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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 171048 July 31, 2007

RUDY A. PALECPEC, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

HON. CORAZON C. DAVIS in her capacity as the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment

and Natural Resources-National Capital Region, Manila, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

The petition before Us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the

following: (1) the Decision1 dated 29 September 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90292

entitled, "Corazon C. Davis v. The Honorable Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, et al.," finding

valid the removal from service of petitioner Rudy A. Palecpec, Jr. for being absent without official leave

(AWOL) for more than 30 days; and (2) the Resolution2 dated 10 January 2006 of the same court

denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision reversed and

set aside Resolutions No. 0409683 (dated 1 September 2004) and 0507584 (dated 7 June 2005) of the

Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirming the Order5 dated 29 January 2003 and Decision6 dated 15September 2003 of the CSC-National Capital Region (NCR) reinstating petitioner to his position as

Administrative Officer III of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-NCR.

The following antecedent facts are undisputed:

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Petitioner rose from the ranks in the DENR-NCR starting as Clerk II, moving onto Statistician I, then as

Legal Assistant II, until he was promoted to Administrative Officer III. He served as Administrative Officer

III of the Interim Internal Audit Division of the DENR-NCR from 1998 until he was dropped from the rolls

of the DENR-NCR plantilla of personnel by virtue of a Memorandum7 issued on 1 August 2000 byrespondent Corazon C. Davis, then the incumbent Regional Executive Director of the DENR-NCR. Under

the aforementioned Memorandum, petitioner was declared separated from work for being AWOL, to

wit:

Please be informed that per Memorandum of the Regional Executive Director dated June 1, 2000, you

were advised to report for work within (5) days upon receipt thereof and file the corresponding leave

application for the days you were absent. Likewise, you were also instructed to submit your Original

Daily Time Record (DTR) Card for the month of April to the Personnel Section. However, up to this

writing, you have not yet complied with said instruction nor have properly informed this Office of your

interest/disinterest to go back to work.

In this connection, we regret to inform you that consistent with Civil Service Commission Memorandum

Circular No. 12 Section 2.1.a, s. 1994 hereunder reproduced, you are Officially dropped from the rolls of

the DENR-NCR Plantilla of Personnel effective August 1, 2000.

"An Officer or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30 calendardays shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall

however be informed of his separation from the service not later than five (5) days from its effectivity

which shall be sent to the address appearing on his 201 files."

In petitioners motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted memorandum, he asserted that he had

been reporting for work as evidenced by his "Entry of Time" in the Security Guards Logbook of

Employees and that he had to resort to such recording of his official attendance since there was no Daily

Time Record (DTR) form found in the DTR rack. To refute the allegations that he was continuously AWOL

the entire months of May, June, and July 2000, petitioner presented the security logbook showing that

he reported for work on 15, 21, 22, and 27 June 2000; and 12 and 24 July 2000.

Respondent denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in an Order8 dated 13 October 2000 citing

that in her earlier Memorandum9 dated 1 June 2000, she already ordered petitioner to return to work

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but he failed to comply therewith, and neither did he properly inform respondents office of his interest

to go back to work. Respondents Order dated 13 October 2000 also stated that per the offices records,

petitioner had been continuously absent from May to July 2000 and only filed an approved leave

application for 8, 9, and 10 May 2000. Respondent likewise denied petitioners second motion for

reconsideration in an Order10 dated 4 December 2000.

Petitioner initially appealed his dismissal from service with the CSC, but his appeal was dismissed

without prejudice in an Order11 dated 2 April 2001, and he was directed to file said appeal first with the

CSC-NCR. Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Relief from judgment with the CSC-NCR, which, after

the conduct of its own investigation, issued an Order dated 29 January 2003, granting petitioners

Petition for Relief, finding as follows:

Foregoing premises considered, Palecpec cannot be found to have been continuously absent for thirtyworking days. Hence, DENRs findings of AWOL and the eventual dropping of Palecpec from the rolls is

without valid cause. Thus, Palecpec should be reinstated to his former position with the payment of

back salaries from the time he was dropped from the rolls. Nonetheless, the DENR should initiate the

appropriate administrative investigation for failure to make complete entries in the logbook.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the Appeal of Rudy A. Palecpec is hereby granted.12

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing CSC-NCR Order, but it was denied by the

CSC-NCR in a Decision dated 15 September 2003.

