Greater Caspian Project 22

CONTENTS

22

EDITORIAL

CYBER-PREPPING THE BATTLEFIELDDOES RUSSIA HAVE A NEW WAY TO WAGE WAR?LAURA GARRIDO

THE MATURATION OF THE SCOAN EMERGING IO OF SIGNIFICANCEDR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S GEOPOLITICSGIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

GREAT GAINS OR GREAT GAME?GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT ACROSS CENTRAL ASIAKEVIN AUGUSTINE

NEW GROUNDS FOR WARHOW THE POWER OF SIBERIA PIPELINE IMPACTS THE ARCTICALEXANDER S. MARTIN

GROWING MILITARIZATION IN ARCTIC AMID INCREASING DISPUTESBAHAUDDIN FOIZEE

CALLING OUT ‘BLUFF DIPLOMACY’RUSSO-PERSIAN MANEUVERS TO OUTWIT OBAMAANDY DEAHN

COMPETING COLD WARSTRYING TO PREDICT IRANIAN STRATEGIESSTEPHEN SARTY

AN ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S ELECTIONSGIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

MORE BEAR THAN EAGLERUSSIA TAKING ADVANTAGE OF AN AMERICAN VACUUMNENAD DRCA

SYRIA AND THE RETURN OF ‘SOVIET’ RUSSIADR. ABDUL RUFF

CHECHNYAAN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUSANTONY CLEMENT

PUTIN, DUGIN AND THE COMINGWILD RIDE ON LEVIATHANJOHN CODY MOSBEY

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THE grEaTEr CaSPIaN PrOJECTBI-WEEKLY DIgITaL EDITION

www.moderndiplomacy.eu [email protected]

Dimitris GiannakopoulosModern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief

Dr. matthew CrosstonThe Caspian Project, Director

authors

“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

t is a strange thing to contemplate how the worldseems to obsess on everything ‘new’ while suppos-edly always remaining true to ‘old’ strategies, ideals,and approaches. This is most certainly the case in

the world of conflict and cooperation: for every new in-vention or arrival of a new epoch the 21st century is sup-posed to bring us, we never seem far removed fromthinking that has always gotten us into trouble as aspecies. This issue of the Greater Caspian Project looks at a broadarray of cases that illustrate this phenomenon. We con-sider innovative ways to look at the aftermath of theJCPOA, at Arctic exploration, and new Russian foreignpolicy thinking. We dive into larger problems that extenddeep into the Middle East and clearly impact the Euro-pean Union and United States. In each instance we beginwith an assumed supposition by the global communitythat these challenges are somehow new and novel andunique. And in each case our analyses break down howeven novelty can still be subsumed by old biases andlong-standing prejudices.

This can be very disheartening for anorganization like Modern Diplomacy,the parent of the Greater Caspian Proj-ect, so interested in seeing new con-nections and pathways develop forthe interests of greater, broader, anddeeper peace and understanding. Un-fortunately, as this issue will show ourreaders, old habits die hard: diplomacyis not always for cooperation; explo-ration is not always for more opportu-nity for all; engagement is not alwaysaltruistic. One thing all of us affiliatedwith the Project continue to hope for,even if it is a small hope indeed, is thateven when things look bleak or ouroptimism in the human agents con-ducting global affairs dims consider-ably, the effort to continue to exposeour readers to knowledge, to new per-spectives and outlooks, will shine abrighter light and construct newerpathways that seemed impossible be-fore. Otherwise, to analyze the ways ofwar and peace, of life and death,would be a hopelessly depressing ven-ture. So here is to No. 22 and to all ofour readers: shine the light of analysisand knowledge into the darkest anddimmest corners. The world needs it.The world needs you.

STUMBLING INTOA CONFLICTED FUTURE

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

MD Advisory Board Vice-Chairman, Director, The Caspian Project

I

THE GREATER CASPIAN PROJECT 22

CYBER-PREPPING THE BATTLEFIELD

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Does Russia have a New Way to Wage War?

ccording to the Bloomberg report,Russia may leverage vulnerabilities incritical infrastructure, including largebanks, stock exchanges, power grids,

and airports, as pressure points against the West.Ashmore (2009) says the future of Russian cyberwarfare is offensively poised. Mshvidobadze (2014)also claimed that analysts examining espionagemalware of apparent Russia origin indicate a prepa-ration of the battlefield for cyber war.

Russia is developing information warfare capabili-ties such as computer network operations, elec-tronic warfare, psychological operations, deceptioncampaigns, and mathematical programming im-pact. Ashmore (2009) agrees that Russia is develop-ing new information war strategies with the use ofhackers that support Russian government informa-tion specialists, providing Russia with assets to useduring future cyber conflicts.


AHeickero (2010) also identifies the main organiza-tions responsible for offensive and defensive cybercapabilities as the Federal Protective Service (FSO),the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Main In-telligence Directorate (GRU). Russia’s approach toinformation warfare and information operations dif-fers from that of Western countries to some extent.Russia sees information as a valuable asset that hasstrategic value and is a key factor for the stability ofthe state, for the regime, and for influential actors.

According to Dr. Matthew Crosston, one of the lead-ing experts both in cyberwar and Russian foreignpolicy, part of the reason why Russia is such a majorthreat to the United States is not only its increasingcapabilities but the reasoning and psychology be-hind its attacks and development of such capabili-ties. Russia’s purpose in developing cybercapabilities seems to be predatory in nature.

LAURA GARRIDO

Laura Garrido is currently finishing her Master’s degreein the International Security and Intelligence StudiesProgram at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska,

USA. Her primary research interests coverthe post-Soviet space and the fight

against radical Islamism.

This predatory purpose is heavily influenced by “thefact that much of the power dominating cyber ca-pability in the Russian Federation is organized andcontrolled by federal security agencies but alsoquasi-outsourced to criminal groups, sometimes in-dependently and sometimes in strict conjunctionwith governmental oversight.” Crosston also notesthe cynical cyber mindset of Russia is somewhatcontrolled by short-term thinking that has massiveprofit and political power-wielding motives.

While not all cyberattacks originating in Russiacome from the state, Russia has been seen as a safehaven for cyber criminality directed against foreigninterests and to some extent domestic cyber crimi-nality. Many have pointed out that Russia has notacted resolutely enough to deal with these lawbreakers. Thus, what makes Russia especially dan-gerous, according to Mshvidobadze (2014), is thecollusion between the Russian state and cyber crim-inals. Criminal operators confound attribution andhone their skills on criminal activity, which ends upbeing a cost-effective reserve cyber force availableto the state when needed.

There has also been a conjoining of criminal andgovernmental malware which could result in evenmore potent cyber weapons. All together thismakes Russian cyber espionage widespread, hardto detect, difficult to attribute, and costly to counter.

Heickerö (2010) pointed out Russian strategy em-phasizing the importance of information warfareduring the initial phase of a conflict to weaken thecommand and control ability of the opponent. Thiswas evident in the 2007 attacks against Estonia andthe 2008 attacks against Georgia. Some calculatethis was also extensively used during the interven-tion in Syria in 2015. To add to this, Herzog (2011)claimed that the severity of the Estonian attacks wasa wake-up call to the world. It showed that poten-tially autonomous transnational networks, such asstate-sponsored, pro-Kremlin hacktivists, couldavenge their grievances by digitally targeting thecritical infrastructure of technically sophisticatedstates. Herzog suggested that enhancing cyber se-curity and creating new multinational strategiesand institutions to counter cyber threats was essen-tial to the sovereignty and survival of states.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

analysts examining espionage malware of apparent Russia origin indicate a preparationof the battlefield for cyber war

The biggest challenge, however, is striking a bal-ance between Internet freedom and maintainingadequate early-warning monitoring systems.Cordesman and Cordesman (2002) criticized thedisconnect between US cyber-defense and cyber-offense. This was later expansively enhanced by thework of Crosston (2011; 2013; 2014) This conceptualanalytic disconnect permeates US governmental ef-forts and the response of state and local authorities,the private sector, and non-governmental organi-zations. They believe in a need for a “comprehensiveannual net assessment of cyber threats that com-bines analysis of the threat that states present interms of cyberwarfare with the threats that foreign,domestic, and non-state actor groups can presentin terms of cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism.”

Ashmore (2009) believes that the internationalcommunity should work together to track and pros-ecute cyber criminals that operate outside thecountry being attacked. Also, Ashmore (2009) be-lieves that nations should “work together to sharetechnical data to maintain cyber defenses and keepup with the newest and ever-changing cyber-at-tacks” because individual hackers usually share in-formation on new techniques that can penetrate ITdefense structures. This prescription, however, re-quires enormous amounts of trust from both sides,which is hard to ask for even amongst allies. Whilethe international community should come togetherto secure cyberspace, it is a completely differentballgame to ask states to share their defense tech-niques. Not only could this information be used toidentify vulnerabilities in their defenses, if the infor-mation is stolen by hackers, it could be used againstthese states and in turn applied to the hackers’ net-works to make countermeasures impotent.

Another prescription offered by Ashmore (2009) isthe creation of laws that make cybercrimes illegalwith the hope that the punishments would deterpotential cyber criminals. The problem with this isthat there is already plenty of laws criminalizinghacking and cyber espionage, none of which haveslowed the frequency of cyberattacks. Will new lawsprevent the average middle-class Joe from sendingvicious malware to his ex-employer out of spite?Maybe. Will new laws prevent criminal hacktivistsfrom launching a politically motivated attack totheir adversary’s networks? The answer is mostlikely no. Just as terrorists continue to murder,maim, and rape their victims regardless of the lawsthat forbid such actions, those who want to hacklikely will. It does not matter what laws are in place.It is this innate internal motivation of the hackerthat states like the Russian Federation count on andstrategically utilize. For the most part, Russia is theundisputed leader in this newly politicized world ofthe dark net.


MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

THE MATURATION

OF THE SCOAn Emerging IO of Significance

ANONYMOUS is currently a graduate studentin International Security and Intelligence Studies

at Bellevue University and works withinthe US governmental system.

The opinions expressed are strictly personaland do not reflect a formal endorsement

of or by the United States’ governmentand/or Intelligence Community.


DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

Advisory Board Vice-Chairman, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science,Director of the International Security and Intelligence

Studies Program, and the Miller Chairat Bellevue University

he United States has long been the dom-inant economic-security structure in theworld. It steps in to negotiate interna-tional trade agreements such as the Trans

Pacific Partnership. Its military is relied upon to trainNATO troops and forces from Iraq to Colombia onhow to manage uprisings, terrorism, and invasions.Its Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) trains othercountries’ law enforcement units about counter-narcotics trafficking and other anti-crime measures.Its Secretary of State and President are often calledupon to negotiate peace treaties and conflict set-tlements. However, with new nations rising to become pow-erful economic and military blocs in their own right,the United States may have new allies it can rely onto manage regional matters or, conversely, havenew contenders to push into the power market andthreaten America’s standing as the only globalsuper power. The direct threat to US influence ineconomic trade or military matters will not likelycome from Russia or China independently. The con-cern, rather, is an ever-strengthening alliance whereRussia and China come together to oppose Westerninfluence with other like-minded nations. One suchalliance to emerge in the next decade is likely theShanghai Cooperation Organization, which com-bines China’s economic power with Russia’s militaryassertiveness.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) wascreated as a Eurasian political, economic, and mili-tary organization in 2001 between China, Kaza-khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan. It was originally focused just on theCentral Asian region but it has rapidly expanded itspurview. In 2016, the SCO decided to admit Indiaand Pakistan as full members and they are expectedto join within the next year. Afghanistan, Belarus,Iran, and Mongolia are considered observer stateswhile Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, SriLanka, and Turkey participate as dialogue partners.The SCO established formal relations with theUnited Nations where it is an observer in the Gen-eral Assembly, alongside the European Union, As-sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), TheCommonwealth of Independent States, and the Or-ganization of Islamic Cooperation.

