Granville - Reactions to the Events of 1956 New Findings From the Budapest and Warsaw Archives

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Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives Author(s): Johanna Granville Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 261-290Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180658Accessed: 21-08-2014 12:11 UTC

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Journal of Contemporary History Copyright ? 2003 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 38(2), 261-290.

[0022-0094(200304)38:2;261 -290;032133]

Johanna Granville

Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives

Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle once exclaimed, 'Alas for our chains or chainlets of causes and effects, which we so assiduously track through certain handsbreadths of years and square miles, when the whole is a broad, deep Immensity, and each atom is chained and completed with all!' By this Carlyle meant that, because of the essential unity of nature, an understanding of any particular event necessitates an understanding of the total context.1 Before the opening of communist bloc archives in the early 1990s, scholars habitually analysed the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 from the Soviet viewpoint, focusing almost exclusively on one satellite country and its subordinate relationship with the Soviet Union, much like an astronomer studies the sun as the focal point and the planets as celestial bodies merely orbiting it. This has been a useful approach, for example, in grasping the significance for the Soviet Union of the events in Poland and Hungary. Among other things, the revolts forced a Soviet re-evaluation of the reliability and role of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in its alliance system. The Stalinist policy of heavy political indoctrination and enforced Sovietization could no longer be relied upon to keep national armies as reliable instruments of the Soviet Union.

However, one can develop a deeper understanding of the total context by focusing more on the 'satellite' states themselves. While Soviet influence on the satellites always loomed large, especially in the 1950s, these satellites were also heavily influenced by their 'fraternal socialist' neighbours and Yugoslavia. Archival documents reveal, for example, the extraordinary influence the Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps had in disseminating the news of the events of 1956 to all the satellite states, with a perspective radically different from that of the USSR. Moreover, events in Poland such as the Swiatlo revela- tions, the Poznan revolt, and Polish 'October' sparked reactions in Hungary, and those reactions of the Hungarians then influenced the Polish leadership

Research for this article was supported in part by a Fulbright fellowship, as well as long- and short-term grants from the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, East European Studies Division, Washington DC. I should like to thank the following for their help: Raymond Garthoff, Adam Bromke, Janos Tischler, Hugh Ragsdale, Edward Wynot, Gyorgy Gomori, Andrew Felkay, Vyacheslav Sereda, Anna Konieczna and Victor Hugo Lane.

Journal of Contemporary History Copyright ? 2003 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 38(2), 261-290.

[0022-0094(200304)38:2;261 -290;032133]

Johanna Granville

Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives

Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle once exclaimed, 'Alas for our chains or chainlets of causes and effects, which we so assiduously track through certain handsbreadths of years and square miles, when the whole is a broad, deep Immensity, and each atom is chained and completed with all!' By this Carlyle meant that, because of the essential unity of nature, an understanding of any particular event necessitates an understanding of the total context.1 Before the opening of communist bloc archives in the early 1990s, scholars habitually analysed the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 from the Soviet viewpoint, focusing almost exclusively on one satellite country and its subordinate relationship with the Soviet Union, much like an astronomer studies the sun as the focal point and the planets as celestial bodies merely orbiting it. This has been a useful approach, for example, in grasping the significance for the Soviet Union of the events in Poland and Hungary. Among other things, the revolts forced a Soviet re-evaluation of the reliability and role of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in its alliance system. The Stalinist policy of heavy political indoctrination and enforced Sovietization could no longer be relied upon to keep national armies as reliable instruments of the Soviet Union.

However, one can develop a deeper understanding of the total context by focusing more on the 'satellite' states themselves. While Soviet influence on the satellites always loomed large, especially in the 1950s, these satellites were also heavily influenced by their 'fraternal socialist' neighbours and Yugoslavia. Archival documents reveal, for example, the extraordinary influence the Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps had in disseminating the news of the events of 1956 to all the satellite states, with a perspective radically different from that of the USSR. Moreover, events in Poland such as the Swiatlo revela- tions, the Poznan revolt, and Polish 'October' sparked reactions in Hungary, and those reactions of the Hungarians then influenced the Polish leadership

Research for this article was supported in part by a Fulbright fellowship, as well as long- and short-term grants from the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, East European Studies Division, Washington DC. I should like to thank the following for their help: Raymond Garthoff, Adam Bromke, Janos Tischler, Hugh Ragsdale, Edward Wynot, Gyorgy Gomori, Andrew Felkay, Vyacheslav Sereda, Anna Konieczna and Victor Hugo Lane.

1 Quoted in J.R. Hale (ed.), The Evolution of British Historiography (London 1967), 42. 1 Quoted in J.R. Hale (ed.), The Evolution of British Historiography (London 1967), 42.



Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2

and population.2 Ironically, without the initial Polish defiance of the Kremlin leaders on 19-20 October, the student demonstration of 23 October in Budapest might not have taken place. Likewise, had the Soviet leaders not decided to intervene in Hungary, they might very well have intervened in Poland instead.

The purpose of this article, then, is to investigate the Polish reactions to the Hungarian events and the Hungarian reactions to the Polish events, drawing on documents from archives in Budapest and Warsaw.3 Surprisingly, the Polish response to the Hungarian events appears to have been more profound and complex than the Hungarian response to the Polish events. While the Polish journalists, diplomats and masses empathized with the Hungarians, Wtadystaw Gomulka himself performed a shrewd balancing act. By contrast, once the crisis in Hungary was under way, the Hungarian leaders rarely mentioned Poland, judging from the minutes of key party meetings. They apparently had no time to follow Polish events.

2 J6zef Swiatio, a lieutenant-colonel in the Tenth Department of the Polish State Security Ministry (Urzad Bezpieczefistwa or UB) from 1949 to 1953, defected to the West in December 1953. He thoroughly exposed his secret police colleagues using the media of the RFE and BBC. The resulting public fall-out helped to bring about Gomulka's release from prison late in 1954. 3 Few studies have looked closely at Polish-Hungarian relations during 1956, drawing on

recently declassified archival documents. In the older literature, most scholars emphasize to vary- ing degrees the Polish influence on the Hungarian revolution but overlook the Hungarian influence on Polish events. In addition, many writers seem to imply that Poland responded to the

Hungarian events as a united mass. Jainos Tischler of the Institute for the Study of the 1956

Revolution in Budapest is the best-known scholar in this area of research. See, for example, Janos Tischler, 'Lengyel szemmel 1956-r6ol', Multunk, vol. 2-3 (1992), 277-8. For a useful, though limited, documentary collection see Tischler (ed.), Dokumenty do Dziejow PRL: Rewolucja wegierska 1956 w polskikh dokumentach (Warszawa 1995). This article will cite additional documents not included in that collection. For a broader overview of new archival findings about

Soviet decision-making during the Polish and Hungarian events, see Mark Kramer, 'The Soviet

Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings', Journal of Contemporary History, 3, 2 (April 1998), 163-214. Older works (written before 1990) tend to

mention the Polish influence (namely the Poznaf revolt) but overlook Hungarian influence on

Poland. For example, see Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Hungary 1956, Revisited (London 1983), 9; Tibor Meray, trans. Howard L. Katzander, Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin (New York 1959), 52; Jiri Valenta, 'Soviet Decision-Making and the Hungarian Revolution' in Bela

Kiraly, Barbara Lotze and Nandor F. Dreisziger (eds), The First War Between Socialist States: The

Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Impact (New York 1984), 266; Michael G. Fry and

Condoleeza Rice, 'The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Decision', Studies in Comparative Communism, XVI, 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer 1983), 87; Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary

(Stanford, CA 1979), 293; Jorg K. Hoensch, A History of Modern Hungary, 1867-1986 (London

1988), 215; and Gyorgy Litvan (ed.), trans. Janos M. Bak and Lyman H. Legters, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963 (London 1996), 51. Adam

Bromke wrote a perceptive article on the Polish reactions to the Hungarian revolt without access

to archival sources. He refers to 'Poland's response', however, as if the entire population

responded in the same manner. See Adam Bromke, 'Poland' in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jones (ed.), The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect (Boulder, CO 1978), 87-93.

and population.2 Ironically, without the initial Polish defiance of the Kremlin leaders on 19-20 October, the student demonstration of 23 October in Budapest might not have taken place. Likewise, had the Soviet leaders not decided to intervene in Hungary, they might very well have intervened in Poland instead.

The purpose of this article, then, is to investigate the Polish reactions to the Hungarian events and the Hungarian reactions to the Polish events, drawing on documents from archives in Budapest and Warsaw.3 Surprisingly, the Polish response to the Hungarian events appears to have been more profound and complex than the Hungarian response to the Polish events. While the Polish journalists, diplomats and masses empathized with the Hungarians, Wtadystaw Gomulka himself performed a shrewd balancing act. By contrast, once the crisis in Hungary was under way, the Hungarian leaders rarely mentioned Poland, judging from the minutes of key party meetings. They apparently had no time to follow Polish events.

2 J6zef Swiatio, a lieutenant-colonel in the Tenth Department of the Polish State Security Ministry (Urzad Bezpieczefistwa or UB) from 1949 to 1953, defected to the West in December 1953. He thoroughly exposed his secret police colleagues using the media of the RFE and BBC. The resulting public fall-out helped to bring about Gomulka's release from prison late in 1954. 3 Few studies have looked closely at Polish-Hungarian relations during 1956, drawing on

recently declassified archival documents. In the older literature, most scholars emphasize to vary- ing degrees the Polish influence on the Hungarian revolution but overlook the Hungarian influence on Polish events. In addition, many writers seem to imply that Poland responded to the

Hungarian events as a united mass. Jainos Tischler of the Institute for the Study of the 1956

Revolution in Budapest is the best-known scholar in this area of research. See, for example, Janos Tischler, 'Lengyel szemmel 1956-r6ol', Multunk, vol. 2-3 (1992), 277-8. For a useful, though limited, documentary collection see Tischler (ed.), Dokumenty do Dziejow PRL: Rewolucja wegierska 1956 w polskikh dokumentach (Warszawa 1995). This article will cite additional documents not included in that collection. For a broader overview of new archival findings about

Soviet decision-making during the Polish and Hungarian events, see Mark Kramer, 'The Soviet

Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings', Journal of Contemporary History, 3, 2 (April 1998), 163-214. Older works (written before 1990) tend to

mention the Polish influence (namely the Poznaf revolt) but overlook Hungarian influence on

Poland. For example, see Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Hungary 1956, Revisited (London 1983), 9; Tibor Meray, trans. Howard L. Katzander, Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin (New York 1959), 52; Jiri Valenta, 'Soviet Decision-Making and the Hungarian Revolution' in Bela

Kiraly, Barbara Lotze and Nandor F. Dreisziger (eds), The First War Between Socialist States: The

Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Impact (New York 1984), 266; Michael G. Fry and

Condoleeza Rice, 'The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Decision', Studies in Comparative Communism, XVI, 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer 1983), 87; Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary

(Stanford, CA 1979), 293; Jorg K. Hoensch, A History of Modern Hungary, 1867-1986 (London

1988), 215; and Gyorgy Litvan (ed.), trans. Janos M. Bak and Lyman H. Legters, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963 (London 1996), 51. Adam

Bromke wrote a perceptive article on the Polish reactions to the Hungarian revolt without access

to archival sources. He refers to 'Poland's response', however, as if the entire population

responded in the same manner. See Adam Bromke, 'Poland' in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jones (ed.), The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect (Boulder, CO 1978), 87-93.

262 262



Granville: Reactions to the Events of 1956 Granville: Reactions to the Events of 1956

Before examining the reactions themselves, I shall review the chronology of events in Poland and Hungary, incorporating some of the new archival findings.

In February 1956, the Polish and Hungarian communist parties took their cues from Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' denouncing Stalin's crimes and 'cult of personality'. Purge victims were rehabilitated. Communist writers who had supported the Stalinist regime now heard the grisly details of the prisoners' experiences and became demoralized. The question of responsibility surfaced and led to sharp intra-party debates. Just two weeks after Khrushchev delivered his Secret Speech on 25 February, the Polish communist Edward Ochab replaced Boleslaw Bierut, who had died suddenly during the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow on 12 March 1956. In Poland, as in the other 'satellite' countries, a rift existed between the so-called Stalinist 'Muscovites' (communist leaders who stayed in the USSR during the second world war) and the 'home communists' (those who had languished in Stalinist prisons at home). In Poland, however, the Muscovites (e.g. Bolestaw Bierut, Hilary Minc, Jakub Berman, Edward Ochab and others) never quite established dominance in the Polish communist party in the early postwar years. Wladislaw Gomulka and the indigenous communist underground had had too much authority. While Ochab had spent the years of the second world war in the Soviet Union and developed strong loyalty to Moscow, he was nevertheless a middle-of-the- roader ('the Polish Hamlet'), who eventually relinquished power peacefully to Gomulka. He admitted that Gomulka should not have been arrested as a 'rightist deviationist' and - after the Poznan revolt - agreed to nominate him and his closest political allies (e.g. Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski and others) for Politburo membership at the Eighth Plenum of the Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR), which was set to take place on 17 October 1956.4

Demands for Gomulka's readmittance to a top leadership position increased after the Poznani revolt, which was caused mainly by acute economic distress. Polish archives are full of top-secret, unpublished letters sent to the CC PZPR, illustrating the workers' dismay over their declining standard of living. For example, one worker named Jozef Juszczyk complained in a letter to the CC PZPR:

About 40 people left the shop today without bread, butter and meat. Why is it so? Why do people complain? They are right. They bring potatoes, but after an hour they are gone. No one feels responsible for the supplies. Maybe it is not important, but after a while it becomes important for a person and then unhappiness arises.5

4 It was later moved to 19 October. (Soon after his election in April 1956 as the new party secretary, Ochab had initially reiterated charges of 'nationalist deviation' against Gomulka, but he later changed his views.) 5 AAN (Warsaw) 'Polska Zjedoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny, Biuro List6w i Inspekcji', Biuletyn #32/143, Warszawa, 7.VII.1956, s. 24. In Polish: Dzis, wlasnie okolo 40 os6b odeszlo ze sklepu z gorzkimi slowami, brak chleba, masta, miesa. Dlaczego tak jest, dlaczego ludzie przeklinaja? Przeciez majg racje . . . Brak poczucia odpowiedzialnsci za ten odcienk

Before examining the reactions themselves, I shall review the chronology of events in Poland and Hungary, incorporating some of the new archival findings.

In February 1956, the Polish and Hungarian communist parties took their cues from Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' denouncing Stalin's crimes and 'cult of personality'. Purge victims were rehabilitated. Communist writers who had supported the Stalinist regime now heard the grisly details of the prisoners' experiences and became demoralized. The question of responsibility surfaced and led to sharp intra-party debates. Just two weeks after Khrushchev delivered his Secret Speech on 25 February, the Polish communist Edward Ochab replaced Boleslaw Bierut, who had died suddenly during the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow on 12 March 1956. In Poland, as in the other 'satellite' countries, a rift existed between the so-called Stalinist 'Muscovites' (communist leaders who stayed in the USSR during the second world war) and the 'home communists' (those who had languished in Stalinist prisons at home). In Poland, however, the Muscovites (e.g. Bolestaw Bierut, Hilary Minc, Jakub Berman, Edward Ochab and others) never quite established dominance in the Polish communist party in the early postwar years. Wladislaw Gomulka and the indigenous communist underground had had too much authority. While Ochab had spent the years of the second world war in the Soviet Union and developed strong loyalty to Moscow, he was nevertheless a middle-of-the- roader ('the Polish Hamlet'), who eventually relinquished power peacefully to Gomulka. He admitted that Gomulka should not have been arrested as a 'rightist deviationist' and - after the Poznan revolt - agreed to nominate him and his closest political allies (e.g. Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski and others) for Politburo membership at the Eighth Plenum of the Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR), which was set to take place on 17 October 1956.4

Demands for Gomulka's readmittance to a top leadership position increased after the Poznani revolt, which was caused mainly by acute economic distress. Polish archives are full of top-secret, unpublished letters sent to the CC PZPR, illustrating the workers' dismay over their declining standard of living. For example, one worker named Jozef Juszczyk complained in a letter to the CC PZPR:

About 40 people left the shop today without bread, butter and meat. Why is it so? Why do people complain? They are right. They bring potatoes, but after an hour they are gone. No one feels responsible for the supplies. Maybe it is not important, but after a while it becomes important for a person and then unhappiness arises.5

4 It was later moved to 19 October. (Soon after his election in April 1956 as the new party secretary, Ochab had initially reiterated charges of 'nationalist deviation' against Gomulka, but he later changed his views.) 5 AAN (Warsaw) 'Polska Zjedoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny, Biuro List6w i Inspekcji', Biuletyn #32/143, Warszawa, 7.VII.1956, s. 24. In Polish: Dzis, wlasnie okolo 40 os6b odeszlo ze sklepu z gorzkimi slowami, brak chleba, masta, miesa. Dlaczego tak jest, dlaczego ludzie przeklinaja? Przeciez majg racje . . . Brak poczucia odpowiedzialnsci za ten odcienk

263 263




On Saturday, 23 June, workers of the Poznan Stalin Works (Zaklady Imieniem Stalina, Poznafi, or ZISPO) locomotive plant in Poznafi (Poland's fourth-largest city) met and decided to send a delegation to Warsaw to persuade the central authorities to meet five key demands, including a 20 per cent wage increase. By 28 June the delegation had still not received an answer from the authorities about the wage increase, and rumours were also spreading that this delegation had been arrested.6 Thus, early that Thursday morning (later known as 'Black Thursday'), the night and day shifts of ZISPO (which employed a total of 12,000 workers) decided to stage a demonstration. The workers apparently wanted to capitalize on the fact that many western reporters were present in Poznani to cover the Twenty-Fifth International Fair that had opened on 17 June.

Assuming that the original ZISPO delegation had been arrested, the crowd first attacked the city jail, freed the prisoners, and seized weapons from the

guards. (According to Edward Gierek, then a PZPR Politburo member in charge of heavy industry and transport, the demonstrators 'armed themselves with monkey wrenches, sticks, crowbars, and sometimes even with pistols'.)7 Then the workers attacked the radio station engaged in jamming western broadcasts. Still looking for allegedly arrested delegates, the demonstrators next attacked the building of the District Office of Security (Wojewodzki Urzad Bezpieczenistwa). This was where the first shots were fired at about eleven o'clock.8 The demonstration escalated into large anti-government riots in Poznani and other Polish cities. At least 60 people died in the crackdown, according to recent scholarship.9

Some controversy surrounds the number of deaths in the Poznafn rebellion. In another study published in 1981, the number of deaths is given as 73. 10

According to the original Polish Press Agency's report on 30 June 1956, 38

people were killed and 270 injured.11 Later, on 17 July 1956, Marian Rybicki

pracy. To sa, soprawy tak malo wazne ale jak doniosle dla czlowieka i mifdzay innymi rodza niezadowolenie.

6 The minor demands relating to bonuses and repayment of taxes, however, had been met. On the rumours about the arrest, see PZPR 237/V/237, 'Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny Sekretariat - Narada poswi~cona omowieniu wypadk6w poznafiskich', 7.

VII.56, s .9. 7 PZPR (Warsaw) 237/V/237, 'Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny Sekretariat - Narada poswiecona omowieniu wypadk6w poznafiskich', 7. VII.56, s. 7. Gierek

eventually succeeded Gomulka as First Secretary in 1970. He resigned from this post in 1980 after the Gdafisk accords were signed (August 1980). 8 Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacia Zbuntowanego Miasta. Wojko Polskie w Czerwcu 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych (Warszawa 1992), 22; Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution [ofi 1956 (New York 1957), 49-52. 9 See Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz (eds), Poznanski Czerwiez (Poznani 1981). 10 See Aleksander Ziemkowski, Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (1981, 2nd edn). Cited also in

Nalepa, op. cit., 55. 11 See 'The Events in Poznafi', Borba [Yugoslav newspaper], 1 July 1956, cited in Paul Zinner

(ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York 1956), 139.

On Saturday, 23 June, workers of the Poznan Stalin Works (Zaklady Imieniem Stalina, Poznafi, or ZISPO) locomotive plant in Poznafi (Poland's fourth-largest city) met and decided to send a delegation to Warsaw to persuade the central authorities to meet five key demands, including a 20 per cent wage increase. By 28 June the delegation had still not received an answer from the authorities about the wage increase, and rumours were also spreading that this delegation had been arrested.6 Thus, early that Thursday morning (later known as 'Black Thursday'), the night and day shifts of ZISPO (which employed a total of 12,000 workers) decided to stage a demonstration. The workers apparently wanted to capitalize on the fact that many western reporters were present in Poznani to cover the Twenty-Fifth International Fair that had opened on 17 June.

