1

Grassroots in Cyberspace:

Using Computer Networks to Facilitate Political

Participation

(c) Mark S. Bonchek, Harvard University

The Political Participation Project, MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory

Presented at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association

Chicago, IL on April 6, 1995

Abstract

This paper explains the rapid adoption of computer networks by citizens and interest groups to

organize grassroots political activity. I hypothesize that computer-mediated communication

(CMC) reduces the transaction costs associated with organizing, thereby facilitating collective

political action. An analysis of seven cases of grassroots activity upholds the hypothesis,

demonstrating that CMC reduce communication, coordination, and information costs, facilitating

group formation, group efficiency, member recruitment, and member retention.

The benefits of CMC for grassroots political activity are offset by two dynamics. Inequalities in

computer literacy and network access lead to a bias in political representation towards young,

male, educated, and affluent citizens. The risk of information overload also suggests that

improvements in collaboration and information-retrieval technologies are needed to help citizens

make the best use of the emerging information infrastructure.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Transaction Costs and Collective Action

3. Does CMC Reduce Transaction Costs?

4. Do Transaction Costs Reduce Collective Action?

5. Case Studies of Groups Using CMC

1. Chinese Students: IFSCSS

2. Community Networking: PEN

3. Smoking Policy: SCARCNet

4. Online Government Access: Jim Warren

5. Institute for Global Communications

6. White Supremacist and Neo-Nazi Movements

7. Information Infrastructure: TPR and CPSR

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6. Costs of CMC

1. Network Access

2. Information Processing

7. Conclusion

8. Bibliography

9. Acknowledgements

1. Introduction

Rich Cowan, a 32 year-old MIT graduate and former campus protester, is the director of the

University Conversion Project in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The project is run in his spare time

out of a one-room church-basement office on a budget of $42,000. Using electronic mail, Mr.

Cowan mobilized and coordinated a nationwide campaign to protest the Republican Party's

Contract with America. The entire process took less than six weeks, culminating with

demonstrations on over a hundred college campuses on March 29, 1995. Activists used

electronic mailing lists to gauge interest levels, obtain feedback, distribute materials to local

activists, and reach a consensus on proposed activities.

The students involved in the University Conversion Project's campaign are part of a growing

movement in which political activists use computer networks to mobilize and organize grassroots

political activity. Between 15 and 25 million people are currently using the Internet and the

number has doubled every year for the last decade (MIDS 1995, SRI 1995). Thousands of

citizens and organizations are using electronic mail, newsgroups, bulletin boards, and online

publications to debate political issues, obtain political information, and organize political

activity. Johnson's survey of environmental organizations (1995) found that 35% used on-line

computer networks to "make people aware of the group and encourage them to join." The

public's interest in using interactive media for "involvement in civic affairs" (Piller, 1994) has

led over 10,000 people to use the White House's World Wide Web site each day

(http://www.whitehouse.gov).

After using electronic mail to organize the March 19 protest, one student activist at the

University Conversion Project remarked that "electronic mail has totally changed the way

students do political activism" (Herszenhorn 1995). This paper presents a theory of why CMC is

changing the way citizens "do" political activism and explores the implications of these changes.

The theoretical approach used in the paper is drawn from the literature on transaction costs. The

methodology is a meta-analysis of existing studies of interest groups and an evaluation of seven

case studies of groups using CMC.

The central argument advanced in the paper is that CMC facilitates collective action by reducing

transaction costs related to group organization. Communication, coordination, and information

costs are found to be barriers to collective action. CMC reduces these costs because of its speed,

low cost, asynchronicity, many-to-many communication , and capacity for automation and

intelligent applications. The effect of this reduction in transaction costs is an improvement in

group formation, group efficiency, member recruitment, and member retention.

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The paper is organized into five sections. The first section introduces the transaction cost

approach and distinguishes communication, coordination, and information costs. The second and

third sections propose that computer-mediated communication reduces these transaction costs

and that lower costs facilitate collective action. The fourth section finds support for the

hypothesis in seven case studies of groups and social movements using CMC. The last section

examines how the costs of CMC affect political representation and citizen's ability to manage

information.

2. Transaction Costs and Collective Action

How might CMC affect collective political action? My claim is that CMC reduces the cost of

mobilizing and organizing citizens in political groups and organizations. Since transaction cost

theory proposes that the cost of an activity affects the activity itself, it is well-suited to our study.

We want to understand whether a change in the cost of organizing affects whether and how

people participate in the political process.

This section delineates the types of transaction costs relevant to collective action. As we will see,

the historical emphasis on economic activities in transaction cost theory means that we must

expand the theory to include additional types of transaction costs.

2.1 Economics

Transaction cost theory is a response to neo-classical economics and its assumptions of perfect

competition and perfect information. In neo-classical economics, agents' only expense in the

exchange of goods and services is the cost of the goods and services themselves. Contractual

obligations are made without cost and always fulfilled. There is no need for monitoring or

enforcement. All relevant information about a good or service is immediately available and

bargaining is superfluous. There are no costs to completing a transaction beyond the cost of the

good or service being transacted.

Coase's seminal essay in 1960 demonstrated that the predictions of neo-classical economics are

highly dependent upon the assumption of zero transaction costs. When agents incur additional

costs to complete a transaction, the transactions themselves are affected. Because of these costs,

some exchanges no longer take place. Car dealers, for example, lose potential sales if they are

unable to guarantee that a car is not a lemon. Other exchanges take place solely as a result of

transaction costs. Rating services such as Standard & Poor's gather and sell corporate

information to help investors monitor corporate behavior.

Since 1960, scholars of the new economics of organization (Moe 1984, Alchian and Demsetz

1972, Williamson 1985) have demonstrated both the pervasiveness of transaction costs in

economic exchange and their impact on economic and social outcomes. Transaction costs have

been shown to affect exchange by preventing oversight and monitoring, altering bargaining

relationships, limiting information search, and inhibiting enforcement.

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2.2 Politics

Political economists have extended the transaction cost approach to political institutions and

outcomes. North (1984) observes that governments influence transaction costs by defining

property rights, affecting the distribution of resources in the economy. North (1990) and

Weingast and Marshall (1988) examine political exchange in the form of vote-trading by

legislators. Ostrom (1990) and Taylor and Singleton (1993) examine common-pool resource

problems such as overfishing and environmental protection. In all of these studies, bargaining,

monitoring, enforcement, and search costs are the types of transaction costs found to affect the

distribution of resources.

2.3 Collective Action

The impact of transaction costs on collective political action has received scant attention. Taylor

and Singleton (1993:195) observe that "for the most part, the existence of the (often very large)

transaction costs of solving collective action problems has not been taken on board." According

to Sandler (1992:48), "there has been almost no attempt to integrate transaction costs and their

relationship to group size into the analysis [of collective action]."

Common-pool resource problems are often considered in the context of collective action, but

they differ from the type of collective action related to political participation. Common-pool

resource problems are best understood as economic phenomena involving property rights, the

exchange of goods and services, and the distribution of economic resources. In contrast,

collective political action is poorly understood from an economic perspective. Collective

political action refers to political activities engaged in by groups that share a common interest or

purpose (Bentley 1949, Truman 1958). As Taylor and Singleton (1993:213) note, "collective

action in rebellions, strikes, protests, and social movements" is "one of a different sort" from

common-pool resource problems because "participants cannot have recourse to the state, which

is usually the object of their collective action." In other words, participation in political activity is

voluntary and not subject to the institutions that govern property rights and economic exchange.

