Greek Fiscal Crisis

8/2/2019 Greek Fiscal Crisis

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Greek Fiscal Crisis:Is a First World Debt Crisis in the Making?

Dr. Kenneth Matziorinis

Dept of History, Classics, Economics

and Political Science

John Abbott College

Montreal, QC, April 16, 2010


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Is a First World Debt Crisis in the Making?

In their recent book Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), ThisTime is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly,Princeton University Press,report the findings of their recent studies based on 66 countries, across 5continents and 8 centuries of economic history.

They find that sovereign debt and default crises have actually been morecommon than we realize, that

during major episodes more than a third (33%) of countries are undergoingdefault or in the process of a serious debt restructuring

they have exhibited a continuing serial pattern of recurrence throughout history

they have involved countries from both the developing as well as thedeveloped world.

every time there is a lull experts pronounce that this time is different and yetthe cycle of defaults keeps on repeating itself

This time is No Different


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Reinhart & Rogoff report the following findings:

1) There have been long periods where a high percentage ( > 40%) ofcountries have been in a state of default or restructuring

2) Since 1800, there have been 5 major default cycles. with one ot two decadelulls in between

3) Serial default is the norm throughout every region in the world, includingAsia and Europe

4) Global economic factors such as commodity prices and center country

interest rates have played a major role in precipitating these crises

5) Periods of high international capital mobility have produced internationalbanking crises, not only as in the Asian, South American, Russian and morerecently global financial crisis, but historically

Sovereign Defaults have been a normal feature of all periods and all countries


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6) Contrary to contemporary opinion, domestic debt constituted an importantpart of government debt in most countries

7) A significant share of domestic debt was of a long-term maturity

8) The governments gain to unexpected inflation often derives at least as muchfrom capital losses inflicted on holders of long-term government bonds

9) The median duration of default spells in the post WWII period is half (3years) the length of what it was during the 1800-1945 period

Sovereign Defaults have been a normal feature of all periods and all countries


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Sovereign External Debt: 1800-2006Percent of Countries in Default or Restructuring

From Reinhart & Rogoff

Sovereign Defaults have been happening in the past and will happen in our future!


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You Should not be Surprised, This is what History Teaches us

Since its creation in 1867 Canada has never experienced a sovereign defaultor debt restructuring although we came danerously close to ones in the 1930sand again in the 1990s

Unlike most countries, Canada has experienced few episodes of excessiveinflation, the highest inflation rate ever recorded in Canada was in 1917 wheninflation reached a maximum of 23.8%

Our history of relative monetary and fiscal stability have ill prepared us tounderstand what other countries have gone through or what we may go

through in the future, but it is never too late to learn

Canadians have been fortunate enough to have escaped the ravages of major financial

defaults


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What are the Major Types of Sovereign Debt Defaults?

External debt default: Here a country defaults on its payments to foreign debt

holders. When a country runs into a sovereign debt crisis interest rates rise, capitalflows stop and the country is thrown into a severe period of economic contractionand fall in living standards.

When this happens, the country has a choice of debt repudiation which means itrenegs on its debt to foreign debt holders entirely as Argentina did recently, as the

Soviet Union did with Czarist bonds and Mexico in the 19th century or

debt restructuring and debt rescheduling which means that it sits down with itsforeign creditors and negotiates a settlement. Usually, the creditors are forced totake a loss on some portion of the debt, known as a haircut, interest rates arerenegotiated towards more favourable terms and external lending resumes

The IMF was created in 1945 to assist countries when they run into this type ofcrisis by extending emergency lending at concessionary rates based onconditionality, that the government undertakes a specific set of reforms to balanceits budget and return the country to financial solvency

External and Internal Debt Defaults


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What are the Major Types of Sovereign Debt Defaults?

Internal debt default: Here a country runs into an inability to service its debtsto its citizens but is not forced to default, because the government has thepower to print money to service its debts. This results in a rise in unexpectedinflation and results in economic stagnation -stagflation

The inflation unleashed by the printing of money reduces the real value of the

bonds held by debt holders who are its own citizens and thus the governmentlessens the burden of its debts. Inflation shifts the burden of debt from the stateto its citizens and represents the ultimate form of taxation.