Assuming that the original ZISPO delegation had been arrested, the crowd first attacked the city jail, freed the prisoners, and seized weapons from the

guards. (According to Edward Gierek, then a PZPR Politburo member in charge of heavy industry and transport, the demonstrators 'armed themselves with monkey wrenches, sticks, crowbars, and sometimes even with pistols'.)7 Then the workers attacked the radio station engaged in jamming western broadcasts. Still looking for allegedly arrested delegates, the demonstrators next attacked the building of the District Office of Security (Wojewodzki Urzad Bezpieczenistwa). This was where the first shots were fired at about eleven o'clock.8 The demonstration escalated into large anti-government riots in Poznani and other Polish cities. At least 60 people died in the crackdown, according to recent scholarship.9

Some controversy surrounds the number of deaths in the Poznafn rebellion. In another study published in 1981, the number of deaths is given as 73. 10

According to the original Polish Press Agency's report on 30 June 1956, 38

people were killed and 270 injured.11 Later, on 17 July 1956, Marian Rybicki

pracy. To sa, soprawy tak malo wazne ale jak doniosle dla czlowieka i mifdzay innymi rodza niezadowolenie.

6 The minor demands relating to bonuses and repayment of taxes, however, had been met. On the rumours about the arrest, see PZPR 237/V/237, 'Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny Sekretariat - Narada poswi~cona omowieniu wypadk6w poznafiskich', 7.

VII.56, s .9. 7 PZPR (Warsaw) 237/V/237, 'Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny Sekretariat - Narada poswiecona omowieniu wypadk6w poznafiskich', 7. VII.56, s. 7. Gierek

eventually succeeded Gomulka as First Secretary in 1970. He resigned from this post in 1980 after the Gdafisk accords were signed (August 1980). 8 Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacia Zbuntowanego Miasta. Wojko Polskie w Czerwcu 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych (Warszawa 1992), 22; Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution [ofi 1956 (New York 1957), 49-52. 9 See Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz (eds), Poznanski Czerwiez (Poznani 1981). 10 See Aleksander Ziemkowski, Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (1981, 2nd edn). Cited also in

Nalepa, op. cit., 55. 11 See 'The Events in Poznafi', Borba [Yugoslav newspaper], 1 July 1956, cited in Paul Zinner

(ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York 1956), 139.

264 264



Granville: Reactions to the Events of 1 956 Granville: Reactions to the Events of 1 956

(the Polish Chief Public Prosecutor) revealed in an interview that the death toll was actually 53, including those who died in hospital.12

New archival documents indicate that the Polish military was perhaps less efficient in suppressing the Poznafi revolt than previously thought. According to Polish historian Edward Jan Nalepa, who has done extensive archival research, the opposite was the case. 'Everybody waited for events to develop, which became increasingly dramatic with each passing hour', he wrote.13 After a flurry of initial phone calls, an emergency session of the PZPR Central Committee was convened at 10 a.m. on 28 June.14 At 6.30 a.m. on 28 June, J6zef Lipiniski, commander of the Tenth Division of the KBW, was the first person to deliver the message to Brigadier-General Wlodzimierz Mus (head of the KBW) about the possibility of street demonstrations in Poznani. Mus then called Franciszek Jozwiak, Deputy Prime Minister. Around 7 a.m. Leon Stasiak, the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee in Poznani, informed Ochab about the situation. General Ryszard Dobieszak, commander of the MO, Wiadystaw Wicha, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and Witold Sienkiewicz, Chairman of the Committee for Public Security Affairs (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczenistwa Publicznego) were also informed early that morning. The objective was to decide how 'to preserve public order' using only the Citizens' Militia (Milicja Obywatelska, or MO) and the Polish Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpiecenstwa Publicznego, or KBW) 'without asking for reinforcements from outside of the city'. Mus suggested calling in additional armoured KBW units stationed near Szczytno, because the local KBW units were inadequate. (These KBW forces in Poznani consisted of only 329 soldiers, including 62 officers, and they were already busy guarding transport lines, stores and other key points in the city.)15 However, since these reinforcements could not arrive until the next day, 29 June, the PZPR and military officials finally decided to call in regular army units. In a somewhat disorganized manner on 28 and 29 June, these regular units of the Ministry of National Defence, along with MO units, pursued insurgents hiding on rooftops and higher floors of buildings. Close analysis reveals that there were no evacuation or defence plans for even the most strategic public buildings in Poznani.16 The local police departments did not co-operate with the MO units (in large part because the demonstrators had robbed the police of their weapons). According to Nalepa, Colonel Pietrzak, the commander of the Citizens' Militia in Poznain, received a report about the the ZISPO workers' demonstration at 6.30 a.m. He merely sent a few patrols to report on the general location of the demonstrators. Then, only at 6.00 p.m. that day, Pietrzak decided to move all policemen

12 See Syrop, op. cit., 42. 13 Nalepa, op. cit., 23. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.

(the Polish Chief Public Prosecutor) revealed in an interview that the death toll was actually 53, including those who died in hospital.12

New archival documents indicate that the Polish military was perhaps less efficient in suppressing the Poznafi revolt than previously thought. According to Polish historian Edward Jan Nalepa, who has done extensive archival research, the opposite was the case. 'Everybody waited for events to develop, which became increasingly dramatic with each passing hour', he wrote.13 After a flurry of initial phone calls, an emergency session of the PZPR Central Committee was convened at 10 a.m. on 28 June.14 At 6.30 a.m. on 28 June, J6zef Lipiniski, commander of the Tenth Division of the KBW, was the first person to deliver the message to Brigadier-General Wlodzimierz Mus (head of the KBW) about the possibility of street demonstrations in Poznani. Mus then called Franciszek Jozwiak, Deputy Prime Minister. Around 7 a.m. Leon Stasiak, the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee in Poznani, informed Ochab about the situation. General Ryszard Dobieszak, commander of the MO, Wiadystaw Wicha, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and Witold Sienkiewicz, Chairman of the Committee for Public Security Affairs (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczenistwa Publicznego) were also informed early that morning. The objective was to decide how 'to preserve public order' using only the Citizens' Militia (Milicja Obywatelska, or MO) and the Polish Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpiecenstwa Publicznego, or KBW) 'without asking for reinforcements from outside of the city'. Mus suggested calling in additional armoured KBW units stationed near Szczytno, because the local KBW units were inadequate. (These KBW forces in Poznani consisted of only 329 soldiers, including 62 officers, and they were already busy guarding transport lines, stores and other key points in the city.)15 However, since these reinforcements could not arrive until the next day, 29 June, the PZPR and military officials finally decided to call in regular army units. In a somewhat disorganized manner on 28 and 29 June, these regular units of the Ministry of National Defence, along with MO units, pursued insurgents hiding on rooftops and higher floors of buildings. Close analysis reveals that there were no evacuation or defence plans for even the most strategic public buildings in Poznani.16 The local police departments did not co-operate with the MO units (in large part because the demonstrators had robbed the police of their weapons). According to Nalepa, Colonel Pietrzak, the commander of the Citizens' Militia in Poznain, received a report about the the ZISPO workers' demonstration at 6.30 a.m. He merely sent a few patrols to report on the general location of the demonstrators. Then, only at 6.00 p.m. that day, Pietrzak decided to move all policemen

12 See Syrop, op. cit., 42. 13 Nalepa, op. cit., 23. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.

265 265




back to their departments to prevent their being robbed, but it was already too late."7

After the Poznanf uprising, the Ochab regime dismissed several senior Stalinist officials and exposed economic failures. Workers' councils mush- roomed around the country, independently of the party and trade unions, thus signalling the need for political reforms to accompany the administrative changes. On 25-26 August, over a million Polish citizens convened at the

Jasna Gora monastery at Cz?stochowa, a shrine that had survived a Swedish invasion three hundred years earlier, in 1655. This pilgrimage signified the Polish people's expectations of a reassessment of Polish-Soviet relations.

Two months later, on 19 October, just as the PZPR Central Committee was about to convene (and Gomulka to be elected First Secretary), the Soviet leadership ordered its troops to advance toward Warsaw. Stationed in north- ern and western Poland, they were undoubtedly there to intimidate the Polish leadership. Polish troops loyal to Gomulka responded by taking up defensive positions around the capital. Earlier in September the Polish leadership had insisted that all Soviet advisers leave Poland. The Khrushchev leadership feared the prospect of a Gomulka regime and the inevitable internal liberalization that would accompany it. Thus on the same day, Khrushchev led an unin- vited and generally unexpected Soviet delegation on a visit to Warsaw. Besides Khrushchev, the delegation included Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich, Marshal Ivan Konev (commander-in- chief of the Warsaw Pact), General Alexei Antonov (Chief of the Soviet General Staff) and ten other Soviet military officers. The Polish delegation meeting them at the airport consisted of First Secretary Edward Ochab, Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Aleksander Zawadzki, Roman Zambrowski and Wiadystaw Gomulka. The discussions, both on the airport tarmac and at Belvedere Palace, were heated. According to the recently-declassified account of this verbal exchange - Gomulka's briefing to the PZPR Politburo two hours after the Soviet and Polish delegations met - Khrushchev shook his

finger crudely under Gomulka's nose and shouted (in Russian) for all to hear: 'That number won't pass here. We are ready for active intervention!'Gomulka responded calmly, not even raising his voice:

[You can] talk in an aggressive tone, but if you talk with a revolver on the table you don't have a fair discussion. I can't continue under these conditions. I am ill. We can listen to the complaints of the Soviet comrades, but if decisions are to be made under the threat of physi- cal force, I am not up to it.'8

17 Ibid. 18 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 66-8. For an English translation of this document see L.W. Gluchowski, 'Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the "Polish October"', Document 2, Cold War International History Bulletin, issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washing- ton DC), 40. Gomulka was in prison for two years and then spent time in a rest home in the summer of 1956. Some US diplomats believed his return to the political scene would not be significant because of his weakened condition. See 'Memorandum of Conversation by James W. Pratt, US Mission to the UN, regarding Liberalization Trends in Poland, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations,

back to their departments to prevent their being robbed, but it was already too late."7

After the Poznanf uprising, the Ochab regime dismissed several senior Stalinist officials and exposed economic failures. Workers' councils mush- roomed around the country, independently of the party and trade unions, thus signalling the need for political reforms to accompany the administrative changes. On 25-26 August, over a million Polish citizens convened at the

Jasna Gora monastery at Cz?stochowa, a shrine that had survived a Swedish invasion three hundred years earlier, in 1655. This pilgrimage signified the Polish people's expectations of a reassessment of Polish-Soviet relations.

Two months later, on 19 October, just as the PZPR Central Committee was about to convene (and Gomulka to be elected First Secretary), the Soviet leadership ordered its troops to advance toward Warsaw. Stationed in north- ern and western Poland, they were undoubtedly there to intimidate the Polish leadership. Polish troops loyal to Gomulka responded by taking up defensive positions around the capital. Earlier in September the Polish leadership had insisted that all Soviet advisers leave Poland. The Khrushchev leadership feared the prospect of a Gomulka regime and the inevitable internal liberalization that would accompany it. Thus on the same day, Khrushchev led an unin- vited and generally unexpected Soviet delegation on a visit to Warsaw. Besides Khrushchev, the delegation included Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich, Marshal Ivan Konev (commander-in- chief of the Warsaw Pact), General Alexei Antonov (Chief of the Soviet General Staff) and ten other Soviet military officers. The Polish delegation meeting them at the airport consisted of First Secretary Edward Ochab, Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Aleksander Zawadzki, Roman Zambrowski and Wiadystaw Gomulka. The discussions, both on the airport tarmac and at Belvedere Palace, were heated. According to the recently-declassified account of this verbal exchange - Gomulka's briefing to the PZPR Politburo two hours after the Soviet and Polish delegations met - Khrushchev shook his

finger crudely under Gomulka's nose and shouted (in Russian) for all to hear: 'That number won't pass here. We are ready for active intervention!'Gomulka responded calmly, not even raising his voice:

[You can] talk in an aggressive tone, but if you talk with a revolver on the table you don't have a fair discussion. I can't continue under these conditions. I am ill. We can listen to the complaints of the Soviet comrades, but if decisions are to be made under the threat of physi- cal force, I am not up to it.'8

17 Ibid. 18 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 66-8. For an English translation of this document see L.W. Gluchowski, 'Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the "Polish October"', Document 2, Cold War International History Bulletin, issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washing- ton DC), 40. Gomulka was in prison for two years and then spent time in a rest home in the summer of 1956. Some US diplomats believed his return to the political scene would not be significant because of his weakened condition. See 'Memorandum of Conversation by James W. Pratt, US Mission to the UN, regarding Liberalization Trends in Poland, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations,

266 266




Reflecting on this episode, Gomulka told a party aktiv on 4 November: 'The language of the party is often not the language of diplomacy. They said what they thought, and we said what we thought. The discussion even became quite heated at times.'19

Recently-declassified archival documents confirm what was deduced earlier, namely that the Moscow leaders were indeed deterred from intervening in Poland by the Polish threat of counter-force. Gomulka also assured them of his loyalty to the USSR and Warsaw Pact.20 Gomulka later told the party aktiv on 4 November: '[N]either I nor any Politburo member wants to damage the friendship with a great powerful socialist country. No communist, Pole, and patriot could have such an intention based on the normal state interests of Poland.' According to the handwritten notes of Czech party leader Antonin Novotny's aide (Jan Svoboda) of the secret meeting of communist bloc leaders on 24 October in Moscow, the Soviet leaders noted that 'Gomulka several times emphasized that they [the Poles] would not permit their independence to be taken away and would not allow anyone to intervene in Poland's internal affairs'.21 At the same meeting Khrushchev said 'finding a reason to start a military conflict against Poland would be easy, but finding a way to end it would be hard'. Moreover, Khrushchev held a meeting on 19 October with his generals at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw while waiting for the Eighth Plenum to elect Gomulka as First Secretary. Later, he admitted candidly:

As we began to analyse the problem in more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could count on to obey Rokossowski, the situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own armed strength far exceeded that of Poland, but we didn't want to resort to the use of our own troops.22

Western Radio Broadcasts', 16 October 1956, National Security Archive, Washington DC, 'Flash- points' Project, Box 2, Record # 79996, Folder 10/15-21/56, p. 1.

19 AAN (Warsaw), Arch. KC PZPR, 237/V-241. 'Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r.: Wystppenia W. Gomulki', 4 November 1956, s. 166. (Nieraz w jezyku partyjnym, ze tak powiem, jezyk partyjnyum nie bywa czVsto jezykiem dyplomacji. Oni m6wili co mysleli i mygmy m6wili cosmy mysleli. Dyskusja byla nieraz moze i ostra.) 20 Ibid. 21 This report was written in Czech by Jan Svoboda, a top aide to Czech communist leader Antonin Novotny's aide, on a key meeting on 24 October of top CPSU Presidium members and East European communist leaders (except Gomulka and Gero). Statni Ulstrednf Archiv (Central State Archive in Prague,or SUA), Fond 07/16, Svazek 3, 'Zpriva o jednani na UV KSSS 24. tijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku' ('Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, 24 October 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary'). See Tibor Hajdu, 'Az 1956.okt6ber 24-i moszkvai ertekezlet', tvkonyv I. (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet 1992), 149-56. For an English translation, see Mark Kramer, 'Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, October 24, 1956', Cold War International History Bulletin, issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washington DC), 1, 50-6. 22 Strobe Talbott (ed. and trans.), Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (New York 1974), 203.

Reflecting on this episode, Gomulka told a party aktiv on 4 November: 'The language of the party is often not the language of diplomacy. They said what they thought, and we said what we thought. The discussion even became quite heated at times.'19

Recently-declassified archival documents confirm what was deduced earlier, namely that the Moscow leaders were indeed deterred from intervening in Poland by the Polish threat of counter-force. Gomulka also assured them of his loyalty to the USSR and Warsaw Pact.20 Gomulka later told the party aktiv on 4 November: '[N]either I nor any Politburo member wants to damage the friendship with a great powerful socialist country. No communist, Pole, and patriot could have such an intention based on the normal state interests of Poland.' According to the handwritten notes of Czech party leader Antonin Novotny's aide (Jan Svoboda) of the secret meeting of communist bloc leaders on 24 October in Moscow, the Soviet leaders noted that 'Gomulka several times emphasized that they [the Poles] would not permit their independence to be taken away and would not allow anyone to intervene in Poland's internal affairs'.21 At the same meeting Khrushchev said 'finding a reason to start a military conflict against Poland would be easy, but finding a way to end it would be hard'. Moreover, Khrushchev held a meeting on 19 October with his generals at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw while waiting for the Eighth Plenum to elect Gomulka as First Secretary. Later, he admitted candidly:

As we began to analyse the problem in more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could count on to obey Rokossowski, the situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own armed strength far exceeded that of Poland, but we didn't want to resort to the use of our own troops.22

Western Radio Broadcasts', 16 October 1956, National Security Archive, Washington DC, 'Flash- points' Project, Box 2, Record # 79996, Folder 10/15-21/56, p. 1.

19 AAN (Warsaw), Arch. KC PZPR, 237/V-241. 'Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r.: Wystppenia W. Gomulki', 4 November 1956, s. 166. (Nieraz w jezyku partyjnym, ze tak powiem, jezyk partyjnyum nie bywa czVsto jezykiem dyplomacji. Oni m6wili co mysleli i mygmy m6wili cosmy mysleli. Dyskusja byla nieraz moze i ostra.) 20 Ibid. 21 This report was written in Czech by Jan Svoboda, a top aide to Czech communist leader Antonin Novotny's aide, on a key meeting on 24 October of top CPSU Presidium members and East European communist leaders (except Gomulka and Gero). Statni Ulstrednf Archiv (Central State Archive in Prague,or SUA), Fond 07/16, Svazek 3, 'Zpriva o jednani na UV KSSS 24. tijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku' ('Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, 24 October 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary'). See Tibor Hajdu, 'Az 1956.okt6ber 24-i moszkvai ertekezlet', tvkonyv I. (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet 1992), 149-56. For an English translation, see Mark Kramer, 'Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, October 24, 1956', Cold War International History Bulletin, issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washington DC), 1, 50-6. 22 Strobe Talbott (ed. and trans.), Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (New York 1974), 203.

267 267




Despite the movements of both Soviet and Polish troops toward Warsaw during the Eighth Plenum, there is no evidence to suggest that any major group in the PZPR actually tried to mobilize military forces to 'storm' the Plenum. Two important documents discovered recently in the Central Military Archive in Warsaw (reports by Major Witold Osinski), shed considerable light on the decision-making process within the Polish military, particularly the KBW.23

In comparison to the Polish leadership after Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech', the Hungarian 'Stalinist' leader Maityais Raikosi clung to power until July 1956 - longer than any of the other Stalinist leaders, with the exception of Walter Ulbricht in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).24 As Rakosi complained to Voroshilov in June 1956:

They say that Hungary needs leaders not connected with the past. You can hear talk in Hungary about how Rakosi was . . .'the faithful student of Stalin', and that after the deaths of Dmitrov, Gottwald and Beirut, Rakosi is 'the last Mohican of the Stalinist era' and thus ... he doesn't fit the spirit of the times.

Like Ochab, Raikosi spent the years of the second world war in the Soviet Union and developed strong loyalty to Moscow, but he jealously guarded his

power. Using the 1948 conflict between Stalin and Tito as a pretext, Rakosi (also nicknamed the 'Bald Murderer') authorized a particularly cruel wave of purges within his own party, beginning with his innocent rival, Laszlo Rajk.25

After the riots in East Berlin in 1953, the Soviet leaders had tried to curtail Rakosi's monopoly of power by forcing him to relinquish one of his posts, the

prime ministership, and to share power with the new Prime Minister, Imre

Nagy. As someone who stood outside Rakosi's inner circle and who was not

Jewish, Nagy - the Soviet leaders thought - could perhaps remedy some of the mistakes of the over-zealous Stalinists by advocating New Course policies (e.g. increased production of consumer goods, relaxation of terror, and con- cessions to the peasantry). As long as Raikosi remained First Secretary, how-

ever, the New Course was doomed to fail; Raikosi sabotaged Nagy's efforts from behind the scenes. This dual leadership caused extreme tension among political elites and the general population. Much hatred among the Hungarian people was also directed against the 'big four' Hungarian communist leaders

23 Major Witold Osinski was a deputy chief in the Second Section of the Chief Directorate of Information (Gl6wny Zarziad Informacji, GZI). See CAW (Warsaw), sygn. 1812/92/8 and Bylego Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby Wewnetrznej, sygn. 2859/20/K. For an English translation, see L.W. Gluchowski and Agnieszka Poleszczuk, 'The Osinski Reports' in The Hidden History of Hungary, 1956: A Compendium of Declassified Documents (Washington DC 1996). This collection was

prepared for the conference 'Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence' in

Budapest, 26-29 September 1996. 24 RGANI (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishii Istorii), f. 89, per. 45, dok. 2, 1. 2, 'Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rikosi', 26 June 1956. 25 Laszlo6 Rajk (1909-49) was a key official of the underground Hungarian Communist Party before 1944. He was Rakosi's Hungarian Minister of the Interior from 1946 to 1948 and then

Foreign Minister. He was sentenced to death in a show trial in September-October 1949, which marked the beginning of the anti-Titoist campaign.