The SCO largely focuses on economic trade oppor-tunity and security in the Central Asian region. Ini-tially, the organization was mostly oriented towardsChina’s interest in better economic trade. It hassince broadened that focus to also build economicopportunities beyond the region and into the Per-sian Gulf. Iranian writer, Hamid Golpira stated, “ac-cording to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s theory, control ofthe Eurasian landmass is the key to global domina-tion and control of Central Asia is the key to controlof the Eurasian landmass…thus, Russian and Chinahave been paying attention to Brzezinski’s theorysince they formed the SCO in 2001, ostensibly tocurb extremism in the region and enhance bordersecurity, but most probably with the real long-termobjective of counterbalancing the activities of theUnited States and NATO in Central Asia.”

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

T

In 2004, the SCO established the Regional Antiter-rorism Structure (RATS). RATS is funded by the SCOand has a permanent staff of 30 with an initialbudget was $2.6 million. Since then its budget hasincreased considerably. RATS is primarily a hub ofinformation exchange between the security serv-ices of SCO members and conducts extensive ana-lytical work. The 30 RATS staff includes seven fromRussia and China, six from Kazakhstan, five fromUzbekistan, three from Kyrgyzstan, and two fromTajikistan. RATS was established to fight the “threeevils”- terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Oneway this is supposedly done is by disrupting cross-border drug crimes, taking away economic oppor-tunity and illicit finances. The SCO has also conducted joint military exercisesthat the organization claims are transparent andopen to the media and public. As SCO’s counterter-rorist arm, RATS advises members on operationaltraining, drafts international legal documents tocombat terrorism, and is compiling a database ofsuspected or known terrorists and extremists forSCO-member use. The RATS committee participatedin drafting the action plan on the implementationof the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Cen-tral Asia and sought to strengthen counter-terror-ism cooperation with ASEAN. In addition, RATSreportedly assisted with security for the 2008 Bei-jing Olympics, the 2010 World Expo, and the 2011Asian winter games. RATS also supports security ef-forts and military training exercises for SCO mem-bers. China and Russia send the majority of troopsparticipating in such games. However, all of themembers are welcome to participate in these train-ing exercises with topics ranging from peacekeep-ing activities to anti-terror exercises.

All are joint efforts and depict scenarios such as dis-rupting and defeating hostage-takers, stormingbuildings and villages, and forcing down hijackedairliners. The main benefit to the members is thattheir military and security services practice tacticsand weapons-handling while also gaining useful ex-perience working with other countries on coordi-nated planning, command and control, logistics,and maneuvers. In 2008, for example, an exercisedepicted neutralizing terrorists who had seized anoil tanker and its crew while another focused on re-pelling a simulated attack on a nuclear reactor.

The concern, is an ever-strengthening alliance whereRussia and Chinacome together to oppose Western influence withother like-minded nations


Another extraordinary agreement between RATSmember states is the ability to extradite criminalsacross borders. In other words, RATS members cancarry out abductions across national boundariesand outside of standard judicial procedures. Thishas been compared to the CIA’s practice of extraor-dinary rendition and allows members to detain sus-pects across the six participating states.Furthermore, the members’ agents are not subjectto criminal liability for any actions committed in thecourse of their duties and are immune from arrestand detention within the six states.

Finally, the SCO RATS has held several conferencesthat allow for coordination between the UN, ASEAN,NATO, EU, G8, and Organization of the Islamic Con-ference on critical issues like the lack of security anddrug-trafficking in Afghanistan.

The conference in 2009 developed a framework forthe SCO-Afghanistan Action plan, which called forjoint operations to combat terrorism, drug-traffick-ing, and organized crime. It involved relevantAfghan bodies to take part in joint law-enforcementexercises led by the SCO, as well as provided meas-ures to improve drug agency training and borderpatrols. A successful raid in 2010 by Russian, US, andAfghan forces against drug labs in Afghanistan wasactually an example of international cooperationlaunched in the region by the SCO. In 2010, RATSsigned a Protocol of Cooperation with the CentralAsian Regional Information and Coordination Cen-ter (CARICC) to combat drug-trafficking, trans-bor-der drug crime, and subsequent terrorist-relatedfinancing. The CARICC was originally established in2006 between Central Asian nations, the UN Officeof Drugs and Crime, and Russia. In 2015, China’s For-eign Minister Wang Yi officially reaffirmed the SCO’scommitment to becoming a regional securityleader by calling for the organization to take a largerrole in regional security and stability during a meet-ing of foreign ministers held in Moscow.

Once a group globally dismissed as an internationalorganization in name only, the SCO has slowlyevolved and deepened its power relevance withinthe constituent member states. As it continues togrow its ranks and develop deeper ties of influencewithin each member, the SCO has the chance to be-come an IO that actually wields an impressive port-folio of legitimate security, economic, and traderesponsibilities. While there are still obstacles andtensions between the member states that hinderthis future potentiality, it is nonetheless importantthat the SCO can no longer be considered a joke onthe global stage.

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n a now famous speech delivered at the Con-ference on Security, held in Munich in 2007,Vladimir Putin harshly clarified the structuraldeterminants of his foreign policy. Let list

them briefly: according to President Putin, Russiadoes not tolerate in any way the encirclement thatthe Atlantic Alliance carried out and still carries outat the edges of the old Warsaw Pact.

Putin is not even convinced – and his argumentcannot be faulted - that the network of sensors,radars, ICBM missiles currently operating aroundthe Federation is bound to manage "instability inthe greater Middle East".

I

THE RUSSIANFEDERATION’S

GEOPOLITICS

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italianeconomist and businessman. He holds prestigious

academic distinctions and national orders.Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and

economics at the world’s leading universities such asPeking University, the Hebrew University of

Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

Moreover, Putin believed, and still believes, that theinternational system should only be based on thelawfulness of the United Nations and the otherglobal agencies rather than on NATO and EU only,as the Russian President said to the Italian Ministerof Defence at that time. Or on the coalitions of thewilling that had unleashed - with adverse and un-expected effects - the US (and Saudi) actions in theFirst and Second Gulf War, by wiping out a Russiantraditional ally, namely Iraq, to create the void ofbands, gangs and regional powers on a territoryturned into "no man's land", for oil in particular.

Putin still remembers when the Head of the US pro-visional government in Baghdad created a systemfor road signalling which was very similar toBoston’s. For the Russian President, the Americanunipolarity is the warning sign of the strategic voidat the edges of empires, with incalculable negativeeffects for the future strategy of global leaders, eventhe United States themselves. Furthermore, againin Munich, Putin stated he was extremely interestedin an agreement with the United States for the re-duction of the ICBM missile systems, to be later ex-tended also to other regional players.It had to be anegotiation to be carried out in strictly bilateralterms and within the UN bodies, and not delegatedto other regional alliances.

Hence a "conventionalization" of confrontationwhich, for the Russian President, avoids the con-stant nuclear threat and allows a significant reduc-tion in military spending, which will no longer betargeted to an impossible bilateral and final post-cold war confrontation, but to the control and re-duction of the peripheral clashes of the Statesplaced in the Rimland, in the peripheries of the oldopposing blocs.


Once again there is special attention paid by Russiato the destructive effects of a future unipolar world:no power alone can control the world but, if it doesso, it generates polarizations paving the way for aterrible war. In those years the Iran case was evi-dent. For Russia, the future world must be multipo-lar, especially at a time when the United States havelost their geo-economic primacy and hence, basi-cally, globalization is over. Indeed, it must be put toan end.

And Europe? Will it wait for the crumbs of the TTIP,namely the still secret Treaty with the United States,to believe it can expand its economy or will it beginto really think big, which, indeed, should be its roleat global geoeconomic level?

Finally, after some very harsh comments on the USbehaviour, in Munich Putin said that the unduepressures to export "democracy" were, in fact,

bad forms of interference, together with interna-tional NGOs, which produced the opposite effect.This means weak and viable States which are at themercy of expensive international aid, as well as Tro-jan horse of multinational companies that subse-quently generate further social tensions which, insome cases, lead to the rooting of Islamist terrorism.An objective and well-grounded analysis which -with Machiavellianism and the harshness of theRussian decision-makers, from Peter the Great tothe current time - avoids the rhetoric of fierce"tyrants" by nature, or the curse of religious ideolo-gies ad memoriam which only lead to jihadists’hegemony.

In Munich as currently, courage was needed to cre-ate a linkage between the global economic disas-ters and jihadist terrorism, as well as betweenglobalization, unipolar policies, and social and po-litical destabilization in the world.

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For Vladimir Putin, in substance, the unipolar worldended with the crisis of what we might define "thefirst globalization", cornered by the expansion ofChina, the BRICS and the other new centres of inde-pendent economic and political developmentwhich, over time, saw the United States be boggeddown in a financial crisis that was directly derivedfrom the geopolitical and financial overstretch ofthe only winner of the Cold War.Today, we realize that some of the Russian Presi-dent’s prophecies have come true: China is expand-ing geo-economically beyond its borders, both withthe One Road, One Belt initiative, which will lead tothe economic development and geostrategic unifi-cation of the whole Asian Heartland, and with theShanghai Cooperation Organization, which isbound to turn from an "Asian EEC" into a real "East-ern NATO". The United States, with current PresidentObama and his successor after the elections, areleaving the Middle East to its fate. This, however, willalso be the end of Europe.

The traditional American pendulum swinging be-tween the "necessary power" to be spent every-where and the "house on the hill", between T.Roosevelt and Monroe doctrine of the 'kitchen gar-den", to be fully exploited up to its limits. Even Israel,which with Prime Minister Netanyahu has refused ameeting with President Obama in Washington onMarch 18, has resumed its ties with Russia. TheKnesset, namely the Jewish State’s Parliament, paida visit to Crimea early February, while the RussianForeign Minister Lavrov has expressed his dissatis-faction with the new bilateral agreement betweenIsrael and Turkey.Israel follows its own Global Strat-egy, which is the repetition of the old divide andrule strategy in the Arab region, typical of the ColdWar, and its natural ambition to become a regionalpower, now that the Islamic world discovers itself atwar with all its many souls and powers.

Currently Israel closely monitors the defensive in-frastructure along its Syrian border and, while at thebeginning of hostilities, it thought that Bashar al-Assad was the ''weak link" of the pro-Iranian axis,the subsequent evolution of the strategic frame-work in Syria has meant that Israel has no longerplans to support the so-called "moderate rebels" -a stance at the time passively inherited from theUnited States.Also the United States, with NATO, believed that theRussian support for the Arab Syrian Army would betechnologically and strategically irrelevant but thereality, with the Baath covert networks already op-erating in Raqqa, the "Caliphate’s capital city", andAssad’s forces a few kilometres away from that cityand now placed all around Aleppo, the key to thelink between Isis and Turkey, shows us a very differ-ent course of events.


today both Chinaand Russia tend to expandonto their “near abroad”,with a view to opposing the US unilateralorder

With its actions in Syria, the Russian Federation hasproved to be a credible opponent of the Atlantic Al-liance, while NATO is now deprived of a strategy inthe Middle East and the Maghreb region going be-yond the old peacekeeping rhetoric.Hence, a new Russian-Israeli axis is likely to materi-alize, also thanks to the Russian and Chinese invest-ment in the Israeli hi-tech sector, which is the mostadvanced in the world. A bond which, as alreadyhappened, fills the gaps left by the old North Amer-ican hegemony, which now persists in maintainingpressures around China, so as to limit its terrestrialand maritime power projection, and encircle theRussian Federation, as in a resurgence of uselessCold War.

