Great Britains Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815 - Daniel a. Baugh

8/10/2019 Great Britains Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815 - Daniel a. Baugh

1/27

Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815Author(s): Daniel A. BaughReviewed work(s):Source: The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 33-58Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40107088.

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2/27

Great

Britain's

'Blue-Water5

Policy,

1689-1815

DANIEL

A.

BAUGH

almost

three

centuries

(from

about

1650

to

1920),

Great

Britainhad available o

it

a

highly

distinctive

ystem

of

national

security.

The

general

attributes

of this

system

are

widely

known,

if

often

vaguely,

but

the

integrating

ogic

behind

it

is not at all

clearly

understood.1

erhaps

his is

not

surprising.

As the

system

evolved

from

1650

onwards,

there

were

disagreements

sometimes

profound

ones

-

as to its

goals,

instruments,

nd

strategies.Surveying

he

long

history

of debate,it is easy to form the impression hat there was not much

common

ground

and that

the

basic

issues were

never

resolved. One

might go

further,

and

postulate

that

they

were

impossible

o

resolve

becauseof

Great

Britain's

geopolitical

ituation.The 'island

realm',

as

Churchill

iked

to call

it,

could

not

afford

to

ignore

political

conditions

in

western

Europe

any

more

than it could

ignore

the

opportunities

summed

up

by

Sir Walter

Ralegh's

oft-quoted

maxim,

'Whosoever

commands the

sea

commands the

trade;

whosoever commands

the

trade

of

the

world

commands

he richesof the

world,

and

consequently

the world itself.'2

Ralegh

wrote these

words

near

the

beginning

of

the

seventeenth

century,

and some of that

century's

events,

most

notably

the

expansion

of

oceanic trade and the

amazing

rise of

the Dutch

Republic,

seemed

emphatically

o

support

him.

On the

other

hand,

the

influence

of French

military

power

upon

western

Europe

after

1670

suggested

hat

his idea

might

have serious

imitations,

and

understand-

ably,

opposing

schools of

thought grew up

-

'Maritime' and 'Con-

tinental'

which

had an

impact

on

British

foreign policy throughout

1

I am

currently

writing

a

book on

this

subject.

In

the

limited

space

here

it

is

pos-

sible to

specify only

a

small

portion

of

the

direct

evidence for

my judgements

and

and to indicateonly some of the detailedqualifications.

2

Quoted by

R.H.

Tawney,

Business and Politics

under

James

I

(Cambridge,

1958),

p. 3-

The International

History

Review, x,

1,

February

1988, pp. 1-172

cn

issn

0707-5332

The

International

History

Review

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/27

34

Daniel

A.

Baugh

the

eighteenth

century.

The

bold claims issued

on

both

sides

have

long

attracted the attention

of historians.

As,

undeniably,

these claims

played

a role

in

shaping

British

policy,

it is

important

to

grasp

what

that role amounted

to. The Maritime

orientation

was

generally popular

and

much

touted

in the

House

of

Commons. The Continental

orientation,

however,

was

steadily

favoured

by

the

Hanoverians,

at least the

first two

Georges,

and

they

were

able

to find

leading politicians

who shared or were

willing

to

support

their

view.

However,

these

politicians

were

usually

unable

to

gain

sufficient

support

in Parliament for a

strongly

Continentalist

policy.

It is all

very

well to

say

that 'the Crown

never lost a

general

election

in

the

eighteenth

century',

but that

fact,

if

it

is a

fact,

did not translate

into

full

support

for the

king's

favourite line of

policy.

The role of the

two schools

should

therefore be seen as

setting

limits

on what kinds of

diplomatic

and

strategic

plans

would

be allowable.

In

the

course of the

century

the

plans

leaned

one

way

or the other

according

to

circumstances of domes-

tic

politics,

to

diplomatic conjunctures,

and to

strategic opportunities.

On

balance,

the decisions

tended

against

military

commitment

on

the

Continent.

In

the form

of

constitutional

monarchy

that

developed

in

England

after

1650,

the

means of

warfare

were

only

obtainable

through parlia-

mentary

vote;

therefore,

the contours

of British

national

security

were

bound to

be

shaped

by

necessity,

convenience,

and

compromise.

In

other

words,

the

historicity

and the main

outlines

of the British

system

of

national

security

between

1689

and

181

5

are best

ascertained

by

keeping

one's

eye

on the decisive

policy

arguments

and the

actual

com-

mitments

(and non-commitments)

of

funds

and

force.

A

system

that

is

not

easily

identified

and

delineated

is,

by

the same

token, not easily labelled. Of the great naval historians who wrote at

the turn of the

century,

Sir

Julian

Corbett came

closest to

producing

a

comprehensive

analysis.

In

Some

Principles of

Maritime

Strategy

( 191

1

)

,

a work whose

analytical

framework was

deeply

influenced

by

Clausewitz's

writings,

Corbett

argued

that

the

important

distinction

that

(eventually)

Clausewitz discerned

between

wars for 'a

"Limited"

object

and those whose

object

was

"Unlimited"

'

had laid

open

'what

are the

radical and essential

differences

between

the German

or Con-

tinental

School of

Strategy

and

the

British or Maritime

School

-

that

is,

our own

traditional School'.

Corbett,

entirely

in

agreement

with

Clausewitz that strategy must grow out of policy, left no doubt as to

his

opinion

that

the

'British or

Maritime

School'

had

dominated

British

policy

in

the

past

and had been

patterned

upon

the

plan

of

'Limited

war'. It

was a

plan

whose

advantages

were

consistently

available

to



4/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy

35

Great

Britain,

thanks to

her

insular

situation,

but

not

to

Continental

powers.

Aside from

occasional

references

o the 'Britishor

Maritime

School',

the term 'Limitedwar' was as

close as he

came to

giving

the

time-honoured

British

ystem

a

name,

and he was not

at

all

happy

with

it.3

Its

inadequacy

s

obvious,

f

only

because t

conveys

so

little.

Within five

years

of the

publication

of

Some

Principlesof

Maritime

Strategy,

GreatBritain

was

fighting

an

unlimitedwax on

the continent

of

Europe.4

The

reaction

of the

Britishnation

to

the First World War

did

not reach

full

flood

until

about a

decade after

it

had

ended,

and

in

the

sphere

of

strategic

tudiesthe most remarkable

esponse

was

surely

that

of

the famous

militaryjournalist,

analyst,

commentator,

and

his-

torian,

Sir

Basil

Liddell

Hart.

In

a lecturetitled

'EconomicPressureor

Continental

Victories'offered to

a

meeting

of the

Royal

United Ser-

vice

Institution

n

1931,

Liddell Hart

concludeda

rapid

historical ur-

vey

by

asking

which

line of

strategy

was

heresy

the

one

pursuing

Con-

tinentalvictories

espoused

by

Great

Britain

n

the First

World

War,

or

the one

'proved

by

three

centuries'

experience

of

warfare'

from

which

she

should never have

departed?

