Great Britain and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1939-1941

8/7/2019 Great Britain and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1939-1941

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Great Britain and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1939-1941

Author(s): Peter LoweSource: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol. 24 (1974), pp. 43-62Published by: Royal Historical SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3678931 .

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OFTHE PACIFIC WAR, 1939-1941By Peter Lowe, B.A., Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S.

READ 1 MAY 1973IN a mood of understandable frustration, the British minister inBangkok sent a telegram to the head of the Far Eastern departmentof the Foreign Officein June 1941,referring to the tedious economicdiscussions he was conducting with the Thai government, saying:

I am disturbed by the contradictory tone of the telegrams sentto me from His Majesty's Foreign Office... Some of them breathethat broad and statesmanlike spirit which I have learnt to respectand admire over a period of nearly forty years. Others strike ashrill and petulant note which is new to me ... I have an uneasyfeeling that you people in Downing Street live in an ivory toweras regards Thailand ...

The aim of this paper is to examine the formulation of Britishpolicy towards the developing Pacific crisis between the outbreakof the European war in September 1939 and the beginning of theco-ordinated Japanese offensives in December 1941. Withoutdoubt it was an extremely difficult period in which to devise aviable policy. The nightmare of the defence chiefs throughout the1930s that Great Britain might face simultaneous crisesof a graveand demanding nature in Europe, the Mediterranean and the FarEast-had become a reality. Inevitably decision-making becamemore complex in time of war. The Foreign Office had to deferfrequently to the views of the chiefs of staff: both the ForeignOffice and the chiefs of staff had to come to terms, from May 1940,with the erratic genius of Winston Churchill, who effectively deter-mined the lines of policy approved by the war cabinet. Apart fromthe inner problems of government departments in London, theexternal issue wassimple andyet not assimple as it at firstappeared:when would the United States accept a commitment to resistJapanese expansion? The theme might be succinctly defined as'Waiting for F.D.R.'

1 Bangkok to Foreign Office (for J. C. Sterndale Bennett), 17 June 1941,F5342/1281/40, F.O. 371/28142. Transcripts/Translations of Crown-copy-right records in the Public Record Office, London, appear by permission ofthe Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.43


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44 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYWhen the European war began, there seemed to be justificationfor cautious optimism in the Far East. On 23 September Sir Robert

Craigie urged from Tokyo that, in the light of the truce betweenRussia and Japan, marking an end to the bitter fighting on theborder between Manchukuo and Mongolia which had continuedsince May 1939, Britain should offer facilities in Hong Kong for apeace conference to terminate the Sino-Japanese war.2 Simul-taneously the parliamentary under-secretaryat the Foreign Office,R. A. Butler, urged a rapprochement with Japan. Such a coursewas, he stated, favoured by Hugh Dalton, the Labour party'sprincipal spokesman on foreign affairs, and by the prominentConservative back-bencher, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne. Butlerobserved:Russia and Japan are bound to remain enemies, and with ourposition in India and the East it would pay us to make a returnto the Anglo-Japanese alliance possible. It does not appear thatthere are the makings of a war between America and Japan;the American interests in the Far East are insufficient to justifya major war. I do not believe that it will in the end pay us tokeep Japan at arm's length and distrust everything she does forthe sake of American opinion....To sum up, therefore, I would wish to see the position inNorth China cleared up, including the withdrawal of our garri-sons; a 'standing pat' at Shanghai; an improvement of ourtrading relations with Japan in our mutual interest on a barterbasis and as soon as possible, and finally a closer approach toChiang Kai Shek [sic] in order (a) to find out what his mindreally is, and (b) if possible to prevent a civil war in China bybringing about a peace settlement in the Far East before it istoo late.3

Halifax brought the subject before the war cabinet. It was decidedon 26 September that Clark Kerr,the ambassador in China, shouldsee Chiang Kai-shek when he visited Chungking in early Octoberand inform him privately of Craigie's proposal: however, it wasto be made clear to Chiang that Britain had no wish to persuadehim to accept the suggestion contrary to his inclinations.4 Soonafterwards Halifax decided not to pursue the proposal owing todoubt concerning the Japanese government's attitude.5 Uneasy

2 Craigie to Halifax, 23 September 1939, Fio533/87/io, F.O. 371/23461.3 Minute by R. A. Butler, 22 September 1939, Flo710/176/23, F.O. 371/23556.4 War cabinet conclusions, 28 (39) 7, 26 September 1939; and 32 (39) 8,30 September 1939, Cab. 65/1.5 War cabinet conclusions, 42 (39) 8, 9 October 1939, Cab. 65/1.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 45and unsatisfactory as Britain's policy was of giving moral supportto China with conspicuously little tangible aid to accompany it,while at the same time voicing disapproval of Japanese policywithout allowing it to go too far, there was no alternative. Halifaxremarked, in a telegram to Craigie sent on 21 November, thatfurther improvement in relations with Japan was desirable, 'ButAmerican support in our present struggle is vital, and it is impos-sible entirely to ignore the fact that what Japan is doing in EastAsia is very closely akin to what Germany has done in Europe.'6Despite the fact that Britain had done little to assist China-paradoxically Germany had initially helped China appreciablyand then Russia and the United States lent growing support-Japan bitterly resented Britain's moral support for China. Withthe looming Japanese threat to Indo-China, the Burma road hadbecome more important as one of the two principal routes forcarrying arms and other goods into China, the other being thelong overland road from Russia. However, the significance of thetortuous and ill-surfaced road from Lashio to Kunming was inessence symbolical of the Chinese determination to continue thestruggle against Japan and of the willingness of various powersto foster that resistance.7 On 24 June 1940 Craigie reported thathe had been handed a memorandum by the vice-minister offoreign affairsrequesting the closure of the Burma road and of theHong Kong frontier.8 Craigie believed that submission wasadvisable although he did not, at this stage, consider full-scalewar probable in the event of refusal; this should be accompaniedby a statement that Britain would expect a strenuous effort to bemade by Japan to secure a just, negotiated peace with China.9Craigie observed there was a division of opinion between themore bellicose younger officers in the army, who 'have now virtu-ally got out of control' and the senior officers,the former advoca-ting a confrontation over the Burma road.l? The initial responsein the Foreign Officewas to oppose closure but to offer concessionsin the supply of raw materials to Japan.The chiefs of staff considered the situation before the warcabinet debated it on 1 July. As was the custom, the matter had