Unsatisfied, the respondent filed an appeal of the 29 January 2003 Order and 15 September 2003

Decision of the CSC-NCR with the CSC En Banc. However, said Decision and Order were both affirmed by

the CSC in its Resolution No. 040968, dated 1 September 2004, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Regional Executive Director Corazon C. Davis of DENR is hereby DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the Orders of CSC-NCR dated January 29, 2003 and September 15, 2003 are hereby

AFFIRMED. Thus, Rudy A. Palecpec is hereby reinstated to his position as Administrative Officer III,

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region. However, this is without

prejudice to whatever disciplinary case that may be commenced against him.13

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Respondents motion for reconsideration of the above Resolution was subsequently denied by the CSC

in its Resolution No. 050758 dated 7 June 2005, finding as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, CSC Resolution No. 04-0968

dated September 1, 2004 affirming the Orders dated January 29, 2003 and September 15, 2003 of the

Civil Service Commission National Capital Region, which reinstated Rudy A. Palecpec to his position as

Administrative Officer III, Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital Region,

stands.

The CSC-NCR is directed to monitor the implementation of this Resolution.14

On 14 July 2005, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals CSC Resolutions No. 040968 (dated 1September 2004) and 050758 (dated 7 June 2005) via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with prayer

for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.

On 28 July 2005, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution enjoining the CSC from implementing the

appealed CSC Resolutions. The Court of Appeals thereafter rendered a Decision on 29 September 2005

reversing the Resolutions of the CSC and ruling thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions

of the Civil Service Commission affirming the CSC-NCRs Orders reinstating Rudy Palecpec to his position

as Administrative Officer III with payment of back salaries are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.15

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of its 29 September 2005

Decision, but said motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 10 January 2006.

Hence, petitioner now comes before us via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the

reversal and setting aside of the Decision dated 29 September 2005 and Resolution dated 10 January

2006 of the Court of Appeals and, consequently, his reinstatement to his position as Administrative

Officer III with the DENR-NCR, with payment of back salaries, per CSC Resolutions No. 040968 (dated 1

September 2004) and No. 050758 (dated 07 June 2005).

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Petitioner posits the following arguments in support of his Petition:

I. THE ASSAILED DECISION IMPOSES A MEANING AFAR OR NOT INFERRED IN A CIVIL SERVICE RULE

CONCERNING THE DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF AN OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IN GOVERNMENT VIS--

VIS THE PRESCRIBED RECORD OF THE DAILY ATTENDANCE WHICH HAS SUSTAINED THE ADMISSIBILITY

OR RELEVANCE OF EITHER THE DAILY TIME RECORD (DTR) CARD OR OTHER EQUIVALENT FORMS.

II. THE ASSAILED DECISION RULING OUT THE AUTHENTICITY AND/OR VERACITY OF THE ENTRIES IN THE

SECURITY LOGBOOK OF EMPLOYEES IN THE DENR-NCR CONCERNING THE ATTENDANCE OF PETITIONER

HEREIN IS FOUNDED PURELY ON SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.