Despite the movements of both Soviet and Polish troops toward Warsaw during the Eighth Plenum, there is no evidence to suggest that any major group in the PZPR actually tried to mobilize military forces to 'storm' the Plenum. Two important documents discovered recently in the Central Military Archive in Warsaw (reports by Major Witold Osinski), shed considerable light on the decision-making process within the Polish military, particularly the KBW.23

In comparison to the Polish leadership after Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech', the Hungarian 'Stalinist' leader Maityais Raikosi clung to power until July 1956 - longer than any of the other Stalinist leaders, with the exception of Walter Ulbricht in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).24 As Rakosi complained to Voroshilov in June 1956:

They say that Hungary needs leaders not connected with the past. You can hear talk in Hungary about how Rakosi was . . .'the faithful student of Stalin', and that after the deaths of Dmitrov, Gottwald and Beirut, Rakosi is 'the last Mohican of the Stalinist era' and thus ... he doesn't fit the spirit of the times.

Like Ochab, Raikosi spent the years of the second world war in the Soviet Union and developed strong loyalty to Moscow, but he jealously guarded his

power. Using the 1948 conflict between Stalin and Tito as a pretext, Rakosi (also nicknamed the 'Bald Murderer') authorized a particularly cruel wave of purges within his own party, beginning with his innocent rival, Laszlo Rajk.25

After the riots in East Berlin in 1953, the Soviet leaders had tried to curtail Rakosi's monopoly of power by forcing him to relinquish one of his posts, the

prime ministership, and to share power with the new Prime Minister, Imre

Nagy. As someone who stood outside Rakosi's inner circle and who was not

Jewish, Nagy - the Soviet leaders thought - could perhaps remedy some of the mistakes of the over-zealous Stalinists by advocating New Course policies (e.g. increased production of consumer goods, relaxation of terror, and con- cessions to the peasantry). As long as Raikosi remained First Secretary, how-

ever, the New Course was doomed to fail; Raikosi sabotaged Nagy's efforts from behind the scenes. This dual leadership caused extreme tension among political elites and the general population. Much hatred among the Hungarian people was also directed against the 'big four' Hungarian communist leaders

23 Major Witold Osinski was a deputy chief in the Second Section of the Chief Directorate of Information (Gl6wny Zarziad Informacji, GZI). See CAW (Warsaw), sygn. 1812/92/8 and Bylego Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby Wewnetrznej, sygn. 2859/20/K. For an English translation, see L.W. Gluchowski and Agnieszka Poleszczuk, 'The Osinski Reports' in The Hidden History of Hungary, 1956: A Compendium of Declassified Documents (Washington DC 1996). This collection was

prepared for the conference 'Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence' in

Budapest, 26-29 September 1996. 24 RGANI (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishii Istorii), f. 89, per. 45, dok. 2, 1. 2, 'Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rikosi', 26 June 1956. 25 Laszlo6 Rajk (1909-49) was a key official of the underground Hungarian Communist Party before 1944. He was Rakosi's Hungarian Minister of the Interior from 1946 to 1948 and then

Foreign Minister. He was sentenced to death in a show trial in September-October 1949, which marked the beginning of the anti-Titoist campaign.

268 268




who dominated Hungary in the postwar period, all of whom happened to be Jewish: Matyas Raikosi, Mihaly Farkas, Jozsef Revai and Erno6 Gerod. Soviet diplomats discussed this at length.

When Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov was ousted in February 1955, the New Course policies quickly lost favour. Nagy, too, was ousted from his position as Prime Minister for 'rightist deviation' the following April and expelled from the party altogether in November. Rakosi prevailed as head of the party, but Hungarian workers and intellectuals did not forget Nagy, whom they saw as an alternative to Rakosi.

After Khrushchev's Secret Speech, as in Poland, the rift deepened in Hungary between the Stalinist 'Muscovites' and the 'home communists', with the latter group gaining popularity. (The Hungarian 'Muscovites' included Matyas Rakosi, Erno Gerod, Jozsef Revai, Mihaly Farkas, Ferenc Miinnich, Zoltan Szanto, Zoltan Vas, Imre Nagy and others. The 'home' or indigenous Hungarian communists included Laszlo Rajk, Geza Losonczy, Gyula Kallai, Janos Kadar, Sandor Haraszti, Szilard Ujhelyi and others.) As their criticism grew more radical, their audiences rapidly multiplied, especially at debates held by the so-called Petdfi Circle [Petofi Kor], a discussion group of young party members. On 29 March Rakosi reluctantly admitted in a speech in Eger that Rajk had been an innocent victim of 'provocation'. The police had 'mis- led' the government, Rakosi claimed.

Finally, in July 1956, Rakosi was forced to retire. In contrast to Ochab in Poland who assisted the reformer Gomulka, Rakosi had promoted Erno6 Gero, a like-minded hard-liner.27 (Indeed, it can be argued plausibly that, had Rakosi been replaced much earlier by a more liberal reformer like Imre Nagy or Janos Kadar, the entire Hungarian Revolution could have been avoided. Ironically, as new archival documents reveal, Rakosi still thought - as late as May 1957 - that he could return to Hungary. He actually claimed that the revolution had occurred because of his absence from Hungary since July 1956!)28 In Hungary, therefore, there was a groundswell of hatred toward the so-called 'Rakosi-Gerod clique' and the 'personality cult', which was absent in Poland. Rakosi was never permitted to return to Hungary. He lived in Moscow, then was exiled to Krasnodar, Tokmak (Kirghizia), Arzamas and finally Gorky, where he died on 5 February 1971.29

26 See, for example, RGANI, 0 28, rolik 5195, delo 479, 1. 1-2, Iz Dnevnika K. A. Krutikova, 'Zapis' Besedy s poverennym v delakh Vengrii v KNR Sail', 17 dekabria 1956. Antisemitism was also prevalent in Poland, stimulated by the fact that at least two prominent Stalinist leaders, Jakub Berman and Hilary Minc, were Jewish, as was the more 'progressive' Roman Dambrowski. 27 In an interview, Ochab later said, 'I wasn't at all anxious to keep my position.' See Teresa Toranska, 'Them': Stalin's Polish Puppets (New York 1987), 78. 28 AAN (Warszawa) 237/XXII-841, 'Notatka a rozm6w przeprowadznych na temat czerw- cowej konferencji WSPR', 6. VI. 1957, s. 30, Budapeszt. (From the consul of the Polish embassy in Budapest, Mosczefski, to Korolczyk, Director of the First Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry.) 29 See the letters written in 1957 by Rikosi to the CC CPSU in attempts to return to Hungary, e.g. RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, per. 45, dok. 67, 11. 1-9. Pis'mo Matiasa Rakoshi, Moskva, 15

who dominated Hungary in the postwar period, all of whom happened to be Jewish: Matyas Raikosi, Mihaly Farkas, Jozsef Revai and Erno6 Gerod. Soviet diplomats discussed this at length.

When Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov was ousted in February 1955, the New Course policies quickly lost favour. Nagy, too, was ousted from his position as Prime Minister for 'rightist deviation' the following April and expelled from the party altogether in November. Rakosi prevailed as head of the party, but Hungarian workers and intellectuals did not forget Nagy, whom they saw as an alternative to Rakosi.

After Khrushchev's Secret Speech, as in Poland, the rift deepened in Hungary between the Stalinist 'Muscovites' and the 'home communists', with the latter group gaining popularity. (The Hungarian 'Muscovites' included Matyas Rakosi, Erno Gerod, Jozsef Revai, Mihaly Farkas, Ferenc Miinnich, Zoltan Szanto, Zoltan Vas, Imre Nagy and others. The 'home' or indigenous Hungarian communists included Laszlo Rajk, Geza Losonczy, Gyula Kallai, Janos Kadar, Sandor Haraszti, Szilard Ujhelyi and others.) As their criticism grew more radical, their audiences rapidly multiplied, especially at debates held by the so-called Petdfi Circle [Petofi Kor], a discussion group of young party members. On 29 March Rakosi reluctantly admitted in a speech in Eger that Rajk had been an innocent victim of 'provocation'. The police had 'mis- led' the government, Rakosi claimed.

Finally, in July 1956, Rakosi was forced to retire. In contrast to Ochab in Poland who assisted the reformer Gomulka, Rakosi had promoted Erno6 Gero, a like-minded hard-liner.27 (Indeed, it can be argued plausibly that, had Rakosi been replaced much earlier by a more liberal reformer like Imre Nagy or Janos Kadar, the entire Hungarian Revolution could have been avoided. Ironically, as new archival documents reveal, Rakosi still thought - as late as May 1957 - that he could return to Hungary. He actually claimed that the revolution had occurred because of his absence from Hungary since July 1956!)28 In Hungary, therefore, there was a groundswell of hatred toward the so-called 'Rakosi-Gerod clique' and the 'personality cult', which was absent in Poland. Rakosi was never permitted to return to Hungary. He lived in Moscow, then was exiled to Krasnodar, Tokmak (Kirghizia), Arzamas and finally Gorky, where he died on 5 February 1971.29

26 See, for example, RGANI, 0 28, rolik 5195, delo 479, 1. 1-2, Iz Dnevnika K. A. Krutikova, 'Zapis' Besedy s poverennym v delakh Vengrii v KNR Sail', 17 dekabria 1956. Antisemitism was also prevalent in Poland, stimulated by the fact that at least two prominent Stalinist leaders, Jakub Berman and Hilary Minc, were Jewish, as was the more 'progressive' Roman Dambrowski. 27 In an interview, Ochab later said, 'I wasn't at all anxious to keep my position.' See Teresa Toranska, 'Them': Stalin's Polish Puppets (New York 1987), 78. 28 AAN (Warszawa) 237/XXII-841, 'Notatka a rozm6w przeprowadznych na temat czerw- cowej konferencji WSPR', 6. VI. 1957, s. 30, Budapeszt. (From the consul of the Polish embassy in Budapest, Mosczefski, to Korolczyk, Director of the First Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry.) 29 See the letters written in 1957 by Rikosi to the CC CPSU in attempts to return to Hungary, e.g. RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, per. 45, dok. 67, 11. 1-9. Pis'mo Matiasa Rakoshi, Moskva, 15

269 269




On 23 October, about 10,000 students participated in a silent demonstration in Budapest. Gomulka's rise in Poland provided these Hungarian students and intellectuals with an opportunity to express their grievances against the Stalinist leaders and Soviet domination. In their '16 points', the students tested the limits of the authorities by boldly calling for, amongst other things, the dis- missal of Raikosi's successor Erno Gero and the reinstatement of the reformer Imre Nagy; the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and true independence and equality with regard to the Soviet Union. The actual number of recorded points varies, according to the youth groups, instititions and cities in which they originated. One of the first meetings of the communist youth organization DISZ (Dolgozo Ifjuisaig Szovetsege) took place in the town of Szeged, where students articulated 12 points (paralleling the 12 points drawn up by Hungarian youth in the March 1848 Revolution). Other students at the Technical University in Budapest expanded the list to 16. The demand for the reinstatement of Nagy, Rakosi's opponent, was intended to parallel Gomulka's return to power.

The Hungarian government called in Soviet troops to suppress the rebellion, which had turned violent toward evening. Hence the first Soviet intervention in Hungary on 23-24 October was actually an invasion by invitation. Although Nagy was later blamed for inviting the troops, and Hegediis (the former Prime Minister) actually signed the official written invitation ex post facto, it was Gero who verbally requested them, summoning the military attache of the Soviet embassy for military assistance. Soviet ambassador Yurii Andropov then

attempted to call into action the Special Corps (Osobii Korpus) in Hungary, headed by Pyotr Lashchenko, who replied that he needed a direct command from Moscow.30 The Soviet Presidium could not take action, however, until it received a formal request from the Hungarian leadership. Strangely enough, when Khrushchev called Gero (after Ger6's call to the Soviet military attache) to invite him to the emergency meeting on 24 October in Moscow, the latter

declined, saying that the Hungarian situation was too serious, but he did not

say a word about his earlier call for military assistance. Only after Andropov called Moscow to inform Khrushchev did the Soviet leader call Gero' again to tell him that his request would be granted, but only if it were in writing. Gero

refused, saying that he did not have time to summon a meeting. The formal

fevralia 1957 g., perevod s vengerskogo. See also reference to several phone calls and visits Rakosi

made to Janos Boldotszki, the Hungarian ambassador to the USSR. RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, per.

45, dok. 54, 1. 5, Iz Dnevnika Zamchevskogo, Zaveduiushchii Piatego Evropeiskgo Otdela MIDa,

'Zapis' Beseda s Poslom Boldotskogo', 28 noiabria 1956 g. For a recent account of Rakosi's years in exile, based on new archival documents, see V.L. Musatov, 'Istoriya odnoi ssylki: "Zhitie"

Matiasa Rakoshi v SSSR (1956-1971 gg)', Kentavr (Moscow), no. 6 (November-December 1993), 72-81.

30 See 'Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku', op. cit. See

note 21. Also Fyodor Lukianov, 'Khrushchev Ostorozhen; Andropov Nastaival', Izvestiia, 169, 24

July 1992.

On 23 October, about 10,000 students participated in a silent demonstration in Budapest. Gomulka's rise in Poland provided these Hungarian students and intellectuals with an opportunity to express their grievances against the Stalinist leaders and Soviet domination. In their '16 points', the students tested the limits of the authorities by boldly calling for, amongst other things, the dis- missal of Raikosi's successor Erno Gero and the reinstatement of the reformer Imre Nagy; the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and true independence and equality with regard to the Soviet Union. The actual number of recorded points varies, according to the youth groups, instititions and cities in which they originated. One of the first meetings of the communist youth organization DISZ (Dolgozo Ifjuisaig Szovetsege) took place in the town of Szeged, where students articulated 12 points (paralleling the 12 points drawn up by Hungarian youth in the March 1848 Revolution). Other students at the Technical University in Budapest expanded the list to 16. The demand for the reinstatement of Nagy, Rakosi's opponent, was intended to parallel Gomulka's return to power.

The Hungarian government called in Soviet troops to suppress the rebellion, which had turned violent toward evening. Hence the first Soviet intervention in Hungary on 23-24 October was actually an invasion by invitation. Although Nagy was later blamed for inviting the troops, and Hegediis (the former Prime Minister) actually signed the official written invitation ex post facto, it was Gero who verbally requested them, summoning the military attache of the Soviet embassy for military assistance. Soviet ambassador Yurii Andropov then

attempted to call into action the Special Corps (Osobii Korpus) in Hungary, headed by Pyotr Lashchenko, who replied that he needed a direct command from Moscow.30 The Soviet Presidium could not take action, however, until it received a formal request from the Hungarian leadership. Strangely enough, when Khrushchev called Gero (after Ger6's call to the Soviet military attache) to invite him to the emergency meeting on 24 October in Moscow, the latter

declined, saying that the Hungarian situation was too serious, but he did not

say a word about his earlier call for military assistance. Only after Andropov called Moscow to inform Khrushchev did the Soviet leader call Gero' again to tell him that his request would be granted, but only if it were in writing. Gero

refused, saying that he did not have time to summon a meeting. The formal

fevralia 1957 g., perevod s vengerskogo. See also reference to several phone calls and visits Rakosi

made to Janos Boldotszki, the Hungarian ambassador to the USSR. RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, per.

45, dok. 54, 1. 5, Iz Dnevnika Zamchevskogo, Zaveduiushchii Piatego Evropeiskgo Otdela MIDa,

'Zapis' Beseda s Poslom Boldotskogo', 28 noiabria 1956 g. For a recent account of Rakosi's years in exile, based on new archival documents, see V.L. Musatov, 'Istoriya odnoi ssylki: "Zhitie"

Matiasa Rakoshi v SSSR (1956-1971 gg)', Kentavr (Moscow), no. 6 (November-December 1993), 72-81.

30 See 'Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku', op. cit. See

note 21. Also Fyodor Lukianov, 'Khrushchev Ostorozhen; Andropov Nastaival', Izvestiia, 169, 24

July 1992.

270 270




request did not actually arrive in Moscow until five days later. Andropov sent it in a ciphered telegram on 28 October 1956.31

The Soviet leaders soon realized that their initial intervention on 23-24 October only exacerbated the situation, inciting a wave of lynchings by the insurgents of the AVO agents.32 After Imre Nagy was voted in as Prime Minister on 23-24 October, he issued a plethora of reformist decrees, which eventually convinced the Kremlin leaders of the need to intervene a second and final time on 4 November. On just one day, 28 October, for example, the Nagy government declared a cease-fire; amnesties for those involved in the uprising; a rise in salaries and pensions, and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and follow-up negotiations for a full troop withdrawal from Hungary. He also rejected previous characterizations of the uprising as a 'counter-revolution', and promised to dissolve the AVO and create new state security organs.33

It has often been said that the Polish October was the 'spark' that ignited the Hungarian Revolution, although earlier events, especially the reburial of the former Hungarian Minister of the Interior Laiszlo Rajk on 6 October, were also important in the early stages of the Hungarian Revolution. Rajk received a death sentence on false charges in October 1949 and was then posthumously rehabilitated in March 1956. The ceremonial reburial of his remains, along with those of three other Hungarian officials, attended by a huge crowd, has been called the 'dress rehearsal for the revolution'.

Indeed, many Hungarians were keenly aware of what was happening in Poland, beginning in the summer of 1956, especially since Hungarian newspapers like Szabad Nep had become less censored. The Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps also provided Hungarians with abundant news about the Poznan revolt and Polish October. Yugoslav newspapers frequently reported on Polish events, providing a perspective different from that of the Soviet Union. According to the Russian-language newspaper Pravda, the Poznanfi riots were caused by 'imperialist and reactionary Polish underground agents, taking advantage of certain economic difficulties', whereas the Serbo-Croatian daily Borba quoted the official Polish communique: 'The objective motives of the Poznani demonstrations should be sought in the workers' discontent

31 See AVPRF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, 1. 12. 'Shifrtelegramma', 28 October 1956. 32 At the time of the first intervention (24 October), Ern6 Ger6 told Mikoyan and Suslov over the telephone: '[T]he arrival of Soviet troops in the city had a negative effect on the disposition of the inhabitants, including the workers.' AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, 1. 1: 'Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta', cable from A.I. Mikoyan and M.A. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956. 33 The State Security Department (Allamvedelmi Osztaly or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949 and renamed the State Security Authority (Allamvedelmi Hatosag or AVH), was reincorpo- rated into the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry in the autumn of 1953. The organization was commonly referred to as the AVO and its employees the 'AVOs'. The term AVO will thus be used throughout this article.

request did not actually arrive in Moscow until five days later. Andropov sent it in a ciphered telegram on 28 October 1956.31

The Soviet leaders soon realized that their initial intervention on 23-24 October only exacerbated the situation, inciting a wave of lynchings by the insurgents of the AVO agents.32 After Imre Nagy was voted in as Prime Minister on 23-24 October, he issued a plethora of reformist decrees, which eventually convinced the Kremlin leaders of the need to intervene a second and final time on 4 November. On just one day, 28 October, for example, the Nagy government declared a cease-fire; amnesties for those involved in the uprising; a rise in salaries and pensions, and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and follow-up negotiations for a full troop withdrawal from Hungary. He also rejected previous characterizations of the uprising as a 'counter-revolution', and promised to dissolve the AVO and create new state security organs.33

It has often been said that the Polish October was the 'spark' that ignited the Hungarian Revolution, although earlier events, especially the reburial of the former Hungarian Minister of the Interior Laiszlo Rajk on 6 October, were also important in the early stages of the Hungarian Revolution. Rajk received a death sentence on false charges in October 1949 and was then posthumously rehabilitated in March 1956. The ceremonial reburial of his remains, along with those of three other Hungarian officials, attended by a huge crowd, has been called the 'dress rehearsal for the revolution'.