The latter had been denounced

as

heresyby

the

'rulingmilitary

eaders

n

1914-18'.

'Yet

in

the

light

of

Britain's

history,'

he

asked,

'who were the real

heretics,

he violators

of

tradition?

Has

any

other

theory

than

the one we have here traced

the

historic

itle

to

be

called "British

Strategy"?'

n

1931

that

was the

only

phrase

he could

think of: 'historic .. "British

Strategy"

. But

a

year

later

when

he revised he

lecture

and

assigned

t

the lead-off

position

n

a

collection

of

his

essays,

he came

up

with 'The British

Way

in

War-

fare',

which

he made the title of the

book.5

t is safe

to

say

that Liddell

Hart,

though

he remains best known

for

his

work in

the

1920s

on

mobile

infantry

actics and

the

strategy

of 'indirect

approach',

devoted

3

Julian

S.

Corbett,

Some

Principles

of

Maritime

Strategy

(London, 191

1

,

Part

I,

Theory

of

War*,

esp. p.

38;

also

52-63,

73.

On

p.

81

he

comments:

*The

expres-

sion

"Limitedwar" is

no doubt

not

entirely happy.

Yet no other has

been found

to

condense

the

ideas

of limited

object

and

limited

interest,

which are its

special

characteristics.'

One of

his

fears

was

that

it

might

be

construed

as

implying

that

battles should

be

regarded

as

unnecessary,

and he did not

mean that at

all

(pp.

81-2).

4

For

a brief sketch of Corbett's reaction

to

this

fact,

see

Donald

M.

Schurman,

Julian

S.

Corbett,

1854-1922

(London,

1981), p.

172.

Readers

should

take

spe-

cial note of Schurman's

tatement in the Preface that

for

particular

reasons

his

biography *shamefully> eglects

Some

Principles of

Maritime

Strategy,

a book

whose

strengths

can

only

be

appreciated,

he

says, by

reading

it *first hand'

(p. viii).

5

B.H. Liddell

Hart,

The British

Way

in

Warfare

(London,

1932),

quotations

on

p. 37.

In

the book he titled the

essay

The

Historic

Strategy

of Britain'.

The

original

'Economic

Pressures

r

ContinentalVictories'

was

published

n the

Royal

United ServicesInstitution

Journal,

xxxvi

(

1

93

1

.



5/27

36

Daniel

A.

Baugh

much of the

later

part

of

his

career

to

proselytizing

for doctrines derived

from

his

concept

of

'The

British

Way

in

Warfare'.6

For

reasons

that

have

mostly

to

do

with the nature of the Second

World

War and its

aftermath,

the

concept

as an historical

tool has

suffered an

eclipse, along

with Liddell Hart's

reputation.

One

reason,

perhaps,

is the name

itself;

although

'The British

Way

in

Warfare'

has

a nice

literary ring,

it is

obviously

a

mouthful,

and

for

purposes

of either

broad

strategic

application

or

analysis,

sounds too historical and

is too

particularist.

Besides,

the

essentially

non-Continentalist

character

of the

system

ought

to be

stressed; therefore,

a

preferable

name,

herewith

pro-

posed,

would be

'blue-water'

policy.7

Specialists

have not

forgotten

Liddell

Hart's formulation.

Michael

Howard

brought

it forward for examination

in

his

Ford

Lectures,

pub-

lished

in

1972

as The Continental

Commitment,

and

again

in

his Neale

Lecture

of

1974,

'The British

Way

in

Warfare:

A

Reappraisal'.8

In

both

instances the examination was critical.

A

passage

from the

latter

sets the

tone

:

But it

would be

doing

Liddell Hart an

injustice,

both

as

a

historian

and

a

controversialist,to suggest that this analysis of British strategy was any-

thing

more than a

piece

of

brilliant

political pamphleteering,

sharply

argued,

selectively

illustrated,

and

concerned

rather to

influence

British

public opinion

and

government policy

than

to illuminate

the

complexities

of the

past

in

any

seriousor

scholarly

way.9

Howard went on to

suggest

that

Liddell

Hart had

seriously

misinter-

preted

the

true

balance of traditional

British

strategy

by failing

to

give

appropriate weight

to

Great Britain's

long

history

of

military

and

diplo-

matic

involvement on the

Continent.

Nor,

in

this

regard,

does

Liddell

6

I

am

including

his

anti-Clausewitzian

writings

as

part

of

this

intellectual

mission.

He

remained

passionate

on the

subject

of

Clausewitz;

see

especially

The Ghost

of

Napoleon (London,

1934)

and

the

lecture

he offered at

the

Naval

War

College

in

1962, printed

in

War,

Strategy,

and

Maritime

Power,

ed.

B. Mitchell

Simpson

III

(New Brunswick,

N.J., 1977), pp. 31-48.

7

Although my

formulation differs in one or

two

important

aspects

from Liddell

Hart's,

that

alone would not have induced

me

to

find

another label.

No historical

label can avoid

being

misleading

in one

way

or

another,

and the one I

have

chosen,

while it

has the

merit

of

announcing

more

plainly

to a

non-specialist

readership

what it is

really about,

has the demerit of

becoming

confused

with

the

concept

of a

purely

maritime

strategy.

It will become

evident that

by

'blue-

water

policy'

I

do not mean

'purely

maritime

strategy'.

8 Michael

Howard,

The Continental Commitment

(London,

1972);

The British

Way

in

Warfare:

A

Reappraisal

(London, 1975);

this lecture

is

reprinted

in

The

Causes

of

Wars,

ed. Michael

Howard

(2nd

ed.,

Cambridge,

Mass., 1984),

pp.

169-87.

9

Ibid.,

p.

172.



6/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy

37

Hart's

biographer,

Brian

Bond,

come to his

subject's

rescue. Far from

it;

he

is

highly

critical.10

he

important

point

is not that both men have

expressed

doubts about the

scholarly

depth

and

grounding

of Liddell

Hart's

history,

for those doubts

are

well

warranted,

but

that

they

are

inherently

unsympathetic

o

his

views on

policy

and

grand

strategy.

Indeed,

Howard

has disinterred

The

British

Way

in

Warfare'

n

order

to

display

ts fundamental

rrors.

An

interesting

nd commendable

eature

of Howard's

critique

s

that,

notwithstanding

he

title,

it

grapples

more

intensively

with Corbett's

Some

Principlesof

Maritime

Strategy

han withLiddellHart'swritings.

