Grand Challenge Problem: Model Check Concurrent Software Edmund M. Clarke Department of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University

Grand Challenge Problem:Model Check Concurrent Software

Edmund M. Clarke

Department of Computer Science

Carnegie Mellon University

Outline of Talk

1. Explain what model checking is

2. Some successes of model checking

3. What makes software different

4. Approaches to software model checking

5. Some of my projects

What is Model Checking? “The are Glitch Project”

Bad pun for cult movie “The Blair Witch Project” ?

Temporal Logic Model Checking

• Model checking is an automatic verification technique for finite state concurrent systems.

• Developed independently by Clarke, Emerson, and Sistla and by Queille and Sifakis in early 1980’s.

• Specifications are written in propositional temporal logic.

• Verification procedure is an exhaustive search of the state space of the design.

Advantages of Model Checking

• No proofs!!!• Fast (compared to other rigorous methods such as

theorem proving)• Diagnostic counterexamples• No problem with partial specifications• Logics can easily express many concurrency properties

Main Disadvantage

State Explosion Problem:

• Too many processes• Data Paths

Much progress has been made on this problem recently!

Model of computation

~ Start~ Close~ Heat~ Error

Start~ Close~ HeatError

~ StartClose~ Heat~ Error

~ StartCloseHeat~ Error

StartCloseHeat~ Error

StartClose~ Heat~ Error

StartClose~ HeatError

Microwave Oven ExampleState-transition graphdescribes system evolvingover time.

No concurrency in simpleexamples.

Temporal Logic

The oven doesn’t heat up until the door is closed.

Not heat_up holds until door_closed

(~ heat_up) U door_closed

Basic Temporal Operators

• Fp - p holds sometime in the future. • Gp - p holds globally in the future.• Xp - p holds next time.• pUq - p holds until q holds.

The symbol “p” is an atomic proposition, e.g. “Device Enabled”.

Model Checking Problem

Let M be a state-transition graph.

Let ƒ be the specification in temporal logic.

Find all states s of M such that M, s ƒ.

Efficient Algorithms: CE81, CES83

The EMC System

PreprocessorPreprocessor Model Checker

(EMC)

Model Checker (EMC)

State Transition Graph104 to 105 states

State Transition Graph104 to 105 states

SpecificationSpecification

True or CounterexamplesTrue or Counterexamples

Breakthrough!

Ken McMillan implemented our model checking algorithm using Binary Decision Diagrams in 1987.

Model Checker SMV

Now able to handle much larger examples!!

Combating the State Explosion Problem

• Binary Decision Diagrams can be used to represent state transition systems more efficiently.

• The partial order reduction can be used to reduce the number of states that must be enumerated.

• Many techniques for alleviating state explosion:– Abstraction.– Compositional reasoning.– Symmetry.– Cone of influence reduction.– Semantic minimization.

Model Checker Performance

• Model checkers today can routinely handle systems with between 100 and 1000 state variables.

• Systems with 10120 reachable states have been checked. (Compare approx. 1078 atoms in universe.)

• By using appropriate abstraction techniques, systems with an essentially unlimited number of states can be checked.

Model Checking Systems

• There are many successful examples of the use of model checking in hardware and protocol verification.

• The fact that industry (INTEL, IBM, MOTOROLA) is starting to use model checking is encouraging.

• Below are some well-known model checkers.

Temporal Logic Model Checkers

• The first two model checkers were EMC (Clarke, Emerson, Sistla) and Caesar (Queille, Sifakis).

• SMV is the first model checker to use BDDs.

• Spin uses the partial order reduction to reduce the state explosion problem.

• Verus and Kronos check properties of real-time systems.

• HyTech is designed for reasoning about hybrid systems.

Notable Examples- IEEE Futurebus+

• In 1992 Clarke and his students at CMU used SMV to verify the IEEE Future+ cache coherence protocol.

• They found a number of previously undetected errors in the design of the protocol.

• This was the first time that formal methods have been used to find errors in an IEEE standard.

• Although the development of the protocol began in 1988, all previous attempts to validate it were based entirely on informal techniques.

Notable Examples-IEEE SCINotable Examples-IEEE SCI

• In 1992 Dill and his students at Stanford used Murphi to verify the cache coherence protocol of the IEEE Scalable Coherent Interface.

• They found several errors, ranging from uninitialized variables to subtle logical errors.

• The errors also existed in the complete protocol, although it had been extensively discussed, simulated, and even implemented.

Notable Examples-PowerScaleNotable Examples-PowerScale

• In 1995 researchers from Bull and Verimag used LOTOS to describe the processors, memory controller, and bus arbiter of the PowerScale multiprocessor architecture.

• They identified four correctness requirements for proper functioning of the arbiter.