6 Halifax to Craigie, 21 November 1939, F11946/6457/1o, F.O. 371/23534.7 Of a total value of ?7,o28,362 of munitions imported into Rangoon andpassed by customs for outward transit to China between 26 March 1939 and31 March 1940, about ?239,ooo or 3.4% originated in the British Empire;details communicated by Burma Office to Foreign Office, 29 June 1940, F3529/43/10, F.O. 371/24666.8 Craigie to Halifax, 24 June 1940, F3479/43/io, F.O. 371/24666.9 Craigie to Halifax, 25 June 1940, ibid.10 Craigie to Halifax, 1 July 1940, ibid.TRANS. 5TH S.-VOL. 24-D


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46 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYbeen examined by the joint planning sub-committee, which hadprepared an aide-memoire to guide the chiefs of staff. The sub-committee opposed the wish of the Foreign Officeto keep the roadopen, for to do so would be to risk war and the danger couldnot be contemplated. In the sub-committee's view, Britain shouldendeavour to achieve peace terms acceptable to China.'1 When thechiefs of staff debated the issue, the chief of the imperial generalstaff, General Sir John Dill, endorsed the report and pressed forthe closure of the Burma road as one aspect of a package dealincorporating a broad settlement.12At the war cabinet on 1 July Halifax urged that the Japanesedemand should be rejected but, to soften the blow and bearingin mind the views of Australia that great care was necessary inhandling Japan, it could be agreed that the volume of trafficusing the road be restricted. The colonial secretary, Lord Lloyd,warned of a harsh reaction in Hong Kong and Leopold Amery,the secretaryof state for India, vigorously opposed closure. NevilleChamberlain, now lord president of the council, believed that thefirstpriority was to avoid war with Japan. There was some supportfor an attempt at attaining a comprehensive settlement. Churchilland Attlee expressed general agreement with Halifax.13 The dis-cussion was adjourned. The Foreign Office still dissented andpressed for keeping the road open, while making additional con-cessions to Japan. The chiefs of staff pursued it further on 4 Julyand concluded that 'the War Cabinet should be left in no doubtas to the apprehension which the Chiefs of Staff felt regardingthe military necessity of avoiding any steps which might lead towar with Japan ... particularly in the light of the possibility thatwe might find ourselves in a state of hostilities with France'.14When the war cabinet met on 5 July, Halifax restated the opposi-tion of the Foreign Office to closure despite the views of the chiefsof staff. He did not believe that Japan would launch a majoroffensive but admitted that an attack on Hong Kong was con-ceivable. However, Craigie and his military attache in Tokyoheld that it would be dangerous to refuse closure. The primeminister stated that, if Britain took a firm stand, the entire burdenwould fall on her shoulders instead of falling where it rightlybelonged-on the shoulders of the United States. 'In the present11 'Policy in the Far East,' aide memoire by joint planning sub-committee,29 June 1940, C.O.S. (40) 506 (J.P.), Cab. 80/14.12 Chiefs of staff committee, conclusions 1 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 2o2, Cab.79/5.13 War cabinet conclusions, I July 1940, 189 (40) i, Cab. 65/7.14 Chiefs of staff committee conclusions, 4 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 2o8, Cab.79/5.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 47state of affairs he (Churchill) did not think that we ought toincur Japanese hostility for reasons mainly of prestige.'5 Therewas general agreement with this conclusion and considerationturned to the most efficaciousmeans of submission. It was felt thatthe advice of President Roosevelt should be heeded that it waspreferable to yield to force majeure rather than make an agree-ment smacking of appeasement as the French had done.The United States surveyed the crisis with mounting concernbut was determined not to intervene. There was much anxietyin the war cabinet at the possible consequences of continued pro-crastination. Halifax, therefore, instructed Craigie to reach agree-ment if feasible on restriction of the use of the road rather thanclosure; if unable to do so, he should accept closure for a three-month period during which Japan would attempt to settle theconflict with China and would work to improve relations withGreat Britain.16 Since Japan insisted on closure and rejected anycompromise, Craigie negotiated the surrender. Starting on 18 July1940 the transit of arms, ammunition, petrol, trucks and railwaymaterial was suspended for three months. The importance of theBurma road crisis is that it jolted all departments in Whitehallinto a full appreciation of how tenuous the British position wasin the Far East.The consequence was a major review of defence problems inthe Far East, the first substantial reassessment since the review in1937 before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war.17 The weak-nesses were starkly revealed. Previous strategy had relied on theability to despatch a fleet to Singapore when the situation war-ranted it. There was no likelihood in the foreseeable future ofsuch a fleet being sent owing to the navy being stretched to thelimit in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The principal lessonsdrawn were that air and land strength must be increased; itwould be essential to attempt to hold Malaya itself and not simplySingapore; a serious effort must be made to reach a general settle-ment with Japan, failing which the aim should be to gain asmuch time as possible before war started. In addition, it was mostdesirable to co-ordinate strategy with the Dutch authorities in the

15War cabinet conclusions, 5 July 1940, 194 (40) i, Cab. 65/8. The perman-ent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan, noted in hisdiary that Churchill favoured 'surrender' over the Burma road contrary tohis own view, see The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, ed.D. Dilks (London, 1971), pp. 310-13, diary entries for 4 July-13 July 1940.16 Halifax to Craigie, 11 July 1940, F3568/43/o1, F.O. 371/24667.17 'The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese InterventionAgainst Us', report of the chiefs of staff committee, 31 July 1940, C.O.S. (40)592 and W.P. (40) 302, Cab. 66/1o.