Indeed, many Hungarians were keenly aware of what was happening in Poland, beginning in the summer of 1956, especially since Hungarian newspapers like Szabad Nep had become less censored. The Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps also provided Hungarians with abundant news about the Poznan revolt and Polish October. Yugoslav newspapers frequently reported on Polish events, providing a perspective different from that of the Soviet Union. According to the Russian-language newspaper Pravda, the Poznanfi riots were caused by 'imperialist and reactionary Polish underground agents, taking advantage of certain economic difficulties', whereas the Serbo-Croatian daily Borba quoted the official Polish communique: 'The objective motives of the Poznani demonstrations should be sought in the workers' discontent

31 See AVPRF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, 1. 12. 'Shifrtelegramma', 28 October 1956. 32 At the time of the first intervention (24 October), Ern6 Ger6 told Mikoyan and Suslov over the telephone: '[T]he arrival of Soviet troops in the city had a negative effect on the disposition of the inhabitants, including the workers.' AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, 1. 1: 'Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta', cable from A.I. Mikoyan and M.A. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956. 33 The State Security Department (Allamvedelmi Osztaly or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949 and renamed the State Security Authority (Allamvedelmi Hatosag or AVH), was reincorpo- rated into the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry in the autumn of 1953. The organization was commonly referred to as the AVO and its employees the 'AVOs'. The term AVO will thus be used throughout this article.

271 271




caused by the unsettled wage scale and social problems as well as by the un- satisfactory living conditions.'34 In fact, the Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps together appear to have served as disseminators of information between the Poles and Hungarians, much to the chagrin of Soviet and Hungarian communist officials, who complained about excessive coverage of the anti-Soviet movements in Poland and Hungary in the Yugoslav media.35

To understand the Yugoslavs' motives, one must review key events in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. It will be recalled that in 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform and boycotted by all members of the communist bloc. The process of forging a detente between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia was first set in motion when Khrushchev visited Josip Broz Tito in Belgrade in July 1955. In addition to the Belgrade trip and the disbandment of the Cominform,36 Khrushchev's speeches at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956 further paved the way to warmer relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Khrushchev acknowledged the existence of 'many national roads to socialism'. In the closed session (the 'Secret Speech') on 24-25 February 1956, Khrushchev clearly stated that the Soviet rift with Yugoslavia had been an 'unnecessary' and 'shameful' mistake.37 He said:

The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The 'Yugoslav affair' contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions

among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this 'affair'; it was

completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have short-

comings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country."

After the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in 1955, Tito and other Yugoslav officials were determined to maintain their unique 'non-aligned' status vis-a-vis the communist bloc and to provide leadership for the other satellites. Yugoslav journalists and diplomats travelled throughout Hungary, visiting factories and

attending cultural events put on by the Yugoslav minority in Mohaics, spreading the rhetoric about the 'third camp' and how there could be 'alternative

34 See 'Polish People Brand Organizers of Provocation', Pravda, 1 July 1956 and 'The Events in

Poznafi', Borba, 1 July 1956, respectively. Also the Yugoslav articles: D. Trailovic, 'The World

Today: Poznafn Epilogue', Borba, 6 July 1956, and 'The Plenum of the Polish Party', Borba, 23

October 1956. Cited also in Zinner, op. cit., 136-42. 35 See AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39, 11. 49-64, passim. Written by V.

Kazimirov, Attache at the Soviet embassy in Hungary, 11 August 1956, 'The Recent Internal

Events in Hungary and the Yugoslav Press (Survey)', sekretno; and f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39, 11

68-73. V. Kazimirov, 'About the State of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations', 23 August 1956.

36 The Cominform was disbanded on 17 April 1956. 37 See Nikita S. Khrushchev, 'The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Closed Session, February 24-5, 1956', annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky in The New Leader (New York 1956), S48.

38 Ibid. Emphasis added.

caused by the unsettled wage scale and social problems as well as by the un- satisfactory living conditions.'34 In fact, the Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps together appear to have served as disseminators of information between the Poles and Hungarians, much to the chagrin of Soviet and Hungarian communist officials, who complained about excessive coverage of the anti-Soviet movements in Poland and Hungary in the Yugoslav media.35

To understand the Yugoslavs' motives, one must review key events in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. It will be recalled that in 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform and boycotted by all members of the communist bloc. The process of forging a detente between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia was first set in motion when Khrushchev visited Josip Broz Tito in Belgrade in July 1955. In addition to the Belgrade trip and the disbandment of the Cominform,36 Khrushchev's speeches at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956 further paved the way to warmer relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Khrushchev acknowledged the existence of 'many national roads to socialism'. In the closed session (the 'Secret Speech') on 24-25 February 1956, Khrushchev clearly stated that the Soviet rift with Yugoslavia had been an 'unnecessary' and 'shameful' mistake.37 He said:

The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The 'Yugoslav affair' contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions

among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this 'affair'; it was

completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have short-

comings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country."

After the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in 1955, Tito and other Yugoslav officials were determined to maintain their unique 'non-aligned' status vis-a-vis the communist bloc and to provide leadership for the other satellites. Yugoslav journalists and diplomats travelled throughout Hungary, visiting factories and

attending cultural events put on by the Yugoslav minority in Mohaics, spreading the rhetoric about the 'third camp' and how there could be 'alternative

34 See 'Polish People Brand Organizers of Provocation', Pravda, 1 July 1956 and 'The Events in

Poznafi', Borba, 1 July 1956, respectively. Also the Yugoslav articles: D. Trailovic, 'The World

Today: Poznafn Epilogue', Borba, 6 July 1956, and 'The Plenum of the Polish Party', Borba, 23

October 1956. Cited also in Zinner, op. cit., 136-42. 35 See AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39, 11. 49-64, passim. Written by V.

Kazimirov, Attache at the Soviet embassy in Hungary, 11 August 1956, 'The Recent Internal

Events in Hungary and the Yugoslav Press (Survey)', sekretno; and f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39, 11

68-73. V. Kazimirov, 'About the State of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations', 23 August 1956.

36 The Cominform was disbanded on 17 April 1956. 37 See Nikita S. Khrushchev, 'The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Closed Session, February 24-5, 1956', annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky in The New Leader (New York 1956), S48.

38 Ibid. Emphasis added.

272 272




roads to socialism', which was in some ways reminiscent of the earlier ideological quarrel of the 1940s between Stalin's 'popular front from above' and Tito's 'popular front from below'. They told the Hungarian workers that the 1948 rift had been the 'Stalinists' fault'.

More than the Polish Stalinist Bierut, the Yugoslav leader Tito and his sub- ordinates especially detested Maityas Raikosi, who had conducted the 1948 anti-Titoist campaign more zealously than the other leaders in the 'peoples' democracies'.39 After Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk's execution in 1949, thousands of Hungarian communist officials and intellectuals were also sentenced to death or to years of imprisonment, while tens of thousands were dismissed from their posts and the party - and an even larger group of non-communists was sent to the gallows, prisons or concentration camps.40 Besides Rajk, the three other prominent victims of the purge trials in 1949 were Gyorgy Pailfy, Tibor Szonyi and Andras Szalai. The total number of those in some way purged in the 1948-56 period was approximately 350,000. This figure includes those accused of being 'class enemies' (kulaks, clerical reactionaries, etc.), or 'Zionist agents' (Jews), and those accused of having 'infiltrated the party' ('Titoists', 'Trotskyists', 'cosmopolitans', etc.). It should be noted that 'purging' did not necessarily mean the same thing as it did in the Soviet Union. In some cases, it meant losing one's job or being demoted; in others it meant being deported or resettled. Some of those 'purged' could even keep their jobs if they were not high up in the party hierarchy. Most were accused of being agents for Tito, who was called the 'chained dog of Western imperialists'.41

The Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials noted in their reports that many of the Yugoslav diplomats had 'built their careers on' the 1948 rift and now had difficulty readjusting.42 For example, Marko Zsigmond, Second Secretary of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest, had once worked in the archive of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee and thus 'knew the

39 Tibor Meray, a noted Hungarian communist writer who later supported Imre Nagy after 1954 wrote: 'Obviously the idea for the trials and trial staging was conceived by the Russians during their battle against Tito and Yugoslavia. [But] it is equally certain that Rikosi and his crew were the most brilliant of the stage directors, since they outstripped their Polish, Bulgarian, and Romanian colleagues. Intent on gaining the attention not only of Stalin but also of international opinion, they made a complete success of this spectacle . . . . [T]he methods of the Hungarian Gauleiters proved to be the best of all because they were the simplest.' Tibor Meray, That Day in Budapest: October 23, 1956 (New York 1969), 114. See also Ferenc Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 62. 'It [the Rajk trial] was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin's reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come.' (Emphases added.) 40 See Gyorgy Litvan (ed.), The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repres- sion, 1953-1963 (London 1996), 19. 41 Ibid. 42 AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, 1. 94, from the Diary of Y.V. Ponomarev, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, J6zsef Marjai', 2 January 1956.

roads to socialism', which was in some ways reminiscent of the earlier ideological quarrel of the 1940s between Stalin's 'popular front from above' and Tito's 'popular front from below'. They told the Hungarian workers that the 1948 rift had been the 'Stalinists' fault'.

More than the Polish Stalinist Bierut, the Yugoslav leader Tito and his sub- ordinates especially detested Maityas Raikosi, who had conducted the 1948 anti-Titoist campaign more zealously than the other leaders in the 'peoples' democracies'.39 After Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk's execution in 1949, thousands of Hungarian communist officials and intellectuals were also sentenced to death or to years of imprisonment, while tens of thousands were dismissed from their posts and the party - and an even larger group of non-communists was sent to the gallows, prisons or concentration camps.40 Besides Rajk, the three other prominent victims of the purge trials in 1949 were Gyorgy Pailfy, Tibor Szonyi and Andras Szalai. The total number of those in some way purged in the 1948-56 period was approximately 350,000. This figure includes those accused of being 'class enemies' (kulaks, clerical reactionaries, etc.), or 'Zionist agents' (Jews), and those accused of having 'infiltrated the party' ('Titoists', 'Trotskyists', 'cosmopolitans', etc.). It should be noted that 'purging' did not necessarily mean the same thing as it did in the Soviet Union. In some cases, it meant losing one's job or being demoted; in others it meant being deported or resettled. Some of those 'purged' could even keep their jobs if they were not high up in the party hierarchy. Most were accused of being agents for Tito, who was called the 'chained dog of Western imperialists'.41

The Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials noted in their reports that many of the Yugoslav diplomats had 'built their careers on' the 1948 rift and now had difficulty readjusting.42 For example, Marko Zsigmond, Second Secretary of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest, had once worked in the archive of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee and thus 'knew the

39 Tibor Meray, a noted Hungarian communist writer who later supported Imre Nagy after 1954 wrote: 'Obviously the idea for the trials and trial staging was conceived by the Russians during their battle against Tito and Yugoslavia. [But] it is equally certain that Rikosi and his crew were the most brilliant of the stage directors, since they outstripped their Polish, Bulgarian, and Romanian colleagues. Intent on gaining the attention not only of Stalin but also of international opinion, they made a complete success of this spectacle . . . . [T]he methods of the Hungarian Gauleiters proved to be the best of all because they were the simplest.' Tibor Meray, That Day in Budapest: October 23, 1956 (New York 1969), 114. See also Ferenc Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 62. 'It [the Rajk trial] was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin's reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come.' (Emphases added.) 40 See Gyorgy Litvan (ed.), The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repres- sion, 1953-1963 (London 1996), 19. 41 Ibid. 42 AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, 1. 94, from the Diary of Y.V. Ponomarev, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, J6zsef Marjai', 2 January 1956.

273 273




history of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift well'.43 Soviet and Hungarian officials noted his tendency to bring the 1948 events into conversations.44

Moreover, the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists' hatred of Rakosi intensi- fied after he admitted on 28 March 1956 that Laszlo Rajk had been innocent, because it further discredited Lazar Brankov, their own compatriot. Brankov was consul at the Yugoslav legation in Budapest in 1948 and charge d'affaires in the absence of Yugoslav Ambassador Mrazovic. In 1948 Rakosi had ignored Brankov's diplomatic immunity, arrested him, and persuaded him to testify against Rajk and Tito during the September 1949 trial.45 Brankov was one of the most damaging witnesses at this rigged trial of Laiszlo6 Rajk. He testified that he had attended meetings during which Tito and Rankovic instructed Rajk about 'overthrowing the socialist order in Hungary'. It is unclear whether Brankov was coerced to testify. He left Hungary in 1956. (Ironically, Brankov was one of the emigre 'Cominformists'; he supported the Cominform Resolution in 1948.) Tito expressed his puzzlement in a speech on 1 October 1949 at the end of manoeuvres by the Yugoslav People's Army in Serbia.

[I]t is interesting that Brankov, who is also one of the accused, immediately, from the very beginning, came out in support of the letters which were sent to our Central Committee. But it is well known who Brankov is, a common thief and defrauder; this has been written about him earlier. And how is it possible that this rascal who considered himself to be the leader of

all likeminded persons on whom they rely in the attack on our country, how is it possible that he was put on trial in such a role?46

It would be natural for the Yugoslav diplomats to conclude from this episode that it was much safer to be an overt 'Titoist' in Hungary, since 1) the

Hungarian 'Stalinist' leadership was adept at using opponents of Tito for its own purposes; 2) no Yugoslav diplomat was safe from Hungarian Stalinists, despite ostensible diplomatic immunity; and 3) it was safer to be a Titoist because of Tito's own repression of 'Cominformists'.

In the spring and summer of 1956, Yugoslav journalists in Hungary attended the Petofi Kor discussions, reported on them in detail, and encouraged Imre Nagy's supporters. Delighted to hear the complaints about Rakosi from

students and writers, the Yugoslavs attributed them to the fact that Raikosi

43 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, d. 036, 1. 148, from the Diary of V.N. Kazimirov, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Second Secretary of the

Yugoslav Mission, Marko Zsigmond and the Attache Novak Radenovic', 5 March 1956.

44 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, 1. 95, from the

Diary of Iu. V. Ponomarev, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of

the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, J6zsef Marjai', 2 January 1956.

45 See Banac, With Stalin against Tito, op. cit., 225, and Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, op.

cit., 62. 46 Josip Broz Tito, 'Power Shall Not Be a Decisive Factor in Relations Between Socialist

Countries' in Pejcinovic (ed.), Josip Broz Tito: Military Thought and Works: Selected Writings

(1936-1979) (Belgrade 1982), 302.

history of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift well'.43 Soviet and Hungarian officials noted his tendency to bring the 1948 events into conversations.44

Moreover, the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists' hatred of Rakosi intensi- fied after he admitted on 28 March 1956 that Laszlo Rajk had been innocent, because it further discredited Lazar Brankov, their own compatriot. Brankov was consul at the Yugoslav legation in Budapest in 1948 and charge d'affaires in the absence of Yugoslav Ambassador Mrazovic. In 1948 Rakosi had ignored Brankov's diplomatic immunity, arrested him, and persuaded him to testify against Rajk and Tito during the September 1949 trial.45 Brankov was one of the most damaging witnesses at this rigged trial of Laiszlo6 Rajk. He testified that he had attended meetings during which Tito and Rankovic instructed Rajk about 'overthrowing the socialist order in Hungary'. It is unclear whether Brankov was coerced to testify. He left Hungary in 1956. (Ironically, Brankov was one of the emigre 'Cominformists'; he supported the Cominform Resolution in 1948.) Tito expressed his puzzlement in a speech on 1 October 1949 at the end of manoeuvres by the Yugoslav People's Army in Serbia.

[I]t is interesting that Brankov, who is also one of the accused, immediately, from the very beginning, came out in support of the letters which were sent to our Central Committee. But it is well known who Brankov is, a common thief and defrauder; this has been written about him earlier. And how is it possible that this rascal who considered himself to be the leader of

all likeminded persons on whom they rely in the attack on our country, how is it possible that he was put on trial in such a role?46

It would be natural for the Yugoslav diplomats to conclude from this episode that it was much safer to be an overt 'Titoist' in Hungary, since 1) the

Hungarian 'Stalinist' leadership was adept at using opponents of Tito for its own purposes; 2) no Yugoslav diplomat was safe from Hungarian Stalinists, despite ostensible diplomatic immunity; and 3) it was safer to be a Titoist because of Tito's own repression of 'Cominformists'.

In the spring and summer of 1956, Yugoslav journalists in Hungary attended the Petofi Kor discussions, reported on them in detail, and encouraged Imre Nagy's supporters. Delighted to hear the complaints about Rakosi from

students and writers, the Yugoslavs attributed them to the fact that Raikosi

43 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, d. 036, 1. 148, from the Diary of V.N. Kazimirov, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Second Secretary of the

Yugoslav Mission, Marko Zsigmond and the Attache Novak Radenovic', 5 March 1956.

44 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, 1. 95, from the

Diary of Iu. V. Ponomarev, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of

the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, J6zsef Marjai', 2 January 1956.

45 See Banac, With Stalin against Tito, op. cit., 225, and Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, op.

cit., 62. 46 Josip Broz Tito, 'Power Shall Not Be a Decisive Factor in Relations Between Socialist

Countries' in Pejcinovic (ed.), Josip Broz Tito: Military Thought and Works: Selected Writings

(1936-1979) (Belgrade 1982), 302.

274 274




had not fully 'corrected his mistakes' after the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress.47

The Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps played a key role in educating the Polish reading public and diplomatic corps about events in Hungary. As political liberalization accelerated in Poland, the Poles naturally showed greater interest in Yugoslav politics. Egon Forgacs of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry noted on 12 October that Polish and Yugoslav delegations have exchanged visits 'more often' and that 'Polish democratization has resulted in their [the Polish people] being more interested inYugoslav politics'.48 Polish Ambassador Adam Willman spoke frequently, for example, with Dalibor Soldatic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest. At a reception in the Yugoslav embassy on 24 May 1956, Soldatic told Willman: 'Polish discussions are widely reflected in the Yugoslav publications, including the newspapers Borba and Polityka and communiques of the Yugoslav Press Agency.'49 News like this soon trickled down to the Hungarians via institutions like the Hungarian-Yugoslav cultural society in Budapest. Although it was banned in 1949, the Hungarians sought to resurrect it in 1956.50 Soviet Ambassador Yurii Andropov immediately notified Moscow with alarm. 'Pay attention to the fact that, despite the liquidation of the society in 1949, it has continued to function, as the enclosed document shows', he wrote. Initiatives like these from the Hungarian intelligentsia seemed to justify Tito in defending himself against Khrushchev's and Kadair's accusations of 'interference'. As Tito wrote in one of the post-invasion letters to the CPSU, it was not Yugoslavia's fault if Hungarians looked to Yugoslavia as a model to emulate. 'We reject the hint about our close ties with the Pet6fi Circle', he said. 'Yugoslavia exists as it is, with its revolutionary past and experience. ... If separate people in Hungary speak about Yugoslavia, that does not give anyone the right to throw blame on Yugoslavia as being responsible for the internal events [of Hungary].'51

A distinction has to be made between the perspective of the leaders of the Hungarian Workers' Party (Magyar Dolgozok Partja, or MDP) and that of the Petofi Circle intellectuals, students and followers of Nagy.