As a result, bargaining, monitoring and enforcement costs play a much smaller role in collective

political action than in common-pool resource problems.

2.4 Organizational Costs

The primary challenge to a group engaged in political activity is creating and maintaining a

successful organization by generating participation from its membership sufficient to achieve its

political goals. Three types of organizational costs are affected by communication technologies:

communication costs, coordination costs, and information costs (see Sproull and Kiesler 1991b

and Pool, et. al. 1984).

Communication, coordination, and information-related activites all require time, money, physical

and mental effort. Communication activities include preparing, transmitting, receiving, and

interpreting messages between two or more parties. Coordination activities include collaboration

(proposing, debating, revising, and reaching agreement), scheduling (sharing time, places, and

resources), planning (transforming ideas into action) and decision-making (creating rules,

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distributing proposals, and aggregating preferences). Information activities include searching

(determining needs, evaluating and locating sources), retrieving (filtering, storing, and

manipulating), and interpreting (verifying, analyzing, and managing retrieved information).

Communication over computer networks, known as computer-mediated communication (CMC),

has the potential to reduce organizational costs related to communication, coordination, and

information-related activities. The next section examines the source of this reduction.

3. Does CMC Reduce Transaction Costs?

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) refers to the exchange of information through

computers attached to a network. In the media of radio, print, telephone, and television,

information is represented in an analog format (see Abramson, et. al. 1988). In computers,

information is represented in a digital format as 1's and 0's, known as binary bits (see Negroponte

1995). Digital information has significant advantages over analog information. Compact disks,

for example, store information digitally, while vinyl records store information in an analog

format. Compared to records, CDs have greater storage capacity and are more convenient, more

durable, and more versatile.

Digital representation of information enables new possibilities for communication. Computers

can be networked together for the exchange of digital information over cables and telephone

lines. The computer-mediated communication that emerges from this arrangement is distinct

from other media and has an important effect on organizational transaction costs. CMC is

cheaper and faster, allows messages to be stored for future retrieval, gives individuals broadcast

capabilities, and allows the computer to automate tasks.

3.1 Speed and Cost

Digital information and computer networking make CMC fast and cheap. Digital information

enables large amounts of data to be stored and transmitted efficiently. Entire encyclopedias can

be stored on cassettes the size of a matchbook. The entire Library of Congress can be sent from

one coast to the other over the Internet "backbone" in a matter of minutes. Measured by the cost

of transmitting a single character, CMC is cheaper than the telephone, telegraph, written letter,

and facsimile (Pool, et. al. 1984). The information contained in a 10-minute (analog) telephone

call costing a couple dollars can be transmitted digitally over a computer network in a couple

seconds for pennies.

The result of this speed and cost advantage is a reduction in transaction costs. Studies of the

impact of telecommunications on economies finds that "transaction costs fall with the advent of

telecommunications " (Norton 1992:178) because "modern telecommunications sharply reduces

the costs of transmitting information over space and time" (Leff 1984:257). For groups and

organizations, CMC enables information to be shared more quickly and with less expense.

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3.2 Asynchronous

Communication media can be divided into synchronous and asynchronous. Synchronous media

like the telephone (sans voice mail) require the sender and receiver to communicate at the same

time. Asynchronous media like a newspaper or compact disc allow the receiver to receive the

message at some point after it was sent. By representing information digitally, CMC has the

advantage of carrying both synchronous and asynchronous media. Synchronous media in CMC

include chat groups and teleconferencing ; asynchronous media include electronic mail and file

transfers.

The capacity for asynchronous communiation reduces transaction costs associated with

coordination. Consider the telephone. An answering machine or voice mail system enables a

caller to leave a message for a receiver to retrieve at a later time, asynchronously. Transaction

costs associated with scheduling a time when both parties are available to speak are reduced.

Computer-mediated communication offers similar advantages by enabling senders to transmit

electronic mail messages or post computer files to be retrieved at the receiver's convenience.

3.3 Many-to-Many

Communication media can also be distinguished by the three possible ways in which they

connect people. The first way of connecting people is "one-to-one" or "point-to-point." One-to-

one media connect one sending location with one receiving location at a time. Face-to-face

meetings, facsimile machines, and telephone (except for conference calls) are examples of one-

to-one media. The second type of media are "one-to-many," connecting one sending location

with multiple receiving locations. Broadcast media such as radio, television, and newspapers are

all one-to-many media. CMC falls into the third category of "many-to-many," connecting

multiple sending locations with multiple receiving locations.

The degree and quality of of interactivity varies considerably according to the medium involved

(see McLuhan 1964). One-to-one media are generally highly personal and interactive. Each party

is both a sender and a receiver. One-to-many media are less personal and interactive. One party

is usually a sender and the other party is a receiver. The advantage of one-to-many is that the

sender is a broadcaster able to send messages to multiple receivers. Many-to-many media

combine the personal and interactive quality of one-to-one media with the broadcast capabilities

of one-to-many media. Each party is a sender, a receiver, and a broadcaster.

Electronic mailing lists demonstrate the benefits of many-to-many media. An electronic mailing

list has an e-mail address and a list of other e-mail addresses. When a message is sent to the

mailing list's address, the computer automatically rebroadcasts the message to everybody on the

list. Since anyone on the list can send a message to everyone else on the list, the mailing list

connects many people with each other. An individual can be a sender by contacting other

individuals on the list, a receiver by reading messages posted by others on the list, or a

broadcaster by sending messages to the entire list.

Whereas electronic mailing lists are asynchronous media, many-to-many media can also be

synchronous. Chat groups, computer conferences, and electronic town halls allow many

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participants to be connected simultaneously, similar to a large conference call. America Online,

for example, held an electronic town hall on election night hosted by news anchor Peter

Jennings. Over 300 users from around the world were in a virtual auditorium. Participants could

"go to the mike" and ask questions of the host, "hear" his replies, and "talk" to other participants

in their "row." Many-to-many communication, combined with the anonymity of electronic

communication, enables CMC to "reduce the impediments to communication across both

physical and social distance" (Sproull and Kiesler 1991a: 122).

Many-to-many communication affects coordination and information costs most directly.

Individuals are able to post "does anybody know?" questions that tap into the collective, informal

wisdom of online communities (see Sproull and Kiesler 1991b, Chapter 7). Groups of

individuals can collaborate on proposals independent of physical and temporal distance

(Crawston 1994). Information resources can be linked together to create an archived, dynamic,

and computable representation of a community's collective knowledge.

3.4 Automation

Computers used for CMC can automate tasks. Telephones are "dumb" communication devices.