The Philippines have offered six new bases to theUnited States, while China has built its new base inDjibouti and America is establishing a network ofSpecial Forces that, starting from Eurasia and China,is global for its outreach and use.In this regard, it is worth recalling John MaynardKeynes’ witty remark according to which "the diffi-culty lies not so much in developing new ideas asin escaping from old ones". The issue arises fromEurasia’ encirclement – that the Americans are pur-suing - or from the Russian use of the EurasianHeartland as hub for the expansion and hegemonyof the new Russia (and current China led by Xi Jin-ping).Today Putin is the most careful follower of theAmerican geopolitician Spykman, one of the mas-ters of the USSR containment, which attached pri-ority to the "edges" of the world's great continentalland masses.Furthermore, today both China andRussia tend to expand onto their “near abroad”,

with a view to opposing the US unilateral order,both by means of the economy, considering China’sgradual relinquishment of its role as first buyer ofUS Treasury bonds, and with Russia’s “conquest” ofthe Middle East nerve centre.

Both new powers, which want to become the refer-ence poles of a new multipolar world, are divestingdollars and buying gold, while now the current do-mestic imbalance in world markets enables Chinato sign contracts denominated in yuan-renminmbiwith emerging countries and enables Russia to selloil and gas to the small "third" powers and to Chinaitself, thus offsetting the embargo imposed by theUnited States and Great Britain. Hence a new distri-bution of world strategic polarities can be imaginedin the near future. It is an axis going from Russia, theWestern strong point of the new Chinese Silk Roadtowards the Middle East, and the European Union,so as to oppose the pro-US Sunni axis in Syria, witha new independent role played by Israel.

Russia is still afraid of the US Global Strike, with orwithout NATO support. Moreover, as early as theMunich Conference of 2007, Russia has attached es-sential importance to the decoupling between theAtlantic Alliance’s power, which Putin sees as partof the US global strategy and projection of US inde-pendent power.Furthermore, the Russian Federa-tion will at first be connected with India in a stableway, so as to expand its own international market,and later with the EU, which is currently undergoinga process of strategic separation from the UnitedStates, if and when Europe implements an effectiveforeign policy. Later it will head for the areas not yetpenetrated by the Western bloc.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

These areas are the Arctic, and the Russian share ofthe Antarctic, namely the primary aim of the Russ-ian new maritime doctrine until 2020, and finally its“near abroad” that Russia sees destabilized by thedoctrine of the US "colour revolutions".

Moreover, NATO expansion is regarded by Russia asthe primary threat to Russian strategic interests, inthe new military doctrines followed by the RussianArmed Forces. Hence destabilizing the Rimland ofthe great continental aggregates to directly hit Rus-sia or China? Are Italy and the European Union reallyinterested in doing so? I do not think so. For theRussian strategic doctrine, a particular factor is thecultural and symbolic aspect. Eurasianism is themainstay of Russia's geocultural issue.The Soviet world has always seen cultural continuitybetween Western Europe and the "Third Rome"which, in the last Tzars’ political theology, was heirto the genuine tradition of a betrayed and forgottenWest, in its deep and spiritual roots.

Even the Bolshevik revolution, long after Peter I andTsar Alexander II, preserved the myth of equalizing,also violently, old Russia and its natural link with theWestern spirit, merged with the popular and "orien-tal" traditions of the Narod, the Russian “people",seen as the spiritual root of the Nation, of its speci-ficity, but also of its heritage of merger betweenEast and West.

Therefore, today, the philosophical Eurasia is a cul-tural and strategic model of autonomy of VladimirPutin’s Russia, an attempt at cultural interconnec-tion between the Eurasian peninsula and the SlavicHeartland.

All this, with a view to creating a geo-cultural andmilitary "environment", referring to a Russia whichis still a great power capable of performing its func-tion as a bridge between nations and traditionalgeopolitical areas, through the Russian spirit and itscultural autonomy.

lexander Cooley in his book, GreatGames Local Rules, describes a newgreat game where the post-sovietstates of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajik-

istan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan take ordersfrom Moscow, Washington, and Beijing. He de-scribes this geopolitical concept as a race in whichthe winner vies to take all in a battle to secure vitalstrategic interests.This great game metaphor is appealing because itsuggests that great powers still attempt to sway, co-erce, persuade, and buy the loyalties of strategicallyvital governments.

KEVIN AUGUSTINE

Kevin Augustine is a graduate studentin the International Security and Intelligence

Studies Program at Bellevue Universityin Omaha, NE, USA.

A

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However, the new great game remains deeplyblinding. Cooley mentions that as times havechanged, so have the rules. Instead of dealing withlocal rulers, warlords, and chieftains, outside powersmust now deal with nation-states and Presidents.These nation-states have inherited certain interna-tional privileges and opportunities that their earliercounterparts lacked. Cooley is correct to use thegreat games local rules metaphor in describing thecurrent situation in Central Asia. However, a bettermetaphor, great GAINS local rules, given the currentsituation and differing perspectives in Central Asia,is even more accurate.

The great powers involved in Central Asia have dif-ferent security, economic, and political goals. Thegreat game of long ago was for power and control.Much of the contemporary battle viewed today isin securing the Central Asian region and adjacentregions to enable national economic interests andcertain natural resources. These national economicinterests often lead to conflict.

According to Cooley, the Central Asian states havelearned to play the great powers off one another fortheir local benefit. However, their exact tactics anddemands depend on the institutional structures, ca-pacity, and natural resource endowments be-queathed to them as independent states. HalvorHaggenes, in his thesis on Central Asia’s missingwar, states that natural resources can act as both amechanism for peace and armed conflict and thusit is never certain whether these new states willerupt into violence following the dissolution of theSoviet Union, even though many experts have pre-dicted this for a generation.

In fact, Central Asia has not seen any more violentconflict than other areas of the former soviet union(FSU) and some would argue that it has been re-markably stable, at least compared to the Caucasusand Southern Russia. However, unequal distributionof natural resources in the region is still a troublingsource of potential conflict.

GREAT GAINS OR GREAT GAME?


Global Engagement across Central Asia

Haggenes rightly pointed out that resource scarcitymay just as well lead to conflict, especially if com-bined with other more justifiable security-orientedfactors that can easily piggy-back on top of eco-nomic motivations and stimuli.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are both rich in oiland natural gas. Their engagement with outsidepowers has been mostly focused in developingtheir respective energy sectors. (Cooley) However,the countries are starkly different in how they pur-sue relationships and cooperation. Kazakhstan ismore willing to build an international reputationand secure international approval for its policies.Turkmenistan, on the other hand, decided duringNiyazov’s rule to completely isolate itself from un-wanted sovereign interference and meddling. (Coo-ley)Uzbekistan with some natural resources and havingthe largest population of the region competes withKazakhstan for the mantle of most important Cen-tral Asian state.

Uzbekistan has a slight transportation/transnationalengagement advantage to the above-mentionedcountries in the fact that it borders Afghanistan andevery other central Asian state combined. However,the country has also at times clashed with the Weston certain economic, military and political issues.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are resource-poor and in-creasingly weaker than the other Central Asianstates and have failed to attract the interest of majorinternational investors to a large degree. However,the attempted engagement of these states with for-eign powers has led to increasing military-to-military cooperation by providing access to localmilitary bases. In this sense both the Kyrgyz andTajik governments have commodified their very ter-ritory to extract economic and political benefits.(Cooley) The fact that these countries are hostingmilitary facilities for countries like Russia, France,India, and the US can arguably lead to tension if notoutright conflict for the local and major players in-volved.

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Foreign powers are seeking to improve the region’ssecurity and hope to stabilize adjacent regions. Thisis their most important strategy. Simultaneously,the big three are also looking to secure certain re-sources for themselves, in particular oil and gas. Outof the three, China may be the only foreign powerto secure major access to oil and gas in Central Asia,especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and hasrapidly completed the construction of new regionalpipelines to transport this energy supply eastward.(Cooley) This success, however, could lead to con-flict with neighboring countries that are resource-scarce and looking at ways to capitalize on what isbecoming a truly global, transnational new SilkRoad economic path to prosperity.

The entry of the United States and China, both asstrategic partners and competitors simultaneously,has complicated Moscow’s efforts as it is looking toresume its “privileged role” in Central Asia. Sincethese states were a part of the FSU, there is at leasta tactical if not strategic reaction from Russia toother foreign powers openly and freely engagingand wielding influence in its so-called ‘Near Abroad.’While many in the academic and diplomatic com-munities have thought it safe to assume that con-flict will stem from resource scarcity within CentralAsia or from a larger geopolitical conflict involvingthe greater powers jockeying in the region, for themost part the countries of Central Asia have coex-isted without nearly the level of conflict that the‘New Great Gamers’ expected. (Cooley)

It seems like it should be possible for the great pow-ers to coexist peacefully while conducting strategicinterests in the Central Asian region. China has se-curity ties with Central Asian states through theShanghai Cooperation Organization and conductsenergy trade bilaterally. Turkey has an oil pipelinethat connects their country with Central Asia. Iranis looking at ways to construct an oil pipeline fromthe Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Finally, Pakistanseeks natural gas from central Asia and supports thedevelopment of pipelines from its countries. All ofthese projects have the potential to be great pro-ducers of peace and stability. Unfortunately, thesesame projects have equal potential to be intensi-fiers of already existing tension and hatred, and ul-timately becoming enflamed into real world conflictand war. Let us all hope that it will be the former andnot the latter that rules the New Great Game.


the big three are also looking to securecertain resources for themselves,in particular oil and gas

NEWGROUNDSFOR WARHow the Power of Siberia Pipeline Impacts the Arctic

ALEXANDER S. MARTIN

Alexander S. Martin is currently pursuing a Master’sDegree in International Intelligence and SecurityStudies from Bellevue University. He earned a Bachelor’s Degree in International Intelligence and Security Studies also from Bellevue University in 2014.

PRODUCTIVE POLICYArctic diplomacy via the Arctic Council has a longhistory of cooperative conflict resolution. The mostnotable instance of successful Arctic diplomacy isthe landmark 2010 resolution of a Russian and Nor-wegian Barents Sea border dispute after decades ofnegotiation. This is largely a result of the unique ap-plication of the rule of international law in the Arc-tic. The predominant legal framework governingArctic activities is the 1982 Convention on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes freedom-of-navigation rights, sets territorial boundaries, sets ex-clusive economic zones (EEZs) and rules forextending continental shelf rights, and has createdseveral conflict-resolution mechanisms. This hasprovided the Arctic states with a solid and widelyaccepted legal framework within which to conductArctic activities and provided effective mechanismsto address disputes.

The five littoral states reaffirmed their commitmentto peaceful and cooperative action within theframework of UNCLOS in the Arctic with the 2008Ilulissat Declaration. The Declaration commits itssignatories to address sovereignty and jurisdictionissues through the “extensive legal framework” thatgoverns Arctic activity. Signatories also promised tostrengthen cooperation multilaterally, through ex-isting organizations such as the Arctic Council andBarents Euro-Arctic Council.

he Power of Siberia pipeline, a joint Russ-ian and Chinese venture in which Russiahas agreed to provide $400 billion of nat-ural gas (LNG) to China over the course

of 30 years, presents a complex vector of potentialconflict. Arctic ice melt, energy resource shortage,and increasing geopolitical tensions are all impli-cated. The complex nature of these issues and theuncertainty regarding their eventual manifestationplaces the pipeline in the realm of emergent con-flict.The Arctic nations, in particular the five littoral Arc-tic Ocean states - America, Canada, Russia, Norway,and Denmark - are most at risk. China is also a keyplayer, due to both its role as recipient of RussianLNG and its Arctic ambitions. These states are allmembers of the Arctic Council, the principle bodyinvolved in international Arctic governance. Whilemany observers consider Arctic diplomacy via theArctic Council a success, and point to the generallycooperative nature of international Arctic interac-tion, this hides the geopolitical divide that exists atthe core of the Arctic Council. Most of the five lit-toral Arctic states belong to Western internationaland supranational organizations like NATO or theEuropean Union (EU). However, the growing inter-dependence of Russia and China, and both states’geostrategic expansionist ambitions, will likely com-plicate future efforts to prevent Arctic tensions andconflict.