According

o

Howard,

Corbett's

analysis

s 'more

subtle',

and

Corbett

is to be considered at least

as

much

a critic

of the maritime chool as

he

was

a

spokesman

or

it',

becausehe

saw

'that

"maritime

trategy"

was

not an alternative o "Continental

trategy"

but

an

extension

of

it'.11

Readers

of Corbett'sbook

may

judge

for themselves

he

sense

n which

these

interpretations

re accurate.

The

parts

of

Howard's

critique

that

pertain

o the

eighteenth-century

ituationare

taken

up

in

what

follows.

*

*

*

Blue-water

policy

rose

to

a

position

of

primacy

n

England

in the wake

of

the

English

Civil War.

This

occurrence

was

signalled

by

the

Rump

Parliament's

enactment

of

the

Navigation

Ordinances

of

1650

and

1

65

1

and

the

outbreak

of the

First Dutch War

in

1652.

Its motto

may

be

found

in

the

Preamble

o

Articles

of War

issued

n

that

year:

'It is

upon

the

navy

under

the

Providence

of God

that

the

safety,

honour,

and welfare

of

this realm

do

chiefly

attend.'12

Many

people

think that

English

defence

policyacquired

ts maritime

accent at

some earlier

date,

particularly

t the time of the

Elizabethan

war

against Spain,

when the

Hawkinses ndSir FrancisDrakepressed or it. In fact, one greatevent

(the

Armada

campaign)

and

excessive

enthusiasm

n the

part

of

some

naval historianshave combined to

distort the

historical

picture.

Al-

though

no

Elizabethan

denied the

importance

of

the

floating

'Wooden

Walls',

he

queen

and

her

leading

adviser,

Lord

Burghley,

eliedon

three

lines of

defence:

first,

expeditionary

fforts

o

preventSpanish-Catholic

League

forces

rom

controlling

he

opposite

shoresof the

English

Chan-

nel;

second,

the

navy;

and

third,

military

forces for

coast

defence.13

10

Brian

Bond,

Liddell Hart: A

Study of

his

Military

Thought

(London,

1977).

He

characterizes

Howard's

reappraisal

as

'a restrained criticism of

Liddell Hart's

historical

arguments' (p. 70).

11

Howard,

'Reappraisal', pp.

1

73-4.

12

Frequently

repeated

in various

preambles

concerning

maritime

policy

thereafter,

with

'strength'

substituted for 'honour'.

18

The

sketch

given

in

J.G.

Black,

The

Reign of

Elizabeth,

1558-1603

(Oxford,



7/27

38

Daniel

A.

Baugh

They

committed

England's

resources

heavily

to all

three,

and had

sound

reasons

strategic, echnological,

and commercial

for

doing

so.

Under the

Early

Stuarts,

however,

England's

military

and naval

forces

were

feeble,

and her

inviolabilitydepended

chiefly

upon

the unsettled

situation

of

monarchical

and

imperial

politics

n

Europe:

there

was

no

defence

policy

deserving

of the

term.

The duke

of

Buckingham's

on-

duct of

war and

diplomacy

n

the

1620s

may

be

fairly

describedas a

sequence

of

catastrophes,

nd

England

was fortunate hat

the Bourbons

and

Habsburgs

had more

important

hings

to

do

elsewhere.14

Nevertheless,t was

during

the first half of the seventeenthcentury

that

two

indispensable

onditionsfor a

viable blue-water

policy

were

achieved.

First,

English

commercemoved

away

from its

overwhelming

dependence

on

the marketsof north-western

Europe: plantation

prod-

ucts

from

Virginia

and the

Caribbean

played

a small

role;

East India

Company

rade

a

greater;

and Mediterranean nd

Iberiantrade

by

far

the

greatest.

(The

tremendous

rowth

of

English

rade

and

shipping

n

the

Mediterranean

during

the seventeenth

century

may

be

classed

as

one of

those

important

facts that

scarcely

anyone,

other than a few

specialists,

eems

to

know.

Second,

the

Parliamentary avy during

the

Civil War

-

a

fleet of

all-weather,

manoeuvrable,medium-sized,

men-

of-war

proved remarkably

ffective

in

enforcing

solation,

that

is,

in

preventing

outside

military

aid from

reaching

the

royalists.

Thus the

1

640s

witnessed

a

prolonged

test

of the 'Wooden Walls'.

As

already

noted,

the

government

of

Elizabeth

had

regarded

he fleet

as

a second

line of

defence

among

three,

but after the

1640s

the

idea

that the

navy

might

functionas the

'first

ine

of

defence'

no

longer

seemed

dangerous

and

unrealistic.

Though

this

phrase

did not come

into use until

later,

936), PP- 354-5 has not been substantiallymodifiedby more recent research.

For

a

thorough

study

of the

accent then

placed upon controlling

the

opposite

shores,

see

R.B.

Wernham,

After

the

Armada:

Elizabethan

England

and the

Struggle

for

Western

Europe 1585-1505

(Oxford, 1984).

14

This

paragraph

and the next

constitute an

extreme

distillation

of

points

addressed

in

a

paper

that I

presented

in

April 1983

to

the

Shelby

Cullom

Davis

Center,

Princeton

University,

Towards a "Blue-Water"Defense

Policy

in

Seventeenth-

Century England'.

There are two

highly

useful

published surveys:

G.M.D.

Howat,

Stuart and

Cromwellian

Foreign Policy (London,

1974),

and

J.R. Jones,

Britain

and

Europe

in the

Seventeenth

Century

(New

York, 1966).

Recent

studies

of note

are:

Hans-Christoph

Junge,

Flottenpolitik

und

Revolution:

Die

Entstehung

der

englischen

Seemacht wa.hrnd der

Herrschaft

Cromwells

(Stutt-

gart, 1980); Roger

Crabtree,

The Idea of a Protestant

Foreign Policy',

in

Cromwell:A

Profile,

ed. Ivan Roots

(New

York,

1973)

;

CharlesP.

Korr,

Crom-

well

and the

New Model

Foreign

Policy

(Berkeley

and Los

Angeles, 1975)

;

J.L.

Price,

'Restoration

England

and

Europe',

n

The Restored

Monarchy,

1660-1688,

ed.

J.R. Jones (Totowa,

N.J., 1979)

;

Phyllis

Lachs,

*Advise nd

Consent: Parlia-

ment and

Foreign

Policy

Under the Later

Stuarts',

Albion,

vii

(1975).



8/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy

39

English

naval

superiority

was

from the middle of

the seventeenth cen-

tury

considered

the sine

qua

nan of defence

of

the realm.

The Restoration

of 1660 not

only

left

blue-water

policy

in

place

but

contributed to

its

enhancement.

The

Navigation

Ordinances became

the

Navigation

Acts and

were

improved

and

tightened. Royal

policy

continued

to

regard

the

Dutch

Republic

as a

prime

adversary,

which

made

adherence

to

a

blue-water

emphasis

logical

because,

of

course,

Dutch

power

was

chiefly

maritime and

could be

most

conveniently

addressed

by

naval means.