They convert sound waves into electrical signals on one end of the telephone line and convert the

signals back into sound waves at the other. Computers are "smart" communication devices

because they can manipulate the information being transmitted. Tasks ordinarily performed by

people can be automated and delegated to computers, saving time and expense. Mail filters sort

incoming messages according to sender, subject matter, and original communication (Malone

1987). Mailbots automatically respond to email requests and notify senders that users are away

on vacation. Collaboration tools facilitate structured dialogue among participants (Johansen

1988). Autonomous software agents gather, interpret, and report on useful information (Foner

1993). Survey systems sends forms to recipients, process their responses, and format the results

in real-time without the need for human oversight or intervention (Mallery 1994b). There is also

the potential for computers to perform analytical, decision-making, and planning functions,

moving computers into the realm of "intelligent" communication devices (Mallery 1988, 1994a)

3.5 Impact on Transaction Costs

Daft and Lengel (1984: 194) have found that "organizational success is based on the

organization's ability to process information of appropriate richness to reduce uncertainty and

clarify ambiguity." CMC takes advantage of the "telecommunications expansion [which] makes

it rational for economic agents to acquire additional intelligence that is pertinent to their

decisions "(Leff 1984:258). CMC's speed and cost advantage, asynchronicity, many-to-many

communication, and capacity for automation reduce communication, coordination, and

information costs for groups and organizations.

The impact of CMC on transaction costs can be represented in the following graph. Using one-

to-one and one-to-many media, organizational communication has a high fixed cost and

increases at an increasing rate. Using CMC, fixed costs are reduced and the rate of increase is

also reduced. Speed, cost, automation, and asynchronicity reduce the fixed costs. Many-to-many

communication reduces the rate of increase. To see this, compare the coordination of 100 people

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and 10 people with phone calls or an electronic mailing list. To have 10 people each talk to each

other once by phone takes 45 calls (10!/2!8!). To have 100 people talk to each takes 4950 calls

(100!/2!98!). A 10-fold increase in group size requires a 110-fold increase in the number of

communications. Communication costs therefore increase exponentially with one-to-one media.

With a many-to-many medium costs increase linearly. Assume that the group has a electronic

mailing list. For 10 people to each send a message to the other members of the group requires

sending 10 messages to the mailing list. A group of 100 people requires 100 messages. A 10-fold

increase in group size requires a 10-fold increase in the number of messages. Furthermore, each

message with CMC is less expensive than with a telephone call.

Terry Grunwald (1994) of the North Carolina Client and Community Development Center and

Philippa Gamse of the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse have suggested:

Electronic networking should be a perfect medium for nonprofits. It offers broad and timely

access to information; efficient tools for communication and dissemination; and increased

opportunities for collaboration.

The next section investigates the proposition that a reduction in communication, coordination,

and information costs facilitates collective action.

4. Do Transaction Costs Reduce Collective Action?

Groups face a number of challenges in the accomplishment of their collective goals. In the

beginning, unorganized interests must generate sufficient commitment and participation to form

a group. Once formed, the group must provide the appropriate mix of selective and collective

benefits to retain existing members and recruit new members. The efficiency with which the

group is able to provide these benefits is important because revenue must exceed costs or the

group will go bankrupt. This section examines the expected impact of a reduction in transaction

costs on each of the four components of collective action: group formation, group efficiency,

member recruitment, and member retention

4.1 Group Formation

Mancur Olson first applied the theory of transaction costs to collective action in The Logic of

Collective Action . Olson (1971:47-48) describes transaction costs as "the costs of

communication among group members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the costs of

creating, staffing, and maintaining any formal group organization." Transaction costs play a role

as one of "three separate but cumulative factors that keep larger groups from furthering their own

interests." The first two factors describe the free-rider problem:

First, the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of the total group benefit any person acting in

the group interest receives. ... Second ... the less the likelihood that any ... single individual will

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gain enough from getting the collective good to bear the burden of providing even a small

amount of it. (p. 48)

The third factor addresses transaction costs and has received far less attention than the free-rider

problem.

Olson argues that transaction costs prevent groups from forming. Unless they can meet the

minimum level of transaction costs necessary to obtain the desired collective good, unorganized

interests will not form into groups:

Third, the larger the number of members in the group the greater the organization costs, and thus

the higher the hurdle that must be jumped before any of the collective good at all can be

obtained. (p. 48)

CMC lowers organization costs at each group size, effectively "lowering the hurdle" and

allowing larger groups to form than would otherwise be able to overcome organization costs.

The capacity for many-to-many communication and the reduction in communication costs

enables CMC to lower organization costs at a given group size, facilitating group formation.

4.2 Group Efficiency

Olson considers transaction costs only in the context of group formation, but they also impact

group efficiency, the production of collective goods, and the ability to overcome the free-rider

problem. Improvement in group efficiency results from reductions in each of the three types of

organizational costs. Lower communication costs free up resources to be used in more

productive areas. Lower coordination costs improve the quality of the group's decisions, enabling

them to use their resources more effectively. Lower information costs improves the quality and

quantity of information, improving decision-making and reducing uncertainty.

Olson writes that groups face increasing cost functions with significant initial or fixed costs. ... In

short, cost (c) will be a function of the rate or level (T) at which the collective good is obtained

(C=f(T)), and the average cost curves will have the conventional U shape (p. 22).

An improvement in group efficiency reduces total costs at each level of collective good

provision, increasing the output of the collective good from Vn to Vc in the figure below:

….

There is evidence that organizational costs consume a significant amount of group resources. A

survey of interest groups by Schlozman and Tierney (198:143) found that 72% of Washington

representatives spend "a great deal" of time and resources on internal communications with

members or corporate headquarters. Among citizens' groups, 57% reported "a great deal" and

95% reported at least "some" time and resources. These figures suggest that a reduction in

organizational costs would allow groups to re-allocate time and resources to more productive

activities.

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4.3 Member Recruitment

To understand the effect of transaction costs on member recruitment, we must first look at why

people join interest groups. Three of the most commonly cited theories of group membership are

pluralist, Olsonian, and what will be called the integrated perspective. The pluralists believe that

citizens join interest groups out of their shared interest in a political outcome (see Truman 1951;

Bentley 1935; Latham 1952). "Disturbances" in society create shared grievances which naturally

motivate citizens to join groups. These groups become vehicles for citizens to express their

grievances and obtain political reform (Truman 1951, pp. 26-43).

Mancur Olson's work challenged the pluralist view by claiming that shared interests are

insufficient for rational individuals to join groups (Olson 1965). Olson assumed that individuals

are rational and only take actions for which the benefits outweigh the costs. Many political

outcomes are "public goods," benefiting both members and non-members. For large groups, a

single individual's participation is unlikely to alter the likelihood that a group achieves its

political goals. An individual is therefore just as likely to benefit from the group's activities by

participating as by not participating. Olson hypothesized that groups must offer selective

incentives to individuals to entice them into joining. The selective incentives are available only

to members, and their perceived value is the determining factor in individuals' decision to join

the group. Groups' political activities are merely "by-products" of the provision of these selective

benefits.

The integrated view adopts Olson's cost/benefit approach to group membership, but differs in its

explanation of why individuals join groups. Three types of benefits are available to group

members: material, solidary, and purposive (Clark and Wilson 1961) . Material benefits are

tangible and have a monetary value to the group member. Solidary benefits are interpersonal and

accrue from group-related interactions. Purposive benefits derive from the satisfaction of

contributing to groups' stated goals. Olson's selective benefits correspond to material benefits;

the pluralists' shared interests correspond to purposive benefits.