Respondent countered the present Petition by filing two Comments, one through private counsel16 andanother through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).17

Respondent asserts that the CSC-NCR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction in entertaining and assuming jurisdiction over petitioners Petition for Relief from

judgment, since a petition for relief cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. Respondent points out that

petitioner received her Memorandum dated 1 August 2000 which declared the latter separated from

work on 18 August 2000, as evidenced by petitioners signature on the registry receipt. Respondent thus

argues that petitioners first motion for reconsideration dated 9 October 2000 and second motion for

reconsideration dated 16 October 2000 of respondents Memorandum fell beyond the 15-day

reglementary period set by Sections 71 and 72 of the Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

Service.18

Respondent also refutes petitioners statement that he worked as a dedicated public servant during his

stay with the DENR-NCR alleging that his stay was actually marked by recalcitrant and contemptuous

attitude towards his superiors and his official responsibilities, in addition to habitual absences.

It is also not true, as petitioner claims, that he only learned of respondents Memorandum dated 1

August 2000 from his officemates, when the registry return receipt indicates receipt thereof by a certain

Rudy A. Palecpec.19 Moreover, according to respondent, the employee security logbook entries cited by

petitioner do not comply with the provision of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1991, and

standing alone, can hardly be considered as sufficient proof of ones attendance in the office. As found

by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 10 January 2006, the signature in the employee security

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logbook which reads "Andy P." is not acceptable as proof of petitioners attendance in the office. CSC

Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1999, cited by petitioner himself, provides guidelines on

ensuring proper attendance recording. It states that any other means of recording attendance may be

allowed provided the employees respective names and signatures, as well as their times of arrival to

and departure from the office, are indicated, subject to verification. According to respondent, petitioner

did not present independent evidence to prove that the name and signature opposite "Andy P." in theemployee security logbook are actually his. The DTR cards are more reliable than the employee security

logbook since a DTR is certified correct by the employee concerned and the chief of office. Hence, when

respondent marked petitioner as absent in the latters DTR cards for June to July 2000, and when

petitioners immediate supervisor executed an affidavit certifying that petitioner did not report for work

and perform his assigned duties during the same period, the respondent and the immediate supervisors

actions are entitled to the legal presumption that they did so in the regular performance of their official

duties.20

Petitioner replied to both of respondents Comments. He contends that the perfection of appeal before

the CSC is not an issue in the instant petition, and that the allegation that he did not work as a dedicated

public servant is negated by his Service Record.

Moreover, the wordings of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1991, simply prescribe the forms

available in recording the daily attendance of an officer or employee in the government, only for the

purpose of ensuring "a uniform system of monitoring the attendance of all government officials and

employees for purposes of complying with the eight hours for five working days a week."21 Petitioner

asserts that the act of not accomplishing his DTR cards may simply be a non-compliance with the policyof his office or the Civil Service Rules, and cannot be proof of his being AWOL for the contested period,

given that he had presented evidence of his attendance for the same period.

Petitioner empathically argues that the signature in the employee security logbook which reads "Andy

P." refers to one and the same person the petitioner as is known by respondent and other

employees of DENR-NCR, since it is the customary signature he had used not only in his attendance

records, but also in receiving his salary for the past ten years.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the Memoranda dated 1 June 2000 and 1 August 2000 are without force

and effect. According to him, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals states that "the absences in

issue herein are not those incurred by [herein petitioner] PALECPEC for the months of April and May, as

asserted in his Opposition, but his absences for the months of June and July 2000."22 If that were the

case, petitioner asserts that a perusal of respondents Memoranda dated 1 June 2000 and 1 August

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2000 would reveal that they concern his absences for the months of April and May, not June and July

2000; and therefore, that he was not given due notice. Petitioner also questions the validity of

respondents 1 August 2000 Memorandum informing him of his separation from service. According to

petitioner, he was not served a copy thereof and only learned of it through his officemates. In his

present Petition, he argues:

[T]he disputed Memorandum (sic) by Davis are flawed simply because it failed to serve it to [petitioner]

x x x. Be it noted that no iota of proof has been adduced that [petitioner] has received either of said

disputed Memorandum.23

Petitioner brought his case before us via an appeal by certiorari from the adverse Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In a long line of cases, it has been held that the Supreme Court is not

a trier of facts; and under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review to be givendue course should raise only questions of law.24

But when is the Court faced with a question of law? We have differentiated a question of law from a

question of fact, thus, "[t]here is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as to what law

pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity

of alleged facts."25 A question of fact arises when "there is need for a calibration of the evidence,

considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific

surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the

situation."26

Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive on this Court, but this rule admits of the

following exceptions27 :

(1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

(3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is mainly mistaken, absurd or

impossible;

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(4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such findings arecontrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a

different conclusion; and

(8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere

conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not

disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the

absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.