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48 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYNetherlands East Indies; here the report was less decisive owingto fundamental disagreement between the General Staff and theAir Council on the one hand and the Admiralty on the otherhand as to whether a binding commitment to assist the Nether-lands East Indies should be undertaken. The first sea lord andchief of the naval staff, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, explained on27 July that it was impossible for the navy to accept any newcommitments unless they were guaranteed by the United States.lsSo strongly was this view held that the Admiralty was even pre-pared to envisage the Japanese taking the Netherlands East Indies.As will be seen later, this issue became a long drawn out andacrimonious matter in 1941.Meanwhile the Foreign Office had begun seriously to examinethe possibility of bringing the Sino-Japanese war to an end andof making concessions to Japan in accordance with the change ofpolicy determined upon when the decision had been made to closethe Burma road. Sir John Brenan observed that the chiefs of staff,Craigie and Lothian, plus Australia and, to a lesser extent, theUnited States supported the concept of a peace settlement. Brenanenvisaged Japanese recognition of the integrity and independenceof China in return for united economic concessions by the powers;Japan would undertake to remain neutral in the European warand to refrain from territorial expansion in any direction. Britainwould offer generous financial assistance and a guaranteed supplyof raw materials to Japan; at the end of the Sino-Japanese warBritain would surrender her extra-territorial rights in China, ashad been anticipated for over a decade.19Sterndale Bennett, thehead of the Far Eastern department, minuted that Brenan had notgone far enough: a searching appraisal was required.20R. A. Butlerreiterated his belief in the need for a settlement:

The 'complete defeat' of Japan can only be brought about bythe enlistment in the war of a first class nation. We should beunwise to undertake the task and I doubt whether the Russiansor Americans will.Therefore I think that we should work for as good a settle-ment in the Far East as we can manage. We &8the Americanshave economic weapons against Japan. Under cover of thesewe should attempt to secure a modification of the Konoye terms[of November-December 1938] . ..To be successful we must be more active with the American18 Chiefs of staff committee conclusions, 27 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 236,Cab. 79/5.19 AMemorandumby Brenan, lo July 1940, F3586/193/61, F.O. 371/24708.20 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 11 July 1940, ibid.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 49Govt. than hitherto. We cannot have them sniping at us inpublic while privately telling us that theyunderstand our motives.I should like to take this line with them:- 'Your &our inter-ests are very similar ... in the Far East let us try, under coverof our economic weapons, to secure a fair settlement, 8cto reviseour position in China (extraterritoriality etc.). If we look likefailing then can we not count on your aid, when the Japs startpouncing on other people's property?'21Further thought was devoted to the subject in late July andearly August 1940. However, Anglo-Japanese relations sharplydeteriorated following the formation of a new government byPrince Konoye Fumimaro, which proceeded to arrestand maltreata number of British nationals. The likelihood of a settlement,never bright, receded. The Foreign Office nevertheless consultedother government departments on the terms of a possible futuresettlement, so as to have the relevant information readily avail-able. The Foreign Office divided the question into the aspectsconcerning Japan and China directly and the wider issues in-

separable from a broad settlement. It was believed that Japan'sterms would embrace recognition of Manchukuo; acceptance ofthe 'New Order'; common opposition to the spread of commun-ism; acceptance of Japanese domination of north China andInner Mongolia; economic concessions throughout China; and aslow withdrawal of Japanese troops as the settlement was imple-mented. China's terms were anticipated to be vague but wouldamount to the full restoration of Chinese independence includingthe complete withdrawal of Japanese forces. Therefore, it wouldbe difficult to reconcile the two adversaries. Peace could only berealized if other powers offered inducements. As regards a broadsettlement, the Foreign Office believed Japan would desire recog-nition of the 'New Order' and acceptance of racial equality, withparticularreference to the United States and the British Dominions;financial assistance to exploit the resources of China; free tradein south-east Asia; guaranteed access to raw materials; and theabolition of the Ottawa tariffs. China would want recognitionof her territorial integrity, abolition of extraterritoriality, assis-tance with her currency and general economic restoration.Numerous difficulties were foreseen in meeting Japan's likelydemands, especially where racial equality was involved. GreatBritain would expect from Japan undertakings at least to remainneutral in the European struggle and to respect British, Dutch

21 Minute by R. A. Butler, 23 July 1940, F3633/193/61, F.O. 371/24708.


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50 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYand American possessions in the Far East and Pacific: from Chinarespect for Britain's particular interests and a promise of partici-pation in the rehabilitation of China.22The various other depart-ments consulted were asked to inform the Foreign Office of theirconclusions.The Dominions Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfareexpressed considerable doubt as to whether it was in Britain'sinterest to help to terminate the Sino-Japanesewar, thus revertingto the attitude widely held before the Burma road crisis.23Themost entertaining answer came from the Colonial Office, whichstressed the problems inherent in making concessions to Japanbut added that if general talks were held, it would like to securethe extension of the lease of the New Territories in the crowncolony of Hong Kong.24The Foreign Office gloomily concludedthat even if the skies brightened east of Singapore the prospectsfor reaching an acceptable settlement were not encouraging. Itshould, however, be noted that several prominent figures in publiclife apparently favoured a settlement, including Lord Hankey,the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster,ErnestBevin, the ministerof labour, and SirWalter Citrine, general secretaryof the T.U.C.25Churchill was profoundly sceptical, advising Halifax to 'go veryslow on all this general and equitable peace business betweenChina and Japan'.26The Foreign Officehad alreadyreached the provisional decisionto recommend reopening the Burma road when the three-monthagreement expired in October.27The effect on American opinionwas the vital aspect. When Lothian and the Australian minister,Casey, saw Cordell Hull on 16 September, Lothian asked him whatsupport would be forthcoming if Britain stood up to Japan andreopened the Burma road. Hull replied that this would dependon the outcome of the 'Battle of Britain': if Britain held out until

