Great Media and Communication Debates: WSIS and the

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report Year: 2006 Journal Title: Information Technologies and International Development Vol and number: 3 : 4 Pages: 15-36 Publisher: USC Annenberg School for Communication ISSN: 1544-7529 Discipline: Media and communications Item Type: Journal Article Language: en URN: URN:NBN:fi:uta-201511262460 URL: http://itidjournal.org/itid/article/view/235/105 All material supplied via TamPub is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all part of any of the repository collections is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone who is not an authorized user.

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15

Robin [email protected] School of Economicsand Political ScienceLondon, United Kingdom

Kaarle NordenstrengKaarle.Nordenstreng@uta.ªUniversity of TampereTampere, Finland

Great Media and Communication Debates: WSIS and the MacBride Report MANSELL, NORDENSTRENG

Great Media and CommunicationDebates: WSIS and the MacBrideReport

In 1980 UNESCO published Many Voices, One World, the report of its In-ternational Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, alsoknown as the MacBride Report, after the commission’s chair, SeanMacBride, the Irish statesman and peace and human rights activist.1 In2004, in an acknowledgment of its importance in current debates aboutthe evolution of information societies, Rowman & Littleªeld republished it.Many Voices, One World was a groundbreaking report and became amilestone in the discussions that had been ongoing since the 1970s. Weexamine its insights in the light of debates leading up and subsequent tothe World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva in 2003and Tunis in 2005. We argue that many of the issues and dilemmas high-lighted by the MacBride Report’s authors exist today.

The record of WSIS participants in tackling these issues is unfortunatelylittle better than that of those who sought to inºuence debates aboutmedia and communication some twenty-ªve years ago. Although therehas been much talk in the intervening years, there are few signs that in-ternational debates and diplomatic mechanisms are fostering the equita-ble development of the media and communication environment that is socrucial for the emergence of information societies in the twenty-ªrst cen-tury. There is a profusion of smaller and larger initiatives aimed at reduc-ing various social and economic inequalities including those associatedwith the media and communication industries. In our view, however, it isunlikely that the new institutional forums that have emerged since theWSIS will be equal to addressing sources of inequality in areas such asgovernance, ªnancing, media diversity, freedom of speech, and humanrights. Nevertheless, and partly as a result of the WSIS dialogue, partici-pants in civil society are becoming better informed about the issues in-volved. Whereas the WSIS, as the MacBride Commission before it, failedto galvanize private and public sector participants into action to promotethe massive investment that is needed, the WSIS process did heighten theproªle of core international media and communication issues in many keyinternational forums. It also conªrmed the need to address these issuesthrough multilateral platforms that encompass all stakeholders, includingcivil society actors.

Earlier, shorter versions of this article appear separately in R. Mansell, “Las contradicciones de las sociedades de lainformación,” pp. 41–44, and K. Nordenstreng, “Un hito en el gran debate mediático,” pp. 45–48, XXV aniversario delInforme MacBride Comunicación internacional y políticas de comunicación, Quaderns del CAC, No. 21, 2005. We aregrateful to two anonymous referees and to the editor for helpful comments; any errors or omissions remain our own.1. For Sean MacBride’s extraordinary record, including the Nobel Peace Prize and the Lenin Peace Prize, see Becker &Nordenstreng (1992).

© 2007 The Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyInformation Technologies and International Development

Volume 3, Number 4, Summer 2006, 15–36

In the next section, we summarize the principalinsights of the MacBride Report and initiatives intro-duced during the 1980s and 1990s and comparethem with the issues addressed during the WSIS. Insection 3, we locate the MacBride Report and theWSIS in the context of the “Great Media and Com-munication Debate.” This is an ongoing and highlypolitical debate with major economic and politicalimplications for the diversity of the media and forthe gap in the accessibility of communication net-works between the wealthy and poor countries. Insection 4, we examine why the passage of time hasnot prepared the ground for more effective concreteactions in key areas following the WSIS. In the con-cluding section, we consider the importance of thegeopolitical environment for the media and commu-nication debate and provide some recommenda-tions, especially with respect to the contribution ofthe academic community in the form of futureresearch.

Since the publication of the MacBride Report, therehas been huge technological change. Nevertheless,the outcomes of the MacBride Commission’s workand those associated with the WSIS have some simi-larities. At the time of the MacBride Report, satellitetechnology was regarded as an innovation thatwould foster greater diversity in the media and pro-vide improved and lower-cost access to communica-tion services and an array of new telehealth andeducation services. Today, there is renewed hopethat the Internet, digitization, and technologicalconvergence will enable the new information andcommunication technologies (ICTs) to reduce the in-equalities between rich and poor. The need for di-versity in media content, extension of affordable andglobal communication networks, and publication ofinformation free from censure by the state or otheractors are components of the ongoing informationsociety debates. The similarities are in the focus of

recent debates and those that were taking place inthe 1970s and 1980s, which emphasized the linksbetween media, communication, and the economicand social order. When the MacBride Report waspublished its authors were very concerned about thedominance of the industrialized countries—and es-pecially the United States—in the production anddistribution of media content. Today, interest is fo-cused on the impact of the forces of globalizationon media production (in terms of both concentra-tion of ownership and opportunities for self-publish-ing through blogs and other new Internet-supportedservices) and in the resilience of local audiences interms of their capacity to resist external media or totranslate their content into their own culturalmilieux.

Media regulation and governance of communica-tion networks have long been important matters forinternational debate. The MacBride Report treatedmedia and communication policy and regulation asformal matters for national governance institutions.State governance institutions, including regulatorybodies and legislative entities, still have an importantrole, but civil society actors are now increasingly rec-ognized as essential actors. On the internationalscene, governance of the media and communicationis involving a wider range of informal and formal in-stitutions. It is questionable, however, whether thesechanges are alleviating the determinants of inequal-ity in the media and communication environment.

The aspirations of participants in the debates aboutcommunication in the decades preceding the 1980MacBride Report and the aspirations of those activein the current information society debates are re-markably similar. Many of the latter want informa-tion societies to develop in a way that underpinsefforts in the economic and political spheres totackle inequality. In our view these aspirations re-main elusive.2 Although awareness has increasedthis has not produced the political pressure or eco-

16 Information Technologies and International Development

GREAT MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION DEBATES: WSIS AND THE MACBRIDE REPORT

2. Our assessment is based, respectively, on Mansell’s participation in international forums hosted by the OECD, agen-cies of the United Nations, and the World Bank since the mid-1980s and her ongoing research on “communication fordevelopment” issues and the role of ICTs, and on Nordenstreng’s participation since the early 1960s in these discus-sions in his capacity as a media and journalism scholar and contributor to several UNESCO platforms, as well as to theMacBride Roundtable discussions in the 1980s and 1990s. Both authors were active contributors to the WSIS debatesand monitor ongoing developments in their roles in the International Association of Media and Communications Re-search (IAMCR).

nomic investment necessary to alleviate unequal de-velopment, including access to and use of newmedia such as the Internet.

The MacBride Report represented the culminationof years of debate on the need to foster a NewWorld Information and Communication Order, orNWICO (Carlsson 2005), involving wide-ranging dis-cussion about how developing countries might usethe media and communication networks to becomemore economically, politically, and culturally self-reliant. The NWICO discussion was closely linked tocalls from the nonaligned countries of the “South”for a new international economic order (Hamelink1978). They were supported by the Soviet-led social-ist countries of the “East,” which had their own rea-sons for pursuing self-reliance and state sovereignty.By the end of the 1970s, discussions in the politicalforums of the time, such as the United Nations, hadreached a peak. The role of the media and commu-nication infrastructure in governing the “free ºow”of information was strongly contested during thisperiod.

Today equally strongly contested are the need toexpand the opportunities for open access to mediacontent and the Internet, the desirability of limitingthe expansion of intellectual property rights protec-tion on digital information resources, and the impor-tance of ªnance to increase literacy and acquisitionof other capabilities necessary for people to partici-pate in information societies. These information so-ciety debates are also occurring in a highly chargedpolitical environment. There are calls for debt relieffor poor countries, and the United Nations millen-nium goals include numerous targets that focus at-tention on the importance of reducing poverty.Despite all the debate and effort, the strength ofglobal forces of capital shows few signs of diminish-ing within the media and communication sphere.These forces are providing incentives for proªtabilitythat often restrict access to new ICTs and to con-tent, and the tensions that characterized earlier de-bates between those that regarded the media as

essential to foster open and public debate and thosethat regarded the media as instruments of statecontrol continue to be very much present.