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This emphasis on cooperation is reflected in the fivelittoral states’ Arctic strategy documents, whichshare a number of basic goals and principles. Theseinclude: a peaceful, safe, and secure Arctic; sustain-able economic and social development; environ-mental protection; addressing the rights and needsof indigenous Arctic peoples; and the maintenanceof sovereignty. Another particularly promising de-velopment is the signing of the Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search andRescue in the Arctic. This treaty, signed in 2011 byCanada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,Sweden, and the United States, encompasses pre-vious agreements like the Tromsø Declaration andcommits its signatories to expanded cooperationand information sharing in Arctic search and rescuemissions. The Arctic Council has historically had areputation for keeping its dealings separate fromother international controversies, and has devel-oped an air of isolation from political turbulence.

This analysis demonstrates that Arctic states havetaken great pains to maintain the cooperative,peaceful nature of national and international activ-ity in the Arctic. In particular, the dogged adherenceto international law has provided a unique way tomanage disputes. In addition, the Arctic Council hasproven a valuable forum in which member statescan address concerns, pursue cooperation, and ef-fectively manage increased access to the Arctic. Itsability to compartmentalize Arctic policy from otherinternational disputes has proven mostly resilient.Which is what makes the impact of Russia’s strate-gies concurrent to the Power of Siberia pipelinemost intriguing.

COUNTERPRODUCTIVE POLICIESThe insulation from international tumult the Arcticcooperation has enjoyed thus far may be eroding.Russia’s annexation of Crimea, linked to the Powerof Siberia pipeline by precipitating the internationalsanctions which served as a catalyst to signing thedeal, has become an important enough threat to in-fluence Arctic policy. In protest of Russia’s supposedrevanchism, the Canadian Chair of the Arctic Coun-cil refused to attend an Arctic Council meeting inMoscow. The Canadian government saw this actionas building on other penalties, like sanctions andtravel bans, it had already imposed on Russia. Whilewell-intentioned, Canada’s policy of including theArctic in its attempts to isolate Russia may have un-intended consequences, particularly in light of Rus-sia’s ongoing military expansion there.

Russia has been increasing its military capacity inthe Arctic for several years now. On December 1,2015, Russia’s Arctic Command Headquarters be-came operational, one of the most visible signs ofRussia’s “plan to form a combined arms group andconstruct a unified network of military facilities inthe country’s Arctic territories, by hosting troops,advanced warships, and aircraft to strengthen theprotection of its northern borders.” This can be seenas a fulfillment of Russia’s 2009 Russian Arctic Strat-egy until 2020. This strategy emphasized the national security di-mensions of Russia’s Arctic policies, with a discus-sion of the need to militarily protect Russianinterests. In addition, Russian President VladimirPutin has explicitly stated that any Russian militarybuildup in the Arctic is a result of US submarines al-ready present in the Arctic.


This has begun to trouble Russia’s Arctic neighborsand is rightfully seen as “a direct challenge to thelongstanding consensus that the Arctic should bekept free of military rivalry.”.Such challenges amid Western fears of Russian ex-pansionism and heightened tensions do not bodewell for future efforts to mitigate or avoid crisis inthe Arctic. Recent backtracking notwithstanding,Canada’s decision to link Arctic cooperation with itswider foreign policy has set a precedent in whichother states may choose to prioritize contentiousforeign policy over the previously pristine Arctic co-operation. Likewise, Russia’s military buildup vio-lates one of the fundamental tenets of Arcticengagement, that of keeping it free from militarycompetition. In light of these developments, thepotential for conflict over the Power of Siberiapipeline, arising from the geopolitics of climatechange, energy scarcity, and divergent strategic po-sitions, should become much more likely.

The Power of Siberia pipeline poses the potentialfor conflict due to the unique forces shaping itsplace in world affairs. As such, careful and effectivepolicy is necessary to avoid such an undesirableoutcome. International cooperation in the Arcticprovides the most appropriate policy issue to ex-plore these potentialities. Arctic policy has a repu-tation for cooperation even in the face of politicaladversity. For the majority of its existence the ArcticCouncil, along with related Arctic bodies, haveserved as valuable arenas for engagement and con-flict resolution. However, recent developments givecause for concern that the Arctic may prove as con-tentious and competitive as other human endeav-ors. In total, while Arctic policy offers much in theway of useful means to arbitrate disputes and man-age conflicts, there is growing evidence that it willsuccumb to the tendency toward competition andconflict. Thus, the melting ice may one day revealnew grounds for war.

GROWING MILITARIZATION IN ARCTIC AMID INCREASING DISPUTES

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ith the rapid melting of ice in theArctic region, the long-isolated re-gion is becoming a more accessiblezone for commercial fishing, fresh

water, minerals, coal, iron, copper, oil, gas, and ship-ping. Thus, the region is increasingly catching theworld powers’ attention.

Arctic states – Canada, Denmark (via Greenland),Russia, Norway and the U.S. – are in rush to exploitall these opportunities from the region, which is be-lieved to hold huge oil and natural gas resources.With such lust for resources, there is the likelihoodthat the slow militarization, which has already beeninitiated by the stake-holding states, will be inten-sified, jeopardizing the peace and stability of the re-gion and the globe.


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DISPUTES

The Arctic region is located around the North Poleand surrounded by landmasses of the aforemen-tioned five countries. Since the Arctic region was “in-accessible” until the end of 20th century because ofthe layers of thick ice, there were less territorial dis-putes until the beginning of this (21st) century.However, ice are melting rapidly in the Arctic regionbecause of the global warming, clearing this ice-covered region from ice. The ice of the region is al-ready reduced by as much as 50% from 1950s. Theregion is warming faster than other areas across theglobe. Such rapid melting of ice is making the re-gion a more “accessible” zone. The melting of thesea ice has been opening up trade routes (duringthe summers) between Asia and Europe throughthe Arctic Ocean; the same region where suchtrades routes were unimaginable even couple ofdecades ago. In 2007, the Northwest Passage be-tween the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans opened forthe first time in memory.

BAHAUDDIN FOIZEE

Primarily a legal practitioner, teaches lawat Dhaka Centre for Law & Economics,

a University of London law graduate,regularly writes columns on international affairs

The constant change in the climate and the increas-ing accessibility to the region would make the ex-traction of oil and gas from the region much easier.Estimations from different corners reveal that theregion is speculated to hold oil reserves of upto 13%of the global total of undiscovered oil, upto 30% ofnatural gas, and also other precious metals. Such‘speculations’ and ‘accessibility' have given rise toplenty of disputes that have emerged among theaforementioned five countries surrounding the re-gion.

However, among those disputes, the most intensi-fied ones are: (i) regarding boundaries in the Beau-fort Sea and the status of the Northwest Passagebetween the U.S. and Canada, (ii) regarding Hans Is-land between Canada and Denmark (via Green-land), (iii) regarding the Lomonosov Ridge – a mountain range across the region — amongCanada, Denmark and Russia, (iv) and regarding themaritime border from the Bering Sea into the regionbetween the U.S. and Russia. Therefore, all countriessurrounding the region are involved in disputes re-garding the ownership and control over differentparts of the region.

Alongwith these five Arctic countries, China and theUK are also involved in the dispute through theirclaims over the Svalbard archipelago, which hap-pens to be within the region.

Some of the Arctic countries that are claimant to thedisputes have been attempting to come to a solu-tion through the Commission on the Limits of theContinental Shelf (CLCS) and the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). How-ever, a constructive solution, which would bind allthe claimants to the Arctic disputes to abide by it,could not be reached through these CLCS and UN-CLOS. This is because, both CLCS and UNCLOS lackthe appropriate mandate from countries across theworld, including the aforesaid five Arctic countries,to impose “legally binding” decisions or provisionsfor any maritime disputes.Therefore, the absence ofa binding legal regime creates scopes for intenseterritorial and maritime disputes concerning thecontrol, exploration and exploitation of the energyresources in such a region that is becoming increas-ingly accessible for such purpose (i.e. purpose of en-ergy exploration and exploitation).

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all the Arctic countries have beenmoving towards militarizing the region in order to acquireeach of their respective objectivesin the region

MILITARIZATIONIn the prevailing scenario, all the Arctic countries,which are involved in the territorial and maritimedisputes among themselves, have been moving to-wards militarizing the region in order to acquireeach of their respective objectives in the region.Norwegian foreign secretary Jonas Gahr Stoere al-ready expressed that the presence of “military, navyand coastguard” in the region is necessary. Canadaplanned deep water “naval facility” at Nanisivik,which lies at the entrance to the disputed North-west Passage. Canada promised (under former PMStephen Harper’s administration) to build armedice-breakers, several patrol ships and several vesselsin order to proceed towards gripping the Arctic. In2011, Canada conducted large-scale “military exer-cises” in the region.

In August 2015, the U.S. permitted Shell to drill foroil in the Chukchi Sea, which falls within the periph-ery of Alaskan Arctic. The U.S. “Coast Guard” has al-ready deployed “sophisticated ships, aircrafts andother maritime assets” in the Alaskan Arctic for theduration of Shell’s drilling in the Arctic. Throughsuch presence, the U.S. is not only trying to exploitenergy resources of the Arctic region, but also try-ing to keep its “military presence” deep inside theregion.

On the otherside, in 2007, Russian scientists divedto the seabed in the Arctic Ocean and planted a ti-tanium Russian flag (Russia claimed that it was flagof Russia’s ruling party) in order to beef up theirclaims. Russia has already moved to restore a Sovietera “military base” and other “military outposts” inthe Arctic. In early 2015, R ussia exercised Arctic “mil-itary patrols” from its Northern Fleet, involving“38,000 servicemen, more than 50 surface ships andsubmarines and 110 aircrafts”.

More interestingly, Russia is currently planning tojointly explore for oil in Russia’s Arctic fields withChina, which is increasingly becoming a strong “mil-itary power” besides being an economic giant.Through such move, Russia is trying to make surethat Russia has a “rising military power” like Chinainvolved into its stake in the Arctic region so thatsuch cooperation favours Russia at the time of es-calation of any “military conflict”.

WRAPPING UPAs of yet, the Arctic region is largely untouched bymankind. However, with the ice caps melting, ac-cess to the Arctic oil and gas reserves, which is esti-mated to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars,will become easier – a prediction that has alreadysparked a military competition in the region. Suchmilitarization of the region is likely to increase withalmost all the countries urging for increasing theirmilitary deployments and exercises, and there ap-pears little hope & opportunity for any diplomaticresolution (or political agreement) regarding thedisputes. It can be well presumed that without anydiplomatic resolution (or political agreement), thecurrent non-hostile debate over the Arctic couldturn into a violent confrontation.

It seems our globe does not lack reasons to engagein chaos. The two world wars began as Europeanconflicts, only to turn gradually into world wars.Likewise, if the disputes over the control of the Arc-tic resources are not resolved quickly, it could turninto a larger military conflict that would not just in-volve the Arctic countries, but would also drag alarger part of the world into this conflict. And forsure, the start of such war would mean the cold, yetbeautiful, Arctic region would become the targetsof war machines– destroying the environment andthe stability of the region and the globe.


ANDY DEAHN

Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree from BellevueUniversity’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program.

He is currently employed as a Department of Defense contractor working as a member of anintelligence analysis team throughout various worldwide locations.