A recognized exception to the general rule that factual issues are not within the province of this Court is

the circumstance in which there are conflicting findings of fact by the Court of Appeals on one hand and

the trial court or government agency concerned on the other.28 The findings of fact of the Court of

Appeals and the CSC herein are evidently in conflict with each other; hence, necessitating our review of

the evidence on record and coming up with our own findings of fact.

The factual matters for our determination are (1) the actual attendance of petitioner during the

contested period and the probative value to be given the security logbook presented as evidence by

petitioner; and (2) receipt by petitioner of a copy of respondents Memorandum dated 1 June 2000

which ordered petitioner to return to work and another Memorandum dated 1 August 2000 dismissing

petitioner from service.

Petitioners allegations that he had been reporting for work on certain days and was not continuously

absent for more than 30 days are dependent chiefly on the probative value to be given the entries in the

employee security logbook. Petitioner asserts that the employee security logbook must be given

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probative value because CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1991, recognizes other means of

recording employees attendance. According to the said Memorandum Circular:

Use of Bundy Clock and Other Records of Attendance

1. All officers and employees shall record their daily attendance on the proper form or whenever

possible, have them registered on the bundy clock. Any other means of recording attendance may be

allowed provided their respective names and signature as well as the time of their arrival to and

departure from the office are indicated subject to verification.

This Court cannot give credence to petitioners assertion. Although it is true that attendance of civil

service employees may be recorded by means other than the DTR, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21,Series of 1991, clearly requires that these records must (1) provide the respective names and signatures

of the employees; (2) indicate their time of arrival and departure; and (3) be subject to verification.

Petitioner failed to establish herein that the employee security logbook complied with all of these

requirements, particularly, that it also indicated his time of departure and that the said logbook was

subjected to the verification of his supervisors and/or superiors.

To better illustrate, the entries in the employee security logbook of one "Andy P." only consist of the

following:

DATE IN OUT IN OUT

(AM) (PM)

June 15 1:00

June 21 8:40 3:30

July 12 (time in is unclear)

July 24 10:1529

Not only are these entries unverified, but they are also palpably incomplete and insufficient to establish

actual attendance. And even though the employee security logbook may be considered as evidence on

behalf of petitioner, it cannot be given more probative value than the positive declarations made by

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petitioners immediate supervisor30 and respondent, as head of office, that he was not present at the

office from April to July 2000. There appears to be no reason why respondent and his immediate

supervisor would insist that petitioner was absent when, as he claims, he was actually not. In keeping

track of petitioners attendance, petitioners immediate supervisor and respondent may be legally

presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, to have acted in the regular performance of

their official duties.31

Petitioners explanation that he failed to accomplish and submit his DTR because he was not provided

with a DTR form with his name on it on the DTR rack is untenable in light of the certification by the

DENR-NCR Chief of the Personnel Division that petitioner was provided his DTR forms for the months in

issue on the DTR rack. Said explanation is also specious considering that petitioner could have easily

asked for a DTR form from the Personnel Division, should there be none on the DTR rack.

If petitioner was actually reporting for work, given that he was already ordered to return to work by

respondent in her Memorandum of 1 June 2000, the more rational course of action for petitioner would

have been to immediately refute that he had been absent, make sure that respondent and his

immediate supervisor see him within office premises performing his assigned tasks, and diligently

submit his DTR thereafter. It is beyond our comprehension why petitioner, faced with a serious charge

of being AWOL, continued with the practice which may have gotten him into trouble in the first place

refusing to submit his monthly DTR and, as alleged by him, signing only the employee security logbook.