• The properties were formalized using bisimulation relations between finite labeled transition systems.

• Correctness was established automatically in a few minutes using the CÆSAR/ ALDÉBARAN toolbox.

Notable Examples - HDLCNotable Examples - HDLC

• A High-level Data Link Controller was being designed at AT&T in Madrid in 1996.

• Researchers at Bell Labs offered to check some properties of the design using the FormalCheck verifier.

• Within five hours, six properties were specified and five were verified.

• The sixth property failed, uncovering a bug that would have

reduced throughput or caused lost transmissions!

Notable ExamplesPowerPC 620 Microprocessor

• Richard Raimi used Motorola’s Verdict model checker to debug a hardware laboratory failure.

• Initial silicon of the PowerPC 620 microprocessor crashed during boot of an operating system.

• In a matter of seconds, Verdict found a BIU deadlock causing the failure.

Notable Examples-Analog CircuitsNotable Examples-Analog Circuits

• In 1994 Bosscher, Polak, and Vaandrager won a best-paper award for proving manually the correctness of a control protocol used in Philips stereo components.

• In 1995 Ho and Wong-Toi verified an abstraction of this protocol automatically using HyTech.

• Later in 1995 Daws and Yovine used Kronos to check all the properties stated and hand proved by Bosscher, et al.

Notable Examples-ISDN/ISUP

• The NewCoRe Project (89-92) was the first application of formal verification in a software project within AT&T.

• A special purpose model checker was used in the development of the CCITT ISDN User Part Protocol.

• Five “verification engineers” analyzed 145 requirements.

• A total of 7,500 lines of SDL source code was verified.

• 112 errors were found; about 55% of the original design requirements were logically inconsistent.

Notable Examples-Edifices

• In 1995 the Concurrency Workbench was used to analyze an active structural control system to make buildings more resistant to earthquakes.

• The control system sampled the forces being applied to the structure and used hydraulic actuators to exert countervailing forces.

• A timing error was discovered that could have caused the controller to worsen, rather than dampen, the vibration experienced during earthquakes.

Grand Challenge:Model Check Software !

What makes Software Model Checking different ?

What Makes Software Model Checking Different ?

• Large/unbounded base types: int, float, string• User-defined types/classes• Pointers/aliasing + unbounded #’s of heap-allocated cells• Procedure calls/recursion/calls through pointers/dynamic method

lookup/overloading• Concurrency + unbounded #’s of threads

What Makes Software Model Checking Different ?

• Templates/generics/include files• Interrupts/exceptions/callbacks• Use of secondary storage: files, databases• Absent source code for: libraries, system calls, mobile code• Esoteric features: continuations, self-modifying code• Size (e.g., MS Word = 1.4 MLOC)

What Does It Mean to Model Check Software?

1. Combine static analysis and model checking Use static analysis to extract a finite state

synchronization skeleton K from the program.

Then check that K models f (K ² f), where f is the specification of the program.

² Bandera (Kansas State), ² Java PathFinder (NASA Ames)


2. Simulate program along all paths in computation tree

² Source code + backtracking (e.g., Verisoft)

² Source code + symbolic execution + backtracking (e.g., MS/Intrinsa Prefix)

3. Use finite-state machine to look for patterns in control-flow graph [Engler]


4. Design with Finite-State Software Models Finite state software models can act as “missing link”

between transition graphs and complex software.

² Statecharts ² Esterel ² Lustre ² OO Software Models

ExampleStatechart for Brake Control

BRAKE_CONTROL

DYNAMIC

DYNAMIC_PARK_BRAKE_ABS_ON

DYNAMIC_PARK_BRAKE_ABS_OFF

[VEHICLE_SPEED<5

or

WHEELSLIP<=THRESHOLD

or

(VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON and in(ACTUATOR_REGULATION))]

[WHEELSLIP>THRESHOLD and in(RR_ACTUATOR_REGULATION) and VEHICLE_SPEED>=5]

ACTUATOR

ACTUATOR_REGULATION

ACTUATOR_HOME

BRAKE_LATCHED

[VEHICLE_SPEED>=5 and PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

[VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]


DYNAMIC

PARK_BRAKE_ABS_ON

PARK_BRAKE_ABS_OFF

ACTUATOR

ACTUATOR_REGULATION

ACTUATOR_HOME

BRAKE_LATCHED

or

or

(VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON and

in(RR_ACTUATOR_REGULATION)

[VEHICLE_SPEED<5 and PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]



[VEHICLE_SPEED<5]

New Projects(Joint research with Tom Reps, Somesh Jha, and Helmut Veith)

Objective:

Develop mechanisms and build tools for establishing properties of concurrent software:

e.g. absence of deadlock, correctness of security features, correct response times, etc.