The integrated view proposes that individuals value solidary and purposive rewards in addition

to material benefits. Group leaders balance all three types of benefits to attract members and

maintain group cohesion (Salisbury 1969, Moe 1980, Walker 1991, King and Walker 1992). If

leaders believe that prospective members value opportunities to meet new people, they will

organize the group to provide for solidary benefits.

The integrated view also differs from Olson's theory in its assumptions about information. In

Olson's model, individuals have perfect information about the costs and benefits of membership.

In the integrated model, individuals do not have perfect information. Instead, they form beliefs

about the costs and benefits of alternative actions (Hansen 1985, 1991) from limited information

(Moe 1980) and update their beliefs over time (Rothenberg 1992).

Empirical research gives partial support to the pluralist model. As predicted by the pluralists,

social disturbances sometimes cause groups to form (Hansen 1985) and citizens do join groups

that fit their interests (Knoke 1988). However, groups do not always organize around shared

interests. Many interests remain unrepresented (Schlozman and Tierney 1986) and members

often disagree with the groups' political activities (Moe 1980, ch. 7). Evidence also suggests that

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material, not purposive, benefits are the primary motive for membership in economic groups

such as unions, farm groups, and trade associations.

Olson's model receives only partial support from the empirical literature. Studies indicate that

citizens base their membership decisions on solidary and purposive benefits in addition to

material benefits (Marsh 1976, Hansen 1985, Sabatier 1992, Rothenberg 1992). Knoke (1988)

finds that "in real associations, members display highly heterogeneous motives that respond to a

variety of organizational incentives with different kinds and amounts of involvement" (p. 327).

Walker (1991) and King and Walker (1992) find that the importance of benefit categories differs

according to group characteristics. Professional benefits dominate for occupational groups while

purposive benefits rank highest for citizen groups. Moe (1980) find that material benefits are

more important for economic groups than non-economic groups.

The empirical evidence contradicts Olson's assumption that citizens have perfect information

about their alternatives. Rothenberg (1992) finds that citizens join interest groups with little

knowledge of the costs and benefits of membership and update their knowledge over time.

In general, the empirical research supports the integrated view. Both material and purposive

benefits are important motivations for citizens to join groups. Solidary benefits, although valued,

are relatively less important in the membership decision. Selective incentives are most important

for economic and occupational groups, while purposive benefits are most important for non-

economic and citizen groups.

Given these findings as to why people join interest groups, how might a reduction in

organizational costs lead to an increase in group membership? First, there is an indirect effect

from the improvement in group formation and group efficiency. If group formation is improved,

there will be more groups available for membership. The fit between groups and members

should improve from this greater selection, improving the purposive benefits available to

members. If group efficiency is improved, groups will be able to produce more of the collective

good, increasing purposive benefits, and devote more resources to material items and social

opportunities, increasing selective and solidary benefits.

Reduced communication, coordination, and information costs should also have a direct effect on

membership benefits. Lower communication costs improve members' ability to learn about

social activities and to be a part of an online community, increasing the supply of solidary

benefits. Lower coordination costs make it easier for citizens to be involved in the group's

political activities, a solidary benefit. Rothenberg found that 3.8% of Common Cause's member

joined the group principally to participate in political action. King and Walker (1992) found that

citizen groups consider participation in public affairs to be the fourth most important benefit in

attracting members.

A decline in information costs enables the group to provide more information at the same cost,

increasing the selective benefits to prospective members. Rothenberg (1992:67) finds that 4.6%

of members in Common Cause reported political information as the principal reason for joining

the group. These numbers most likely underestimate the importance of selective information to

members since Rothenberg's survey asked only for the principal reason. Knoke's factor analysis

(1988) finds "information incentives," including publications, data services, and research, to be

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one of six factors important to the membership decision. Citizen groups consider publications to

be the second most important type of benefit in attracting members (King and Walker 1992).

Purposive benefits may also increase as members are more informed about group activities and

accomplishments.

4.4 Member Retention

Reduced organization costs should improve groups' ability to retain members once they have

joined. Moe (1980) has argued that people do not have complete information about the groups

they are considering joining. Instead, they form expectations about the benefits they will receive

and the costs they will incur as group members. Rothenberg (1992) finds that people "sample"

organizations they expect will fit their interests. Over time, they acquire more information and

learn about the organization. Members who discover a good fit between their own interests and

the organization's interests stay, those who do not leave.

A reduction in information costs should improve the quality and quantity of information about

groups available to prospective members. People will be more likely to find a group that fits their

interests and less likely to join a group that does not fit their interests. The result is a better fit

from the start of their membership and a reduced likelihood that they will drop out. Lower

organization costs may also draw members into the organization more fully. Rothenberg found

that solidary benefits and participation were important factors in the retention process. By

participating more actively in the organization, members may be less likely to leave.

5. Case Studies of Groups Using CMC

Our theoretical investigation predicts that CMC can facilitate collective political action by

reducing organizational transaction costs. In this section, we examine seven case studies of how

interests have used CMC to organize and engage in collective political action. The case studies

support the hypothesis and reveal additional insights into the relationship of communication

media to collective action.

5.1 Chinese Students: IFSCSS

Tiger Li (1990) has studied how Chinese students in the United States have used CMC to

communicate and engage in political action. Chinese students are organized into 160 local

campus organizations . Each local organization is a member of the Independent Federation of the

Chinese Students and Scholars (IFSCSS), established in July 1989 and headquartered in

Washington.

At the time of Li's study, 43,000 students from the P.R.C. used two forms of CMC to

communicate. The first, a newsgroup called Social Culture China (SCC), was started in

November 1987 on Usenet, a part of the Internet. Most Chinese students with a computer

mainframe account at a university had access to the newsgroup. Approximately 40 articles were

posted to the newsgroup per day, with an estimated 20,000 readers, making it one of the 20 most

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active of the 1500 groups on USENET at the time. The second form of CMC was electronic

mail, also available through university accounts.

In July 1989, the Chinese students began lobbying Congress to pass legislation protecting them

from reprisals by China. They first established a lobbying committee to coordinate activities by

Chinese students at over 160 colleges and universities. E-mail and the newsgroup were

instrumental in coordinating the lobbying effort. In the early stages, drafts of the proposed bills

and detailed analyses of the bills' merits were posted and debated on the newsgroup.

After the students reached a consensus in support of HR2712, they used CMC to orchestrate their

lobbying effort. On July 20 the lobbying committee was given four days to conduct a survey of

student opinions. Using email, they were able to distribute and collect the surveys in time for the

hearing. Electronic mail was also used to report on the progress of the bill and coordinate

lobbying efforts. The newsgroup regularly featured a list of representatives who were "good

prospects" for lobbying along with their phone numbers and addresses. The newsgroup was used

to direct a media campaign around the time of the final vote, which led to published editorials

and stories in all of the major newspapers and network news broadcasts.