The republication of the MacBride Report in2004 has increased accessibility to its insights for thecurrent generation of researchers, activists, andpolicymakers. It is important that these be assessedin the light of today’s developments to considerwhat has been achieved since the report’s initialpublication. In his foreword to the new edition,Calabrese (2004, xiv) argues that, “in the MacBrideReport, we ªnd a spirit of hopefulness about how abetter world is possible, about the continuing im-portance of public institutions as a means to ensureglobal justice at local, national, and transnationallevels, and about the value of global communicationas a means to knowledge, understanding, and mu-tual respect.” This spirit of hopefulness was comple-mented by eighty-two recommendations for action,many of which are still relevant. These recommenda-tions are set out under themes: strengthening inde-pendence and self-reliance; social consequences andnew tasks; journalistic professional integrity andstandards; democratizing communication; and fos-tering international cooperation.3 These themes em-phasize the essential link between media andcommunication policies and social, cultural, andeconomic development objectives. They also stressthe importance of participation by all factions of so-ciety in the deªnition of these objectives, althoughthe term civil society had not come into use. The re-port called for the elimination of all forms of com-munication gaps—foreshadowing present-daydiscussions about digital divides. It emphasized theuse of all means of communication (using botholder and newer technologies) and of education.The MacBride Report’s emphases resonate with thecurrent emphasis on the importance of fosteringmedia literacies, of strengthening capacities for localcontent production, and of widening access to thecommunication infrastructure.

The MacBride Report authors acknowledged that

Volume 3, Number 4, Summer 2006 17

MANSELL, NORDENSTRENG

3. Space limitations do not allow a full exposition of the content of the report. The subissues addressed under thesethemes were strengthening independence and self-reliance (communications policies, strengthening capacities, basicneeds, particular challenges); social consequences and new tasks (integrating communication into development, facingthe technological challenge, strengthening cultural identity, reducing the commercialization of communication, accessto technical information); professional integrity and standards (responsibility of journalists, improved international re-porting, protection of journalists); democratizing of communication (human rights, removal of obstacles, diversity andchoice, integration and participation); and fostering international cooperation (partners for development, strengtheningcollective self-reliance, international mechanisms, international understanding).

achieving equity in all these areas would require ma-jor changes in the structure and organization of me-dia and communication markets. Their call forchanges in media and communication regulationand market structures presaged later moves to pro-mote telecommunication market liberalization, andpolicies aimed at curtailing the monopoly power anddominance of the newspaper and broadcast compa-nies; however, neither the work of the MacBrideCommission nor the speciªc recommendations ofthe report can be regarded as having led directly tochanges in policy, regulation, or market structures.Subsequent changes in communication marketswere pushed through on a competitiveness agendadriven largely by the industrialized countries; only afew countries worldwide introduced measures, ofvarying effectiveness, to curtail the power of themajor media companies.

Although some commentators have criticized theMacBride Report for its statist approach to ªnancingthe development of information content and thecommunication infrastructure, it can be seen in an-other light. It can be read as emphasizing noncom-mercial or public provision of communicationservices and media as an alternative to market-ledmechanisms. This is similar to WSIS participants’calls for preservation of a public space for the mediaand for scientiªc, education, and information con-tent, free from overly restrictive IPR protection. TheMacBride Report also addressed the need for a codeof conduct for journalists and measures to protectfreedom of speech and diversity of media content;similar calls for codes and communication or infor-mation rights protections were made at the WSIS.The MacBride Report recommended “utilizing fundsprovided through bilateral governmental agreementsand from international and regional organizations”(MacBride Commission 1980/2004, 268) to tacklethe gaps between the rich and the poor. The WSISacknowledged that public sector or donor agency

funding would be insufªcient to reduce the gap inresources needed to alleviate inequalities in the me-dia and communication ªeld. Civil society actors arecalling for the use of multiple mechanisms forªnancing and a reduction in sole reliance on marketmechanisms, echoing the recommendations of theMacBride Report.

The MacBride Report contained a diversity of ur-gent priorities for action. The WSIS Declaration andits associated plan of action emphasized the needfor international and regional cooperation, universalaccess and bridging the digital divide, investmentpriorities, and mainstreaming ICTs within the workof donor organizations. Both sets of documents em-brace a mishmash of actions and aspirations. In theWSIS case, and in contrast to the MacBride Report,speciªc targets were established for 2015; however,nearly all of these targets relate to technology ratherthan the media, communication processes, and hu-man beings.4 In the plan of action there are refer-ences to capacity and conªdence building, the needfor a conducive legal and institutional environment,issues related to cultural diversity and identity, lin-guistic diversity and local content, the media, andthe ethical dimensions of the information society. Allthese areas are highlighted as urgent for action andthus are a wish list that does not include means ofimplementation, at least not on a scale that wouldbring about a step shift in the reduction of informa-tion society inequalities.

While the detail from the MacBride Report andthe WSIS is overwhelming and unlikely to be fullyacted upon both for political and economic reasons,perhaps the renewed emphasis on media and com-munication as vital social processes will have an im-pact on decision making about informationsocieties. The MacBride Report strongly emphasizedthe social aspect and the potential contribution ofthe media and communication to forces of democ-ratization. Its authors expressed their hope for the



4. The targets in the plan of action illustrate the strong focus on ICTs. These targets may be taken into account in theestablishment of the national targets, considering the different national circumstances: to connect (a) villages with ICTsand establish community access points; (b) universities, colleges, secondary schools, and primary schools with ICTs; (c)scientiªc and research centers with ICTs; (d) public libraries, cultural centers, museums, post ofªces, and archives withICTs; (e) health centers and hospitals with ICTs; (f) all local and central government departments and establish Web sitesand e-mail addresses; (g) to adapt all primary and secondary school curricula to meet the challenges of the informationsociety, taking into account national circumstances; (h) to ensure that all of the world’s populations have access to tele-vision and radio services; (i) to encourage the development of content and to put in place appropriate technical meansto facilitate the presence and use of all world languages on the Internet; (j) to ensure that at least half the world’s in-habitants have access to ICTs.

emergence of societies in which there would be“the diffusion of power through broader access toand participation in the communication process; . . .the beneªts of communication used as an educa-tional and socializing force; . . . the reduction of in-equalities through democratization; [and] . . . theabolition of the vestiges of domination as full na-tional liberation becomes a reality” (MacBride Com-mission 1980/2004, 6).

This statement resonates with the aspirationscaptured in the WSIS Declaration, which expresses itslightly differently. The WSIS Declaration starts froma “Common Vision of the Information Society.” Itemphasizes information and knowledge rather thanthe media or the communication process but ex-presses the “common desire and commitment tobuild a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone cancreate, access, utilize and share information andknowledge, enabling individuals, communities andpeoples to achieve their full potential in promotingtheir sustainable development and improving theirquality of life, premised on the purposes and princi-ples of the Charter of the United Nations and re-specting fully and upholding the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights” (WSIS 2003a, par. 1).

The WSIS Declaration also sees ICTs as contribut-ing to the achievement of the development goals ofthe United Nations Millennium Declaration5 andreafªrms “that everyone has the right to freedom ofopinion and expression,” stating that “communica-tion is a fundamental social process, a basic humanneed and the foundation of all social organiza-tion. . . . Everyone, everywhere should have the op-portunity to participate and no one should beexcluded from the beneªts the Information Societyoffers” (WSIS 2003a, par. 4).

Unfortunately, as Cees Hamelink (2004a, 281) hassuggested, “the ªnal Declaration of the WSIS com-mences with the aspiration of a common vision. Theend result is however a blurred confusion.” TheMacBride Report was similarly ambitious and inplaces also similarly self-contradictory. The ofªcialdocuments of the WSIS were complemented by anunofªcial civil society declaration, “Shaping Informa-

tion Societies for Human Needs.” The centrality ofpeople and of poverty reduction was very clear inthis Declaration: “At the heart of our vision of infor-mation and communications societies is the humanbeing. The dignity and rights of all peoples and eachperson must be promoted, respected, protected andafªrmed. Redressing the inexcusable gulf betweenlevels of development and between opulence andextreme poverty must therefore be our primeconcern” (Civil Society Declaration to the WSIS2003, 2).