But to be of

any long-term significance,

blue-water

policy

had to be

answerable

to

threats mounted

by

a

power

great

upon

land as well as

upon

sea.

France attained

such a

position

by

the

1670s,

and

for two

centuries

thereafter

France

was

generally

regarded

as the source

of

greatest

danger

to

England.

It is

pertinent

that the

English people,

as

represented

in

the

House

of

Commons,

came to this

conclusion before

their

kings

did;

suddenly,

in

the

year 1673,

the

Commons refused

to

vote

the

necessary

revenues

to

continue the

Third

Dutch

War,

in

which

England

and France

were allies.

This sudden alteration

of

opinion

took

place against

a

background

of

dismaying

events

-

the

disclosure of

the

duke of

York's Catholicism and

the

outrageous

inaction of the French

fleet

in

the battle off

the Texel

-

but there

were

deeper

reasons.

First,

Louis

XIV,

under

Jean

Baptiste

Colbert's

guidance,

had

by

the

early

1

670s

built

a

powerful navy.

Second,

he

was

attempting

during

that

same decade

to crush

the Dutch

Republic

by

force of

arms,

and French

domination

of

the

Low

Countries

could never be

in

England's

interest.

Third,

Louis

XIV's

escalating persecution

of the

Huguenots

con-

tributed an

element of

moral

outrage,

and

the

English

court's secret

dealings

with him

amplified religious

and constitutional

fears.

Thus,

political concerns became entwined with and served to reinforce geo-

political

ones.

Although

the

House

of

Commons

asked Charles

II to

commence

hostilities with

France

in

1677-8

and to

form

alliances

suit-

able to

the

purpose, nothing

much

came

of

it.

The

king's

heart was not

in

it,

and he

suspected, rightly,

that

the Commons

would fail to vote

him

anything

near

the level of resources such a war would

require.

(The

excitement did

generate,

however,

a

huge

appropriation

for

build-

ing thirty

new

ships

of

the line.

)

A

serious

confrontation did not occur

until the

Glorious

Revolution of

1688-9

brought

William of

Orange

and

his

English

wife

Mary

to

the

throne of

England.

William,

as Dutch

Stadtholder, had spent his young manhood struggling in the field against

French armies

bent on

destroying

the

independence

of

the Dutch Re-

public,

and his

installation

on

the

English

throne led to

immediate

hostilities between

England

and France.

Along

with this

new

era

in

the



9/27

40

Daniel

A.

Baugh

history

of the

English

constitution here came

a new era

in the

history

of

English

warfareand

warmakingpower.

Before

examining

he

period

between

1689

and

18

15,

it

is

vital that

we set forth

the essential

eaturesof blue-water

policy

as

they

stood

at

the

outset.

First,

to reiteratea

point

that

is too

easily

forgotten,

ts basic

rationale,

both

at the time it

originated

and

thereafter,

was

pitched

upon

defence of

the realm

against foreign

invasion;

the central

point,

to

which

all other

objectives

and

considerations ere

subsidiary,

was naval

command of

the

English

Channel and

North Sea.

European

waters

came first.Second,blue-water

policy

rested

upon

a

particular

system

for

sustaining

he

expense

of

the

prodigious

naval

force it

required.

The

keys

here

were trade

and

shipping.

Trade

supplied

the

liquid

funds,

taxable

and

lendable,

as well

as a source

of

government

evenue

n

the

form

of customs

duties,

and the

shipping

ndustry

provided

our

things:

profits

o

be

taxed or

lent,

auxiliary

vessels

n

time

of

war,

shipbuilding

skills

and

facilities,

and

above all trained eamen.

The

indispensable

ole

of

the

Navigation

Act

to

blue-water

policy

is thus evident.

Colonies,

t

should

be

noted,

were seen as useful

n

seventeenth-century

alculations

only

insofar

as

they

contributed

o the

enhancement

or

protection

of

trade.

Obviously,

blue-water

policy

entaileda

concept

of cost-effective-

ness,

for

it

was

designed

to minimize internal

impositions

and taxes

(therein

lay

its

appeal

to

the

country gentry,

however

distasteful

t

might

seem

to them

on

ideological

or

social

grounds)

and

it

promised

to

minimizethe

need

for

military

recruitmentand a

standing

army.

A

land

force

was

admittedly

required

to

capture

and

garrison

colonial

possessions

and

overseas

bases,

to

keep

a

steady eye

on

Ireland

and

Scotland,

and

to be

ready

on

occasion

to

deal

with invasion

threats

(in

a

manner

we

shall

examine

later).

Such a

policy

implied

that

the Englishpopulationwould be largely destitute of military train-

ing

or

experience

and the

English

aristocracy

would

be

no

longer

at-

tuned

to

calls of

military

virtue.But

in

England

these

things

had

pretty

well

gone by

the board

during

the sixteenth

century,

never

to

make a

lasting

recovery:15

s

Stephen

Baxter

has

remarked,

since the late

Middle

Ages,

'the

English

had

become,

as

they

remained,

one

of the

most

stubbornly

civilian

societies

on

the face

of the earth'.16

The

splendidly

effectiveNew

Model

Army

seems to

have made

little

moral

or

cultural

mpression

on

the

nation, unless,

perhaps,

a

negative

one,

15 See the

interesting

article

by

Jeremy

Goring,

'Social

Change

and

Military

Decline

in

Mid-Tudor

England',

History,

lx

(1975), 185-97.

The

recovery

of

military

skills in the

1580s (p. 197)

lasted

only

to

the end

of

Queen

Elizabeth

I's

reign.

16

Stephen

B.

Baxter,

WilliamIII and the

Defense

of

European

Liberty 1650-1702

(New

York, 1966), p. 249.



10/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy

41

and

James

Harrington's

eo-machiavellian

roposal

n

Oceana

(

1656)

proved

o

be a non-starter.

n

sum,

blue-water

policy,

aside from reduc-

ing

military

necessities,

was

cost-effective,

practical,

and

mundane;

it

installeda

calculating

commercialism

t

the

heart of

the

most

impor-

tant task

of

government.

Although

some of its

earlier

militantly

Prot-

estant

proposers

ad entertaineddreams

of

a

Protestant

League

on

the

Continent,

his

aspectgave

way

to blue-water

practicalities

n the

1650s,

if not before.

Truly,

a revolution

n

English

defence

policy

had

been

accomplished.

The

English

grand

strategy,

n line with these

principles,

was essen-

tially

defensive

n

Europe

(and

European

waters)

and

aggressive

ver-

seas. Overseas

aggressiveness

as aimed at

enlarging

he maritimeand

commercial

base of

England's

naval

power

while at the same time

reducing

that of actual

or

potential

enemies.

Success

n

war could be

achieved

only

by

economic

pressure.

Against

an

adversary

ike Holland

whose

power

base was

maritime,

thus

highly

vulnerable

o

blue-water

strategy,

successcame

quickly

n

most

instances;

against

an

adversary

like

France,

a

successfulwar was bound

to

be a

long

one,

regardless

f

what

some blue-waterenthusiasts

iked to think.

In our

analysis

of the

period

rom

1689

to

18

15,

we shall take note

of

the

ways

in

which blue-

water

policy

had to be

adapted

to confrontationwith

a

major

land

power.

*

# *

The

important

historical est

of blue-water

defence

policy

would

lie

in

its

capacity

to meet

the

challenge

of

a

great

land

power,

and

after the

1

670s

Francewas

usually

he

greatest

and

power

n

Europe.

There was

a

time

(

from about

1716101733)

when GreatBritain

and Franceoften

co-operated,which is well to remember,becausenothingillustrateshe

'kaleidoscopic

ature

of

Europeanpolitics'

more

emphatically.17

till,

if

17

Jeremy

Black,

British

Foreign

Policy

in the

Age of

Walpole

(Edinburgh,

1985),

p. 5.

This

is

now

the best

general

study

of

the

period.

See

also

Black's Natural

and

Necessary

Enemies:

Anglo-French

Relations in the

Eighteenth

Century

(Athens, Ga., 1986)

and his 'The British

Navy

and British

Foreign

Policy

in the

First Half of

the

Eighteenth

Century',

n

Essays

in

European History

in

Honour

of Ragnhild Hatton,

ed. Karl Schweizer and

Jeremy

Black

(Lennoxville,

Que.,

1985).

There are two

important

recent

surveys

of

British external

policy:

J.R.

Jones,

Britain

and the

World

1649-1815

(Glasgow,

1980),

and Paul

Langford,

The

Eighteenth

Century

1688-18

15

(London, 1976).

For

a

recent

bibliographical

guide

to

European

oreign policy

see Derek

McKay

and H.M.

Scott,

The Rise

of

the GreatPowers

1648-1815

(Harlow,

1983).

Among other things, it gives the

locations

of

important

articles

by

G.G.

Gibbs. Recent work

on British

policy

is

very

thoroughly

covered

in

a

bibliographical

essay

by Jeremy

Black,

'British

Foreign Policy

in

the

Eighteenth Century:

A

Survey',

Journal

of

British

Studies

xxvi

(1987).



11/27

42

Daniel

A.

Baugh

therewas some

truth

n

the

general

dea

that

Austriawas

GreatBritain's

'natural

ally',

there

was far

more truth

in

the idea

that

France

was

Great

Britain's

natural

enemy'.

This second

truth

rested not

only

on

France's

potential

o dominate

affairson the

Continent,

but

also

on

the

strategic possibilities

nherent

in

France's

geographicalposition:

like

the

Netherlands,

France

was

conveniently

ituated

to

launch invasions

of

GreatBritain

and Irelandas well as

to

maintain

sea

communications

with transoceanic heatres

of war.

It was the

triple

combination

of

France's

military

power

in

Europe,

possession

f

much of the

opposite

shoreof the Channel,anddifficult-to-interdictceanic access hat made

her

Great

Britain's

natural

enemy'.

To discover

how

blue-water

policy

adjusted

o these

challenges,

t is

neither

necessary

nor advisable o

go through

the whole

period

1689-

18

1

5,

war

by

war. With the

exception

of two or three

major changes

in

circumstances nd

orientation,

he situation remainedstatic

during

the

century

and a

quarter,

and

will

be

analysed

here

under two broad

headings:

objects

and

grand strategy.

In

the

eighteenthcentury

t

was common o

speak

of 'British

bjects'

that Great Britain

ought always

to

fight

for 'British

objects'

was a

familiarrefrain

n

the House of

Commonsand

the

press.

The

popular

mind

fondly

posed

the issue

in

terms of British

objects

versus Con-

tinental

objects,

magining

that all

Continental

dealings

were necessi-

tated

by

the narrow

and

foreign,

probably

Hanoverian,

concernsof

the

Georgian

monarchs.But the

real

issue was whether

the

objects,

where-

ever

pursued,

would serve to

enhance British

prosperity

and

national

security.

Politicians

and statesmenof

course do not deal

just

in

coolly

calcu-

lated

assessments

f

this

kind:

they

also deal

in

special

interestsand

morallysuffusedpassions. t is thereforenecessary o acknowledge he

existence,

ndeed the

seemingprevalence,

of

these influences.

Naturally,

the

widespreadpopular

opinion

that

the

only

genuinely

British

objects'

were

commercial,

colonial,

and

oceanic

-

never

European

served

the interestsof

those

who

hoped

to

profit

from the

lottery

of

privateer-

ing,

and more

importantly,

hose

who

pursued

ar-flungprofits

behind

a

publicly

inanced

naval and

military

shield.

This should

not

make us

forget

that

many

people

were

caught up

in

a bona

fide infatuationwith

the

possibilities

f

maritime-commercial

xpansion,

which

during

the

second half of

the

eighteenth

century

ed to some dubious

pre-emptive

flourishes nd acquisitionsn distant locales.18Althoughthe objectsin

18

See

my

Clark

Library

lecture of

1983, 'Seapower

and Science:

Perspectives

on

the

Motives of

Pacific

Exploration

in

the

Eighteenth Century',

to be

published

in

a volume edited

by

Derek

Howse

(forthcoming).

The

impulse

towards

far-flung



12/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy

43

view were

indisputably

British',

he

bearing

of

many

of

them on

na-

tional

security

was

often remote and

speculative.

There

was a

high

incidence

of

political opportunism

transoceanic

objects

were

popular,

and

opposition

politicians

often

played upon

them;

to borrow

an

image

from

George

Kennan,

striking

attitudesbefore the mirrorof domestic

political

opinion'.19

ndisputably,

he

spokesmen

for

maritime,

com-

mercial,

and

colonial

objects

were

often

self-serving,passionately

de-

luded,

or

both,

but

given

the

unarguablepremise

that naval

strength

depended

heavily

upon

commercialreturns and

shipping,

there

was

senseaswell assillinessn their

arguments.

Opposition

follies

are

loud

and

strident;

government

follies are

usually quiet,

indeed often hushed

up,

or at least

soberly

exhibited.

Prior

to

the

accessionof

George

III in

1760,

the

government

view was

heavily

nfluenced

by

the

personalpredilections

f William

III,

George

I,

and

George

II. Bornand

brought

up

in

Europe,

still

formallyrespon-

sible

for the

safety

of their native

realms,

and

deeply

attachedto

things

military,

heir

perspective

was

indelibly

European.

There was

as

much

scope

for

politicians

to

exploit

a

Continentalist

tance at

court

as

a

Maritimeone

in

the

public

forums.Yet

it was seldom a

matter of

pure

opportunism.

There

was a

Whig

ideal,

first

implanted

when

William

III stood at the head

of

the Grand

Alliance,

that not

only

spoke

of the

necessity

of

preserving

he 'balance

of

power'

but

also

expressed

a

fer-

vent moral

concern or

the

'liberty

of

Europe'.

It

may

not be too

much

to

say

that

these

sentimentsamounted

to

a secular

resurrection

f the

old

passion

or a

Protestant

League.They

were

genuineenough.Among

Whigs

in

opposition

n

the

1730^

here were

Continentalist

s well as

Maritime votaries.20

Whig

Continentalism

may

well have

found its

finest

expression,

however,

after

1760,

when Edmund Burke

in the

early1770s'denouncedLordNorth[theprimeminister] orsayingthat

maritime

expansion

at the

end

of

the

century

is covered in

David

Mackay,

In

the Wake

of

Cook:

Exploration,

Science

and

Empire ij8o~i8oi

(New

York,

1985).

19

George

F.

Kennan,

Memoirs,

1

925-1

950

(Boston, 1967),

p.

54.

On

the

degree

to

which Pitt's

shifting

enunciations

of

policy

and

strategy during

the Seven Years

War arose

from the

difficulty

of

dealing

with intractable

popular prejudices,

see

the invaluable

study by

Marie

Peters,

Pitt and

Popularity:

The Patriot Minister

and London

Opinion

during

the

Seven Years' War

(Oxford, 1980).

The

diffi-

culties

posed by public

attitudes in

William Ill's

reign

can

be

extracted

from

Henry

Horwitz's

definitive

study,

Parliament,

Policy

and Politics in the

Reign

of

William III

(Newark,

Del.,

1977).

Popular misgivings

during

the

reign

of Anne

are

expertly

exhibited in

Douglas Coombs,

The Conduct

of

the

Dutch:

British

Opinion

and the Dutch Alliance

during

the War

of

the

Spanish

Succession

(The

Hague,

1958).

20

Black,

British

Foreign

Policy, p. 84.



13/27

44

Daniel

A.

Baugh

the national honour

did not consist

of

being

busy

meddlers

in

every

European

quarrel';

such

an

attitude,

Burke

claimed,

was bound to

undermine

European respect

for

Great

Britain,

'once

the

refuge

and

protectoress

of

distressed nations'.21

As

so

often,

Burke's

arguments

from

sentiment walked hand-in-hand

with national

security

arguments.

He

went on to

warn

that the stance

of

Lord North's

government

would

in

time cbe

seen

in

all its

impotence

and

folly;

and

when

the

balance of

power

is

destroyed,

it will be found of what infinite

consequence

its

preservation

would

have

been'.22

Great Britain's fundamental national

security

problem

during

the

eighteenth century

was how

to

coexist

safely

with French

power

while

maintaining

British

power.

The

duke

of

Newcastle,

Thomas Pelham-

Holles,

and William

Pitt,

later earl

of

Chatham,

stood for

diametrically

opposed approaches,

and

their

example

at

mid-century

serves

to illus-

trate

the extreme

polarity

of

possible

objects.

In

1749

Newcastle

expressed

his

anxiety

about

France's

proceedings

in

Europe

now that

a

compromise

peace

had

been

signed.

The French

were

offering

subsidies

right

and left to

gain

allies,

and

in

due

course,

he

predicted,

all

Europe

and

finally

Great Britain would

be

reduced

to

'a

state

of

dependency'

:

If

they go

on

in

buying up

all the

powers upon

the Continent when

they

have

bought

those

which

are

to

be sold

they

will

get

the

others

from

fear,

and

therefore France will

reasonably

then conclude that

they may impose

what

condition

they please upon

us

without

our

daring

to

dispute

them

and

therefore

in

reality

run no

risk

of

engaging

themselves

in

a new

war;

whereas if

we had a

tolerable

system

and force

upon

the Continent

...

[they

would be

deterred].23

A

week later

he

answered the

objection

that

priority

had to be

given

to

naval

expenditure by

acknowledging

the

necessity

of a

strong

navy,

but

only

to add

that:

21

Gaetano L.

Vincitorio,

'Edmund Burke and the First

Partition of Poland : Britain

and the Crisis

of

1772

in the "Great

Republic" ',

Crisis in the 'Great

Republic3

ed. G.L.

Vincitorio

(New York,

1969), pp.

36-7.

The

first

quotation

is

Vinci-

torio's

summarizing,

the

second from Burke's

speech

in the House of

Commons,

18

May

1774.

The 'Great

Republic'

is a

name Burke

gave

to

civilized

Europe.

The

linkage

between

these sentiments

and Burke's

advocacy

of a

'holy

war*

against

Jacobinism

in

Europe

in the

1

790s

is

fairly

obvious.

22

Ibid.,

p. 37.

Richard

Pares's

article,

'American

versus Continental

Warfare,

1739-63',

first

published

in

1936

and

reprinted

in

Pares,

The Historian's Business

and Other

Essays

(Oxford, 1961),

pp.

130-72,

offers a rich texture of evidence

exhibiting

the

interplay

of

doctrinal

prejudices

and national

security

realities.

23

Newcastle to Lord

Chancellor

Hardwicke,

25

Aug.

1749,

quoted

by

D.B.

Horn,

'The

Cabinet

Controversy

on

Subsidy

Treaties in

Time

of

Peace,

1

749-50',

The

English

Historical

Review,

xlv

(1930), 463-4.



14/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy

45

a naval

force,

tho5

carried never

so

high, unsupported

with even the

appearance

of a force

upon

the

continent,

will

be

of

little use ...

France

will

outdo

us

at

sea,

when

they

have

nothing

to

fear

by

land ... I

have

always

maintained

that our

marine

should

protect

our alliances

upon

the

con-

tinent;

and

they, by diverting

the

expense

of

France,

enable us

to

maintain

our

superiority

at

sea.24

At the

opposite

extreme

William

Pitt,

commenting

on the

peace

of

1763,

told the

House of Commons:

Franceis

chiefly,

if not

solely,

to be dreaded

by

us in the

light

of a maritime

and commercial

power

...

[and]

by

restoring

to

her all

the valuable West-

India

islands,

and

by

our

concessions

n

the Newfoundland

fishery,

we had

given

to

her the

means

of

recovering

her

prodigious

losses

and of

becoming

once

more

formidable to

us at sea.25

Upon

the

outbreak

of

hostilities,

he had

inveighed

against anything

even

remotely

directed

towards

broad Continental

objects

and en-

gagements:

We have sufferedourselves to be deceived by names and sounds, the bal-

ance

of

power,

the

liberty

of

Europe,

a common

cause,

and

many

more

such

expressions,

without

any

other

meaning

than to

exhaust

our

wealth,

consume

the

profits

of

our

trade,

and

load

our

posterity

with intolerable

burdens.26

If

policy

consists

of

what

is

decided

and then

supported

by

genuine

effort,

Newcastle's

extreme

interventionism

was

persistently

rejected.

In

1749,

the

rejection

was

categorical;

the

objections

of

his

brother

Henry

Pelham

and

Lord Hardwicke were

decisive,

though

the

duke

was

allowed

to

offer one

or two subsidies to German

principalities

as a

consolation.

(They

stirred

up

nothing

but

trouble).27

On the other

hand,

Pitt's

comments

on

the

peace

of

1763

and his

pronouncements

at

the outset

of

the

1755-63

war

may

seem

inconsistent

with the

policy

he

actually

pursued

when

he

was

given

charge

of

its direction.

After

all,

24

Newcastle

to

Hardwicke,

2

Sept.

1

749, quoted

by

Philip

G.

Yorke,

The

Life

and

Correspondence

of Philip

Yorke,

Earl

of

Hardwicke

(

3

vols., Cambridge,

1

9

1

3

)

,

ii.

23.

25

Quoted by

H.M.

Scott,

'The

Importance

of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction

to the

Strategy

of

Choiseul after

the Seven

Years'

War',

The International

History

Review,

i

(i979),

17.

26

Quoted by

Pares,

American versus Continental

Warfare', p.

1

38.

27

See

Horn, 'Subsidy

Treaties', p. 466

: It 'resulted

in a futile

subsidy competition

between

Britain

and

France,

set

Germany

in

an

uproar,

and contributed

to the

alienation

of Austria

from

Britain,

and

the

break-up

of

the old

system

of alliances

which Newcastle

had intended to confirm

and consolidate'.



15/27

46

Daniel

A.

Baugh

he had

approved,

and

against

Lord

Bute

emphatically

supported,

size-

able subsidies

to Prussia and the

use of

British

military

force

in

Ger-

many.

As

is well

known,

it was

a

point upon

which

he did

change

his

mind,

for he feared that Canada

might

otherwise be

given

back,

as

Cape

Breton

had been

given

back

in

1748.

The Prussian alliance

appeared

to

offer

an

efficient means

of

preventing

that

:

when

Pitt

said

that

his

purpose

was

to

conquer

America

in

Germany,

he meant

it.

His

conception

of

the

object

of the

war

never

changed;28

what

changed

was

his

view

of

strategic

and

diplomatic

methods,

but we are

concerned

here

with

objects.

Pitt never

thought

that Great Britain was

fighting

for a

European

balance

of

power.

It is

to

the

purpose

to allow

Henry

Pel-

ham,

the

first

lord

of the

treasury,

the

last

word.

Defending

the

peace

of

1

748

in

the

House

of

Commons,

he

asked

:

Will

any gentleman

say

that it was not more

for the

interest

of this

nation

to restore to France the

possession

of

Cape

Breton than to

leave

her in

possession

of

Hainault,

Flanders,

Brabant and

Namur,

and

consequently

of

the

whole coast from Zealand

to

the westernmost

part

of

Bretagne[?]

..

Our

restoring

of

Cape

Breton

upon

this consideration

was

for the

interest

of England,without any regardto our allies, or to the balance of power in

Europe.29

Henry

Pelham's

point

is of

central

importance.

While not

everyone

considered

French

possession

of the Netherlands

to be

fatal,

few could

ignore

the increased

danger

it

presented,

with

regard

both to

invasion and the

safety

of sea-lanes and

commerce.

This

leads us to

an

understanding

of

the

true nature of Great Britain's

European

concerns. In

accordance with the

principles

of

blue-water

policy,

Great

Britain had no

territorial ambitions on the

continent

of

Europe, but there were particular areas not to be ignored. Excluding

Minorca because it

was an

island and

patently

defensible

by

sea

power,

these

were

Gibraltar,

Portugal,

the

Baltic

Sea,

the

Netherlands,

and

Hanover. In

the

earlier

part

of

the

eighteenth century,

control

of

the

Mediterranean Sea

was also

very

much

coveted,

but

commercial and

diplomatic

trends

made that somewhat less

important

later

on. In

the

defence of

all

these

except

the

Netherlands and

Hanover,

sea

power

was

decisive.

Gibraltar's

road

communications with

the

Spanish

mainland

were

so bad that

sea

communications could

readily

outsupply

a

besieg-

28

Cf.

Pares,

'American

versus

Continental

Warfare',

p.

168:

'However, though

their reasonsand their spirit were very

different,

Pitt and Newcastle

agreed

in

defending

the

policy

of the

whole war

against

the new

party

[led

by Bute]

which

had

arisen

for

contracting

t*.

Italics mine.

20

Quoted

by

Herbert

W.

Richmond,

The

Navy

in the War

of

1739-48 (Cambridge,

1920),

iii.

241.



16/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy

47

ing

army. Portugal,

whose reason to fear Bourbon

power

(whether

Spanish

or

French)

remained

onstant,

was a

steady,

ndeed

dependent,

ally

-the

only

one,

in

fact;

its interior

terrain facilitated

military

defence;

and sea

power

could

decisively

affect the defence of Lisbon.

Great Britain'saccess

to

Baltic

ports

had

to be

maintained

by

diplo-

macy

and

occasionally

by military

orce,

but

in

both

respects

ea

power

had a decisive

influence. The most

expensive

area to defend

was

the

Netherlands,

nd

the

preservation

f 'the Barrier' nd the

independence

of

the

Netherlands

nevitably

posed

a

problem.

So did

Hanover.

All of thesesphereswere of serviceto blue-waterpolicy, except one.

Gibraltar's

ey

role was

of course o

monitorthe movementsof French

fleets;

Portugal

not

only provided

an

advanced station

to

assist Medi-

terranean

voyages,

but also stood near the

primary

sea-lane

for

out-

bound

voyages

to

the

West Indies and North

America;

the

Baltic was

a

primary

ourceof masts and

naval

stores or all

the

maritime

powers

of

Europe;

and

the Netherlandscontained he best

ports

and estuaries

for

hiding

and

sheltering

invasion

barges.

These

were

the

specific

objects

of

British

policy

n

Europe,

and

in

additionthe

general

concern

to

keepEurope'sports open

to

British rade.

The

exception

was

Han-

over,

whose

dynastic

connectionwas railed

against

not

only

because t

affronted

he

chauvinismand isolationism

of

the British

populace,

but

also

because

t often obstructed he best

diplomatic

and

strategic

choices

for

preserving

British

nterests

n

the Netherlandsand the Baltic. Han-

over

was a

millstone,

ts

only

strategic

value its

(and

Hesse-Cassel's)

capacity

to

provide

loyal

mercenaries.

