Greece in the EU

8/3/2019 Greece in the EU

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/greece-in-the-eu 1/14

about GREECE 145

GREECE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION A Political / Institutional Balance Sheet

byMichaelTsinisizelis

Professor, University of Athens

This balance sheet finds theEU in themidstof yetanother serious

and prolonged crisis. Rejection of the Constitutional Treatyby Franceand the Netherlands in May-June 2004 meant that the long overduereformof the working of itsinstitutions is still pending with all thenegative consequences associated with that. The situation currently seems so delicate that no easy way forward can be foreseen. Nev-ertheless a number of different scenarios have appeared by variousactors although noneseems to be gaining the necessary momentumto produce thenecessary consensus.Theso called“reflection period”seems tobe de facto extended up to 2009, the year of the next elec-tions for theEuropean Parliament. Thingshave changed considerably since the last publication of the volume at hand. The EU has already 27 members and a numberof countriesin theWestern Balkans arein a process of rapprochement with the EU. Although the further en-largement of the EU does not seem to be a popular choice, it also

necessitates a further treatyreform given that theTreaty of Nice cur-rently in force didnot anticipate more than 27 members.Neverthe-less, Greece is one of the eighteen member states that havealready ratified the Constitutional Treaty.



about GREECE146

GREECE and the WORLD

In attempting to presenta balancesheet on the relations between a

member state and the EEC, weusually have to come to termswith an immense amount of rele-vant information. Books, mono-graphs and research theses havebeen andare being produced at animpressive rate throughout andoutside the European Union. Thisholds equally true for the relationsbetween Greece and the EEC.

Here we are concerned with the po-litical / institutional affects of membership and in European pol-

icy terms with aspects of the do-mestic foundations of the Greekpolicies vis-a-visEurope. In fact,weareconcerned in this chapter withan outline ofthe main effects ofEUmembership uponthe operation of the Greek political institutions.

A HISTORICAL OUTLINEGreecewas the first countryto signan Association Agreement withthe EEC as early as 1961 (appliedfor in 1958, in force since 1962).

The “Athens Agreement” was aim-ing at the accession of Greeceinto the EEC within 22 years. TheAgreement was partly frozen for seven years (1967-1974), at theini-tiative of the Commission of theEEC, (nowadays the EuropeanCommission) as a reaction to themilitary regime that assumed pow-er in Athens in 1967 (April, 21) andre-entered into force on the restora-tion of a liberal parliamentaryregime in 1974. Almost immediate-ly (as a result of the Cyprus im-broglio and of a deepening eco-nomic crisis that was beginning toshow its teeth) the New DemocracyGovernment then in power under K. Karamanlis, crowning its novel

political project of liberal bourgeois(Mavrogordatos 1984), applied for

full membership to the EEC inearly 1975. Greece joined the EEC,as its tenth member, in 1981.

The collapse of the military regimein 1974, the “Metapolitefsis”, hashad important consequences for the political system of the country.It is probably fair to suggest thatthis was not far short ofa politicalrevolution on a numberof counts.The population became consciousof the virtues of RepresentativeParliamentary Government, sec-

ondly, in association with the for-mer, the Greek Communist Partybecame legal after almost 30 years(since 1947). Thirdly, the anticom-munistideology, a pillarof thepre-coup state was driven ad absur-dum,forthly, in completion of the“liquidation of thepast image” pol-icy pursued by theGovernment theday the monarchy was broughttoan end through the December 1974 free and fair referendum.Fifth, the composition and struc-ture of the political personnelchanged radically.