He had previously worked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air Control Party member in the U.S. AirForce supporting Army Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

ccording to the Obama administration,the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA), a deal struck with the IslamicRepublic of Iran over its nuclear capabil-

ities, is a landmark and triumphant diplomaticopening with the isolated Tehran regime.However, there have been multiple underlying is-sues boiling over into what can only be viewed asan attempt to escalate tensions between the twonations. These allegations hold the potential to un-dercut the “historic” nuclear deal, either by a breachof contract on the one side or by force on the other.One such recent challenge toward the U.S.-Iranianrelationship transpired at the end of December2015 when five Iranian Revolutionary Guard vesselsapproached the USS Harry Truman—an Americanaircraft carrier currently tasked with conducting


Anaval operations in the Gulf Region—beforelaunching multiple unguided rockets in close prox-imity to the U.S. naval vessel. And while this was notthe first provocation, it was the most significant dueto its proximity to U.S. forces. For example, the Iran-ian regime conducted a ballistic missile launch in-side its borders in October 2015. This launch drewcondemnation from U.S. Congressional lawmakersas well as the United Nations, which claimed the Oc-tober launch violated U.N. Security Council resolu-tions.A lack of clarity, credibility, and follow-through onbehalf of President Obama in regards to a deter-rence strategy has left Iran apparently guessing atwhich acts will trigger retaliation by Washingtonand has left no incentive for the regime to strictlycomply with the provisions outlined in the deal.

CALLING OUT ‘BLUFF DIPLOMACY’Russo-Persian Maneuvers to Outwit Obama

The October launch not only stirred up tensionsamong Western powers: a lack of serious conse-quences also prompted a second launch in Novem-ber 2015. It should be noted that the Novembermissile launch was conducted utilizing a Ghadr-110medium-range ballistic missile. This weapon systemhas a range of 1,200 miles and is capable of strikingU.S. military assets in the region as well as the nationof Israel. With Iran in possession of such a weaponand with the launches showcasing its capability inusing it, the Islamic Republic arguably has no inten-tion of normalizing relations with the United Statesor backing down from its potentially damaging anddestabilizing Middle East policy.

So far President Obama’s lack of resolve in challeng-ing Iranian provocations has generated two proba-ble courses of action: first, Iranian use of “salamitactics”—that is, small violations of the JCPOAdeemed not significant or dangerous enough totrigger a major response—bring the regime closerto nuclear weapons capabilities without gettingclose to any red-line responses from the West;

second, the Iranian regime may continue to clan-destinely pursue nuclear capabilities, which posesa challenge for detecting these secret violations,even under the JCPOA. This latter course of actionis perceived as more likely due to Iran’s extensivehistory of secret nuclear development as well asweak provisions in the nuclear agreement inspec-tion protocols, making the detection of bomb-re-lated capabilities difficult. Furthermore, the formerand more aggressive course of action poses a sig-nificant challenge in the near-term as Iran ap-proaches two critical elections in February 2016; thefirst election for its general assembly and the sec-ond for the council which chooses the nextSupreme Leader. These domestic power strugglesmean that more ambiguous and antagonistic inci-dents might possibly occur as the Supreme LeaderAyatollah Ali Khamenei strikes a balance betweenhard-line rhetoric and following the guidelines ofthe JCPOA.In addition, since the nuclear deal was struck andthe civil war within Syria expanded into a globalissue, Tehran has bolstered relations with Russia.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

This Russo-Persian relationship may also be a con-tributing factor for poor attitudes within Iran to-ward the JCPOA, taking cues from the Russianplaybook of hard-nosed diplomacy and prideful po-litical discourse. While relations between Moscowand Tehran historically have not always beensmooth, this newly revitalized partnership may beopportunistically geopolitical.For example, bilateral dialogue between Moscowand Tehran is most often economic and political.This is based upon tension from Western sanctions,energy needs, the Iranian nuclear program, securityacross Central Asia, and the impact of Western/U.S.involvement in Syria, Iraq, and the greater MiddleEast. Both nations have denounced regional terror-ism, identifying the threat that it poses for their ownnational security, while at the same time criticizingU.S. sanctions and condemning Western demandsfor a regime change in Syria. Moreover, both playersobserve President Bashar al Assad’s stay in power asmore preferable to their regional interests and pro-vides the opportunity to exert and expand their in-fluence in this strategically critical country.

Their status as two of the world’s largest energysuppliers, combined with their proximity to theCaspian Sea, has led these economic deals to be-come energy-centric collaborations: new initiativeshave been created with Russia providing to Iran a 5billion USD line of credit, with renewed cooperationover joint transportation and energy projects. Rus-sia also agreed to begin construction of two nuclearreactors within Iran down the road. All of these arepreemptive to the planned US sanctions relief aspart of the JCPOA.

It is unclear at the moment whether the Russo-Per-sian relationship will develop into a more geopolit-ically sound partnership enhancing the JCPOA ordissolve into geostrategic maneuvering that ulti-mately undermines the new agreement. Regardless,the increased aggressiveness on behalf of Iran andthe nation’s stagnating relationship with the UnitedStates—even with the JCPOA intact—will continueto create a complicated detente, as no one seemscertain that what is presently perceived withinTehran as serialized bluffing on behalf of PresidentObama will continue indefinitely. The goal of U.S.policy at this point should be to remove all doubtsfrom all actors involved: namely, that the UnitedStates will uphold its commitments outlined in thenuclear agreement, even if that means showing ause of force once thought impossible. The JCPOAwill amount to nothing if the only ‘tool’ being usedby the United States to support it is bluff diplomacy.


he end of the Cold War brought aboutdrastic changes in global relations be-tween states as well as a dramatic changein international politics. These changes

have brought about the need for states to maintainflexibility in their foreign policies to react to an ever-changing world as states search to answer “what isnext?”

For Iran, which was ill-equipped to face such chal-lenges, it created a foreign policy nightmare it is stilldealing with. This has never been truer since theend of the Cold War, which brought about wide-spread international system change, not all of itgood to the internal dynamics within Iran.

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COMPETING COLD WARSTrying to Predict Iranian Strategies

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

STEPHEN SARTY

Stephen Sarty is a graduatestudent in the International

Security and IntelligenceStudies program at Bellevue

University in Omaha, NE, USA.He is a former U.S. Marineand has lived and worked

in the Middle East forthe last 23 years.

For example, the warming of Iran’s relations with itsGulf neighbors took a hit during the Gulf Wars. Withincreased relations and strengthened military pres-ence of the US in the region, and its continuinghardline stance on Iran, reignited tensions were in-evitable. The removal of the Saddam regime in Iraqalso reignited fears across the Gulf of a spreadingShia influence. Saudi fears of an emerging Shia Cres-cent intensified. The US presence helped Saudi Ara-bia hold onto its grip on regional power, however,as Iran had to recalculate its own security posturein the face of a potential American strike. Adding tothe tension was always the looming nuclear issue.This caused Iran to enter into somewhat of a “ColdWar” period with its Arab neighbors and in particu-lar Saudi Arabia, while also continuing to try to as-sert its regional dominance: in Lebanon through itsuse of its main proxy, Hezbollah; in Syria, throughits support of Assad; and in Yemen, through theHouthi militants.

Internal changes within Iran, however, have startedto bring about an external change. While Iran seeksto improve relations internationally it also in partic-ular wants to gain a place of dominance in terms ofsecurity within the region. As the Iranian domesticlandscape continues to change towards more prag-matism, it has had a marked effect on its foreignpolicy. Iran currently maintains good relations withTurkey, the Assad regime in Syria, and also with theHezbollah and Shia powers in Iraq. It has also re-cently entered into agreements with Russia and hasbegun to participate in several joint operations to-gether


It has traditionally been at odds with its Arab coun-terparts, mainly the GCC nations, as well as theUnited States, Egypt and Israel. The recent nuclearagreement appears to be part of a general warmingtrend, however, as the region remains hopeful thata nuclear Iran is not on the immediate horizon. Awarming of the international community towardsIran, however, would most likely force Saudi Arabiainto new alliances with Pakistan and Turkey, letalone Israel, along with further changes to the al-liances with other GCC states in an effort to counterincreased Iranian status and power.

The uranium enrichment program and an Iraniannuclear capability is also a major shaper of how Iranviews its own internal security posture, as well asshaping how states within the region and beyondaddress Iran. Domestically Iran is divided in regardsto the nuclear issue into three main groups:

Nuclear supporters. Those who unreservedly sup-port Iran’s nuclear program and believe Iran has theright to develop nuclear weapons as a credible de-terrent against perceived external threats.

Nuclear detractors. Those who advocate perma-nently rolling back Iran’s nuclear program in favorof other national interests and domestic develop-ment priorities.

Nuclear centrists. Those who are willing to accepttemporary constraints on Iran’s uranium-enrich-ment-related and reprocessing activities—therebylowering the degree of nuclear weapons latency—to end Iran’s international isolation.

A nuclear Iran drastically changes the balance ofpower in the region, especially when it comes toSaudi Arabia, and has been a major factor in notonly Iran’s international dealings but also for SaudiArabia as it seeks to minimize this threat. Thuswatching how the internal dynamics of those threegroups within Iran jockey for authority and su-premacy will be important in understanding howSaudi Arabia views Iran’s inevitable reemergenceonto the regional/world stage. With its recentmoves to improve relations and relieve tensionswith regards to its nuclear program it is not incon-ceivable that Iran, while working to thaw its ownCold War with Saudi Arabia, could also be workingto reignite Cold War tension between the UnitedStates and Russia.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

A return of Russia into the regional mix on Iran’sside, acting mostly with Iran’s interests, along withthe concerns that the JCPOA agreement has cre-ated between the US and Saudi Arabia, bodes wellfor Iran.

On the other hand, instead of just assuming eternaldiscord and rivalry, Iran and Saudi Arabia need tocontinue to work diplomatically to reduce their mis-trust and, at times, their misconstrued perceptionsof one another. One potential item for the agendashould be Yemen. Yemen does not appear to be adispute that has any core value to Iran outside of itbeing a target of opportunity to simply createhavoc in the region and to threaten Wahhabisthegemony.

Given that this does not seem to be of true strategicvalue to Iran, it is possible that it could work diplo-matically with Saudi Arabia towards a solution thatcould go a long way towards easing fears within theGCC states of a post-JCPOA Iran. Because there is somuch ample opportunity for a future post-JCPOAIran to be either a new stable ally of the global com-munity or conversely revitalized adversary, and notmuch consensus as to which direction it will ulti-mately choose, political and intelligence analysis onthe Islamic Republic should prove fruitful and fasci-nating for years to come.


With increased relationsand strengthened military presence of theUS in the region, and its continuing hardline stance on Iran,reignited tensions were inevitable

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

Advisory BoardCo-chair Honoris Causa

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valoriis an eminent Italian economist

and businessman.He holds prestigious academic

distinctions and national orders.Mr Valori has lectured oninternational affairs and

economics at the world’s leadinguniversities such as Peking

University, the Hebrew Universityof Jerusalem and the Yeshiva

University in New York.

AN ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S ELECTIONS

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irst and foremost, it is worth clarifyingthat in Iran the division between "re-formists" and "liberals" on one side and"conservatives" or even "fundamental-

ists" on the other makes no sense whatsoever. Bothpolitical camps are linked to the memory and teach-ing of Imam Khomeini, who was a political leaderbecause he was an innovator in the field of TwelverShia Islam. For the Imam of the 1979 revolutionwho, immediately after rising to power, dismissedIran's nuclear power inherited from the Shah as "asign of the devil" – albeit he later changed his mind- the aim of the Prophecy, which for him is equal tohuman reason, "is to guide mankind towards the es-tablishment of a just society through the imple-mentation of divine laws". Hence, unlike what happened in the old Quietisttradition of both strands of Islam, namely Sunni andShia, for the Imam of the Shia revolution "Islam is apolitical religion, and every aspect of this religion ispolitical, even its worship". Therefore, during thecurrent period of ''concealment of the Last Imam",the faqih, namely the "experts of Islamic Shia law",must set up an Islamic State. In short, the politicalpower is the faqih’s religious duty: this is the basisof the famous velayat-e faqih, namely the"guardianship of the jurist". For Imam Khomeini, thewhole community of faqih represents the con-cealed Imam on the earth until his appearance-rev-elation.Hence the “experts of Islamic Shia law” have,jointly and collectively, the same authority and re-sponsibility as those that Prophet Muhammad andthe first “well-directed” Caliphs had on the earth.