47 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077, o. 37, por. 9, p. 187, 1. 112, Iz Dnevnika S.S. Satuchina, Pervyi Sekretar' Sovetskogo Posol'stva v Vengrii, 'Zapis' Besedy s Pervym Sekretariem Iugoslavskoi Missii, Milan Georgievic', 2 iulia 1956 g. 48 MOL (Budapest) XIX-J-1-j (1945-1964). Kiiliigyminiszterium TUK Lengyelorszig. 5 doboz. 5/b, 12. X.1956. old. 1. 'Lengyel - jugoszlav viszony ijabb fejlemenyei'. 49 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. depesz W. 48, T. 612, s. 1, Szyfrogram nr. 9583, 25.V.1956, from Adam Willman in Budapest to [Karol] Korolczyk in Warsaw. 50 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39, 11. 43-6, from Yurii Andropov to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N.S. Patolichev. 'About the Rehabilitation of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Society', trans. from Hungarian by V. Kazimirov. (One of the society members was G6za Losonczy, a close Nagy supporter who died in prison even before Nagy was exe- cuted.) 51 RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, per. 45, dok. 38, 1. 15, from the CC CPY, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU, Khrushchev, 8 November 1956.

had not fully 'corrected his mistakes' after the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress.47

The Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps played a key role in educating the Polish reading public and diplomatic corps about events in Hungary. As political liberalization accelerated in Poland, the Poles naturally showed greater interest in Yugoslav politics. Egon Forgacs of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry noted on 12 October that Polish and Yugoslav delegations have exchanged visits 'more often' and that 'Polish democratization has resulted in their [the Polish people] being more interested inYugoslav politics'.48 Polish Ambassador Adam Willman spoke frequently, for example, with Dalibor Soldatic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest. At a reception in the Yugoslav embassy on 24 May 1956, Soldatic told Willman: 'Polish discussions are widely reflected in the Yugoslav publications, including the newspapers Borba and Polityka and communiques of the Yugoslav Press Agency.'49 News like this soon trickled down to the Hungarians via institutions like the Hungarian-Yugoslav cultural society in Budapest. Although it was banned in 1949, the Hungarians sought to resurrect it in 1956.50 Soviet Ambassador Yurii Andropov immediately notified Moscow with alarm. 'Pay attention to the fact that, despite the liquidation of the society in 1949, it has continued to function, as the enclosed document shows', he wrote. Initiatives like these from the Hungarian intelligentsia seemed to justify Tito in defending himself against Khrushchev's and Kadair's accusations of 'interference'. As Tito wrote in one of the post-invasion letters to the CPSU, it was not Yugoslavia's fault if Hungarians looked to Yugoslavia as a model to emulate. 'We reject the hint about our close ties with the Pet6fi Circle', he said. 'Yugoslavia exists as it is, with its revolutionary past and experience. ... If separate people in Hungary speak about Yugoslavia, that does not give anyone the right to throw blame on Yugoslavia as being responsible for the internal events [of Hungary].'51

A distinction has to be made between the perspective of the leaders of the Hungarian Workers' Party (Magyar Dolgozok Partja, or MDP) and that of the Petofi Circle intellectuals, students and followers of Nagy.

47 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077, o. 37, por. 9, p. 187, 1. 112, Iz Dnevnika S.S. Satuchina, Pervyi Sekretar' Sovetskogo Posol'stva v Vengrii, 'Zapis' Besedy s Pervym Sekretariem Iugoslavskoi Missii, Milan Georgievic', 2 iulia 1956 g. 48 MOL (Budapest) XIX-J-1-j (1945-1964). Kiiliigyminiszterium TUK Lengyelorszig. 5 doboz. 5/b, 12. X.1956. old. 1. 'Lengyel - jugoszlav viszony ijabb fejlemenyei'. 49 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. depesz W. 48, T. 612, s. 1, Szyfrogram nr. 9583, 25.V.1956, from Adam Willman in Budapest to [Karol] Korolczyk in Warsaw. 50 AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39, 11. 43-6, from Yurii Andropov to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N.S. Patolichev. 'About the Rehabilitation of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Society', trans. from Hungarian by V. Kazimirov. (One of the society members was G6za Losonczy, a close Nagy supporter who died in prison even before Nagy was exe- cuted.) 51 RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, per. 45, dok. 38, 1. 15, from the CC CPY, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU, Khrushchev, 8 November 1956.

275 275




The first major Polish event that affected the Hungarians was the Poznani revolt of 28-29 June. Just one day earlier, a tumultuous press debate took place in Budapest, which was sponsored by the Petofi Circle. In his telegram to Moscow, Mikoyan referred to this debate as 'an ideological Poznani without gunshots'. He continued: 'We should remember that in Poznafi there were no direct counter-revolutionary attacks. Thus, the absence of counter- revolutionary slogans in the Pet6fi Circle should not reassure the Hungarian communists.'52

At that time, Matyais Rakosi was still in power, although only for another three weeks. He convened a meeting of the MDP Central Committee two days after the Poznanf revolt, on 30 June, to call for a resolution against the Petofi Circle, which was later published in Szabad Nep on 1 July 1956. Citing the 'anti-Soviet nature' of the speakers' remarks at the Petofi Circle debate and the Poznani crisis in Poland, Rakosi sought to punish the Peto'fi Circle and sharply curtail freedom of the press. 'This was the most seriously organized attack against our people's democratic order, and against the workers' class we have seen in some time!', Rakosi exclaimed.53 He was shocked that even 'members of the Central Leadership, a Deputy Minister, the President of the Pest County's Council and similar functionaries were present', because this strengthened even more 'the growing right-wing attacks'. People were so eager to get good seats that they 'presented false invitations and took their places hours before the beginning of the ceremony'. Rakosi was also disgusted that

Foreign journalists were also present, taking pictures. Some of the speakers attacked the party leadership, and the party itself in carefully-prepared, written speeches. Some utilized clever demagoguery invoking the XXth Congress; they spoke of freedom and the youth of '48, enticing the audience to commit hostile acts.54

Rakosi used the event to attack the Nagy group. 'We have to tighten our

party's ranks. This is even more important because this month, on the occa- sion of Imre Nagy's [sixtieth] birthday, a group of comrades got together -

among them two members of the Central Leadership - comrades Czottner and Boros participated.'55 Sensitive to the growing criticism against him for not

implementing the lessons of the Twentieth Party Congress, Rakosi added: 'This does not mean the repression of edifying judgment and of debate which solidifies our free, socialist order.'56 Genuinely alarmed, Rakosi and other

52 RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, 1. 61. 'Informatsiia Mikoiana iz Budapeshta, 18 iulia 1956'. 53 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 52/34 6.e., (MDP), old. 14, Budapest, 30.XI.1956. 54 Ibid., old. 14. The reference is to 15 March 1848, a key date in Hungarians' revolutionary struggles for independence. Two especially vocal speakers in the Petofi Circle, Tibor D6ry and Tibor Tardos, were expelled from the MDP, but readmitted in September 1956. 55 Sandor Czottner (1903-80) served as Hungarian Minister of Mining and Energy from 1950 to 31 October 1956. From 1957 until 1963 he was the Minister of Heavy Industry. Gergely Boros was a more minor official in the MDP Central Leadership in October 1956. 56 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 52/34 6.e., (MDP), old. 14, Budapest, 30.VI.1956.

The first major Polish event that affected the Hungarians was the Poznani revolt of 28-29 June. Just one day earlier, a tumultuous press debate took place in Budapest, which was sponsored by the Petofi Circle. In his telegram to Moscow, Mikoyan referred to this debate as 'an ideological Poznani without gunshots'. He continued: 'We should remember that in Poznafi there were no direct counter-revolutionary attacks. Thus, the absence of counter- revolutionary slogans in the Pet6fi Circle should not reassure the Hungarian communists.'52

At that time, Matyais Rakosi was still in power, although only for another three weeks. He convened a meeting of the MDP Central Committee two days after the Poznanf revolt, on 30 June, to call for a resolution against the Petofi Circle, which was later published in Szabad Nep on 1 July 1956. Citing the 'anti-Soviet nature' of the speakers' remarks at the Petofi Circle debate and the Poznani crisis in Poland, Rakosi sought to punish the Peto'fi Circle and sharply curtail freedom of the press. 'This was the most seriously organized attack against our people's democratic order, and against the workers' class we have seen in some time!', Rakosi exclaimed.53 He was shocked that even 'members of the Central Leadership, a Deputy Minister, the President of the Pest County's Council and similar functionaries were present', because this strengthened even more 'the growing right-wing attacks'. People were so eager to get good seats that they 'presented false invitations and took their places hours before the beginning of the ceremony'. Rakosi was also disgusted that

Foreign journalists were also present, taking pictures. Some of the speakers attacked the party leadership, and the party itself in carefully-prepared, written speeches. Some utilized clever demagoguery invoking the XXth Congress; they spoke of freedom and the youth of '48, enticing the audience to commit hostile acts.54

Rakosi used the event to attack the Nagy group. 'We have to tighten our

party's ranks. This is even more important because this month, on the occa- sion of Imre Nagy's [sixtieth] birthday, a group of comrades got together -

among them two members of the Central Leadership - comrades Czottner and Boros participated.'55 Sensitive to the growing criticism against him for not

implementing the lessons of the Twentieth Party Congress, Rakosi added: 'This does not mean the repression of edifying judgment and of debate which solidifies our free, socialist order.'56 Genuinely alarmed, Rakosi and other

52 RGANI (Moscow), f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, 1. 61. 'Informatsiia Mikoiana iz Budapeshta, 18 iulia 1956'. 53 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 52/34 6.e., (MDP), old. 14, Budapest, 30.XI.1956. 54 Ibid., old. 14. The reference is to 15 March 1848, a key date in Hungarians' revolutionary struggles for independence. Two especially vocal speakers in the Petofi Circle, Tibor D6ry and Tibor Tardos, were expelled from the MDP, but readmitted in September 1956. 55 Sandor Czottner (1903-80) served as Hungarian Minister of Mining and Energy from 1950 to 31 October 1956. From 1957 until 1963 he was the Minister of Heavy Industry. Gergely Boros was a more minor official in the MDP Central Leadership in October 1956. 56 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 52/34 6.e., (MDP), old. 14, Budapest, 30.VI.1956.

276 276




hard-liners believed that the 'Poznan provocation has spurred a growth in enemy activity inside the peoples' democracies; including our own backyard .... [T]he enemy is using all instruments at his disposal to discredit the out- come of the XXth Congress. It is trying to sow confusion between the party and the worker masses.'

Poznan's famous international fair permitted Raikosi to raise the spectre of foreign espionage. He said: 'A few days before the fair, the Americans had sent many groups of parachuting, armed saboteurs.'57 Janos Tausz, Minister of Internal Trade, supported Rakosi on the need to issue a resolution to suppress the Petofi Circle. 'We have tolerated too many right-wing manifestations in the last few months under the guise of developing open criticism.'58 He added:

After reading the papers this morning about the events in Poznafi [this has] become my opinion. We shouldn't play with fire, and without further delay the party must make a resolution in which it clearly and decisively states its point of view, because I maintain that this will aid the development of rightful criticism .... We are still too close to the Horthy regime's reign of horror; we can't afford such luxuries. After the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, we must step up resolutely so that the working class sees crystal clearly the party line and the party's point of view.59

In the opinion of Tausz, Andras Hegediis and other officials, the source of the problem was not the 'fight against bureaucracy', but rather the press. They had been discussing one particular article in Szabad Nep on 24 June that had praised the Pet6fi Circle debates. Hegediis agreed that 'by now a big part of the media is not controlled by the party anymore'. He said:

Comrade Khrushchev emphasized very starkly the incidents occurring in ... Poland with serious implications for the whole international workers' movement. How serious would the situation be if events like those taking place in Poland occurred in the Soviet Union or other peoples' democracies? This would cause inestimable damage to human progress, to the cause of socialism. This issue must not only be viewed from a Hungarian angle, but also from an international point of view.60

This 'problem' of the uncontrolled press persisted well into the autumn, under Gero's leadership, despite resolutions specifically calling for stricter overview and holding key party officials accountable. At a session of the Political Committee on 20 October, for example, Hungarian party officials decreed that 'the Hungarian press and radio are allowed to deal with the Polish events only according to the articles by TASS [the Soviet News Agency] and to official Polish materials in a comparable official tone'. Lajos Acs, one of the

57 Ibid., old. 14. 58 Ibid., old. 24-5. 59 Ibid. (emphasis added). The phrase 'events in Czechoslovakia' in all likelihood refers to the hitherto unknown abortive student revolts in Prague and Bratislava, April-May 1956. See John P.C. Matthews, 'Majales: The Abortive Student Revolt in Czechoslovakia in 1956', Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 24 (Washington DC September 1998). 60 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 52/34 6.e., old. 33, 30 junius 1956.

hard-liners believed that the 'Poznan provocation has spurred a growth in enemy activity inside the peoples' democracies; including our own backyard .... [T]he enemy is using all instruments at his disposal to discredit the out- come of the XXth Congress. It is trying to sow confusion between the party and the worker masses.'

Poznan's famous international fair permitted Raikosi to raise the spectre of foreign espionage. He said: 'A few days before the fair, the Americans had sent many groups of parachuting, armed saboteurs.'57 Janos Tausz, Minister of Internal Trade, supported Rakosi on the need to issue a resolution to suppress the Petofi Circle. 'We have tolerated too many right-wing manifestations in the last few months under the guise of developing open criticism.'58 He added:

After reading the papers this morning about the events in Poznafi [this has] become my opinion. We shouldn't play with fire, and without further delay the party must make a resolution in which it clearly and decisively states its point of view, because I maintain that this will aid the development of rightful criticism .... We are still too close to the Horthy regime's reign of horror; we can't afford such luxuries. After the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, we must step up resolutely so that the working class sees crystal clearly the party line and the party's point of view.59

In the opinion of Tausz, Andras Hegediis and other officials, the source of the problem was not the 'fight against bureaucracy', but rather the press. They had been discussing one particular article in Szabad Nep on 24 June that had praised the Pet6fi Circle debates. Hegediis agreed that 'by now a big part of the media is not controlled by the party anymore'. He said:

Comrade Khrushchev emphasized very starkly the incidents occurring in ... Poland with serious implications for the whole international workers' movement. How serious would the situation be if events like those taking place in Poland occurred in the Soviet Union or other peoples' democracies? This would cause inestimable damage to human progress, to the cause of socialism. This issue must not only be viewed from a Hungarian angle, but also from an international point of view.60

This 'problem' of the uncontrolled press persisted well into the autumn, under Gero's leadership, despite resolutions specifically calling for stricter overview and holding key party officials accountable. At a session of the Political Committee on 20 October, for example, Hungarian party officials decreed that 'the Hungarian press and radio are allowed to deal with the Polish events only according to the articles by TASS [the Soviet News Agency] and to official Polish materials in a comparable official tone'. Lajos Acs, one of the

57 Ibid., old. 14. 58 Ibid., old. 24-5. 59 Ibid. (emphasis added). The phrase 'events in Czechoslovakia' in all likelihood refers to the hitherto unknown abortive student revolts in Prague and Bratislava, April-May 1956. See John P.C. Matthews, 'Majales: The Abortive Student Revolt in Czechoslovakia in 1956', Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 24 (Washington DC September 1998). 60 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 52/34 6.e., old. 33, 30 junius 1956.

277 277




Political Committee members, was to be held responsible for overseeing the editorial boards.61 Despite these precautions, Szabad Nep published a major editorial on 23 October praising the upcoming student demonstration, thus making it difficult for Gero to cancel it.

As the crisis in Hungary accelerated in October, however, especially after the Polish Eighth Plenum (when Gomulka was elected and the Soviet tanks were withdrawn), one finds, surprisingly, that the Polish example was seldom mentioned in Hungarian decision-making sessions. A thorough perusal of the minutes of the MDP (MSZMP) Political Committee from 23 October to 4 November reveals little mention of Poland.62 Once so fearful of the Poznani riot, the eruption of the revolution in their own country ostensibly over- shadowed the Hungarian leaders' earlier anxieties about Poland. As Ambas- sador Willman reported to Karol Korolczyk, deputy director of the First Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry in Warsaw:

The chairman of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, while discussing with Miinnich and me the problem of past fears of some Hungarian high-ranking party members concerning the developing situation in Poland, said that 'fears for the socialist development of Poland have long ago disappeared and melted as snow when a thaw begins'.63

The Hungarian party officials were instead consumed with survival issues, such as ensuring the food supply, getting people off the streets, disarming the insurgents, treating the wounded and burying the dead. At the session of the Hungarian council of ministers held at 2 p.m. on 23 October, Hegediis told his colleagues that he did not know much about the Polish events because he had no time to read about them. He had just returned from Yugoslavia.64 The

Hungarian embassy in Warsaw also had difficulty assessing events. Peter Balo, the Hungarian ambassador to Poland, reported:

The embassy work during the last period was influenced by the events back at home [in Hungary]. Its work consisted of informing dozens of delegations.... Everybody was con-

cerned for the development of socialism. This does not mean that everybody evaluated the

events correctly. [E]vents occurred so quickly, and the situation was so difficult, that it was

impossible to evaluate it.65

61 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 53, 6.e. 310, old. 1 'Jegyz6konyv, A Politikai Bizottsig 1956 okt6ber 2o-in tartott uiilsr6l'. 62 Nagy's new government was renamed the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkispart or MSZMP) on 1 November 1956. 63 AMSZ (Warsaw) Z. depesz T. 783 W. 57, s. 89, szyfrogram nr. 4746 , 17 kwiecien 1958, from Ambassador Willman, Budapest, to Korolczyk, Warsaw. 64 MOL (Budapest), XIX-a-83-a 160 doboz, Jegyz6konyv, Keszult a Minisztertanics 1956.

tvi okt6ber h6 23-an d.u. 2 6rakor kezd6d6 ileser6ol. 65 MOL (Budapest) XIX-J-1-j (1945-1964). Kuliigyminiszterium TUK Lengyelorszag, Magyar

Nepkoztarsasag Nagykovetsege, Vars6, 'A kovetseg legkozelebbi feladatai', 1 doboz. 1/b 008066, 1956. 15 december 1956, old. 1. Emphasis added.

Political Committee members, was to be held responsible for overseeing the editorial boards.61 Despite these precautions, Szabad Nep published a major editorial on 23 October praising the upcoming student demonstration, thus making it difficult for Gero to cancel it.

As the crisis in Hungary accelerated in October, however, especially after the Polish Eighth Plenum (when Gomulka was elected and the Soviet tanks were withdrawn), one finds, surprisingly, that the Polish example was seldom mentioned in Hungarian decision-making sessions. A thorough perusal of the minutes of the MDP (MSZMP) Political Committee from 23 October to 4 November reveals little mention of Poland.62 Once so fearful of the Poznani riot, the eruption of the revolution in their own country ostensibly over- shadowed the Hungarian leaders' earlier anxieties about Poland. As Ambas- sador Willman reported to Karol Korolczyk, deputy director of the First Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry in Warsaw:

The chairman of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, while discussing with Miinnich and me the problem of past fears of some Hungarian high-ranking party members concerning the developing situation in Poland, said that 'fears for the socialist development of Poland have long ago disappeared and melted as snow when a thaw begins'.63

The Hungarian party officials were instead consumed with survival issues, such as ensuring the food supply, getting people off the streets, disarming the insurgents, treating the wounded and burying the dead. At the session of the Hungarian council of ministers held at 2 p.m. on 23 October, Hegediis told his colleagues that he did not know much about the Polish events because he had no time to read about them. He had just returned from Yugoslavia.64 The

Hungarian embassy in Warsaw also had difficulty assessing events. Peter Balo, the Hungarian ambassador to Poland, reported:

The embassy work during the last period was influenced by the events back at home [in Hungary]. Its work consisted of informing dozens of delegations.... Everybody was con-

cerned for the development of socialism. This does not mean that everybody evaluated the

events correctly. [E]vents occurred so quickly, and the situation was so difficult, that it was

impossible to evaluate it.65

61 MOL (Budapest) MK S276, csoport 53, 6.e. 310, old. 1 'Jegyz6konyv, A Politikai Bizottsig 1956 okt6ber 2o-in tartott uiilsr6l'. 62 Nagy's new government was renamed the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkispart or MSZMP) on 1 November 1956. 63 AMSZ (Warsaw) Z. depesz T. 783 W. 57, s. 89, szyfrogram nr. 4746 , 17 kwiecien 1958, from Ambassador Willman, Budapest, to Korolczyk, Warsaw. 64 MOL (Budapest), XIX-a-83-a 160 doboz, Jegyz6konyv, Keszult a Minisztertanics 1956.

tvi okt6ber h6 23-an d.u. 2 6rakor kezd6d6 ileser6ol. 65 MOL (Budapest) XIX-J-1-j (1945-1964). Kuliigyminiszterium TUK Lengyelorszag, Magyar

Nepkoztarsasag Nagykovetsege, Vars6, 'A kovetseg legkozelebbi feladatai', 1 doboz. 1/b 008066, 1956. 15 december 1956, old. 1. Emphasis added.

278 278




As was to be expected, the circle of crisis decision-makers also narrowed. At the MDP Central Committee plenum on 28 October, attended by Soviet Presidium members Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, an 'emergency sextet' was formed, consisting of Jinos Kadair (director), Antal Apro, Karoly Kiss, Ferenc Minnich, Imre Nagy and Zoltan Szanto.66

The Polish example did, however, inspire Hungarian students and intellectuals. For months leading up to the revolution, Hungarian students were regularly invited to the special 'Polish Reading Room' (Czytelnia Polska) in Budapest for special 'Polish-Hungarian Friendship Weeks', poetry readings, films, field trips, lectures and language lessons.67 Gomutka's triumphant speech of 20 October was published in full in Szabad Nep, the official organ of the MDP on 23 October, the very day of the student demonstration in Budapest. Gomutka's rise in Poland provided the Hungarian intellectuals with an opportunity to express their grievances against the Stalinist communists and Soviet domination.