Neither is there enough proof to show that the signature "Andy P." refers to petitioner. We cannot

accept on face value petitioners allegation that the signature "Andy P." pertains to him in the absence

of other proof that indeed such is the signature and appendage petitioner has been using for the last ten

years.32 We note that petitioners name is Rudy A. Palecpec, Jr., and there is utter lack of rationalization

as to why his personal signature would bear a different name such as "Andy P." Assuming it were true

that petitioner is known among DENR-NCR employees to be "Andy P." and that he actually uses this

signature in his office transactions, then he would have had numerous possible pieces of evidence to

present to support such a contention. Petitioner could have easily provided additional testimonies or

affidavits from his officemates at the DENR-NCR to prove his contention that "Andy P." and Rudy A.

Palecpec, Jr. are one and the same person. He could have also procured copies of official documents

from his office, such as his personal data sheet or statement of assets and liabilities, showing that he

actually signed the same as "Andy P." Given the obvious adverse consequence he would have to face by

his failure to establish such a fact, petitioner once again acted contrary to reason by relying on the

security logbook and his self-serving allegation that the "Andy P." therein was his signature, instead of

presenting readily accessible, objective and independent evidence in support thereof.

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While petitioner claims respondent did not put the authenticity of the employee security logbook

entries in question, the records of the case reveal otherwise. As respondent argues, "we beg to disagree

that we did not put the authenticity of the logbook entries in question, because it was even first raised

in the Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC-NCR and subsequently discussed under letter A,

Arguments and Discussion of the Memorandum of Appeal."33 Accordingly, respondent actually puts in

issue the authenticity of the aforementioned logbook entries. In her Motion for Reconsideration filedbefore the CSC-NCR, respondent avers that "the same has no basis in fact and in truth, the alleged

entries in the logbook can be entered by anybody."34

Lastly, the fact that petitioner was issued his disbursement voucher for his salary for the period 1-31

May 2000 does not necessarily prove that he had reported for work during the entire period. It is

important to note that petitioner had an approved leave of absence from 8-10 May 2000. We also take

notice of the fact that reasonable time is needed for the Personnel Division to coordinate with the

Accounting Division of the same office for the withholding of the salary of an employee for any reason.

This is more so when the non-payment of salary is due to unauthorized absences because the

employees salary is released by the end of the month, just about the same time when the employee is

required to submit his DTR for the said month. It is not uncommon for salary that is improperly paid to

be merely deducted from the employees salary for the following month. Neither can the said voucher

negate petitioners continuous unauthorized absence for 30 days in the succeeding months of June and

July 2000, for which reason he was dropped from the rolls.

The dearth of evidence presented by petitioner astounds us, considering that if petitioner were truly

present at the office during the contested period, then he could have so easily proven the same bypresenting testimonies of officemates who had seen or interacted with him during those days or his

work output during the period such as work-related documents which bear his signature and date of

signing. Apart from stating that there was no deliberate malice in his absences, as he had a family

problem at the time the absences were incurred, and in giving a copy of dubious entries in the employee

security logbook, petitioner presented little evidence to refute the AWOL charge against him.

Unfortunately, petitioner chose to build his case around the questionable entries in the employee

security logbook and mostly self-serving allegations.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that except for the period 8-10 May 2000 for which petitioner

was granted an approved leave of absence, petitioner had been absent without authorization beginning

2 May 2000, the entire months of June and July 2000, and up to 1 August 2000 when respondent issued

her second Memorandum. The evidence presented and legal presumptions applicable herein support

the conclusion that petitioner incurred continuous absences of more than 30 days.