Overall, CMC was used as an "organizational communication tool," a "public campaign tool", a

"public forum", and a "news distribution channel." Electronic mail and newsgroups were used to

coordinate leadership activities, organize demonstrations and symposium, report on activities of

Chinese consulate officers on college campuses, and provide a "comprehensive, timely, and

economical source of information about China" (135). Li concludes that

the CMC system has played a key role in the communication among the Chinese student

organizations in the U.S. Without such a network, the Chinese students who are widely dispersed

geographically could not have organized as a whole to engage successfully in the highly

coordinated democratic activities since June 1989 (p. 129).

Without CMC, communication and coordination costs would have been too expensive for the

students who had limited time and small budgets.

Li's analysis suggests that the reduction in transaction costs had a direct impact on group

formation, group efficiency, group recruitment, and group retention by the IFCSS. Without

CMC, the group would not have formed, would not have been as effective, would not have

grown, and would not have maintained its size and group cohesiveness. Regarding group

formation, Li writes that "the major impact the CMC system had on the Chinese students in the

U.S. is their transformation from a grouping to a nationally functional group" (133). Regarding

group efficiency, Li concludes that "the CMC system has provided the most efficient means for

the Chinese students to make group decisions" (133). Regarding group recruitment, Li notes that

CMC was instrumental in the decision by the individual campus organizations to join together as

a national IFCSS:

If it had not been for CMC, the Chinese students would never have been able to make such

decisions ... They could afford neither the money nor the time that would have been required for

making phone contacts with more than 100 organizations at one time (p. 128).

14

Finally, group retention was enhanced by the greater participation on the part of the Chinese

students resulting from the use of CMC.

5.2 Community Networking: PEN

The Public Electronic Network (PEN) was established in Santa Monica, California in 1989 as the

first interactive, public computer network in a U.S. city. PEN provides free CMC services for

Santa Monica residents, allowing them to send and receive electronic mail and participate in

public conferences on a variety of topics. Santa Monica created PEN to promote communication

among citizens and between citizens and their government.

Soon after the establishment of PEN on February 12, 1989, a group of citizens began talking

online about the problem of homelessness, the leading concern among Santa Monica residents

according to surveys at the time (Varley 1991:15). The discussions were notable for their

inclusion of some homeless people, who participated through public terminals at locations such

as city libraries. In July 1989, a group of 20 PEN users formed the PEN Action Group to work

on community projects and they chose homelessness as their first project.

In August 1989, Santa Monica artist Bruria Finkel made a proposal in the online discussion to

close a gap in the homeless services provided by the city. After much online discussion, the

group adopted the SHWASHLOCK proposal (for SHowers, WASHers, and LOCKers) and used

further online discussions and monthly meetings to coordinate a grassroots political campaign.

They eventually overcame neighborhood and City Council resistance, obtaining a $150,000 line

item in the budget and approval for converting an old bath house to a facility for the homeless.

Since SHWASHLOCK, the PEN Action Group has worked on a cooperative job bank for the

homeless and participation by Santa Monica schools in KIDS-91, an international effort to teach

schoolchildren about electronic communication (Wittig 1991).

A survey of the 62 PEN Action Group members found that CMC on the PEN system improved

communication, organization, and information. On average, respondants reported that PEN had a

"moderately positive " effect on "(1) information regarding local events, (2) ability to comment

and organize around local issues, (3) contact with and understanding of diverse others" (Wittig

and Schmitz, forthcoming). These responses suggest that CMC reduced communication,

organizational, and information costs.

The history of the PEN action group indicates that CMC facilitated group formation and group

recruitment, since the group did not exist before the online system and members were recruited

from members of the online community. Wittig and Schmitz (forthcoming) report that hundreds

of online users offered suggestions to the group members. The survey responses indicate that

organizational effectiveness and group efficiency were enhanced by CMC. Finally, group

retention appears to have been helped since the group remained active for most of the period

from 1989-1994. Members were able to find out about the group's activities at a low cost by

observing discussions, or "lurking," on the computer network before committing to being a

member.

15

5.3 Smoking Policy: SCARCNet

SCARCNet is a computer network run by the Smoking Control Access Research Center

(SCARC) at the Advocacy Institute in Washington D.C. As an "ongoing brainstorming session,"

SCARCNet has been used to link over 200 anti-smoking activists around the country.

SCARCNet includes electronic mail facilities, a news database with summaries of newspaper,

magazine, and trade journal articles, and a computer conference to facilitate discussion,

brainstorming, strategizing, and coordination (Osborn 1992). Use of the network is restricted to

anti-smoking activists approved by the Advocacy Institute. The privacy of the network promotes

focused discussion and hinders the tobacco industry from gaining hold of confidential plans and

information. Despite these efforts, the tobacco industry has attempted to break into the network

and has filed a lawsuit to force the Institute to reveal information the network.

A major achievement of SCARCNet was the fight against Philip Morris's Bill of Rights Tour

launched in the Summer of 1990. Philip Morris had planned a nationwide media campaign in

which representatives toured the country opposing attempts to restrict smokers' rights. The

Advocacy Institute developed a strategy to counter Phillip Morris's tour and used SCARCNet to

organize the media counter-campaign . They posted information about the tour schedule and

detailed plans for local activists to download and use in their local communities. As the tour

made its way around the country, activists used the network to coordinate their activities and

posted the lessons they learned from their efforts, enabling activists in other cities to made their

campaigns more effective. The counter-campaign was effective and Philip Morris canceled the

tour early (Osborn 1992).

SCARCNet appears to have promoted group formation at the local level because local activists

could communicate directly with each other instead of having messages routed through

Washington. The effect on group recruitment and group retention is unknown. Group efficiency

was significantly improved as a result of activists being able to coordinate their activities more

effectively. Their efforts increased the supply of the group's collective good -- lobbying against

smoking.

5.4 Online Government Access: Jim Warren

AB1624, signed into law on October 11, 1993, requires the California government to provide

"comprehensive online public access via the public nets to information about legislation-in-

process and to already-enacted state statutes, without charge by the state" (Warren 1993). Prior

to AB1624, private firms sold government information to the public at rates that excluded most

citizens. Government information was also sold back to agencies in the government, adding to

taxpayer expense.

The passage of AB1624 has been credited to the efforts of Jim Warren, a self-proclaimed

"citizen-volunteer-advocate of AB1624" with "no business interest therein." Warren used

electronic mail and an Internet mailing list to organize lobbying efforts by a committed group of

fellow activists. Using the mailing list, Warren sent out frequent reports with critical political

information: current status of the bill; legislative and political obstacles; names, addresses, phone

numbers, and fax numbers of important legislators; sample letters and phone scripts; and lessons

16

on grassroots lobbying techniques. CMC was used to mobilize and coordinate a network of

online activists, who then used traditional techniques of political action to mobilize and organize

a larger activist community. An aide to the author of AB1624 has stated that Warren's online

organization and mobilization of constituent contacting before key votes was crucial to the

passage of the bill (Detweiler 1993).

Jim Warren's accomplishment with AB1624 supports the theory that CMC can facilitate

collective action by reducing transaction costs. Group formation, group efficiency, and member

recruitment were all facilitated by the reduction in communication, coordination, and

information costs. The time and expense involved in personally contacting each of the members

on the mailing list would have been prohibitive. Furthermore, the speed with which Warren was

able to get news bulletins out to the group and get feedback from theme was critical to the

group's success. Regular feedback also helped to keep the group together, improving group

retention.

Jim Warren's experience with CMC points to the role of CMC in facilitating the activities of

political entrepreneurs. A number of scholars have cited the role of political entrepreneurs in

solving the collective action problem (Salisbury 1969, Frolich, et. al. 1971, Walker 1991.) As the

initiator and leader of the movement to pass AB1624, Jim Warren fits the criteria of a political

entrepreneur .

Moe (1980) describes the role of communication costs in the activities of the political

entrepreneur:

Communication becomes a cost. As with any other cost, [the political entrepreneur] has an

incentive to communicate as cheaply as possible and, hence, to use the most efficient means

available for obtaining and exchanging information with clients. ... Because he needs to know

certain things about members, then, as well as to transmit information to them, it is important

that the flow of information be two-way (pp. 39-40).

Moe distinguishes between direct contact and indirect contact between the entrepreneur and

group members. Direct contact, including mass media, direct mail, and personal contact, is useful

to

(a) acquaint [members] with the full array of [the entrepreneur's] services and to influence

member evaluations of the costs and benefits of both selective incentives and collective goods;

(b) to serve as a selective incentive, with information content taking on its own value for

members; and (c) to raise revenue from sources outside (and perhaps inside) the association (p.

43).

Indirect contact involves communication with middlemen who then retransmit the

communication to members and potential members. The advantage of indirect contact is that

"middlemen are in a better position to make personal appeals and to shape their arguments to the

specialized needs and perceptions of customers" (p. 44). Moe proposes that "a communications

network can be established in which communication flows are regularized between the

entrepreneur and each middleman and between each middleman and particular sets of members

and potential members" (p. 44).

17

Moe proposes that direct contact is superior for group maintenance, whereas indirect contact is

superior for group recruitment. Jim Warren's experience with AB1624 supports this theory.

Warren used an electronic network to keep a group of online activists engaged in the lobbying

effort by providing information as a selective incentive and influencing the evaluation of the

costs and benefits of participation. This direct contact was supplemented by indirect contact with

other activists. Members of the electronic network served as middlemen, mobilizing phone calls,

letters, faxes, and publicity campaigns from their own personal networks.

The importance of CMC can be seen in Warren's ability to maintain direct contact with the group

of online activists at a low cost and use them as middlemen for group recruitment. Moe writes,

It would be very difficult and highly costly, after all, were [a political entrepreneur] to try to

make direct personal contact with hundreds or even thousands of potential members, and his

problems increase if the clientele happens to be geographically dispersed or difficult to identify

(p. 40).

With CMC, a political entrepreneur has much lower communication costs, and geographic

dispersion is no longer a determining factor. Since passage of AB1624, Warren has continued to

write an electronic newsletter that is distributed to thousands of individuals with an interest in

making government information available electronically at no cost to the public.

Moe's theory of communication and political entrepreneurship adds an important perspective to

Jim Warren's entrepreneurial role in obtaining passage of AB1624. By reducing organization

costs, CMC can greatly expand the ability of an entrepreneur to maintain direct contact with

members and middlemen, lowering the hurdle for group formation, directly improving group

retention and group efficiency, and indirectly improving group recruitment.

5.5 Institute for Global Communications

The Institute for Global Communications (IGC) is a division of the non-profit Tides Foundation,

and a member of the Association for Progressive Communications (APC). Formed in 1987, the

APC is a coalition of computer networks around the world, linking over 25,000 activists in 130

countries. As an indicator of how rapidly the APC is growing, the number of members grew

from 16,000 to 25,000 between 1994 and 1995, and the number of countries represented grew

from 94 to 130. Approximately 15% of the members are organizations.

The purpose of the IGC Networks--PeaceNet, EcoNet, ConflictNet, and LaborNet--and APC

partner networks are to create a global computer communications system promoting

environmental preservation, peace, and human rights. Membership on the IGC network costs

$12.50 per month plus $3-$10 per hour online depending upon one's method of connecting to the

IGC. Anyone with a computer, modem, and basic communications software can connect and

become a member.

Through the IGC, members are able to send and receive electronic mail, participate in online

conferences, access online information services, distribute organizational information, and access

the Internet. The IGC networks include both individual and organizational members ranging

18

from large organizations such as Amnesty International and ABC News to small organizations

such as Zephyr High School and Z Magazine.

Amnesty International uses the public conferences on the IGC's PeaceNet network to announce

their Urgent Action Alerts. AI activists around the world are able to learn which political

prisoners are being detained, the facts of the situation, where to send their letter/telex/fax, and

what approach to take in their communication. PeaceNet users also have access to the Internet

newsgroup "soc.rights.human," a public computer conference on the topic of human rights and

activism for the Internet community.

In its promotional literature, the IGC places great emphasis on the ability of CMC to reduce

communication costs, enhance organizational coordination, and improve information search and

retrieval. An email pamphlet, available automatically from an IGC mailbot (igc-

info@igc.apc.org), declares that

New technologies are helping [environmental preservation, peace, and human rights] worldwide

communities cooperate more effectively and efficiently. ... Electronic mail is quick, inexpensive,

reliable, and easy to use. ... IGC's conferencing services offer easy-to-use tools in group

communication and event coordination. ... IGC's several hundred public conferences also include

events calendars, newsletters, legislative alerts, funding sources, press releases, action updates,

breaking stories, calls for support, as well as ongoing discussions on issues of global importance.

... [With ] Internet publishing, [you can] disseminate information to the vast Internet community

and create visibility for your organization by posting information on our publicly available

gopher, or making use of IGC auto-reply emailers, mailing lists, [World Wide Web] and

newsgroup services."

The success of the IGC network and the way in which the IGC markets itself indicates that the

reduction in organizational costs arising from CMC is improving the ability of groups to achieve

their goals. Further research is required to determine more accurately the impact of IGC on group

formation, group efficiency, group recruitment, and group retention. Electronic mail and

conferencing services seem to benefit group efficiency and group retention, while Internet

publishing seems to benefit group recruitment.

Like Jim Warren and political entrepreneurship, the IGC networks point to another theory as to

how organizations overcome the collective action problem--piggybacking. Russell Hardin (1982)

writes that "many formerly latent groups have been very resourceful at overcoming organization

costs by `piggybacking' their causes onto extant organizations." The IGC networks, and

computer networks as a whole, may be serving as "extant organizations" enabling latent groups

to overcome organization costs. In the case of the IGC, they are intentionally establishing

themselves as an organization on which group can piggyback themselves.

HandsNet is a similar `carrier' organization. HandsNet is a national, nonprofit computer network

supporting organizations working on human service and economic justice issues. Their 4000

members include research centers, direct service providers, legal service programs, public policy

advocates, local, state and federal government agencies, and grassroots organizations.