Both the MacBride Report and the WSIS docu-ments comment on the relationships between com-munication and society with special attention to thesocial, political, economic, and educational dimen-sions, as well as to the problems created by unequalaccess to media and communication networks. TheMacBride Report, however, throws out a strongerchallenge to the persistent overemphasis on techno-logical advance at the expense of attention to mediainºuences on the construction of meaning andshared cultural understandings. Its authors discuss indetail the problems created by the “one-way ºow”of communication from the dominant economiccenters of the world; by a failure to encourage criti-cal awareness of the relationships among the media,journalism ethics, and democratization; and by theabsence of policies to encourage the equitablespread of communication infrastructure and diversityin media content. Its central conclusion is that “theutmost importance should be given to eliminatingimbalances and disparities in communication and itsstructures, and particularly in information ºows. De-veloping countries need to reduce their dependence,and claim a new, more just and more equitable or-der in the ªeld of communication. This issue hasbeen fully debated in various settings; the time hasnow come to move from principle to substantive re-forms and concrete actions” (MacBride Report1980/2004, 253).

Today’s vocabulary perhaps makes the politicaland economic “dependence” on the wealthy indus-trialized countries less evident. Globalization has ledto concerns about unequal interdependence amongcountries and regions, but the desire for a “just andmore equitable order” remains strong. The MacBrideReport was explicit about the importance of the so-cial, political, and economic development agenda in



5. See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ retrieved April 20, 2007.

the context of decisions about media and communi-cation policy, emphasizing in particular the “politicalfoundations of development”: “Since informationand communication may today become—as neverbefore—the sources of the creation of wealth, thesystem responsible for the existing communicationgaps and the inequality in this sphere threaten towiden the gulf between the rich and the poor. . . .But the basic decisions in order to forge a better fu-ture for men and women in communities every-where, in developing as well as in developednations, do not lie principally in the ªeld of techno-logical development: they lie essentially in the an-swers each society gives to the conceptual andpolitical foundations of development” (MacBrideCommission 1980/2004, 12–13 [emphasis added]).

Development issues, poverty, and inequality, andthe importance of a political will to foster greaterequity were clearly signaled by the MacBride Reportas being more important than the potential of tech-nological innovation in isolation. The MacBrideCommission was relatively small, and the reportreºected its members’ individual experience in thecontexts of the wealthy and poor countries.6 In con-trast, the WSIS documents were the result of a con-sensus, brokered by ofªcials and a few accreditedparticipants in the WSIS main, ofªcial forum. Thesewere mostly government and intergovernmentalofªcials, although some of the texts prepared bycivil society representatives were incorporated intheir reports.

The members of the MacBride Commission andUNESCO spokespersons were not alone in the1980s in acknowledging the relationships amongthe media, the extension of communication net-works, and development prospects. For example, in1984, the Independent Commission for World WideTelecommunications Development, established bythe International Telecommunication Union (ITU),produced the Missing Link, a report produced by thecommission’s chair, Sir Donald Maitland, a seniorBritish diplomat, which argued that “all mankindcould be brought within easy reach of the telephoneby the early part of next century” (Maitland 1984,69). This report focused on development of the un-

derlying telecommunication infrastructure, but, likethe MacBride Report, its authors emphasized thatthe main challenge was not simply greater invest-ment in technology, but promotion of the strategies,market and regulatory mechanisms, technical andmanagement capabilities, and training and ªnancingfrom multiple sources. The Missing Link report au-thors, again like the MacBride Report authors, em-phasized the “political character” of their task,stating that disparities between rich and poor wereunacceptable “in the name of common humanity”(Maitland 1984, 3).

Both these reports stressed the need to addressdevelopment of media and communication net-works in the light of the problems created by in-equalities throughout society. In the late 1970s,concerns focused on the spread of cultural domina-tion as a result of one way or vertical ºows of infor-mation and communication, the intensiªcation ofthe “industrialization of communication” and theimpact of “transnationalization,” leading to thedominance of a few media producers over globaland local markets. There was concern that an infor-mation explosion might defeat people’s capacities toproduce and consume a diverse array of informa-tion. It was also acknowledged that “the subjects ofimbalance and domination were among the mostcontentious in the early rounds of the world-widedebate on communications” (MacBride Commission1980/2004, 164).

Ongoing information societies debates havesome commonalities in terms of the issues that werediscussed and which proved to be the most conten-tious in the 1980s. Participants in the WSIS ex-pressed their anxieties about the vast quantity ofinformation resources circulating within the Internetand the increasing personalization of information re-source access, which potentially excludes diversesources of information, and continuing imbalancesin the capabilities to produce and consume informa-tion among and within different regions of theworld. The reasons why these issues are contentiousare many, but in essence they reºect tensionsamong those keen to rely mainly on market-led de-velopments and those that are lobbying for a major



6. Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States for the wealthy countries; and Chile, Egypt,India, Indonesia, Nigeria, the former Yugoslavia and USSR, and Zaire. The report also beneªted from the work of col-laborating consultants from the media and communication research community including James Halloran, FernandoReyes Matta, and Yassen Zassoursky.

increase in public or public-private initiatives to re-duce inequalities and imbalances. For instance, thereare those who claim that today’s digital divides areof small concern as mobile telephone networks arereaching even the poorest communities; for them itis simply a matter of time before market-led initia-tives close the digital divide. For others, concern isgrowing about the widening disparities—not neces-sarily in terms of access to technology, but in termsof the capabilities and literacies required to beneªtfrom its potential and the concentration and powerof the media.

Although the MacBride and Maitland reportsmay for a time have languished on the shelves ofthose whom their authors sought to inºuence, bythe late 1990s UNESCO was renewing efforts to fos-ter discussion on the problems associated with in-equality in the development of information societies,the term being used in place of NWICO. Part of itsefforts consisted of sponsoring several INFOethicsconferences aimed at highlighting the importance ofaccess to public information content, and to net-works and services, increased rights of access to ed-ucational, scientiªc and cultural information, andprotection of privacy and freedom of expression. Atits third conference in 2000, the then assistant direc-tor-general of UNESCO suggested that “Wisdomcomes from our understanding of what the ICTs canbe used for, how they can be used and with whomthey can be used. . . . Our understanding of the eth-ical, societal and legal implications of the ICTs forhuman beings is essential. . . . Education, in its full-est sense, is, in my opinion, the ultimate answer touniversal access to information and knowledge shar-ing” (UNESCO 2000, 65).

Ethical, societal, legal, and governance arrange-ments for ICTs were given precedence over concernsabout the technologies themselves. This initiativesignaled the need for substantial attention to in-equalities in access to information, the communica-tion infrastructure, and education and in legalprotection of information or communication rights.Although the WSIS highlighted many of these issuesas being important, there are reasons for someskepticism about whether the political will to ad-dress them is any stronger than it was after the pub-lication of the MacBride Report. The situationappears to be as unclear as it was in the 1980s andearly 1990s (see, for example, Nordenstreng andSchiller 1993). At about the same time as UNESCO

was rekindling these debates, the World Bank(1998) published its world report on “knowledge fordevelopment,” highlighting both information andknowledge as keys to poverty reduction. By the endof the 1990s, debates about emerging informationor knowledge societies had reached a new peak innumerous national, regional, and internationalforums.

By the 2003 and 2005 WSIS, there was height-ened awareness of these issues, but no clarity aboutwho would be best positioned to take the lead infostering continuing open dialogue and action. Inthe next section, we examine some of the similari-ties and differences in the political and economiccontexts surrounding the various stages of the“Great Media and Communication Debate.” We doso to demonstrate why the political will to take ac-tions to introduce fundamental change leading togreater equity in the media and communication ªeldremains so weak.

The MacBride Report stands as a milestone in mediaand communication history just as the WSIS willwith the passage of time. The work of the MacBridecommissioners was not primarily a scientiªc exerciseto discover the worldwide state of media and com-munication; it was ªrst and foremost designed to bea political stock taking of the socioeconomic forcesinºuencing the contemporary media and communi-cation ªeld. Similarly, the WSIS can be seen as a po-litical response to a variety of pressures resulting in aprocess and events intended to give a high proªle tomeasures aimed at reducing inequalities in informa-tion societies.

The MacBride Report emerged in the context ofwhat came to be known as the “Great Global Me-dia Debate” (Gerbner et al. 1993; Padovani andNordenstreng 2005). This debate, for analytical pur-poses, can be seen as emerging through ªve, rela-tively clearly demarcated, major stages that began inthe 1970s, each with one or more milestones of itsown.