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Now we proceed with a discussion of petitioners assertion that he was not properly served a copyof

respondents Memoranda dated 1 June 2000 and 1 August 2000, and that he allegedly learned only of

the latter Memorandum from his officemates. Petitioner contends that non-service on him of the

questioned Memoranda deprived him of his right to proper notice. Petitioners arguments are

unmeritorious.

Petitioner alleges that he was never served the first Memorandum dated 1 June 2000, arguing that the

signature on the registry receipt is under the name of a certain "Priscilla Sanchez" whom he does not

even know. However, despite his protestations, petitioner had already admitted such fact of receipt of

the first Memorandum in his second motion for reconsideration of respondents second Memorandum

dated 1 August 2000, wherein he stated:

It is not true that [petitioner herein] did not report for work in compliance with the Return to WorkOrder dated June 1, 2000 and received by him on June 16, 2000. x x x."35 (Emphasis supplied.)

Based on the afore-cited, petitioner may not now deny receipt of the above 1 June 2000 Memorandum.

Furthermore, we have already recognized that a government employee who is on AWOL may be

dismissed without prior notice.36

The provisions of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15,37 Series of 1999, are clear and leave no room for

interpretation. A civil service officer or employee who is continuously AWOL for at least 30 working days

shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without need of any prior notice. The said

Memorandum Circular only requires that the employee be informed of his separation from service not

later than five (5) days from its effectivity and sent to the address appearing on his 201 file or to his last

known address, which respondent complied with by her issuance of the second Memorandum dated 1

August 2000.

But petitioner denies being served the second Memorandum dated 1 August 2000, alleging he obtained

knowledge thereof only through his officemates. Petitioners allegation is contradicted by the registry

return receipt for the said Memorandum clearly bearing the handwritten name or signature of a "Rudy

A. Palecpec." Moreover, the said Memorandum was sent to petitioners last known address, where he

regularly receives mail, and the very same address reflected in his 201 file. When a document is shown

to have been properly addressed and actually mailed, then there arises a presumption that the same

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was duly received by the addressee,38 and it becomes the burden of the latter to prove otherwise.

Again, petitioners bare denial of receipt of a copy of the Memorandum dated 1 August 2000 does little

to persuade. In view of the foregoing, this Court sees that it has been established that petitioner was

duly served a copy of respondents Memorandum dated 1 August 2000 notifying him that he was being

dropped from the rolls.

Assuming arguendo that petitioners unauthorized absences are not continuous and are less than 30

days, he may still be dropped from the rolls by reason thereof, after compliance with the requirement

set forth in section 2b, Rule XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1999, which reads:

If the number of unauthorized absences incurred is less than thirty (30) WORKING days, a written

Return-to-Work order shall be served on the official or employee at his last known address on record.

Failure on his part to report for work within the period stated in the order shall be a valid ground todrop him from the rolls.

Respondents first Memorandum dated 1 June 2000 expressly required petitioner to return to work

within five days from receipt thereof; it thus constitutes a "written Return-to-Work Order" required by

the afore-quoted provision. Petitioner admitted receipt of the said Memorandum, yet he still failed to

comply with the order to return to work within five days from receipt thereof, giving respondent valid

ground to already drop him from the rolls.

Now, we proceed to address petitioners argument that he was not properly informed that he was being

dismissed for his continued absences in June and July 2000, for respondents 1 August 2000

Memorandum refers only to his absences during the previous months of April and May 2000. We

disagree with petitioner because a cursory reading of respondents 1 August 2000 Memorandum,

particularly the first paragraph thereof, would reveal that respondent noted petitioners absence and

refusal to submit his DTRs for the months of April to July 2000, thus:

Please be informed that per Memorandum of the Regional Executive Director dated June 1, 2000, youwere advised to report for work within five (5) days upon receipt thereof and file the corresponding

leave application for the days you were absent. Likewise, you were also instructed to submit your

Original Daily Time Record (DTR) Card for the month of April to the Personnel Section. However, up to

this writing, you have not yet complied with said instruction nor have properly informed this Office of

your interest/disinterest to go back to work. (Emphasis supplied.)