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5.6 White Supremacist and Neo-Nazi Movements

Resistance, Inc. is a media company based in Detroit, Michigan that produces records and video

documentaries, promotes bands and publications on its own Internet site, and publishes its own

magazine with a reported circulation of 13,000. What makes Resistance, Inc. distinctive is that

Resistance, Inc. is a white supremacist and anti-Semitic organization. Founded by George Burdi

a year ago, Resistance, Inc. has deployed "an array of modern communications technology

outside the mainstream media ... [and] awakened a once-moribund neo-Nazi skinhead movement

in the United States" (Schneider 1995).

The activities of Resistance, Inc. and other hate groups adds further evidence that the low

transaction costs of CMC have facilitated communication, coordination, and information

distribution among organized interests. Through the Internet and seven national computer

bulletin boards, white supremacists exchange news, information, messages, and broadcast

schedules, order racist books and magazines, and obtain addresses of other white supremacist

groups.

According to Don Black , a former Ku Klux Klan leader and operator of a white supremacy

computer bulletin board called Stormfront, electronic communication

has had a pretty profound effect on a movement whose resources are limited. ... Tens of millions

of people have access to our message if they wish. The access is anonymous and there is

unlimited ability to communicate with others of a like mind (Schneider 1995).

The Simon Wiesenthal Center estimates that at least 50 of the 250 hate groups in the U.S. are

online (Sandberg 1995), helping to push the number of "hard-core supporters" of the neo-Nazi

skinhead movement to 4,000 from 1,000 eight years ago (Schneider 1995).

CMC appears to have benefited group efficiency and group recruitment in the white supremacist

movement. Lower communication and information costs have helped because of the groups'

limited resources, and lower organization costs have helped because of the geographic dispersion

of supremacist supporters. Group retention appears to have benefited from greater participation

and better information. The effect on group formation is unknown, as we would need to know if

new groups have formed from online activity.

5.7 Information Infrastructure: TPR and CPSR

The Telecommunications Policy Roundtable - Northeast (TPR-NE) is a group of

communications professionals and representatives of nonprofit and public interest organizations

in the northeastern United States. The goals of TPR-NE are to involve the public in the

formulation of policies affecting the national information infrastructure through public

education, public debate, a "bill of electronic rights," and equal access to communication

technologies for nonprofits.

TPR-NE uses an electronic mailing list to organize and advertise their activities. Their primary

activity up to 1995 has been the production of public forums about telecommunications issues.

20

The leadership of TRP-NE uses an electronic mailing list of approximately four hundred people

to advertise their forums. Most of the attendees at the forums come from this mailing list.

Coralee Whitcomb, one of the organizers of TRP-NE, has said that electronic mail has been

critical for the group. They do not have the money to advertise the forums using traditional

means. In her opinion, the mailing list has given the group visibility, has helped it to define its

role, has established a regular constituency, and has enabled the group to distribute information

more effectively. Email helped the leadership create the group. Whitcomb has said that "the idea

for this group wouldn't have been thought through as well" without electronic communication.

Whitcomb also found that their electronic constituency is giving them legitimacy and clout as

they begin expanding into traditional avenues of fund-raising and membership recruitment (see

Walker 1992).

Whitcomb, who sits on the board of the nonprofit group Computer Professionals for Social

Responsibility (CPSR), used an example from CPSR to demonstrate the capacity of CMC to

facilitate collective decision-making. In June of 1993, CPSR decided to create a vision statement

with input from its members. First, the four leaders of CPSR drafted a proposal. They then sent

the proposal to the thirteen directors by electronic mail. After the directors reached a consensus,

the proposal was sent to the twenty local chapters who solicited input by electronic mail or a

chapter meeting. The proposals were emailed back to the president who pulled the suggestions

together into a final form. The statement was then ratified at the annual meeting in October.

Whitcomb believes that electronic communication was instrumental in completing the process in

only five months while still allowing members to contribute their ideas and opinions.

5.8 Analysis

Taken collectively, the case studies suggest that CMC facilitates collective action for

unorganized interests by reducing organizational costs involving communication, coordination,

and information. Political entrepreneurs and organized interests can improve group formation,

group efficiency, member recruitment, and member retention by using CMC.

These case studies also suggest that some groups will benefit more from CMC use than others.

As implied by the theory, CMC should benefit groups with the greatest sensitivity to

communication, coordination, and information costs. Group characteristics include (1) broad

geographic distribution of members, (2) large volume of intra-organizational communication, (3)

high value placed on information as a selective benefit, and (4) poor access to mainstream media.

The groups in the case studies show evidence of these characteristics. Chinese students, activists

in the environmental movement and the peace movement (EcoNet and PeaceNet), and white

supremacists are all geographically dispersed. As Sproull and Kiesler have observed (1991:71),

"computer mediated communication technology has the most leverage when people are separated

across time and space." Intra-organizational communication was particularly important to anti-

smoking activists in SCARC and to activists in Jim Warren's network to gain online

governmental information. Members of the Telecommunications Policy Roundtable and

Amnesty International placed a high value on timely political information to ensure rapid

response. White supremacists and members of the PEN Action Group had poor access to

mainstream media for ideological and financial reasons, respectively.

21

6. Costs of CMC

Thus far, our analysis has focused on three types of transaction costs: communication,

coordination, and information. CMC reduces these types of transaction costs, facilitating

collective action. But CMC also introduces new types of transaction costs, and a full

understanding of the effect of CMC on collective action must incorporate the costs of CMC as

well as the benefits. This section addresses two of the most important costs: network access and

cognitive complexity.

6.1 Network Access

Although CMC reduces some transaction costs, it also introduces new costs arising from the use

of computers and networks. To use CMC, individuals and organizations must have computers,

must know how to use them, and must pay the network connection charges. Network access

costs are an inhibiting factor in the use of CMC. Groups in the best position to take advantage of

CMC will be those with the lowest CMC access costs, i.e, those who (1) have access to

computers, (2) have computer skills, and (3) have access to computer networks.

The case studies support this hypothesis. The group with the highest computer literacy and

lowest network costs are university students and computer programmers. University students

typically are computer literate and have free or low-cost computer accounts on networks with a

high bandwidth (i.e. fast transmission speeds). The University Conversion Project, the Chinese

students, and a substantial portion of the IGC membership are university based. The founder of

the University Conversion Project went to MIT as an undergraduate. Computer programmers and

individuals who make a living in the computer industry are even more computer literate and

either have network connections through their work or have the skills to set up a low-cost system

on their own. Jim Warren, the political entrepreneur behind AB1624, has been a professional

computer consultant for much of his life. The founders of the Telecommunications Policy

Roundtable are affiliated with universities, and members of the Computer Professionals for

Social Responsibility have professional expertise with computers.

Because some individuals experience lower transaction costs in using wide-area computer

networks, CMC users do not represent the general population. Internet users, for example, are

younger and more educated than the general population and are predominantly male. Electronic

mail surveys of Internet users with a political interest found that users are 80% male, 80% white,

and have a median age of 31 years (Margolis, et. al. 1994; see also Hurwitz and Mallery 1995).

World Wide Web users, who require a more sophisticated and expensive network connection,

have a stronger gender, education, and income bias and are more likely to be students (GVU

User Survey 1995, Pitkow 1994). In addition to the cost factor, there are also differences in how

much people value CMC use. Younger men typically have a higher interest in technology,

increasing the perceived benefit of CMC use and reducing the net cost.