Again to quote Khomeini, "Islamic government isneither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional.It is constitutional in the current sense of the word,i.e. based on the approval of laws in accordancewith the opinion of the majority. It is constitutionalin the sense that the rulers are subject to a certainset of conditions in governing and administeringthe country, conditions that are set forth in theNoble Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Most NobleMessenger (s). It is the laws and ordinances of Islamcomprising this set of conditions that must be ob-served and practiced. Islamic government maytherefore be defined as the rule of divine law overmen".

All the members of the Iranian Parliament and ofthe other elected or non-elected institutions actwithin this set of values, principles, as well as legaland Qur’an practices. Needless to think of a West-ernization through liberalization, as some Westernanalysts imagine. Or to think of a Shia regime rift between pro-West-erners and "reactionaries" because, for the Iranianruling classes, the core of the issue is how to use theWest and not be used by it.

Hence thinking of a specific theocracy "of waiting"- as the one of the Iranian Shia State, a unique casein political theology - as a system divided between"liberals" and "conservatives" (regardless of whatboth words may mean in the West) is a sign of ut-most naivety for those who have to interpret the re-sults of Iran’s 2016 elections.

F


The Pervasive Coalition of Reformists: the SecondStep, named the List of Hope, led by MohammedKhatami, is the only coalition which openly sup-ports the so-called "reformists". It is an assemblageof parties or lists such as the Council for Coordinat-ing the Reforms Front, Mehdi Kharroubi’s NationalTrust Party, the Union of Islamic Iran People Party,which is the Hassan Rowhani’s newly-establishedpolitical arm, and finally, the Followers of Velayat,led by Ali Larijani, former chief nuclear negotiators(considered a "conservative") and current Speakerof Parliament.

The political groups allied to the List of Hope, whichhas great significance in two-round elections suchas Iran’s, are the Assembly of Qom Seminary Schol-ars and Researchers, the Combatant Clergy Societyand the Association of Followers of the Imam's Line.It is worth recalling that the List of Hope also in-cludes 24 other smaller groups, such as the IslamicAssociation of Women and the Islamic Labour Partyof Iran.

In the elections this party-coalition obtained28.62% of votes and got 83 Parliamentary seats outof a total of 239. The Principlists Coalition that theWest (gazing, as Narcissus, at its own reflection)passes off as "conservative" is made up of a fractionof the Combatant Clergy Society and the IslamicCoalition Party, as well as four other smaller groups.It got 64 seats in the Majlis with 22.06% of votes.Ali Motahari’s People’s Voice Coalition was createdto criticize the "conservative" Ahmadinedjad.

A cousin of Ali Larijani, who is now leading his ownparty within the winning coalition, Motahari is theson of a faqih and is regarded as a liberal-conserva-tive politician. Motahari’s List obtained 3.44% ofvotes and got ten seats, but it is difficult to place itin the traditional Downs’ left-right axis we use forthe systems derived from the American and Frenchrevolutions. There are many true independent can-didates - as many as 55 members of Parliament,who can safely support either camps, which appearto us progressive or conservative.

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for the Imam of the Shia revolution "Islam is a political religion, and every aspect of thisreligion is political, even its worship"

The religious minorities accepted in the country,namely Jews, Zoroastrians, Christians, Assyrians,Chaldeans and Armenians, obtained their five con-stitutional seats and garnered 1.75% of votes.The results are even more complex to analyze in thecase of the Assembly of Experts, the Council en-trusted with the task of supervising the Parliamentin accordance with the velayat-e-faqih. It is the 88-member Council that will elect the next Rahbar, theSupreme Leader.

As many as 27 seats were obtained by the Princi-plists Coalition, while the Second Step reformistsgained 20 seats. As many as 35 candidates, how-ever, were supported by both coalitions which welike to ascribe to our camp.

The results reached by the various coalitions showthat, in the Assembly of Experts, 19 mujtahid wereelected directly by the Second Step coalition, while27 were elected with the votes of other lists not al-lied to the "progressives", for a total of 46 "experts"who, I assume, will be answerable to both politicaltraditions – if any. The Combatant Clergy Societyhas 5 Experts directly elected, but as many as 51voted also by other groups, including many of thecamp we define as progressive.The CombatantClergy was created in 1977, before the Islamic rev-olution, to topple the Shah. Its first leaders were AliKhamenei, the current Supreme Leader, Ali AkbarRafsanjani, who is the current leader of other pro-gressive lists, and Morteza Mohtahari, the father ofthe current leader of the People’s Voice Coalition.


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The group now counts 56 members in the Assemblyof Experts, accounting for 64%. This rebalancesmuch of the progressive shift in the Majlis.The Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom elected 3Experts directly and 51 ones jointly with other liststhat sponsored them.It is the group at the origin of the 1979 revolution,founded by Ayatollah Khomeini’ students as earlyas 1961, when the Shah seemed unassailable andindeed, according to his Iranian name, "King ofKings".As can be easily imagined, in the city and provinceof Tehran, the People’s Experts list received a land-slide victory.But, as in other countries, including Western ones,here the divide is between urban and rural areas -the same rift which gave rise to capitalism in theWest and destroyed centralist socialism in the USSRand, in other respects, in China.

Nevertheless many Rowhani’s personal opponentsand competitors were excluded from Parliament orfrom the Assembly of Experts. Hence, for the Presi-dent in office, the issue lies in using this power sur-plus.The focus of Rowhani’s policy is the economy and,above all, the geopolitical impact of the plannedIranian economic expansion after the agreementwith the P5+1.Iran needs it. It needs a booming economy to tacklethe problems and uneasiness of young people(leading to their "Westernization") and update itsobsolete production system, which has grown lazyand idle as a result of an almost completely nation-alized economy.

The President will privatize, at first, the automotiveindustry, but he has also bought a fleet of 118 Air-bus airplanes for a total sum of 25 billion US dollars.Nevertheless the political debate in Iran does notconcern reforms, but their pace and their shape.And especially their political impact on the relationswith the United States and some other Westerncountries. Nobody, within the Majlis or the Councilof Experts, wants the United States to monitor Iran’sindustrial transformation and its very recent open-ing onto the "market-world".

Currently Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) amountsto 4.88 billion US dollars, but Iran has designed aDevelopment Plan for the period 2016-2021. Anamount of 361 billion US dollars needs to be in-vested, 204 of which can be found in Iran, but therest has to come from foreign countries or privateinvestors.


Hence, if Iran uses the JCPOA to become the largestpopulation and economy to be globalized after theUSSR collapse, the geopolitical effects are likely tobe the following: it will increase its engagement inthe Greater Middle East, but only in connection withthe Russian Federation and China; it will counteractthe low oil price policy led by Saudi Arabia to "pun-ish" the United States and Russia; it will create itsown Shia area of influence, which will not lead to awar against the Sunnis, but to an ongoing attritionwith Saudi Arabia and its allies.

The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia willbe particularly fierce in attracting the Foreign DirectInvestment (FDI) which is coming to Iran after thesigning of the JCPOA and after Saudi Arabia open-ing for the first time to FDI in June 2015.The above stated plan envisages a yearly GDPgrowth exceeding 8%, a Chinese-style growth rate,

but it is very likely that - once temporarily put anend to the nuclear power for military purposes (butis it really so?) - Iran will manage a military buildup,funded by economic growth, which will follow thetraditional criteria: the primacy of guerrilla warfareand "hybrid strategies", managed by the Pasdaran,and the ICBM missile system.

The strategic goals will be to strengthen its own re-gional role and the political management of themany Shia minorities scattered throughout theSunni universe.

Moreover, the link between economic growth andIranian remilitarization will be used to revive the re-lations with Russia and to enable China’s peacefulexpansion into the Middle East and the Horn ofAfrica, finally as guardians of the future new "SilkRoad" planned by Xi Jinping as early as 2013.

t is evident that the US cannot fight DAESHas if there is no complex war raging in Syria.Considering the conditions on the ground,the US administration must address not only

how to degrade and destroy DAESH, but how USpolicy can help restore stability across the Syrianstate.It must do both by being diplomatically active in en-gaging all major actors in play in the region. ForAmerica, Russia and Iran cannot be allowed to setdiplomatic precedence in Syria and Iraq and be theleaders.

NENAD DRCA

Nenad Drca is a former military trilingual linguistwho worked across many nations over eight years.

He lived and worked on three continents.This experience gave him a deep appreciation

for intelligence community. After graduating withBA in Psychology he returned to work

for the US Army as a DOD civilian.He expects to graduate next March

with Master of Science in International Securityand Intelligence Studies degree.

I

MORE BEARTHAN EAGLE

Russia Taking Advantage of an American Vacuum

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The United States must formulate integrated strat-egy that would involve Washington in any majordiplomatic discussions regarding potential politicalsolutions. So far this is not the case. This new ap-proach will require expanded engagement with theSyrian players, both domestic and foreign, in orderto improve possibilities for change.

Without inclusion of the Russian side, it will be morelikely to undermine Western plans and potentiallydrag America into protracted and chaotic proxy war.Once it was clear that Syrian leader Assad would notstep down easily, US policy did not adapt nor didpolicymakers create a viable alternative strategy toachieve its goals. It is apparent that Syria is becom-ing a geopolitical Chernobyl, spreading violenceand fanaticism across the region. Once DAESH iseliminated any new strategy must aim to achievean immediate drop in violence by coordinating aceasefire across all sides. The difficulty is going tobe determining the political price for the elimina-tion of DAESH.

American political and military lethargy in Syriashould be viewed as a result of having no com-pelling strategy that could push for deeper effectiveinvolvement. This must no longer be the case, as theUS must work towards curbing further spillover ofthe Syrian crisis, which has brought refugee may-hem to Europe. Now US allies in Europe must con-tend with the massive potential threat emerging.The United States and European Union should usea combination of assertive military initiatives andbroad diplomatic approaches to establish commu-nication with all major regional actors. The UnitedStates must pressure Saudi Arabia, Qatar, andTurkey to halt financial and weapons assistance totheir groups of choice within Iraq and Syria. Boththe EU and US can use an integrated strategy thatincludes arms embargos, economic sanctions andrewards, and airstrikes. Keeping Russian pride in mind, cooperation is pos-sible by working parallel, coordinated air strikes andother operations for maximum effect againstDAESH.


Former deputy director of the CIA Michael Morellsaid that any strategy should probably includeworking with Syrian President Bashar Assad andRussia. The reason for this approach is that proxywar with Russia will not help America and it will notdecimate terrorist groups that are more importantin the immediate-term. The priority for all involvedsides right now must be the absolute destruction ofDAESH and its allies. DAESH has clearly achieved ca-pacity to strike the EU and it has the same plans forthe United States. The question whether PresidentAssad needs to go can be tackled in a post-DAESHworld.

The fight against radical Islam is something that theEU, Russia, and even China support. There is a po-tential to use this international sentiment to startworking on new diplomatic relationships. Whilesome countries can help militarily, many more canhelp financially by providing supplies or impedingDAESH financial networks. After multiple brutal ter-ror attacks in France and now Brussels, the EU is outof time and must act as soon as possible on newideas. Meanwhile, the United States must stop ap-pearing hamstrung by the continued lack of validpartners on the ground in Syria, whether diplomat-ically or militarily. Too much time and resources arewasted and it is only adding to the image of the USbeing indecisive and even impotent.Continued diplomatic dialogue should present re-alistic and achievable goals that many countriesfind attractive. At the moment most countries wantDAESH to be eliminated. But the United Statesshould not allow Russia to continue to lead the wayin military and diplomatic action.

In April, Foreign Minister Lavrov called it “the mainthreat” to Russia today. Jihadists who live in Russia’sNorth Caucasus have switched their allegiance toDAESH and declared their regions as part of theDAESH provincial network. Russia is worried thatthe Syrian Assad regime could be replaced by aworse Islamic extremist force. The collapse of gov-ernments in Libya and Iraq is used by Russia to af-firm such concerns. The United States should usethis shared fear to motivate Russia and the EU towork together with it. This is an opportunity forAmerica to develop a new diplomatic path and es-tablish new beneficial connections to Russia andcome out as a cohesive positive influence. But so farthis has frustratingly not happened.

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The priority forall involved sides right now must be the absolute destruction ofDAESH and its allies

It should be a primary part of all regional high levelnegotiations, which at the moment it is not. The cur-rent rigid and recalcitrant American strategy shouldbe abandoned. The Middle East must understandthat America will be the part of any solution no mat-ter what. That is something Iran should be re-minded of due to its recent political and militaryassertions.At the moment, the EU lacks cohesive leadershipthat can mandate decisions and act in a timely man-ner. Sometimes it can take the EU a very long timeto agree on something urgent. Following the recentattacks in Paris and Brussels, it remains to be seen ifNATO can react according to its accord of mutualprotection. If it doesn’t, then some of America’sprime European partners might start looking moretoward Russia as a strategic partner. For example,British Prime Minister David is open to offering com-promises on the future of Syrian President Assad inreturn for Russian help targeting DAESH.

French President Hollande will travel to Washingtonand Moscow to discuss ways of increasing interna-tional cooperation in the fight against DAESH, notjust Washington. The United States must act toavoid losing leadership position to Russia in thisfight against terrorism. Putin is more than willing toexploit the void left by Washington in Syria and Iraq.Both France and the UK cannot single-handedly de-feat domestic or international terrorist threats. Theyare now painfully aware that they both need foreignassistance in this desperate struggle. So what re-mains to be seen is who is going to step up to thatdesperate need in REAL terms: America or Russia?Disturbingly, so far in real terms the answer seemsto be more bear than eagle.


n order to deny Russia its due place in worldaffairs and contain it from all possible sides,the USA and its imperialist allies keep raisingthe bogey of Russian “intention” to revive the

Soviet empire, even as the USA, NATO and EU makestrenuous efforts to keep the former Socialist blocof nations under its political and military control.

As Russia ventured military action in Ukraine andSyria, the Western powers cry oud about the returnof Soviet empire under a “dictator” Putin. Russia an-nexed Crimea because it had been a part of Russiaeven before Soviet Union came into existence byadding neighboring nations and it did so in orderto teach a lesson to Ukraine trying to be a part ofwestern military alliance to target Russia.

DR. ABDUL RUFF

Prolific writer, Independent Analyst; Columnistcontributing articles to many newspapers

and journals on world politics;Expert on Mideast affairs, Chronicler of foreignoccupations & freedom movements (Palestine,

Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Xinjiang,Chechnya, etc.) Chancellor-Founder of Center

for International Affairs (CIA); Commentator onworld affairs & sport fixings, Former university

teacher; Author of eBooks/books

I

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Russia’s intervention in European Ukraine, followedby its annexation of Crimea, now direct interventionin West Asian Syria, among other Russo-US conflict-ual seeds, have sent unmistaken signals to USA andEU that Russia is back to reassert its super powerstatus. In its military intervention in Syria, which isnot a part of its backyard zone of former Sovietspace, Russia has clearly let the USA know that itcan’t , in order for securing its energy requirementson permanent basis , go on invading energy richArab nations like wild beast in modern times.

Most Russians feel Russian non-interference policypursued since the end of the so-called Cold War didembolden the USA and its NATO allies to step up itsunilateral military actions leading to invasions inMideast after success in Afghanistan following theSept-11 hoax. Russia’s reassertion of its militaryprowess now under strongman President Putin ismeant to reveal its resolve to come out its “neutral”position of avoiding direct confrontational ap-proach towards USA and reinvigorate the cold warphase.

The Kremlin has a point to make: it does not fear USmilitary prowess as it is capable of directly challeng-ing it easily but it perhaps expected if it stayed outof confrontation with the West international peaceas consequence of ending Cold war could takeshape. Now that USA and NATO team nations haveclearly established full control over the world andits military plus energy resources in the absence ofany other super power, Moscow has also decided toreactivate and step up its military presence by en-tering into the Syrian conflict.

Ever since Vladimir Putin became Russia’s presidentfirst in 2000 he has pursued aggressive foreign aswell as domestic policy. Putin's military interventioninto Syria to support President Bashar al Assad's fail-ing regime against a broad US supported opposi-tion, including the ISIS and al-Qaeda, certainlysurprised many on both sides of the Atlantic. Whilethat deployment is militarily modest so far politi-cally, psychologically and geostrategically it has hadfar greater impact.

SYRIA AND THE RETURN OF ‘SOVIET’ RUSSIA


And its launch of several dozen Kaliber cruise mis-siles from the Caspian Sea to attack Syrian opposi-tion targets nine hundred miles away surely madecertain political statements.Russian antagonism against US military arroganceis well known but its military adventures in WestAsia, besides Ukraine and earlier Georgia beforethat, expressed through a series of military actions,does not in any way indicate its love for Islamic orArab world or it wants to defend energy rich Arabworld its enemies in favor of Islam or Islamic worldfacing civilizational threat.

Not at all! Russian is not even protecting Syria orAssad in the real sense. It just challenges US/NATOmilitarism, though some experts feel USA and Rus-sia coordinate their military operations in Syria andaround with help from Israel. Russia just wants toshowcase its military muscle to its former chief Coldwar foe by trying to restrict the US/NATO militaryoperations. Russia wants the West to know that itcan intervene if the USA continues with itsunchecked military interventions and invasionsglobally.Russia does this mainly because USA, as per the se-cret agreement among veto members, would notattack Russia directly.

There is a fundamental difference between Sovietand Russian policies: while fighting USA, Soviet Rus-sia also defended other weak nations, helped free-dom movement in third world leading toindependence of countries like Pakistan and Indiaagainst the will of USA and UK; Russia today pursuesits military operations only to announce its returnto world stage as a virtual super power and to in-crease its military trade volumes.

While earlier it has provided economic assistance tothe needy nations, Russia only sells today and seeksservice charges for any service it renders to anothernation. This also explains Russian move today tostrike economic and military deals with Pakistan, atraditional American ally. Moscow-Islamabad tiesmake both USA and India nervous and would co-erce India to strike more military deals with Russiawithout hesitation. Putin’s message is loud andclear: consider Russia as a credible equal partnerface our military opposition where necessary.

Not long ago (Soviet) Russia was a super power veryactively opposing capitalist-imperialist policies ofthe other super power USA and its allies. In fact, USAthen saw Russia as being a serious problem for cap-italism and obstruction for the imperialist bloc ofcountries and sought to end socialist constructionprocess globally. Western world succeeded in dis-mantling Soviet and socialist system as corrupt ele-ments in Soviet Union deliberately spoiled thesystem, aided the Western efforts to destabilize So-viet Union and East Europe.Not only the Berlin Wall fell, but even the mighty So-viet Union broke into pieces- most of them now arewith USA and NATO.When Vladimir Putin assumed power in the Kremlinin 2000 following the incapacitation conditions, thefirst ever popularly elected president of new ofRussian Federation Boris Yeltsin, by cruelly dealingstock and barrel with the Chechen Muslim youthsseeking freedom from Russian yoke, he, a formerKGB man in civil dress, began reasserting Russianprowess lost with the collapse of USSR and socialistsystem, though he never initiated steps to revisitSocialist aspirations of many Russians. Putin doesnot want to annoy the West.

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Not impressed by Russian efforts for “democracy”USA has not accepted Moscow as a truly equal part-ner because , according Washington, Russians donot share core “values” of USA and it wants to useRussia when needed and for which some “conces-sions” are readily provided off and on to Moscow.But USA refused to treat Russia either as an equalpartner or a new super power. In fact, USA wouldnever accept any power as its equal, not even theUnited Kingdom but Moscow refuses to accept thattruth.Today Russia and USA share terror values. Russianleaders have with enthusiasm made efforts tooblige and appease Washington. When a new Rus-sia was born out of the collapse of the mighty SovietUnion, the new President Boris Yeltsin went all outto embrace western capitalism and even ready toshare military based imperialist values. Later, follow-ing the Sept-11 hoax, Russia was quick to come for-ward to “stand” by the affected America and southUS opposition to the Chechen problem and supportfor the action of the Putin government in Chechnya.However, while supporting Russia on Chechnyaissue, USA was certainly not impressed by Russiansupport for USA and NATO military action inAfghanistan and Iraq.That the USA still refuses to treat Russia as a trustedstrategic partner sharing “values” annoys Russiawhich has, since the end of Cold War, made strenu-ous efforts to come closer to Washington by makingmaximum use of all available opportunities afterthe collapse of USSR. Both found a common enemyin Islam and Moscow sought US support to crushthe Chechens seeking freedom. Disappointed by UScold attitude, eventually Yeltsin talked about US-Russia relations as being based on “Hot Peace” inplace of cold war.

It might look strange that Russia has not yet comeout of shame feelings that it had lost the WW-II toUSA and then lost the Cold War also to USA again.Possibly, therefore, many Americans believe Russiahas taught a valuable lesson to them by the Sept-11 hoax and they think Russia had engineered aspart of winning the ideological and military rivalrywith USA. Accordingly, the attacks well inside theUSA would have given Russia the much needed vic-tory and overall moral advantages. Although therewere reports of terror attacks inside Russia a fewyears after the Sept-11 hoax, those were consideredless important as they could not make Sept-11smallor meaningless. Even the blasts in India, an emerg-ing strategic partner of USA, particularly in Mumbaicould not outwit the Sept-11 hoax.


Russia wants the West to knowthat it can intervene if theUSA continueswith itsunchecked militaryinterventionsand invasionsglobally.

There is a clear agreement among the veto powersnot to wage war against one another and eachshould, in case of mutual tensions, use diplomaticchannels and threats along with hot lines to resolvethem. Both USA and Russia use proxy wars in a thirdcountry by getting their allies on board to fight oneanother. That is why USA has never attacked Russia– or vice versa - over the Sept-II attack or tensionsthey create elsewhere even if it was convinced ofAmerican or Moscow’s role in it. For instance, USAdid not attack Russia over Cuban missile crisis dur-ing the cold war or when Russia annexed Crimeadeliberately; Moscow knows well USA can never at-tack Russia for whatever reason as it would neverdirectly breach the Russian boundaries. Seemingly,USA does not seek to annoy Russia and rekindle thecold war rivalry.

The NATO is planning to expand its strength in Eu-rope by getting more East European nations. Thefinal decision is expected to be a priority for its War-saw Summit in July. Russia has repeatedly opposedthe NATO move to expand itself eastward by takinginto its fold more East European states, therebybringing its military directly to Russian borders.Russia is genuinely concerned that the NATO hasnot given up its containment policy towards Russia.Even while expanding itself to reach the Russianborders, NATO tells Russia it does not have any hid-den agenda against Russia.

One consequence of Putin's expansive strategy hasbeen a direct challenge to the West and to NATOand not just in Europe. So far, NATO responses toRussia’s increasingly active involvement in Europeand West Asia have been just tactical, not strategic.USA uses former allies of Russia in East Europe tochallenge the Kremlin and threaten Russia’s empireambitions, if any, by taking them into NATO.