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It is very clear from the foregoing that petitioner, from April 2000 up to the time of the Memorandums

writing on 1 August 2000, had not yet submitted any DTR, reported back to work, or informed

respondent of his interest/disinterest to return to work. Although petitioner contends that he had

submitted his DTRs for April and May and that the two DTRs are in the possession of the PersonnelRecords Division of the DENR-NCR, it behooves this Court to wonder why there was no attempt by

petitioner to provide copies thereof as evidence. Petitioner could have easily provided us a copy of the

aforementioned DTRs he allegedly submitted by securing copies thereof from the Personnel Records

Division. Without supporting evidence, petitioners contention that he had submitted his DTRs for April

and May is, once more, declared self-serving and deserves scant consideration.

Anent respondents allegation that petitioners motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service

Commission was filed out of time, petitioner argues that the reglementary period of 15 days within

which to file does not apply inasmuch as there was no sufficient notice and valid service thereofeffected upon petitioner. Petitioners assertion is delusive. Under Section 80 of the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a decision of the CSC or Regional Office shall be immediately

executory after 15 days from receipt thereof unless a motion for reconsideration39 is seasonably filed.

As has been extensively discussed in the preceding paragraphs, there was proper service on petitioner

of the first and second memoranda. Thus, petitioners argument on this ground must fail. The registry

receipt shows that a certain Rudy Palecpec received the 1 August 2000 Memorandum on 18 August

2000. Records reveal petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on 9 October 2000 or 52 days from18 August 2000, way beyond the 15-day reglementary period; his second motion for reconsideration, on

the other hand, which the CSC treated as an appeal, was filed on 16 October 2000.1avvphi1

This Court has indeed, in several instances, pronounced that the rules on technicality can be brushed

aside in order to serve the ends of substantial justice.40 Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the

findings of the Court of Appeals as to the validity of his removal from service due to AWOL are in

accordance with law and the records of the case.

Our Constitution enshrines the policy that "public office is a public trust [and all] public officers must at

all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity,

loyalty and efficiency."41 Public office therefore is given utmost regard, and the highest standards of

service are expected from it. We have categorically pronounced that "the nature and responsibilities of

public officers enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and oft-repeated in our case law are not mere

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rhetorical words, not to be taken as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals

that should be matched with actual deeds."42

Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, provides measures to ensure

compliance with these working standards and goals. With respect to unauthorized absences, "the Civil

Service Law provides that frequent or habitual unauthorized absences shall be ground for disciplinary

action."43

As this Court has held in the case of Talion v. Ayupan44 :

[C]ivil service employees who are absent for at least 30 days without leave are considered absent

without leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due notice. The notice contemplatedby this rule is not jurisdictional in nature and failure to give such notice by the appropriate government

office does not prevent the dropping of the employee concerned from the government service. Staying

away from ones regular employment in the government or remaining on leave without proper approval

is something that an employee can hardly be unaware of.

Time and again, this Court has made the pronouncement that any act which falls short of the exacting

standards for public office shall not be countenanced.45 Absence without leave for a prolonged period

of time constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service and justifies the dismissal of

an employee and the forfeiture of benefits with prejudice to re-employment in the government46 since

it is an established fact that frequent unauthorized absences cause inefficiency in the public service.

Hence, in this case, the dismissal of petitioner for being AWOL carries with it the attendant penalties of

cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in

government service.47

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present Petition for Review on Certiorari and AFFIRM

the Decision dated 29 September 2005 and Resolution dated 10 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 90292. We hereby ORDER that petitioner Rudy A. Palecpec, Jr. be dropped from the rolls

of the Plantilla of Personnel of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital

Region effective 1 August 2000, with the cancellation of his civil service eligibility, forfeiture of

retirement benefits; and with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch of the government or any of

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its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned and controlled corporations. Costs

against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the

above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion

of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes