G.R. No. 126252 August 30, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT

FACTS:

For review is the conviction of accused-appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for illegal possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana for which he was initially sentenced to death.

That on or about the 28th day of November, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control five (5) kilos of compressed marijuana dried leaves, without the authority of law to do so.

The prosecutions case hinges on the testimony of Senior Inspector OLIVER ENMODIAS. He recounted that on November 28, 1994, he and SPO3 JOSE PANGANIBAN boarded a passenger jeepney from their office in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, en route to Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while SPO3 Panganiban sat opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When the jeepney reached Km. 4 or 5, accused JESUS GARCIA boarded the jeepney carrying a plastic bag. He occupied the front seat, beside the driver and placed the plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of minutes, the policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from accused's bag. To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow accused when he gets off the jeepney.

The accused alighted at the Baguio city hall and the police officers trailed him. The accused proceeded to Rizal Park and sat by the monument. Half a meter away, the police officers saw the accused retrieve a green travelling bag from the back pocket of his pants. He then transferred five (5) packages wrapped in newspaper from the plastic bag to the green bag. As the newspaper wrapper of one of the packages was partially torn, the police officers saw the content of the package. It appeared to be marijuana. Forthwith, the policemen approached the accused and identified themselves. The accused appeared to be nervous and did not immediately respond. The policemen then asked the accused if they could inspect his travelling bag. The accused surrendered his bag and the inspection revealed that it contained five (5) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. The police officers then arrested the accused and seized his bag.

The accused admitted being at the locus criminis but denied possessing marijuana or carrying any bag. He alleged that on said day, at about 8:00 a.m., he left his residence in Angeles City to visit his brother, NICK GARCIA, whom he had not seen for ten (10) years. He arrived in Baguio City at 12:30 p.m. Before proceeding to his brother's house, he took a stroll at the Rizal Park. At about 2:00 p.m., two (2) men accosted him at the park. They did not identify themselves as police officers. They held his hands and ordered him to go with them. Despite his protestations, he was forcibly taken to a waiting car and brought to a safehouse. There, he was asked about the source of his supply of illicit drugs. When he denied knowledge of the crime imputed to him, he was brought to a dark room where his hands were tied, his feet bound to a chair, his mouth covered by tape and his eyes blindfolded. They started mauling him. Initially, he claimed he was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs. When asked further whether he suffered bruises and broken ribs, he answered in the negative. Thereafter, he explained that there were no visible signs of physical abuse on his body as he was only punched, not kicked. Notwithstanding the

maltreatment he suffered, the accused claimed he stood firm on his denial that he was dealing with illicit drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the police is guilty of arbitrary detention (Art. 125 RPC)

HELD:

Firstly, appellant pointed out that if the police officers indeed smell and the marijuana he was allegedly carrying while they were all on board the jeepney, they should have immediately arrested him instead of waiting for him to alight and stroll at the Rizal Park. Secondly, appellant faulted the procedure adopted by the arresting officers who, after the arrest, took him to the CIS office at the Baguio Water District Compound for investigation instead of bringing him to the nearest police station, as mandated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Finally, appellant theorized that the prosecution's omission or failure to present the other arresting officer, SPO3 Panganiban, to corroborate the testimony of its witness Senior Inspector Enmodias was fatal to the prosecution's case as the lone testimony of Enmodias failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These contentions of appellant fail to persuade.

The police officers, without compromising their sworn duty to enforce the law, the police officers exercised reasonable prudence and caution in desisting to apprehend appellant inside the jeepney when they initially suspected he was in possession of marijuana. They sought to verify further their suspicion and decided to trail appellant when the latter alighted from the jeepney. It was only after they saw that one of the packages with the torn wrapper contained what looked like marijuana fruiting tops did they accost appellant and make the arrest. At that precise time, they had obtained personal knowledge of circumstances indicating that appellant had illicit drugs in his possession. They had reasonable ground upon which to base a lawful arrest without a warrant.

