of warfare

7. The proliferation of nuclear weapons

Pessimismis intended,

pleasant

surprises

are less of

an issue

Need

op


7/22



8/22


Armor/anti-armor competition has always bthat the advantage fluctuates between anti-and vehicle protection measures

Silver bullets and invulnerability have both prove

History and recent experience in Iraq and Afsuggest that anti-armor weapons will be cheto field than the countermeasures that prote

Even non-state actors have been able to keep pace measures, as demonstrated by IED development

Active protection measures may provide a nprotection, but can likely be countered relatcheaply

Bottom Line: Looking forward, no level of ar(or other form of protection) is likely to provinvulnerability, the race will remain a close o


9/22


Force protection has become an increasingly dominant priority for the

ground forces in operations and procurement

Especially true and particularly evident in Iraq and Afghanistan,where $43.5B spent on MRAPs, $20.8B spent on JIEDDO

This appears trend appears unlikely to be reversed

Moral imperative

Maintain combat power and operational

Protect the dollars and cents value of U.S. military personnel

Preserve the affordability of the all-volunteer force by

Bottom Line: It appears unlikely that U.S. ground forces will be able to

dial back force protectionbut maintaining the desired level will

likely grow more difficult and expensive (perhaps prohibitively so)


10/22


Owing to the growing cost of projecting land po

partner capacity is a central element of our nat

strategy

No More Iraqs and No More Afghanistan

Resource constraints and the high cost of ex

operations

Play to U.S. competitive advantages

Partners will have varying levels of sophisticatio

Bottom Line: The United States may be challeng

vehicles that meet the needs and desires of part


11/22

Click to edit Master title The United States is losing its near-monopoly in precision-

guided weaponry

Next decade or two will likely see the proliferation of G-

RAMMguided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles

Two forms appear likely to emerge:

Battlefield G-RAMManti-tank guided missiles, mortars,

shoulder-mounted surface-to-air missiles, all with ranges

of roughly 20 miles or less

Theater G-RAMMcruise missiles and ballistic missiles

with significantly greater ranges (20-1500 miles)

Bottom Line: Different mixes of the two types will likely be

employed by different adversaries, but both will pose serious

tactical- and operational-level problems for U.S. ground forces


12/22


Trend in warfare is toward non-linear operat

G-RAMM could provide adversaries ability toat the tactical level (e.g. inside bases like Cam

operational level (e.g. APODs and SPODs in t

Bottom Line: The prevalence of non-linear op

especially when combined with G-RAMMhimplications for a range of ground operations

defense of formerly safe rear-area assets (e

points) and convoy operations


13/22


Demographic trends show a clear movement toward

urbanization

Urban environments challenge preferred U.S methods ofoperation

Dilute U.S. advantages in range, mobility, precision,

sensing and comms

Urban eviction and control operations typically require use

of sizable ground forces and involve protracted fights and

incurring heavy casualties

Clever adversaries will look to exploit this situation

Bottom Line: The ground forces will not be able to avoid urban

combat because it is hard, but rather will be compelled to

engage in it because it is hard


14/22


Proliferation of nuclear weapons appears li

Thresholds at which use of nuclear weaponmay change

To date, U.S. forces have not mounted conv

operations against a nuclear-armed advers

Bottom Line: Looking forward, the ground

include operations in a nuclear environmen

for which they should prepare


15/22


l k d l


16/22


As these trends play out, they will almost certainly challenge U.S. Army

Corps power-projection operations

A far more lethal operational environment

Anti-armor advantage in the armor/anti-armor competition

G-RAMM

Nonlinear operations

Urban operations

Nuclear environment

Force protection will likely remain an imperative (for several reasons)

li k di i l


17/22


But deploying and sustaining armored vehicleswhich is already challengingw

more difficult as environment becomes less permissive

The threat from anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (e.g. battlefiel

RAMM) to air and sea ports of debarkation, fixed bases, and depots could s

increase the costs in blood and treasure of deploying and sustaining large,

forces

Non-linear threats to sustainment operations will make sustaining logistica

vehicles still more difficult

The Army and Marine Corps need to develop operational concepts that will info

to deploy, fight, and sustain themselves in this environment

THIS POSES A DILEMMA TO WHICH

THERE IS NO READILY APPARENT TECHNOGICAL SOLUTIO

Cli k di M i l


18/22


Growing resource constraints require careful resource allocation

In the absence of a major breakthrough in vehicle defense technologies

large sums on developing new systems seems ill-advised

Ground forces should seek to use it up, wear it out, make it do, or do

without whenever possible by:

1. Extending the service lives and enhancing the utility of existing veh

appear well suited to future challenges and can be affordably recap

2. Procuring off-the-shelf (OTS) solutions when existing vehicles canno

modified to meet anticipated needs but OTS (perhaps modified) veh

3. Undertaking ambitious developmental efforts only when 1. and 2.cannot meet needs AND there is a high degree of assurance that a

from-scratch design will provide a discontinuous boost in effectiveness

Cli k di M i l


19/22


Given the uncertainty inherent in the future security

environment, need to mitigate its consequences by maximizing

the adaptability of new andrecapitalized vehicles

M113: 40+ variants in service 50+ years on

Several measures could enhance adaptability:

Employing an open architecture approach (easily

replaceable components, standard interfaces, etc.) that

enables plug and play of subcomponents

Designing in surplus space, weight, and power (SWaP) in

order to facilitate future modifications

Cli k t dit M t titl


20/22

Click to edit Master title Science and Technology (S&T) funding is the seed corn of future capabilities; nee

Trends suggest several priority areas for S&T investment:

Protection

Possible to reverse cost imposition equation?

Fuel Efficiency

Ground vehicles are a major source of fuel demand (roughly 1/3 of wart

High fuel consumption rates increase effects of supply interdiction and e

convoys to attack (1/8 of Army casualties related to fuel convoys)

Reduce sustainment requirements

Policy action needed: decisions need to account for the fully burden cost Robotics

Robotic systems ideal for dull, dirty, and dangerous work

Address force protection challenges

Free up trade space taken up by protective measures

Reduce sustainment requirements



21/22


Whatever modernization strategy is pursued, ground forces need to co

effects on the industrial base

Age of austerity will likely bring about contraction of the defense indus

Some design and manufacturing capability could be lost, and could be

expensive (if not impossible) to recover later

Accordingly, ground services should identify the most critical sectors of

vehicle industrial base and make a deliberate effort to sustain them



22/22


Documents

Ground Vehicles Rollout Brief 6mar121