1. 1970–75 Decolonization Offensive

• Idea of information imperialism

• Concept of a New International InformationOrder (NIIO) proposed by UN



2. 1976–77 Western Counter-Attack

• Establishment of World Press Freedom Com-mittee

• Delayed introduction of UNESCO’s Mass Me-dia Declaration in Nairobi

• Proposal of a “Marshall Plan for telecommu-nications”

3. 1978–80 Truce

• Adoption of UNESCO’s Mass Media Declara-tion

• Work and report of the MacBride Commis-sion

• Consensus on the concept of a New WorldInformation and Communication Order(NWICO)

• Establishment of the InternationalProgramme for the Development of Commu-nication (IPDC)

4. 1981–90 Western Offensive

• Conference of Voices of Freedom in Talloires

• United States and United Kingdom withdrawfrom UNESCO

• Unseating of UNESCO’s Director GeneralM’Bow

• Killing the concept of NWICO

5. 1991– Globalization Culminating inthe WSIS

• Global markets versus cultural exception

• Multinational corporations versus global civilsociety

• Digital divide concerns

• Information societies and knowledge socie-ties in the context of poverty reduction

The politics of the ªrst four stages have been exam-ined elsewhere in terms of how they inºuenced de-velopments in the international policy arena formedia and communication policy (see Nordenstreng1984, 1999). The ªfth stage, commencing in theearly 1990s, focused on the role of the media andcommunication in the face of the forces of global-ization. It culminated in the WSIS. Although thisglobalization stage can be broken down into several

phases, for our purpose, which is to consider thepolitical forces inºuencing the narrative about policyin the media and communication sphere during thisperiod in terms of the way it both parallels and de-parts from earlier phases of the “great debate,” thisis not essential.

The MacBride Report was published soon afterthe release of UNESCO’s Mass Media Declaration in1978. The idea of an international commission tostudy the global problems of media and communi-cation grew out of a political deadlock withinUNESCO in the mid-1970s. The drafting of a decla-ration on “fundamental principles concerning thecontribution of the mass media to strengtheningpeace and international understanding, to the pro-motion of human rights and to countering racialism,apartheid and incitement to war” was underway(UNESCO 1978, 1). A draft was voted on by the ma-jority of participants in an intergovernmental confer-ence in 1975; it contained strong formulations ofstate responsibility for the media and reference to acontroversial UN resolution equating Zionism withracism, which galvanized participants to expresstheir views on the declaration, culminating in awalkout by the Western countries. UNESCO’s direc-tor general Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow suggested a“reºexion group of wise men” in a bid to circum-vent a political crisis during the General UNESCOConference in Nairobi in 1976 (Nordenstreng 1984,20, 112). This crisis was largely due to mounting dis-agreements about UNESCO’s competence for estab-lishing normative standards for the media andcommunication. Those governments that supportedthe declaration were from the nonaligned develop-ing countries and the socialist economies of easternEurope. Those in the camp against the language ofthe declaration were the governments of the Westand the major media producers and publishers.

A compromise achieved at the Nairobi confer-ence was to postpone the launch of a standard-setting declaration and establish a commission. Thisbroke the political deadlock and created a positiveenvironment conducive to the redrafting of the Dec-laration.7 A three-year process was set in place forpreparation of the report of the International Com-mission for the Study of Communication Problems,or the MacBride Commission. In the course of pre-



7. Nordenstreng served on a team of three, which in 1977–78 prepared a “behind-the-scenes” revised draft declara-tion for UNESCO’s secretariat. A detailed account of this process is given in Nordenstreng (1984).

paring the report the commission studied more thana hundred background papers (see MacBrideCommission 1980/2004, 295–302).

At the same time, a parallel instrument was be-ing discussed that was intended to help to avoid anyfuture impasse. The idea was to establish an inter-national fund to support the development of themedia and communication infrastructure in develop-ing countries. This was a joint initiative by the mod-erate developing countries, notably Tunisia, andleading Western countries, and offered material as-sistance to developing countries in the form of a“Marshall Plan of Telecommunications.” The West-ern offer was led by U.S. President Jimmy Carter’sadministration. The aim was to adopt a tactical shiftfrom stick to carrot with the intention of persuadingthe developing countries from espousing a militantline, thereby “trading ideology against coopera-tion.” This diplomatic “buy out” led to the estab-lishment of the IPDC within UNESCO (see Norden-streng 1984, 16–22; 1999, 244–245); however, thisinitiative failed to attract the ªnancial supportenvisaged.

The MacBride Commission was the basis of amaneuver to play down the anti-imperialist momen-tum of the nonaligned movement’s advocacy of anew international economic order and to neutralizeattempts designed to enable the agencies of theUnited Nations system to set standards for the massmedia. For the political West this momentum pre-sented a serious threat as the political South wasempathically supported by the Soviet-led politicalEast. Of course, there were idealists, including SeanMacBride himself, for whom the commissionrepresented a genuine quest for discovering and ad-dressing the global problems of media and commu-nication, but the main motivations and crucialforces lay with the realists, including M’Bow, whowanted to achieve a compromise between the aspi-rations of the capitalist West, the socialist East, andthe nonaligned South. And there was room forcompromise—a truce in the information war—inthe late 1970s, largely due to East-West détente andthe oil crisis, which supported those Western strate-gists that preferred the carrot to the stick.

It was in this spirit that the idea of a new inter-national order in the ªeld of media and communica-tion came to be broadly accepted as a consensus,understood as “an evolving and continuous pro-cess” instead of a ªxed standard. The NIIO echoing

the anti-imperialist drive of the South and the state-sovereignty approach of the East was replaced withthe less controversial “New World Information andCommunication Order,” or NWICO. This watered-down new order thinking was manifest in theMacBride Report’s subtitle: Towards a New MoreJust and More Efªcient World Information and Com-munication Order.

The balance of global forces changed dramati-cally soon after the MacBride Report was publishedand the rebalancing process led to a shift in the for-tunes of the NWICO concept and its lobbyists. Fol-lowing Ronald Reagan’s election to president in1980 the policy of the United States was redirectedfrom multilateralism toward unilateralism and theemployment of power politics, with a relative weak-ening of the then USSR and the nonaligned move-ment. The truce of the late 1970s was followed by anew Western offensive in the 1980s. At this stagethe elements of compromise that earlier had beenregarded as valuable and honorable, very suddenlywent out of fashion and became liabilities. M’Bowdeparted, mainly for political reasons, although hismanagement style and proªle were used to veil thereal reasons for his departure, and NWICO became ataboo topic at UNESCO.

In the broader context of Western politics,UNESCO came to be regarded as a burden. The Rea-gan administration decided that the United Statesshould leave the organization, and the United King-dom under Margaret Thatcher followed suit soonafter. It is important to understand that the reasonsfor the American and British departures fromUNESCO were not primarily the NWICO debate, theMacBride Report, or M’Bow’s leadership. The under-lying cause in both cases was a strategic shift awayfrom multilateralism—a warning to the internationalcommunity that leading Western powers refused tobe outvoted by the majority of the world’s nations.As expressed in a Newsweek interview with a for-mer assistant secretary of state in the Carter admin-istration, “UNESCO was the Grenada of the UnitedNations”—a relatively small target used to demon-strate what could be done on a larger scale if the in-terests of the big powers were not respected.

UNESCO’s record after M’Bow’s reign—in mediaand communication and in other sectors—for a pe-riod of time was far from honorable. The organiza-tion not only abandoned the strategic direction ofthe South and the East; it did its utmost to appeal



to the West—not least to the nonmember state, theUnited States. For example, it attempted to censor abook that exposed UNESCO’s about-face in the areaof media policy (Preston et al. 1989). The culture inUNESCO during the 1980s and early 1990s was toview the MacBride Report, and the NWICO debate,as politically incorrect. During this period there wasno interest in making new imprints of the MacBrideReport.

These then were the political conditions that gaverise to the commission and to the context withinwhich the MacBride Report was prepared. The re-port itself can be assessed in terms of whether itrepresented a document that adequately capturedthe emerging world of media and communication atthe time. Communication scholars came together asa group to produce a critical assessment of the re-port (Hamelink 1980) immediately after its publica-tion.