Neither can the police officers be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable by afflictive or capital penalties.

AVELLA GARCIA v. CA

Art.171, 172

FACTS:

Petitioner Avella Garcia (Avella) was charged with Falsification of a Private Document, defined and penalized under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the month of January, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines , Abella Garcia, being then in possession of a receipt for Five Thousand Pesos dated January 21, 1991 issued by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down payment of the sale of a house and lot situated at No. 46 P. Gomez St.,

Mandaluyong, Metro Manila by Albert Quijada, Jr. to accused, said accused then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud and damage Alberto Quijada Jr made alterations and wrote words, figures and phrases to the original receipt which completely changed its meaning by making appear thereon that it was issued on January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and in fact, the said accused fully well knew that the receipt was only for the amount of Five Thousand Pesos.

Sometime in early October 1990, a verbal agreement was entered into between Alberto Quijada, Jr. (Alberto) and Avella for the sale of the former’s house and lot located at 46 P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for the purchase price of P1.2 million pesos. On October 23, 1990, an “earnest money” in the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) was given to Alberto by Avella. On October 31, 1990, the amount of one hundred and fifty-five thousand pesos (P155,000) was delivered by Avella representing this time the downpayment for the house and lot. A subsequent payment of five thousand pesos (P5,000) was made on January 21, 1991.

The relationship between buyer and seller turned sour. Avella filed a complaint for estafa against Alberto for his failure to execute a deed of sale and deliver the subject property. Among the evidence she submitted was the copy of the receipt she prepared on January 21, 1991. However, the receipt appeared to have been altered in the following manner: 1) the word “fifty” was inserted before the word “five” on the second line of the receipt to read “fifty five thousand” instead of “five thousand”; 2) the number “5” was inserted before “5,000.00” on the third line of the receipt so that it would read “55,000.00”; 3) additional words were inserted in the last sentence of the receipt which reads, “Now covered by T.C.T. # 3998 R.D. Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to execute of [sic] valid deed of conveyance covering the same sale”; 4) on the date “January 21” the number 4 was superimposed so that it would read as “January 24” instead; and 5) there now appears the amount of “55,000.00” and below it the word “value” on the upper left hand corner of the receipt.

Having noticed the alterations, Alberto instituted a criminal action before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City charging that Avella had made it appear that he received P55,000 when he received only P5,000. Needless to state, the City Prosecutor found that a prima facie case of violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code had been committed by Avella and accordingly filed the corresponding Information.

Avella, in her defense, admitted that she did in fact alter the receipt but claims that it was done in the presence and at the request of Alberto.

On January 21, 1991, Alberto, along with his sister, came to Avella’s residence in Mandaluyong City to ask for additional downpayment for the house and lot. At that time she only had P5,000 in cash which she handed over to Alberto and then promised him a bigger sum in the future. Avella then hand wrote two receipts which was signed by Alberto and his sister, as evidence of the payment of P5,000. One receipt was her copy while the other was for Alberto. Three days later, on January 24, 1991, Avella called up Mr. Celso Cunanan (Celso), an architect, from whom she asked to borrow P50,000. Celso had earlier committed

to Avella that he would lend her P50,000. Celso arrived at her house that evening to give her the money. Already present in the house were Avella, her sister and Alberto. Celso delivered to Avella P50,000 which the latter, in the former’s presence, handed over to Alberto. With respect to the alteration, Avella explained that Alberto did not have with him his copy of the January 21, 1991 receipt and so he told her to just “add” in her copy the amount of P50,000 to make it P55,000. Avella acceded to the request and made the changes in front of Alberto while he was counting the money. Avella said she showed the altered receipt to Alberto but that he was not able to affix his signature thereon because he was in a hurry to leave. Avella’s account was corroborated by the testimony of Celso who declared that all these happened in his presence.