Moreover, the route that the student demonstrators took on 23 October is significant. About 10,000 students started off from the statue of the poet Sandor Petofi.68 After articulating the above-mentioned 16 points and listening to the famous actor Imre Sinkovits recite poetry, the demonstrators, in a sym- bolic gesture, marched to the statue of the Polish General Jozef Bem - the hero of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49 - chanting:

Independence based on freedom and equality!69 Poland shows us the way, let's follow the Hungarian way! We're the nation of Father Bem and Kossuth, let's walk hand in hand! Long live the Polish nation! Long live the Polish Workers' Party! Long live the Polish-Hungarian friendship! To hell with traitor leaders! We want new leadership; we trust in Imre Nagy! We won't stop half way, death to Stalinism! Independence, freedom!

66 'Feljegyzes az MDP K6zponti vezetosegenek iuleserol, 28 okt6ber 1956', old. 116, Otvenhat okt6bere es a hatalom: a Magyar dolgoz6k Pdrtja vezeto testiileteinek dukumentumai 1956 okt6ber 24-okt6ber 28 (Budapest 1997). 67 AMSZ (Warsaw) Z. 7, T. 551 W. 66, s. 33-41, 'Sprawozdanie z dzialalnogci Czytelni Polskiej za pierwszy kwartal 1956 roku'. 68 Sandor Petdfi is arguably the most famous Hungarian poet. He became the aide-de-camp of General J6zsef Bem, then head of the Transylvanian army, who had great affection for the somewhat unsoldierly but enthusiastic poet. Petdfi played a leading role in the literary life of the period preceding the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution of 1848. He disappeared during the Battle of Segesvar on 31 July 1849. According to one account, Soviet investigators found archival documents in the late 1980s revealing Pet6fi to have been one of the 1800 Hungarian prisoners of war who were marched to Siberia. According to this source, he died of tuberculosis in 1856. See Gyula Farkas, 'About the supposed skeleton of Sandor Pet6fi found in Siberia' in Acta Biologica, Nova series, Tomus XLIII, Fasciculil-4, 1999. http://www.sci.u-szeged.hu/ABS/old./90s.html. Also mentioned on the website of the University of West England. See 'Biographies: Mass Politics and the Revolutions of 1848', http://humanities.uwe.ac.uk/corehistorians/ 1848/coredocs/biogs.htm. 69 J6zef Bem was born in 1794 in Tarn6w, Galicia, which is now part of Poland. Although a Polish army officer who trained at the Warsaw Military School, Bem offered his services to the Hungarian leader Lajos Kossuth in 1848 and defeated his opponents in Transylvania and the Banat region.

As was to be expected, the circle of crisis decision-makers also narrowed. At the MDP Central Committee plenum on 28 October, attended by Soviet Presidium members Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, an 'emergency sextet' was formed, consisting of Jinos Kadair (director), Antal Apro, Karoly Kiss, Ferenc Minnich, Imre Nagy and Zoltan Szanto.66

The Polish example did, however, inspire Hungarian students and intellectuals. For months leading up to the revolution, Hungarian students were regularly invited to the special 'Polish Reading Room' (Czytelnia Polska) in Budapest for special 'Polish-Hungarian Friendship Weeks', poetry readings, films, field trips, lectures and language lessons.67 Gomutka's triumphant speech of 20 October was published in full in Szabad Nep, the official organ of the MDP on 23 October, the very day of the student demonstration in Budapest. Gomutka's rise in Poland provided the Hungarian intellectuals with an opportunity to express their grievances against the Stalinist communists and Soviet domination.

Moreover, the route that the student demonstrators took on 23 October is significant. About 10,000 students started off from the statue of the poet Sandor Petofi.68 After articulating the above-mentioned 16 points and listening to the famous actor Imre Sinkovits recite poetry, the demonstrators, in a sym- bolic gesture, marched to the statue of the Polish General Jozef Bem - the hero of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49 - chanting:

Independence based on freedom and equality!69 Poland shows us the way, let's follow the Hungarian way! We're the nation of Father Bem and Kossuth, let's walk hand in hand! Long live the Polish nation! Long live the Polish Workers' Party! Long live the Polish-Hungarian friendship! To hell with traitor leaders! We want new leadership; we trust in Imre Nagy! We won't stop half way, death to Stalinism! Independence, freedom!

66 'Feljegyzes az MDP K6zponti vezetosegenek iuleserol, 28 okt6ber 1956', old. 116, Otvenhat okt6bere es a hatalom: a Magyar dolgoz6k Pdrtja vezeto testiileteinek dukumentumai 1956 okt6ber 24-okt6ber 28 (Budapest 1997). 67 AMSZ (Warsaw) Z. 7, T. 551 W. 66, s. 33-41, 'Sprawozdanie z dzialalnogci Czytelni Polskiej za pierwszy kwartal 1956 roku'. 68 Sandor Petdfi is arguably the most famous Hungarian poet. He became the aide-de-camp of General J6zsef Bem, then head of the Transylvanian army, who had great affection for the somewhat unsoldierly but enthusiastic poet. Petdfi played a leading role in the literary life of the period preceding the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution of 1848. He disappeared during the Battle of Segesvar on 31 July 1849. According to one account, Soviet investigators found archival documents in the late 1980s revealing Pet6fi to have been one of the 1800 Hungarian prisoners of war who were marched to Siberia. According to this source, he died of tuberculosis in 1856. See Gyula Farkas, 'About the supposed skeleton of Sandor Pet6fi found in Siberia' in Acta Biologica, Nova series, Tomus XLIII, Fasciculil-4, 1999. http://www.sci.u-szeged.hu/ABS/old./90s.html. Also mentioned on the website of the University of West England. See 'Biographies: Mass Politics and the Revolutions of 1848', http://humanities.uwe.ac.uk/corehistorians/ 1848/coredocs/biogs.htm. 69 J6zef Bem was born in 1794 in Tarn6w, Galicia, which is now part of Poland. Although a Polish army officer who trained at the Warsaw Military School, Bem offered his services to the Hungarian leader Lajos Kossuth in 1848 and defeated his opponents in Transylvania and the Banat region.

279 279




When they arrived at Bem Square around 4 p.m., they placed flowers on the statue, and hung up Polish flags, the Kossuth coat of arms and Hungarian flags with the coat of arms symbol representing the communist regime cut out of the middle.70

In addition to the students, the Nagy government also looked to Poland for guidance. For example, at the session of the MSZMP Political Committee on 2 November, Nagy's cabinet suggested that Warsaw would be the right place for negotiations between the Hungarian and Soviet delegations regarding Soviet troop withdrawal. As things turned out, the negotiations took place at the Soviet military headquarters in Budapest. When one recalls that KGB Chief Ivan Serov arrested the entire Hungarian delegation at midnight on 3 Nov- ember on Csepel Island (Budapest), thus incarcerating Nagy's top military officials on the eve of the second invasion, one wonders how much the course of history might have been altered had Warsaw been chosen instead as the site for negotiations.7' As we now know, Nagy also sought the Polish leadership's help on 3 November, regarding Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Hungarian cardinal and Archbishop of Esztergom since 1945, who had been released from prison on 31 October 1956. Ambassador Willman sent a telegram at 4 p.m. on 3 November to Warsaw, conveying Nagy's request that the Polish government persuade Cardinal Wyszyiiski, head of the Polish Church, to exert influence on Cardinal Mindszenty in favour of reducing the tension in Hungary. The Soviet intervention the next day rendered this request point- less.72 Poland played a mediating role yet again after the second Soviet intervention, when Janos Kadar requested on 11 November that Ambassador Willman help mediate between his new government and the Nagy group stay- ing at the Yugoslav embassy.73

In contrast to Hungarian reactions to the events in Poland, Polish reactions were more complex and in some ways circumspect, due in part to the greater scale of violence in Hungary and to Gomulka's temperament as a realist.

70 MOL (Budapest) 1676/2000, XX-5-h, 1. doboz, 1. kotet, 'Esemenynaptar, 1956, old. 137'. 71 MOL (Budapest) 3541/2000, XX-5-h, 13. doboz, 8. kotet, Vizsgalati dosszi6: Nagy Imre es tarsai ugyeben, 1957. III. 10.-1957. VIII. 17. Jegyz6konyv a Kormany Kabinet 1956 november 2-a'n delutan tartott negyedik iileser6l. It is not yet known exactly why the negotiation site was changed to the Soviet headquarters, but presumably the Soviet leadership - having decided to intervene by then - insisted on the change for logistical reasons. 72 AMSZ (Warsaw), Szyfrogram nr. 17984/2 z Budapesztu, 3 listopada 1956, s. 101. The Polish Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyfiski was arrested in 1953 and released on 28 October 1956. He supported Gomulka's policies. Jo6zsef Cardinal Mindszenty, on the other hand, supported Nagy and the revolution but in a much more restrained fashion. He was sentenced to life in 1948 and released on 31 October 1956. On 4 November, he took refuge in the US embassy in Budapest. 73 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z despesz, w. 48, t. 613, kart 30, 11 listopada 1956. 'Depesza od Wierna do polskiej ambasady w Budapeszcie'. Wierna told Willman to assist in reaching an agreement and in concentrating the socialist forces in the government.

When they arrived at Bem Square around 4 p.m., they placed flowers on the statue, and hung up Polish flags, the Kossuth coat of arms and Hungarian flags with the coat of arms symbol representing the communist regime cut out of the middle.70

In addition to the students, the Nagy government also looked to Poland for guidance. For example, at the session of the MSZMP Political Committee on 2 November, Nagy's cabinet suggested that Warsaw would be the right place for negotiations between the Hungarian and Soviet delegations regarding Soviet troop withdrawal. As things turned out, the negotiations took place at the Soviet military headquarters in Budapest. When one recalls that KGB Chief Ivan Serov arrested the entire Hungarian delegation at midnight on 3 Nov- ember on Csepel Island (Budapest), thus incarcerating Nagy's top military officials on the eve of the second invasion, one wonders how much the course of history might have been altered had Warsaw been chosen instead as the site for negotiations.7' As we now know, Nagy also sought the Polish leadership's help on 3 November, regarding Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Hungarian cardinal and Archbishop of Esztergom since 1945, who had been released from prison on 31 October 1956. Ambassador Willman sent a telegram at 4 p.m. on 3 November to Warsaw, conveying Nagy's request that the Polish government persuade Cardinal Wyszyiiski, head of the Polish Church, to exert influence on Cardinal Mindszenty in favour of reducing the tension in Hungary. The Soviet intervention the next day rendered this request point- less.72 Poland played a mediating role yet again after the second Soviet intervention, when Janos Kadar requested on 11 November that Ambassador Willman help mediate between his new government and the Nagy group stay- ing at the Yugoslav embassy.73

In contrast to Hungarian reactions to the events in Poland, Polish reactions were more complex and in some ways circumspect, due in part to the greater scale of violence in Hungary and to Gomulka's temperament as a realist.

70 MOL (Budapest) 1676/2000, XX-5-h, 1. doboz, 1. kotet, 'Esemenynaptar, 1956, old. 137'. 71 MOL (Budapest) 3541/2000, XX-5-h, 13. doboz, 8. kotet, Vizsgalati dosszi6: Nagy Imre es tarsai ugyeben, 1957. III. 10.-1957. VIII. 17. Jegyz6konyv a Kormany Kabinet 1956 november 2-a'n delutan tartott negyedik iileser6l. It is not yet known exactly why the negotiation site was changed to the Soviet headquarters, but presumably the Soviet leadership - having decided to intervene by then - insisted on the change for logistical reasons. 72 AMSZ (Warsaw), Szyfrogram nr. 17984/2 z Budapesztu, 3 listopada 1956, s. 101. The Polish Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyfiski was arrested in 1953 and released on 28 October 1956. He supported Gomulka's policies. Jo6zsef Cardinal Mindszenty, on the other hand, supported Nagy and the revolution but in a much more restrained fashion. He was sentenced to life in 1948 and released on 31 October 1956. On 4 November, he took refuge in the US embassy in Budapest. 73 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z despesz, w. 48, t. 613, kart 30, 11 listopada 1956. 'Depesza od Wierna do polskiej ambasady w Budapeszcie'. Wierna told Willman to assist in reaching an agreement and in concentrating the socialist forces in the government.

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He and his colleagues in the PZPR followed events closely in Hungary, as indicated by the high-level PZPR Central Committee meetings, official communiques, and the more than 60 secret telegrams to Warsaw written by Ambassador Adam Willman in Budapest.

As with the Hungarian reactions, one needs to differentiate between the different segments of the Polish population: the Polish masses, journalists, the diplomatic corps in Budapest and Gomulka himself.

On the one hand, the Polish population expressed great sympathy for Hungary for its human and material losses, particularly given the special historical relationship between the two countries. Poland and Hungary had shared monarchs74 and aided each other during the second world war, albeit fighting on opposite sides.75 Indeed, for many Poles the Hungarian uprising reminded them of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. In both cases outnumbered 'freedom fighters' fought stronger foes without external assistance and lost. In the end, while deterred by their common sense, many Polish veterans nevertheless had yearned to intervene more actively.

Polish journalists also opposed the Soviet intervention, and were infuriated when a Polish delegation voted in the UN on 4 November on the side of the USSR against the West on the Hungarian question.76 The first news about the 'Hungarian tragedy' was provided by more or less uncensored Polish newspapers, such as Trybuna Ludu (the central organ of the PZPR Central Committee) and other provincial newspapers on 24 and 25 October. On 28 October the PZPR Central Committee published an appeal to '[our] Hun- garian brothers' to stop the shedding of blood.77 Radio Poland called for blood donors, and so many citizens volunteered that they had to sign up for appoint- ments. They also collected money, food and medicines to send to Hungary. In fact, Poland was one of the very first countries to begin sending generous

74 Through strategic marriages with Hungarians, the Polish monarchy was able to extend its power and territory. In the fourteenth century, for example, the main line of the Piast dynasty ended in 1370 with Casimir III, and the crown passed to Casimir's nephew, Louis I of Hungary and to Louis' daughter, Jadwiga, who married the Duke of Lithuania, the ruler of the house of Jagellon. Poland and Lithuania then began 187 years of joint rule and expansion. See Joyce Moss and George Wilson (eds), Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Republics: The Culture, Geographi- cal Setting, and Historical Background of 34 Eastern European Peoples (Detroit 1993), 203. 75 The Hungarians went to extraordinary lengths to help Polish Jews escape the Holocaust. Janusz Moszczefiski, First Secretary of the Polish embassy in Budapest, wrote a report discussing the activities of Dr J6zsef Antal, the former director of the social department in the Hungarian Interior Ministry during the war. According to his account, during the war he facilitated the departure to the West of several thousand Polish Jews. They escaped to Hungary from the terri- tories of former Galicia occupied by Hungarian armies. He provided them with 'Arian' papers in Hungary and protected them from German and 'native' fascists. AMSZ Z. 7, T. 553, W. 67, s. 161. Budapeszt, 27.III.1957. 76 See note 96. 77 'Apel KC PZPR do narodu wVgierskiego, 28 paidziernika 1956 r.', Sztandar Mlodych, 28 paidziernika 1956 r., s. 1. Published also in Tischler (ed.), Dokumenty do Dziej6w PRL, op. cit., 132.

He and his colleagues in the PZPR followed events closely in Hungary, as indicated by the high-level PZPR Central Committee meetings, official communiques, and the more than 60 secret telegrams to Warsaw written by Ambassador Adam Willman in Budapest.

As with the Hungarian reactions, one needs to differentiate between the different segments of the Polish population: the Polish masses, journalists, the diplomatic corps in Budapest and Gomulka himself.

On the one hand, the Polish population expressed great sympathy for Hungary for its human and material losses, particularly given the special historical relationship between the two countries. Poland and Hungary had shared monarchs74 and aided each other during the second world war, albeit fighting on opposite sides.75 Indeed, for many Poles the Hungarian uprising reminded them of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. In both cases outnumbered 'freedom fighters' fought stronger foes without external assistance and lost. In the end, while deterred by their common sense, many Polish veterans nevertheless had yearned to intervene more actively.

Polish journalists also opposed the Soviet intervention, and were infuriated when a Polish delegation voted in the UN on 4 November on the side of the USSR against the West on the Hungarian question.76 The first news about the 'Hungarian tragedy' was provided by more or less uncensored Polish newspapers, such as Trybuna Ludu (the central organ of the PZPR Central Committee) and other provincial newspapers on 24 and 25 October. On 28 October the PZPR Central Committee published an appeal to '[our] Hun- garian brothers' to stop the shedding of blood.77 Radio Poland called for blood donors, and so many citizens volunteered that they had to sign up for appoint- ments. They also collected money, food and medicines to send to Hungary. In fact, Poland was one of the very first countries to begin sending generous

74 Through strategic marriages with Hungarians, the Polish monarchy was able to extend its power and territory. In the fourteenth century, for example, the main line of the Piast dynasty ended in 1370 with Casimir III, and the crown passed to Casimir's nephew, Louis I of Hungary and to Louis' daughter, Jadwiga, who married the Duke of Lithuania, the ruler of the house of Jagellon. Poland and Lithuania then began 187 years of joint rule and expansion. See Joyce Moss and George Wilson (eds), Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Republics: The Culture, Geographi- cal Setting, and Historical Background of 34 Eastern European Peoples (Detroit 1993), 203. 75 The Hungarians went to extraordinary lengths to help Polish Jews escape the Holocaust. Janusz Moszczefiski, First Secretary of the Polish embassy in Budapest, wrote a report discussing the activities of Dr J6zsef Antal, the former director of the social department in the Hungarian Interior Ministry during the war. According to his account, during the war he facilitated the departure to the West of several thousand Polish Jews. They escaped to Hungary from the terri- tories of former Galicia occupied by Hungarian armies. He provided them with 'Arian' papers in Hungary and protected them from German and 'native' fascists. AMSZ Z. 7, T. 553, W. 67, s. 161. Budapeszt, 27.III.1957. 76 See note 96. 77 'Apel KC PZPR do narodu wVgierskiego, 28 paidziernika 1956 r.', Sztandar Mlodych, 28 paidziernika 1956 r., s. 1. Published also in Tischler (ed.), Dokumenty do Dziej6w PRL, op. cit., 132.

281 281




humanitarian aid to Hungary. During February 1957, according to one Foreign Ministry report, Poland donated the most goods to Hungary, including 45 wagonloads of foodstuffs, 10 of clothing and shoes, and 27 of thread and textiles.78

The Polish embassy in Budapest maintained close contact with the Hungarian people. Karol Korolczyk, deputy director of the Polish Foreign Ministry's First Department, issued careful instructions to the diplomats to base their reports as often as possible on 'conversations with the people', not on 'press reports'.79 Nagy supporters personally delivered flyers to the Polish embassy and asked Polish personnel to distribute them. They read:

We, Hungarian communists . . . never agreed with the anti-social policy of Rakosi-Ger6, but we also never agreed with the merciless terror of the Kadar clique, directed mainly against the democratic forces. In these difficult days we find it necessary to raise our voices and to

speak for the unity of the Hungarian democracy born in the revolution of 23 October. We declare our support for the principle of national communism as represented by comrade Imre

Nagy. We oppose the lawless actions directed against the Hungarian journalists and writers and we demand that the present regime keep its promise not to persecute them. The arrested communists and Hungarian patriots should be released. We demand that the regime estab- lishes friendly contacts with the People's Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of

Yugoslavia.80

At the height of the Hungarian Revolution, the Polish embassy was bom- barded with pleas for help, not only from Polish citizens wishing to emigrate, but also from Hungarian citizens. In at least one case, a group of Hungarian refugees in Vienna appealed for 'asylum' in Poland.81 The embassy's shortage of cars increased the tension. In a letter to Rapacki (the Polish Foreign Minister) later, one Polish citizen, Wlodzimierz Galinski, described Ambas- sador Willman as 'pale-faced' and 'too busy to talk'. 'The embassy personnel were nervous and would not let me make phone calls', Galinski complained, and added indignantly: 'The atmosphere was such that the people of Budapest were more friendly toward the Poles than was the Polish embassy.'82 He

explained:

I had been living in the hotel 'Nenizetti' [sic] where the fighting was most intense (the city centre near the radio station and the offices of the newspaper Szabad Nep). The hotel was

partially damaged. I was lucky that the bullets and burst of shots from automatic weapons hit my room, because it forced me and my wife to move out. But we had no car.