The adoption of CMC by political interests creates two important dynamics. On the one hand,

CMC reduces some transaction costs, helping unorganized, latent interests organize and grow.

22

The effect of this dynamic is to offset the existing bias in the political system towards

institutional interests (see Salisbury 1984, Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Chapter 4). On the other

hand, high transaction costs surrounding access to computer networks introduce a new source of

bias within the domain of citizen groups (see Walker 1991). Groups with an interest in

technology and computers and low-cost access to computer networks have an advantage over

those that do not.

The bias introduced by CMC exacerbates existing distortions in the political system. Citizens

with a higher socio-economic status are already overrepresented in the political process

compared to those with less education and fewer economic resources (Verba, et. al., 1993b). In

fact, inequalities in political resources dominate attitudes and beliefs as a predictor of political

participation (Verba, et. al., 1993a). In most cases, computer literacy and network access requires

a high level of education and economic resources. CMC appears to help groups overcome the

barriers to collective action more than it helps individuals overcome the barriers to political

participation.

6.2 Information Processing

Another characteristic of CMC that offsets its potential benefits is the need to process the

unprecedented amounts of information now available as a result of the digital revolution. The

process of assimilating and representing information can be thought of as having a cognitive cost

to the information user. Individuals must spend time, energy, and mental effort on sorting,

filtering, interpreting, and utilizing information (see Sproull and Kiesler 1993, p. 115 and Hiltz

and Turoff 1993). As the quantity and complexity of the information increases and as the quality

decreases, individuals must think harder, incurring a greater cognitive cost.

The ease of transmitting and retrieving information with CMC puts people at the risk of

drowning in a deluge of digital data. Newt Gingrich, for example, received almost 13,000 e-mail

messages in the first six weeks of the 104th

Congress. Internet users frequently speak of their first

forays onto the net when they subscribe to a few interesting and popular discussion lists, only to

find their electronic mailboxes filled with hundreds of messages. Complaints about the difficulty

of navigating the vast sea of information available through the net are common.

The sources of this information overload are the four properties discussed in section 3. The

higher speed and lower cost of transmission enable individuals to retrieve a large amount of

information in a short amount of time. Since processing time greatly exceeds retrieval time,

individuals end up with lots of information and not enough time to process it. Asychronicity

exacerbates the problem because information can be easily stored for future processing, creating

an inventory of information to be processed.

The many-to-many nature of CMC, combined with automated broadcasting, makes sending

information easier than processing information. As we saw in section 3.5, sending a message to

everybody in a 100 person group using a one-to-one medium requires sending 4950 messages.

Sending a message to everybody using a many-to-many medium such as an e-mail mailing list

requires only 100 messages. In other words, sending costs increase linearly in a many-to-many

medium. The problem is that receiving costs increase exponentially. Although only 100

messages need to be sent using the mailing list (because the computer rebroadcasts the message),

23

the group will still have a total of 4950 messages to read. This dynamic in which sending costs

increase linearly while receiving costs increase exponentially is a recipe for information

overload. Considering that only a fraction of the world's population is on the Internet, that the net

is growing at an exponential rate, and that all parts of the net are available to all other parts,

information load will continue to increase, furthering our "information anxiety" (Wurman 1989).

7. Conclusion

Computer-mediated communication offers geographically dispersed groups with a need for intra-

organizational communication and information exchange an important alternative to more costly

personal and broadcast media. CMC reduces communication, coordination, and information

costs, facilitating collective action by making it easier for groups to form, improving group's

efficiency at providing collective goods, increasing the benefits from group membership, and

promoting group retention through more informed decision-making. Offsetting these benefits are

costs of network access and cognitive complexity, which bias the representativeness of CMC

users in the political process and contribute to information overload.

Utilizing the best features of CMC involves reducing all transaction costs associated with CMC

use: communication, coordination, information, access, and cognition. Communication costs can

be reduced by increasing the bandwidth that carries digital information between users.

Coordination costs can be reduced by improving "groupware," the type of software that allows

for collaboration and group decision-making (Malone, et. al. 1987). In general, we need to take

better advantage of the many-to-many nature of CMC and incorporate synchronous

communication more effectively. Information costs can be reduced through faster hardware,

natural language interfaces for information retrieval, and automation of information analysis

tasks. Applications of these ideas include network-based video-conferencing with real-time

polling and databases derived from group communications that represent a group's collective

knowledge and are accessible using natural language queries.

Access costs can be reduced through social policies that support equal opportunity in computer

skills and network access. The community networking movement (Schuler 1994) is an important

step in the direction of equalizing the bias that favors white, male, educated, affluent, and

technically skilled citizens. The PEN system and its mobilized network of professionals, artists,

homeless people, and homemakers serves as a model for what can occur when access costs are

kept at an affordable level. Along with equal access and community networking comes an

opportunity to create virtual communities (Rheingold 1993) and to foster physical communities

(Oldenberg 1989), helping to rebuild social capital (Putnam 1993a,b).

Cognitive costs can be reduced by designing CMC media to complement the ways in which

humans process information. Some media are better at presenting certain information than

others. Tape recordings are as poorly suited to conveying a beautiful sunset as film is for making

U.S. census data available. Choosing the right media and the right combinations of media can

improve information retrieval and assimilation. Learning, for example, has been found to

improve by combining text, sound, and action.

24

The design of a medium also makes a difference. Within the medium of the printed page, serif

fonts serve to move the reader's eyes along, increasing reading speed.

Sans serif fonts slow the eye down, increasing comprehension.

There are also ways of organizing information to improve its usability. Chapters, tables of

content, headers, and indices are all technologies that reduce the cognitive costs associated with

reading a book. Software agents can provide analagous functions for CMC, helping to orient and

direct the user towards useful information.

Semantic links in distributed hypermedia provide a structured dialogue that allow a large group

to deliberate and debate complex subjects. The Electronic Open Meeting of the National

Performance Review utilized this approach with great success. By combining text and graphics

and incorporating knowledge representation into the structure of the application itself (Alker

1975, 1988), the technology used in the Electronic Open Meeting took advantage of the

schematic organization of information in the brain (Bonchek 1995). A LISTSERV discussion,

the primary alternativc technology, is poorly suited to the information-processing abilities of the

brain.

Further research integrating media studies, artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, political

science, and microeconomics will lead to principles of content and media design, minimizing

cognitive burden and taking full advantage of the opportunities now made possible by the digital

revolution.

8. Bibliography

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Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics. New York:

Basic Books.

Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz. 1972. "Production, Information Costs, and Economic

Organization." American Economic Review. 62:777-795.

Alker, Hayward R., Jr. 1975. "Polimetrics: Its Descriptive Foundations." In Handbook of

Political Science, Vol. 7. F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds. Reading, MA: Addison, Wesley. Pp.

139-210.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks are due to John Mallery, Roger Hurwitz, Benjamin Renaud, Jim Alt, David King, Sidney

Verba, and Ken Shepsle for their ideas and inspiration. Early stages of this research were

supported under a grant from the National Science Foundation. Current research is being

conducted at the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

whose research is supported in part by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the

Department of Defense under contract number MDA972 - 93 - 1 - 003N7.