Avella further claimed that this case was filed against her in retaliation for the estafa case she filed against Alberto. As claimed by Avella, she found out that the deed of sale which purportedly transferred ownership of the house and lot to Alberto was a fake. Upon her request, the National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.), Questioned Documents Division, examined the signatures of Mr. Floro Caceres and Mrs. Paciencia Castor Caceres, the transferees of the subject property, contained in the deed of sale. In its report the N.B.I. determined that the questioned signatures and sample signatures of Floro Caceres and Paciencia Caceres were not written by one and the same person

ISSUE:

W/N Avella is guilty under Art 171 and 172 of the RPC

HELD:

The plea lacks merit and is denied.

The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (4) that the changes made the document speak something false. When these are committed by a private individual on a private document the violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person.

Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and without convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is readily apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he did not. Hence, Avella’s conviction.

DENIED and Affirmed.

AMADEO TETANGCO V. OMBUDSMAN

ART.220

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order, of public respondent Ombudsman which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner Amando Tetangco against private respondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 220 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on January 26, 2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman and P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, on March 5, 2001, Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the financial assistance from the City of Manila when such disbursement was not justified as a lawful expense.

In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the case and the same case had previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, the Complaint had no verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The mayor maintained that the expenses were legal and justified, the same being supported by disbursement vouchers, and these had passed prior audit and accounting.

The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence and merit. The Ombudsman adopted his recommendation.

The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CHARGE AGAINST RESPONDENT MAYOR ATIENZA FOR VIOLATION OF ART. 220 OF THE RPC DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT HIM FOR THE CRIME CHARGED OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF R.A. NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT).

HELD:

In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 11 Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for.

The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art. 220 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. – Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or property under his administration to any public use other than that for which

such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.

If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to 50 percent of the sum misapplied.

The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender is an accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this case.

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

SAMANIEGO V AGUILA

334 SCRA 438 (2000) ART. 204

Facts: The Office of the President granted the exemption from the coverage of the "Operation Land Transfer Program" the land owned by X. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition questioning the decision of the Office for failure to implead the Office of the President, as they should be considered as indispensable parties.

Issue: Whether the Office of the President should be considered as an indispensable party and must therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules.

Held: No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action without that party being impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that the court cannot proceed without their presence. "Interests" within the meaning of this rule, should be material, directly in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest on the subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party on the record. In the case at bar, the failure to implead the Office of the President does not warrant the dismissal of the case as such is considered as a pro forma party.

People v. Maramara

317 scra 222 Art. 251

FACTS:

The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate, convicting accused-appellant Cresenciano Maramara of murder. That on November 18, 1991, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Calpi, Municipality of Claveria, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with a handgun one Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter on the chest, thereby inflicting wound which caused his death. The prosecution's version of the killing of Miguelito Donato, as culled from the testimonies of his younger brother Ricardo Donato and father Regarder Donato, is as follows:

A benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School Parents-Teachers Association of which accused-appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accused-appellant's house in Barangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of accused-appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about two (2) meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused-appellant took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter on the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardo's head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about three (3) minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of what happened to their son Miguelito.

Regarder Donato, Miguelito's father, immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day (November 19, 1991). Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused-appellant.

The defense had a different story. At about 11:00 in the evening, brothers Ricardo and Miguelito Donato arrived at the benefit dance and approached the dancing pair of Rowena del Rosario and Dante Arce. Then Ricardo and Miguelito ganged-up on Dante Arce. Accused-appellant, who was about eight (8) meters away, rushed to the scene to pacify the trio. Ricardo held accused-appellant's hands at his back and then Miguelito repeatedly stabbed accused-appellant on different parts of his body. Accused-appellant regained consciousness at the Claveria hospital where Dr. Gil Geñorga treated him for a few days, then transferred him to the Pio Duran Hospital. There was no way accused-appellant could have resisted Miguelito's attack, much less was he capable of inflicting injury on Miguelito, since the stronger Ricardo was holding accused-appellant's hands and was dragging him away while Miguelito kept lunging a six-inch bladed weapon at him.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not accused-appellant is liable under Art. 251

HELD:

There is no merit in accused-appellant's position that he should be held liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body — two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused-appellant with his handgun shot Miguelito.

Assuming that a rumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused-appellant as Miguelito Donato's killer.

While accused-appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him these wounds, the evidence is inadequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the defense's version stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to the circumstances surrounding the Miguelito's death.

We do not subscribe, however, to the trial court's appreciation of treachery which, we note, was discussed only in the dispositive portion of the decision and which was based solely on the fact that appellant used a firearm in killing the victim Miguelito Donato. The use of a firearm is not sufficient indication of treachery. In the absence of any convincing proof that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the means by which he committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant. And where treachery is not adequately proved, the accused-appellant can be convicted only of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby MODIFIES the judgment appealed from. The Court finds accused-appellant Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable of homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Miguelito Donato without the attendance of any modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the Court hereby SENTENCES accused-appellant Cresenciano Maramara to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all its accessory penalties, and to pay the heirs of Miguelito Donato in the amount of P10,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as death indemnity.1âwphi1.nêt

Costs against the accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.ELVIE EJANDRA @ ELVIES EJANDRA @ BEBOT EJANDRA @ ALEJANDRO EJANDRA @ BEBOT OCAY SUANGCO, MAGDALENA CALUNOD y MAGANOY @ MAGDALENA SALIOT-SUANGCO, ANTONIO HUERA y RANDA, ROEL REVILLA CERON, and EDWIN TAMPOS y AMPARO (All detained at Quezon City Jail, Quezon City), appellants.

Art. 267

FACTS:

This is a review on automatic appeal of the Decision1 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 219, convicting appellants Elvie Ejandra, Magdalena Calunod, Edwin Tampos and Roel Revilla of kidnapping for ransom, and sentencing them to suffer the death penalty.

The accused were charged of kidnapping for ransom. That on or about July 2, 1997, in Quezon City, and, the accused, while confederating, conniving, conspiring, and helping each and one another, did then and there with the use of force, threat and intimidation, take and carry away, a nine-year-old minor child, Ed Henderson Tan, against the will and consent of the latter nor any of his natural and legal parents or guardian, to an unknown destination, detain, hold and control Ed Henderson Tan depriving him of his liberty, and during their control and custody of Ed Henderson Tan, call, demand and negotiate the payment of ransom money from Eddie Tan, the father of Ed Henderson Tan, for the safe release and return of the victim Ed Henderson, otherwise, the victim would be harmed or killed, the victim’s father Eddie Tan actually paid the accused the amount of P548,000.00 as ransom money, for the safe release of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the victim Ed Henderson Tan and his father Eddie Tan.

Edwin Tampos, Roel Revilla, Elvie Ejandra and Antonio Huera denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Ed Henderson, and invoked alibi as an additional defense.

In the case at bar, the overt acts of the appellants were so coordinated to attain a common purpose: that of kidnapping and detaining Ed Henderson for ransom. Appellants Ejandra, Tampos and Revilla abducted the victim. Appellant Revilla drove the motorcycle from the place of abduction to the house where the victim was detained. Appellant Calunod guarded the victim during the latter’s detention, and later brought the victim to E. Rodriguez Avenue in Quezon City prior to his release, along with appellant Tampos. Appellant Calunod also collected the ransom from the victim’s father. All the foregoing facts indubitably show that the appellants conspired to kidnap the victim for ransom.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.

To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity.81 It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim’s release.

In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the release of the victim. The trial court correctly sentenced the appellants to death. However, the trial court erred in failing to order the appellants to pay, jointly and severally, to Ed Henderson, his parents Eddie and Marileen Tan the amount of P485,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages. Under Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, the principals are jointly and severally liable for the civil liabilities arising from the delict.

ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ART. 287

FACTS:

What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of accused Ong Chiu Kwan, for unjust vexation.

Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of “Crazy Feet,” a business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong.

Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to “relocate” the telephone, electric and water lines of “Crazy Feet,” because said lines posed as a disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business establishment.

The Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation, and sentenced him to “imprisonment for twenty days.” The court also ordered him to pay moral damages, finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of “Crazy Feet” caused the interruption of its business operations during peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a decision dated December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the decision of the lower court in toto, without stating the reasons for doing so.

On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On August 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal, agreeing with the lower court’s finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.

Hence, a petition for review in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

W/N accused is guilty of unjust vexation

HELD:

The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:

“This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their corresponding memorandum or brief. The prosecution filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.

“After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in toto.”

The Constitution requires that “[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that “[T]he judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.”

Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own.

Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded decision of a regional trial court, we said:

“[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.”

Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take refresher courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.

Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for compliance with the constitutional requirement of contents of a decision. However, considering that this case has been pending for sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if we review the evidence and decide the case.

Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of complainant’s business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.

Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to be without basis. Moral damages may be recovered if they were the proximate result of defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award of exemplary damages is justified if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. There is no evidence to support such award. Hence, we delete the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is hereby deleted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant.

ART. 294(2)

FACTS:

Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery with Rape.

That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, the said accused confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain, violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside, hogtied said Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry away cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner Consuelo Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of

the commission of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic) wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually abused and/or intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.

Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was identified at a police line-up by Nerissa and her grandmother.

The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he was staying in the house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the gold panning business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified and corroborated his defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5 kilometers away from Barangay Bangon.

The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused. The Court found accused Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape.

ISSUE:

W/N the accused is guilty of Robbery with Rape.

HELD:

We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory replies of Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala removed his mask "before" or "after" she and Nerissa were hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant. The contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala as there was a flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being counted and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo remembered the earring on his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station. Misoedp

The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: Edpmis

"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."

The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are cases holding that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs. Martinez, accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who remained at large, were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by

the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime.

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. Supreme

Judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED.

ANICIA RAMOS-ANDAN, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

ART. 315

FACTS:

Instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, versus Anicia Ramos-Andan and Potenciana Nieto, accused, Anicia Ramos Andan, accused-appellant."

On February 4, 1991, Anicia Ramos-Andan, herein petitioner, and Potenciana Nieto approached Elizabeth E. Calderon and offered to buy the latter’s 18-carat heart-shaped diamond ring. Elizabeth agreed to sell her ring. In turn, Potenciana tendered her three (3) postdated checks.

Inasmuch as the three checks (PDB Check Nos. 14173188, 14173189, and 14173190) were all payable to cash, Elizabeth required petitioner to endorse them. The latter complied.

When Elizabeth deposited the checks upon maturity with the drawee bank, they bounced for the reason "Account Closed." She then sent Potenciana a demand letter to pay, but she refused.

On July 10, 1997, Elizabeth filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan a Complaint for Estafa against petitioner and Potenciana. Finding a probable cause for Estafa against them, the Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan. Subsequently, petitioner was arrested but Potenciana has remained at large. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.

During the hearing, petitioner denied buying a diamond ring from Elizabeth, maintaining that she signed the receipt and the checks merely as a witness to the transaction between Elizabeth and Potenciana. Thus, she could not be held liable for the bounced checks she did not issue.

After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and imposing upon her an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify Elizabeth E. Calderon in the amount of P73,000.00 representing the purchase price of the diamond ring.

The trial court held that while it was Potenciana who issued the checks, nonetheless, it was petitioner who induced Elizabeth to accept them and who endorsed the same. Accordingly, petitioner cannot escape liability.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. The maximum penalty imposed was increased to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal and the indemnity was reduced to P23,000.00 considering the RTC’s finding that:

Complainant, however, was able to present in Court only Planters Development Bank (Check) No. 14173188, dated June 30, 1991, in the amount of P23,000.00 and the fact of its being dishonored. The other two checks were neither presented nor the fact of being dishonored proven. Likewise, the two checks were not mentioned in the demand letter marked as Exhibit ‘C.’ Although, therefore, it is clear from the records, in fact admitted by the accused, that the total amount of P23,000.00 as purchase price of the diamond ring has not been paid, the accused should only be held liable for the dishonor of the check above-stated as the dishonor of the two other checks was not proven in Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate Court.

Hence a petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty under Art.315

HELD:

The elements of the offense as defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are:

(1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;

(2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and

(3) the payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did not know that the offender had no funds or insufficient funds.

All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution proved that the checks were issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation, i.e., the checks were issued in payment for the ring. The checks bounced when Elizabeth deposited them for the reason "Account Closed." There is no showing whatsoever that before petitioner handed and endorsed the checks to Elizabeth, she took steps to ascertain that Potenciana has sufficient funds in her account. Upon being informed that the checks bounced, she failed to give an adequate explanation why Potenciana’s account was closed. In Echaus v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that "the fact that the postdated checks…were not covered by sufficient funds, when they fell due, in the absence of any explanation or justification by petitioner, satisfied the element of deceit in the crime of estafa, as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code."

PEOPLE vs. MANANSALA , 273 SCRA 502 (1997)ART. 337

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of RTC-Manila finding Dante Manansala guilty of rape against his 14-year old daughter, Jennifer Manansala. On direct examination, she said that she was raped by her father on 8 occasions from the period Nov 1, 1991up to Nov 13, 1991 in a taho factory where he was living.

Held:

Reversed on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Ratio:

Incestuous rape is admittedly one of the heinous crimes. However, the constitutional presumption of innocence is sedulously observed. For this purpose, the Court has formulated a set of principles: (1) An accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, where only 2 persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;(3) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.The declarations made by the principal witness for the defense, private complainant Jennifer Manansala, is contradictory to her mother's testimony(Teresita who was presented as a witness for the prosecution) in that the latter said Jennifer was with her father in Tarlac from Nov 1 to 13. Jennnifer was undulating and wavering on her statements when upon cross-examination she said that she was raped in Manila by her father on Nov 1, but was again raped several times in Tarlac from Nov 2 to 13. She explained that the reason why she claimed that she had been raped in Manila was because she was afraid that her complaints will be dismissed for improper venue. Later she testified that she was raped in Nov 1 and 2 in Manila, and then raped in Tarlac on Nov 3 to 8.The prosecution's evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on Nov 1, 1991, why did she go with her father to Tarlac on Nov 2 and stayed there with him until Nov 14? She was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the following day and for 13 more days after that she stayed with him. It is true that the medico-legal examination conducted on Nov 17 showed that shw was no longer a virgin and that she had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape, but quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at that time of the crime). This is expecially true because she said that she had been given money by her father everytime they had an intercourse. The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from complainant's testimony is that although accused had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or intimidation.

EDUARDO P. DIEGO,vs.JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH 43,

ART. 349

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.

On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single;

In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce."

Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein complainant’s brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.

The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The combined testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego.

Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition, complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judge’s finding of good faith on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our country and because the accused’s first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

HELD:

Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Applying the rule as then prevailing, and in line with applicable jurisprudence, the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the amount of P10,000.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-appellant.

ART.365

FACTS:

That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, taking advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from … behind in a sudden and unexpected manner with the use of said vehicle … members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class 07-95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or less, from one trainee to another, thus forming a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st man to the last man, unable to defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in spite of the continuous warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan Tabacon Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously waving their hands at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from a distance of 100 meters away from the jogger’s rear portion, but which accused failed and refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the joggers, thus forcing the rear hitting, bumping, or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being aware that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake, continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting the victims.

ISSUE:

W/N Glenn violated art 358.

HELD:

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that GLENN "escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims." It being crystal clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum of said penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period.

Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca and of GLENN that the latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is that which could properly be imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, since the maximum term for each count is only two months the Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries

ELPIDIO BONDAD, JR., Y BURAC, appellant, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee.

RA 9165 Dangerous drugs act of 2002

FACTS:

That on or about the 29th day of January 2004, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell to poseur buyer 0.02 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, a dangerous drug.

Denying the charges against him, appellant, a former police officer, claimed that he was framed up and gave the following version:

On January 29, 2004, while he was playing inside 3 C’s billiard hall, PO2 Brubio, whom he knew was a policeman, entered the billiard hall. After greeting PO2 Brubio in Bicolano, he continued playing but PO2 Brubio suddenly handcuffed him and asked him "Sumama ka muna." Another person who was at his back pushed him out of the billiard hall in the course of which he felt PO2 Brubio reaching his (appellant’s) right front pocket, drawing him to restrain the hand of PO2 Brubio, telling him "pera ko yan!"

Aware that his son was inside the billiard hall, appellant summoned and handed him his wallet containing P2,000. PO2 Brubio, however, took the wallet from his son, telling him "Huwag ka makialam dito." He was then made to board a car and taken to the Office of the SAIDSOTF at the police station.

Appellant’s defense was corroborated by his son Christian Jeffrey C. Bondad, and Roberto U. Mata who was a "spotter" (referee) at the billiard hall at the time appellant was arrested.

ISSUE:

W/N accussed appellant is Liable under RA 9165

HELD:

Appellant claims that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, hence, it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized items.

Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof ; x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Appellant claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the drugs took place. A reading of the testimony of the poseur-buyer

People v. Pringas holds, however:

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor , and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team . Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.17 (Citation omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Court’s pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, viz:

x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds , as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, by PO2 Dano’s claim, he immediately marked the seized items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission, however, he did not conduct an inventory of the items seized. Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was thus failure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned early on, during the cross examination of PO2 Dano, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, despite PO2 Dano’s awareness of such requirements. And the defense raised it again during the offer of evidence by the prosecution, thus:

Atty. Puentebella:

x x x x

Exhibits "B" which is the brown envelope, "B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" are objected to for being product of irregular functions of police and therefore fruit of poisonous thinking [sic] and they are not admissible and they were not photographed in the presence of the accused as provided for by Sec. 21, par.1, R.A. 9165; (emphasis supplied)

IN FINE, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against appellant, his acquittal is in order.

This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first and third assignments of error.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant, Elpidio Bondad Jr., y Burac, is ACQUITED of the crimes charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RONNIE AGOMO-O, accused,

EDDY PANEZA and OSCAR SERVANDO, accused-appellants.

PD. 532

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City, finding accused-appellants Eddy Paneza and Oscar Servando, together with accused Ronnie Agomo-o, guilty of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532.

That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1993, along the national highway, in the Municipality of San Enrique, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a pistolized homemade shotgun and bladed weapons announced a hold-up when the passenger jeepney driven by Rodito Lasap reached Barangay Mapili, San Enrique, Iloilo, and by means of violence against or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain, take steal and carry away cash money, in the amount of FIFTY PESOS (P50.00), Philippine Currency and a wrist watch with a value of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) both belonging to JOSE AMADOR, another amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P130.00) belonging to FREDDIE AGRABIO, and the amount of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) belonging to the driver, RODITO LASAP, with a total value of THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P3,380.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid persons and on the occasion of said robbery, the accused, with intent to kill shot the driver RODITO LASAP, with the firearms they were provided at that time which resulted [in] the death of Rodito Lasap and with deliberate intent to kill likewise stab one FREDDIE AGRABIO with a bladed weapon they were provided thus hitting him on the left elbow, thus commencing the commission of homicide directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.

ISSUE:

W/N accused is liable under PD532

HELD:

It is settled that so long as the witnesses’ testimonies agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor the verity of their testimonies. As this Court has held:

In sum, the inconsistencies referred to by the defense are inconsequential. The points that mattered most in the eyewitnesses’ testimonies were their presence at the locus criminis, their identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime and their credible and corroborated narration of accused-appellant’s manner of shooting Crisanto Suarez. To reiterate, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor inconsistencies even manifest truthfulness and candor erasing any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

In contrast to the clear and positive identification of Freddie Agrabio and Jose Amador, accused-appellants gave nothing but alibi and denial. They gave only self-serving testimonies, corroborated only by the testimonies of their relatives. As we have held, “[a]libi

becomes less plausible when it is corroborated by relatives and friends who may then not be impartial witnesses.” Alibi is an inherently weak defense and must be rejected when the accused’s identity is satisfactorily and categorically established by the eyewitnesses to the offense, especially when such eyewitnesses have no ill motive to testify falsely. In the case at bar, the defense failed to show that Freddie Agrabio and Jose Amador were motivated by ill will.

Furthermore, accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial cannot be believed as they themselves admitted their proximity to the scene of the crime when the offense occurred. Eddy Paneza testified that, at the time of the incident, he was in Barangay Madarag, a town within the municipality of San Enrique where the robbery took place. On the other hand, Ma. Elena Servando testified that Oscar Servando went with her to gather corn in Sitio Baclayan which is also in the municipality of San Enrique.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the following must be established: (a) the presence of the accused-appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime. These requisites were not fulfilled in this case. Considering that accused-appellants themselves admitted that they were in the same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it cannot be said that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the crime. On the contrary, they were in the immediate vicinity of the area where the robbery took place. Thus, their defense of alibi cannot prosper.

Second. Accused-appellants contend that there can be no finding of conspiracy against them because the prosecution failed to establish their participation in the killing of Rodito Lasap.

This argument is without merit. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused indicating a common purpose, a concert of action, or community of interest. That there was conspiracy in the case at bar is supported by the evidence on record. Freddie Agrabio testified that after shooting the driver, the accused ordered the passengers to give their money and valuables. Although Freddie Agrabio could not specify who among the three divested him of his wallet because he was lying face down on the floor of the jeepney, it is clear that accused-appellants took part in the robbery. Accused-appellant Paneza did not only take valuables from the passengers but also stabbed Freddie Agrabio, hitting the latter on the left elbow. Jose Amador identified both accused-appellants Eddy Paneza as the one who took his wrist watch and wallet while simultaneously pointing a “pinote” at him, and Servando as the one who frisked his waist as he was alighting from the jeepney. Clearly, therefore, accused-appellants cooperated with one another in order to achieve their purpose of robbing the driver and his passengers. “[F]or collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the accused acted in concert showing that they had the same purpose or common design or that they were united in its execution.”

While only Ronnie Agomo-o shot and killed Rodito Lasap, accused-appellants cannot be exonerated. When conspiracy is established, all who carried out the plan and who personally took part in its execution are equally liable. Accused-appellants must both also be held responsible for the death of Rodito Lasap.

Third. Accused-appellants further assert that they cannot be convicted of highway robbery as the crime was not committed by at least four persons, as required in Article 306 of the

Revised Penal Code. However, highway robbery is now governed by P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. This law provides:

Sec. 2. (e). Highway Robbery/Brigandage.¾ The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.

In the case of People v. Puno, it was held that P.D. No. 532 amended Art. 306 of the Revised Penal Code and that it is no longer required that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers. The number of offenders is no longer an essential element of the crime of highway robbery. Hence, the fact that there were only three identified perpetrators is of no moment. P.D. No. 532 only requires proof that persons were organized for the purpose of committing highway robbery indiscriminately. “The robbery must be directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims.” In this case, the accused, intending to commit robbery, waited at the Barangay Mapili crossing for any vehicle that would happen to travel along that road. The driver Rodito Lasap and his passengers were not predetermined targets. Rather, they became the accused’s victims because they happened to be traveling at the time when the accused were there. There was, thus, randomness in the selection of the victims, or the act of committing robbery indiscriminately, which differentiates this case from that of a simple robbery with homicide.

WHEREFORE, Decision is AFFIRMED.

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

R.A 4200

FACTS:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.

ISSUE:

W/N Socorro D. Ramirez is guilty of RA 4200 Anti- wire Tapping Act.

HELD:

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.