78 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 146. 79 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 551, W. 66, s. 236. 'Sprawozdanie prasowe za okres styczen-luty- marzec 1956 r. Pismo K. Korolczyka'. 80 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 84. 'Ulotka nadeslana do polskiej ambasady w

Budapeszcie'. The flyer is undated, but must have been written after 4 November 1956 but before

Nagy's execution in June 1958. One copy, translated from Hungarian into Polish, was sent to the

Department of Foreign Affairs in the PZPR Central Committee.

81 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 10. 'Notatka, Warszawa, dnia 30 listopada 1956 r.,

Modrzejewski z Wydzialem Zagranicznyn Zrzeszenia Studentow Polskich'.

82 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 88. 'List od inz. Wlodzimierza Galifiskiego do

Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rapackiego'.

humanitarian aid to Hungary. During February 1957, according to one Foreign Ministry report, Poland donated the most goods to Hungary, including 45 wagonloads of foodstuffs, 10 of clothing and shoes, and 27 of thread and textiles.78

The Polish embassy in Budapest maintained close contact with the Hungarian people. Karol Korolczyk, deputy director of the Polish Foreign Ministry's First Department, issued careful instructions to the diplomats to base their reports as often as possible on 'conversations with the people', not on 'press reports'.79 Nagy supporters personally delivered flyers to the Polish embassy and asked Polish personnel to distribute them. They read:

We, Hungarian communists . . . never agreed with the anti-social policy of Rakosi-Ger6, but we also never agreed with the merciless terror of the Kadar clique, directed mainly against the democratic forces. In these difficult days we find it necessary to raise our voices and to

speak for the unity of the Hungarian democracy born in the revolution of 23 October. We declare our support for the principle of national communism as represented by comrade Imre

Nagy. We oppose the lawless actions directed against the Hungarian journalists and writers and we demand that the present regime keep its promise not to persecute them. The arrested communists and Hungarian patriots should be released. We demand that the regime estab- lishes friendly contacts with the People's Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of

Yugoslavia.80

At the height of the Hungarian Revolution, the Polish embassy was bom- barded with pleas for help, not only from Polish citizens wishing to emigrate, but also from Hungarian citizens. In at least one case, a group of Hungarian refugees in Vienna appealed for 'asylum' in Poland.81 The embassy's shortage of cars increased the tension. In a letter to Rapacki (the Polish Foreign Minister) later, one Polish citizen, Wlodzimierz Galinski, described Ambas- sador Willman as 'pale-faced' and 'too busy to talk'. 'The embassy personnel were nervous and would not let me make phone calls', Galinski complained, and added indignantly: 'The atmosphere was such that the people of Budapest were more friendly toward the Poles than was the Polish embassy.'82 He

explained:

I had been living in the hotel 'Nenizetti' [sic] where the fighting was most intense (the city centre near the radio station and the offices of the newspaper Szabad Nep). The hotel was

partially damaged. I was lucky that the bullets and burst of shots from automatic weapons hit my room, because it forced me and my wife to move out. But we had no car.

78 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 146. 79 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 551, W. 66, s. 236. 'Sprawozdanie prasowe za okres styczen-luty- marzec 1956 r. Pismo K. Korolczyka'. 80 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 84. 'Ulotka nadeslana do polskiej ambasady w

Budapeszcie'. The flyer is undated, but must have been written after 4 November 1956 but before

Nagy's execution in June 1958. One copy, translated from Hungarian into Polish, was sent to the

Department of Foreign Affairs in the PZPR Central Committee.

81 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 10. 'Notatka, Warszawa, dnia 30 listopada 1956 r.,

Modrzejewski z Wydzialem Zagranicznyn Zrzeszenia Studentow Polskich'.

82 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 88. 'List od inz. Wlodzimierza Galifiskiego do

Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rapackiego'.

282 282




Galinski's letter triggered a paper trail of justifications from embassy personnel. Stanislaw Jaworski wrote to Maria Wierna on 27 November 1956:

The objections are completely ungrounded. I am a chauffeur in the embassy. During the most intense street fighting, risking my life, tired and hungry, day and night, among the bullets, tanks and automatic weapons, sometimes all by myself and sometimes accompanied by other embassy members, I drove to the addresses where the Polish citizens resided, to take them to the embassy or to the airport which is located some 40 kilometres from Budapest.83

Jaworski was not the only embassy member whose life was at risk, it seems. Archival documents reveal that the Polish embassy itself was attacked. 'Bullets hit the window frames and balcony frames' of the embassy building on 6 November 1956, just two days after the final Soviet intervention.84 This incident was similar to the attack on the Yugoslav embassy the day before, at 3.30 p.m., but in the latter case, the Yugoslav cultural attach6 Milenko Milovanov was killed.85 Without further evidence one cannot prove that these were deliberate attacks by Soviet or AVH forces, but it is interesting that the embassies of the two East European countries most supportive of the Hungarian revolution were attacked.

The diplomatic corps continued to report candidly on the Hungarian situation following the crackdown, during the so-called 'normalization' process. In a secret note of 3 May 1957, Willman reported to Korolczyk in Warsaw on the 'brutal methods of the [Hungarian] security services' (stosowanie brutal- nych metod przez organy bezpieczenistwa) and the arrests and deportations taking place.86

v%- x- x-

83 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 102. 'List od Stanislawa Jaworskiego do tow. Wierna z dnia 27 listopada 1956 r'. Wierna then sent a telegram to Ambassador Willman: 'We understand the difficult situation in the embassy and we do not want to judge this case too early . . . but we want you personally to intervene, to stop this wave of protests, which may go too far.' AMSZ, Z. depesz nr. 356, T. 613, W. 48, s. 9, 2.XI.1956. Willman then wrote a soothing note to both Wierna and Korolczyk, assuring them that 'efficient care of Poles present in Hungary was from the very beginning an objective of the embassy, approached with full responsibility'. AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 96-8. 'Pismo ambasadora Willmanna do tow. Wierna, Korolczyka i Szybka'. 84 AMSZ, Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 5. 'Sytuacja wewnetrzna Wsgier: wypadki i ich echa; dzialalnos ambasady w tych dniach. Budapeszt, 6 listopada 1956'. 85 RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 77, 1. 7, 'Telefonogramma ot Astafieva v Budapeshte k P. S. Dedushkinu MIDa SSSR, 24 iiunia 1958 g'. See also RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 29, 1. 3, 'Iz Dnevnika D. T. Shepilova, Ministr Inostrannykh Del, Zapis' Besedy s Iugoslavskim Poslom Michunovichem, 7 noiabria 1956 g'. There is a discrepancy in the time of the incident. Micunovic and Shepilov said it occurred on 6 November at 12.45 p.m. The Soviet investigatory commission, however, established the time of the occurrence as 5 November, 'around' 3 p.m. See AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 18, p. 188, 1. 38, from General-Lieutenant Beliusov, Chief of the Eighth Administration of the General Staff, to N.S. Patolichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 'Act'. 86 AMSZ, Z. 7, T. 553, W. 67, s. 60 (recto). 'Referat od Korolczyka do Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, 9 maja 1957. Tajne'.

Galinski's letter triggered a paper trail of justifications from embassy personnel. Stanislaw Jaworski wrote to Maria Wierna on 27 November 1956:

The objections are completely ungrounded. I am a chauffeur in the embassy. During the most intense street fighting, risking my life, tired and hungry, day and night, among the bullets, tanks and automatic weapons, sometimes all by myself and sometimes accompanied by other embassy members, I drove to the addresses where the Polish citizens resided, to take them to the embassy or to the airport which is located some 40 kilometres from Budapest.83

Jaworski was not the only embassy member whose life was at risk, it seems. Archival documents reveal that the Polish embassy itself was attacked. 'Bullets hit the window frames and balcony frames' of the embassy building on 6 November 1956, just two days after the final Soviet intervention.84 This incident was similar to the attack on the Yugoslav embassy the day before, at 3.30 p.m., but in the latter case, the Yugoslav cultural attach6 Milenko Milovanov was killed.85 Without further evidence one cannot prove that these were deliberate attacks by Soviet or AVH forces, but it is interesting that the embassies of the two East European countries most supportive of the Hungarian revolution were attacked.

The diplomatic corps continued to report candidly on the Hungarian situation following the crackdown, during the so-called 'normalization' process. In a secret note of 3 May 1957, Willman reported to Korolczyk in Warsaw on the 'brutal methods of the [Hungarian] security services' (stosowanie brutal- nych metod przez organy bezpieczenistwa) and the arrests and deportations taking place.86

v%- x- x-

83 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 102. 'List od Stanislawa Jaworskiego do tow. Wierna z dnia 27 listopada 1956 r'. Wierna then sent a telegram to Ambassador Willman: 'We understand the difficult situation in the embassy and we do not want to judge this case too early . . . but we want you personally to intervene, to stop this wave of protests, which may go too far.' AMSZ, Z. depesz nr. 356, T. 613, W. 48, s. 9, 2.XI.1956. Willman then wrote a soothing note to both Wierna and Korolczyk, assuring them that 'efficient care of Poles present in Hungary was from the very beginning an objective of the embassy, approached with full responsibility'. AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 96-8. 'Pismo ambasadora Willmanna do tow. Wierna, Korolczyka i Szybka'. 84 AMSZ, Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 5. 'Sytuacja wewnetrzna Wsgier: wypadki i ich echa; dzialalnos ambasady w tych dniach. Budapeszt, 6 listopada 1956'. 85 RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 77, 1. 7, 'Telefonogramma ot Astafieva v Budapeshte k P. S. Dedushkinu MIDa SSSR, 24 iiunia 1958 g'. See also RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 29, 1. 3, 'Iz Dnevnika D. T. Shepilova, Ministr Inostrannykh Del, Zapis' Besedy s Iugoslavskim Poslom Michunovichem, 7 noiabria 1956 g'. There is a discrepancy in the time of the incident. Micunovic and Shepilov said it occurred on 6 November at 12.45 p.m. The Soviet investigatory commission, however, established the time of the occurrence as 5 November, 'around' 3 p.m. See AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 18, p. 188, 1. 38, from General-Lieutenant Beliusov, Chief of the Eighth Administration of the General Staff, to N.S. Patolichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 'Act'. 86 AMSZ, Z. 7, T. 553, W. 67, s. 60 (recto). 'Referat od Korolczyka do Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, 9 maja 1957. Tajne'.

283 283




To a great extent Gomulka went along with this outpouring of public sympathy toward Hungary. He had to, for his political position was perhaps less secure than commonly thought. The situation in Poland was still volatile in late October and November 1956, stimulated in part by the Hungarian revolution. As PZPR member Pitatowski said at a party aktiv meeting on 4 November: 'There is no doubt, comrades, that the political situation got a little more complicated after the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of our party and that this situation was complicated by the events in the international arena in Hungary.'87

Strikes and demonstrations continued to erupt in Polish cities well after the Eighth Plenum in October. Rallies took place in Gdanisk, Szczecin and other cities on 22 October, and the next day in Poznaf, Lublin, L6dz, Bydgoszcz, Kielce and Wroclaw. As late as 18 November in Bydgoszcz, a spontaneous street demonstration broke out, during which people called for the 'overthrow of the Stalinist regime in Poland' (i.e. Gomulka's) and protested against the coercion of Poland by the USSR.88 Had Gomulka displayed weak leadership or approved too strongly of the Hungarian uprising, the Soviet leaders could easily have decided to send tanks rolling back into Poland.

The measured pace and scale of Gomulka's political and economic reforms after the Polish October further indicate his desire not to alarm Soviet leaders. While he and his colleagues worked to eliminate the most oppressive Stalinist features, such as arbitrary arrests, collectivization of agriculture, Herculean work norms, and persecution of the Roman Catholic Church, they also maintained the command economy and the absolute monopoly of the Polish Communist Party. More importantly, Gomulka insisted on retaining Soviet troops and membership of the Warsaw Pact. While Polish citizens grew dis- illusioned, they still believed in the late 1950s that Gomulka's policies resulted from Moscow's coercion.

Moreover, the Gomulka regime's reaction to the Hungarian revolution dif- fered from that of the other communist bloc countries in that Gomulka did not blame the unrest on 'foreign counter-revolutionary elements'. He knew such

propaganda would not convince the Polish people. A major segment of Polish

society identified itself with the ideas of the Hungarian revolution and felt that the events in Hungary resembled Polish events in the summer and autumn of 1956. The Poznani revolt was too fresh in their memories. Thus Gomulka directed Polish propagandists to speak mainly of the 'Raikosi-Gero clique's errors'.

Gomulka shared Imre Nagy's conviction about the need for each Warsaw Pact country to follow separate roads to socialism that incorporated indigenous elements. In fact, his position resembled Tito's of Yugoslavia to some extent: publicly he needed to support Nagy's policies because they were close

87 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, 237/V-241. 'Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r.: Wystapenia W. Gomulki,' s. 66.

88 Jastrzebski, op. cit., 57.

To a great extent Gomulka went along with this outpouring of public sympathy toward Hungary. He had to, for his political position was perhaps less secure than commonly thought. The situation in Poland was still volatile in late October and November 1956, stimulated in part by the Hungarian revolution. As PZPR member Pitatowski said at a party aktiv meeting on 4 November: 'There is no doubt, comrades, that the political situation got a little more complicated after the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of our party and that this situation was complicated by the events in the international arena in Hungary.'87

Strikes and demonstrations continued to erupt in Polish cities well after the Eighth Plenum in October. Rallies took place in Gdanisk, Szczecin and other cities on 22 October, and the next day in Poznaf, Lublin, L6dz, Bydgoszcz, Kielce and Wroclaw. As late as 18 November in Bydgoszcz, a spontaneous street demonstration broke out, during which people called for the 'overthrow of the Stalinist regime in Poland' (i.e. Gomulka's) and protested against the coercion of Poland by the USSR.88 Had Gomulka displayed weak leadership or approved too strongly of the Hungarian uprising, the Soviet leaders could easily have decided to send tanks rolling back into Poland.

The measured pace and scale of Gomulka's political and economic reforms after the Polish October further indicate his desire not to alarm Soviet leaders. While he and his colleagues worked to eliminate the most oppressive Stalinist features, such as arbitrary arrests, collectivization of agriculture, Herculean work norms, and persecution of the Roman Catholic Church, they also maintained the command economy and the absolute monopoly of the Polish Communist Party. More importantly, Gomulka insisted on retaining Soviet troops and membership of the Warsaw Pact. While Polish citizens grew dis- illusioned, they still believed in the late 1950s that Gomulka's policies resulted from Moscow's coercion.

Moreover, the Gomulka regime's reaction to the Hungarian revolution dif- fered from that of the other communist bloc countries in that Gomulka did not blame the unrest on 'foreign counter-revolutionary elements'. He knew such

propaganda would not convince the Polish people. A major segment of Polish

society identified itself with the ideas of the Hungarian revolution and felt that the events in Hungary resembled Polish events in the summer and autumn of 1956. The Poznani revolt was too fresh in their memories. Thus Gomulka directed Polish propagandists to speak mainly of the 'Raikosi-Gero clique's errors'.

Gomulka shared Imre Nagy's conviction about the need for each Warsaw Pact country to follow separate roads to socialism that incorporated indigenous elements. In fact, his position resembled Tito's of Yugoslavia to some extent: publicly he needed to support Nagy's policies because they were close

87 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, 237/V-241. 'Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r.: Wystapenia W. Gomulki,' s. 66.

88 Jastrzebski, op. cit., 57.

284 284




to his own, but privately he dreaded an uncontrollable revolutionary movement within Polish borders, especially in the absence of Soviet troops. He told a group of editors on 29 October:

We are not going to get involved in any political situation [similar to] what is happening in Hungary. Hungary is in a different geographical place, and they [the Hungarians] live under different conditions. Our country's interests dictate to us different necessities and a different way of working things out .... It's easy to decide that [to withdraw Soviet troops], but it will be much more difficult to be responsible after that.89

Furthermore, as a realist, Gomulka knew that he could not be too supportive of the Hungarian insurgents and simultaneously reassure Moscow of his loyalty. As mentioned earlier, the Khrushchev leadership continued to observe his actions closely. Poland was the Soviet 'land bridge' to the GDR. Gomutka knew that the Polish Communist Party could only maintain its monopoly - and its western Oder-Neisse border - with the help of Soviet power. (In fact, to ensure a permanent Soviet military presence, he signed a Polish-Soviet bi- lateral treaty in Moscow in mid-November 1956.) This put him in a difficult situation, since one of the Hungarians' '16 points' was the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. If Gomulka supported the Hungarian cause too demonstratively, Polish citizens would probably pressure him to have Soviet troops withdrawn from Poland.

A glance at several of Gomulka's public declarations thus reveals a shrewd balancing act to appease both his Polish constituency and Kremlin bosses. He denounced Gero for calling in Soviet troops on 23 October 'instead of entering immediately and consistently on the road of solutions in conformity with the interests of socialism'.90 Then, at his triumphant appearance on 24 October in front of the Palac Kultury i Nauki in Warsaw, Gomulka tried to dampen the enthusiasm of the Polish teenagers who had shown up waving Hungarian flags:

Today we turn to the working people of Warsaw and of the entire country with an appeal: enough meetings and demonstrations! The time has come to embark on daily work - full of faith and consciousness that the Party united with the working class and with the nation will lead Poland on the new road to socialism.91

On the evening of 29 October Gomulka visited Warsaw Technical Univers- ity where students asked him if they could designate a day of general mourn- ing in honour of Hungary; Gomulka quickly rejected the request.92

89 AAN (Warsaw), PZPR 237/V/840, s. 14.'Wystgpienie tow. W. Gomulki na naradzie redak- tor6w w dniu 29.X.1956 r'. 90 Trybuna Ludu, 2 November 1956. 91 Trybuna Ludu, 25 October 1956. For an English translation, see Zinner (ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, op. cit., 270-6. 92 Marcin Kula, Paryz, Londyn i Waszyngton patrza na Pazdziernik 1956 r. w Polsce (Warszawa 1992), 140.

to his own, but privately he dreaded an uncontrollable revolutionary movement within Polish borders, especially in the absence of Soviet troops. He told a group of editors on 29 October:

We are not going to get involved in any political situation [similar to] what is happening in Hungary. Hungary is in a different geographical place, and they [the Hungarians] live under different conditions. Our country's interests dictate to us different necessities and a different way of working things out .... It's easy to decide that [to withdraw Soviet troops], but it will be much more difficult to be responsible after that.89

Furthermore, as a realist, Gomulka knew that he could not be too supportive of the Hungarian insurgents and simultaneously reassure Moscow of his loyalty. As mentioned earlier, the Khrushchev leadership continued to observe his actions closely. Poland was the Soviet 'land bridge' to the GDR. Gomutka knew that the Polish Communist Party could only maintain its monopoly - and its western Oder-Neisse border - with the help of Soviet power. (In fact, to ensure a permanent Soviet military presence, he signed a Polish-Soviet bi- lateral treaty in Moscow in mid-November 1956.) This put him in a difficult situation, since one of the Hungarians' '16 points' was the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. If Gomulka supported the Hungarian cause too demonstratively, Polish citizens would probably pressure him to have Soviet troops withdrawn from Poland.

A glance at several of Gomulka's public declarations thus reveals a shrewd balancing act to appease both his Polish constituency and Kremlin bosses. He denounced Gero for calling in Soviet troops on 23 October 'instead of entering immediately and consistently on the road of solutions in conformity with the interests of socialism'.90 Then, at his triumphant appearance on 24 October in front of the Palac Kultury i Nauki in Warsaw, Gomulka tried to dampen the enthusiasm of the Polish teenagers who had shown up waving Hungarian flags:

Today we turn to the working people of Warsaw and of the entire country with an appeal: enough meetings and demonstrations! The time has come to embark on daily work - full of faith and consciousness that the Party united with the working class and with the nation will lead Poland on the new road to socialism.91

On the evening of 29 October Gomulka visited Warsaw Technical Univers- ity where students asked him if they could designate a day of general mourn- ing in honour of Hungary; Gomulka quickly rejected the request.92

89 AAN (Warsaw), PZPR 237/V/840, s. 14.'Wystgpienie tow. W. Gomulki na naradzie redak- tor6w w dniu 29.X.1956 r'. 90 Trybuna Ludu, 2 November 1956. 91 Trybuna Ludu, 25 October 1956. For an English translation, see Zinner (ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, op. cit., 270-6. 92 Marcin Kula, Paryz, Londyn i Waszyngton patrza na Pazdziernik 1956 r. w Polsce (Warszawa 1992), 140.