22 Memorandum, 'General Settlement with Japan', enclosed in ForeignOffice to Board of Trade, Ministry of Economic Warfare, Colonial Office,Dominions Office, India Office, Burma Office and Petroleum Department,lo August 1940, ibid.23 Dominions Office to Foreign Office, 27 August 1940 and Ministry ofEconomic Warfare to Foreign Office, 2 September 1940, F41o8/193/61 F.O.371/24709.24 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 17 August 1940, F3859/193/61, F.O.371/24709.25 See letter from Lord Sempill to Hankey, 3 June 1941 enclosing notesprepared in September 1940, Hankey papers, Cab. 63/177.26 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, ii (5th edition, 1955), p. 571,Churchill to Halifax, 20 July 1940.27 Memorandum by Halifax, 'Reopening of the Burma Road', 2 September1940, W.P. (40) 348, Cab. 66/11.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMINGOF THE PACIFIC WAR 511941, the United States could adopt a far stronger policy in thePacific. He implied that the United States would contemplateaction which 'might bring United States of America very nearto war against Japan'.28However, he felt that this would not beto Britain's advantage because it would entail a reduction insupplies to her. He greatly hoped that the Burma road would bereopened. The Foreign Office welcomed Hull's remarks and wereinclined to agree that it was not desirable that the United Statesshould go to war with Japan and reduce aid to Britain as a conse-quence.29 When the war cabinet examined the position on2 October, the prime minister 'questioned the statement that itwas not in our interests that the United States should be involvedin war in the Pacific'.30 Churchill was interested solely in themoment when the United States would become a full ally, believingthat intervention in the Pacific would lead to participation inthe European war. The Burma road was reopened on 18 October1940.Between October 1940 and April 1941 a series of defence confer-ences met in Singapore and Washington to exchange views withthe Americans and Dutch and to seek improved co-ordinationbetween the various forces in the Far East and Pacific. The firstconference met at Singapore in October 1940 as an all-Britishgathering apart from an American observer. Its report reinforcedthe pessimism of the chiefs of staff three months earlier. 'Our firstand immediate consideration must be to ensure the security ofMalaya against direct attack. The Tactical Appreciation showsthat the army and air forces in Malaya (including reinforcementsnow being provided) are, both in numbers and equipment, farbelow those required in view of the inadequacy of the naval forcesavailable. This deficiency must obviously be remedied immedi-ately. .. .'31 Emphasis was laid on the importance of securingeffective Dutch co-operation. In the existing situation it was mostimprobable that either Malaya or Singapore could be held forother than a brief period. In their commentary on the report,the joint planning staff endorsed a number of the detailed recom-mendations concerning provision of new aerodromes,extension ofaid from India and the need for more discussions with Australiaand New Zealand. In general terms, however, the staff concluded,'We consider... that the views of the commanders on the general

28 Lothian to Halifax, 16 September 1940, F429o/193/61, F.O. 371/24709.29 Foreign Office minutes, 2-21 September 1940, ibid.30 War cabinet conclusions, 2 October 1940, 264 (40) 4, Cab. 65/9.31 'Report of the Singapore Defence Conference, October 1940', 31 October1940, Cab. 80/24.


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52 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYdefence situation are unduly pessimistic and that they have inparticular tended to over-estimate the minimum air forces neces-sary for reasonable security.'32 In their detailed remarks theystated their opinions more forcefully. The air requirements en-visaged at Singapore: 'appear to be entirely divorced from reality.The Japanese have never fought against a first-class Power in theair and we have no reason to believe that their operations wouldbe any more effective than those of the Italians'.33At the end of 1940 preparations were being made for the'technical conversations'with the United States, scheduled to beginin Washington in January 1941.34 In the instructions for theBritish delegation, the chiefs of staff stated that the conversationsshould be based 'on the hypothesis of a war between Germany,Italy and Japan on the one hand and the British Empire with ourpresent Allies and the U.S.A. on the other'.35The hypothesis didnot imply a political commitment. Singapore was regarded as'the key' to the defence of the entire Far East and Pacific.36 Itwas recalled that preliminary consultations had already been heldand from these the principal divergence hinged on differences ofoutlook between the British and American navies. The Britishnaval staff believed that the combined allied forces could combatGermany, Italy and Japan simultaneously, whereas the UnitedStates naval staff maintained that they could not with confidencehope to restrain Japan if occupied in the Atlantic and Mediter-ranean. The British wanted the United States forces to be basedon Singapore whereas the Americans wished to remain at Hawaii.37Churchill, while supporting the instructions, emphasized that,'It was most important that the attitude to be adopted by our32 'Far East Tactical Appreciation and Report of Singapore Defence Con-ference, Commentary by the Joint Planning Staff', i January 1941, Cab. 79/8.33 Ibid.