In

sum,

when

we scrutinize

Great

Britain's

European

objectives,

we are driven

to

the same con-

clusions

hat

caused the British

public

in

the

1670s

to

regard

France

rather

than

Holland

as the most

menacing neighbour:

first,

because

Francehad built a battle-fleet;and second,becausepowerfulFrench

armies were

attempting

to

bring

the Low

Countries

under

French

dominion.

What, then,

of the balance

of

power?

The

short

answer,

evinced

repeatedly

by

policy

decisions

of

the

British

government during

the

eighteenth

centuryespecially

n

the terms

of

peace

settlements,

was

that

the

'balance

of

power

was worth

a certain

price,

but a

very

low one'.30

Counterpoise

and

equipoise

were

objects only

so

long

as

they

were

achievable

by

minor naval

and

military

efforts or

by diplomatic

ges-

tures

and

linkages

of

mutual convenience.31

30

Pares,

'American versus Continental

Warfare', p.

138.

Pares did not

say,

as I

do,

that

this

represented

the

prevailing

policy

doctrine.

31

Vincitorio,

'Edmund

Burke and the

First

Partition

of

Poland',

p. 37.

Burke

played

to

this

disposition

in

1774

when he

alleged

that adverse

trends

in

Europe

'might

have been

prevented

by

mere

force

of

negotiation'.



17/27

48

Daniel

A.

Baugh

It

may

be

argued

that the

distinctiondrawn here

between

specific

Europeanobjects

(consonant

with blue-water

policy)

and the

general

structure of

European politics

(the

balance

of

power)

disappeared

when

it

came to actual

practice;

that even

limited

Continental

objec-

tives were seen to

require

a

favourable

power

balance. Such

reasoning

rests, however,

on

the fallacious

idea

-

entertained

by

Newcastle,

as

we have seen

-

that an adverse

tipping

of the balance would

probably

lead

to

a calamitous

slide

(today's

'domino

theory');

that because

national

defence

based on

naval and commercial

upremacy

ould

not

be successfullyarriedon

against

an establishedContinental

hegemony,

the

danger

was too

great

to be

ignored.

This

argument, usually

laid

down

as an

axiom,

was

as

specious

n

its

eighteenth-century

ontext as

it is

in

today's.

Regarding

Newcastle's

allacy,

we

may

note that

some theoristsof

the

eighteenthcentury

argued

the

precisely

opposite

case,

that

the bal-

ance

was

invariably

self-adjusting:32

he

historical acts of

the

period

1

689-18

15

tend

to favour

the

self-adjustment

heory

over the domino

theory.

The conduct of

the smaller

polities

near

France's

borders

n-

volves

intricacies

hat cannot be delved into

here;

with

respect

to

the

larger

powers,

the

crucial issue was

whether

they

feared France more

than

they

feared

each other.

Newcastle,

for

instance,

was

always

in-

clined to

think

that

other

powers

viewed France as the main menace

because

GreatBritaindid.33

He

was

wrong.

When William III

formed the

Grand

Alliance

at

the

outset

of the

period,

he could

draw

upon

western

Europe'swidespread

ear of Louis

XIV's ambition.

And

when

that ambition extended to

upholding

a

dynastic

connection

with

Spain,

it was difficulteven for

Tories,

who

detestedWilliam's

Continentalism,

o

oppose

a

war

aimed at

preventing

it, becausepracticallyeveryonefeared that commercialaccessto the

Spanish

Empire

overseas would

otherwise fall under the

sway

of

France.34

he British

public's

enthusiasm aded

during

the

courseof

the

war

as this

sway

came

to

appear

ess

plausible.

After

1714,

the

circum-

stances for

creating

a

Grand

Alliance

disintegrated:

the

war-weary

Netherlands

eased to

regard

France as

its

only

source of

danger,

and

Austria and

Prussia

came to

fear each

other

more

than France.

By

32

See

M.S.

Anderson,

'Eighteenth-Century

Theories

of the

Balance

of

Power',

Studies

in

Diplomatic

History:

Essays

in

Honour

of

D.B.

Horn,

ed.

Ragnhild

Hatton

and

M.S.

Anderson

(London, 1970), pp. 189-90.

33 Pares, 'American versus Continental

Warfare', p. 135.

34

A

good

account

of the

degree

to which

maritime

objects,

especially

the

question

of access to

the trade

of the

Spanish

Empire,

influenced

public

support

for the

war of

the

Spanish

Succession

may

be

found in

Admiral Sir Herbert

Richmond,

The

Navy

as an

Instrument

of

Policy, 1558-1727

(Cambridge,

1953),

pp. 276-81.



18/27

'Blue-Water'

Policy 49

mid-century

he

Austrianswere

causingpractically veryone

n

London

to

despair except

the duke of

Newcastle,

who was ever

disposed

to

propitiate

hem

in

hopes

of

restoring

he

'good

old

system'.

(The

word

'system'

n

the

eighteenth century

was

commonly

used

to

describe a

diplomatic

plan.

After

George

HI

came

to

the

throne

in

1760,

Court

pressure

or

European

alliances

essened;

George

III,

born not in

Hanover

but in

England,

was not

a

Continentalist,

nd

'gloried

n

the

name

of Briton'.

Neither

he

nor

his ministers

gnored

Hanover and

Europe,

but their

policies

stuck

closely

to 'British

objects'

(Burke was in opposition).

When

Frederick

f

Prussia

expostulated

n 1

768

: 'The

English

System?

The

English

have no

system',

he was

speaking nothing

less than

the

truth with

regard

to the

period

after

1760.

This

diminutionof

British

concern or

European

connectionswas matched

three

years

ater

by

an

equally important

diminution of French

aggressiveness

n the Con-

tinent;

the

policy

of

the

duke

of

Choiseul

and of the

count

of

Vergennes

after

him

aimed

at

keeping Europe

contentedand

unthreatened,

hus

creating

a

situation

n

which

Great

Britain would

find

it less

easy

to

fashion useful alliances.35

Not

until

Jacobinism

arose

in

France and

Bonapartism

howed

Europe

an ambition

and

intransigence

more com-

pelling

than Louis

XIV's,

did

the

possibility

f

forming

a coalition

with

purposes

akin

to those of

the GrandAlliance

(let

alone

with a

view to

overthrow)

reappear,

and

even

then it took a

long

time

before

Prussia

and

Austria were

disposed

to dread France as

much as

they

dreaded

35

Their

object,

as

noted

below,

was

to build

up

Bourbon maritime sinews with a

view towards

reducing

Gr

Documents

Great Britains Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815 - Daniel a. Baugh