A critical reading of the report suggested that ittreated the history of the media and communicationin isolation from fundamental social and global de-velopments (Nordenstreng 1980). For example, al-though it referred to “one world,” it was arguedthat the report did not project a coherent picture ofthe dynamics and conºicts informing the history orlikely future of the media and communication indus-tries (Nordenstreng 1980). Instead, as Nordenstrengsuggested, it provided an abstract image of thesedevelopments, accompanied by a discussion of anumber of more or less disconnected phenomenaand debates. It presented the “crucial problems fac-ing mankind today” as a simple list of familiar issueswith no explicit explanation of the theoretical andpolitical controversies that they represented. The re-port was viewed as counterproductive because it didnot reveal the deep interrelationships between themedia and communication and other social phe-nomena. These interrelationships were not evidentbecause the concept of communication used by thereport’s authors was drawn principally from themainstream of bourgeois liberalism. It incorporateda functionalist, positivist, and ahumanistic approach,which came increasingly to predominate in later de-bates about the role of the media and communica-tion in society. This profound weakness wassummed up at the time in the following way. “TheReport is an excellent illustration of the dilemma ofeclecticism: you try to be comprehensive but you

lose the totality which you are supposed to discover.In this respect the Report could well be called ‘Mis-sion Impossible’” (Nordenstreng 1980, 249).

Although this judgment about the scholarlyworth of the document still stands, as a politicalmilestone the report, together with the scholarlycommentary, has withstood the test of time. CeesHamelink, for instance, noted that the report hadunderplayed the growing strength of transnationalcorporations and their implications for the output ofthe media and the development of communicationnetworks and services. He argued that the MacBrideReport did not adequately foresee that the “oneworld” of the future, in the absence of changes inpolicy and regulation, would be one in which majorcorporations would play a very major role in shapingthe media environment. In this assessment he wasprophetic: “The Report, although rightly pointing tothe crucial role of transnational corporations in theªeld of international communications, did notsufªciently recognize that the new international in-formation order is indeed likely to be the order ofthe transnational corporations. The ‘one world’ theReport ambitiously refers to in its title may very wellbe the global marketplace for transnational corpora-tions” (Hamelink 1980, 281). The next generation ofmedia and communication scholars reached similarconclusions about the way that the MacBride Reporthad served not to open up informed scholarship andpolicy debate but rather to close it down because ofthe assumptions it made about the openness ofglobal markets and the roles of major media andcommunication ªrms. (Samarajiva and Shields 1990;Samarajiva and Holliªeld 1994; Mansell 1995).

In the ªfth, globalization, stage of the “GreatMedia and Communication Debate,” we can returnto the report to reexamine the insights it holds forresearchers and policy analysts. In the later part ofthe 1990s, as we have seen, there were signs of arenewed willingness to address many of the issuesthat the MacBride commissioners had addressed,this time under the rubric of information or knowl-edge society issues. Concerns about the digital di-vide and its implications for social and economicinequality, together with the political momentumcreated by the civil society movement, began to fos-ter a new political space for dialogue.

Although the MacBride Report is relatively light-weight when measured against scholarly criteria, itprovides today’s civil society organizations and the



current generation of researchers a text signalingthe crucial role of the media and communication ina globalizing world in which democracy, participa-tion, ethics, and rights are high on the internationalagenda. Its observations on these issues help to clar-ify directions for the global movement toward de-mocracy and equity in media and communication,building on the decolonization offensive of the early1970s. Most of the MacBride Report’s eighty-tworecommendations were never implemented (Han-cock and Hamelink 1999), and most of the issuesreappeared on the agenda of the WSIS in one guiseor another.

The MacBride commissioners’ views are neverthe-less valid and important. They point to measuresthat are needed if we are to halt the trends that areproducing deeper divisions between the wealthyand the poor and the media and communicationnetworks that are sustaining such divisions, eventhough the technology and the political context theyinitially referred to have changed. For example, theMacBride Report (1980/2004, 206, 214, 219) calledfor policies at national and international levels toachieve the necessary “allocation of public re-sources, decisions about general structure for com-munication activities, elimination of internal andexternal imbalances, and deªnition of priorities,which naturally vary from one country to another.”The need to develop such policies is as urgent todayas the need to deªne priorities. Although theMacBride Report highlights certain priorities, its longlist of recommendations is akin to, and covers simi-lar areas as, the long list of measures encompassedby the WSIS Plan of Action, which introduces therisk that efforts to redress these issues will be inade-quate in light of the huge number of topics.

The MacBride commissioners called for measuresto “promote endogenous capacities in all countriesfor devising, producing and using new communica-tion technologies, as well as programs and theircontent.” They observed that “international assis-tance in general, tends to remain of ad hoc nature,sporadic and poorly integrated into overall develop-ment plans.” The huge effort that still is needed tobuild local capabilities, combined with the “stop–go” nature of ICT and “communication for develop-ment” projects, suggest that little heed has beenpaid to these earlier recommendations. Efforts tomainstream ICT-related issues continue to be contro-versial, and the emphasis is on technology diffusion

rather than on the assessment of information andcommunication needs, speciªcally tailored to poorcommunities, countries, and regions of the world.

The MacBride commissioners called for new edu-cation programs to counter what they regarded asforces that could foster the standardization and ho-mogenization of the media environment. In linewith their emphasis on education, they called forless focus on the fascinating potential of technologyand greater effort to foster literacies to equip peopleto choose and discriminate between the products ofthe media and communications industry. The WSISputs some degree of emphasis on literacies, al-though associating them more broadly with infor-mation and knowledge than with the media inparticular.

Those supporting the concept of the NWICO inthe early phases of the Great Media and Communi-cation Debate envisaged it as “an open-ended con-ceptual framework . . . [that] pre-supposes a newdistribution of available resources in accordance withtheir [the poorer sections of the world’s population]vital rights and needs” (MacBride Report 1980/2004, 39). Similarly today, civil society actors andbusiness community stakeholders that support theopen software movement envisage informationsocieties that respect the rights and needs of all,providing open communication and media diversityrather than exclusion for all but the loudest mediaindustry voices. The spread of the Internet and thenew opportunities for self-publication and expres-sion via blogs, e-mail, chat rooms, and webcams of-fer new prospects for such developments, but donot mean that the problems of the past with respectto media closure and control of communication net-works have dissipated. Not only are new media suchas the Internet unavailable or too costly for many ofthe world’s poor, but issues such as the role of thetraditional and new media in the education of citi-zens, in promoting trust and democratic participa-tion, and the reliability of information of bothknown and unknown provenance continue to de-mand attention from all the stakeholders in the cur-rent phase of the debate.

Despite the fact that they were writing in the late1970s, the authors of the MacBride Report envis-aged a network akin to the globally distributedInternet that has emerged. They pointed to the po-tential democratizing inºuence of “a web of com-munication networks, integrating autonomous or



semi-autonomous, decentralized units” (1980/2004,12). Under certain conditions, they argued, “the ad-vance in modern electronic systems . . . also offersthe possibility of localized, inexpensive, ºexible anddecentralized communication structures which facili-tate broader public access and participation” (1980/2004, 150).

Some of those conditions have been fostered byinnovations in ICT hardware and software, not leastthe Internet protocol and the introduction of theWorld Wide Web. The Internet’s evolution has beencharacterized by decentralized forms of governance.This situation, however, could quickly change if thepolitical climate were to shift in the face of an en-forcement of the security agenda. This agendathreatens to override established media-relatedrights and freedoms as well as the open and, so far,relatively insecure Internet. If achieving greater infor-mation and network security and reliability as ameans of reducing real or perceived risk become ahigher priority for governments and ªrms, the po-tential of localized, ºexible, and decentralized net-works and media could be jeopardized. The politicaland economic context clearly has changed since theNWICO debate, but many of the political and eco-nomic issues are the same.

The momentum provided by the WSIS makes itvery important to draw on the insights documentedin academic publications and professional forumssuch as the MacBride Round Table discussions orga-nized since 1989 (Vincent et al. 1999) and work byscholars in the ªeld of media and communication.There are some scholarly works that brought theseissues into focus in the years leading up to the WSIS(for example, Mansell and Wehn 1998; Mansell1999a, 2001, 2002; Hamelink 2000, 2004b; Raboy2002; Goonasekera et al. 2003). Governmentofªcials, private sector spokespersons, and represen-tatives of civil society sought support for measuresto encourage more transparent governance of theInternet, improved policy aimed at extending infra-structure and services, and codes of conduct sup-porting open dialogue and debate in the media (seefor instance, the special issue of Information Tech-

nologies and International Development (2004) onthe WSIS; Instituto del Tercer Mundo [2005];Milward-Oliver [2005]; and Stauffacher andKleinwächter [2005]).