34 There was some delay in Whitehall in completing arrangements for theconversations, to the annoyance of the American military attache; see TheLondon Observer: the Journal of General Raymond E. Lee 1940o-94i, ed.J. Leutze (London, 1972), pp. 192-93.35 Annex: British-United States Technical Conversations, General Instruc-tions for the United Kingdom Delegation to Washington, 15 December 1940,Cab. 80/24.36 Ibid.37 'British-United States Technical Conversations, Note by the Chiefs ofStaff submitting Draft Instructions for the United Kingdom Delegation toWashington', 15 December 1940, C.O.S. (40) 1043, Cab. 80/24. Lee, theAmerican military attache in London, remarked in his journal that thesecretary of the navy, Colonel Frank Knox, was disturbed at the defeatismprevalent in the navy, which he attributed to the malign influence of JosephKennedy, the former ambassador in London and now a leading isolationist,see The London Observer, ed. Leutze, p. 175.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMINGOF THE PACIFIC WAR 53Delegation in the discussions on naval strategy should be one ofdeference to the views of the United States in all matters con-cerning the Pacific theatre of war.'38The staff conversations took place in Washington betweenJanuary and March 1941. In an appreciation of the situation inthe Far East, the significance of Singapore as a fundamental con-stituent of British defence policy was explained. As regards prob-able Japanese strategy, it was believed that Japan could launcha land and air offensive upon Malaya from Indo-China andThailand, attack the Netherlands East Indies and probably com-plete arrangementsto attack the Philippines. Japan was estimatedto have sufficient strength to carry out all three offensives at once,an accurate forecast in the light of December 1941. The mostsatisfactory solution would be to base a naval force, includingcapital ships, at Singapore: because of the heavy British commit-ment in other theatres, it would be most sensible for this task tobe discharged by the United States.39In their rejoinder, the United States staff committee stated thatin their opinion if the United States became involved in war withJapan, she would fight Germany and Italy, too; similarly if theUnited States fought Germany and Italy, she would go to warwith Japan if Japan was not then at war with Britain. The staffcommittee did not think the United States would go to war ifJapan occupied Indo-China and Thailand. 'Furthermore, thereis serious doubt that the United States would immediately declarewar against Japan were that nation to move against Malaya,British Borneo, or the Netherlands East Indies, unless the UnitedStates were previously also at war with Germany and Italy.'40Itwas likely that Japan would aim to defeat her opponents one ata time, although a general offensive was feasible. The significantdifference from the British appreciation was that they did notaccept the concept of Singapore as the mighty fortress that mustbe held at all costs. 'The general moral effect of the loss ofSingapore and the Philippines would be severe. Singapore hasbeen built up in public opinion as a symbol of the power of theBritish Empire. The eastern Dominions, the Netherlands EastIndies and China look upon its security as the guarantee of their

38 'British-United States Technical Conversations', Note by the Secretary,19 December 1940, C.O.S. (40) 1052, Cab. 80/24.39 'British-United States Staff Conversation. The Far East Appreciationby the United Kingdom Delegation', 11 February 1941, B.U.S. (J) (41) 13,Cab. 99/5.40 'British-United States Staff Conversations. Statement by the UnitedStates Staff Committee: The United States Military Position in the Far East',19 February 1941, B.U.S. (J) (41) 16, Cab. 99/5.


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54 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYsafety. Its value as a symbol has become so great that its captureby Japan would be a serious blow. But many severe blows can beabsorbedwithout leading to final disaster.'41While the Washingtontalks fostered contacts and mutual appreciation, they did not leadto the formulation of a carefully co-ordinated strategy againstJapan.A defence conference was held at Singapore in February 1941between the British, Dutch and Australians, followed by twofurther conferences in April 1941; Americans were present asobserversor participants. It was felt in February that the Japanesewere not in a position to launch simultaneous offensives onMalaya and the Netherlands East Indies: instead they would con-solidate their hold on Indo-China, infiltrate Thailand and thenattack Malaya. 'If Japan is certain that the U.S.A. will interveneto support the N.E.I. or the British Empire, the chances of warbreaking out are reduced to very small proportions.'42In Aprilthe statement that Japan was not in a position to attack bothMalaya and the Netherlands East Indies was qualified: it was nowconsidered that Japan could theoretically do so but in practicewould not owing to her preoccupation in China.43Progress towards securing a unified response among the powersthreatened by Japan was slow, therefore. In the case of the UnitedStates refusal to give a commitment was understandable giventhe problems confronting Roosevelt. What is more surprising isthat Britain behaved in a not dissimilar way towards the Nether-lands East Indies. Throughout 1941 an interminable debate per-sisted between the Foreign Office,on the one hand, and the primeminister and the chiefs of staff, on the other hand. The ForeignOffice maintained that since the Netherlands was allied withBritain and the Netherlands East Indies was a vital area for thedefence of British interests, an undertaking of mutual supportin the event of Japanese aggression should be entered into. Theprime minister and the chiefs of staff, particularly the first sealord, refused to agree to a firm promise of support being givenunless the United States guaranteed support. The Netherlandsgovernment in exile ardently desired an understanding, whichfollowed logically from the growing bellicosity of Japan and of thestress on co-operation in the Singapore defence conferences in

41 Ibid.42 'Report of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference', held at Singapore,22-25 February 1941, Cab. 80/29.43 'Report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations', held at Singapore,27 April 1941 and 'Report of the British-Dutch Conversations', held atSingapore, 27 April 1941, C.O.S. (41) 387 and 388, Cab. 80/28.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 55February and April 1941. The subject was regularly raised in thewar cabinet by Anthony Eden, now foreign secretary, and post-poned. On 21 July he told the war cabinet:

that the idea had been dropped of making a public declarationthat we should go to the help of the Dutch East Indies if theywere attacked by Japan. All that was now proposed was thatwe should tell the Dutch privately that we would do so, andwould inform the United States of what we had done ...On the merits of the case, he could not see that, if Japanattacked the Dutch East Indies, we should not go to their aid.He found difficulty in postponing a decision on this matterfurther, as the Dutch were pressing us to ratify the conversa-tions. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand were inagreement with the course proposed ...44