Theissue of EEC membership wasentangled in the general back-ground of xenophobia that owes itsexistence to the history of themodern Greek state -that was revi-talised and expanded in socialterms in 1974- due to British andNATO inaction to prevent or reversethe Turkish invasion of Cyprus,their alleged action to preventtheGreek army from landing on the is-land and on top of the alleged roleand support of the USA with regardto the military regime. For, a pop-ulation accustomed to real or per-ceived threats to its national in-tegrity throughout the years of its



about GREECE 147


existenceas an independent stateunder International Law, wouldbe easily drawn by arguments of the kind. Andreas Papandreou'sPASOK skillfully managed to utiliseupon this element and in thespace of seven years managed tocapture 48% of the vote and ahandsome majority in Parliamentin the 1981 elections (actually,PASOK in three consecutive elec-tions in 1974, 1977 and in 1981 al-most doubled its share of the voteeach time!). The irony of historyhad brought to power a politicalparty that was elected on a ticketto withdraw from the EEC, at thetime that Greece was becoming afull member! Ironically enough,the government of the day whichmanaged the accession of the

country in the EEC,a factwhich bynow is regarded as themost signif-icant post World War II improve-ment in the status of the country

in the international system, lost theelections held immediately after accession. Contemporary Euro-pean history abounds with suchironies starting from the 1946British General elections.

To be fair to the anti EEC forces,however, the EEC at the time rep-resented no more than a merecustoms union with a fewcommonpolicies, hitby the consecutive en-ergy crises of the ’70s and be-trothed in fierce debates internallyover budgetarycontributions. TheEMS in 1979 was the more impor-tant institutional development of theperiod butthis,to reinforce thepoint, was arranged outside theTreaty framework at the time. To befair, there was no way for PASOK or

any of the parties of the “Left”, or anybody else for that matter thatcould have foreseen the dramaticsystemic changes of the 1989 Eu-

Signing the Treaty of Greece’s Accession to the E.E.C. (1979)



about GREECE148


ropean annus mirabilis or thosethat began in the EEC a few years

later with the introduction of theSingle European Act (SEA) –1987–and the consecutive Treatychanges in the ’90s. On top of thatPASOK came to powerwith a clear social agenda as its top prioritywhich was long overduein Greecebut not easily reconciled with theconditions of the European Systemof Cooperation - in spite of the ex-istence of all sorts of non tariff bar-riers to trade not only betweenGreeceand the restof the EEC butalso in intra-EEC trade. Mitterand’s

France and Papandreou’s Greecewere singled out in the literatureas examples of the limitations of economic interdependence on au-tonomous policy making.

On top of that as Fatouros (1992)pointed out that the issue of theentry of the country into the EECbecame part in the old cleavagebetween “westernizers” and “tra-ditionalists”. This cleavage drawsits existence in the years before theindependence of the modernGreek state in 1831. This cleavagerefers to theage-old question as towhether Greece belongs to the“East” or to the “West”.The “West-ernizes” (modernizers) historicallyidentified, grosso modo, with therational inquiry and the politicalliberalism of the Continent, asometimes cosmopolitan view of the world, whereas the “Eastern-ers” (traditionalists) were repre-sented chiefly by the OrthodoxChurch advocating the defenseof the status quo, e.g. religion, tra-dition and social hierarchy. A clear indication that this cleavage isstill active, reminiscent and echo-ing perhaps of the early, but stillactive, religious cleavages in Eu-

rope,was given by the recent con-troversy over religious identifica-

tion in theIdentityCards betweenthestate and thechurch which hastormented the country for almostfourteen months after the 2000elections. On these grounds thechallenge facing the country uponentry into the EEC in 1981 was asValinakis (1994) pointed out, howto bridge the gap between its po-litical, economic and cultural iden-tity as a western European nationwithits East European location andtraditions. This rather schizo-phrenic situation probably is a

good explanatory variable of muchof the problems that the countryfaced inside the EEC/EU.

This, inter alia, may be due to thefact that the country joined theCommunity on political rather thaneconomic grounds. Certainly, itseems, the charismatic authorityand consummate statesmanshipof K.Karamanlis, Prime Minister atthe time, hasbeen instrumentaltothe success of the Greek applica-tion, as much as it was a result of the influence of the Franco (D'Es-taing) - German (Schmidt) ententein the EEC.

In Greek eyes, the new (as from1974) situation in the neighbor-hood of the country necessitatedadditional structures of support inits international relationsIn internalpoliticalterms the EEC was seen as(a) the additionalsupport requiredfor the protection of the new andfragile liberal Parliamentary regime,and (b) the political and economiccontext which would facilitate theeconomic development of thecountry. The strategy of the Govern-ment of the day was based on atheory of induced modernization,



about GREECE 149


e.g. that the country as a wholewould have to adjust to this new

and much more competitive envi-ronment or else. In short, “Right”vs. “Left”, “East” vs. “West” (andpossibly “Third World” vs. “East”and “West”), these cleavages (andtheir by-products) initially markedthe developmentof the Greco-EECrelations.

The first PASOK EEC years (1981-1989) went through a number of phases. The impassioned anti-EEC stance of the Party during itsopposition years was to a large ex-

tent responsible fora good part of the problems that the countryfaced inside the EEC. For, if any-thing this posture educated ac-cordingly the grassroots and moreimportantly the cadre of the party,that is to say the very people thatwere responsible for the creationand implementation of Govern-ment policies both in Greece aswell as in the EEC institutions.Thesecond phase of thePASOK at-titude wasmarked with the “mem-orandum to the EEC” of March1982 whose main aim has beenthe increase in funding of theGreek economy by the EEC, andthechange was completed with thesupport offered to theSingleEuro-pean Act (S.E.A.) probably themost important liberal project inthe history of the EEC/EU.

The 1989 annusmirabilis in Europeand internal developments inGreeceled to a significant changein PASOK’s attitude vis-a-vis theEEC. The collapse of theformer So-viet block and the “Europa offen-heit” policiesof the former WarsawPact countries seeking rapproche-ment with all western dominatedinternational institutions -from

NATO to the OECD- made the EECa desirable reality.The anti-impe-

rialist / anti-western attitude in PA-SOK tumbled down although resur-faces in times of crises suchas therecent Yugoslav and Gulf ones, ina large chunk of the partyand thesociety, a factthat the leadershipof that party must take into ac-count. This may be an explanatoryfactor of the reasons of the Greekinsecurity feelings during the re-cent Balkan bewilderment over the collapse of theYugoslav feder-ation and its still pending issues.This dormantlegacyof the past is

still part of the “zero point energy”political culture of the country.

The 1989 - 1990 political criseswith theformation of three consec-utive ecumenical governmentsended with PASOK loosing the1990 elections after a decade inpower and returning to oppositionuntil the premature downfall of theNew Democracy Government of the day. At the 1994 elections PA-SOK returned topower. In 1996 A.Papandreou,the founder of PASOKand Prime Minister of the countrydied, and K.Simitis was elected asparty leader and consequently asthe new P.M. The election of Simitisto the leadership of the party sig-nified a radical change to the pro-file of PASO K. The “Allagi”(Change) slogan used during thePapandreou years acquired astrong modernizing dimension,which was exemplified by a num-ber of institutional changes re-garding Education (Metarithmisi)and the Local Authorities (Kapodis-trias Program) as well as changesat the level of economic policymaking. The Simitis Governmenthelped to change the attitude of the country vis- a-vis Europe. The



about GREECE150


primary objective of the Govern-ment of the day evolved around

the entry of the country in theEconomic and Monetary Unionand the satisfaction of the Maas-tricht criteria, the change of the“blacksheep” image of thecountryin the EU.

The new Government of thecoun-try after the 2004 general electionsunder K.Karamanlis had the ardu-ous task to organize the 2004Olympic Games and conclude itsmany overdue constructions(roads, the Olympic Stadium etc.)

which naturally became its topand only priority for the best partof that year.

The new Government actively pur-sued the conclusion of the entrynegotiations in the EU of Bulgariaand Romania, continuing the poli-cies of its predecessors and veri-fying the existence of a strategicconsensus on European Affairs.For, the country is now bordering with other countries of the EU of-fering important developmentalpossibilities forsome of its less de-veloped regions in the north. Ontop of that these countries are of great economic significance giventhe important investments by4,700 Greek companies andbanks with total investments of over 14 billion Euros.

On theother Balkan frontsthe sit-uation appears to be more compli-cated as the Kossovo and Fyrom is-sues are in need of further discus-sions. Both issues are of obviousimportance for the stability of theregion although the recent renam-ing of the Petrovats airport toAlexander the Great!!! directlycontravenes the 1995 interim

agreement between the two sidesin theUN. Similarly the UN propos-

als on the future of this Serbregion does not seem to acquirethe agreement of both sides.