Project 1From Shape-Analysis to Model Checking

Obtaining useful models of software in the presence of • User-defined types/classes• Pointers/aliasing + unbounded #’s of heap-allocated cells• Procedure calls/recursion• Concurrency + unbounded #’s of threads

Shape Analysis: Formalizing “. . .”

Formal: y

{r[y],r[x]}{p[y],r[x]}x

{p[x]} {r[x]}

Informal:

x

y

A list:

x

y

Java Threads Are Heap-Allocated Objects Thread Analysis Shape Analysis

A memory configuration:

thread3inCritical

lock1isAcquired

thread1atStart

thread2atStart

thread4atStart

csLock

csLock

csLock

csLock

heldBy

An abstract memory configuration:

threadinCritical

lock1isAcquired

thread’atStart

csLock

csLock

heldBy


Here, model checking means:

Explore the space of possible transitionsamong abstract memory configurations


Project 2 Verification of Real Time Embedded Systems

Real time embedded systems:Set of tasks, to be scheduled on 1 or more processorsExecute periodically Share resources and dataHard deadlinesCan be safety critical

Want to verify:SchedulabilityDeadlocksData flow (variables used before defined...)Sound communicationResponse times,.....

Verification of Real Time Embedded SystemsTargetedTargetedCompilerCompiler

WCET analysisWCET analysisof basic blocksof basic blocks

assembly codeinspection

WCET ofcomplex tasks

BDD based max. path exploration

SchedulabilityAnalysis

rate monotonicanalysis

Model checkingRT model checking

SMV, UPPAAL, VERUS,...

Verification results

(counterexample)

Embedded System

Correctnessrequirements

Statecharts, MATLAB

( temporal logic, RT logic)

Global finitestate RT model

tasks + scheduler + synchronization

no recursion, pointers,complex data types,...

producer(int p) { bool prod; p = 0; prod = false; periodic(0,10,10) { wait(3); prod = true; p = p+1; wait(1); prod = false; };} main() { int p,c; process producer(p); consumer(c); ...

producer(int p) { bool prod; p = 0; prod = false; periodic(0,10,10) { wait(3); prod = true; p = p+1; wait(1); prod = false; };} main() { int p,c; process producer(p); consumer(c); ...

abstract model

Project 3Verifying Security Protocol Interaction

• Security protocols run on top of other protocols

– the SSL record protocol runs on top of TCP

• Interactions between these protocols can cause subtle bugs

• Consequence: cannot analyze these protocols in isolation

Source code

Abstractspecification

of theprotocol stack

Model checkercapable of handling

security and non-securityrelated properties

Attacks!

Relateback tothe code

Project 4Bounded Model-Checking

• Problem: How to compute set of reachable states? Fixpoint computation is too expensive.

• Idea: Restrict search to states that are reachable from initial state within fixed number n of transitions

• Implemented by unwinding program

Bounded Model-Checking (cont.)

•Advantages:

+Avoids expensive fixpoint computation

+Number n can be adjusted to available computational power

+Finds all bugs if program terminates quickly enough

+No need for manual loop invariants•Disadvantages

–Runtime grows with bound, might be too small for large examples

Bounded Model-Checking (cont.)void f(...) { ... while(cond) {

Body; } Rest;}

void f(...) { ... while(cond) {

Body; } Rest;}

Bounded Model-Checking (cont.)• while() loops are

unwound iterativelyvoid f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; while(cond) { Body; } } Rest;}

void f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; while(cond) { Body; } } Rest;}


unwound iteratively• Use a combination of

decision procedures to check spec.

void f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; while(cond) { Body; } } } Rest;}

void f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; while(cond) { Body; } } } Rest;}




• Assertion may be inserted after last iteration: violated if program runs longer than bound permits

void f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; while(cond) { Body; } } } } Rest;}

void f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; while(cond) { Body; } } } } Rest;}




• Assertion may be inserted after last iteration: violated if program runs longer than bound permits

• If program terminates “fast enough“, one gets a positive correctness result!

void f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { assert(FALSE); } } } } Rest;}

void f(...) { ... if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { Body; if(cond) { assert(FALSE); } } } } Rest;}

Project 5: Alternative Approach:Automated Theorem Proving for Code

Proof SystemProof System

Language ModulesLanguage Modules

ANSI-C

VHDL

PVS

AbstractionAbstraction

Data Types

Predicate

Decision ProceduresDecision Procedures

CMU SMVSATPresburgerBitvector Arith.Simplex

SyMPProof Manager

SyMPProof Manager

SyMPUser Interface

SyMPUser Interface

EMacs

Project Homepage

http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~emc/cip

Documents

Grand Challenge Problem: Model Check Concurrent Software Edmund M. Clarke Department of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University