Churchill once again disagreed:As for a Japanese attack on Singapore, he did not believe any-thing of the sort was contemplated. It might well be that, evenif Japan encroached on the Dutch East Indies, the right policywould be that we should not make an immediate declarationof war on Japan. Once war had been declared, Japanese cruiserswould attack our sea communications, and none of our shippingwould be safe unless heavily protected by convoys.At the presentmoment we were not in a position to send an adequate fleet tothe Far East.45It is remarkable that Churchill was prepared to contemplateJapanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, particularly

when he himself had cogently pointed out the unacceptabledangers of such a policy to the war cabinet a year before.46 Itwas decided, as a compromise, that Eden should inform theNetherlands minister that Britain considered that she had alreadyassumed the responsibility for protecting the East Indies as best44 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 21 July 1941, 72 (41) 0o,Cab. 65/23.45 Ibid.46 Churchill had then observed: 'that, to his mind, the central facet of thesituation, if Japan obtained the mastery of the Netherlands East Indies, wasthat she would be able to prepare strong positions facing Singapore, includinga base for her fleet. If we did not fight, she would be able to prepare thesepositions in peace, and to use them against us at the moment which suitedher best.If we made it clear that we should fight to preserve the integrity of theNetherlands East Indies, Japan might very well decide against attack . . .'See war cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 29 July 1940, 214 (40) 7,Cab. 65/14.


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56 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYshe could but that no undertaking could be given on the formthat protection would take.47The Netherlands government wasnot satisfiedand pressedfor the military obligations to be resolved.48Discussions continued for months afterwards but no concretemilitary commitment was extended. Ashley Clarke of the FarEastern department of the Foreign Office reflected on the situationin appropriately ironic terms:

The salient points to bear in mind are (1) that we shall haveto defend the Dutch East Indies anyway and (2) that the UnitedStates can give us no prior guarantee of support although theprobability of such support amounts almost to a certainty. Wetherefore lose nothing by having an unambiguous agreementwith the Dutch and we gain nothing by making further appealsto the United States. The reluctance which is felt by the Chiefsof Staff to make a frank agreement with the Dutch seems to melike saying that when invasion comes we will defend Hampshireand of course Devonshire, but we are short of anti-tank gunsand will therefore not commit ourselves to defend Dorsetshireunless we get some backing from the President of the UnitedStates.49

Eden concurred and identified the obstacle, 'It is not only, or evenmainly the Chiefs of Staff (C.I.G.S. happens to agree with us) butAdmiralty & above all P.M. who take this view . ..50 There thematter rested until just before the outbreak of war: an under-taking of military support in unequivocal terms was at last con-veyed to the Netherlands government on 5 December after Britainhad received a promise of support from the United States. It is arevealing issue in a number of respects, not least for demonstratingthe obstinate inflexibility of Churchill and the Admiralty. Itdamaged relations with the Netherlands government, alienatedofficials in the East Indies and handicapped effective co-ordinationin defence. All to no purpose for, as Cadogan had once minuted,the cynical answer to saying that little help can be given is thatthere is nothing to lose by promising it therefore.51In the final crisis of 1941 the changing relationship, wherebythe immense burden that Great Britain carried was assumed bythe United States, reached its climax. In the Far East Roosevelt

47 Eden to Bland, 1 August 1941, F7214/230/G, F.O. 371/2777948 Eden to Bland, 8 August 1941, F7526/23o/G, F.O. 371/27780.49 Minute by Clarke, 7 November 1941, F11734/4366/61, F.O. 371/27847.50 Minute by Eden, 9 November 1941, ibid.51 Minute by Cadogan, 6 May 1941, F4118/54/61, F.O. 371/27777.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMINGOF THE PACIFIC WAR 57did not display the decisiveness that accompanied the introductionof Lend-Lease. Until the eve of Pearl Harbour, he declined to giveBritain a guarantee of support in the event of a Japanese attackon British possessions. Yet he pursued a tough policy towardsJapan in the economic sphere involving the serious risk, to put itno higher, of Japan eventually deciding to go to war. The catalystcame with the Japanese advance into southern Indo-China inJuly 1941. Despite initial doubts about provoking conflict in thePacific,52Roosevelt imposed the drastic freeze on economic rela-tions with Japan including the effective suspension of crucial oilexports. Within the British government, there were reservationsabout going so far; before the American decision was announced,a more limited form of economic retaliation had been planned.However, the wider implications of co-operation with the UnitedStates took priority and the war cabinet decided to support theUnited States wholeheartedly.53Great Britain was not consulted with any adequacy by theUnited States in the protracted discussions with Japan. In onesense this met the British desire, felt for so long, that the UnitedStates should meet her full responsibilities in the Pacific. However,it was not satisfactory that Britain should be kept largely ignorantof developments and much dissatisfactionwas voiced in the ForeignOffice. It is of interest to examine the closing stages of the crisisin late November and early December 1941.54 By this time theKonoye government had fallen in Japan; Konoye had made agenuine attempt to secure agreement with the United States byremoving his foreign minister, Matsuoka, and by offering to meetRoosevelt for a summit conference.55The differences between thetwo countries were so great that Hull dissuaded Roosevelt fromseeing Konoye.56While still in office,Konoye had accepted funda-mental policy decisions in liaison and imperial conferences toexpand south and to go to war with the United States unless

52 From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency 1938-194I, ed. J. M. Blum(Boston, 1965), p. 377.53 War cabinet conclusions, 24 July 1941, 73 (41) 4 and 28 July 1941, 75 (41)6, Cab. 65/19.54 For a fuller discussion of the situation in 1941, see P. Lowe, 'GreatBritain and the Outbreak of War with Japan, 1941', in War and Society:Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J. R. Western 1928-71, ed. M. R.D. Foot (London, 1973).55 For a useful brief description of Matsuoka, see Chihiro Hosoya, 'Retro-gression in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process', in Dilemmas ofGrowth in Prewar Japan, ed. J. W. Morley (Princeton, 1971), pp. 92-93.56 See R. J. C. Butow, 'Backdoor Diplomacy in the Pacific: the Proposalfor a Konoye-Roosevelt Meeting, 1941', Journal of American History, lix(1972), pp. 48-72.


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58 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYagreement was quickly attained.57His successor as prime minister,General Tojo Hideki, was a resolute advocate of war but agreedthat there should be one final attempt to resolve matters peace-fully.The principal obstacles to agreementbetween Japan, the UnitedStates and Great Britain lay in Japan's conflict in China and hermembership of the tripartite pact. The special Japanese emissary,Kurusu, proposed a temporary agreement; Hull considered analternative three-month agreement.58The British Foreign Officewas at first inclined to give a cautious welcome to the Kurusumission. Ashley Clarke minuted that 'if the Kurusu suggestion(of possible withdrawal from Indo-China) is genuine there seemsto be some ground for a (very cautious) response on the part ofthe Americans'.59Sterndale Bennett agreed: 'We cannot of courserule out the possibility that a piecemeal settlement may merelygive the Japanese a breathing space. But to get them reallymoving in reverse would be a great gain for us.'60When more in-formation arrived, it was held that neither Kurusu's proposalnor Hull's contemplated alternative was satisfactory. It was toodangerous to leave loopholes through vague terms and the freezingmeasures should only be lifted if there was certainty of a signifi-cant Japanese retreat.61The reactions in Chungking wereferocious.Chiang Kai-shek urgently required aid to bolster his ramshackleregime; he was deeply alarmed at the danger of even a temporarycompromise between the United States and Japan. Apprehensionhad been growing in London for a considerable period overChina's ability to continue the struggle and there were rumoursof a Japanese offensive in Yunnan to cut the Burma road.Churchill thought that the rumour might be accurate andaddressed one of his personal messages to Roosevelt warning thatChiang should not be neglected.62 In the resulting turmoil inWashington Hull abandoned his own proposal, sent a lengthy

57 For the relevant documentation, based on notes taken by the Japanesemilitary representatives, see Japan's Decision For War: Records of the 1941Policy Conferences, ed. N. Ike (Stanford, 1967), pp. 77-163. See also A. Iriye,'The Failure of Military Expansionism', in Dilemmas of Growth, ed. Morley,pp. 130-35.58 For the text, see Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter citedas F.R.U.S.], i931-Z941, ii, pp. 755-56, and F.R.U.S. I94z, iv, pp. 66o-64.59 Minute by Clarke, 19 November 1941, on Washington to Foreign Office,18 November 1941, F19475/86/23, F.O. 371/27912.60 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 2o November 1941, ibid.61 Foreign Office to Washington, 24 November 1941, F12655/86/23, F.O.371/27912.62 Churchill, The Second World War, iii, p. 530, Former Naval Person toPresident Roosevelt, 26 November 1941.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 59communication to Japan calling for a complete Japanese retreat,including withdrawal from China, and regarded the talks asvirtually terminated. He told Halifax that he did not resentBritain's representations, although he thought Churchill hadlistened uncritically to Chiang. Hull reserved his ire for thegeneralissimo and for his own colleague, Stimson, who had playeda leading part in 'busting' his diplomatic efforts.63All that was clear in London was that the crisis was extremelygrave. The uncertainty was precisely where Japan would strikeand in what circumstances. The abruptness of the climax seems tohave surprised Churchill and the chiefs of staff. It was only afortnight or so since Churchill had spoken in the war cabinet ofthe futility of sending more forces to the Far East where theymight be inactive for a year and the chief of the air staff haddenied that the situation was one of 'extreme danger'.4 At theend of November Churchill determined to make a renewed effortto obtain a promise of American support: he despatched a personalmessage to Roosevelt but, from his remarks to the war cabinet,wasnot sanguine on the answer.6aAt last Roosevelt acteddecisively.A discussion took place on 1 December between Roosevelt, HarryHopkins and Halifax. Hopkins referred to the dangerous impres-sion that 'the Japanese acted while we only sent notes and talked'.66Roosevelt concurred and said there must be a clearAnglo-Americanunderstanding on the course of action when he received a replyfrom the Japanese concerning troop movements in Indo-China.He wished to know what Britain would do if the Japanese replywas unsatisfactory or if Japan attacked Thailand outside the Kraisthmus. Halifax commented that the inference was that if Japanmoved, there should be a unified response. 'At one point he threwin an aside that in the case of direct attack on ourselves or theDutch, we should obviously all be together, but he wished to clearup the matters that were less plain.'67With regard to the delicateissue of a British advance into Thai territory to take the Kraisthmus, Roosevelt observed that it would be preferable if Thailand

63 Washington to Foreign Office, 29 November 1941, F12992/86/23, F.O.371/27913. For the text of Hull's communication to Japan, see F.R.U.S. i931-1941, ii, pp. 768-70.64 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 12 November 1941, 112 (41)i, Cab. 65/24.65 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 1 December 1941, 122 (41)3, Cab. 65/24.66 Foreign Office to Washington, 1 December 1941, F13114/86/23, F.O.371/27913. See also, for a discussion of the last days before the outbreak ofwar, L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy In The Second World War, ii(London, 1971), pp. 165-77.67 Ibid.


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60 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYcould be persuaded to invite Britain to enter but added that'strategical necessity' must govern policy. If Britain advanced 'wecould certainly count on their support, though it might take ashort time, he spoke of a few days, to get things into political shapehere'.68In the British reply to Washington, Roosevelt's words werewarmly welcomed. The president's promise of support was inter-preted as connoting armed support and Britain would accordinglybe prepared to implement the preventive operation in the Kraisthmus if 'there were a direct attack or threat of immediate attackon the Kra isthmus'.69The Foreign Office added that the Thaiprime minister had emphatically stated that the only way to saveThailand from Japanese domination was an unmistakable warningby Britain and the United States. Halifax saw Roosevelt again on4 December. The president fully confirmed that his previous assur-ance of support meant armedsupport, the characterof which wouldhave to be determined by the defence chiefs; he agreed that theoperation to take the Kra isthmus should be implemented if neces-sary.Like Churchill, he thought an attack on the Netherlands EastIndies was probable and it could be readily presented to Americanpublic opinion as a threat to the Philippines.70 In a further dis-cussion the next day Roosevelt commented on the British proposalthat a warning to Japan should embrace an attack on the Burmaroad, apart from aggressiondirected against Malaya or the Nether-lands East Indies. He could not accept an attack on the Burmaroad, since this would be part of the Sino-Japanesewar which hadlasted since 1937. To achieve the political purpose of rallyingAmerican opinion, Japanese aggressionmust be seen asentirely newacts of violence. Otherwise Roosevelt supported the idea of awarning:

He thinks that if the warning is given by the United States,ourselves and the Dutch, we should act independently all within24 hours, using different language to mean the same thing ...He would prefer the United States to get in first. On account ofpolitical considerations here, it was important that their actionshould be based on independent necessities of United Statesdefence and not appear to follow on ourselves ...7168 Ibid.69 Foreign Office to Washington, 3 December 1941, ibid.70 Washington to Foreign Office, 4 December 1941, F13g19/86/23, F.O.371/27914.71 Washington to Foreign Office, 5 December 1941, F1378o/86/23, F.O.371/''7914.


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 61War therefore came to British possessions in the Far East andPacificshortly after the long-awaited promise of American supportarrived. The disasters that ensued for Britain were a tragic and yet,in some respects, appropriate concomitant of what one ForeignOffice official referred to as our 'fumbling' policy.72 The ForeignOfficeappreciated the Japanese menace to some extent but not thefull reality. The Foreign Office believed that the imposition ofrigorous economic sanctions in July 1941 would bring the crisisto a head ultimately but that there was a chance that Japanmight see sense and draw back from the brink. Memories of thepolicy of appeasement and of the discredit of this policy in the

circumstances of 1939-41 haunted the Foreign Office: whateverhappened there must be no repetition of Munich. The same out-look characterized policy makers in Washington. There could beno retreat but it might be dangerous to advance. It was difficultto compromise between the two and, if it came to a choice, warhad to be accepted. The chiefs of staff, always conscious of weak-ness, were preoccupied with existing wars in Europe and theMiddle East, seriously underestimated Japan and were dominatedby Churchill. The Admiralty was the most obdurate in refusingto accept a new commitment in the Far East. While it was under-standable enough, the Admiralty did not face up to the full impli-cations of its inflexible attitude. The Air Ministry paid lip-service to the urgent need of improving air strength in Malaya.If Sinclair, the secretary of state for air, and Beaverbrook, theminister of aircraft production, agreed on only one subject, it wasthat they must resist pressure to send planes out of Europe totheatres where lesser crises existed.73 In an important discussionin the war cabinet in November 1941 Sinclair seemed confused asto how many aircraft were in the Far East and made a misleadingstatement.74The Air Ministry was sadly mistaken in its confidentbelief that Japanese aircraft were definitely inferior to those oftheir opponents. The local defence establishment in Malaya under-estimated the Japanese and was too complacent.As for Winston Churchill, his attitude was a combination ofpublic outspokenness, superficial dismissal of the Japanese threatand effacement when it came to properly co-ordinating defencesfor the contingency of a Japanese attack. The burdens he carried

72 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 5 February 1941, on Craigie to ForeignOffice, 3 February 1941, F54o1/9/61, F.O. 371/27760.73 Sinclair to Beaverbrook, 16 March 1941, and Beaverbrook to Sinclair,16 March and 11 April 1941, Sinclair papers, Air 19/510.74 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 5 November 1941, 109(41)2Cab. 65/24.TRANS 5TH S.-VOL. 24-E


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62 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETYwere so great that he could devote little time or reflection to thePacific. He did not comprehend the resolution and tenacity ofJapan. He thought it unlikely that Japan would go to war ifAmerican involvement was certain. Even if she did, Japan couldbe held. All that could be done was to muddle along and hope forthe best, the best connoting an eventual American commitment.As was true of most opinion, Churchill exaggerated the power ofthe United States to block Japanese expansion rapidly. In themidst of the disasters in January 1942, Lord Hankey wrote, 'Eitherwe ought to have avoided the war, or we ought to have preparedfor it much better than we did'.75The war could not be avoidedbecause the major decisions were taken by Japan and the UnitedStates. It is undeniable that Britain should have been betterprepared. When it came to appreciating the power and spirit ofJapan, the men of Downing street and Whitehall did dwell in anivory tower.University of Manchester.75 Hankey to Piggott, 26 January 1942, Hankey Papers, Cab. 63/177.

Documents

Great Britain and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1939-1941