PARLIAMENT, STATE ANDPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONThe literature on the democraticdeficit in the EU has blown out of proportion during recent years.This hasbeen a structural problemof the EEC on account of the logicof the neofunctionalist CommunityMethod and its legal guarantees

that has helpedto shape theinte-gration process by affording roles,powers and capabilities to theEuropean Institutions and espe-cially the European Commission, inthe policy making process. Thison-going debate though hashelped tobring to a wider attention issuescentralto parliamentary democra-cies as those related to the legit-imization of the policy processes,or those that are related with thevery physiognomy of the EuropeanSystem of Cooperation and its fu-

ture directions.

It is probably fair to suggest that theoverall influence of the Parliamentin foreign policy formulation ismarginal.This is true in the case of the European Policy of Greece,which is regarded, technically atleast,as partof theinternational re-lations of the countryin spite of theoccasional declarationsto the con-trary by variousinfluentialindivid-uals inside or outside themain po-litical parties. This attitude is grad-

ually altered given theevolution of the EU system butit is fairly early toconclude on theimplications or theextentof such a change. The mostimportant function that the 1975



about GREECE 151


and the 2000 constitutions recog-nise in thefieldof foreign policy for the Parliamentis theratification of international treaties, on the countprovided for by the new art.36

para.2.

The position of the country in theEuropeanSystem of Cooperation isusually being discussedin the Par-liament on the occasion of moregeneral debates on “the stateof thecountry” between party politicalleaders,or on the eve of major Eu-ropean Councils, a practice mostlyused during more recentyears dueto the rapid developments in theEEC since the mid ’80s.

The role of the Greek Parliament inthe case of the incorporation of EEC legislation is minimal. IndeedLaw 945/1979, by which the Acces-sionTreaty was ratified, stipulates

that the final responsibility for theincorporation of the EEClegislationin theGreek Legalorder rests withthe Executive of thecountry on thebasis of the general authorisation

ofart.43 Para4 ofthe 1975consti-tution, e.g. through PresidentialDecrees. Earlier, from the periodbetween 1975-1979, during thissecond phase of the Associationyears, the Parliament has been in-volved four times in legislation of relevance to the EEC. For example,once in the Community andin thespace of nine years (1983-1993)only 31(!) laws were ratified byParliament. This number includesalso allthe major pieces of EEC leg-islation such as the Accession

Treaty, theS.E.A, and theTreaty onEuropean Union.

Parliamentary committees for thescrutinyof Community Legislation

The celebration for the 25 years of Greece as a member of the E.U.



about GREECE152


(the likes for ex. the House of Lords Select Committee on Euro-

pean Integration) or for the closestpossible involvement in EECpolicymaking of the Parliamentaryinsti-tutions (Folketing) are known for quite some time in the EEC andtheir cases are well documented.The Greek Parliamentary commit-tee on European Integration is amixed committee consisting of 24MPs (12) andMEPs (12) and one of thevice chairmen of theHouse asthe chairman of the committee(Total 25). It was set up by a deci-sion of the Chair of the House on

the 13th of June 1990. Both MPsand MEPs are voting membersand are chosen on the basis of theelectoral strength of their partiesat both the National and theEuro-pean Parliaments although theelectoralsystem is notthe same inboth instances.

Anastopoulos (1993), Makridim-itris-Passas (1992) and Spanou(2001) discussed the problemsthat the Greek Public Administra-t ion faces wit hin t he EEC.Hellinocentrism, defensive atti-tudes, a narrow financial approachas well as inflexibility are some of itsmajor shortcomings. As a resultthecredibility of theAdministrationin the EEC is seriously impeded.Passas (1993) pointsout that in or-ganisational terms the main prob-lem seems tolay in the poor coor-dination between the verticallyorganised units, the understaffing of those unitsand the wide mobil-ity of personnel mainly throughparty political activity.