The process of unwinding the sovereign debt burden results in a period ofmoderate inflation (10% - 20%) and moderate contraction. The Developed

world went through such an episode during the 1970s. Today, with centralbank independence, it is questionable to what extent central banks will allowthis to happen without breaching their inflation control mandates. If they resist,interest rates will rise.

External and Internal Debt Defaults


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Alternatives Methods for Reducing Sovereign Debt Burdens

Currency debasement: When a sovereign debtor is unable to pay its bills itmay resort to debasing its currency. In the past when metalic money was used,it came in the form of dilution in the amount of gold or silver contained in themetalic money and this ofcourse, produced inflation and resulted in adevaluation of the countrys currency

Currency devaluation or depreciation:When a sovereign debtor is unableto meet its obligations it can resort to currency depreciation. This works whena country is utilizing a flexible currency regime whereby it allows the value of itscurrency to be determined by demand and supply in the foreign exchangemarket.

Devaluation and depreciation help a country boost its exports and reduce itsimports thereby stimulating domestic economic activity and moderating thecontractionary effects on production and employment arising from the debtpressures.

Currency Debasement and Currency Depreciation


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What are the Major Precipitating Causes of Defaults

World Commodity Price Cycles: When commodity prices fall many countriesexposed to the exportation of commodities succumb to external defaults

Large Movements of Capital Flows:When large amounts of capital flow into

a country they increase its indebtedness and when the cycle ends and interestrates rise, they are unable to repay, forcing them to default

Wars:Wars -both external and civil- have always disrupted the monetary andfiscal stability of nations leading to sovereign debt defaults

and due to a relatively recent and perhaps biggest financial innovation in thehistory of banking the introduction of bank safety net i.e. liquidity insurance,deposit insurance and capital insurance that can cause a sovereign debtdefault when the losses are transferred to the state:

Financial Leverage and Banking Crises

Commodity Cycles, Large Uncontrolled International Movements of Capital, Warsand now Banking Crises


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Banking on the State to a Degree of Biblical Proportions

In a recent study for the Bank of England, titled Banking on the StateAlessandri and Haldane (November, 2009) have tabulated the total supportprovided by the US, UK and Eurozone governments to the financial sector ofthe economy

It totals over $14 trillion or almost 25% of global GDP!!!

This figure tallies the support given only to the financial sector and does notinclude the fiscal stimulus packages introduced by these governments nor thesizeable cumulative fiscal deficits that have resulted from the global economicdownturn.

The liabilities and losses from the banking crisis have been transferred to thesovereign to a degree never seen before in economic history!

Following the global financial crisis the banking system of the developed world has come torely on the state to a degree of BIBLICAL proportions


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A Role Reversal Between the State and the Banks

Alessandri & Haldane (2009) in their insightful paper state the following:

Historically, the link between the state and the banking system has beenumbilical. Through the ages sovereign default has been the single biggestcause of banking collapse

For the past two centuries, the tables have progressively turned. The statehas instead become the last-resort financier of the banks. As with thestate, banksneeds have typically been greatest at times of financial crisis.The Great Depression marked a regime-shift in state support to thebanking system. The credit crisis of the past two years may well mark

another

Then, the biggest risk to the banks was from the sovereign. Today,perhaps the biggest risk comes from the banks. Causality has reversed.

Whereas before the banks were the victims of sovereign debt defaults today the sovereignstate is the victim of bank defaults


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Government Support to Financial Industry

The support given to financial industry since the inception of the Anglo-American financialcrisis has been of biblical proportions

Source: Alessandri & Haldane, Table 1, Banking on the State, Bank of England, November, 2009

G ove rnment Support Packages to F inancia l Sector

Un ited S tates, Uni ted Kingdom and Eurozone

T rillions of U S $ U K U S A E U R O T otal

Ce ntra l Bank- "M one y cre atio 0.32 3.76 0.98 5.06

- C o llate ral swa 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.50

G o v e r n me n t

- G uarante e s 0.64 2.08 1.68 4.40

- Insurance 0.33 3.74 0.00 4.07- C apital 0.12 0.70 0.31 1.13

T otal ( % o f G D P ) 74% 73% 18% 15.16


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Implications Arising From Extension of Banking Safety Net

Alessandri & Haldane state that there is an unwriten social contract betweenthe state and the banks: state support for the banks is one side of the contract,state regulation is the other.

While the state expanded its support for the banks it has not expanded itsregulation of the banks

When banks know that the state will run to their support in times of crisis theycan afford to take bigger risks. Without more regulation they are driven toincrease their returns by taking bigger risks. When they win they keep theprofits, when they lose, it is the state that pays

We all know who is behind the state: you the taxpayer and the recipient ofpublic services. Something has gone terribly wrong with this picture

When banks win they keep the profits, when banks lose, the state takes the losses!


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World Economic Growth, 2001-2009 and Projections for2010 & 2011

The global economic downturn that followed the global financial crisis impacted the worldsdeveloped economies far more than it did the developing economies

Source: IMF WEO Update, January 26, 2010

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

0

2

4

6

8

10

-2

-4

Advanced Economies Emerging Economies World Average


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Government Budget Deficits, Percent of GDP, 2009

Budget deficits have exploded all over with the worst affected being in the advancedindustrial world

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Iceland Greece

UK Spain

Ireland USAPortugal France

Japan Czeck

Belgium Russia

Turkey ItalyNetherlands Canada


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Advanced Economies: Gross Debt-to-GDP Ratios, 2010 IMFProjections

Debt-GDP ratios have been rumped up dramatically in many countries

Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis World, IMF, February 4, 2010

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250 Percent (%) of GDP

Japan Iceland

Greece Italy

Belgium USA

France Canada

Portugal Israel

UK Germany

Ireland Austria

Netherl Spain


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Debt-to-GDP Ratios: Advanced vs. Emerging G-20 Nations, 2010

Debt-GDP ratios for advanced countries are bearly triple those of developing countries.Clearly it is the developed world that is facing a sovereign debt crisis

Source: IMF

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Advanced G-20 Emerging G-20


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Fiscal Consolidation Required to Achieve Debt Target Between2010 and 2020

IMF study has calculated that many advanced industrial countries will have to undertake ahigh degree of fiscal consolidation over the next 10 years to achive debt targets

Source: IMF, Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis World, February 4, 2010

GRC IRE JAP USA UK SPA POR FRA BEL AUS ITA GER CAN

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16Percent (%) of GDP

Degree of Fiscal Consolidation


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The Economics of Debt-GDP Ratios

Government DebtDebt-GDP Ratio = ------------------------- x 100Nominal GDP

Government (or public) debt grows when the government has a budget deficitand it stops growing when it balances its budget

To reduce the debt-GDP ratio, nominal GDP must grow faster than thegovernment debt. For this to happen, the economy must experience economicgrowth in output (real GDP), rise in prices (inflation) or both.

Low interest rates also help in that they contain the interest cost of servicingthe countrys debt and help balance the budget sooner

In the long-run demographic factors also play a role, in that a country withstagnant or declining population experiences much slower growth in its

nominal GDP and makes it harder to bring down the debt burden

Countries with higher growth rates and inflation can reduce debt-GDP ratios faster


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What are the Prospects for Economic Growth and Debt Reduction?

In light of the large debt loads advanced economies will have to undertake aseries of fiscal consolidation measures to reduce government spending andincrease taxes which will lower the growth rate of these economies for anumber of years to come

Most of these countries have high and rising age dependency ratios and low orfalling population growth rates which put additional pressures on the state andreduce the growth potential of the economies

All of these countries have expensive social and entitlement programs which

add to the burden of the state and reduce room for manuevre

The Eurozone countries are especially vulnerable because they are tied into amonetary framework that places priority on monetary control and low inflation

Growth prospects are poor, entitlements are large and the European countries have placedthemselves into a deflationary straightjacket


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Why has Greece Garnered so much Attention lately?

A country of 11.2 million and GDP of US$ 360 billion, representing 2.8% ofEurozone and 27th biggest economy in the world

Has one of the highest debt-GDP ratios in the world: 113% of GDPHas one of the highest budget deficits in the world: 12.9% of GDPHas a large current account deficit: 11.0% of GDP

Has a high degree of net foreign debt: 70% of GDPHas not had a credible financial reporting of its fiscal position Is viewed as the first domino in a potential first world sovereign debt crisisGreeces total outstanding public debt amounts to 290 billion euro If Greece were to default on its debt payments it would amount to the biggest

sovereign default in history, bigger than that of Russia and Argentina combined

If Greece were to default, it would raise fears that the crisis will spread to otherEurozone members and this could cause the collapse of the euro currency

Greece has the worst combination of high debt level, large budget deficit and largeexternal debt


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Why has Greece Garnered so much Attention lately?

Since it joined the Eurozone, it has ceeded control of monetary policy to theECB and can no longer print money

Wages have risen faster than in Germany and has not adapted its economy

rapidly enough to global competition, especially from Asia

Two of its largest industries, maritime shipping and tourism were hit stronglyfrom the global economic downturn

The Eurozone has not injected the same degree of monetary liquidity as did

the UK and the USA while the ECB has maintained a more contractionarymonetary stance than the other two central banks

The euro has appreciated by about 65% since 2001 against the US Dollar andby 47% against the Chinese Yuan

But because it part of the Eurozone, has given up control pf monetary policy andthe printing press


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10-Yr and 1-Yr Greek Government Bond (GGB) Yields: 1998-2010

Greeces entry into the Eurozone has allowed long-term interest rates to be cut in half andshort-term rates to be cut 5 -fold which stimulated borrowing

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1-yr GGB 10-yr GGB


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USD/EUR Exchange Rate Since Greeces Entry Into the Eurozone:

2001-2010Between January 2001 and January 2010 Euro has appeciated by 65% against the US Dollar,

undermining the competitiveness of Greek exports

200120012001200220022003200320042004200520052006200620072007200820082009200920102010-12

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6USD/EUR Exchange Rate

USD/EUR Exchange Rate


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Greece/euro vs UK /euro Exchange Rates:March 2008 - March 2010

Being part of the Euro Area Greeces exchange rate remains fixed compared to Euro Areamember countries while UK has allowed the Pound to depreciate against Euro Area countries

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1.1

Greece/Euro UK/Euro


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Value of US Dollar Relative to Price of Gold: 1900-2009The USA has been able to sustain its economy by debasing its currency at the cost of product and assetinflation which in recent years has produced serial asset bubbles, financial crises and international trade

imbalances. At some point this game will come to an end with devastating consequencesIndex (1900 = 20.67) Formula: ( 1 / USD Price of Gold ) x 20.67 x 100

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

1

10

100

1000

Series 1


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US GDP IN NOMINAL US DOLLARS VS. US GDP MEASURED INGOLD, 1929 - 2009

When measured in gold terms, this chart clearly shows the peaks and valeys in US economichistory since 1929 and shows that since 2000, the US economy has entered a period of

decline

30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 0 2 4 6 8 10

10

100

1000

10000

100000Trillions of US Dollars

1

10

100Billions of oz of Gold

USA GDP Current $ US GDP in Gold


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US Federal Gross, Net and Foreign Debt as Percent of GDP , 1939-2009 and Projections to 2011

US Federal debt levels have risen dramatically since the global financial crisis. Gross debt willreach 100% of GDP in 2011 and foreign debt 35%

39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94 99 04 09 11

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140Percent of GDP

Gross Debt Net Debt Foreign Debt


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US Foreign debt as percent of publicly held debt, 1969-2009

The US has been relying increasingly on foreign savings to finance its debt. In 2008, foreignborrowing accounted for over 50% of money raised to finance its debt

39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94 99 04 09

0

10

20

30

40

50

60Foreign debt as % of Publicly held debt

Series 1


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Total US Debt Outstanding: Household, Business & Government,1974-2009

Total private and public debt in the US is now 370% of GDP

1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

0

100

200

300

400 Percent of GDP

0

10

20

30

40

50

60Trillions of Dollars

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts Z1 d3Canbek Economics

Total Debt to GDP Total Debt


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Is the Greek Crisis Coming to America ?

Documents

Greek Fiscal Crisis