285 285




Moreover, in order to prevent the Hungarian revolution from shifting far- ther to the right, on 28 October the Gomulka leadership sent a delegation to Budapest, composed of Marian Naszkowski (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Artur Starewicz (candidate member of the Central Committee).93 On 29 October an appeal by the PZPR Central Committee was published in all the Polish newspapers, and in the Szabad Nep paper. Signed by both First Secretary Gomulka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, it expressed 'sorrow at the bloodshed and damage in Budapest' and 'called upon the Hungarians to stop the fratricidal fight' as quickly as possible. 'We are both on the same side ... the side of freedom and socialism. We have not the slightest intention of interfering in the internal affairs of your country', the message continued.94

When Khrushchev, Molotov and Malenkov flew to Brest on 1 November to consult Gomulka, the latter opposed military intervention in Hungary.95 But on 2 November, yet another appeal by the PZPR Central Committee was published in Szabad Nep, this time condemning both Soviet interventionism and the Hungarian 'counter-revolution' in which reactionary bands were 'lynching good communists'.96 On 4 November, strongly influenced by the Chinese communists, Poland voted in the United Nations General Assembly on the side of the Warsaw Pact countries against the USA and other western countries condemning the Soviet intervention in Hungary.97 (The Polish Political Committee met on the evening of 4 November to decide how to vote on the Hungarian issue in the UN General Assembly. Earlier that day Wang Ping-nan, the Chinese ambassador in Warsaw, had told Marian Naszkowski that Poland should vote on the side of the USSR and the new Kaidair government because Imre Nagy's government had been counter-revolutionary.) It should be remembered that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was not officially rec-

ognized in the UN until October 1971; only the Nationalist Chinese government of Taiwan (Formosa) was. Therefore the PRC had a vested interest in

persuading other communist states to vote the way it would have. On the same day (4 November) in his speech for party aktiv workers in

Warsaw, Gomulka noticeably refrained from condemning the Soviet intervention that was taking place literally as he spoke. On 20 November delegations

93 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. despesz., W. 48, T. 612, K. 215, s. 76, Szyfrogram nr. 17654 z

Budapestu, 28 paidziernika 1956, Adam Willman. 94 'Apel KC PZPR do narodu wvgierskiego, 28 paidziernika 1956 r.', Sztandar Miodych, 28

pazdziernika 1956 r., s. 1. Published also in Tischler (ed.), Dokumenty do Dziejo6w PRL, op. cit.,

132 and in Szabad Nip, 29 October 1956. 95 Gomulka later told Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai on 11-12 January 1957 that the

Russians did not reveal their intentions, but merely asked about the Polish opinion on the

Hungarian situation. 96 Szabad Nep, 2 November 1956. 97 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 107, tom 5. Materialy dotyczace stosunk6w polsko- chifiskich i problem6w wewetrznych Chin z lat 1956-1957, kart 388. 'Stanowisko rzadu

Chifiskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie sytuacji na Wegrzech, sprecyzowane przez ambasadora

ChRL w Warszawie w rozmowie z wiceministrem spraw zagranicznych Marianem Naszkowskim

4 listopada 1956 r'.

Moreover, in order to prevent the Hungarian revolution from shifting far- ther to the right, on 28 October the Gomulka leadership sent a delegation to Budapest, composed of Marian Naszkowski (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Artur Starewicz (candidate member of the Central Committee).93 On 29 October an appeal by the PZPR Central Committee was published in all the Polish newspapers, and in the Szabad Nep paper. Signed by both First Secretary Gomulka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, it expressed 'sorrow at the bloodshed and damage in Budapest' and 'called upon the Hungarians to stop the fratricidal fight' as quickly as possible. 'We are both on the same side ... the side of freedom and socialism. We have not the slightest intention of interfering in the internal affairs of your country', the message continued.94

When Khrushchev, Molotov and Malenkov flew to Brest on 1 November to consult Gomulka, the latter opposed military intervention in Hungary.95 But on 2 November, yet another appeal by the PZPR Central Committee was published in Szabad Nep, this time condemning both Soviet interventionism and the Hungarian 'counter-revolution' in which reactionary bands were 'lynching good communists'.96 On 4 November, strongly influenced by the Chinese communists, Poland voted in the United Nations General Assembly on the side of the Warsaw Pact countries against the USA and other western countries condemning the Soviet intervention in Hungary.97 (The Polish Political Committee met on the evening of 4 November to decide how to vote on the Hungarian issue in the UN General Assembly. Earlier that day Wang Ping-nan, the Chinese ambassador in Warsaw, had told Marian Naszkowski that Poland should vote on the side of the USSR and the new Kaidair government because Imre Nagy's government had been counter-revolutionary.) It should be remembered that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was not officially rec-

ognized in the UN until October 1971; only the Nationalist Chinese government of Taiwan (Formosa) was. Therefore the PRC had a vested interest in

persuading other communist states to vote the way it would have. On the same day (4 November) in his speech for party aktiv workers in

Warsaw, Gomulka noticeably refrained from condemning the Soviet intervention that was taking place literally as he spoke. On 20 November delegations

93 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. despesz., W. 48, T. 612, K. 215, s. 76, Szyfrogram nr. 17654 z

Budapestu, 28 paidziernika 1956, Adam Willman. 94 'Apel KC PZPR do narodu wvgierskiego, 28 paidziernika 1956 r.', Sztandar Miodych, 28

pazdziernika 1956 r., s. 1. Published also in Tischler (ed.), Dokumenty do Dziejo6w PRL, op. cit.,

132 and in Szabad Nip, 29 October 1956. 95 Gomulka later told Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai on 11-12 January 1957 that the

Russians did not reveal their intentions, but merely asked about the Polish opinion on the

Hungarian situation. 96 Szabad Nep, 2 November 1956. 97 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 107, tom 5. Materialy dotyczace stosunk6w polsko- chifiskich i problem6w wewetrznych Chin z lat 1956-1957, kart 388. 'Stanowisko rzadu

Chifiskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie sytuacji na Wegrzech, sprecyzowane przez ambasadora

ChRL w Warszawie w rozmowie z wiceministrem spraw zagranicznych Marianem Naszkowskim

4 listopada 1956 r'.

286 286




from the German Democratic Republic and Romania visited Budapest, but a Polish delegation was noticeably absent.98 On 29 November Gomulka opined publicly that 'the western aggression in Suez' was much worse than the Soviet intervention in Hungary, because in the latter case, the Soviet Union was not trying to transform Hungary into a colony.99

Polish-Hungarian relations cooled somewhat in 1957. The Hungarian ambassador to Poland, Peter Balo6, complained to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry that Polish journalists deliberately shunned the Hungarian embassy in Warsaw and refused to publish articles on the Hungarian events in Polish newspapers. A new Hungarian institute was established in Warsaw, but no journalists came. 'Knowing the negative opinion of most Polish journalists, we even included a couple of delicate issues (kenyes kerdes) in our speech', he wrote.100?? Finally, Nagy's execution in June 1958 tarnished Polish-Hungarian relations still further. Gomulka vehemently protested against the execution, which came as a total shock to him.101 A month after the execution, the Polish ambassador spoke to Kapicic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, about Polish reactions to the execution, as reflected in Gomulka's speech in Gdanisk on 28 June 1958. 'The Polish leadership does not consider [the Nagy sentence] to be an internal Hungarian affair', Willman reported to Warsaw.102

In many ways the Hungarian crisis was a godsend for Gomulka. It diverted Soviet attention from Poland somewhat, hence facilitating his removal of Marshal Rokossowski from the Polish Ministry of Defence, as well as the Soviet advisers.103 It enabled him to claim credit for his 'thoughtfulness and bravery that preserved Poland from meeting Hungary's fate',104 and it allowed

98 MOL (Budapest), XIX-A-83-a, 160 doboz, 'Jegyz6konyv: A Magyar Forradalmi Munkais Paraszt Kormany 1956. 6vi november ho 19. napjin tartott iileserol'. 99 MOL (Budapest), 288, f. 32/1958/14 o.e., old. 13. 100 MOL (Budapest), XIX-J-l-j (1946-1964) KUM TUK Lengyelorszag, 9. doboz, 5/f 001893, 5 iprilis 1957, 'Marcius 15-i unnepseg, Vars6'. 101 OHA (Budapest, Interview no. 572, Emanuel Planer, former head of the Polish Radio's Public Relations Department, conducted by Janos Tischler, 1993. See also Gomutka's speech in Gdafsk, 28 June 1958 in Nepszabads,g of that same day. 102 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. depesz, T. 783, W. 57, s. 168 [misnumbered as page 167], Szyfrogram nr. 9166, 18.VII.1958, from Adam Willman in Budapest to [Maria] Wierna in Warsaw, Director of the First Department in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 103 Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski was born in Poland in 1896, but moved to the Soviet Union at the age of 17 and joined the Soviet Communist Party in 1919. He suffered in the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s, and commanded the Byelorussian front toward the end of the second world war. Poles despised him as the one who led the Red Army forces to 'liberate' Poland, after conveniently waiting on the other side of the Wisla [Vistula] River for the Polish resistance forces to expend their energies in the futile Warsaw Uprising of 1944. He served as Polish national defence minister from December 1949 to November 1956, despite the fact that he was a Soviet citizen. He was removed from the PZPR Politburo on 20 October 1956 and recalled to the Soviet Union in mid-November 1956. 104 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 59, numery 1-17, kart 63, 'Informacja Biura Politzcynego KC PZPR dla organizacji partyjnych PZPR o sytuacji na WVgrzech i stanowisku partii w kwestii stosunk6w polsko-radzieckich, 1 listopada 1956 roku'.

from the German Democratic Republic and Romania visited Budapest, but a Polish delegation was noticeably absent.98 On 29 November Gomulka opined publicly that 'the western aggression in Suez' was much worse than the Soviet intervention in Hungary, because in the latter case, the Soviet Union was not trying to transform Hungary into a colony.99

Polish-Hungarian relations cooled somewhat in 1957. The Hungarian ambassador to Poland, Peter Balo6, complained to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry that Polish journalists deliberately shunned the Hungarian embassy in Warsaw and refused to publish articles on the Hungarian events in Polish newspapers. A new Hungarian institute was established in Warsaw, but no journalists came. 'Knowing the negative opinion of most Polish journalists, we even included a couple of delicate issues (kenyes kerdes) in our speech', he wrote.100?? Finally, Nagy's execution in June 1958 tarnished Polish-Hungarian relations still further. Gomulka vehemently protested against the execution, which came as a total shock to him.101 A month after the execution, the Polish ambassador spoke to Kapicic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, about Polish reactions to the execution, as reflected in Gomulka's speech in Gdanisk on 28 June 1958. 'The Polish leadership does not consider [the Nagy sentence] to be an internal Hungarian affair', Willman reported to Warsaw.102

In many ways the Hungarian crisis was a godsend for Gomulka. It diverted Soviet attention from Poland somewhat, hence facilitating his removal of Marshal Rokossowski from the Polish Ministry of Defence, as well as the Soviet advisers.103 It enabled him to claim credit for his 'thoughtfulness and bravery that preserved Poland from meeting Hungary's fate',104 and it allowed

98 MOL (Budapest), XIX-A-83-a, 160 doboz, 'Jegyz6konyv: A Magyar Forradalmi Munkais Paraszt Kormany 1956. 6vi november ho 19. napjin tartott iileserol'. 99 MOL (Budapest), 288, f. 32/1958/14 o.e., old. 13. 100 MOL (Budapest), XIX-J-l-j (1946-1964) KUM TUK Lengyelorszag, 9. doboz, 5/f 001893, 5 iprilis 1957, 'Marcius 15-i unnepseg, Vars6'. 101 OHA (Budapest, Interview no. 572, Emanuel Planer, former head of the Polish Radio's Public Relations Department, conducted by Janos Tischler, 1993. See also Gomutka's speech in Gdafsk, 28 June 1958 in Nepszabads,g of that same day. 102 AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. depesz, T. 783, W. 57, s. 168 [misnumbered as page 167], Szyfrogram nr. 9166, 18.VII.1958, from Adam Willman in Budapest to [Maria] Wierna in Warsaw, Director of the First Department in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 103 Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski was born in Poland in 1896, but moved to the Soviet Union at the age of 17 and joined the Soviet Communist Party in 1919. He suffered in the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s, and commanded the Byelorussian front toward the end of the second world war. Poles despised him as the one who led the Red Army forces to 'liberate' Poland, after conveniently waiting on the other side of the Wisla [Vistula] River for the Polish resistance forces to expend their energies in the futile Warsaw Uprising of 1944. He served as Polish national defence minister from December 1949 to November 1956, despite the fact that he was a Soviet citizen. He was removed from the PZPR Politburo on 20 October 1956 and recalled to the Soviet Union in mid-November 1956. 104 AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 59, numery 1-17, kart 63, 'Informacja Biura Politzcynego KC PZPR dla organizacji partyjnych PZPR o sytuacji na WVgrzech i stanowisku partii w kwestii stosunk6w polsko-radzieckich, 1 listopada 1956 roku'.

287 287




him to justify a firm grip on the PZPR and the population, lest a fate similar to Hungary befell Poland. As Gomulka told party members in somewhat rambling Polish on 20 December 1956:

As we know, our situation was not that bad. In Hungary, the situation was much worse. In Poland, even though the leadership was isolated from the masses and from the working class, the party as a whole was still in such a condition that one stronger impulse could not possi- bly destroy its activity and make it crash.'05

In sum, according to the records of inner council meetings, the Hungarian leaders seldom referred to the Polish experience as a guide during the peak of the Hungarian crisis. They were reacting to the chaotic events at home. Later they sought Poland's help as a mediator. Gomulka and the Polish people, however, avidly followed events in Hungary. Presaging the future conservatism of his regime in the late 1960s, Gomulka positioned himself charily in the middle, attempting both to reassure Moscow of his loyalty and to maintain popular support at home.'06

Meanwhile the Polish press and intelligentsia rooted for their Hungarian 'brothers'. While the Polish people wanted to intervene, a sense of fatalism prevailed. As Polish poet Adam Wazyk sombrely noted, 'We used to be the conscience of history, but now our silence has become raison d'etat."'07

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

him to justify a firm grip on the PZPR and the population, lest a fate similar to Hungary befell Poland. As Gomulka told party members in somewhat rambling Polish on 20 December 1956:

As we know, our situation was not that bad. In Hungary, the situation was much worse. In Poland, even though the leadership was isolated from the masses and from the working class, the party as a whole was still in such a condition that one stronger impulse could not possi- bly destroy its activity and make it crash.'05

In sum, according to the records of inner council meetings, the Hungarian leaders seldom referred to the Polish experience as a guide during the peak of the Hungarian crisis. They were reacting to the chaotic events at home. Later they sought Poland's help as a mediator. Gomulka and the Polish people, however, avidly followed events in Hungary. Presaging the future conservatism of his regime in the late 1960s, Gomulka positioned himself charily in the middle, attempting both to reassure Moscow of his loyalty and to maintain popular support at home.'06

Meanwhile the Polish press and intelligentsia rooted for their Hungarian 'brothers'. While the Polish people wanted to intervene, a sense of fatalism prevailed. As Polish poet Adam Wazyk sombrely noted, 'We used to be the conscience of history, but now our silence has become raison d'etat."'07

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Hungarian: AVH

AVO

doboz kotet MDP MOL MSZMP OHA old.

Hungarian: AVH

AVO

doboz kotet MDP MOL MSZMP OHA old.

Allamvedelmi Hatosaig (State Security Authority; name of

Hungarian secret police agency after 1949) Allamvedelmi Osztaly (State Security Department; name of Hungarian secret police agency until 1949) box, carton volume Magyar Dolgozok Partja Magyar Orszagos Leveltar Magyar Szocialista Munkaispairt 1956-os Intezet Oral History Archivum oldal (page)

Allamvedelmi Hatosaig (State Security Authority; name of

Hungarian secret police agency after 1949) Allamvedelmi Osztaly (State Security Department; name of Hungarian secret police agency until 1949) box, carton volume Magyar Dolgozok Partja Magyar Orszagos Leveltar Magyar Szocialista Munkaispairt 1956-os Intezet Oral History Archivum oldal (page)

105 AAN (Warsaw), 237/IV/842, Przem6wienia Tow. Wladyslawa Gomulki, 19-20.XII.1956.

Wystapienie I Sekretarza KC PZPR tow. Gomulki na konferencji partyjnej Warszawskiego Komitetu Wojewodzkiego PZPR w dniu 20 grudnia 1956 r., s. 245.

106 By 1968, as Soviet archival documents show, Gomulka had become one of the most vocal

advocates of military intervention in Czechoslovakia to suppress the 'Prague Spring' movement.

See RGANI, f. 5, op. 60, rolik 9763, d. 316. Otdel TsK KPSS po sviazam s kommunisticheskimi i

rabochimi partiiami sotsialisticheskikh stran. Kratkaia spravaka po obstanovke v Chekhoslovakii,

2.XII.68, passim. Two years later he was dismissed as First Secretary. 107 Adam Wazyk, Nowa Kultura (25 November 1956). Cited in Bromke, op. cit., 91.

105 AAN (Warsaw), 237/IV/842, Przem6wienia Tow. Wladyslawa Gomulki, 19-20.XII.1956.

Wystapienie I Sekretarza KC PZPR tow. Gomulki na konferencji partyjnej Warszawskiego Komitetu Wojewodzkiego PZPR w dniu 20 grudnia 1956 r., s. 245.

106 By 1968, as Soviet archival documents show, Gomulka had become one of the most vocal

advocates of military intervention in Czechoslovakia to suppress the 'Prague Spring' movement.

See RGANI, f. 5, op. 60, rolik 9763, d. 316. Otdel TsK KPSS po sviazam s kommunisticheskimi i

rabochimi partiiami sotsialisticheskikh stran. Kratkaia spravaka po obstanovke v Chekhoslovakii,

2.XII.68, passim. Two years later he was dismissed as First Secretary. 107 Adam Wazyk, Nowa Kultura (25 November 1956). Cited in Bromke, op. cit., 91.

288 288




o.e. orzesi egyseg (preservation unit) PIL Politikatorteneti Intezet Leveltaira (Archive of the Institute of

Political History (Budapest))

Polish: AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of New Documents) AMSZ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Archive of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs) CAW Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) KC Komitet Centralny (Central Committee) PPR Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Workers' Party) PZPR Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers'

Party) strona (s.) page sygn. signature teczka portfolio wigzka bundle or group zespo6 group, complex, set

Russian: AVP RF Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of

Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation) CC Central Committee CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union d delo (file) dok. dokument (document) f. fond (fund) GARF Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of

the Russian Federation) KGB Committee for State Security 1. list (page) op. opis' (inventory) p. papka (folder) per. perechen' (list) por. portfel' (portfolio) rolik reel RGANI Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishii Istorii. The name

of this archive has changed; it used to be called the Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii, or TsKhSD).

TsK KPSS Tsentral'nyi Komitet Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

o.e. orzesi egyseg (preservation unit) PIL Politikatorteneti Intezet Leveltaira (Archive of the Institute of

Political History (Budapest))

Polish: AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of New Documents) AMSZ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Archive of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs) CAW Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) KC Komitet Centralny (Central Committee) PPR Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Workers' Party) PZPR Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers'

Party) strona (s.) page sygn. signature teczka portfolio wigzka bundle or group zespo6 group, complex, set

Russian: AVP RF Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of

Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation) CC Central Committee CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union d delo (file) dok. dokument (document) f. fond (fund) GARF Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of

the Russian Federation) KGB Committee for State Security 1. list (page) op. opis' (inventory) p. papka (folder) per. perechen' (list) por. portfel' (portfolio) rolik reel RGANI Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishii Istorii. The name

of this archive has changed; it used to be called the Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii, or TsKhSD).

TsK KPSS Tsentral'nyi Komitet Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

289 289



290 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2

Johanna Granville

is Associate Professor of Political Science at Clemson University. She is the author of Patterns of Misperception: International Decision-

Making in the 1956 Hungarian Crisis (College Staion, TX, forthcoming), and is writing a second volume on this topic.

290 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2

Johanna Granville

is Associate Professor of Political Science at Clemson University. She is the author of Patterns of Misperception: International Decision-

Making in the 1956 Hungarian Crisis (College Staion, TX, forthcoming), and is writing a second volume on this topic.