In order to deter Russia, the Baltic States as well asPoland repeatedly asked for permanent NATO al-liance's forces deployment on their soil. From thestrategic point of view provoking Russia with suchsteps may have serious consequences for the Balticregion and Europe as a whole. However, NATO is op-posed to additional permanent stationing of sub-stantial combat forces, maybe to assure the Kremlinof any European aggression.

Poland and the Baltic States drive themselves intoa corner insisting on permanent NATO troops' de-ployment on their territories and create conditionsunder which NATO could even frustrate some of itsshort-sighted member-states preferring to calmRussia in order to prevent the new Cold War. Threesmall Baltic nations Lithuania that border Russianterritory, Latvia and Estonia joined NATO in 2004 forgaining protection from any possible attacks fromRussia. The Baltic States will willfully continue tourge the need for permanent of NATO forces re-gardless on possible political implications.

What does Russian president Putin's challengemean for NATO today? Do Russian incursions inMiddle East through intervention in Syria mean any-thing significant for NATO? Is NATO ready or pre -pared to deal strategically with Russia in Europeand, as after the end of the Cold War, is the allianceprepared to look beyond Europe's borders to thesouth and east and take a larger role in promotingglobal stability?

At times it appears Russia is aiming at a closer al-liance with NATO. But Russia’s annexation of Crimeaand intrusion into Ukraine, and now Syria indicatetheir tensions. Russia is trying to assure the NATOthat Crimea was just one time affair and it does nothave other agenda in store.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

“The strong do what they have to doand the weak acceptwhat they haveto accept”

Thucydides


ANTONY CLEMENT

Antony Clement is currently a student of the International Relations programat the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Chechnya today is a federal subject ofRussia but long been a boiling point. AlJazeera report point out that, “it remainsa historic challenge for Russia”. The first

and second Chechnya war respectively in 1991 and1999 aimed to contain and crushed the groundgained for independence from the Russian Federa-tion. Since the first Chechnya war more than1,00,000 people were killed in that many of themwere civilians.Russia’s masterful man PresidentVladimir Putin has appointed its own man RamzanKadyrov in-charge of Chechnya in 2007. Since thenChechnya prevails with some sort of stability. How-ever, the natural mindset of the Chechnya’s wouldbe the real question.


CRussian troops today in Chechnya as peacemakers.However, the US embassy cables in 2006 said, Krem-lin’s present tactics towards in maintaining stabilityin Chechnya has limited ability to respond. This pro-jection has could be meant with based on two ob-servations. Firstly, the present economic situationin Russia link with the Ukraine crisis. The sanctionson Russia by the EU and the US have made chal-lenges and opportunities for Russia. Russia couldnot get market access from the near neighbor EU;however, on this shadow of the crisis it has earnedmore contracts from the Chinese to export for itsliquid gas. Secondly, the capacity of Putin’s manKadyrov dealing with grassroots challenges in mak-ing the region peace.

CHECHNYAAn Unresolved Conflict in the Caucasus

Further, the accusation on Kadyrov for corruptionand many other eventualities which has been buck-led with mysterious assassination of opposition po-litical leaders, human rights activists and mediapersonalities have giving more pressure to Putin.Now Putin has no other choice but to lean on Kady-rov for the stability of the region gave more privi-leges to be enjoyed by Chechnya leader whilecompare with any other regional leaders in Russia.However, Moscow reluctant to criticize its proxyleader in Chechnya would be perceived the allwhether ties between Putin and Kadyrov. Hence, re-ports climb that Kadyron himself as an increasingchallenge to Kremlin. In future if the Chechnyaleader goes against the strategic interest of Russiathe perception would be Putin resist Kadyrov - per-ceived to be a jeopardy for the stability of Chech-nya.

However, the present report admonishes that –though the concern is at large about the handlingof human rights atrocity in Chechnya under thecommand of Kadyrov the present period would bedescribed as relatively stable. This can be acknowl-edged as an advantage for Putin. It is true that theinternational community raise their strong concernagainst the suppressing on media freedom andhuman rights issue in Chechnya and criticizingMoscow. Further, though Putin relay on Kadyrov forthe harmony in Chechnya always the Russian pres-ident keeps his eye on the region preciously. ForPutin the advantage would be the free flow of in-formation he has received helps him to theorize thereality in Chechnya in taking advance measures foravoid any farther conflict. This is because of his for-mer designation as the KGP of Russia.

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Moscow should encourageits direct control in the region in support towards for moreopen dialogue

The NATO stops at Ukraine would be converted asa strong hold for Putin tactical game in controllingChechnya further. This should be the double victoryfor Putin.

During the 2015 the upheaval in the Middle East bythe ISIS also has been reach out to Chechnya. TheBBC report claims that during the last year “Jihadists,including those aligned with Islamic State and al-Qaeda, remain active in the region”. The philosoph-ical terrorism is more danger than the institutionalbased, since the rise of the ISIS would be a bad newsfor Moscow. Hence, the takeover of Moscow theatreby the Chechen rebels in 2002 would be a prolongreminder for Russia. Furthermore, the separatistrebels occupied a school had taken hostages ofmore than 1100 people in 2004 required a bloodyfight for evacuation. In this background the futuresecurity threat for Chechnya should be handled.Preventing this kind of atrocities from the rebels tosustain the peace should require a substantial strat-egy to give a hope for the civilians to keep theirtrust on Russia for their security.

However, to retain the present momentum in a sus-tainable format would require undisturbed focus onthe region’s local issues, I hope Putin will demon-strate. What Russia should do to – keep its forcescontinue as the peacemakers in the Chechnya inthe same number for the reasonable time - to sup-port the ground level democratic process with inthe frame work of Russia.

At the same time Moscow should encourage its di-rect control in the region in support towards formore open dialogue. Further, this open dialoguewould have a chance to facilitate to wider the pathfor most of ordinary Chechnya’s to accept theiridentity with in Russia. If this happens the more possibility of repels, sepa-ratists and terrorists wings would imperceptibly de-cline in getting their ground support. Hence, thiswould weak their decisions to fight the mightyRussian army in the future. Moreover, a separatespecial package of development fund would be anecessary step to reassure for the ongoing educa-tional programmes without any hindrances. At thesame time Moscow should keeps its eyes wider ifany of the outsiders like the ISIS sympathies recruit-ing the unemployed youth for fighting outside orto fight inside. This continual momentum has re-quired more funds from the Russian Federationbudget, but it may have more chances of keepingthe region more stable and under its rule as a uni-fied Russia.


PUTIN, DUGIN AND THE COMING WILD RIDE ON LEVIATHAN

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

It does not strain the imagination to snaredrum tautness to imagine Vladimir Putin, barechested in his best rodeo persona, bronco-busting Leviathan. However, the imagination

does balk at him placing Alexander Dugin in thesaddle behind him. Unfortunately, this could bemore than just a Boris Vallejo rendition of a HunterS. Thompson inspired movie poster; it is a real Eura-sia vs. the West possibility and perhaps even be thebasis to the trailer for the coming release of a sequelentitled, Cold War II.

Thomas Hobbes used biblical imagery of Leviathanthe Sea Monster in his description of a powerfulstate able to keep peace and provide its citizenswith security across the spectrum from personal tonational. Hobbes was fain to envision the popula-tion of Leviathan the State contracting away mostor all power to a single authority be it a single per-son or a relatively small authoritative council ableto enforce the law and relieve the security concernsof the masses.


IAlexander Dugin, the contemporary Russiangeopolitical philosopher, is a strong advocate of amultipolar world where a strong Eurasia is the majorland power that checks the unipolar, globalist am-bitions of the Atlanticist ocean-based power of theWest. Dugin has endorsed a Eurasian power, cen-tered in Moscow (the Third Rome in his eschatolog-ical theology) stretching from Dublin to Vladivostok.Dugin was an early supporter of Putin’s Crimean ad-venture, nullification of Ukraine’s Westward leaning,and Russian reassertion in the Middle East.Dugin is a Russian traditionalist, a man who seemsto yearn for a Russian inspired Eurasia with veryconservative even Czarist Orthodoxy, but with evengreater than Czarist geographical proportions andpossessing the military might of the Soviet Unionat its height. He is also a Russian Traditionalist claim-ing close kinship with René Guénon the FrenchMetaphysician - a religious philosopher believing inthe esoteric and revealed perennial Truth handeddown through gnostic initiation from the days ofGod’s initial revelation to man.

JOHN CODY MOSBEY

John Cody Mosbey is consultant and instructor in Criminal Justice and EmergencyManagement. He is also researcher and writer in various aspects of conflict resolution,

terrorism, homeland security, and related criminal justice and national security fields.Mr. Mosbey is completing his PhD research in Russian Political Theology

at Trinity College Dublin.

It is no coincidence that the acclaimed film by An-drey Zvyagintsev is titled Leviathan. Zvyagintsevportrays a powerful but corrupt state and the abuseof its power at the personal and community level.Although Zvyagintsev is attempting to show thedark flip-side of Leviathan’s security powers, theHobbesian association is unmistakeable.

“Realism in international relations,” Dugin has writ-ten, is based on the premise that human nature isimperfect, that humans are prone to sin and weak-ness, and that there is permanent discord betweenpeople (Hobbes’ thesis Homo homini lupus est:“man is wolf to man”). The state and society existprecisely for the purpose of maintaining the indi-vidual in a neutral state, or at least try to preventhim from total disintegration, if not improve him.

While Dugin views Putin as a political realist, heviews Russia as having a higher purpose, “a specificRussian purpose which sets it apart” from othergovernments.

Dugin’s higher purpose ascribes to Russia a mes-sianic and apocalyptic future. Placing inheritance ofthe Roman mantel on Russia’s shoulders, Dugintends to divide Russian history, hence a very signifi-cant chunk of world history, into three rather dis-tinct periods: Pre-Constantinian, Constantinian(later Byzantine, and post-1660 Muscovite; the agesof the First Rome, The Second Rome (ByzantineConstantinople), and Third Rome (Moscow). Omi-nously, The Third Roman period contains the Age ofAntichrist.

Dugin has expressed that Russia’s messianic role - arole that may involve hastening the end of the ageassociated with the defeat of Antichrist - is also Rus-sia’s eschatological purpose. Dugin’s support forRussian expansion eastward, westward, and south-ward are very much in keeping with his vision of aEurasia, guided by Russia, and involved in directlychecking the might and expansion of the Atlanti-cists.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Dugin has expressed that Russia’smessianic role - a role that may involvehastening the end of the age associatedwith the defeat of Antichrist - is alsoRussia’s eschatological purpose

The easy thing to do is to write off Dugin as Putin’sRasputin reincarnation. Certainly in an oh-so-secular-and-proud-of-it West Dugin seems to be afringe Evangelical touting a strange and nonconse-quensial occultic ecumentical brew. But, cautionshould be taken here. Alexander Dugin is not mad.Theology is not relegated to the lunatic fringe in Or-thodox Russia, nor in the eastern areas of a possiblefuture Eurasia where much value is placed on bothMuslim tradition and and theology.

If Alexander Dugin’s influence gains additional trac-tion in the halls of Russian power, the West can ex-pect continued and persistent pressure forwestward expansion; first of Russian influence andnext of Russian de facto control.

Expect Russian pivots off of the Syrian adventureagainst and into Turkey and southward into Libya.Expect renewal and expansion of economic andmilitary agreements eastward. Expect Russian andShia Muslim cooperation overtures, and mutualdiplomatic, perhaps even military, support for Shiacontrolled areas and states.

Putin is already riding Hobbes’ Leviathan; if andwhen he pulls Dugin into the saddle behind him itmay be too late to take notice. Dugin has alreadystated that a second Cold War could become veryhot very quickly.


“The strong do what they have to doand the weak acceptwhat they haveto accept”

Thucydides


Documents

Greater Caspian Project 22