As a result of EEC membership thestyle of policymaking has becomemore open involving experts fromother Departments/ Ministries as

well as independent experts.Ioakimides (2001) talks aboutthe

“de-externalisation of foreign pol-icy …in the sense that many ‘out-siders’ seek to influence foreignpolicy outcomes”.

Internally the responsibility for European issues was given to theMinistry of the National Economyand for mostof the time totheSOE–The Council of Economic Advis-ers–, a unit of strategic importancewithin the Ministry of the NationalEconomy, both of which at thetime under Minister Arsenis (as

was previously the case under Minister Manos and under thelate Minister Genimatas, Minister Papantoniou and the current Min-ister Alogoskoufis) had almostabsolute authority on issues of economic policy broadly con-ceived, following a politics/ eco-nomics dichotomy. Graduallythough under the influence of cer-tain “economism” in the percep-tions of the implications of the Sin-gle European Actand of the Treatyon European Union, but also dueto the poor comparative economicperformance of the country, theMinistry of National Economy hasacquired the best part of the re-sponsibility for European Affairs.This process of power reallocationbetween the various Ministriesbecame all the more obvious dur-ing the term of the previous Gov-ernment (1996-2000) given thevery difficult yet unprecedentlysuccessful effort to join the thirdstage of the EMU and satisfy theMaastricht criteria - a task consid-ered at the time asmission impos-sible. Reduction of Public debt, re-duction of the Public deficit, low-ering of the interest rates andmonetary and fiscal stability -



about GREECE 153


macroeconomic stabilisation- onthe basis of the 1993 and 1994

convergence programs -all thesepushed the Ministry of NationalEconomy at the centre of the game.Of course this has been a sourceof tension between the variousMinistries, which is compoundedby the fact that to all intents andpurposes the EEC Council of Min-isters is a “legal fiction”. More dif-ficult problems arise outof theal-location to the various Ministriesof funds from the Structural Funds-a sine qua non for the conver-gence and rationalisation of the

Greek economy with interesting de-centralizing implications forthe po-litical system as a whole- andthevarious financialinstruments aris-ing out of the 1988 restructuring of the Funds and the variousreformssuch as those included in theCommission’s Agenda 2000. Con-flicts between the various Min-istriesare solved at a higher level,at the cabinet level (at KISIM) or even personally by the Prime Min-ister. It must be said,however, thatin general the effectiveness of such bodies of collective respon-sibility as the cabinet (KISIM), is atbest dubious.

Considerable efforts have beenundertaken in more recent yearstochange the prevailing culture inthebureaucracy and checkthese of its aspects that are notconsideredfriendly to the citizen. The creationof the Ombudsman in 1995 andthesetting up of a numberof Independ-ent Authorities on the EU or Euro-peanmodels dealing inter aliawiththe protection of civil rights helpedto re-emphasise the obvious pointthat the citizen is at the centre of any political system and alsohelped the corroboration of political

democracy in Greece. Communityfunds are also used to modernise

the public bureaucracy throughtheapplicationof a vast number of programs introducing and extend-ing the application of informationtechnologies –e-administration–or improve theskills of civil servantssuch as for example the “Politeia”program. Transparency is slowlybutsteadilybeing introduced in thesystem but on the whole asIoakimides (2001) argued thesechanges(and othersas well) helpedto rebalance state –societyrelationsin favour of the latter. Itshould be

mentioned, however, that in spiteof the various EU initiatives on is-suestraditionally outside the polit-icalagenda,mobilisation and quan-tifiable public awareness havebeen rather low. Environmentalmovements, feminist movementsetc. or any ofthose included in In-gelhart’s typologies, do not seemto be able to mobilise citizens atany impressive rate. On top of thatpolitical parties were quick to in-clude such post– materialist issuesin their manifestos precluding thusthe development of such move-ments. Civil society is still in astate of development. Migration onthe other hand has been a totallynew issue tobe dealt within the po-litical system. Itis a directresult of the post -1989 developments andalsotouches upon the foreign pol-icy of the country. Greece has beentraditionallya laborexporting coun-trywherethroughoutthe 20th cen-tury migration flowswere recordedtowards the more developedeconomiesof thecountriesof west-ern Europe, the USA and Australiawhile repatriation flows occurredfrom the prosperous Greek commu-nitiesin Africa and the Asia minor 1.Data show that the vast number of



about GREECE154


migrant workers originates fromBalkan neighboring countries al-

though there seems to be also mi-gration flows similar to the rest of the EU.

Interest groupsThemodern Greekstate grew up ina hostile neighborhood whosecontinuous turbulence triggered aseries of political crises internally.Thus the centralization of the po-litical system was the inevitable re-sult, with the Greek state in the roleof modern Leviathan or a Colossusbutwith “feet of clay”,as Mouzelis

(1990) colorfully suggested. Tradi-tional political parties with exten-sive networks of clientelistic rela-tions, offering, inter alia, publicsector enrollment, became thechief stabilization mechanism insupport of the system.

On the EEC/EU issues PASEGESand theGovernmentof thecountry,through a process of consultation,manage to adopt a unanimousstance in the Community arenasinmost cases. This may also be ex-plained with referenceto theimpor-tance of theagriculturaleconomy of the country. Indeed, agriculturalcontributes 17.4% of the grossvalue added in Greece and ac-counts for31.3% ofthevalue of totalexports. Still 20%approx.of theto-tal labor force is employed in theagricultural sector but the number is steadily declining. The existenceof the CAP has been the chief pa-rameter of successive Governmentsin their decision to associate, joinandfinally stay in the EEC, in spiteof the comparatively poor supportfor the Mediterranean productionunder theCAP regulations.The de-fense of thenationalinterest, there-fore, requires unanimity at the EEC

level. On the other hand GSEE isoneof thetwo peakunions(theoth-

er oneis ADEDYrepresenting publicsector employees stricto sensu)and is member of the ETUC, theworkersconfederationsumbrellaor-ganisation at the EEC level.

GSEE appears at the top of an or-ganisational pyramid in which theunions of the private as well as thewider public sector (banks, com-mon utilities organisations etc.) arerepresented. Today the picture isone of extreme apportionment asthere are over 5000 first rank

unions and 84 federations. Ameasure of the lack of political au-tonomy of theorganisation maybegiven by the fact that in every in-stance until 1989 the leadership of the GSEE was of the same party po-litical affiliation as the Governmentof the country. Nevertheless, at thenational level the organisationhas developed a network of link-ages with the Ministry of Employ-ment, especially so after the Am-sterdam Treaty and theLisbon Eu-ropean Council, although currentlythecountry lacks a clear forum for the dialogue between the socialpartners. Through party politicalconnections the GSEE remainedcalm for the time required for thecountry to join the Euro zone, buttension has grown once again dueto the failed attempt by theGovern-ment to reform the social securitysystem, an item which triggered aserious party and Governmentalcrisis and which resulted in the re-formulation of the Government inOctober 2001.

The SEV (Federation of Greek In-dustries) is an active participant inUNICE and has developed closelinks with the EU institutions



about GREECE 155


through itsBureau in Brussels.TheSEV consists of mainly big indus-

tries (two out of three more prof-itable industries of the country) in-cluding those representing multi-national capital. In contrast withthe other two organisations re-ferred to above, the SEV exhibitsa higher degreeof political auton-omy which is probably better ex-plained with reference to the im-portance of its political resources,e.g. its significance in economicterms. More recently the SEV, withtheoccasionalhitches, acted as apowerful ally to the efforts to ratio-

nalise the public sector and theeconomy and attain the Maastrichtcriteria although tension betweenthe two sides grew as a result of Government hesitation to deregu-late further the economy.

Throughout the term of the previ-ous and the present Governmentunder Simitis, the quest of theadaptation of the society to thenew European environment tooka more concrete form. For it wasnot only the efforts of the countryto join the third and final stage of the EMU but also a number of ef-forts internally to streamline thevarious sectors of the economyand the society to be able toadapt best to the new and moredifficult environment. The initia-tive internally depended on thepremise that at the present stageof development of the EuropeanSystem of Cooperation competi-tion is not only about firms but ex-tends to competition of systems,modes of organisation, and finallyto roles and identities. Educationand the system of local authori-ties were chosen as the first sec-tors to adapt. Both of these initia-tives were not without problems

and revealed the limits of theadaptive capacity of the sectors

concerned and perhaps of thesociety as a whole. Wider Euro-pean initiatives such as the Sor-bonne, the Bologna, and recentlythe Prague Declarations, coincid-ed with internal reforms and trig-gered a wider debate internally.The “Ekpedeftiki Metarrithmisi” of 1997-2000 was a vigorous effort-at considerable political cost- tomodernize the educational sys-tem at all levels, focusing thoughat the secondary level (Lyceum).Party political considerations, tra-

ditional attitudes, financial con-siderations and opposition frominterest groups (OLME - DOE) ac-tive in Education -teachersunions- in defense of the statusquo stood well in the way. Inspite of the above-mentioned dif-ficulties the program was carriedthrough. Serious oppositionagainst Government initiatives toimplement agreed European widepolicies within the “BolognaProcess” on Quality Assurancewere also recorded. This was amajor initiative -and long overdue-of the Karamanlis Government inpower since 2004 with a hand-some majority in Parliament. Thenew, as from 2004, Minister for National Education and ReligiousAffairs, Mrs Giannakou, was thenext in line to introduce long overdue reforms to the laws gov-erning the country’s tertiary edu-cation, e.g. Universities and Tech-nological Universities. Constitu-tional reform and especially re-form of art.16 of the Constitutionto enable the private sector to beassociated with tertiary educationwas the last piece in Governmentsdrive to modernize the system.Again party political considera-



about GREECE156


tions and fierce opposition fromleft wing teachers unions andstu-

dent organizations stand on theway. PASOK,nowdays the main op-position party went out of its wayand abandoned the constitutionalreform process unable to manageintraparty hostility especially onthe reform of art.16 in spite of itsleadership pledge to support Gov-ernments initiative.

On theother hand “Kapodistrias”-the name of the founder of theModern Greek state- was given tothe program to rationalize the sys-

temof local authorities. The pictureof the system beforethe Kapodis-trias plan was one of extremefrag-mentation in that there existed5,999 koinotites-anything withless than 10000 inhabitants (com-munes) –and 304 demoi– any-thing with more than 10,000 in-habitants. The plan aimed at thereduction in the overall numbers torationalize the system and stream-line expenditure, given thatthesebodies heavily depend on statefunding for their survival. Althoughthe program was carried throughit is still in need of further actionfor its stabilization. In essencethe plan helped to accommodatethe EEC inspired decentralizationprocess of the political systemwhich has started off as early as1984 when the countrywas divid-ed into 13 regions forthe purposesof the EEC’s regional policy. Al-though this has been for sometime a mere administrativedivision-a nominal devolution- it was in1994 that the first sub-governmentelections were held (prefecturecouncils) which added an interest-ingnew dimension to the politicalsystem as a whole (Tsinisizelis1996, Ioakimides 2001).

PUBLIC OPINION ANDEUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Data on the public opinion cover the period from 1974 to 2000. Insome cases, the data used relateto shorter periods, as from 1981(Greek entry in the EEC).

Generally speaking Greek publicopinion is responding within thetrend recorded for the rest of theEU members although it seems tobe more responsive to develop-ments not immediately associatedwith the EU per se and which arerelated to the “zero point energy”

culture referred to above. In this re-gard I am inclined to treat thesedata with caution, especially thoserelated to the CFSP or the CFSDP.That is to say high politics, even incases not related with the EU areaffecting the attitude towards theEU itself.

A big majority was recorded infavour of the unification attemptsin W.Europe in every instance dur-ing the period 1983-2000. Of therespondents to the question

whether they were in favour of the efforts to unify W.Europe 40%on average replied that they werestrongly in favour, 30% were infavour to some extent (70% ap-prox. these two categories togeth-er), whereas only approx. 15%were found to be against to someextent or very much against theunification attempts.

In every instance during the 20years period those of the respon-dents that considered the EEC as

a “good thing” were considerablymore than those that considereditas a “bad thing” bya factorof 2.5upto 1983 and bya factorof 5 - 10from then onwards with a peak of



about GREECE 157


75% vs. 6%in 1990(a factorof 13approx). Data as to the feeling of

the respondents as to whether their country has benefited fromthe EEC show that since 1989 on-wards the percentages in favour of European Unification match withthose that feel that their countryhas benefited from the EEC. Inevery other instance up to 1989(1980 - 1993)those of therespon-dents that thought that their coun-try has benefited from the EECare moreby a factorof 2 than thosethat thoughtthe opposite. If we ob-serve the trend in both questions

we may conclude that the anti -EEC attitude is declining sharplyfrom 1990 onwards as it becameapparent that the EU is the onlyblockof stability in Europe and asthe real situation in the former So-viet block countries was becoming apparent.

A similar point can be made withrespect to the feelings of the re-spondents had the EEC beenscraped. It is only since 1988 thatthose who replied that they wouldlave been indifferent had the EECbeen scrapped were less thanthose that replied that they wouldhave been sorry! Still 10% of the re-spondents (average 1981 - 1998)declared that they have been re-lieved had theEEC been scrapped.This percentage declines thoughfrom 1986 onwards to a mere 4%in 1990from the 50% thatit stoodduring the second six months of 1982 and becomes irrelevant fromthen onwards.

The Macedonia question at itspeak at the beginning of the ‘90sand the war on Yugoslavia at theend of the ‘90s are the only in-stances during which support for

the European integration actuallydeclines. By thesame token, it in-

creases during instances that theEU is seen,as protective of the na-tional interestsof the country suchas is the case during the immedi-ate aftermath of the Helsinki Euro-pean Council with reference tothe Greco-Turkish relations. Onthe whole, available Eurobarome-ter data show that there is a widesupport for European Integration–amongst the highest in the EU–which slightly declines in time of international crises which are seenas affecting vital nationalinterests.

Similar trends are recorded in the2006 Eurobarometer Survey with57% of the respondents evaluat-ing positively the country’s partic-ipation in the EU. Greeks tend totrust the EU by a margin of 65%which is the third highest after Slovenia (70%) and Romania(67%) although 34% of the re-spondents expressed mistrust, atanyrate considerablyless than theEU average (40%).

Concluding Remarks

Greecehas been a member of theEEC / EU twenty six years. Nowa-days, thesituation seems to havebeen stabilisedsince the three ma-jor parties in Parliament,e.g. NewDemocracy, PASOKand the smaller Alliance of the Left (Synaspismos)are unanimous that the countrymust positively adapt in the newEuropean environment and thisat-titude is uniquocally supportedby a huge majority of the popula-

tion. With the exception of thesmall Greek Communist Party noother party denies European Inte-gration.



about GREECE158


TheEuropean policyof Greeceispri-marilytheresponsibility of theGov-

ernment of the country. At thesoci-etal level the pattern seems thesame:partypoliticalinterventionen-sures that no otherform of politicalrepresentation is capable of chal-lenging that authority. At the Euro-pean leveltherelations betweentheGovernment and the organised in-terests still project“a billiard ballim-age”as differentactorspromotethesame positionsin differentfora.Toa certain extent this is a structuralproblem in thesensethat thediffer-ing levelsof economic development

between Greeceand the other EECmember states facilitate a com-promise internally on the need for pore resources from the variousCommunityfunds.Thishasbeen themainconcern of theGreekEuropeanpolicy since 1981. Internally, al-though improvements are requiredin a number of issues, the politicalsystem has become more open,more transparent and less cen-tralised throughitsEU membership.

European and International reali-ties have considerably altered

since the entryof the country in theEEC /EU. In the spaceof just fifteenyears the original EEC treatieshave been extensively modifiedcreating a system of multilevelgovernance in search of its phys-iognomy. The country even con-templates to join in any high pol-itics enhanced cooperation struc-tures that may appear. This de-notes the tremendous changesthat this country has undergonefroma state ofdenial tooneof themore pro-integrationist member

states.

1 I am notreffering to repatration flows asa result of Balkanor Grec0-Turkish warssuch as in 1922.

USEFUL LINKS

www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/European+Policy

Documents

Greece in the EU