Following the WSIS there has been debate aboutwhether the process and its outcomes succeeded inproviding a renewed foundation for action to ad-dress the problems confronted by the economicallydisadvantaged. For example, Cammaerts (2006),Hamelink (2006), and Raboy (2006) have all sug-gested that the WSIS process was important interms of raising awareness among civil society actorsabout the issues, but they are less than convincedthat the WSIS created a political will for action totackle injustices and inequalities in the media andcommunication ªeld. In the next section, we exam-ine three key areas where there is a crucial need foraction but little sign that the WSIS can be regardedas being instrumental in bringing about fundamen-tal changes in direction.

The current terminology refers to the information orknowledge society.8 There has been a shift in therhetoric compared to the early stages of the so-called Great Media and Communication Debate.Nevertheless, the contemporary terminology echoesthe MacBride Report’s notion of “one world.” Theemphasis in debates in international forums hasshifted toward the role of ICTs in knowledge accu-mulation and increasing emphasis on the economicsof the production and consumption of information.9

Today’s discussion is perfunctory about the problemscreated by imbalance and domination in the mediaand communication industries and the political andeconomic contexts in which information societiesare developing. For instance, debate tends to becentered on the emergence of the information soci-ety rather than a diverse interlinked set of informa-tion societies with distinct histories, voices, andfutures. The MacBride Report, however, emphasizedthe centrality of media diversity, the communication



8. The use of the preposition “the” suggests that there is only one society characterized by the importance of informa-tion, a suggestion that is clearly contradicted by historians such as Innis (1950). Similarly, references to “the” knowl-edge society convey a singular vision of the role of knowledge in society.9. During the WSIS process, UNESCO tried to move a more socially and culturally oriented concept of knowledge socie-ties onto the agenda (see UNESCO 2005). However, “the” information society prevailed as the main concept and “the”knowledge society (singular) appeared only in the last sentence of the WSIS Declaration of Principles.

process, and the need for a major investment initia-tive.

Of course, the debates about the information so-ciety are occurring within the wider political andeconomic context of globalization. Politically, talk offostering democracy is coinciding with state-led orencouraged wars within states, supported by thewealthy industrialized countries, notably the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom. Economically, thegrowing dependence of the global economy onelectronic services means that efforts to preserveand extend the commodity model of informationproduction are strong, as evidenced by attempts tostrengthen intellectual property rights protection ofdigital information (Mansell and Steinmueller 2000).Civil society organizations are increasingly visible andtheir representatives are vocal on citizens’ rights is-sues, and, in some areas, technological innovation issupporting open access to information and mediaproduction by citizens, in new ways. Examples in-clude the many efforts in both the wealthier and thepoorer countries to promote open source softwareand to develop intellectual property rules consistentwith an open information commons, alongside ex-isting restrictive rules.

The political context of the globalization stage ofthe Great Media and Communication Debate, likethe MacBride Commission before it, is the result of apolitical compromise. A WSIS was proposed initiallyduring the International Telecommunication Unionplenipotentiary conference in Minneapolis in 1998.It was argued that the “ITU is the organization bestable to seek appropriate ways to provide for devel-opment of the telecommunication sector geared toeconomic, social and cultural development.” TheITU was seeking at the time to reposition itself as aforum capable of shaping an international commu-nication environment following years of telecommu-nication privatization and liberalization. In the effortto achieve this it needed to promote issues of inter-est to developing countries, as well as the wealthiercountries that were home to many of the ICT pro-ducer ªrms.

The summit later became the subject of a UnitedNations (2002) General Assembly Resolution, givingit potential prominence on the world stage. Al-though the relevance of many United Nations agen-

cies was acknowledged, UNESCO does not ªgure inthese early documents, despite the fact that, in thelatter part of the 1990s, it had promoted ethical, so-cietal, and legal debates. The ITU became the leadorganization in the WSIS, with UNESCO playing aless visible role in the preparations. Its Web sitestated that “UNESCO’s contribution incorporates theethical, legal and sociocultural dimensions of the In-formation Society and helps to grasp the opportuni-ties offered by the ICTs by placing the individual atits centre,”10 but the strong emphasis on technologyin the ªnal WSIS documents, especially the ICT indi-cators, shows that it was the interests of those moreclosely aligned with the ITU that prevailed at thesummit.

The formal parts of the WSIS did not reach thekind of impasse that led to the withdrawal fromUNESCO of the United States and the United King-dom in an earlier stage of the debate. Globalizationhad changed the geopolitical landscape and in-creased the prominence of countries such as Chinaand India in various hardware, software, and ser-vices segments of the ICT market. On the economicfront, little progress was made in the WSIS in termsof ªnding the resources to reduce the digital divide.On the political front, although the post-9/11 envi-ronment meant that the United States governmenthad a very strong potential interest in the role of themedia and in promoting the use of ICTs in supportof democratization movements in the Middle Eastand elsewhere, by the time of the summit in 2003the focus was shifting to concerns associated withnational security and the role of ICTs and the mediain this context. The heady days when ICT marketsaturation in the wealthy countries was creatingnew pressures to open developing country marketsto new media products and services had all but dis-appeared. The dot.com crash had dampened theenthusiasm of investors in ICTs and Internet-relateddevelopments and markets were languishing, incontrast to conditions when the idea of a WSIS wasªrst discussed. By 2005, many new commercial op-portunities were emerging in relation to the devel-opment of more secure networks, and the impetusto extend networks into poor areas regarded by ICTªrms as marginally proªtable had reduced.

The contradictions in the wider political and eco-



10. See portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID?1543&URL_DO?DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION?201.html retrieved April 20,2007.

nomic environment to some extent explain why theissues raised about Internet governance (and con-trol) during the WSIS were so problematic. Thesesame contradictions help to explain why little prog-ress was made on issues related to media freedom,information or communication rights and responsi-bilities, or ªnance and investment. These wereamong the many issues that remained unresolvedafter the ªrst phase of the WSIS in December 2003.The most contentious issues in the MacBride deliber-ations were ªnance, governance (or policy and regu-lation), and rights—albeit for different politicalreasons.

The Plan of Action of the WSIS (2003a, par. 27)called for a “digital solidarity agenda” that “aims atputting in place the conditions for mobilizing hu-man, ªnancial and technological resources for inclu-sion of all men and women in the emergingInformation Society.” Reminiscent of the 1970s“Marshall Plan for Telecommunications,” thisreºected the need to ªnance efforts to expand thedevelopment of the media and communication in-frastructure, equipment, capacity building, and con-tent. Following the 2003 WSIS, a task force was setup to examine existing ªnancing mechanisms andthe feasibility of creating a voluntary digital solidarityfund.11 This fund, led by the president of Senegal,was established and received some relatively smallcontributions prior to the second phase of the sum-mit in 2005. At the end of 2004, the Report of theTask Force (2004, 10–11) included the observationthat funding “should be seen in the context of avail-able ªnancing for the broader set of developmentagendas and goals.” It called for improved cross-sectoral and institutional coordination, more multi-stakeholder partnerships, stronger emphasis on do-mestic ªnance, private sector support for locallyrelevant applications and content, strengthening ca-pacities to secure and use funds effectively, and in-creased voluntary, consumer-based contributions. Inreferring to the digital solidarity fund, the “TaskForce felt that it was not in a position to assess itsrole among the various ICT ªnancial mechanisms”(Report of the Task Force 2004, 13). Just as the IPDCin the 1980s had failed to attract substantial fund-

ing, so the new solidarity fund has been poorly sup-ported in spite of the enthusiasm of a few cities andthe Swiss government. The opportunity to under-take a huge ªnancial effort, at the time of theMacBride Report envisaged as being through theIPDC, has been missed again.

In the lead-up to the WSIS independent analyseswere made of the adequacy of existing ªnancingmechanisms (Instituto del Tercer Mundo 2005; Peyer2005). They concluded that, whereas market-ledforces would continue to predominate in ªnancinginformation society development, there are manycomplementary and creative approaches that couldbe adopted. This is essentially the conclusionreached by the MacBride Report’s authors. Some ofthese approaches involve adjustments to marketmechanisms, while others require community or co-operative initiatives and public funding through tax-ation or development assistance. Over the years,there have been many efforts to persuade ªrms thatinnovative approaches to providing affordable com-munication services in poor areas could be proªtablein the medium term (Mansell 1999b). Such ap-proaches require proper assessments of the propor-tion of disposable income that the poor would bewilling to spend on communication (rather than mis-leading estimates that are based on the experienceof wealthy countries), examinations of the cost-revenue relationships associated with microprepayservices for new services such as mobile telephony,and reconsiderations of the policy and regulatorybarriers to such schemes. Although some work hasbeen done in these areas, there is little enthusiasmon the part of either major ICT or communicationservice providers, which continue to resist such de-velopments on a large scale in most countries forcommercial or competitiveness reasons (Milne2006).

Although the major ICT supplier ªrms were visi-ble in the trade shows that were mounted duringthe WSIS, and they conducted product launchesaimed at the poor, their presence was rather mutedin the formal debates, and in terms of making dura-ble commitments to new, much-needed, investmentschemes to address the digital divide. Although itwas recognized that a huge ªnancial effort will beneeded to correct imbalances and reduce the domi-nation of major media producers and communica-



11. See Digital Solidarity Fund, 2004, www.dsf-fsn.org/en/15c-en.htm# retrieved April 20, 2007.

tion operators, the summit report on ªnancing didnot recommend new means of mobilizing the nec-essary investment. Those whose interests in short-run proªts outweigh their interests in extending net-works and media diversity in many parts of theworld, prevailed. WSIS participants could have re-sorted to existing partnership initiatives to deliverlow-cost Internet access terminals that were in theplanning or prototype stage based on a combinationof government and private funding (Mansell 2006);indeed, they could have initiated a new twenty-ªrst-century Marshall Plan for media and communica-tion. And if such a plan had won the backing of in-vestors, they would have done well to heed theMacBride Report’s exhortation to focus more oncommunication needs than on the technology.

In contrast to the MacBride Report’s statist ap-proach to media and communication planning andªnancing, the WSIS process emphasized the impor-tance of partnerships between public and privatestakeholders and the inclusion of civil society organi-zations in decision making. The development anduse of media and communication products and ser-vices depend ultimately upon market-led supply anddemand, something clearly recognized by the WSISparticipants and by the MacBride Report’s authors.In a global environment in which disparities per-sist,12 numerous regulatory and policy measures arestill needed to augment market forces. For the mostpart, however, the WSIS participants focused onnew media or Internet governance–related issuesrather than on attempts to grapple with barriers togreater investment.

Internet governance proved to be a strongly con-tested issue for the WSIS participants, and many ofthe developments in this area have implications forolder media and communication platforms as over-laps between online Internet-based and traditionalmarkets increase in the publishing, press, broadcast,and communication ªelds. The Working Group onInternet Governance (WGIG) was established tomake proposals for action at the 2005 summit. Thismove was designed to circumvent a political dead-lock between those, including the United States, fa-voring status quo arrangements and those callingfor more transparent, public oversight of the devel-

opment of the Internet (Kleinwächter 2004a,2004b). The WGIG was given a mandate that in-cluded developing a working deªnition of Internetgovernance; identifying public policy issues relevantto Internet governance; and developing a new un-derstanding of the roles and responsibilities of gov-ernments, international organizations and otherforums, the private sector, and civil society.13 Its re-port (WGIG 2005) presented alternatives for facili-tating Internet access for all and for fostering astable and secure Internet with diverse, multilingualcontent.

The controversies over governance arrangementswere essentially over scarce resources whose charac-teristics and distribution have major political andeconomic implications. The treatment of Internetaddresses and domain names and their manage-ment are of major importance for the Internet’slong-term development. The Internet’s architectureand its protocols will be inºuenced substantially bythe prevailing governance arrangements which aremaintained by the Internet Corporation for AssignedNames and Numbers (ICANN) and several related or-ganizations. These arrangements were criticized forfailing to account adequately for the interests of de-veloping countries and civil society actors. As a pub-lic-private organization, there was unease aboutICANN’s decision-making structures and processes.Proposals for change made prior to the 2005 sum-mit ranged from introducing a global governancesystem through a UN agency, such as the ITU, tomaintaining the status quo. Those backing thestatus quo included major media and communica-tions producers based mainly in the wealthy indus-trialized countries as well as some members of theacademic community (see Oxford Internet Institute2005). Despite the fact that the Internet is an opennetwork, those organizations seeking to proªt fromits use are regarded by some as having dispropor-tionate sway over its development, especially in rela-tion to plans to introduce differentiated quality ofservice for Internet services (David 2007).

The WGIG Report (2005) made suggestions forimproved governance with a view to strengtheningthe inclusiveness of participation, coordinating policyat world level, and bringing greater transparencyand equity to all facets of Internet governance. It



12. As documented by empirical studies, see for example Gillwald (2005) and Zainudeen et al. (2006).13. Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), see www.wgig.org/About.html retrieved April 20, 2007.

was explicit that, although by no means the only is-sue, high priority should be given to the question ofunilateral control by the U.S. government of the ad-ministration of the root zone ªles and system. Itconcluded that “no single government should havea pre-eminent role in relation to internationalInternet governance” (WGIG 2005, 12). Proposalswere made for the creation of global forums orcouncils for discussion of policy-related issues. Theresponse of the WSIS in Tunis in 2005 to these pro-posals was for an Internet governance forum (IGF)to be established under the auspices of the UnitedNations. The stakeholder groups who would partici-pate formally were selected but there were someconcerns about the representativeness of the civilsociety actors. Nevertheless, the forum’s initial meet-ing in October 2006 was open to civil society actorsand academics. Although an important initiative, itwill be some time before it becomes clear whetherthe IGF can inºuence the future accessibility andopenness of the Internet. This will remain a politi-cally charged issue, with continuing frictions be-tween those keen to guard against pressures tointroduce a high-quality and uncongested Internetfor those who can pay and a second-tier Internet forthose unable to afford the costs of the high-qualityservice.

How the Internet and its governance regimeªnally evolve will be subject to the geopoliticalwinds of change. A probable outcome will be thatthe actual or perceived risks from the Internet’s con-tent or threats to the infrastructure will result instrong efforts to control the Internet’s developmentin line with state and economic interests in thewealthy countries, and the United States in particu-lar (Mansell and Collins 2005). The concerns ex-pressed in the MacBride Report about the potentialfor innovative technologies to be shaped to the in-terests of powerful economic or political forces areextremely relevant today.

The MacBride Report’s authors signaled that contra-dictions in society—that is, conºicts between the in-terests of major political or economic actors—couldlead to media and networks that would embed thevalues of hierarchy and centralization and increasedsocial control, accompanied by inequalities. As onemeans of resolving such contradictions in the inter-

ests of all citizens, they called for a “right to com-municate” to be enshrined in a UN declaration onassociation, information and development rights. Atthe time, their thinking was informed in part byRichstad and Harms (1977, np) statement to the ef-fect that

Everyone has the right to communicate: the com-ponents of this comprehensive Human Right in-clude but are not limited to the following speciªccommunication rights: (a) a right to assemble, aright to discuss, right to participate and relatedassociation rights; (b) a right to inquire, a right tobe informed, a right to inform, and related infor-mation rights; c) a right to culture, a right tochoose, a right to privacy, and related human de-velopment rights. . . . The achievement of a rightto communicate would require that communica-tion resources be available for the satisfaction ofhuman communication needs.

During the WSIS, communication or informationrights issues and the potential for far-reachingchange to redress inequalities in this area emergedand became the subject of major debate, at leastamong the civil society participants (Padovani 2004).These concerns were less visible in the texts pro-duced in the WSIS formal sessions.

In the post-9/11 environment and in the face ofthe “war on terror,” proponents of measures topromote information surveillance and intrusive mon-itoring of citizens’ access to information and com-munication networks are voluble (Lyon 2004). Thepolitical environment in most of the wealthy coun-tries is fostering these developments in the name ofsecurity. Although there is resistance in some quar-ters, many national surveys are being interpreted bygovernments as suggesting that, for the most part,the general population is not averse to measuresthat challenge existing human rights legislation. De-spite the results of independent analyses of citizens’perspectives on issues of privacy protection and sur-veillance (see Bennett and Raab 2003), since 2001new national security legislation has been passed inmany countries, including poorer ones (Caidi andRoss 2005). Discussion about the information rightsor communication rights that need to be upheld inthe face of such measures continues, but it is frag-mented and contested even among civil society ac-tors and within the academic community.

There is unlikely to be an early resolution of con-troversies in this area. A surge, at least in the short



term, in the political will to incorporate such rightsin a new international declaration is unlikely, regard-less of the WSIS document’s recommendationsabout the need to respect human rights. If the WSIShad prompted action in the direction of a new dec-laration, this could have committed the signatoriesto foster media and communication environmentsconsistent with the objectives of “sustainable devel-opment, democracy, and gender equality, for the at-tainment of a more peaceful, just, egalitarian andthus sustainable world, premised on the principlesenshrined in the Charter of the United Nations andin the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (CivilSociety Declaration 2003, 2). In the absence of suchaction, there is good reason to monitor the confor-mance of state and nonstate actors to existing citi-zen rights. The main impetus at present is toimprove collaboration in information security andmonitoring globally, with respect to potential terror-ist actions. Questions of freedom of speech and theimplications of politically or commercially motivatedcensorship of media and information content willgive rise to ongoing debate about the need for hu-man rights protections (see, for example, Thomasand Nain 2002; Kalathil and Boas 2003; Klang andMurray 2005; Dean et al. 2006). In this regard, thereare substantial differences in the focus of currentdiscussions and those that took place in earlierstages of the Great Media and Communication De-bate. It is the availability of the Internet and devel-opments in new media that facilitate monitoringand surveillance that are rendering protection andinfringement of human rights topics of very highpriority, such that the MacBride commissioners couldnot have foreseen.

Our conclusions about the impact of the WSIS aresimilar to those of the scholars who commented onthe MacBride Report. Regardless of the potential ofthe WSIS to garner widespread support for thekinds of changes needed to reduce inequality in to-day’s information societies, especially in those issueareas highlighted in this article, it is to the sphere ofgeopolitics and the forces of globalization that wemust turn for an explanation of the failure to intro-duce the necessary changes in governance, ªnance,and human rights protection. There was a majorchange in the geopolitical environment following

the MacBride Report’s publication with the shiftfrom U.S.-led multilateralism to unilateralism. Thisbrought with it an overriding concern for U.S. inter-ests in the media and communication ªeld, ratherthan a desire to support development initiativesaimed at the disadvantaged. In the present stages ofthe Great Media and Communication Debate, andaround the time that the WSIS was being planned inthe ªrst years of this century, there was a shift fromthe relatively outward-looking multilateral politics ofthe Clinton administration to the equally outward-looking, but unilateral, politics of the Bush adminis-tration. This shift, combined with a more globally in-terdependent economy, has meant that thelikelihood of the WSIS aspirations being convertedinto concrete actions aimed at achieving greater eq-uity in information societies is much reduced. In ad-dition, the turmoil created by the continuing “waron terror” has meant that ªnancial resources arelikely to be devoted to measures to enhance the se-curity of existing networks and services. This will cre-ate growing markets for software developers andhardware manufacturers in the wealthy countries,alleviating pressures on ªrms to expand into less lu-crative markets in developing countries, at least forthe time being.

Our conclusions must be tempered, however, bythe advances made by civil society actors as a resultof the WSIS, in prizing open formerly closed deci-sion-making forums at the international level. Thecivil society coalition that participated in the WSISmay not have represented a broad alliance thatwould enable the full participation of the poor andother excluded groups (Cammaerts and Carpentier2005); however, its members have succeeded in rais-ing the proªle of ªnance, governance, and mediaand communication rights and responsibilities. Al-though this coalition may have failed to modify theactions proposed in the mainstream WSIS Plan ofAction substantially, it introduced some helpful lan-guage into the documents in relation to issues ofeducation, media freedoms, and gender, for exam-ple. There has also been a precedent set for greaterparticipation in the IGF and future international fo-rums and a greater awareness of the need forªnancial support to extend the reach and inclusivityof global media and communication networks.

It may be argued that incremental policy reformis the answer to reducing inequality, that marketforces ultimately will provide media and communica-



tion services that are affordable for all, and that top-down government intervention to provide ªnancingwill only distort the efªcient working of markets;however, the record of market liberalization and pri-vatization in the communication industry in thepoorest countries is not good (Gillwald 2004). In ad-dition, media ownership and concentration concernswith respect to media diversity have not disappearedfrom the political agendas in many countries, and, insome industry segments, there is evidence of in-creasing concentration (Thomas and Nain 2002). Amix of public- and private-sector initiatives is essen-tial if the poorest areas of the world are to be in-cluded in the information societies that arechampioned by those that supported the aspirationsin the WSIS Declaration.

As can be applied to the MacBride Report, wemust look to the wider political and economic con-text in which the WSIS occurred for an explanationof the slow progress that is being made to redressthe digital divide and related issues. In the contextof the MacBride Report, it was understood thatproblems could be tackled only by a huge effort in-volving the establishment of mechanisms to achieveinternational cooperation and partnerships for devel-opment. The MacBride Report did not explicitly ac-knowledge that this would require a favorablepolitical environment. Similarly, explicit discussion ofthe politics informing information society develop-ments is missing from the WSIS documents. Follow-ing the WSIS, the political environment might bethought to be rather more conducive to addressingthe problems underlying poverty and inequality andthe constraints to the emergence of equitable infor-mation societies. After all, the governments of theUnited Kingdom and many of the European Unionmember states have made efforts to tackle povertyand to agree on debt relief for poor counties.

Contradictions will remain, however, betweenthe interests of those who seek to proªt from infor-mation societies and those who seek to promotethem in ways that are consistent with reducingworld poverty and fostering communication thatsupports human dignity and respect. It will beinsufªcient to rely on technological innovation andthe market to bridge the gaps. Similarly, it will beunsatisfactory to assign the development of mediaand communication for the poor, to those espousingthe beneªts of public–private–civil society partner-ships. This will produce little momentum to imple-

ment or scale them up. Without action to tacklemarket and nonmarket barriers to greater invest-ment and more effective participation by all stake-holders in the debate about information societies,twenty-ªve years on from the WSIS we are likely tosee yet new forms of injustice that discriminateagainst the poor. Measures are needed to encour-age the diversity of media content, to encouragethe ethical conduct of journalists, stem abuses ofcitizens’ rights, and overcome uneven access to newgenerations of ICTs.

Research on the role of media and communica-tion in development (Hemer and Tufte 2005) is pro-ducing a strong argument for positive action at theinternational level in the areas of governance,ªnance, and human rights with respect to mediaand communication. The argument rests heavily onthe fact that the media and communication in infor-mation societies are intertwined with social justiceand equity. As Cohen (2001, 168, 183) so vividly ar-gues, the media “have a near monopoly in creatingthe cultural imagery of suffering and atrocities. . . .The principle of social justice does not depend onyour moral awareness of people like you—but yourreadiness to extend the circle of recognition to un-known (and even unlikable) people who are not alllike you.”

The topics we have highlighted will be the sub-jects of hotly contested debate in multiple forums inthe coming years. Averting a negative outcome ofthe WSIS and associated initiatives will not be easyand will require the involvement of all stakeholders,including the academic community. As media andcommunication scholars, we have an obligation tospotlight the contradictions that arise from the vary-ing stakeholder interests. We are often well-placedto suggest political action, economic developmentstrategies, and organizational coalitions that willprovide a buffer against the forces that threaten toundermine the construction of equitable informationsocieties. Critical analysis is needed of the dynamicsof institutional change with respect to policy andregulation at national, regional, and internationallevels and studies of alternative ways of supportingmultistakeholder involvement in dialogues about themedia and communication needs of the poor. Weneed to examine the interfaces between bottom-upand top-down strategies for change and to maxi-mize education, learning, and capability building.Evaluations must be made of the multiple factors



that must coalesce to enable the spread of mediaand communication networks to support the poor.

Understanding people’s needs must be the over-riding concern of development strategies that, inturn, should inform media and communication ini-tiatives. Research alone will not provide the neces-sary solutions. Research needs to be translated intopolitical action sponsored by broadly-based coali-tions of actors. This remains essential for the reasonexpressed by Sean MacBride just over twenty-ªveyears ago: “As communication is so central to all so-cial, economic and political activity at community,national and international levels, I would paraphraseH. G. Wells and say human history becomes moreand more a race between communication and ca-tastrophe. Full use of communication in all its variedstrands is vital to assure that humanity has morethan a history . . . that our children are assured a fu-ture” (MacBride Commission 1980/2004, xxi).

This interplay between research and practice isvery difªcult but is unavoidable if we are to tacklethe causes and consequences of world media andcommunication inequalities. The MacBride Report,combined with recent work on the determinants ofinequality in information societies, provides a foun-dation for essential future work on the politics ofthe media and communication globally, and on theprospects for equitable evolution of informationsocieties. ■

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Great Media and Communication Debates: WSIS and the